in 1836â\200\235. (25>

Though the circumstances under which Ramabulana came to power were unpopular and suspect, this<i¬\202hi¬\202rmm save the Venda chiefs from invasion.

Perhaps the contrary was the case.

In February 1856 Commandant Jan Jacobs "returned from an attack on the stronghold of the Venda Chief Rasikhuthuma in which twenty-five Africans were shot, with 76 head of cattle, 108 sheep and goats, and 13 "jonge kaffers" captured.

The same thing

happened in January 1861 when Michael Buys was sent against "Makakabula" and "brought back 14 'klyn goet'".

When

"Makakabula" sued for peace, Landrost Nicolaas Grobler offered to return the "klyn goetâ\200\235 if the chief "delivered ten tusks to defray the costs of the patrol".<26>

The exchange or payment was

not only imlcnuni, ivory and the like but also in "black ivory". During the annual wars in Zoutpansberg district in the fifties and sixties of timaihast century, African children were brought cmt and disposed of, the average value being about two hundred Rixdollars (£15).

Ramabulana was succeeded by Makhado, a man who later commanded as many as two thousand warriors. But if one considers that in 1879 Mojaji, the rain maker, the queen of the Lobedu, had 10,000 warriors at her disposal, then Makhado's army was not exceptionally big.<26>

This explains why the three battles (1890-94) had made little impression on her.

Also the thirty

independent Tsonga headmen mustered between the some 10,000 warriors in 1879.<27>

But Makhado had other advantages:  $a\200\235$ The gun was the basis of Boer power<miti $\202$ mehigveld ... a 'mystery' of which only he was the master, to be enjoyed by him alone.

And yet by the 1860's so

## D E D I C A T I O N

To the youth of South Africa who, through their actions and thinking are upholding the traditions of resistance narrated in this book.

and their ideology and the masses. This was done because we believe the dichotomy is artificial. To denounce the founding fathers of the ANC as "elitist" and "reformist" and end there is tantamount to doing injustice to our history. This is not how we understand the writing of history. Wishful thinking cannot replace the hard facts of life. Those Africans who managed (under difficult conditions) to get a university (or any other form of educatiohgwere (and are) a pride to our people. By their very existence as a social stratum (without doing anything except working in their professional occupation) they shattered the racist myth of inherent or biological inferiority of the Africans. Some went even beyond that amdjoined the ANC and fought for the improvement of the lot of the Africans. What we are saying is that there is no historical justification for an artificial demarcation between the "ANC of the founding fathers" and the ANC of today. There was development, change and continuity. Our analysis takes these into consideration. We have attempted to situate the history of the ANC in the conéext of the African (continental) approach of the founding fathers of the ANC. There are many examples of this in the book. But one example will suffice. national anthem "Nkosi Sikelel'i Afrika", composed by Enoch Our

In this book we have paid attention to both the leaders 8e gig

Mankayi Sdntonga in 1897 is imbued with these lofty ideals of African unity

- on a continental basis..

It talks of

Africa as a whole (not South Africa) and "¢uphondo lwayo" (its horn) - Somali, Ethiopia etc. - has to be lifted high.

It is written in a poetic language but the message is loud and clear. This continental (African) approach of the ANC does show how the history of the continent influenced and influences the developments in South Africa and how the policy and politics of the ANC have an impact on the developments

set free and returned  $a\200\235homea\200\235$ .

He could not return to Thaba

Mosega, which had been burnt down in the war and which had fresh military associations, but went to a nearby place called Manoge. It was on the night of August 13, 1882, that Sekhukhune was nmrdered by his halfâ\200\224brother, Mampuru, who claimed that he was the lawful king of the Marota and that Sekhukhune had usurped the throne on September 21, 1861, when their father, Sekwati, died. Thereafter Mampuru, fearing arrest, escaped and sought refuge first with Chief Marishane (Masemola) and later with Nyabela,

The Pretoria Boers asked Nyabela to surrender Mampuru for trial on a charge of murder.

Nyabela refused.

King of the Ndebeles.

He said that

Mampuru was in his (Nyabela's) stomaeh.

.Another war broke out

between Nyabela and the Boers.

It raged for

nine months.

Ultimately Nyabela surrendered and gave up Mampuru to the Pretoria Boers.

Marishane, Nyabela and Mampuru were tried in the Pretoria Supreme Court.

On January 23, 1884, Marishane was

sentenced to seven years imprisonment for having granted Mampuru temporary refuge and for  $\hat{a}\200\235$ causing a tumult".

He returned to his

 $\hat{a}\200\230$ village Marishane (Mooifomtein) thereafter to die.

Nyabela was

sentenced to death (later commuted to life imprisonment) on September 22, 1883.

Mampuru was sentenced toci¬\202i¬\201ui¬\202lfor murder and rebellion and was hanged in Pretoria prison on November 22, 1883.

Thus ended one of the stormiest politicoâ\200\224military careers in

our country.

And thus too ended the great  ${\tt Marota\ kingdom.}$ 

Ιt

had been defended bravely.

broad sense this book is a product of the struggles of the people of Southern Africa; it is part of their struggles; it tells their story - a painful but inspiring story. Whilst I was writing this book I kept on thinking about my family, especially my brother Mbuyiselo and my sister Vuyiswa whom we called  $\hat{a}\200\234$ Nokri: whose sacrifices in sending me to school, laid a basis for the ultimate writing of this book. â\200\231 To all I say  $\hat{a}$ \200\224 Thank you. Ningadirvegya na ngomso: â\200\230N (K I will expect you to do the same tomorrow! â\200\235UK b /ZVâ\200\231\ 1\*, INâ\200\234 9/:

Aai~13:â\200\234

\_superiority and a higher Civilisation should not be misused for

the exploitation of man and his destruction but should be umu] for his progress". <34)

Colonialism committed many crimes in South Africa.

The

colonialists' search for land, cattle, raw materials, markets and labour power (which they now monopolise) led them to commit (and they are still committing) almost irreparable damage and unpardonable crimes against our people.

The genocidal wars that

they waged destroyed productive forces, including innumerable human lives, smashed flourishing social systems, ruined the material and spiritual cultures and crushed the self-confidentfz of the African people in South Africa and their philosophy of life.

They obliterated the nascent willâ\200\230and embryonic national consciousness of the peeple;

they introducedxmwrways of

thinking, alien norms of behaviour and foreign cultural valuesâ\200\235
The aim was simple: to inculcate among the African people a
feeling ef inferiority towards and rejection of their own
heritage and potential.

In their devastating wars the

colonialists demolished everything and left nothing but ruins.

In the process of mental enslavement, the missionaries played a significant role.

They introduced formal education, a

[nissionary undertaking'vi¬\202uxae aim was the evangelisation of our people.

The African had to read the Bible, even memorise it, but not interpret it.

Education in these institutions was bookish in the extreme.

Again the aim was simple:

the ideological and

political centre was to be the church rather than the traditional institutions.

At the turn of the century, there was  $\hat{a}\200\235$ dual power $\hat{a}\200\235$  in the rural areas of  $\hat{a}\ani\nderbrack 2011$ Africa  $\hat{a}\$  there was the power of the  $\hat{a}\200\224142$ 

struggle of the Tswana and Sotho to defend their independence dominates ti¬\201uzliistory CH7ti¬\202M3 highveld during this period until 1882.

It is interesting to note that the first wars of resistance fought by the highvehilchmkas were against the British rather than the Boers.

In 1848, the new and ambitious British Governor of 'UMECEpe Colony decided to annex the Boer republics on the highveld on the pretext that the Boers were still British subjects.

After defeating the Boers at Boomplaats, Sir Harry
Smith created the Orange River Sovereignty and unilaterially
repudiated the treaty signed with Moshoeshoe in 1843.

Smith laid

claim to large tracts of the Sothos' best arable land.

The Sotho

refused to accept this patently unjust procedure and prepared to resist.

For three years, the dispute between the Sotho and British raged until, finally, in June 1851 the British tried tr) cut the gordian knot by invading Lesotho.

They were met by

£kï¬\201ï¬\202m>armies at Viervoort, beaten and forced to withdraw.

The

following year, three British columns commanded by Cathcart marched into the Sotho kingdom.

At the Battle of Berea<m1

December 20, 1852, the Sotho with 6,000 gun wielding cavalry routed the three British columns and drove them out.

The Sotho victories of 1851 and 1852 were largely due to generalship rather than weapons.

Though armed with guns,ii¬\201ma

traditional spears and Sotho battle axe won the day.

A squad of

British Lancers, trapped in a pass at Berea, was practically annihilated by warriors armed only with these.

Cathcart and the

British colonial office then decided to abandon Smith's abortive scheme to annex the area beyond the Orange River.

~66â\200\224

learnt how to handle and maintain their weapons.

In this manner,

Sekwati built up a stockpile of guns to offset.ti¬\202u2ciisparity in arms between his people and the Boers.

Sechele, like Moshoeshoe,

struggled to acquire the skills possessed by the Boers and encouraged the British missionary, David Livingstone, to set up a mission station in his lands.

He himself learnt to read and

write and was baptised a Christian in 1848.

Through adventurers

and traders who regularly passed through his lands en route to the north, he stockpiled firearms and ammunition.

The Boers lmui formed an impression of weakness on the part of the African chiefdoms.

To increase the labour supply to their

farms, they moved to extend their forced labour systantx>the independent clans beyond their boundaries.

The Boers' Volksraad

(parliament) passed laws empowering their military commanders to seize captives duringlnilitary expeditions and share these out amongst farmers as "apprentices" â\200\224 in reality, stMxL Orphans and foundlings in the Boer state could also be pressed into this \_ form of service and African parents could sell their children into "apprenticeshipâ\200\235 in return for a fee.

This system, made for

abuse and Ixxmilted in Boer farmers waging  $a\200\235$ unofficial $a\200\235$  military campaigns against Africans and capturing slaves.

African parents

on Boer farms and in the locations were also browbeaten and bullied into barting with their children by "selling" them to Boer families.

In the Boers' mode of reasoning, their state had inherited that of the Ndebele by right of conquest.

As such the

'Tswana euui Sotho had become their vassals, with obligations such

as paying tax, submitting to the forced labour system and fighting on behalf of the Boers when their state required it. The  $^{\sim}65^{\sim}$ 

yields obtained from this new grain made it possible to relax the usual rigour of the labour intensive system of cultivation and in turn created an explosion in population growth.

'The politimizal structure of Nguni society had taken account of such possibilities.

Traditionally, when the population of a

principality outgrew the tightly knit clan structures, one means of adjusting to this growth was fission.

This option became less

feasible after the introduction of maize.

The chiefs had

acquired a vested interest in the expansion and control of the trade and a chief with a few followers became vulnerable to attack by more powerful rivals.

Division thus became a less

attractive option to both chiefs and their subjects.

An\_opposite

tendency now asserted itself.

To COpe with population expansion

and to become effective contenders in the struggle to control the trade, chiefs strove to build larger political.inyits out of the separate clans and peoples.

The chief antagonists in the struggle for hegemony were the Ndwandwe, led by their chief Zwide, and the smaller Mthethwa clan under Dingiswayo.

The Ndwandwe were at the centre of a clustem' of clans and peeples that had coalesced around the leadership of Zwide and made him their king.

'Phese formerly independent

peoples had either adhered to Zwide through persuasion or had been impressed into the alliance by military force.

It was

Zwide's practice to distinguish between these two types by allowing the voluntary adherents to retain a number of their ancient rights and prerogatives.

The growth of the Ndwandwe

kingdom raised new political problems.

In the past, neighbours

were usually related and jointly shared lands allocated to their

-38-

professed to be sympathetic to the Sotho and critical of the Boers. This act was followed by a series of soâ\200\224calhuitxeaties nmrking the â\200\235boundariesâ\200\235 of Lesotho: the Napier Treaty of 1843, the Maitland Treaty of 1845, the Smith Treaty of 1848 and the Warden "linesâ\200\235 of 1849.

All these "agreements" represented a steady deterioration in the position of the Sotho and a shrinking of their territory.

Sir Harry Smith, the Cape Governor and High Commissioner for "South Africa", established the Orange River Sovereignty in 1848 and annexed to the Crown the lands of Adam Kok's Griquas, the Sotho of Moshoeshoe and all other peoples inhatdjxhug the region between the Orange, the Vaal and the Drakensberg.

Major Warden,

a former officer of the Cape Corps, a Coloured regiment with white officers, had been appointed British Resident to Trans-Orangia in 1845.

The Boers rebelled against this and rose

in.revolt under Andries Pretorius who advanced with a thousand men on Bloemfontein, expelled Warden from the capital, enui summoned Moshoeshoe to meet him there.

Moshoeshoe refused.l Sir

Harry Smith marched from Cape Town with 700 men and obtained Griqua reinforcements.

August 1848.

The Boers, the Sovereignty officials and the Cape government kept on drawing  $a\200\235$ new boundaries" for Lesotho,lxnumMries which would deprive Moshoeshoe of more than a hundred villages and several thousands of Sotho subjects, including the members of his brother Posholi's village at Vechtkop.

Early in 1849, the Tlokwa

attacked Thaba Bosiu and were again repulmaitw'Moshoewumzand his allies, the Taung of Chief Moletsane.

The raids continued.

«89\*

Ngqika's veterans who were killed were, Jotelo, ti¬\201mz<grandfather of Rev. Tiyo Soga; Ntoyi, the father of Tyhala who 1ntor becnmn A senior councillor; and Qhukwana.

Ngqika's armies were routed and

he was forced to flee to Winterberg.

From there he dispatomai

one Hermanus Xogomeshe Matroos to seek help from the British.

Somerset responded five months later when he sent Lt.Col.

Brereton to invade the land of the Xhosa.

Brereton attacked

Ndlambe and his allies in December 1818.

After capturing 23,000

head of cattle, he retreated across the Fish River.

Ngqika

received 9,000 of these as his share of the plunder.

There were a number of skirmishes between Xhosa warriors and colonial troops between December 1818 and Marohâ\200\230HTHL.

1819, Ndlambe decided to launch a counterâ\200\224offensive.

Dividing

In April

his armies into two sections, one commanded by himself, the other under the joint command of Makhanda and his eldest son, Mdushane, Ndlambe marched his column west and crossed the Fish River early in.April.

They moved into the Zuurveld and fell upon the Boer settlers' farms and drove them out of the area as far as Graaf Reinet.

The second column, under Makhanda and Mdushane, assembled in the forest on the east bank of the Fish River in preparation for a march southâ\200\224west towards Algoa Bay. Makhanda's objective was the chain of forts constructed along the west bank of the Fish River after the war of 1812. Grahamstown was timarmain fort in this chain.

As was customary,

Makhanda sent a defiant challenge to the British commander, Col. Wiltshire, advising him that his forces would attack on April 22.

Wiltshire mistook the challenge as mere bravado and took his nmmning ride as usual on the  $\hat{A}$  22nd.

He realised the gravity of

1

-33-

Amathole mountains, where he was joined by'tktthaalderâ\200\2305£fter the bombardment of Fort Armstrong.

From this mountain fortress they

carried out raids and guerilla attacks harassing the British troops who tried to occupy the plains below.

Uithaalder also

tried to enlist the support of Adam Kok and other Griqua chiefs whom he invited to send forces to defend what little remained of Khoiâ\200\224khoi/Coloured independence.

Kok was unwilling to assist in

this unequal struggle, perhaps because he was engaged in his own TTansâ\200\2240rangian battlesemuitmmed to win British support against the Boers on the highveld.

For 18 months the joint

Xhosa-Coloured armies held the British at bay.

Sir Harry Smith,

who had precipitated the war, was removed from his office as Governor in March 1852, to be replaced by General Cathcart. The tide began to turn against their resistance in October 1852.

The British had managed to reinforce their garrisons holed

1m; in the forts for most of the war and from here they launched
savage scorched-earth campaigns to starve the African armies into
submission.

i¬\202i¬\202ua final stroke came in March 1853, when the British forces stormed Maqoma's stronghold on the AmaThole Mountains.

Rather than surrender, General Willem Uithaalder withdrew with his men to the slopes of the Drakensberg above Natal from where he waged a low intensity guerilla war against the British untilrï¬\201tsdeath.

Maqoma negotiated terms with

Cathcart.

Cathcart ordered that all the Rharhabe clans be removed to the Khobusi river and reinstated the resident magistrates.

The Kat River Settlement was dismembered for

rebellion and its lands sold off to white settlers.

Andries

Botha, who had been captured, was tried for treason and sentenced  $200\22482^{\sim}$ 

recruited from the diamond diggings in Kimberley.

The Lydenburg

area was said to hold large deposits of gold, diamonds and other precious minerals.

This attracted them.

That is why Von

Schlieckmann voluntarily headed the Lydenburg Volunteer Corps.

They fought fiercely.

They wanted to avenge the defeat of

President Burgers.

They lost.

Von Schlieckmann was killed in

battle on November 17, 1876.

He was succeeded by Aflred Aylward,

an Irishman.

Then there came the British.

On April 12, 1877, Sir

Theophilus Shepstone annexed the Transvaal.

The pretext was that

the Boer Republic which had failed to "pacify" the BaPedi threatened by its very existence and weakness, to destabilise the British colonies of the Cape and Natal.

It is interesting to

note the change of position of the British.

Up to 1877 they

"supportedâ\200\235 Sekhukhune's attitude to the Boers, which was that his kingdom fell outside the jurisdiction of Pretoria.

however,

after the British Annexation of the Transvaal (April, 1877)

British attitudes changed: now Sekhukhune's country was included

in the new British territory.

Sekhukhune could not accept this new British position. By

March 1878, chnmm; ci war were beating again in Sekhukhuneland -

this time it was against the British.

Captain Clarke who was sent to subdue Sekhukhune was routed with heavy loss of life and barely escaped with his life at

Magnet Hills.

After this first British failure to subdue Sekhukhune, a fully equipped force of 1,800 men under Colonel Rowlands made another attempt, from August until October 1878, to reduce Sekhukhune to submission.fi $\neg$ 202m2nmssion failed (again with  $\sim$ 111â\200\224

settler farms an opportunity to rise in revolt.

They seized

weapons, horses and wagons and decamped en masse to join the

Stuurmans who were fighting in alliance with the Xhosa.

Fighting with skill, ti¬\202m2jcdnt Khoi-khoiâ\200\224Xhosa armies drove all

the settlers out of the Graaf Reinet district.

The thtni)&m\$a War of Resistance emerging as it did with

the revolt of the Eastern Cape Khoi-khoi was the first example of

unity, interâ\200\224ethnic unity, during these anti-colonial wars.

Ndlambe, as the most senior Xhosa chief was given command of

Xhosa armies, while on the Khoiâ\200\224khoi side the command was shared

by Klaas Stuurman, Boezak and Trompeter.

The fighting skills of

their Khoi-khtd.erllies who rode horses and were proficient

marksmen, helped register a number of early victories for the

African side.

In june 1799, a joint Xhosa-Khoi-khoi army of 150

men routed a Boer commando of some 300.

This victory struck

terror into the hearts of the Boer settlers and rumours that Cape

Town itself might come under attack spurred the British governor,

Dundas, to dispatch Maynier to the fighting zone.

Maynier's

mission was to try'euui split the Khoi-khoi-Xhosa alliance.

Не

tried to buy off the Khoiâ\200\224khoi leaders by promising reforms on

time settler farms and offering land grants to their commanders.

These terms were rejected with the contempt they deserved by

Stuurman, Boezak and Trompeter.

After a short lull, between 1800

and 1801, the fighting escalated again.

During the following

year, 470 settler homesteads were laid.waste by the resisters.

A new commander was appointed to head the settler commandoes, one

Van der Walt, who had won renown during the sweeps that drove the

San out of their mountain bases.

In February 1802, Van der Walt

-25\_

Sekhukhune and Pedi Resistance

Sekhukhune was king of the Marota people, commonly known as BaPedi.

The BaPedi originated from the BaKgatla.ci¬\201fti¬\202me Western Transvaal.

Sekhukhune built his kingdom byemi¬\202xuing into diplomatic marriages with various peoples, by admitting refugees into his kingdom and by military conquest.

By the middle of the

19th Century, the BaPedi had become a kingdom, uniting the disparate people in the area under a common loyalty.

Sekhukhune's father Sekwati (1775â\200\2241861) resisted the arrival of Hendrik.£ki¬\202xgieter and the Voortrekkers.

In 1838 he defeated

the Voortrekkers at a famous battle at Phsiring where he established his stronghold on a hill from which his warriors rolled stones down to push back the advancing invaders.

Because

Phsiring was insecure, Sekwati moved his headquarters to Thama Moseya(fighting koppie) in the Lulu Mountains of the Eastern Transvaal.

Claiming to have purchased the land from the Swazis, the
Boers sought txncaxpel the Marota from the land east of the
Tubatse (the so-called Steelport) River.

They were rebuffed.

This was in 1846.

iNmM1there arose conflicts with Dr Alexander

Merensky (1837â\200\2241917), Superintendent of the Berlin Missionary Society who was expelled in 1865 "for activities that were deemed to be subversive of Sekhukhune's authority and favourable to the Pretoria Boersâ\200\235.<21>

He disappeared to Bochabelo, near

Middelburg where he established a mission station and a school of that name.

Johannes Dinkoanyane, Sekhukhune's half-brother, had become

refused to ransom him but instead had him put to death as a dangerous threat to his power.

After the death of Dingiswayo,

the Mthethwa army thrustcmmaci¬\201 its ablest military commanders, Shaka, the "illegitimateâ\200\235 son of Senzangakhona, chief of the small Zulu trike which Dingiswayo had absorbed, into the leadership of the kingdom.

Shaka was a military genius of rare quality.

He retained

Dingiswayo's age-rankxnilitary system but devised new military tactics, ?stcï¬\202iief innovation being the introduction of a short stabbing spear to replace the throwing lance.

He drilled his

army in new military formations and applied the concept of total war with devastating impact on most of the clans and kingdoms in the region.

Upon succeeding Dingiswayo, his principal objective was tt> avenge his benefactor's death and dismember tge kingdom Zwide had built.

He tried in 1818, but the war ended in a standâ\200\224off.

Pk;

therefore tmunuai to diplomacy to undermine Zwide's kingdom from within.

His main target was a young chief, Mzilikazi, the son of Mashobane of the Khumalo clan, who had been brought up in Zwide's household and had been placed at the head of the clan by thi¬\202a who was responsible for his father's death.

Shaka persuaded

rmzilikazi to accept his overlordship in return for a large measure of autonomy over clan affairs.

When Zwide renewed hostilities against Shaka in 1820, he was lured deep into Shaka's territory and routed at quikoli.liill on the Mhlatuze River.

The retreating Ndwandwe army was unable to preventiï¬\201mzinvasion of their homebase and the rest fled north

towards Maputo under the leadership of three generals,

-40..

Moshoeshoe decided in October 1853 to athm $\ensuremath{\text{in}}\ensuremath{\text{Noshoeshoe}}\ensuremath{\text{Noshoeshoe}}\ensuremath{\text{old rival}}\ensuremath{\text{Sekonyela}}.$ 

He stormed Sekonyela's mountain stronghold and forced

him to flee with a handful of followers.

There was another problem:

the other enemy of Moshoeshoe  $\hat{a}\200\224$ 

the Boers, who were becoming more active.

Josias Hoffman, the

first President of the Orange Free State, was a friend of Kimg Moshoeshoe.

Hoffman admitted that the Warden Line was unjust to Moshoeshoe.

This displeased Hoffman's opponents who staged a coup and removed him from office in February 1855 and installeml their man, Jacobus Boshof.

Sir George Grey, the new Governor and

High Commissioner, supported Boshof who imposed on the Sotho the Emuthfield "Agreement" of October 1855, which provided for pass regulations, procedures for recovering stolen stock, a ban on trespassing, etc.

fMuaCMange Free State had a white population

of less ti¬\201mniâ\200\23013,000 while Lesotho had 100,000 inhabitants.

But

the whites owned at least ten times as many horses, five times as many cattle and 25 times as many small  $stock'Uuniti¬\201maBaSotho$ .

They wanted more. Moshoeshoe knew this.

He tried to look for

allies among the Xhosa, Hlubi and Griqua chiefs.

The Xhosa were

not in a position to respond because of the Nongqawuse affair.

The Boers attacked in March 1958.

They killed, looted

villages, including those of the French mission at Beersheba and Morija, and advanced towards Thaba Bosiu.

Moshoeshoe gave orders

that the Sotho should refrain from a direct assault:

 $a\200\235$ When the Boers began their siege of the mountain fortress in May, the Sotho regiments had swept round them and were raiding border farms far and wide, \_.91.~

fate which befell the other African occupied areas of South Africa when they were incorporated in the provinces.

Masupha held out against this new deal struck between Letsie and the colonialists for two years.

Finally in 1886 he

approached the resident commissioner to post a magistrate in his district. This symbolic surrender ended the last phase of the Gun War.

The resistance put up by Masupha had forced the Cape to abandon Lesotho and had also managed to win back some of the powers the chiefs lost with annexation to the Cape.

He failed to

attain his primary objective, the restoration of Sotho independence.

The Gun War won a respite for the Sotho people but was unable to save them from the effects of the industrial revolution overtaking South Africa in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries.

When Letsie died in 1891, his son Lerotholi succeeded him to the Sotho throne.

Masupha himself died in 1899, the year

during which the war  $a\200\224$  the Angloa $200\224$ Boer War  $a\200\224$  which would decide the fate of South Africa, began.

It took another six decades of

struggle before Sotho independence was restored.

The Battle of Isandhlwana

The first chiefdom to be victimised for owning arms was the Hlubi of Natal, led by Langalibalele.

The British governor of

Natal, Pine, ordered that the Hlubi register their firearms in 1873.

Langalibalele correctly perceived that this was the first step towards  $\hat{a}\200\235$ disarmament $\hat{a}\200\235$  and refused.

Rather than face the

colonialist army in an unequal combat, he resolved to retreat

took the field with a troop of 300 settlers and a company of  $\frac{200}{224}$  western Cape.

His first military engagements proved disastrous as did his later battles in May and August that year.

Van der Walt was killed in

an ambush in August 1802.

Both the Xhosa and the Khoi $\hat{a}$ 200\224khoi armies suffered setbacks in the latter part of 1802.

A Xhosa force attacked a laager and was

broken after fierce fighting in September; Klaas Stuurman fell in battle during the same month.

In Dececember, his brother, David,

was defeated by a company of British soldiers assisted by Boer settlers at Langekloofemuisï¬\202mmtiy thereafter Boezak was beaten on the banks of the Oliphant River.

Eï¬\202uï¬\202a.Marks in a different

context eriticises the Oxford History <6> which suggests that the commando system was more effective against the San than the Xhosa  $\frac{200}{224}$   $\frac{200}{235}$  in fact it was probably ineffective in both cases.

ZN: took

the arrival of the British troops both on the northernemui eastern frontier to tip the balance of power in favour of the white man". <6>

When peace was finally restored in 1803, the new governor of the Cape, which that year reverted back to Dutch control, was forced to recognise the achievements of the resisters.

The Xhosa

and the Khoi $a\200\224$ khoi were allowed to keep $a\200\230$ all the livestock seized durdJm; the warn

'Phis amounted to 50,000 head of cattle, 50,000 sheep and 1,000 horses.

The third Xhosa War of Resistance and the Khoinuï¬\202.revolt had definitely rolled back the eastward expansion of the settler colony and won a valuable respite for the Khoiâ\200\224khoi who would otherwise have been totally displaced from the area.

Shula Marks

"Although I do not like war and am afraid of its consequent horrtnxs, I cannot consent to buy the lives of my people with country belonging to them, where they were tmnni, where their forefathers were born likewise; besides I know of no country where they could go".<13> Moshoeshoe died on 11 March 1870.

He had become the

physical and spiritual centre of his people's resistance; a unifier and builder of Sotho people.

The struggle of the Sotho people continued.

Moorosi, born

in about 1790, was to be the man destined to continue Moshoeshoe's fight.

Moorosi was chief of the BaPhuthi clan, who

luni¬\202 become tributaries cd'the Sotho kingdom during the years of the Difaqane.

The clan had loyally discharged all its obligations tx>zits Sotho allies in subsequent years.

They

supplied the Sotho with horses; fought as their allies in all the wars with. $tin\202u21\&ritish$  and the Boers, and participated as junior partnersznithe peace negotiations.

Both parties to this

arrangement accepted that the Phuthi were an independent entity, retaining all its traditional rights and prerogatives, ixu:luding autonomy ixizits internal political arrangements.

However, when

Lesotho became a British protectorate in 1868, the lands of the Phuthi vmnna incorporated without their consent.

This grievance

rankled and was exacerabed by British attempts to curtail and reduce the chiefly powers of Moorosi, particularly after the administration of Lesotho was taken over by the Cape colonial government in 1870.

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Amongst the political leaders of the Kat River Settlement, were men like Willem Uithaalder, a veteran of the Cape Corps who had served in all the preceding wars; Andries Botha, a veteran of the Cape Mounted Rifles who had been made one of the captains of the Kat River colony.

Besides these were the Christianised educated Coloured youths, products of the mission.stations at Shiloh and Bethelsdorp.

These were all modernists who had imbibed and come to accept the values of European "enlightenment", including its teachings of democracy and self~government.

They all nursed a bitter sense of national grievance against the white settlers, whose racial bigotry sought to exclude them from the full benefits of the commercial farming they engaged in, and against the British colonial administration which they began to perceive had used them as cannon fodder against the independent African kingdoms but was now ready to betray them to the untender mercies of the white settlers.

After the outbreak of the War in December 1850, Hermanus was amongst the first to join forces with the Xhosa.

On the morning

of January 6, 1851, he led a daring attack on Fort Beaufort.

.Acting CH1 intelligence reports that the greater part of the garrison would be outside the Fort that day, he hoped to capture the Fort and thus deny the British its future use.

Unfortunately, his sources proved unreliable and the British had made preparations for just such an eventuality.

When the assault

began, Matroos' men were decimated by fire from behind the British fortifications.

He himself was killed during the battle.

His corpse, i¬\202mnulcmtside the Fort after the withdrawal of his men, was placed in the market place until it rotted.

~80â\200\224

land at Algoa Bay.

The British governor and his staff decided to  $\mbox{txi} \mbox{$^{20}$ue the war across the Fish River on February 7th.}$ 

Three

British columns forded the river at three separate points in an attempt to drive the Xhosa back across the Keiskama.

Magoma and his commander had anticipated a massive invasion.

Their strategy was one of defence in depth accompanied by harassment and ambuscades that would wear down the morale of the British troops.

The Xhosa were rarely seen by the British troops and their settler auxiliaries, then they would suddenly Spring out of the bush, inflict some casualty, then as swiftly disappear into the bushy terrain.

Smith and hisnnen began systematically plundering African cattle.

"This Kaffir war is nothing else than

looking foremuiljfting cattle", Smith wrote to his wife.

When

this tack failedq ti¬\202ua villages were burned down and homesteads sacked, but the elusive enemy continued to deny the British a chance to use their technical superiority.

D'Urban at this point, resolved to bring the war to a quick finish by invading the kingdom of the Xhosa King, Hintsa, on the pretext that as Ngqika and Ndlambe were his subjects, he was ultimately responsible for the war.

Hintsa's reign as king started in troubled times.

Within

his own kimmnhmn, the threat of total fission loomed large until the 1820's.

When this threat passed, new problems descended upon him frtmiti¬\202ua refugees fleeing the armies of Shaka and Matiwane. Hintsa had allowed missionaries, traders, and in 1828 the British troops to enter his territory and repel the Ngwane.

Among these

missionaries was one Rev. John Ayliff, who had emigrated to South

Africa with the 182? settlers.

Ayliff arrived in Hintsa lands in
-51-

raiders or traders.

The San kept up a low intensity guerilla war

against the settlers in the Bokkeveld and Camdebo districts.

In

the 1770's this escalated into big raids during which the San made off with some 700 head of cattle and more than 2,000 sheep. The San guerillas had by this time mastered the art of riding and had acquired small stocks of firearms, which they used to great effect.

Fighting in terrain they had occupied since

â\200\230time immemorial.enui unencumbered by the paraphenalia associated with technically sophisticated armies, they could move swiftly across the mountain ranges and veld, striking at moments of their choosing, then melting back into the terrain.

GHua raids of the

late 1770's so disheartened the Dutch settlers that many abandoned their farms in the Bokkeveld and Camdebo for more secure areas.

Here too, they found the farmers reluctant to

leave their farms to go out on commando raids for fear that the
guerillas would attack their homes during their absence.

Emboldened by their successes, the San began attacking in

large groups and almost succeeded in driving the settlers fnmn

the area around Swellendam.

In response to this crisis the DEIC

commander called out a general commando to make sweeping cmerations to drive the San out of their bases in the mountain caves.

The Dutch managed to persuade Jager Afrikaaner, a Namaqua chief, to assist them against the San.

Using Afrikaaner's

Khoi $\hat{a}\200\224$ khoi scouts, the DEIC commander, Maynier, systematically searched out the San guerillas and massacred them by the hundreds.

Maynier owed his successes to a basic weakness in the San's military strategy.

As guerilla raiders, the San had sunmJimed by

-17\_

Khoiâ\200\224khoi from the Dutch settlement.

The lands seized during the

war were shared out amongst newly landed settlers.

By 1679, the

Dutch settlement had penetrated as deep as the Hex River Valley.

The defeat of Ngquonema and his people achieved two vital objectives for the Dutch.

One of the wealthiest clans: Ulthe

western Cape had been crushed and forced to accept Dutch overlordship as symbolised by the tribute they pahi¬\202.

Tte

intimidatory effect on the other peophes thus gave the settlers greater control over the Khoi $\hat{a}$ 200\224khoi.

The European/Khoiâ\200\224khoi interaction moved into its fourth phase after 1679 when Simon van der Stel arriwaian:the Cape as commander.

\kulder Stel was determined to bring the Khoiâ\200\224khoi permanently under Dutch control, by diplomacy if possible, by war if necessary.

By this time, the Cape clans had.tmwmirnilitarily crushed or dispersed and those on the outskirts of the colony had become less assertive in their relations vi¬\202ii¬\2021 the Dutxi¬\201i. Simon

van der Stel wanted to formalise this arrangements by converting all these into tribute paying dependents.

His first step was to

claim the right of adjudication in intra-Khoiâ\200\224khoi disputes.

Не

followed this up with the power of consent  $tt>fir\201u31^{\kappa}hoi$  chiefly successions.

The subordination of the Khoi-khoicï¬\202ï¬\201eï¬\201doms was formalised by Van der Stel, who gave each new chief a copper headed cane of office as a mark of their new relationship with the DEIC.

It was during this time that the Dutch adopted the practice of giving their client chiefs European names.

The next phase of Van der Stel's  $\hat{a}\200\235$ reforms $\hat{a}\200\235$  was dispensing with the services of Khoi~khoi brokers in the cattle trade. Dohra, renamed Klaas by Van der Stel, chief of the Chainoqua had  $\hat{a}\200\230$ 

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Moorosi's remains, such as they were, were later buried on the mountain  $200\224$  tob which today bears his name  $200\224$  Thaba Moorosi.

The rest of the Phuthi people were distributed as labourers amongst the white settler farms of the Cape and the Cape Government formally dissolved the Phuthi chieftaincy.

The struggle continued, now led by the direct descendants of Moshoeshoe.

Ntwa ya Dithunya (or Gun War) is the name the Sotho gave tx>ea rebellixnu led by two of Moshoeshoe's descendants, his third son Masupha, and Lerotholi, his grandson in 1880.

After assisting the Cape in suppressing the Phuthi, the Sotho were ignominiously betrayed by their former allies.

Taxes levied by the Cape were

Everything seemed normal.

regularly paid and so long as the resident magistrates respected the authorityremf the Sotho chiefs, they gave their cooperation. The threat of "disarmament" caused a great deal of disquiet amongst the people, and it finally drove them into Open rebellion.

The Sotho had begun stockpiling firearms during Moshoeshoe's reign.

'Nuacmmning up of the diamond mines made it easier for them to build up their arsenals.

YoungIMNIjoinedtnpcxlthree

month contracts to earn enough to buy a gun.

The guns thus

represented long hours of arduous labour, under the most brutalising canditions, and their owners were understandably reluctant to part with them.

To the traditional leaders, guns

represented insurance against attack by the Free State Boers, the Sotho's  $lrnuy\hat{a}\200\224$ standing enemies.

 $a\200\235$ Disarmament" would thus render

the Sotho helpless and totalLy<jependeht on the British in matters of defence.

the warriors" for war.

The stage was now set for armed conflict,

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liltté Sengttnnlxcr â\200\23018E30.

Alarmed by the developments in Lesotho, the Cape government sent troops to garrison the magistracies of Lescmi¬\201up.

When they

crossed the Orange River, Masupha attacked thetuihmwiand drove it to Maseru, which he then besieged.

Simultaneously, other

rebel Sotho troops blockaded the magistracies.

The siege lasted

seven months, during which the Cape was forced to feed not only its own troops and civil servants, but also the hundreds of loyalists who flocked to these strongâ\200\224points.

Lerotholi, in the

meantime, struck at the reinforcing columns in lightning guerilla raids, harassing and disintegrating them.

As the cost of the war

rose, the Cape government became more amenabbetx>a.negotiata $i = \sqrt{202}$  settlement.

In April 1881 the Cape government produced a formula which would allow the Sotho to keep their guns but at the same time force them to accept responsiblity for the war damage inflicted. LerothoLirmd fought to retain Sotho firearms.

When this

objective had been attained, he was willing to return to the status quo ante.

Masupha, on the other hand, had hoped the werâ $\200\231$  could reâ $\200\224$ establish Sotho independence.

He rejected the

settlement,cni¬\202y'relenting when his counsellors warned him that rash action could result in his defeat.

The Cape demanded 5,000

head of cattle as compensation from the Sotho in addition to individual claims from traders and mission stations that had

sustained damage during the seven month war.

The second phase of the Gun War commenced shortly after the Cape's troops were withdrawn.

It brought about a breach between

~100~

warriors then retreated into the mountain forests, making periodic raids on British lives.

Frustrated by these tactics

the British, assisted by Boer commandoes and their recently acquired African allies, raided and sacked homesteads in the plains.

TWmachestruction of their homesteads made the Xhosa sue for terms.

Sandile accepted responsiblity for the losses suffered by the colonialists and undertook to make restitutbmq. Shortly thereafter, a new British column with 300 African auxiliaries marched to Sandile's capital to arrest him.

Не

escaped before they reached it and took refuge in the forests  $a\200\230$ with his troops.

Ihxmn here, he once again sent out.feelers for termseumiwas eventually given a safe conduct assurance which persuaded him to come to the British camp to negotiate new terms. On arrival in the British camp, Sandile, Ynislmrothers, and their councillors were shackled and transporteï¬\2021x>CHahamstown where they were imprisoned.

The author of this despicable trick

 $\hat{a}\200\230$ was Col. Harry Smith, now endowed with a knighthood after his exploits in India.

With the leaders of Rharhabe safely out of the way, SHUJHI implemented the plans he and D'Urban had devised

10 years earlier.

All the land between the Kei and Keiskama was annexed; Sandile's capital was removed from the Amathole Mountains to Khobusi; new treaties were imposed on all the Xhosa chiefs, stripping them of their judicial powers, and a BritiSh state official was placei¬\202 with each chief to control and limit his political actions.

Once the system was installed, Smith released his prisoners.

On arrival on the Khobusi River, Sandile found one

Calderwood, a British magistrate, attached tx311is capital.

Two

~73-

By 1825, Mzilikazi built a new capital at Mhlahlandlela on on the banks of the Crocodile River.

By adapting the political

techniques he had learnt from Zwide and Shaka to his own purposes, Mzilikazi set about building his own kingdom.

Settlement and building a kingdom brought atmnn:ea complete transformation of the community.

Flight from the Zulu had

disrupted the former unity of the Khumalo clan.

Thousands of the

original group had perished in battle and in the bitter highveld winters.

The survivors had been forced to makfzsmaift progress, carving anlaa path with the weapons, through hostile territory.

Only the fittest had survived the rigours of migration.

For two

years on the highveld, the Khumalos had been unable to sow grain and lived by raiding or occupying the towns or Villages of their adversaries.

They had attached to themselves the women and young children of defeated clans and absorbed groups of Nguni refugees who joined thenlcniti¬\202ue highveld.

By the time they reached the

Crocodile River, the clan was Khumalo in name only.

Their common

bond was ti¬202uaLr allegiance to Mzilikazi which they recognised by referring to themselves.as  $a^200^235Mzilikazi's$  people".

Their Sotho

enuiâ\200\230rswana neighbours called them "Matebele", a name they later adOpted, changing it slightly to "Ndebele".

After 1825, Mzilikazi tried to live at peace with his neighbours, using military force only when he felt obliti¬\201ui to do so in defence of his interests.

He was content to receive

tribute from the Tswana and did not insist on incorporation.

1830, the Ndebele kingdom dominated the western highveld covering some 30,000 squareinibes.

Its southern boundary was the Vaal

River.

society in the Cape had forced thousands to become labourers and serfs (Mi settler finnns.

Thomy who tried to retain some measure

of independence had crowded around tmernission stations, hiring themselves out as day labourers or engaging in lumbering and wagon.driving to keep alive.

In 1829, at the suggestion of the missionaries and liberals in the Cape, the colonial administration had set up the Kat River Settlement as an experiment in assimilating the Khoiâ\200\224khoi and Coloureds of the Eastern Cape.

The settlement was also viewed as a military colony which.cxnhui serve as a buffer against the Xhosa on whose land it was established.

During the war of 1835, ti¬\202ua Kat River

Coloureds had fought hard on the side of the British colonialists and a number of their leaders had been rewarded for their services.

Amongst these were Hermanus Xogomeshe Matroos, of half Khoiâ\200\224khoi-Xhosa parentage.

Matroos had grown up amongst his mother's people, the Rharhabes, livdmm;\yith them until 1813, the year after Ndlambe was eXpelled from the Zuurveld.

On leaving home, he sought work

on settler farms where he learnt Afrikaans am $\n^2021hm\n^2202ish$ , adding these to Xhosa and Khoiddu $\n^202u$ 

He subsequently returned home in

about 1817, vi¬\202umn he came to Ngqika's notice.

He became an

interpreter in Ngqika's capital, serving the chief well in negotiations MHJHl the British.

He remained with Ngqika for the

next three years before moving to live $\hat{a}\200\230$ with Maqoma on the banks of the Kat River.

Shortly before Maqoma's eviction from the area, he entered the service of the colonialists in which

capacity he fought during the war of 1835.

For his services,

 $\ensuremath{\text{D'Urban}}$  gave him a farm in the Foqt Beaufort area.

Here he grew

~â\200\231/;-

Ι

converted into a Khoi $a\200\224$ khoi/Coloured settlement $a\200\235$  vi $\202$ iich could act as an additional buffer between the Xhosa and the colony.

Α

number of Coloured and Khoi $\hat{a}\200\224$ khoi veterans from the puppet Cape Mounted Rifles and Cape Corps were setthalixxthe district with their families.

The settlement was organised as a military colony, headed by captains and veld-cornets.

The Authorities

provided them with weapons and regularly supplied them with ammunition to defend themselves.

In its original concepthmiti¬\201mrKat River settlement was an experiment in â\200\235acculturationâ\200\235.

The missionaries hoped to

encourage the displaced Khoi $\hat{a}$ \200\224khoi and other Coloured people in the Eastern Cape to become commercial farmers.

If successful the

project would become a pole of attraction, drawing other Africans out of their traditional societies and thus assist in christianising them.

Its immediate effect was to create a new source of tension between the Xhosa and the colony.

The displaced Xhosa were never willing to accept their evicticuL.

'They complained bitterly about its blatant injustice
but were restrained from taking any action by tfmarnissionaries,
Dr John Phillip and James Read Snr.

'Nua situation deteriorated

when Tyali was also evicted to placate the insistent voices<mf the settlers.

Again, the missionaries counselled restraint and promised tc>smi¬\201i¬\202< constitutional redress for these grievances by taking up the matter with Whitehall.

As the tensions mounted, a cycle of raids started, piling up the dry tinder for the spark of war.

In December 1834, a company

of British soldiers tracking  $200\235$ stolen cattle" camped overnight outside the homestead of Chief Xhoxho, a brother of Maqoma's.

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(Hudstians gained the impression that there was a fundamental difference between the local settlers and the British Government in London.

Thenceforth, they sought to bypass the local colonial administration and appeal directly to London when they experienced an injustice.

This notion was to exercise a decisive

influence on the political thinking of African converts.

The white settlers reacted to the repudiation of D'Urban's

Many had pinned their hOpes on

treaty with dismay and anger.

extending the area of white occupation through the annexation of the lands west of the Kei.

An additional source of grievance for

the Boers was the emancipation of slaves decreed thrt $i^2$ 202ue British in 1834i200\235

Zhn'protest against what they regarded as "oppressiveâ\200\235 and "indecisive" British rule, some 14,000 Boers, men, women and children, accompanied by their servants, migrated out of the Cape in what became known as the Great Trek.

The Great Trek differed

from previtnnsxnigrations by the Boers.

The steady extension of

the Cape colonial boundaries had been a piecemeal process undertaken by scattered groups of traders, hunters and cattle raisers.

The Great Trek, on the other hand, was an organised affair, consciously undertaken by the Boers to conquer African lands beyond the reach of the British colonial administration.

The Thxi¬\202< began.illâ\200\2301836, reaching its climax during the last two years of the debade.

Land Wars in the Interior

Before the Boers departed from the Cape another migrating people had preceded them into the interior.

It ii¬\201saalneasure of

interplay of these factors rendered African societies more vulnerable to the disintegrative forces of colonialism.

Military

force, applied as an ultimate sanction, pauperised them by the seizure of the basic form of productive property, the land. British colonialism gradually prepared the social and economic conditions for the windfall CE 1866, the discovery of diamonds near Kimberley.

The opening of the mines, first at

Kimberley in 1870, then the gold mines on the Witwatersrand in 1885, is the watershed of South African economic development.

Ιt

firmly implanted the capitalist mode of production in our country, for the first time inwalving large numbers of the indigenous people in the modern economy.

The massive importation

of capital, capitalgyxxkh and skilled immigrants, dramatically changed the demographic configuration of the country and catapulted South Africa into the centre of interâ\200\224imperialist rivalry.

Taxation, the means traditionally used by the colonial state to prise the African peasant from the land, was streamlined.

It.was the economic and cultural interaction between black and white, which took place along the frontiers, that led to the snfmdy integration of the Africans into the settlerâ\200\224controlled modern economy.

Conquest speeded up the process by imposing taxes that induced African peasants to become involved in the cash economy.

In and around the mission stations another form of integrationni¬\201m;unfolding.

With encouragement from Sir George

Grey, ti¬\202uaxnissiOHaries had expanded their operations by building schools where African converts learnt and mastered western agricultural techniques, skills and literacy.

Ihxmlamong these

-138â\200\224

Americarxenui<21ribbean colonies, the Cape never became the home of lucrative plantation economies.

With the slow but steady

growth of the white settler community, the settlers began to evolve interests apart from those of the Dutch East India Company.

They clamoured against the strictures imposed on their trading activities and enqmyalixxincessant smuggling to bypass these regulations.

The conflict reached its climax on the eve of the first British occupation of 1795, when two inland settlements, Swellendam and Graaff Reinert, seceded from The Netherlands.

The rebellion was quickly crushed by the British in the next year.

British occupation of the Cape reflected the change in fortunes of the European maritime states.

Britain had overtaken

The Netherlands as the leading trading nation and was already well on her way to becoming "the workshop of the world".

Factory

based production with powerâ\200\224driven machines had replaced the small workshops of the earlier era.

The Netherlands was

beginning to decline and the Dutch East India Company itself went bankrupt four years later.

British occupation broke the

"stifling strangleholdâ\200\235 of Dutch mercantilism on the Cape, opening up the territory for further  $a\200\235$ economic development". The first British occupation found the Western Cape a "cosmopolitan" society, drawing its population from various parts

Slavery was the dominant mode of

productitni in and around Table Bay.

The Colony produced wheat,

of Africa, Asia and Europe.

mutton, wine and vegetables for export, but depended on Europe

for all its manufactured goods, including "necesities of frontier lifeâ\200\235 such as gunpowder, iron and steel products, textiles and  $^{\sim}133$ 

then had him slapped in irons and imprisoned on Robben Island.

Ike then sent out a war party to crush the Garinghaikhonaqua whom he subdued in 1659.

Once the Dutch settlers began ploughing the land, the  $Khoi\hat{a}\200\224khoi\ realised$  that the Dutch had come to stay.

Their sense

of grievance and betrayal was enhanced by the seizure of watering places along the slopes of Table Mountain.

Few of the chiefs

were WilliIKJtHD translate their resentment into action and this was left to â\200\235Doman", a commoner amongst the Garinghaiqua. Doman, lJJualAutshumayo, had acted as an agent for European seamen at the Cape.

He had travelled to Java to learn Dutch and "like many an African nationalist leader of the twentieth century, lkxmulreturned from his education abroad to lead Khoi resistance to European intrusion at the Capeâ\200\235 <2).

He had a

clear understanding of both Dutch power and weakness.

Не

carefully explained to the Peninsula Chiefs the implications of a Dutch sett $\[ \neg \]$  202rnmmit and finally persuaded them to join forces in a concerted attack on the Dutch.

The first Khoiâ\200\224khoi war of resistance broke out in May 1659.

The Khoi-khoi denied the Dutch

victory by attacking on rainy days when the enemy's flintlock firearms would be ineffectiVe.

By skillful employment of

guerilla tactics, they harrassed the Dutch soldiers and never afforded Van-Riebeeck the opportunity to bring his superior weaponry to bear.

Van Riebeeck used all the tactics that were later to become notorious in colonial wars.

He attacked Khoiâ\200\224khtd.â\200\230rillages and massacred women and children; he burnt down villages he found

undefended and carried off the livestock; any Khoiâ\200\224khoi found

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he could employ to crush the power of his main enemy, Mzilikazi. In return for food, camping sites and fresh teams of oxen, the Boers offered the Ba-Rolong protection against their more powerful neighbours.

Boer  $a\200\235$  protection  $a\200\235$  however was more akin to the "protection rackets  $a\200\235$  run by the modern gangsters.

Its aim

was to squeeze as much as possible out of the promaï¬\201a.

Moroka

had assumed that it would be an alliance between equals and that he would gain as much from it as the Boers.

The Boers crossed the Vaal into Mzilikazi's territory shortly after October 1836.

The Ndebele military commander

assumed that these white horsemen were no more a threat than the Koranna of whom the Ndebele had experience.

The first small

parties were attacked and wiped out.

News came of more and

larger parties under the command of Khaliphi, one of Mzilikazi's most experienced generals.

The Boers had been warned of the

advance of the Ndebele annies and formed a defensive laager to ward off the attack.

Khalirmi used the conventional Shaka

tactics,t $\ddot{}$ -201m oxbow military formation, trying to surround and annihilate the enemy.

Each successive Ndebele charge was met

with withering rifle fire and broke.

Finally the Ndebele

retreated, taking the cattle and sheep of the Boers with tman.

Khaliphi had lost a number of his best fighters in the battle and the prize was not worth the sacrifice.

The Boers were left stranded without any oxen to draw their wagons euui appealrxi to Moroka for assistance.

Moroka gave them

fresh draught oxen and helped them back to Thaba Nchu.

The Boers

vowed to avenge their pyrrhic victory at VegkOpenmisent outea commando under Potgieter to attack the Ndebele imitlanuary 1837.

-57-

Autshumayo's people, the Garinghakhonaqua, were an off-shoot of the two major peninsula people, the Garinghaiqua and the Gorouchouqua.

Unlike other Khoiâ\200\224khoi people, they did not engage in livestock rearing; they hunted and gathered seals and penguins along the coast.

The Dutch gave them the name "Strandlopers" â\200\224 the beachcombers - because of this practice.

The intermittent visits and landings of the European seamen had given.ti¬\202m21i¬\202naiâ\200\224khoi the false impression that no matter how 1tmg they stayed, the Europeans would eventually leave.

Their

knowledge of the wealth to be had in the East reinforced this view.

When Van Riebeeck arrived with his small party of 90 men, Autshumayo was convinced that he was justeumWher EurOpean captain with whom he could do business.

Autshumayo was

indispensable to the Dutch because of his knowledge of their language and his familiarity with their culture.

To secure his

services, Van Riebeeck entertained him lavishly at the small fort the Dutch built and through their conversations, picked up some knowledge of the country, its people and its potential.

Autshumayo's main interest was to acquire the commissions paid to him by both the Dutch and other Khoiâ\200\224khoi people for his services as broker.

The Garinghaikhonaqua were keen to build up their herds.

As soon as they felt that they had acquired sufficient livestook,â\200\230Autshumayo devised means to withdraw his people fronlti¬\202uaiKhoi-khoi/Dutch trade.

Other clans fearing the

loss of their herds, followed his example.

Van Riebeeck complained bitterly to the Dutch East India
Company (DEIC) that the Khoiâ\200\224khoi sold him only sickly or old

cattle.

He, therefore, resolved to acquire his own herd to free  $% \left( 1\right) =\left( 1\right) \left( 1\right)$ 

-9-

illness.

On March 9, the magistrate sent out police to arrest Bambata.

To evade them, he fled to Zululand with his family and found refuge for them in the homestead of the Zulu King, Dinizulu.

During Bambata's absence, the magistrate had him deposed as chief and apointed his uncle, Magwabava, in his stead. Ekmmmta returned to Natal shortly thereafter in the company of Cekijana ka Gezindaba, who became his right hand.nmni.

It would

appear that it was after his return from Zululami¬\202ti¬\202mm:Bambata decided to wage war on the Natal government.

On April 2 he

captured Magwabava, the magistrate's puppet, and attacked a patrol sent out to arrest him on April 4.

After beating the

Natal police in a brief skirmish, he retreated to the Nkandla mountain forests with most of his people.

Here he was joined by

the Ncube clan, led by S'gananda who swelled his ranks to approximately 1,000 men under arms.

When they realised that armed resistance was spreading, the Natal ax $\ddot{}$ -\202 $\ddot{}$ -\202uxrities stepped up their military repression.

Rather

than inducing submission, this had the effect of driving previously neutral or passive elements into Open rebellion.

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case in point was Mehlokazulu, chief of the Qungebe clan.

lMehlokazulu had a long history of conflict with white authority dating from the war of 1879.

He and his people had refused to

pay the tax, but had maintained the peace for 3 months until May. Acts of repression against friends and neighbours finally drtnma ti-202uan over the brink and they threw in their lot with Bambata at the end of May.

Shortly thereafter elements from Faku's clan, led by Lubudlunga, also joined the rebellion. Bombata had held lengthy discussions about the imgosition of  $^125\hat{a}\200\224$ 

E

the P011 Tax with Dinizulu during his sojourn in Zululand.

Dinizuliltrhnself had promptly paid the new tax and had given no indication that he actually opposed it.

Nonetheless, Bambata

used his name, the royal battle cry and the prestige of the Zulu king to mobilise support.

All these symbols were intended to

lend legitimacy to the revolt by placing it on a par with the  $antia^200^24$ colonial wars of the past.

But in 1906, in the 20th

Century, the old Zulu society held together by tradition, a common interest in defence of common territory and united in its allegiance to the Zulu king, was crumbling.

Heterogeneitylnni

replaced the old cohesion and a number of chiefs and their' followers felt threatened by the prospect of a return to the old ways.

Rather than drawing them into the rebellion, the use of the name of Dinizulu repelled them and in some instances dnywa  $tir\202mmlinto$  the arms of the Natal government.

In spite of this,

Bambata attracted a number of adherents from among the Christian community and in recognition of this, i¬\202ound room for priests in. the rituals of the revolt.

The fighters were  $a\200\235$ doctoraT'hw a

tradithmui¬\202.army doctor and Shaka's military tactics were employed.

On June 10 they were driven into a confrontation with the Natal troops.

Caught in a valley, the rebels were easily surrounded by the Natal troops and were mowed down by machine gun fire when they tried to break out of the encirclement.

This

battle took place at Mowse Gorge in June 10, 1906.

Bambata

himself was killed in the fighting and "his head cut off for

identification purposes  $200\235 < 30$  and S'gananda and Cekijana were both captured and later sentenced to death by court martial; After the defeat of Bambata's main forces, a third outbreak  $200\224$ 

and were to become the most decisive as industrialisation developed.

At the end of the Century, South Africa went through the Anglo-Boer War (1899â\200\2241902), a war which was â\200\235an antiâ\200\224imperialist struggle only in an extremely technical and qualified sense" because for the Africans hitjmaTTansvaal "the characterisation of Kruger's campaign as a progressive antiâ\200\224colonial war must have sounded very odd indeed, for they were liwdjug in a semi-feudal state whose rigidly enforced constitution, afteremi¬\202uuwi¬\202edging its authority from the Almighty (who is also, by the way, the acknowledged inspirer of the current South Africa Act), proclaimed that there shall be no equality between black and white in church and state".<33>
The Anglo-Boer War ended in the imposition of British domination over the whole of South Africa.

In many respects, the war was a political act waged to bring the

The terms

agreed at Vereeniging in 1902 opened the way to rapproachment between Boer and Brit on the basis of common interest in the super-exploitation of black labour.

domination by British mining and finance capital.

political.ixustitutions into line with the economic realities of

This reconciliation was

given palpable expression in the  $\hat{A}$ £3,000,000 pledge towards the rehabilitation of the former Boer Republics.

One of the unintended side effects of the warâ\200\230fumi'been the closure of the mines and the consequent dispersal of the African mineworkers.

The mining companies clamoured for more workers but were unable to attract them because of the low wages paid.

As a

result indentured Chinese labourers were recruited from Hong Kong in 1903, to fill the gap left by insufficient African labour 1  $\rm \hat{a}\)200\)230$ 

-140â\200\234

the tools for the hunt and their clothes, they carried hardly any baggage.

Control over hunting land was vital to the survdxunl of the community as this provided both game and sources of clean water.

Each San group was led by a hunt leader with ritual and military functions.

He was the custodian of the group's hunting grounds and waterholes but possessed no institutional powers. Each member of the group was responsible to the group and all decisions were collectively taken by the adult members of the group.

By an interâ\200\224group consensus the hunting grounds had been divided anmnuyat the groups in accordance with natural endowment and taking into acount the size of the communities involved.

There were also herders or pastoralists â\200\224 the Khoiâ\200\224khoi peOple ~1numnlderogatively as "Hottentot" by the imperialists.

These werezrunmmiic herdsmen who bred cattle and sheep.

As they

did not till the soil they supplemented their diet with wild fruit and vegetables.

These nomadic pastoralists stretched in an arc along the sea coast from Namibia as far east as the Kei River.

Some of them also lived inland along the banks of the Orange River.

The two basic necessities of pastoral activity were pasturage and sources of water.

Among the Khoi $a\200\224$ khoi

pastoralists, timapasturage was considered common property but

'the herds of long $\hat{a}\200\224$ horhed cattle and fat $\hat{a}\200\224$ tailed sheep were owned by families or clans.

Nomadism requires regular movement, unhampered by many possessions and fixed property.

Tk>ti¬\202ua Khoiâ\200\224khoi, their herds represented both their social wealth and the means of additional

accummulation.

They provided their staple diet of meat, milk and  $200\2352$ -

Zwangendaba, Soshangane ahd Nxaba.

Shaka meanwhile incorporated

the territory and peeple of Zwide into his own kingdom.

By 1821, Shaka was the dominant king in what later became Natal.

It is not clear when he decided to drop the original Mthethwa name for his kingdom and adopt that of YUASâ\200\230Clan, Zulu, but by the midâ\200\2241820's, when the EurOpean traders settled at Port Natal, this was the name used by his subjects and his enemies.

The repercussions of the rise of the Zulu kingdom and the destruction of Zwide's kingdom, characterise the Mfecane.

The

three Ndwandwe generals subjugated the Tsonga around Maputo using the military tactics devised by Shaka.

Their power awed the

Portuguese from whom they extracted an annual tribute as the price for peace.

:Ullééb, they quarrelled and Soshangane drove out Zwangendatmaenmi Nxaba, forcing both to take their followers north.

Zwangendaba cut a swathe through south-central Africa, crushing the Rozwi empire in central Zimbabwe in the process and finally settling with his followers imtTanganyika (now part of Tanzania).

The followers of Nxaba first made their way into Zimbabwe then marched north across the Zambesixï¬\202mnmzthey were dispersed by another migrating group, the Tswana-speaking Kololo led by Sebitwane.

Two years after Shaka's victory over Zwide, Mzilikazi unilaterally revoked the terms of their previous arrangement and was forced to flee into the highveld after being driven from his home by a Zubianmwu

Employing the battle tactics of the Zulu,

which their men had learnt while they participated in the Zubi ageâ\200\224rank military system, the Khumalo clan easily overcame the resistafmxacyf the Bethe and Tswana inhabitants of the highveld.

In June 1851, Warden raised an army of 1,400  $\hat{a}$ 200\224 only 120 were whites  $\hat{a}$  and attacked Viervoot mountain, occupied by Moletsane's Taung.

Moshoeshoe sent reinforcements which forced Wani¬\202i¬\202lto retreat to Thaba Nchu.

#### It is said:

"This defeat, in the first Sotho war against the colonialists, shocked the British, already seriously perturbed.turti¬\202na recent and most sustained war in the Eastern Cape, where Sandile's Ngqika aided by the Khoi-khoi took up arms in December 1850 against British supremacy.

When the news reached England, the Cabinet decided on a strategy of withdrawal from the Orange Sovereignty.

The first step was taken when the Sand

River Conventirn1<yf January 1852 granted the right of

selfâ\200\224government to the Transvaal Boers, ruled out

alliances with African chiefs north cf the Vaal, and

undertook to allow whites, but not Africans, ti¬\202ua right

to purchase arms and ammunition from the Capeamui

Natal."<11>

Unprovoked attacks by white farmers continued and the Sotho retaliated.

Sir George Cathcart, the Cape Governor, led an army of 2,

(HM), including cavalry and artillery units, into Lesotho.

He presented an ultimatum for the delivery of 10,000 cattle and 1,000 horses.

Before Moshoeshoe could do anything about this, he was attacked.

This was the second British war against Lesotho.

rmore than 5,000 mounted Sotho, armed with muskets, assegais and battle axes fought back.

with his people into Lesotho.

The fleeing Hlubi were intercepted

at anhmans River by a regiment of British troops and afterea brief exchange of fire, during which the British lost a few casualties, made their way into Lesotho.

Pine and the Natal

administration decided to treat the matter as rti¬\202xallion.

Those

old and weak who had remained behind when their chief trekked were hunted down in their hillside hideouts and massacred.

Pressure was exerted on Molapo, one of the senior Sotho Chiefs,

He was led into a trap by Molapo and

to betray Langaljixihele.

brought back to Natal in chains, where he stood trial for treason and on being found guilty transported first to Robben Islami $\neg \ 202$ , then to the mainland.

The Hlubi people were rounded up and returned to Natal where they'were distributed as labourers amongst the white settler farmers.

The depth of feeling amongst

ti¬\202ua Africans about this incident can be gauged by the fact that more than 50 years later, in 1927, Josiahâ\200\230Tshangana Gumede, the African National Congress Presidentâ\200\224General,Imnkaspecialâ\200\230 reference to it in his speech at the World Congress organised by the League Against Imperialism in Brussels.<15>

CNue next victims of rapacious British colonialism were the Xhosa in the Eastern<kuxx

A dispute between the Xhosa and the

Mfengusxï¬\202KDlived amongst them brought the British troops into Sathili's lands, east of the Kei, in 1877.

Assisted by his

counsins, Sandile and Mhala, Sathili fought the last great war in defence of Xhosa independence.

Makinana and Guruna, the sons of

Mhala and Ekuuï¬\202ile respectively, engaged the British troops west of the Kei while Sandile made his way east to join Sathili.

After the Battle of Centane in early 1878, Sandile and his men

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~103â\200\224

### confirms:

"From the point of view of the colonists,knrfar the most disastrous of the three 'frontier wars' of the eighteenth century occurred in 1799â\200\2241802, when the Xhosa were joined by an uprising of Khoisan servants, who deserted from the farms with their masters' horses and guns.

Although the wholesale desertion of servants and their combination with the numerically stronger Xhosa was novel, this was by no means the first time the Khoisan servants had joined the 'resisters' â\200\224 the raiders of the last three decades (and possibly even the earlier bands) undoubtedly contained a good proportion of deserters, many of them armed with guns."

The war had also served Ndlambe's ambitions well.

### Durimg

the fighting he had displayed military skill and.ti¬\202u3 â\200\235Ciskeian" chiefs were compelled to recognise his authority.

# He emerged

from the war greatly strengthened by his newly'vmnllxrestige but had lost the leadership of the house of Rharhabe to Ngqika.

As a result of these first three wars, the Xhosa had become the dominant group in the region, both militarily and numerically.

This situation prevailed until a more formidable force entered the fray for control of the Zuurveld in 1806. Ngqika's quarrel with Ndlambe was like a festering ulcer in the body politic of the Rharhabe paramountcy, offering an opportunity for their enemies to exploit it - as a means of -27-

followers made his way across the Fish River to join the Ntinde, Gwali, Mbalu and the unnukhwebe.

Events ixllbarope brought about a change in the fortunes of all the communities living on the eastern frontier.

Britain

seized control of the Cape Colony in 1795, acting on behalf of the House of Orange, the Dutch royal family deposed in the course of the French revolutionary wars.

The arrival of thelhi¬\201tish

fleet coincided with a settlers' rebellion in the Swellendam and Graaf Reinet districts.

The British governor marched a regiment

of newly conscripted Khoi-khoi troops, the Cape Nknnmted Rifles, and British soldiers of the line into the area bosnummess the rebellion.

The spectacle of Khoiâ\200\224khoi troops putting the white settlers to rout had an extremely "subversive" effect on the Khoi~khoi servants and labour tenants who witnessed it.

Desertions increased and a number of deserting Khoiâ\200\224khoi coalesced around the leadership of the Stuurman brothers, Klaas and David, allied to the Xhosa.

British intervention had

inadvertently changed the balance of the frontier.

After crushing the Boer rebellion, the British forces, commanded by Van der Leur, tried to force the Xhosa who had crossed the Sundays River back across it, invoking an old treaty forced on Langa, chief of the ImiDange.

When the Xhosa refused,

the order to Use force against them was issued in February 1798. This amounted to a declaration of war and the Xhosa mobilised to resist.

Fighting broke out in 1799 when an army of 700 Khoiâ\200\224khoi and Xhosa fighters pinned down Van der Leur's troops in Algoa Bay.

The outbreak of the war gave the Khoiâ\200\224khoi servants on the

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which was accustomed to living off the spoils of war during campaigns, found itself at a loss.

The troops often were hungry

and the generals were tempted to risk battles even where the circumstances were not propitious.

Ii¬\201rJuly, Chelmsford reached

Ulundi and provoked an army of 5,000 into battle on the Mahlabathini plains on July 4.

Here Chelmsford was able to deploy his superior firepower and managed to break the Zulu lines after 25 minutes of fighting. The British cavalry then pursued the retreating Zulu warriors, scattering ti¬\202uan and capturing Ulundi.

Cetshwayo had been moved

to safety before the attack and was unharmed.

The capture of the

capital did not mean the end of the war.

ResisUnumzcontinued

until August, when Cetshwayo was captured and sent as a prisoner to the castle at Cape Town.

In his absence, Theophilus

Shepstone, Secretary for Native Affairs in Natal, presided over the dismemberment of the Zulu kingdom, splitting it into 12 little kingdoms each headed by a "king" appointed by him.

Transvaal, Lnuhar Britain at the time, was awarded the territory it claimediahmm; the Ncome ("Blood") River but the best arable land was ceded to the Natal Colony.

In 1897,ni¬\202mn:remained of

the former Zulu kingdom was annexed to Natal.

Cetshwayo was

The

returned to his home in 1883 and given control of a 13th "kingdomâ\200\235 on sdme stony patch of ground.

He was driven from this

by two of the 12 kinglets appointed by Shepstone.

He died a

virtual prisoner of the British at Eshowe in 1885.

A contemporary of Makhanda's, Ntsikana, who lived among
Ngqika's people had also begun preaching around the same thme.

Like Makhanda, Ntsikana had been influenced by Dr Van der Kemp
and had experienced dreams and Visions predicting the coming of a
rmmzreligion.

Ntsikana was a diviner and abandoned his calling after a revelation he experienced one morning while admiring his favourite ox.

He began preaching a more rigorous version of Christianity, counselling reconciliation with the Whites and acceptance of their God as the only true one.

Ntsikana's prophecies dovetailed wellnmnï¬\2021the policies of

Ngqika,wi¬\202m>immediately sponsored him as a rival to Makhanda. The antagonism between the two prophetsxmusfnelled by the conflict between Ndlambe and Ngqika, both of whom sought to use their chaidjnma to strengthen their positions.

Ngqika confirmed

his alliance with the new British governor, Charles Somerset, at a meeting cnxti¬\202ue Kat River in 1817.

The terms of the agreement

(reached between the two) permitted British troops to track  $^2200\235$ stolen cattle" into Xhosa territoy and Somerset promised to give Ngqika milii¬\201mqrassistance in the event of hostilities between him and his Xhosa opponents.

A third civil war broke out amongst the Xhosa in 1818 after

Iquika refused grazing rights to Hintsa's and Ndlambe's cattle.

The decisive battle of the war was fought on the plains of

AmaLinde in June 1818.

During the fierce fighting on the plains that day, a number of Ngqika's senior military commanders fell.

His eldest son, Maqoma, who commanded one of ti¬\202u3:regiments, was forced to retire from the battle with seriousanwi¬\202s.

Amongst

to death.

A anMN:ci¬\201'Coloured leaders were spared hanging and transported for life.

The military defeat of 1853 drove the

Xhosa people into despair, psychologically preparing them for the next and disastrous prophetic movement - Nongqawuse, of 1857.

The defeat of the Kat River Rebellion represents one of the major historical landmarks in the shaping of the future of South Africa.

1Hua.republicanism espoused by the Kat River rebels was superior in content and intent to anything put forward by either the Boers or the British colonialists.

It was an attempt to

translate into practice the ideas of democratic selfâ $200\224$ government. These ideas they had learnt from the missionaries and other Cape liberals.

Had the movement been successful it would have brought

South Africa to a new stage while at the same time laying the

foundation for the growth of democratic institutions for the rest

of the country.

So as not to be mistaken they also had their ideals derived from their own experience:ill life and these were of paramount importance.

There are three approaches that have been adopted to the Nongqawuse episode irlEanï¬\2021African historiography.

The first,

put forward by the colonialists and their apologists, regards it as an elaborate political hoax peretrated by King Sarili in cooperation with King Moshoeshoe to bring about mass starvation: amongst the Xhosa people so that the desperate and hungry thousands would descemi¬\202imxnlthe Cape colony, arms in hand, and (irive the settlers from the land.

A second approach, which has

received a great deal of supbort in pnmgressive circles, treats it as a conspiracy hatched between the missionaries and the Cape colonialemhi¬\201jmstration led by Grey, to break the military and

a Lutheran convert and therefore a supporter of Merensky.

But

this support did not last long and he was soon back with his

followers in Spekbook Hills, in the Tubatse Valley.

Problems

with Boer farmers, especially one Jankowitz and German

missionaries (Rev. Nachtigal) arose.

Pretoria heard about this.

President Thomas Francois Burgers decided to "deal with the

Sekhukhune menaceâ\200\235 himself.

He assembled an army of over 14,000

men armed with Krupp guns and marched on Thaba Mosega.

fNIis was

on August 1, 1876.

He was supported by 2,500 Swazi troopSii¬\202u)

 $\ 200\ 235 fought$  in the hope that the land under Sekhukhune would be given

to them after Sekhukhune was defeatedâ\200\235.<22>

Sekhukhune canmztx>

Dinkoanyane's rescue and inflicted a humiliating defeat on the

Boers and President Burgers.

Dinkoanyane himself vmusl<illed in

action.

The Boers retreated: â\200\235The Boers literally ran away

helterâ\200\224skelter from the battle-field to their wives and children

- 'Huistoe' became their common cry!

They have not yet recovered

fully from the charge of cowardice as a result of that

performanceâ\200\235.<23>

Burgers lost his position as Transvaal

President to Paul Kruger.

'Then the Boers sponsored an army of mercenaries called the

Lydenburg Volunteer Corps under the leadership of Conrad Hans von

Schlieckmann,ea(knmmh exâ\200\224officer and solder of fortune who was

closely connected\_vdii¬\202iâ\200\230the German Establishment and had fought

under Otto von Bismarck in the Francoâ\200\224German War of 1870~71, a

reckless adventurer of Diamond notoriety.

Other mercenaries Came

from America, Britain, Ireland, France, Germany, Austria and other European countries.

They acted with the connivance of

their home<mmummies.

These were soldiers of fortune who were

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clans.

Vi¬\201jflthe growth of the kingdom, strangers and unrelated peopltz<3ften liwmui¬\202 chcwi¬\202< by jowl.

Blood ties and familial

loyalty had been one of many matrixes binding Nguni societies together.

In the Ndwandwe kingdom, these were fast being replaced by political allegiance and submission to the authority of Zwide.

Dingiswayo acceded to his father's throne after years of wandering which had taken him to the land of Bhungane, the Hlubi chief, to Delagoa Bay, where he worked with Tsonga traders ami¬\202 south into the Cape.

He organised a caravan of cattle and ivory

to the mouth of the Maputo River soon after his coronation. Unlike his rival, Zwide, he adopted a highly centralized model

for his "natirn11m1ilding".

As king of the Mthethwa he was the

pinnacle of a politico-military power structure.

All his

subordinates were appointed by him and responsible to him directly.

He adapted "tribal" democracy and the chiefs and clan heads clung on to a few ritual powers but were denied the substance of political power.

In their place he put his own

appointees, izinduna, and military commanders vi-202u31meld power by the grace of the king.

In order to neutralise the threat of

resurgent familial or tribal loyalties among the clans and peeples he incorporated, he developed an elaborate system of military villages based on ageâ\200\224ranks through which all the youth of his kingdom passed.

bulitary force or the threat of its use

was the primary instrument for political expansion.

Zwide and Dingiswayo fought for the loyalties of northern

Nguni over two decades until Zwide managed to deftmm:13ingiswayo in battle in 1817.

After capturing the Mthethwa king,  ${\tt Zwide}$ 

-39-

the land by right of occupation or purchase.

Moshoeshoe rejected

these claims because they were contrary to the Sotho law of land tenure and the conditions of settlement.

The dispute continued

and became more serious in the 1840's and later when British officials and Boer immigrants arrived in Lesotho.

The arrival in Lesotho in 1833 of the French Protestant missionaries, notably Casalis and Arbousset, coincided with the ending of the Difagane.

Moshoeshoe relied greatly on their

advice.

By the middle of the century more than a thousand Sotho were members of a Christian church and many more attended Sunday services.

Vi¬\202mle attending the church, the King refused baptism because: "to be a Christian he would have to renounce all his wives but one, reject traditional healing, abandon sacrifices to ancestral.snyrrits and in.other ways adopt a life-style alien to the great majority of his people". <10)

The Great Trek of a few hundred Boer families with their servants was a reaction to and resentment against the freeing of the slaves ixlti¬\202ue Cape â\200\224 a British policy.

It also signified a

retreat from the stubborn resistance of the khosa to white invasion.

But the Boers were to meet an equally stubborn resistance from the Sotho.

The Boers were welcomed by Moroka in Thaba Nchu.fmmnr decided to spread out.

Moshoeshoe gave them permission to graze

their cattle until they were ready to move on. He refused to sell the land, accept any gifts or put hisrmark to paper.

The Boers

refused to move on.

The French missionaries advised the King to appeal for

support to the British government at the Cape; a government which

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draconian system of labour exploitation akin to serfdom.

Locations assigned to them by the Boers were:ai¬\201:im)under Boer appointed chiefs.

The Boer state levied a labour tax against

each location which required the appointed chiefs to superviae the drafting and distribution of a labour force for Boer farms in the vicinity.

On these Boer farms, African "serfs" were required to work 90 days of the year at harvest time, in return for a small plot which the serfs could till for themselves.

No African

was allowed to own or carry firearms, ammunition or a horse.

То

move from place to place they required a pass signed either by an employer or a state official.

The Tswana and Sotho chiefdoms were anxious to maintainâ\200\230a modimuncï¬\201 peacenï¬\202ï¬\201le they restored the social equilibrium of their societies and, therefore, trieï¬\202tx>nmintain friendly relations with the Boers.

In 1845, Sekwati, chief of the BaPedi,

canmatxa an agreement with the Boers ceding them land east of the Steelport River.

The Kwena, Kgatla, Bafurutse and other Tswanaâ\200\230 people to the west also bought time by allowing the Boers to seize lands which they claimed.

There was, however, a keen

awareness that such a fragile peace would not survive long.

Sekwati of the BaPedi, Sechele of the Kwena, Gaseitsiwe of the Ngwaketse, were in regular communication through messengers preparing for the conflicts they knew would inevitably come.

The

Pedi took the lead by establishing contact with the Sotho.

From

1850 onwards Sekwati sent parties of migrant workers to the Cape in search of work.

On their: mauumxhome, these workers stopped

at Colesburg where they bought guns and proceeded to Moshoeshoe's kingdom.

Here, under the supervision of Sotho marksmen, they  $\ensuremath{^{\sim}54\text{--}}$ 

### EARLY WARS OF RESISTANCE

## Precolonial South Africa

Before the arrival of the EurOpeans in our country, the indigenous peoples lived in separate political and economic 
â\200\230units, reflecting varyirmylevels of socioâ\200\224economic development. 
The communities that comprised the indigenous gxnmjlation may be 
sub~divided into three basic categories, namely:â\200\224
 The food gathering communities - the San people â\200\224 also known 
as Aba Thwa by the Nguni Speakers or haâ\200\224Rwa by Sotho speakers, 
but derogatively called "Bushmen" by the imperialiji¬\202xs.

The San

lived by hunting and gathering wild fruit and vegetables from the veld.

They were composed of a number of hunting cxnmmunities of (jifferent sizes that ranged over all of Southern Africa.

Their

former caves and artwork are found in all parts of the region as far north as Zambia.

These hunter communities lived off the game on the slopes of the mountains and along the river valleys. Along time seaâ\200\224shore they fished and harpooned fish. Wild roots,

berries and fruits also constituted a large part of the diet.

Their lives as hunters required more or less free movement over a fairly large territory.

The need to rotate their hunting activitimi¬\202s, so as tn) give areas they passed through a chance to recover from previous hunts, necessitated constant movement.

As

[mobile communities the San usually lived in caves or rudimentary shelters.

They owned no animals except hunting dogs.

 $\ddot{c}$   $\ddot{c}$  201 $\ddot{c}$  202 $\ddot{c}$  201s and that of the church.

There were other forces such as

the trader, the colonial government and the white community  $\hat{a}$ 200\224 factors which militated against the victory of the Africans.

These progresive antiâ\200\224colonial chiefs were the respected and recognised spokesmen and leaders of their people.

They were

freedom fighters and did not permit themselves to be absorbed by the colonial administration  $\hat{a}200\224$  as our present  $\hat{a}200\224$  day chiefs have done.

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In terms of the Sand River and Bloemfontein Conventions, negotiated solely with the Boers to the exclusion of the Africans, the British withdrew from the north of the Orange River in 1854.

In their "whites onlyâ\200\235 negotiations, the two sides agreed to impose an embargo on arms sales to the Africans.

Henceftuï¬\201ï¬\202i, the Boers would be allowed to purchase arms through British ports in Natal and the Cape, increasing the disparity between themselves and the Africans.

While the Sotho were engaged in fighting the British in the south, the Boers provoked a warxmi¬\201i¬\201ithe BaPedi2h11852.

In an

effort to exploit the differences between the African communities on their boundaries, the Boers concluded a "peace treaty"â\200\230with the Swati ceding the land west of the Steelport to the Boers, although it was occupied by the Pedi.

Attacking in force in

1852, the Boers besieged Sekwati's capital at Phiring.

Sekwati

Phiring was insecure "and so Sekwati moved

his headquarters to Thaba Mosega (the fighting koppie) in the Lulu Mountains of the Eastern Transvaal from which his people were dislodged only by a series of bitter wars ending in December, 1879."

We shall come back to some of the struggles waged by the BaPedi.

Though the invasion of the land of the Pedi proved abortive, the Boers were nonetheless determined to impose their control from the Kalahari to the Drakensberg.

In 1852, the Boer

commandant of the western Transvaal summoned all the chiefs under Boer control baeanmmxing at the capital of Mosielale, chief of the Kgatla.

Sechele,

who refused to recognise Boer suzerainty,  $\hat{a} \geq 00 \leq 3467.$ 

on the continent  $\hat{a}\200\224$  yesterday and today and surely tomorrow.

I have said that the language used in this book is

that of the ANC.

But the terminology which today is no

longer acceptable is to be found either in speeches delivered

then or articles written at that time.

We could do nothing

about that.

This includes also the designation of the racist

Government departments.

From 1912 to 1925 the ANC called

itself the South African Native National Congress.

But»

in the book we have consistently used the designation African

National Congress. This was merely a question of convenience.

We did not want to confuse the readers.

The original manuscript for this book was written for

the commemoration of the 70th Anniversary of the ANC in

5zhxmxfodï¬\201~1982.Aâ\202¬Lhad very little time to do research and write this

book;

it was written in the midst of a busy schedule. Our

priority and preoccupation is the struggle for liberation

of our people and although writing this book is part of

that strUggle - it was not my priority.. Hilary Rabkin,

Beryl Baker and Jackie Hoogendyk typed the manuscript. Pallo

Jordan did contribute to shape the final form of the early resistanceiwhile the comments made by Jack Simons were very valuable.

But this is my book.

It is not the "official history"

of the ANC and definitely not the last word on the subject. Some of my comrades and colleagues will perhaps differ with me on a number of questions, including points of emphasis. That is natural.

We differ in order to agree.

The idea of publishing the book in Zimbabwe was accidental.

In general terms one can say the victory of the Zimbabwean people's struggle in 1980 made this possible and in that

The death of Sekhukhune did not pass unnoticed.

The London

Times newspaper of August 30, 1882, announced his death and paid reluctant tribute to him in a long editorial.

It said inter

alia:

"There is yet no sign of permanent peae among the native races of South Africa.

We hear this morning

from Durtmu1<3f the death of one of the bravest of our former enemies, the Chief Sekhukhune.

He, with his son

and fourteen followers, had been kilbai..n. The news carries us some years back to the time when the name of Sekhukhune was a name of dread, first to the Dutch and then to the English Colonists of the Transvaal and Natal. ... It was, indeed, to a great extent the danger causai¬\202knrthe neighbourhood of this formidable Chief that led to the annexation of the Transvaal by England. When war was declared against the Zulu King, operations went on simultaneously against Sekhukhune and early in 1879 his stronghold was attacked. .... Obstacles stood in the way of these Operations and when, after Ulundi, Sir Garnet Wolseley entered the Transvaal, he endeayoured to humiliate the Chief.

"But Sekhukhune was safe, as he imagined, in an impregnable mountain fortress, and scornfully rejected the terms offered by the British General.

It became

necessary to attack him in force.

A combined movement

of columns, containing 2,000 English and 10,000 Swazis and other native troops was planned and carried out  $^{\sim}1'15^{\sim}$ 

The Griqua retained the traditional chieftainship but blended this witi¬\201iea style of "popular" government borrowed from the Boers.

Parallel to the chiefs was the council, composed of elected popular representatives.

They founded two major

settlements, the first at Griquatown west of the confluence of the Orange and the Vaal, and the second at Phillipolis,rmmed after the Rev. Dr Phillip, east of the confluence of the two rivers.

The chief of Griquatown was Andries Waterboer while Phillipolis was headed by Adam Kok.

The Koranna are a composite group of Khoiâ\200\224khoi, escaped slaves and people of Euro-African descent.

Like the Griqua, they

were horsemen and used firearms.

They appear boiunmandgrated

earlier than the Griqua.

Their principal leaders were Barend

Barends, who settled in the northâ\200\224east modern Orange Free State, and Gerrit Taaibosch who succeeded him.

Contrary to the lie propagated by the racists, when the Boer trekkers crossed the Orange River, the territory beyond was densely populated and shared by a number of Coloured and African people.

i

The wars of the Difaqane/Mfecane had resulted in the concentration of populations around the capitaljscyf their kings and chiefs and had left bitter animosities which the Boers eagerly exploited for their own purposes.

Enmity between the

Tswana and the Ndebele, especially that between the Ba~Rolong and their Nguni neighbours, presented the Boers with an easily exploitable fissure among African peoples.

After crossing the

Orange, the trekkers were received at Thaba Nchu by Chief Moroka

of eastern  $Ba\hat{a}\200\224Rolong$ .

Moroka saw the Boers as useful allies whom

r56-

the racism and bias in South African historiographyâ\200\230Uuuzthis migration has largely been ignored until recently.

It was a

migration of a differing kind from Boer migration.

Two separate

groups of Khoi-khoi and Coloured emigrants moved out of the Cape colony beginning at the end of the 19th Century in order to escape racism and opressive laws imposed after the destruction of Khoi-khoi independence.

These were the GriqUa and the Koranna.

The origins of the Griqua lay somewhere in the upper reaches of the Gamtoos River from whence they trekked north to settle in the area of the confluence of the Vaal and Orange Rivers.

Most

of the community had already been christianised and had lost their Khoiâ\200\224khoi language having adopted Afrikaans as their means of communicatuMI.

Thoughi¬\201his younger members of the community had been assimilated, wearing western dress in preference to the traditional Khoi~khoi attire, other members still lived in the prefabricated houses of their forefathers.

By the time they

reached the Orange River, the Griqua included in their numbers elements drawn from most of what became known as the Coloured population  $a\200\224$  that is, escaped slaves, peeple of mixed Euro $200\224$  frican descent and Khoi $200\224$ khoi.

They had, however, retained

the Khoi~khoi nomenclature, Griqua, meaning the Gri people.

Having mastered horsemanship and the use of firearms, the Griqua were a redoubtable military force.

They easily overcame the

resistance of the Tswana in whose lands they settled and for years continued to harass and raid Moshoeshoe's Sotho to acquire livestock to build up their herds. It was in order to effectively combat them that Moshoeshoe strove to acquire horses and firearms after 1830.

converts emerged a stratum of landowning African farmers, living outside the traditional societies.

This westernised elite,  $\hat{a}$ \200\235the

school people", was distinct and distinguishable from the "unschooled" African.

Producing for their own consumption am $in\202$  selling their surplus on the market, these farmers were both highly productive and efficient.

In Natal, groups of African

converts ammi¬\201ji¬\201es clubbed together to buy or lease land which they farmed cooperatively.

Even in the Boer Republics they

turned the squatter system practised by the Boers to their advantage.

It is from amongst this group that the first

sprinkling of African professionals and intellectuals came.

But it was the mining revolution whichci¬\201mszfricans into the modern economy.

Before 1870, what was later to become the

City of Kimberley was practically bare veld.

By the following

year, its population, housed in tents, shanties and other rudimentary shelters, had risen to 50,000.

Africans came from

Somth.Africa proper and from beyond its borders.

In 1873, the

Cape and Natal oovernments were able to raise the capital to begin railway construction, connecting Wellimmï¬\202xni, the railhead (of the Cape at the time, Durham, East London and Port Elizabeth with the diamond fields.

Smaller concentrations of Africans also

began appearing at the port cities and on railway constructnmi sites.

Captured African resisters, other convicts and workmen built the breakwater at Cape Town harbour, cut the passes that connected Wellington to the Karoo and helped build the line

between East London and Queenstown.

Kimberley was, however, the

largest concentration of Africans so integrated.

The urban areas

became the fastest growing centres of African proletarianisation  $\mbox{$\hat{a}$}\mbox{$200$}\mbox{$234139}^{\sim}$ 

prosperrnns, attractdmu; to him a number of poor peasants who had lost their lands in the Kat River Settlement.

IBesides ti¬ $\202uair$  peaceful pursuits, Matroos and his followers engaged in acts of  $a\200\235banditry$ ".

They regularly made raids on

settler farms, seizing livestock and started a number of other robberies.

The dissatisi¬\202action of these men and women was the resulx:<3f white settler prejudice and injustice against the Coloureds of the area.

The Kat River settlement had been set up with land distributed more or less equally amongst its inhabitants.

With time, however, sharp social cleavages began to appear in the community as some grew wealthyâ\200\230attjmzexpense of others.

In time, the poorer sections lost their land or found it so unproductive that they had to enter the service of their wealthier colleagues to make ends meet.

In addition to this, the

white settlers had managed to establish a number of discriminating practices on the market place.

Through their

control of the markets and fairs, they saw to it that the Kat River Coloureds were paid the lowest prices for their produce and  $200\234$  were gnnavented from buying high quality stock even when they had the means.

These dissatisfactions increased as moves were made towards granting the Cape  $self^{\sim}government\ underi\ddot{u}^{\sim}202mzcvntrol\ of$  the white settlers.

Though the Kat River Coloureds foughtcmuti¬202szritish side during  $1846 \hat{a} 200 \hat{2}247$ , there was enough discontent amongst them that they were not fully trusted by their British allies.

??Us grew to

alarming proportions when a regiment of the Cape Corps almost staged a mutiny and had to be disarmed and sent back to Cape

Town.

â\200\23479â\200\235

the fort.

Maqoma had been born during the height of the dynastic dispute between his father and great-uncle.

As a boy, he was

very close to his father, who took him along on his rounds of the paramountcy enabling the boy to learn statecraft by observing his elders.

There is no evidence to indicate that Maqoma approved of his father's policy, but he fought courageously on his behalf at AmaLinde.

The eldest of Ngqika's many sons, Maqoma was not however the heir, having been born of a junior wife, Nothonto, of the Ngqosini clan.

Ngqika had impressed on his sons the need to befriend the missionaries.

Throughout his life, Maqoma kept up a close relationship with the mission stations that had begun to spread among the Xhosa.

His conflicts with the British colonial authorities began during his father's last years and were a direct result of Ngqika's previous actions.

Matters between Maqoma and the British colonialists came to a head in 1829 after he had assisted a neighbouring Thembu chief, Bawana, to suppress a rebellious clan head.

After the Xhosa army

returned home, Col. Henry Somerset, the commander of the British forces i

1 the Eastern Cape, informed Maqoma that the rebels were in fact allies of Britain and summoned Maqoma to appear before him to answer charges of disturbing the peace.

Dkuxmm.ignored

the summons and duly attacked in May 1829.

To pay for his

"crime" he was forced tt>surrender 5,000 head of cattle and was forcibly removed from the Kat River and resettled on the banks of the Khobusi.

Andries Stockenstrom and a group of missionaries seized the opportunity and recommended that the land taken from the Xhosa be  $^48\hat{a}\200\224$ 

Masupha and Lerotholi, who switched sides and supported his father.

Letsie tried to rely on his own resources to suppress the rebels, but was soon forced to call in assistance from the Cape.

On January 24, 1882, an army under his command attacked

Thaba Bosiu in alldjuuxainith Cape troops but failed to capture

Masupha.

Ixnxm'while Masupha was discussing terms with General Gordon (later of Khartoum  $\hat{a}$ 200\235fame"), a second Sotho force attacked Thaba Bosiu but did not achieve much.

Negotiations were

reâ\200\224opened in October 1882, when Sauer, the Cape's Secretary fcmâ\200\230 Native Affairs, visited Thaba Bosiu.

Masupha refused to

surrender, rejected the posting of a magistrate among his people and told Sauer that he would no longer pay taxes to the Cape government.

The renewed hostilities were proving costly to the  ${\tt self\hat{a}\backslash 200\backslash 224governing\ Cape\ despite\ the\ collaboration\ of\ Letsie.}$ 

In

1883, the Cape changed its tactics.

At a pitso, convoked for the

purpose, they offered to restore some of the rights of chiefs and grant Lesotho a greater degree of local auhmumnu

Masupha was

invitaï¬\202,knuzrefused to attend.

Instead he called together his

own supporters.

It was at this gathering that  $lmafi¬\201$  ist voiced

the demand for the restoration of Sotho independence.

After three years of intermittent fighting, the Cape

government had become exasperated with the intractable problem of controlljxug Lesotho.

At a pitso in April 1883 the Cape proposed

handing Lesotho back to the British colonial office.

Most of the

Sotho accepted this as the lesser of the two evils.

Thus in

March 1884, the territory was formally handed to Britain to govern as a protectorate.

This measure saved Lesotho from the

â\200\224101-

powers as a sovereign and died defending the last tattered pieces of his inheritance.

Shortly after Sandile's coronation, a British "diplomatic agentâ $200\235$  was posted at his capital.

In 1841, the Lieutenant

Governor, Gen. George Napier, sought an audience witkiti¬\202ue Xhosa chiefs ixicnxhar to advise them that he intended building a fort (Nithe banks of the Tyhumie River.

The meeting took place at

Blockdrieft and Napier arrived with a huge escort of dragoons intended to intimidate the Xhosa chiefs.

Sandile was unimpressed

by this vain show of strength and put up such stiff resistance to the colonial governor's blandishments that the nwaating ended ill deadlock (200) 234

Lhuï¬\202sle to get their way by bluff, the British waited for a suitable opportunity to get it by force.

The chance came

in 1846, when a group of Xhosa rescued a prisoner from a Ghana gang, killing a Khoi-khoi prisoner in the process.

One of the

rescuers was also killed by the military escort, but the rest made their get-away.

The colonial administration sent a demand that the prisoner and his rescuers be surrendered.

Sandile at first tried to

ignore the demand but eventually sent a reply, stating that Xhosa legal values<in\202hin\202ruin\201:permit him to surrender fugitives to their pursuers and moreover that the death of one of the rescuers fully compensated the loss of life suffered by the Khoiâ\200\224khoi prisoner.

The new governor, Peregrine Maitland, seized this as an opportunity to invade Sandile's lands in March 1846.

The invasions began with a military disaster.

At Burnshill

on April 15, the British column was beaten and forced to abandon its baggage and provisions in a hasty retreat.

The Rharhabe

-72-

After the flight of Mzilikazi, the only effective opponents of Zulu power in Natal were the Ngwane under Matiwane.

trade with Ndwandwe until they were defeated by Zwide in 1817.

After the dismemberment of the Ndwandwe kingdom they had faced the Zulu army on the slopes of the Drakensberg and were forced to move south where they fell upon the Hlubi of Mtimkulu, later settling in the Caledon River valley.

Matiwane's people had contended for control over the Delagoa Bay

They tried to buihitu)

their herds by attacking Moshoeshoe and forced.

ruhn to evacuate

his base at Butha-Buthe for the more secure mountain fortress on Thaba Bosiu.

Moshoeshoe's diplomacy provoked a second war

between Matiwane and Shaka forcing the Ngwane to trek southâ\200\230of the Orange River seeking a new home a safe distance from Zulu poweru

DMitiwane force-marched his people through the territory of the southern Nguni, attacking and routing his adversaries with the devastating military tactics pioneered in Natal.

fi¬\201murfinally reached the Umtata River in 1828 but were met by a reginmnn:<3f British soldiers whom the Xhosa chiefs allowed to advance into their territory in order to halt.ti¬\202u3 "invadersâ\200\235 from the north.

Facing firearms for the first time in his military career, Matiwane was beaten, sustaining heavy casualties.

He turned north, trying to make his way back to Natal.

During the bitter winter's night on the southern slopes <3f the Drakensberg, the rest of his battered army was decimated in a snowstorm.

By the time he reached the Zulu kingdom, Dingane had assassinated Shaka and usurped his throne.

Rather than allow

a potentially dangerous rival to live out his last years in

peace, Dingane had Matiwane murdered.

enriched himself by acting as middleman between the inland people and the Dutch colony.

In 1693, Van der Stel launched an

unprovoked attack against his (Klaas') peeple, destroyed them and seized their huge herds in the process.

After this, Dutch

settlers were allowed to negotiate trade deals with inlamd Khoi-khoi people on their own account.

Despite the heavy losses they had suffered and the reduction of their power, the Khoiâ\200\224khoi continued to put up tough opposition.tx>Ihitch encroachments on their remaining pasturage.

Between 1701 and 1703, Khoi-khoi guerillas, allied with San â\200\230hunters mounted massive attacks on Dutch livestock and isolated

"The pattern of violence and counter-violence, raid and counterâ\200\224raid, punctuated every decade in the eighteenth century" <3>, says Shula Marks.

farms in an effort to drive the settlers out.

The final blow to the western Cape Khoiâ\200\224khoi, was a smallpox epidemic that swept through their communities ljluaxdildâ\200\224fire ifl 1713.

'Wmnis was probably the worst of the epidemics to hit the non~immune Khoi, though even before this they had suffered frrmI Europeanâ\200\224introduced disease which played a large part in reducing their numbers.

Khoi cattle also appear to have been hit by disease in 1713 $\hat{a}$ 200\22414:euui in 1755, when another smallpox epidemic raged". <4>

It is estimated that 90% of the western Cape clans died during this episode.

The epidemic was caused by contagion from a passing ship which had landed some linen for laundering.

â\200\230ann

the slaves who handled the laundry, the infection spread first to the Khoi $a\200\224$ khoi working in the Cblony, then spread to the outlying

Letsie, Moshoeshoe's successor as king, proved weak and indecisiwma in opposing the measure.

Consequently, leadership of

the movement to oppose "disarmamentâ\200\235 fell on the shoulders of his younger brother Masupha, by now anageingwarrior.

Lerotholi,

Letsie's heir, sensed that the mood of the people was for resistance.

He jci¬\202xmxilais uncle as one of the most determined opponents of "disarmament".

80 popular was their cause that both

felt they could defy Letsie and challenge the regulations.

The opposition movement passed through three phases, each of which ended ijlti¬\201ualhass of credibility by the Cape government. First the Sotho organised a petition, demanding the repeal of the

They then sent a deputation of chiefs to Cape Town to lobby parliament.

When the deputation returned empty-handed, they organised a second petition addressed to Queen Victoria, asking her to intercede on their behalf.

But still they received no

satisfaction from that quarter.

Magistrates and missionaries had in the meanwhile been persuading the Sotho to surrender their guns voluntarily.

When a

law.

few individuals followed this advice, they were attacked by rebellious chiefs, led by Masupha.

Skirmishing and fighting

broke out between the loyalist faction ami¬\202ti¬\202mzrebels.

Ietsie

tried to restore order by allowing Sprigg to address the Sotho at a pitso.

Masi¬\201pha refused to attend, but Lerotmiti(pmonounced Lerothodi) made an appearance and adamantly refused to surrender iiis weapons.

Vï¬\202iile these proceedings were in progress, Masupha had gathered his supporters in an opposition council where an oath to resist the law by force was taken.

They began

strengthening the defences of Thaba Bosiu and time Wdoctoring of -99..

with great skill, and on the 28th November, 1879, the kraal was taken by assault.

Still the Chief and a

great number of his men held the 'koppie' and from the caves euui cracks ixu the rock they poured an incessant fire upon their assailants.

At last the summit was

gained, and after a desperate and sanguinary struggle, the enemy was subdued.

Sekhukhune however, like

Cetewayo, succeeded in escaping.and was only captured a few'days later. .He was treated for a time as a State prisoner and his land was settled somewhat after the Zulu manner. ...

"If, however, the death of Sekhukhune portends anything, it means that the displaced Chief in these savage and warlike regions still retain some power, and that on occasion they are able to rise successfully against him who superseded them. ... " (24> 'Phis tribute, however reluctant, is significant because it was pani¬\202em:all - in the 19th Century, The Times newspaper was

not in the habit of devoting columns of editorhilsmmce to the

passing of African Kings.

Venda Resistance

In the 19th Century the Venda were under Chief Ramabulana  $a\200\235a$  weak candidate in Venda law who had come to power in  $1836a\200\230wiU1$  the ahici¬\201 the guns of Koris Buys and Louis Trichardt and had slain the then chief, his brother Ramavhoya, vi¬\202u3<iied, probpbly  $a\200\224116$ 

seizing livestock and burning homesteads as the Boers themselves had done to the Sotho.

When the reports of

these attacks reached the commandos, they

disintegrated.

The men returned to their homes,

leaving Boshof to grapple with the consequences of

defeat.<12>

After this victory, Moshoeshoe sent dispatches to Grey,

tabulating his grievances and urging him to restore Lesotho to

its rightful owners.

A compromise was reached and the King

assented reluctantly.

Sir Philip Wodehouse, who succeeded Grey as Governor and

Commissioner, was â\200\235pressurised" by J H Brand, the newly installed

President of time(lrange Free State, to intervene.

He did.

But

the Boers wanted more: to avenge their defeat on June 9, 1858.

Brand declared war on Lesotho on June 9, 1865.

Five thousand

Boers invaded Lesotho with the help of several.ti¬\202umasand African "allies".

Ehnnui could defeat the BaSotho only with the help of

the 1,000 Transvaal Boers under Paul Kruger.

But the Free State

and Transvaal Boers soon quarrelled over the division of the

spoils.

The problems did not end there.

The Boersxwmxaafraid of

Sotho raids and there was harassment from both sides.

In March 1867, Ehxuuï¬\202 called on the commandos to renew the

 $\hat{a}\200\235$ scorched earth" operations.

The ultimatum which was issued irl

June marked the formal beginning of the third Boer war against

Lesotho.

Moshoeshoe was now 81 years oldi ihalnade one of his unforgettable statements:

-92i

Early in February 1851 the Kat River Coloured Settlement rose in rebellion against the British. Using the military tactics they had learnt from the British, they took Fort Armstrong and held it until a bombardment in late February forced them to abandon it.

But the rebellion was still in its early stages.

In

March the Cape Mounted Rifles staged a mutiny and joined the rebels now commanded by Willem Uithaalder.

When the rebellion began, the Kat River leadership set up a provisional government with a view to establishing an independent republic in the Eastern Cape when final victory was  $200\230$ mxn The

republic was<umumi¬\202yed of as democratic, with equal rights for all its inhabitants, black and white.

It would accept as

citizens Coloureds, Africans and Boers but no English because\
these were regarded as representatives of<miuni¬\202alism.

It was

this provisional government that conferred the title of "General" on Willem Uithaalder in early March 1851.

Though the war now took on the appearance of "black against white", as one British officer put it,ti¬\202mzAfrican side did not allow matters to deteriorate into a race war.

White

non-combatants were not attacked and Andries Botha allowed all the missionaries and the wives and children of sxihi¬\202iers at Fort Armstrong to reach safety after he invested the Fort.

 $(\ddot{\neg}\2011the$ 

other hand, the colonialists spared no Africans who fell into their hands.

On their raids, homesteads, women, children and the aged were all fair game.

The brutalities of the colonialists

forced the waverers to take sides.

By March 1831ti¬\202mzsoâ\200\224called

 $200\235\$  defected en masse and joined the resisters.

During this war, Maqoma set up his headquarters on the

~81â\200\224

When they rose on the following morning, theyrmmkzstraight to Xhoxho's cattle kraal and seized a number of head on the pretext that they were stolen from the colony.

When Xhoxho protested, a

trooper struck him acrosss the head with his rifle.

The wound

bled profuselyu

EWithout awaiting their chief's instructions, a number of warriors attacked the patrol, killing two while the rest number off.

Xhoxho, infuriated by the assault, together with a few minor chiefs, spontaneously launched a raid across the Keiskama River.

The ferocity of the Xhosa attack took the settlers by surprisen.

'Their houses and barns were razed about their ears as they were making preparations to celebrate Christmas.

Those

closer to the Fish River fled towards Grahamstown as soon as they heard the news.

The Xhosa offensive continued unchecked until it reached the slopes of the Winterberg late in December.

Maqoma, now regent on behalf of Ngqika's heir Sandile, stepped into the breach and began organising the chiefdoms for war.

His objective was to drive the settlers out of the "neutral zone" and at least reconquer the lands east ofti¬\202mai¬\201ish River. Fighting with tenacity amd skill, the Xhosa armies advanced as far as the Fish River by the end of January 1835.

Here they

halted and awaited the British counter-attack which they knew would be comingl

News of the outbreak reached the British governor, D'Urban, while he and his staff were at a new Year's Eve party at the Castle in Cape Town.

D'Urban dispatched a new commander, leâ\200\230the

person of Col. Harry Smith, to take control of the defence of  $\mbox{Gratmumatown}$  while he set sail with reinforcements which he would -50-

areas.

The rest of the broken clans were absorbed into the Dutch colonial.exmanomy as servants and labour tenants.

But it is

important to note,  $a\200\235$ though the power of the Khoi to resist white expansitnlxwas undermined by the disastrous smallpox epidemic of 1713, attempts to dislodge the white intruders cnxti¬\202uair grazing lands continued". <5)

Guerilla Warfare Tactics

The creation of a settler community in the Western Cape began a process that soon developed its own momenturn Jirom Van Riebeeck's days, the DEIC had been reluctant to allow outward expansion both because it inevitably led tr>vnyr and to the raising of revenues by the sale of grazing licences to settler farmers within its colony.

After the settlers were allowed to

trade with imi¬\202xnui clans, it became almost impossible to contain 'the outward movement of the settlers.

Trading expeditions

regularly left the Stellenbosch area to buy cattle, livestock and ivory from clans inland.

These eXpeditions were often also

raiding parijius taking advantage of their superior weaponry and the power of the DEIC to force reluctant Khoi-khoi people to part with their cattle.

Their depredations led to armed clashes and a cycle of raids and counter raids around the Piketberg area and the Bokkeveld district in 1738â\200\2249.

The most resolute resisters in

the area were the Namaqua and groups of San hunters.

After a

punitdxme raid against the Nama, the registers ceased hostilities and contented themselves with hiding or slaughtering their livestock to keep them from the clutches of rapacious Dutch  $200\22416 200\224$ 

Garinghiakhonaqua, who lived on the Cape Peninsula; the Cochoqua

lived north of Table Bay; the Guriqua to the northwest in the direction of Saldhana Bay and the Chaimoqua occupied the area between the "Hottentotsâ\200\224Hollandâ\200\235 Mountainsemuignesentâ\200\224day Swellendam.

The arrival of the Europeans impinged upon the Khoiâ\200\224khoi in the form of four distinct movements:  $\hat{a}$ \200\224

(a)

trade and barter with passing ships and callers at the Bay;

(b)

the establishment of the Dutch Refreshment station in 1652;

(C)

the implantation of the free burghers as a settler colony as from 1657;

(d)

the outward expansion of the settler colony beginning in the 1670's.

These four phases of interaction evoked differing responses from the Khoi-khoi.

After overcoming their suspicions, they tended to cooperate with the Europeans, providing fresh meat, fruit and milk to the passing ships in return for1hxxh copper and tobacco.

This continued into the second phase and only turned.ixnua hostility when the releasing of the settlers posed a direct threat to the territorial integrity of the country.

To the north, the Portuguese presence had an unsettling effect on the Highveld and coastal regions.

Commencing with the

seizure of the gold trade centred in Zimbabwe and the introduction of maize from the Americas, the Portuguese traders euui settlers became a key factor in precipitating the political Changes known as the Mfecane in Nguni and Difaqane in Sothoâ\200\224Tswana.

The Portuguese trading post at thermmi¬\201i¬\201lcf the

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Maputo River, which they dubbed Delagoa Bay, becamegthe focus of -7-
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was also a contributory factor.

Opposition to the new taxxwms

almost universal.

Each chief who was informed about its

imposition complained that his people could ill $\hat{a}\200\224$ afford it in view of their poverty.

But the selfâ\200\224governing colony of Natal was determined to push the measure through and the ruthlessness with which the revolt was suppressed attests to the pressing economic imperatives that necessitated it.

The law specified that the chiefs should report.txa the resident magistrates with their followers to pay the tax in January 1906.

In some areas, the tax was paid without incident,

but in others the protests went beyond mere grumbling, taking the form ofinnqrvocal protests and passive resistance.

The Natal

government reacted almost immediately to these protests, unleashing a reign of terror that first fuelled revolt but finally crushed it in a spate of bloodletting far out of proportion to the actual dangers posed by the outbreak.

The first signs cï¬\201fxxasistance were vocal protests against the payment of P011 Tax on January 22, 1906.

The protests were

accompanied with threats of overt resistance if the regime tried to force the issue.

On February 7, Chief Mveli of the Funzi clan

Tarranged to meet his followers outside the magistracy of Henly, in the Umgeni Valley, to pay their tax.

Amongst them were a

small group Of resisters, made up primarily of nmaners of Moses Mbelle's sect, $vir\202m$ had brought no money and were determined to resist payment.

Rather than take these elements into town with him, whereii¬\202ui¬\202m attitude could lead to confrontation with the magistrate, Mveli asked them to remain behind, while he went to

pay the tax with his pliant followers.

The upshot of tfmarnatter

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In return for his services, the Boers had Mpande crowned king of the Zulu.

He granted them control of all the lands south of the Mfolozi River as far south as the Mzimvubu.

The Boers

renamed it Natalia, the first Boer republic witi¬\2021ztts capital at Pietermaritzburg, named after Piet Retief and Gerrit Maritz, two leaders of the Boer vanguard that entered the Zulu kingdom.

Mpande ruled as a Boer puppet king for 32 years but was unable to destroy the national identity or patriotic spirit of the Zulu people.

After his death, the cudgels of resistance were once again taken up by his son, Cetshwayo and his contempories.

'The Boer republic ci'Natalia was shortlived.

In 1842, the

British fleet sailed into Port Natal (now Durban) and forced the Boers to capitulate.

Most of them decided to trek back across the 'Drakensberg rather than submit to British rule.

Their place

was taken by 5,000 British settlers who emigrated to South Africa in 1849 and 1850.

The Boer trekkers introduced a new factor into the relations between and amongst the independent African kingdoms in the highveld.

They'vmnna an alien community bearing values, customs and institutions unknown to the African people.

Despite their

small numbers, their possession of horses, sumxnmsand firearms made them a powerful force.

Although the Boers represented a

backward section of European culture, the technical achievements of this culture formed part of their heritage.

Moshoeshoe was amongst the first African statesmen to recognise the threat posed by the Boers.

In the space of two

years after their arrival they had defeated two of South Africa's most powerful armies in battle and taken over their lands.

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rThey

There vmnxaealso about five hundred men of the Transvaal Mounted Rifles under Barker who were stationed at Esidumbini.

'The African armies, who were lacking the natural advantage of the Nkandla forests and were relatively easilgrihocated, were killed in large numbers.

Their numbers were too large for

effective guerilla tactics and sabotage and rm $\ddot{}$ -\202: Large enough to $\hat{A}$ » overwhelm the Whites.

They were in three separate groupsamui

were thus dealt with each in turn. The following tells the story:  $a\200\235$ The disturbances had cost the Natal government nearly  $a\200\0$ , a sum which had risen to  $a\200\0$  June 1907.

The white losses amounted to twentyâ\200\224four, including shrvï¬\202m>had died from causes other than the enemy: heart disease, self~inflicted bullet wounds, and epilepsy.

Thirty $\hat{a}$ 200\224seven white soldiers were wounded and half a dozen civilians killed.

The number of loyal

levies killed was also six, and thirty were wounded.

'mee.African losses were far, far higher.

Some three

to four thousand had been killed and in September 1906, some seven thousand were in gaol. ...

â\200\235In Mapumulo, Ndwendwe, and Lower Tugela, 6700 huts had been destroyed and well over 30,000 people had been rendered homeless.

For months afterwards no one could

be found to bury the dead".<32>

This was just an aspect of the brutality of the British colonialists who flogged,  $\hat{a}$ 200\235lashed to ribbons", IJirched, wounded and maimed our people.

groups:

the Sothoâ\200\224Tswana (including the Southern Sotho, the Pedi and Tswana); the Nguni (made up of tho Xhosa, Zulu and Ngwano); and lastly the Tsongaâ\200\224Venda and Lobedu.

The Africans were mixed agriculturalists, who reared cattle, sheep and goats and grew sorghum (derisively called "kaffir cornâ\200\235 by ti¬\202ue racists), (xalabashes, pumpkins, beans, ground nuts, and, from the 15th Century onwards, maize.

The basis of a mixed

agricultural economy is the availability of land for pasture and tilling.

The land represented the chief item of productive property in these communities and was commonly owned.

Livestock

was considered inalienable property belonging to families. (miltivation of the soil and livestock rearing provided the

staple items of the diet of meat, corn, milk and vegetables.

copper and gold which were worked into tools and ornaments.

Their homes were made of clay daubed wattle frames orti¬\202mtch.

From the land, these communities also dug metalssaxi¬\2011as iron,

They lived in villages usually made up of members of the same clan.

As a sedentary agricultural community, the Africans regularly produced a surplus which could be exchanged with neighbours or traders.

Livestock, grain and other crops

regularly were exchanged amongst units of this group.

fi¬\201ni¬\201ing

for pelts and ivory also provided marketable surplus.

Those

amongst them who mined and worked metal, dominated the market for tools, weapons and ornamentation.

fMue secure productive surplus provided a basis for greater economic diversification.

Among the Africans could be found

speciatists  $\hat{a}\200\224$  artisans, craftsmen, medicine men, diviners, etc.  $\hat{a}\200\224$ 

By picking off the sultanates one by one, thelhi¬\201xi¬\2011built up a formidable alliance of ynunxi¬\202;:xbwtes.

By 1680, they felt; sstrong

enough to try to impose dependence on Bantam.

Rather than accept

the Dutch terms, Sheik Yusuf with a number of Bantam patriots took to the hills and waged a guerilla struggle against the Dutch puppet placed on the throne of Bantam.

Three years of bitter

fighting ensued until the Dutch managed to trick Sheik Yusuf into coming down from the hills to discuss peace terms.

He was

arrested on December 14, 1683, transported to Batavia, the Dutch stronghold in Indonesia, whence he was transported first to Ceylon, ti¬\201mnltua the Cape Province in South Africa as a prisoner of the Dutch.

fin\201in\201stllowers were rounded up and shipped to the Cape Provdmmxaeas slaves.

Their descendants formed the core of

what later became known as the Cape Malay community.

The defeat of the Indonesian resistance fighters placed the Netherlands in undisputed control over trade between Europe and the Far East.

The Cape acquired its strategic importance for the Dutch East hmha.Company in this context.

Van Riebeeck's task

was both to establish a refreshment station and to secure the entrance to the Indian Ocean against foreign competitors.

As in

other colonies, the Dutch.East India Company practised the mercantile system in its relations with the colonists at the Cape.

The settlers were forbidden to engage in any form of local manufacturing, on the economic principle that such manufacturers would compete with the Netherlands' emergent factories.

In 1657

the Netherlands released some of its servants in the Cape to become  $\hat{a}\200\235$  free burghers  $\hat{a}\200\235$ , market gardeners, to supply its ships with fresh meat and vegetables.

To work the settler farms,

~130~

of resistance broke out in the Mapumulo district on June 18.

On

June 19 the followers of Ndlovu ka Timunu in the Mapumulo area attacked a sttumaart Thring's Post.

They killed one storeman, a

Norwegian, Sangreid, and a trooper.

They attacked 66 members of

the Natal Mounted Rifles at Otimati River.

The Natal Mounted

Rifles retaliated.

On June 21, Colonel Leuchers ordered the

forces of the Natal Mounted Rifles, the Umvoti Field Forceamuï¬\202 the Borderlmmuï¬\201Âfï¬\202.Rifles to patrol along the Tugela to prevent Africans from crossing into Zululand.

The Africans had three or four separate armies in Mapumulo.

Meseni who was joined by some of Swaimana's people had his;

Ndlovu ka Timunu who was joined by Ngobizembe's followers undem-

Sambela hadlxuw and Matshwili who was joined by Tshingumusi's

people, plus a number of peoples from smaller chiefdoms under

Xhegwana.

 $\mbox{fin-201manain body of African troops was under Meseni and}$  it was estimated at between three and four thousand strong. This

number increased. Migrant workers from Durban joined in:

"These included more than a thousand dockers, some five
hundred domestic workers, a number of rickshawâ\200\224pullers
and, most disconcertingly for Whites, some 40 per cent
of the African Borough Police".<31>

Meseni waited and dillyâ\200\224dallied until the Qwabe women couhi¬\202rui¬\201: take it any more: they urged the men into action.

Colonel Duncan McKenzie who had established his headquarters at Thring's Post, was joined by 2,500 troops, mainly the Natal Carbineers under Mackay and the column under Woolls Sampson.  $-127 \hat{A}$ .

1827  $^{\sim}$  at about the same time as the AmaMfengu arrived.

While

the Xhosa were unrecoptive to his preaching, the AmaMfongu seemed eager to convert.

Ayliff grew very attached to his new

parishioners and took it upon himself to rescue them from what he regarded as their "degraded conditionâ\200\235.as clients of the Xhosa.

Like many men of his calling, he assumed that his limited

knowledge and understanding of African society was reality.

Using contacts amongst other Methodist missionaries, he agitated for the "emancipation" of the AmaMfengu.

During the war of 1835,

he became very active and colluded with D'Urban to accomplish the secession of the AmaMfengu from their Xhosa patrons.

He incited

the AmaMfengu to stage an uprising when the colonial troops entered Hintsa's kingdom.

On April.153, 1835 D'Urban crossed the Kei and invaded Hintsa's kingdom.

The invasion force extended over three miles

\*when marching compact.

It was one of the largest bodies of men employed during the whole war.

D'Urban announced that his

[nission was to recover cattle seized by the Xhosa in the colony and to force the Xhosa king to make peace.

After receiving

assurances of safe conduct, Hintsa arrived in the British camp on April 29.

Dishonouring the safe conduct assurances he had made,

[Vtmban placed Hintsazmuiliis son, Sarili, who had accompanied him to the camp, under arrest.

To win his freedom, D'Urban

demanded that Hintsa order his subjects south of the Kei to lay down.ti¬\202u3ir arms.

The king explained in vain that he had no such

authority over Mqoma and Mhala.

D'Urban was determined to annex the land ofii¬ $\202$ maRharhabes south of the Kei.

On April 30th, he  $i\neg\202$ orced Hintsa to accept an

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with no newspaper, a small but little used library, and a few church schools run by the Dutch Reformed Church.

fi¬\202ui¬\201mzschools

dhiJJttle more than prepare children for confirmation.

The

pastimes of the settlers were cardâ\200\224playing, hunting and dancing.

Until this time the Dutch produced no poetry, no music, no drama.

The only art form that thrived was architecture.

British domination catalysed a number of socioâ\200\224cultural changes.

The absolution of the mercantile system and the introduction of the high woolâ\200\224bearing Merino sheep helped change the economic fortunes of the Cape.

The growth ofxmxi¬\202.farming

and the wool trade provided the stimulus for the development of a finance market, so that by 1831, a number ofsymi¬\202j.local banks had been set up.

In 1861, they were unified under the rubric of the Standard Bank of South Africa, with 29 district branches and directly linked to the finance capital of the world, London.

In

the gmni¬\201:<:ities, Cape Town and Port Elizabeth, small pockets of local industry were beginning to emerge.

From amongst the 1820 settlers, a handful of talented men, like Thomas Pringle, started the first neWSpapers, laying the .basis for a tradition of South African journalimn.

11:is from

this community that the first seeds of liberalism germinated.

Above allâ\200\235 ti¬\202uaiBritish colonial state in South Africa was used asti¬\202m battering ram of the process of primitive capital accumulatjxni.

It systematically seized African land and turned the erstwhile peasants:nnx>a readily exploitable landless proletariat for the benefit of the settler farmers.

Legislation,

liketi¬\202mzCaledon Code of 1809, pressganged the nominally free

Khoi-khoi into the service of the settler farmers and Ordinanace  $^{\sim}136 \text{\^a}\200\224$ 

not infrequent means of hitting back at the perpetrators of their misery.

Radical forms of resistance only began to emerge towards the last days of slavery at the Cape.

This was the time when

anti-slavery agitation in Britain and other slave holding countries become more vocal.

News of the successful slave revolt

in Haiti also reached the stevedores at the harbour.

When the slave trade was abolished in the British empire in 1834, everyone knew that the abolition of slavery itself was imminent.

Slave revolts took place but they were doomed to failure.

Slavery was finally abolished in 1834 by an Act of the British Parliament.

The terms under which it took place favoured the slave owners, all of whom received compensation for the loss of their property.

The slaves, who had fed, clothed and sustained these drones, were condemned to two years of "apprenticeship"

after abolition, so that the slave owners could adjust to the change.

Britain had "returned the Cape to the Dutchâ\200\235 in 1803, ti $\neg$ \202umi retook it three years later.

Before the second British

occupatumh the cosmopolitan society that had grown up in the Cape had been  $a\200\235$  pressed into a common mould" by the religious and political intolerance of the Dutch East India Company.

Nonâ\200\224Dutch

settlers had been forced to abandon their own languages and culture and a large measure of social uniformity had been imposed on  $tfmaxin\202iite$  community by the church and the state.

The slaves

and the Khoi-khoi had their distinctive cultures crushed and were

adopting the local creolised Dutch (later known as Afrikaans) as their language.

Culturally, the Cape colony was a backwater,i

~135~

towards the Indian Ocean.

After crossing the Drakensberg range,

they entered the Zulu kingdom in early 1838.

This advance party

was let by Piet Retief, a Boer from the Estern Cape who had announced his departure from the Cape in a â\200\235Manifesto" denouncing British rule and openly declaring the Boers' intention of setting up new states based on slavery and racial oppression.

The

chief;

problem with the "Manifestoâ\200\235 was not the denunciation of the British rule but the fact that the Boersxuumed tockavï¬\201mt the British were doing: oppression of thelAfricans "without foreign. interference".

Shaka had been dead ten years when the Boers reached their destination.

Dingane, Shaka's halfâ\200\224brother, had succeeded him as king.

He had also been warned of the white

Dingane had received reports of the Boers' arrival when they first entered his kingdom.

invaders by an African from the Cape, named Jacob, who was living at his capital, Umgungundlovu - what is today Pietermaritzbmrg; VHuan the Boers sought an interview with him, requesting land to settle, he tried to get rid of them by requesting that they recapture cattle he had lost to the Tlokwa from Sikhonyela, their

(Dne can assume that Dingane used this ploy as a means of ridding himself of two potential enemies without raising his lunui.

He probably hoped that the Boers would attack Sikhonyela and both sides would suffer heavy losses in the enumging battle. In fact, Retief managed to outwit Sikhonyela and obtained the cattle without firing a shot and returned to Dingane with his forces intact.

It was then that Dinqane resolved to destroy the trekkers.

The Zulu king was alarmed by reports that even more Boer  $200\23459200\235$ 

the whole Xhosa kingdom.

Alinwn spread amongst thw rnsidont magistrates as Mlanjeni's appeal grew.

They sent frantic reports to Cape Town warning cf
the possibility of a new outbreak of war if the governor did not
cxme out to address the chiefs.

Finally, in early 1850, Smith

relented and paid a visit to Kingwilliamstown, where he assembled theâ\200\230Ciskeiani¬\202chiefs for a meeting.

Almost all the chiefs turned

up for the meetimm;\yith the exception of Sandile and a few others.

VWKHIthe governor angrily demanded an explanation for the paramount chief's absence, he was tohi¬\202ii¬\202uu;8andile feared that if he attended the meeting, the same fate which befell Hintsa might befall him.

This reference to his earlier crime and treacherous behaviour infuriated Smith.

Brownlee was sent out to

speak to the Rharhabe paramount chief and offer assurances of safe conduct.

Sandile adamantly refused to budge, reminding

Brownlee that in 1846 he had accepted similar assurances and had ended up in the Grahamstown fort, a prisoner of Smith's.

Brownlee returned empty-handed and Smith decided to proceed with the meeting in the absence of Sandile.

This second meeting

took place in December 1850.

Maqoma was appointed by the chiefs

to speak on their behalf.

Smith opened the meeting with an

announcement that.lm31umj written Sandile off as a recalcitrant and rebel.

He was, therefore, dethroning him and installing his mother as regent.

He then proceeded to warn against any attempt

to make war on the British and demanded that the Xhosa surrender all the guns they had acquired.

Maqoma, in his response to Smith, said that he had no legal power to disarmlt $\[ \] \] \]$  202ua Xhosa and refused to surrender their arms. -75-

The upheavals resulting from this series of wars created a flood of destitute refugees who fled south along the coast.

is the origin of the Fingoes or AmaMfengu.

The Fingoes were a

heterogeneous group of ethnic communities, some Nguni, other Sotho, who had managed to escape the internecine wars to the north.

They often arrived with little apart from a few personal possessions at a time when the Xhosa themselves were being turned into refugees by the annexation of the lands west ofti¬\202szish River (1812) and later those between the Keiskama and the Fish IRivers (1819).

The Fingoes were partly incorporated into the community.

During these troubled times, a new kingdom gnavim>in the hilly SIOpes of the Drakenberg.

The Sotho people living west of

the escarpment were divided into a number of small clans and peoples which included the Bakwena, Bafokeng, Bataung and BaKgatla.

Around, 1820, a young chief Moshoeshoe of the Bakwena, began moulding the separate units into a centralised state under his leadership.

His plans were disrupted and assisted by the Difagane.

In 1824, he successfully avoided war with the Ngwane

by moving his capital to Thaba Bosiu, then manouevred his enemies'

into a war with the Zului

During the winter of that same year,

another migrating people, the BaTlokwa, led by their warrior queen Mmanthanthisi, laid siege to Moshoeshoe's capital but were forced to retreat after a while.

Thaba Bosiu h351fiat-topped

mountain whoaesmmmut can be reached only through a few easily defended passes.

It is a natural fortress, well endowed with green sweet grass, a rich tOpsoil and a number of waterholes.

is possiti¬\202i¬\201etxa sow grain and herd livestock on this summit.

It

-44-

He also warned Smith against his precipitous decision to outlaw Sandiltzanui reminded Snï¬\2011ï¬\201icpf the numborloss acts of bad faith both he (Smith) individually and the British colonial administraton collectively had been guilty of.

Sandile was

correct to be distrustful, Maqoma said, especially of Smith, for was it not he who had murdered Hintsa?

The eloquence of the old

prince was more than Smith could bear;

after the reference to

Hintsa's murder, he interrupted and called Maqoma "an old drunkardâ\200\235.

Grimly and calmly, Maqoma warned the arrogant colonialists that few men dared speak to him in that manner: "Indeed, you must be drunk to think you can even dare."

The

exchange between.tfm2tnw3 had heated up the proceedings.

Smith

was furious and before adjourning the meeting, he once again pronounced the outlawing of Sandile and vowed to send out a patrol to capture him and bring him back in chains.

An old

counsellor, who had sat silently throughout the proceedings, then rose to deliver a warning to Smith:  $\hat{a}200\235$ Tread carefully, young man", $\hat{a}200\230$  he said, "Sandile is with his hounds whereverlueni-202ght be.

His

hounds have a loud bark but they also bite!"

The meeting broke

up and Smith retired to his quarters.

On December 24, C01. McKinnon with 500 soldiers was sent out to capture Sandile.

They marched out of Kingwilliamstown and

entered the Boomah Pass.

Midway through the pass, they were

attacked.

After a hard fought battle, McKinnon was able to

escape with a handful of his men and raced back to the safety of iKingwilliamstownd

 $\hat{a}\200\231$ The eighth Xhosa War of Resistance had started.

Chireoeiving news of the ambush, Smith made for Fort Cox where he holed up to gather his wits after the disastrous  $^{76\hat{a}\200\224}$ 

the decades that followed.

The descendants of Ndlambe and Ngqika

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themselves well as defenders of their people's independence.

It was soon after the arrival of the settlers that the

tension that led to war came to the surface once more.

The Xhosa

had never accepted the loss of their land and the parcelling out of the neutral zone to British farmers increased their dissatisfaction.

As a concession, the British colonialists

agreed to allow Maqoma, Ngqika's eldest son, to settle with his

followers on the banks of the Kat River.

A year later, his

tmtmher, Tyali was allowed to settle on the Mankazana.

Though

kxï¬\201ï¬\202i these chiefs reclaimed these lands with the consent of the colonial authorities, their very presence was regarded as a threat by the white settlers.

Pressures were exerted to have

them expelled.

To accommodate the fears of the settlers and also

to intimidate Maqoma

and Tyali into submissiveness, the colonial

administration built a fort on the banks of the Kat River.

Latery tnnmaps under the command of a magistrate mounted regular

patrols along the Winterberg and the boundaries of Maqoma's

lands.

thue of these measures satisfied the white settler

farmers.

In 1823, the cycle of cattle raids started up once more.

Ιt

had been practice on the Zuurveld for Boers to build up their herds by trading or seizing African cattle.

The British settlers

learnt these methods as soon as they had become acclimatised.

Raids against Maqoma accounted for 7,000 cattle added to settler herds in 1823 alone.

On neither occasion did Maqoma retaliate,

obviously cowed by the ominous presence of the British trOOps at

~47-

Inobility, auui firearms which easily overcame the spears and sh in 1d :3 of the Xhosa :1 . A 1â\200\235 Lu :f . 1 ("CW 1.; 1m 11â\200\230 p , she) I. $\hat{a}$ 200\234 t en gag emon t;  $5\hat{a}$ \200\234} , Langa and his fellow chiefs, Tshatshu of the AmaaNtinde; Ngeno of the Ama'Gwali and Xasa of the AmauMbalu were forced across the Fish River. Only one chiefdom managed to resist: the unnukhwebe led by Tshaka. The Boers returned from the war with a sizeable herd of cattle which they shared out amongst themselves. The victory of the Boers proved illusionary. By the midâ\200\2241780's all four displaced chiefdoms had returned to their lands between the Sundays and Fish rivers. The Khoiâ\200\224khoi pastoralists were the chief victims in the white settlements deprived them of grazing land and watering places. Their herds were depleted in.raids andâ\200\230Umacï¬\202ans were

conflimi¬\202: that dominated the life of the region.. The pressure of

unable to survive.

One by one, the powerful Khoiâ\200\224khoi clans <in\202isintegrated and their members were absorbed by their two more</pre> powerful neighbours.

Within the settler community, the Khoiâ\200\224khoi had a predefined place as servants or labour tenants.

Vkmking

uhder brutalising conditions for employers who refused to recognise their humanity, they chafed for an opportunity to reassert themselves and reclaim their independentmn.

Among the

Xhosa, the Khoiâ\200\224khoi were adopted as clients but after assimilation were accepted as full members of the host community. Small pockets tried to survive independently ofixi¬\202fohosa and Boer under the leadership of chiefs but soon realised ti¬\202uat their own real option was alliance with the Xhosa against the settlers. The unnukhwebe were the main beneficiaries of Khoiâ\200\224khoi -71-

Lo

imprisonment at the breakwater at Cape Town harbour.

Moorosi and

his clan had never accepted Lehana's guilt and were determined that he should not be sent to the convict colony in Cape Town.

On December 31, a party of Phuthi horsemen broke open the jail at Austen's nmuyistracy and rode off into the hills with Lehana and other prisoners.

Moorosi refused to surrender'fuhs son in spite

of Austen's repeated warnings that force wouhikmzused to
recapture the escapees.

The victory of the Zulu armies at

Isandhlwana in January 1879 stiffened his resolveztua resist the magistrate's threats.

Events now moved rapidly towards war,

which broke out in February when one of Austen's patrols fired on Dilame, one of Moorosi's sons, during a search for Lehana and his colleagues.

The colonial armies were still recovering from the disastrous defeat at Isandhlawana and could not immediately come to the assistance of the Cape.

Griffiths, the governor's agent,

sought assistance from the Sotho king by promishugfi¬\201i¬\201lthat his people would be exempted from the "disarmament" provisions if he helped suppress the Phuthi.

After much heart-seaixi¬\202uhmg, Letsie

put 2,000 Sotho troops at the Cape Government's disposal.

The invasion of the land of the Phuthi began in March 1879. The colonialists and their Sotho "allies  $200\235$  had to engage in a

number of skirmishes before they could reach the mountain fortress on which Moorosi had secured his people and their cattle.

The march through hostile terrain left nmnny casualties so that the invading column was tired and felt harassed by the time they reached their goal.

Moorosi tried to rally the support of other chiefs by

recruits.

More  $\hat{a}200\235$ efficient $\hat{a}200\235$  means had to be devised to "free $\hat{a}200\235$  African peasants from the soil.

It was in part to meet this

crisis that the new tax was instituted in 1905.

The 250 years of resistance by our people are a glorious chapter in anti $\hat{a}$ 200\224colonial struggles which were waged by peoples throughout the world.

\*\*\*\*\*

'Da conclude this chapter, let us say a few things.

Before

the colonialists came to our country, our people were already evolving a  $cir\202xir\201tlisation$  which was defying tribal exclusiveness.

The common territory occupied was determining a.cxmmmon loyalty.

This process is more noticeable among the Zulu and Sotho people.

There was intermarriage, trade and contact.

This is not to

suggest that there were no conflicts, succession disputes or that "blood relations" had completely disappeared.

Ehi¬\202: there was a\_

process in motion.

The invasion of our country by the colonialists set the clock back.

The real problem that confronted our people was that

two different and antagonistic social systems confronted each

other:

there was the emergent capitalist system (colonialian)

on the one hand, and the pre $\hat{a}\200\224$ capitalist African societies on the other.

But it should be said that the Africans were not fighting

for the  $a\200\235$  preservation  $a\200\235$  of the already crumbling tribal system;

they were fighting for the defence of hard earned achievements of

our people:

â\200\235huhxxh the African was more forward looking

because he fought for a noble cause:

namely, that technical

~141â\200\224

the grass on the plain unsuitable for grazing except during four months of the year.

The divergent lifestyles of the Khoi $a\200\224$ khoi and the Xhosa were the source of the conflict.

The main protagonists in these

conflicts were Hintsati, chief of the qunaqua and "Ruyterâ\200\235 of the Houteniqua on the Khoi-khoi side; the chiefs of the Xhosas who had migrated into the area during the late 1600's on the Xhosa side.

thter years of intermittent warfare, during which

Hintsati was killed, his queen, Hoho and "Ruyter" agreed to cede

the lands between the Fish and the Sundays River to the Xhosa

princes.

Sharing the same region, the two societies became entwined and through intermarriage, the unnukwebe and Sukwini emerged.

The arrival of the Boer settlers Coincided with a period of political upheaval amongst the Xhosa.

In accordance with

longâ\200\224standing tradition, Rharhabe, a junior son of the Xhosa king, Phalo, migrated with his people south~west of the Kei to establish a semiâ\200\224autonomous branch of the Xhosa kingdom aroumi¬\202 1760.

Rharhabe became a paramount chief, subordinate only to the king.

In order to consolidate his authority, he sought jurisdiction over the Ciskeian chiefdoms of the Ntinde, Gwali, Midange, etc.

Rharhabe's ambitions were resisted by theâ\200\234Ciskeian chiefs who had acquired a large measure of autonomy before Rharhabe's arrival.

On his part, the new paramount employed tactics that oscillated between subtle diplomacy and open threats to gain their submission.

Neither method yielded the desired effect.

Rharhabe was killed in battle in 1782 when he went be war against a Thembu chief, leaving the consolidation of his -19-

near the Dutch settlement were shot out of hand.

But the factor

that tilted the balance was the rear base Of the Dutch.

Regularly resupplied from the sea, the Dutch could sustain a war of attrition.

After two years of fighting, the Khoi-khoi chiefs sued for peace in 1660.

The terms imposed by Van Riebeeck required the Khoiâ\200\224khoi to cede the lands along the Liesbeek River to the Dutch but allowed the Khoi-khoi to keep the livestock they had captured during the war.

The first war left the Khoiâ\200\224khoi of the Peninsula, with the exception of the Garinghaikhonaqua, more or less intact.

However, the Dutch settlers had achieved their principal objective, the occupation of Khoi-khoi lands and had demonstrated

Autshumayo contrived his escape from Robben Island and travelled overland to the area around Saldhana Bay where he unsuccessfully tried to mobilise the other clans for war against the Duhi¬\202u

Three years after the peace of 1660, he died, the year after Van Riebeeck left the Cape.

their ability to hold them by force of arms.

After thirty-one years of

service and cooperationâ\200\230with the Europeans, Autshumayo died an enemy of kdxszï¬\201armer friends, savouring the bitter fruits of his well-intentioned actions.

In the decade after Van Riebeeck's departure, the Dutch settlers became more aggressive in their attitude towards the iKhoi-khoi.

'Their firearms had proved a decisive weapon in defending their small numbers against the more numerous Khoi-khoi and with the additional defensive measures taken  $\hat{a}\200\224$  regular patrols, the famous Almond hedge and Lookout $\hat{a}\200\224$ tower $\hat{a}:-\hat{a}\200\224$  they felt -12-

sending emissaries into the Cape from his fortress. Only Mhlontho, chief of the Mpondomise at<lunbu, tried to send help» but it arrived late. After a few attempts to storm the Phuthi fortress, the colonial troops settled down to a long siege. For six months they tried to find ways of reaching the flat-topped summit but were driven back. Finally, Gordon Sprigg, Prime Minister of the Cape colony, personally came to parley with Moorosi. The negotiations began on October 24. Moorosi was then 90 years old. This is how the meeting went. Ekmigg started by demanding that Moorosi surrender to him and to Letsie, who was then Chief of the BaSotho. Moorosi: I should be glad to hear how I should surrender. believe that my kingdom and my land are mine alone. Т am surprised that you suggest that Letsie is my chief. I am the chief of the BaPhuthi; whilst Letsuais the chief of the BaSotho. Sprigg: szare not talking about that. I only advise you to surrender. Do not boast with what happened on the 29th of May at the junction of the Orange and Quthing, when your people killed twenty of my soldiers.

Moorosi:

You say we should talk about surrender, but ii? that is what'you called me for, there is nothing more to say.

## Sprigg:

lifthe BaPhuthi continue to massacre our soldiers as you did on June 5th to Captain O'Connor's men, we shall send many other soldiers, and you yourself, though you are such a ripe old age, will die a cruel death.

## Moorosi:

I have expressed my feelings about surrenderu.

iLf you

i ~96~ under Ndlambe played a minor role in these events.

Having failed

to convince the four subgroups to submit1x>tms authority,

Ndlambe had resorted to intrigue.

During the War of 1779, he had

stood by and allowed the settlers to humiliate Langa in the hope that defeat would persuade him to submit.

Again, during the War

of 1793, he had refused to assist his kinsmen hoping that adversity would drive them into his arms.

The victory of the

Xhosa's western advance guard made these chiefs even more independent.

Ndlambe's stratagem was doomed to failure also by a dynastic dispute between himself and his nephew, Ngqika. When Ngqika achieved manhood in 1793 undergoing the initiation rites, he expected to ascend the throne of his grandfather Rharhabe.

Ndlambe proved reluctant to relinquish power and appealed to Khawuta, the king of the Xhosa, to adjudicate in the matter.

Khawuta sided with Ndlambe because he ai¬\201eared Ngqika's ambitions.

Ngqika rejected the king's ruling and

sent back a.ChaEiant message challenging his authority.

Khawuta

felt constrained to assert his authority over the young prince and dispatched a punitive expedition to attack him in 1797.

Ngqika's supporters were young military commanders who had shared the initiation lodge with him.

They managed to split up the

king $\hat{a}\200\234s$  forces and defeate  $\bar{a}\202$  both sections in a series of fierce engagements.

Ihdth Ndlambe, vdusxmarched with Khawuta's armies, and Hintsa, the king's heir apparent, were captured in the fighting.

Hintsa later managed to escape but Ndlambe was brought back to Ngqika's great place and made a virtual prisoner. Here,

under close supervision, he was practically stripped of his powers until he contrived his escape and together with his  $-23_{-}$ 

and creating the impression that their main force was miles from the adversary  $200\235.<19>$ 

Finalhy, cniJanuary 20, the British troops

camped on the slopes of Isandhlwana mountain.

On the morning of the 22 January, Chelmsford led half his troops out of the camp trying to locate: the Zulu army and left some 2,000 troops behind.

At about noon that day, the attack of

the Zulu regiments was triggered by a British scouting party which came across the main body of the army a few miles away from  $tin\202$ ualkritish camp.

Attacking in the Shaka oxâ\200\224bow formation, the regiments: i¬\202xnmed the British camp breaking through a gap that developed when a British contingent ran out of ammunition.

## After

one hour or so of fierce hand to hand fighting there were no survivors in the British camp: "Over 1,800 British troops Eur dead together with over 2,000 Zulu warriors, for the bullets had taken a fearful toll."<20>

In one afternoon, the British army suffered its most humiliating defeat in the annals of its colonial commxxï¬\201xh

The Zulu generals withdrew with their men and following the orders of the king did not invade the Natal colony.

One regiment that had not participated in the battle attacked the mission station at Rorke's Drift but were beaten off.

(Huelmsford was forced to retire with the rest of his column to await reinforcements from the far flung British empire.

In

the following months, he built up a new army of 30,000 men to invade the Zulu kingdom.

For the next six months, the British laid waste all that lay in their path.

The Zulu managed to

register some victories but none could match the feat of Isandhlwana.

Fighting on their own territory, the Zulu army,  $407. \, \hat{a} \backslash 200 \backslash 224$ 

retreated to the forest at the headwaters of ti¬\201mthiffalo River.

On May 1S9, their position was surrounded by Mfenqu puppet troops

and Sandile was shot in the ensuing battle.

Sathili was finally

beaten and to escape arrest he fled north to his mother's people, where he died in exile.

The surviving Xhosa leaders were hunted

down and arrested.

All were sent to Robben Islandxi¬\202mxe they

were detained until the 1880's.

These included Mhala, Xhosho

Sandile's brother, Sixaxa his son, Nathaniel Mhala, the christian son of Mhala and Stokwe, a Thembu chief.

All the lands belonging

to the Xhosa were annexed after this war and the Thembu lost their independence in 1879.

The Umtata River was now the

boundary of the Cape colony and it was only a matter of time before the areas beyond it were also incoporated.

After 100

â\200\234years of wars, the Cape Nguni were finally conquered.

In the meantime, in Natal, Britain had tx><myntend with the resurgence of the Zulu power after the puppet king Mpande â\200\224 a fact which makes utter nonsense of the Boer claim and racistâ\200\224mongering every December 16, that they had crushed Zulu powercmmmaand for all at Blood River in 1838.

Cetshwayo had

succeeded his father aftem'a brief succession dispute with some of his brothers.

The British Secretary for  $a\200\235$ Native Affairs" in Natal, Shepstone, finally agreed to recognise Cetshwayo as the rightful successor.

(matshwayo tried to steer a diplomatic course in his relations with the British in Natal but by degrees was forced into a nmnna; assertive role.

His main enemies had been the

Transvaal Boers who had spurious land claims in his kingdom. As long as the Zulu kingdom was in dispute with their enemy,  $200\224104^{\circ}$ 

dismembering the whole Xhosa kingdom.

Such an opportunity

presented itself in 1807.

Ngqika had developed a passion for one of Ndlambe's youngest wives,ti¬\201m beautiful Thuthula, who had earlier been his lover during their youth.

Instigated by his impetuous young

councillors, Ngqika conspired to have her kidnapped and took her as his wife.

This episode, known as "Thuthula Affairâ\200\235 antagonised many of the young chief's own followers, who regarded his love affair as incestuous and in violation of sacred taboos. Hintsa, who had become king of the Xhosa after his father's death in 1804, and Ndlambe seized the occasion as an opportunity to avenge themselves on Ngqika for the humiliations they had suffered at his hand during the civil war of 1797.

Their armies

attacked and defeated Ngqika in 1807 and restored Thuthula to her husband.

This second Xhosa civil war drove Ngqika into the arms of the colonialijnns.

He cast about desperately seeking allies and finally caught the eye of the British colonial governor.

Secret

negotiations were begun during which Ngqika agreed to COOperate

in driving Ndlambe and his people out of the Zuurveld.

In 1811, the British governor, Cradock, invoking an old

treaty, demanded that Ndlambe move his people acrosstiq $\202$ meFish

River or face armed attack.

Ndlambe promised to comply but

pleaded that they be allowed to harvest their grain and other crops before migrating.

Choosing his moment carti- $\201$ hilly, Cradock

ordered Lt. Col. Graham "to destroy and lay wasteï¬\202'tï¬\202ua standing fieldsscaf unharvested grain in December 1811.

A combined force

of 900 Boer settlers, 200 Khoiâ\200\224khoi puppet troops backed up by  $^{\sim}28^{\sim}$ 

1819, 30 prisoners, including Makhanda overpowered the prison guards and made for the Blaauberg beach in a small boat.

Half-way across Table Bay, the boat capsized and Makhanda and two others voluntemnxai to swim to the shore.

Makhanda was overcome

by the waves and was forced to clamber onto a rock to regain his breach.

Exhausted and cold, he clung onto this precarious perch until he was swept off and drowned.

This is the origin of the

Xhosa saying: "ukuza kuka Nxeleq- the return of the leftâ\200\224handed, and this means something which will not materiatha (Makhanda was left-handed).

In October 1819, the British forced the Xhosa chiefs to surrender all the territory between the Fish and Keiskama Rivers as time price for peace.

Ngqika, whose alliance with the British

had precipitated the war, also lost his lands.

Ndlambe evaded

capture by the British by fleeing to his mother's place, the Thembu; he returned in 1820 to find Ngqikaq aiciisillusioned man who had turned to hard liquor to drown his sorrows.

Reconciliation between uncle and nephew now became possible.

With the consent of Hintsa, they divided the Rharhabe paramountcy into two sections, <mm3Â¥mmded by Ngqika known as amaNgqika, the other headed by Ndlambe, amaNdlambe.

Neither played a prominent

role in Xhosa politics after this time.

Ndlambe's last battle

was in 1824, when he helped Hintsa repel Matiwane's Ngwane.

Both

Ngqika and Ndlambe died in 1829.

Their deaths brought to a close

the first chapter in the epic one hundred years of Xhosa resistance.

We shall come back to these wars of resistance<of

the Xhosa.

â\200\22436â\200\224

for several months but were forced to withdraw.

Moshoeshoe's

allies came to his rescue.

Hie people weakened by hunger (but

with their herds and flocks intact) Moshoeshoe transferred U3
Thaba Bosiu, a stronger natural fortress.

The fortress was attacked by Matiwane, chief of the Ngwane, in 1827 and four years later by an Ndebele army.

They were both

repulsed.

On the second occasion, Moshoeshoe, the diplomat, showed his sagacity by sending the retreating warriors a gift of cattle with the message:

"Hunger brought.ymn1}uare; take these cattle to eat on your way and go home in peace.â\200\235<9>

These encounters were testing grounds for the Sotho who then acquired new military skills and weapons, especially those of Koranna and Griqua raiders who could not proceed to the Transvaal because of Mzilikazi's regiments and instead invaded Sotho country.

By the midâ\200\224thirties the Sotho community on Thaba Bosiu, numbering 25,000, was well provided with livestock, crops and perennial streams and Moshoeshoe was in a strong position to safeguard, feed and care ftm the starving survivors of the Difagane wars.â\200\230

There were other problems that emerged: the newcomers.

Among these settlers were clients of Wesleyan missionaries who came from the Vaal River Valley in the north; the Ba-Rolong under Moroka, who settled at Thaba Nchu; Griquas, Kora, who moved to Mpokane.

These rmmuumners, supmwrted by the Wesleyahs, claimed

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"5?:

hallmarks of a spirit medium and mystic by his people.

Не

occasionally had V'L:~.;.'L<->n:3 and L-?XpULhiencc-zd mysterious dreams which the diviners interpreted as communications with the ancestral spirits.

During his 3mMNi-202n he was apprenticed as a diviner and was initiated into the mysteries of rnjseirt shortly before the War of 1811.

This is how the legend of Makhanda goes.

During the spell of peace after the Third War of Resistance, cross cultural interaction between African and white had continued along the Xhosa's western frontier.

inn 1803, (Mme Dr.

van der Kemp, known as "Nyengane" by the Xhosa, founded a mission station at Bethelsdorp.

Around it there gathered some Khoiâ\200\224khoi

people and Xhosa chiefs, like Tshatshu of the Amantinde, sent his
son,;nn1tx>study with Van der Kemp.

Makhanda took a keen

interest illCHIristianity and often engaged the missionaries and Euitish officers at Fort Frederick in Algoa Bay in discussions counterposing his beliefs to theirs.

From these discussions, he

formed a confused image of the Whites and their religion and formulated his own political and religious ideas in opposition to them.

The expulsion of the Xhosa from the Zuurveld came two years after Makhanda was initiated into manhoodd

Iha began preaching

shortly after 1812 when he had settled east oft $\[ \] \] \$  River. As a diviner, Makhanda enjoyed legitimacy as a political

organiser amongst the Xhosa.

He claimed he was a prophet on

behalf of two African deities who were more powerful than the God of the Whites.

They were Mdalidiphu and Thayi, two river gods,

who had chosen him to  $a\200\235$ purify $a\200\235$  the Xhosa kingdom.

7Nszhosa,

Makhanda said, had been reduced to their condition because they

-30-

Inilk-products which they supplemented with wild grain, fruit and vegetables.

The hides from their livestock provided clothing' and shelteru

'Their houses were made of prefabricated sections (i¬\201ftude stretched over wooden frames, easily assembled or taken lapart becauseeti¬\202ua community was constantly on the move.

these migrations their herds could be converted into beasts of burden and mounts.

Khoi-khoi society was composed of clans headed by a chief possessing judicial and executive authority.

Chiefs sat in

During

judgement over disputes and togethter with a council composed of elders of the clan and clan heads were responsible for social decisions and their implementation.

The clans were further

sub-divided into patrilineal groups, each usually led by a senior male member with religious and political functions.

Although possessed of meagre material resources, the  $\label{lem:khoia} Khoia\200\224 khoi often produced a surplus which could be traded with outside communuities.$ 

As they regarded their herds as the chief means of production, exchange with outsiders often enHuailed the sale of sickly or infertile livestock, hides and otheremi¬\201i¬\202ml products.

When they were militarily overcome, the Khoi-khoi often lost their livestock to more powerful neighboursemni intruders.

As a nomadic people, the Khoi-khoi cxnrhi also serve as middle-nmni in the internal trade between African communities and later between Europeans and Africans.

There were also Africans.

Although the Khoiâ\200\224khoi and Sarx

are also "Africanâ\200\235, we make this distinction to avoid confusion. In common usage, the term  $a\200\235$ Africanâ\200\235 is generally applied in

reference to these communities that fell into three language

-3-

Makhanda lay strewn on the battlefield.

Late that afternoon, he

retreated with the rest of the army.

'Phe British then.raided deep into Xhosa territory, seizing cattle and razing villages.

Makhanda's influence tmxi¬\201ni to wane

and the chiefs demanded that he surrender himself to the British to put an end to the ranms.

Ck115 August 1819, Makhanda walked

into the camp of Veld Cornet Andries Stockenstrom and gave himself up.

where he was to await a ship to take him to Robben Island.

He was made prisoner and transported to Algoa Emy

A few days after Makhanda's arrival at Fort Frederick, another African prisoner was brought into the prison to accompany him to Robben Island.

This was David Stuurman who had ledii¬\202ua

Khoiâ\200\224Khoi armies1during the Revolt of 1799.

Stuurman had been

imprisoned earlier by the British but had managed to escape from Robben Island in 1809.

After making his way 700 miles across

land, he crossed the Sundays River and found refuge among his old friends, the unnukhwebe under Chief Chungwa.

He lived there

until 1812.

Vï¬\202uan the war of 1819 broke out, he returned to his old home and tried to mobilise the Khoi-khoi tx>luelp the Xhosa.

Few of the demoralised Khoi-khoi servants and mission station residents were willing to join this enterpriseaenuï¬\202 Stuurman was betrayed to the colonial authorities.

He was reâ\200\224arrested and was

to be returned to the island prison camp.

Eki¬\202i¬\202i these resisters

were put on board the "Redwing" and transported to the penal colony, Robben Island, in early September.

When Makhanda conceived of an escape is unknown.

But it

seems plausible that the hkxavms jointly hatched with Stuurman  $200\230$ who had broken.cun:<3f the prison once before.

On Christmas day

-35-

political cohesion of the Xhosa by starving them to near deati¬\201u
'The actual consequences of the movement have tended to reinforce
this view.

A third view regards the movement as a legitimate expressitn1<1f messianisnlanmmgst the hard pressed and desperate people who had tried and failed in eight previous wars to defeat a powerful enemy.

Nongqawuse was an apprenticed diviner living with her uncle, Mhlakaza, when she began experiencing her dreams and visions. These instructed her to tell the chiefs that a mass ritual amni¬\201fice was required to cleanse the nation and win back the favour of the ancestral spirits.

After these rites had been

performed on an appointed day, the ancestors would rise from the dead, bringing with them fat herds of cattle and sheafs of corn, and help the Xhosa people drive their enemies into the sea - where they came from.

The movement would probably have fizzled out.iAf it had not attracted the support of important chiefs.

Magoma was the first

to come<mn:ixlsupport of Nongqawuse; Sarili followed suit soon afterwards.

Sandile at first was very soeptical but the enthusiamnc $\[ \] \]$  elder brother swayed him to throw his weight behind the movement.

The predicted date<yfti¬\202mandllenium was February 14, 1857.

In vain the people waiixxi for the divine deliverance.

After a

few days it became obvious that no such deliverance was forthcoming tun: in the meantime the economic basis of the Xhosa had been almost irrevocably destroyed.

After a few months,

thousands of Xhosa crossed the frontier in search of work in the Cape colony.

The disaster of 1857 undermined the credibility of

did not attend this meeting but learnt from the others that Scholtz had announced the extension of the forced labour system] to all the clans, ixuihnï¬\202ing those beyond the boundaries of the Boer republic.

In addition, the Boers would require all the

Africans concerned to pay an annual tax, in return for tme

"protection" they received from the Boer state against their enemies.

Failinna to comply with these demands, Scholtz warned, would be severely punished by the Boers.

Mosielele did not feel strong enough to fight the Boers, but neither was he willing and prepared to submit his people to 'piecemeal subjugationi

He chose flight as a means of avoiding both these opthmuL.

The Kgatla trekked inland and found refuge at the capital of Sechele's Kwena, Dimawe. Flight, however,

merely provoked the Boers.

In August.1852, Scholtz personally

led a Boer army against Dimawe demanding that Sechele surrender Mosielele.

Sechele refused, pointing out that African traditional law and his status as a sovereign did not permit him to comply.

The Boers attacked Dimawe and laid it waste.

The mission

station run by Livingstone was also sacked during the attack.

From Dimawe the Boers proceeded to Kanye, the capital of Gaseitsiwe, chief of the Ngwaketse, and on the BaRolong for refusing to provide auxiliaries to assist the Boer army.

200

Tswana women and children were taken<mmring the short war.

All

were distributed among Boer families as "apprenticesâ\200\235.

The Kwena

had been dislodged from their home and forced to trek north into the Kalaharixï¬\202mme Sechele founded a new capital, Dithwharuha. This new home becammntï¬\202ue refuge of other Tswana chiefs fleeing 1

~68~

combination of diplomacy and warfare became the hallmarks of Moshoeshoe's tactics in defence of his people.

After the battle of Vegkop, the Boers had met at a place they renamed. VHJi¬\202mxrg to draw up guidelines for what they called the  $\hat{a}$ \200\235Free Province of New Holland in South-East Africa".

â\200\230Differences among their leaders led to a division which ended with Retiefâ\200\230s trek inbati¬\202mzZulu kingdom.

Potgieter, the other

protagonist in the Boer quarrel took.his followers north where ' they defeated and drove out the Ndebele.

The differences amongst

the Boers were temporarily overcome after the death of Retief and the establishment of the Republic of Natalia.

bki¬\202aalia accepted

representatjAmn3<3f the Highveld Boers settled at Mooi River and Winburg and moves towards a federation were in the pipeline when the British seized Natalia.

The Highveld Boers roundly rejected

the capitulation of the Natalia republic and decided to set up their own highveld republic in April 1844.

The subordination of

the Blacks within the Boer republic was written into its constitution, which excluded "bastards ... down to the tenth degree" from membership of any law $\hat{a}$ 200\224making body.

The Boer republics were essentially agrarian societies based on the private ownership of lama.

The Boer enclave in the

'Transvaal cmxnnpied the heart of the former Ndebele kingdom.

On

its boundaires were almn $\ddot{}$ -\202xn:ci Sotho and Tswana chiefdoms that were beginning to revive after years of Ndebele incursion.

Within the confines of tmeIRKM state, a number of Tswana clans tried to reclaim their lost lands but found that they had to submit to the Boer state.

In return for the right to live in the

Boer held territory, these clans were forced tn accept a

managed to survive.

Mphephu and his warriors had to flee and on

December 15 Mphephu gave his followers a choice either to

surrender or to accompany him across the Limpopo into the English

territory.

Only a few followed him.

He surrendered to the

British authorities and he was disarmed.

Those warriors who

surrenderekitx: the Transvaal Boer government had to pay dearly.

The African â\200\235alliesâ\200\235 of the Boers were extremely Vicious against

Mphephu's people: they plundered and murdered everything that

moved.

The Venda were left in dire distress and poverty; the

land was depopulated; houses were burnt; cattle plundered; rmai

killed and women and children were taken hostage.

On January 10, 1899, General Joubert put the imprisoned

chiefs and warriors on trial.

Those who had not yet surrendered

their weapons were ordered to do so.

Most chiefs were given

heavy sentences.

They were brought to Pretoria and were

incarcerated.

Part of Vendaland was declared a reserve which no

one could leave without permission.

The rest was occupied by

white settlers.

In the vicinity of Mphephu's stronghold, the

Whites built the town of Louis Trichani¬\202t.

Pretoria imposed new'

chiefs â\200\224 in reality collaborators.

This situation did not change

when the British took over at the beginning of this century.

"After the Angloâ\200\224Boer War", says Staytq 'Wï¬\202uaâ\200\230whole country was

(jivided into locations under white administration, a large part

being demarcated for white settlement.â\200\235<29>
In conclusion, once can discern the following tendencies in the anticolonial struggle of the Venda in the 19th Century: â\200\224 After the Venda, whose clan was split into three by the colonialists, repelled the Boer settlers from Schoemansdal in ~121-

towards Vendaland.

But the Boers failed to subdue or overcome

the Venda.

In the 1880's, the white colonialists began to demand more

land.

First came the individual traders who followed the

missionaries.

The white farmers then settled.

The growing white

population began digging for salt and cutting wood in \201nrtrade.

Then followed governmentcafficials who wanted to measure land.

Makhado's brave warriors repelled the colonialists.

But the

fleeing officials reported that there was gold in Vendaland.

This brought more reinforcements into Vendaland.

The Venda knew how to defend themselves against the colonialists.

Because of this stubborn resistance,ti¬\202maVenda

upheld their independence.

It was perhaps for these reasons that

tir(202u2<ualonialists) decided to attack the Lobedu (1890â\200\22494) and the Baganonoa (1893â\200\22494) and other neighbours of the Venda.

'The conflict within the Venda hierarchy was exacerbated by

smallpox, which was introduced by the Europeans in  $1893 \hat{a} \ 200 \ 22494$ .

This

weakened.ti¬\202ueâ\200\230Venda community and its organisation.

At the same

time, swarms of locusts invaded the fields and destroyed the

harvest and rinderpest decimated the animals.

Hunger and poverty

were the result.

The formation of a united front.ci $\neg$ \201'the three Venda chiefs

remained a problem.

Makhado died in 1895.

Mphephu succeeded

him.

Tshivhase was prepared to accept subjugathmuvnthout any form of resistance, although a number of subordinate chiefs under Tshivhase, especially his sons, were interested in an antiâ\200\224colonial alliance of all Venda.

Mphaphuli was also not

hnpressed by Mphephu's appeals for an alliance.

The attempts of

-119â\200\224

## INTRODUCTION

1986 is an important year in the history of the people

of South Africa.

It marks the 200th anniversary of the

birth of Moshoeshoe, king

and founder of the Sotho Kingdom;

the centenary of the discovery of gold;

the 80th anniversary

of the Bambata Rebellion;

the 30th anniversary of the 20,000

strong women's march to Eretoria protesting against the

introduction of passes  $i^2 201hi^2 201ngEn$  and the 25th anniversary of the formation of Umkhonto we Sizwe, the military wing

of the ANC.

All these and other historic events have been

discussed in the book.

In this sense this book is a commemorative.

appreciation-of the efforts of our people to rid themselves

of colonialism and imperialist domination.

There are other reasons which prompted the author to

write this book. The recent "revival" of Solomon Tshekisho

Plaatje, the first Secretary-General of the ANC, journalist,

publicist and chronicler of the ANC history inspired the

author to play his role in the revival and continuation of the good tradition of his predecessors.

The innumerable

discussions the author held with the

rank and tile of the ANC led the author to the inevitable

and unavoidable conclusion.

told-him:

happened before that is a dark chapter for me."

"My life starts with the Soweto uprisings. What

One of the young comrades once

'There was a need  $^{\sim}12$  thought - to throw light on this "dark chapter."

Many books and articles have been written on aspects

of the history of the ANC. 'books have become experts on the subject.

Some of the authors of these

The problem is

to us.

that not all their theories are acceptable, or friendly

As an illustration let us take Tom Lodge, one of

the experts.

In his book, Black POlitics in South Africa

since 1945

class respectability of the Tambo leadership" and goes on

(London 1983), he talks of the "solidly middle-

to state (without providing any facts for his assertion)

that:

"The current enthusiasm for the Freedom Charter and the apparent downgrading of the more radical 'Strategy and Tactics adopted

at Morogoro may also be indicative of a realistic perception of the danger of alienating the steadily growing black middle class"

(p.343)

This has nothing to do with reality.

It is a product of

the fertile imagination of Tom Lodge.

While we do not directly

reSpond to all these distortions - although in some cases we do - we have attempted to stick to one goal

- to put

the record straight.

In this book we attempt to show the roots of the ANC which run deep in the history of our people. There were problems which confronted the author in this regard. The problem was how to summarise and synthesise the more than 300 years of resistance of our people.

The theme of the

book is not the history of South African resistance but the history of the ANC, that is part of this resistance.  $\tilde{\text{ANC}}$  But it i§.impossible to deal with the history of the ANC

without dealing with the resistance prior to the formation of the ANC.

The problem was the length of the book and

this explains why some incidents in the book are touched upon – at times by way of passing reference. Indeed in

some cases this book takes the form of "Chapters in the History of the ANC."

>This problem was a difficult dilemma

to solve.

This brings me to the question of sources, methodology

and periodisation. The book is based primarily on material produced by the ANC - conferences, published and unpublished material, speeches, articles by ANC leaders and rank and file, and researchers, scholars and publicists.

To illustrate

until 1815 provided a ready market for British iron foundries, aljxnving capitalists to reap large profits which were reinvested in improved plant and innovation.

With the enui<1f the wars had

come the steam locomotive and the railways which raised the demand for iron and steel to Unprecedented heights.

The

adaptation of the steam engine for locomotion and transportation revolutionised travel in the 19th Century, bringing the furthest markets and raw materials within the reach of the British manufacturer.

It was during this period that Britain steadily strove for total political control of the Indian sUbâ\200\224continent and her merchants began battering down the Great.VhLll of China.

I&ritish aggression seenmiiirrepressible and South Africa was to be no exception.

The demand for wool on the British market whetted the acquisitive appetites of the settlers in the Eastern Cape.

They

had been sadly disappointed by the outcome of D'Urban's war against the Xhosa and their insistent demand that the land between the Keiskama and the Kei be annexed received sympathetic hearing in the corridors of the colonial.auhninistratixnu in Cape Town.

All the colonial administration required was an apparently "legitimateâ\200\235 casus belli.

Among the Xhosa, the years after 1836 saw the return of relative cahn.â\200\2301%mainternecine disputes that had weakened the kingdom had disappeared but the lands west ofii¬\202mzKEiskama had been lost forever.

Pressure on land had ijuzreased atsea result4 larixigirlg

vvitfl it 116W

[)rok31enus of cavexngrazzing eand overâ\200\224utilisation.

'Nuatmmds of the kingdom had been denuded by

the payment of indemnities and through raids. ,Consequently,  $\dots 7 \mbox{Q}\_\mbox{$^{\sim}$}$  much loss of life on both sides) and had to be abandoned on October 6, 1878.

The British made a third attemptlat subduing Sekhukhune in June/July 1879, under the command of Colonel Lanyon.

This too

failed to achieve the required purpose.

There was little more the British could do at that time since they had on their hands colonial wars in the Eastern Cape, in Natal, in Lesotho (the Gun War), in Ashanti (Ghana),

Afghanistan and Cyprus.

Military logic forced them to await the

outcome of these wars before challenging Sekhukhune again.

This

stage was reached after the Battle of Ulundi and the exile of King Cetshwayo.

Thereafter Sir Garnet Wolseley moved his motley troops of Britons, Boers and Africans (10,000 Swazi troops)1x>tuing down Sekhukhune.

This was the fourth British attempt to reduce Sekhukhune to submission..

Wolseley\_chose November 1879 for his major military Operation.

His forces moved in a pincer movement from Fort

Kruger, Fort MacMac, Fort Weeber, Jane Purse, Eki¬\202xa, Schoonoord,

Lydenburg, vuï¬\202uï¬\202ile, Nkoana, Steelpoort, Nchabeleng, Swaziland â\200\224 literally from all sides ~ to Thaba Mosega.

The battle raged

furiously from November 28 to December 2, 1879.

Sekhukhune fought bravely.

His men had muskets obtained

from Lesotho where he had royal support and French missionaries as friends and from Kimberley where his people worked in the diamond fieï¬\202ths; from Delagoa Bay (Mozambique) with which he had close trade and other links.

The British used their modern Mausers.

Much life was lost.

intense rivalry to control the trade among the kingdoms and chiefdoms of the northern Nguni.

Coupled with a leap in

population grrwnï¬\202i brought about by the increased cultivation of maize, this set off a series of wars and population migrations that were to change the demography of the region.

When Jan van Riebeeck, the Dutch colonialist, landed at Table Bay, near what is today known as Cape Town, on April 6, 1652, he was met by a group of Khoiâ\200\224khoi led by their chief Autshumayo.

Like many other local chiefs, Autshumayo had become accustomed to EurOpean seamen landing at theirlxurfor a short stay to recover from the gruelling voyage between Asia and EurOpe or vice versa.

Autshumayo had been employed as a postman by the English ships that periodically called at Table Bay.

In return

for a fee paid in copper, iron and tobacco, he held mail for passing ships and acted as middleman in acquiring fresh stocks of meat and fruit for the European ships.

The English had also

given him the opportunity to sail to Bantam in Java, Indonesia, where he learnt English and Dutch.

His stay in the East gave him

an insight into the indispensable role the Khoi-khoi at the Cape played ijxtï¬\202ue lucrative Far East trade of the seafaring nations of Europe.

Shortly after his return home, Autshumayo entered hi $\neg$ 201x>a similar contract with the Dutch.

Thus when Van Riebeeck arrived,

the Cape Peninsula Khoi~khoi had some 164 years of previous experience with the Europeans.

Autshumayo himself had been their

local agent for the past 20 years.

Whatxmaenxzsaying is that

the Cape was not "discovered" by Van Riebeeck as we are sometimes

told.

confident they could detect.snmqyrise attacks.

The

"freeburghers", as the settlerâ\200\224farmers were called, now could provide regular fresh supplies of fruit and vegetablestx>the colony's daily consumption.

Resorting to the Khoi-khoi only

became necessary when large quantities of meat were required.

From 1671, there were intermittent skirmishes between Dutch settlers and Khoiâ\200\224khoi fighters.

Most of these were provoked by

the settlers who regularly made forays into Khoi-khoi pastures tow hunt and raid livestock to increase their own herds.

The Cochoqua, who lived to the north of Table Bay, became the main centre of this renewed resistance.

Led by their Chief,

Ngquonema, the Cochoqua declared war on the Dutch settlers in 1673.

The war lasted four years, during which the Dutch managed to win only one decisive battle.

The Dutch tried to win allies

amongst the other clans by promising them rich booty at the expense of the Cochoqua.

When it became clear'ti¬\202uit Ngquonema's

tactics were denying the Dutch victory, these melted away.

The

Dutch governor at first tried to use the slaves, imported to the Cape from 1658 onwards, as puppet troops but when he discovered a slave plot to ally with the Khoiâ\200\224khoi, he ordered them to be Shackled.

Three punitiveeexpeditions were launched against the Cochoqua, one in 1674 and two in 1676.

?Finallyy le 1677,

Ngquonema sued for peace to save the remainder of his tribe.

In

return for peace, the Cochoqua were forced to pay an animal tribute of 30 cattle to the Dutch settlers and cede all the lands

between Table Mountain and the  $\hat{a}\200\235$ Hottentots-Holland" Mountains to the Dutch.

In parts of the Cape Peninsula, one can still fimi¬ $\202$  traces of the hedges planted during this time to exclude the

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persist in talking to me in this manner, remember that I too am a chief like you; and since you have been defeated, I cannot see how you can speak as if you are a conqueror.

Sprigg:

Surrender, and the government will do what it likes with you!

Moorosi:

I shall never surrender to you.

I shall fight you and

I shall defeat you.

This is where our talk ends.

Ι

am going now and the war will proceed to the bitter end.<14>

These negotiations show the calibre of Moorosi - steadfast as ever, denouncing the Cape Government and defying Sprigg.

The ease with which the Phuthi had held off the colonial army had instilled in them an overâ\200\224confidence and underestimation of their enemy.

After the negotiations broke down, the Cape forces began a  $23^{\circ}$ day'tmmmardment of the mountain fortress.

On

November 20, assault teams, using scaling ladders and ropes, reached the summit under cover of an intense barrage of artillery fire.

The HMNï¬\201u.were decisively beaten in the fierce hand to hand combat that ensued after the colonial troops breached their defences.

Moorosi himself was killed during the battle.

Not content

with their victory, the Cape colonial forces mutilated Moorosi's body.

First they severed the head, then they flayed the torso and laid it out on the rocks for the red ants and vultures to feed culliis flesh $\hat{A}$ »

'These atrocities produced an outcry amongst the Christian Africans of the Cape and led directly to John Tengo Jabavu's resignation as editor of "Isiqidimiama Xhosa".
.\_97w

Matters came to a head after a man resident magistrate was appointed to Moorosi's district in May 1877.

The new magistrate,

Hamilton Hope, was a haughty colonial<3fficer whc>vmu3 impatient in his dealings with the Phuthi chief.

In his eagerness to

impose the Cape's authority on the clan, he seemed bent on doing everything cmnunaivable to precipitate a clash.

The differences

between the Phuthi and the Cape apeared to be temporarily composed when the governor's agent, Bowker, removed Hope from his post in 1878.

The Phuthi read this as a concession extracted from the mihxi - \202alists by Moorosi's steadfastness and the solid support given to him by his clan.

The spell of tranquility was,

however,tx>be shortlived.

The Cape government's decision to

disarm all.ti¬\202ue Africans under its jurisdiction after the War of  $1877\hat{a}\200\22478$  in the Eastern Cape raised the temperature again.

In

October 1878, Griffiths, the Governor's agent among the Sotho, announced the decision at a specially convened pitso (communal assembly).

meaSotho were dismayed by the new law.

There was

much disgruntlement but no active opposition was evident.

Moorosi had not attended the pitso, but he was briefed atmni¬\202: it by Austen, Hope's successor as resident magistrate.

The Cape government had anticipated that Moorosi would be opposed to "disarmament".

Secret plans had been drawn up to meet

such a contingency.

The threat of  $a\200\235$  disarmament  $a\200\235$  and the machinations of the resident magistrate created an atmosphere of suspicion and hostility.

It was in this context that Austen

ordered the arrest of Lehana, one of Moorosi's older sons, in November 1878.

The charges were alleged horse thefts.

Austen

-94i

personally tried the case and sentenced Lehana to four years

consuming the proceeds of their raids.

Maynier's campaign, which

began in 1790, forced them to fight on their own territory where provisions imiti¬\202ua field were unavailable except by hunting.

Ву

1793, the Dutch commandoes had broken the back of San resistance and were disbanded.

San women and children, who were taken

qumi¬\201ve during raids were given to Dutch farmers as part of the booty.

The survivors from these ruthless raids subsequently abandoned the Cape and moved further north.

Xhosa Resistance

By the ner#18th Century, the Dutch colony had extended its boundaries eastwards as far as Swellendanu anirty years later, the boundary reached Graaf Reinet.

Trade had been the stimulus

for colonisation.

In return for beads, tobacco, knives and other metal products, Africans sold the Dutch traders, hides, ivory and cattle.

The development of internal trade affected the needs and expectations of both the communities involved.

As Africans

Uï¬\201ua

became accustomed to satisfying certain needs through trade, there developed an interdependency between African and European. The area into which the  $a\200\235$ trekboers" moved, was jointly occupied by the Xhosa and the Khoi-khoi of timaeaast coast.

most powerful of the Khoi~khoi tribes were the qunaqua, followed by the Houteniqua and the smaller Ubiqua.

For a century befcmte

the arrival of the Boers, the Khoi~khoi and Xhosa had jostled each other for control over the wellâ $200\224$ watered river valleys of the region.

The Boers gave the area the name  $\hat{a}\200\235$ Zuurveld"  $\hat{a}\200\224$  sour grasslands ~ tmnxmase of the high acidity of the soil which made ~18~

rout at Boomah Pass.

Sandile had moved with lightning speed aftnr the ambush.

His forces were close on the heels of Smith when he made his way to Fort Ckn<.

'They laid siege to the fort and attempted to take it.

Lacking cannon and other siege weapons, their attempts were not very effectivtn

I&ritish forces in the region made repeated attempts to raise the siege by attacking the Xhosa from the rear.They too met with little success.

The object of the siege seemed

tt»have been either the capture or the killing of Harry Smith.

On December 31, when the Governor managed to break out ofti¬\202ma fort disguised as an ordinary soldier, the Xhosa decided to lift the siege.

Smith made a successful dash to Kingwilliamstown, whereluatmgan making preparations for a long war against the Xhosa.

After the withdrawal of Sandile's warriors from Fort Cox, the Xhosa.began serious war preparations.

Maqoma was given

command of the armies which by the middle of March 1851 numbered some 14,000 men.

By this time, practically all of the land which the British had seized in 1847 had been rid of white settlers. Except for a few forts, stretching in a line between East London and Kingwilliamstown, the British troops too had been driven from the field.

The Kat River Rebellion and the Struggle for a Republic

After the Khoi~khoi Revolt of 1799, most of the Khoi-khoi and Coloured leaders of the Eastern Cape had given up the figfm: against coloniali¬\201rnn.

The gradual destruction of the Khoiâ\200\224khoi

â\200\23477.

among the African people.

The War against Hintsa

The terhu3<3f the peace imposed by British armies after the defeat of Ndlambe and Makhanda's armies during the war of 1819 required the Xhosa to evacuate the area east ofii¬\202waFdsh River and resettle beyond the Keiskama.

The area was to become a

neutral zone occupied by neither side.

The British began

building forts along the banks of the Keiskama to enforce observance of these conditions by the Xhosa but unilaterally revoked its application to themselves in 1820, when 4,000 British settlers were given farms in the "neutral" zone.

The introduction of the settlers was intended to serve two political purposes.

They would provide a frontier guard for the British colony and also help to dilute the Boer predominance among the white population in the Eastern Cape.

Most of them

were farmers nad artisans, with a sprinkling of professionals. The British colonial administration encouraged them to become capitalist farmers, raising wool for the growing textile industries of Britain.

For this purpose, they required land and labour, both of which could only be had at the expense of the

Xhosa.

Durino the next 30 years, it was the demands of this

British settler community which would set the pace of African
dispossession.

The defeat of the Xhosa had finally brought about a measure of  $\hat{a}\200\235$ reconciliatjxnf' among their princes.

The pressure of white

-45-

settler unmlgrabbing helped to cement this new found unity in

paramountcy to his successors.

His son and heir, Mlawu, had died

' one year earlier, leaving as heir his son, Ngqika.

[As Ngqika was

still a minor, Mlawu's brother, Ndlambe, was appointed to act as regent.

Ndlambe's first objective was to unify the clans and chiefdoms living west of the Kei under the leadership of the house of Rharhabe.

The events on the Zuurveld greatly assisted his designs.

The interaction between African and European on the Zuurveld was fraught with dangerous tensions.

The Boer settlers,

accustomed to bullying and brutalising the Khoi $a\200\224$ khoi into parting with their livestock, tried to use the same methods in their dealings with the Xhosa.

Friction was the inevitable consequence.

The local chiefs,

intent on protecting the rights and property of timatr subjects, raided settltn:<xattle in retaliation for what they perceived as cheating or brutal treatment of their people.

Raid and

counter-raid slowly escalated, leading to the First Xhosa War of Resistance which broke out in 1779.

The underlying causes of the war were the EurOpean settlers' encroachmenttuxxlthe lands the Xhosa regarded as their own but the precipitating event was a cattle raid across the Fish River, undertaken by the Prinsloos, a Boer family whc>ruui settled near Bruintjies Hoogte.

Langa, the Imi~Dange chief declared war and

launched a  $\hat{a}\200\235$ mumsive raid on the settler farms, carrying off some 20,000 head of cattle.

The Boers retaliated the following year.

The settlers enjoyed a marked advantage over their Xhosa adversaries.

They possessed horses, to give them Speed and high

-20-

years later Charles Brownlee, the son of earnissionary, Ixaplaced Calderwood.

The diminution of the power of the chiefs through the British residents was a recipe for disaster.

Ostensibly

appointed to ensure that "British standards" of justice prevailed in the chiefs' cxmxrts, the resident magistrates' assumptions of nmmal and racial superiority were bound to be both provocative and insulting.

Their additional function as the "eyes and ears" of the colonial regime was not calculated to win them popularity among the people and chiefs.

Clashes between chiefs and

magistrates were frequent and the situation was not improved by the introduction of a "Native police force", recruited to assist these magistrates.

A few years before the War of the Axe, as the seventh Xhosa War of Resistance was called, a new prophetic movement began amongstii¬\202m2Xhosa.

i¬\202i¬\201mamovement was led by a diviner known as Mlanjeni.

Lhi¬\202jke his predecessor, Makhanda, Mlanjeni was not a; mystic or spirit medium.

He had been trained as a healer but had

been:hi¬\202tiated into the mysteries of divination.

He dealt in

magic charms and talismans reputed to have protective qualities. After the defeat of 1847, the Xhosa proved very receptive to his message which once again called for ritual purification and reconciliathi¬\201itmtween neighbours.

Mlanjeni drew adherents by

the thousands and the chiefs, following the advice of their people, began listening to him.

Sandile himself visited the

prophet and encouraged his people to follow his teachings.

The

movement reached its high point when Sarili, the king of the .Xhosa, decided to apoint Mlanjeni as "itola" or army doctor for -74-

enabled the Sotho to defy an invader indefinitely by retreating to the summit.

The Sotho victory over Mmanthanthisi, won with few casualties on either side, attracted fugitives from other clans, including former enemies.

When Matiwane returned from his

disastrous trek to the south, Moshoeshoe offered him asylum which the former turned down.

By 1831, after beating off a Ndebele

assault, Moshoeshoe had established his suierainty over most of the present day Orange Free State.

The Tlokwa under Mmanthanthisi moved westward after the fruitless siege of Thaba Bosiu.

Practically stripped of their

livestock, they attacked other Sothoâ\200\224Tswana peOple ranging as far Vi¬\201xi¬\201:as modern Kuruman and across the Vaal where they forced a section of the BaFokeng Led by Sebitwane to migrate north into the Kalahari.

In this area they were defeated by the Ngwaketse and trekked deep into Tswana territory finally crossing the Zambesi where they subjugated the local Lozi and established their dominance.

The Tlokwa finally turned south where they

allied with Moshoeshoe's Sotho as a tributary clan.

The warfare in the highveld and along the coast of Natal had completely transformed the demography of Southern Africa.

The

new centralised political units had grown at the expense of weaker clans that had been unable to adapt to the changed conditions.

These were consequently dispersed as farlmnï¬\201ï¬\201las Lake Victoria or had disintegrated into the thousands of destitute fugitives who settled in the Cape.

The upheavals

resulted in animosities that ranked for decades creating greater opportunities for outside aggressors to exploit the divisions

luxury goods.

Its main asset was the technological achievements

of Europe, whose outpost it was on the southern tip of Africa.

Cape colonial society was also riven with internal conflicts arising from its inequitable nature.

The dominant strand of

internal conflict was that between the slaves and the slave owners.

Contrary to the myth of an idyllic paternalism

7pr0pagated\_turti¬\202ue apologists of the system, slavery at the Cape was characterised by the grossest forms of brutality and intense class conflicts.

As a form of undisguised exploitation, slavery could only be maintained by force.

Tortures suci¬\2011eus flogging,

branding, mutilation and the thumb screw were common forms of enforcement.

In extreme cases, death by breakjmug<3n the wheel,

flogging, hanging or immolation were not unknown.

The slaves in turn fought back with everything at their disposal.

We have already recorded some ofii¬\202mthoiâ\200\224khoi resistance wars.

One of the forms of resistance was escape or

fleeing:

the slaves collectively or individually tried to break out of the system by escaping and/or returning to their homelands.

Escape plots were common amongst the newlyelanded slaves and were characteristic of the early days of slavery at the Cape.

bkmst of the recorded cases refer to the 1770's.

The

Khoi-khoi living "beyond the boundariesâ\200\235 of the colony received escapees as Ci¬\201ki'the westward Xhosa.

Hundreds of escaped slaves

swelled the ranks of the Griqua and Koranna in the horth $a\200\224$ western Cape, bringing to their host communities the skills they had mastered during servitude.

The slaves also resorted to individual acts of terrOrism by way of reprisal for brutality.

Acts of sabotageianmiearson were

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was that it was the magistrate who provoked an incident by sending a detachment of polhuatx>investigate the group who had remained outside town.

After a brief exchange of words, the resisterschxnmzthe magistrate's men off and returned to their homes.

The following day, February 8, a second police detachment rode to a nearby farm to arrest the resisters.

On arrival at the

farm, they found one Mjongo, local leader of the independent sect, and took him into custody.

The arrest provoked angry

protests from the others, leading to a skirmish during which two of the police were killed and the rest driven off.

It was in

response to this minor incident that the Natal government declared martial law on February 9.

Troops were sent into the Umgenicirvision to begin combing the area for other resisters.

In a brutal show of force, the

troops Qui¬\202y flogged and hanged any African who appeared to be opposed to the Poll Tax or did not assume an attitude of humility in their presence.

Hundreds of homesteads were razed to the

ground, cattle and other livestock were confiscated and kangaroo courts settupknrthe military,uï¬\202m>handed down stiff sentences, including death by firing squad, hanging, imprisonment and flogging.

This phase of the revolt came to an end in March.

The

Natal government felt confident that it had terrorised the
Africans into Submission, and prepared to demobilise its forces.
The second phase of the rebellion commenced in this period.
On February 22 Chief Bambata came to Greytown to pay tax with his people.

Vi¬\202uen he found that most were not prepared to pay it, he

sent out a small group of 97 while he remained behind with the others.

'The Boer attack.txxi¬\202< the Ndebele by surprise and some 400 men, women and children were lost in the fighting.

They had barely

recovered from this blow when a Zulu army arrived during the winter months.

Many of their recentLy acquired Boer cattle and Sheep were lost and Mzilikazi resolved to move his people further north.

It was while preparations were being made for this second migration that the second Boer invasion occurred in November 1837.

Potgieter's commando rode into the Marico Valley and in pitched battles that lasted nine days drove to Mzilikazi'sxuav capital at Gabeni.

The Ndebele armies were defeated and Mzilikazi barely escaped capture.

3,000 Ndebele people lost

their lives on the battlefield.

The Ndebele were forced to undertake their second migration under circumstances that made their flight from Natal pale in comparison.

Mzilikazi had built up a kingdom embracing 60,000 people in the Transvaal.

It had been rich and its power

unchallenged until the arrival of the Boers.

Now reduced to

15,000 persons with the remainder of their plundered herds, the Ndebele set out in two columns to cross the Limpope River into what later became Rhodesha, rmm72imbabwe.

The second migration

was fraught with many dangers.

There was a powerful enemy at

their back and the danger of defections by the recently incorporated elements was ever present.

Mzilikazi had to use all

his skill as leader and statesman to retain the loyalty of his

followers.

A small minority had decided to remain behind, later to be incorporated into the Tswana chiefdoms that regained their vigour after the departure of the Ndebele.

From Thaba Nchu another party of trekkers had moved east  $^{\sim}58 \mbox{\ensuremath{\$}}\mbox{200}\mbox{\ensuremath{$224}}$ 

slaves were imported in 1658. The first slaves came from Madagascar, Mozambique, Angola and Ceylon (Sri Lanka). Later, Indonesian prisoners of war were sohi:nnx>slavery at the Cape. Slave labourers performed most of the menial and hard work in the Cape Colcnulxnitil slavery was abolished by the British in 1834. They were the domestic workers in settler homes, the agricultural workers who tilled the soil, the stevedores who handled the cargoes in the harbour, some were seamstresses, artisans and skilled craftsmen. By the end of the 17th Century, South African colonial society â\200\224 in the Western Cape â\200\224 lxxï¬\201uai something like this: the top layer was a small class of rich white landowners, who ran farms that produced for the export market. Amongst them could be "¬\202mnnia"¬\2021.the leading officials of the Dutch East India Company, who used their positionSâ\200\230Uasmi¬\201ze the best farmland and enriched themselves. on the tier below them were the urban "free burghers",  $\hat{a}\200\230$ usually absewuxua landowners, who preferred to live in town where they ran inns, guest houses and taverns to service passing sailors. beneath them were the  $\hat{a}\200\235$ boeren $\hat{a}\200\235$ , or farmers, struggling with a few slaVes to make ends meet on the inhospitable sandy soil. below them were the so~called â\200\235knechtsâ\200\235, made up of retired sailtnxs, soldiers euui artisans. They worked for wages, as overseers and slave drivers on the farms of the rich

landowners.

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unequal treaty, ceding the lands southâ\200\224west of the Kei to the Cape colony and issued a<ir\202ecree to this effect ten days later.

Hintsa was abused and threatened by Harry Smith, who later

boasted of these deeds in a letter to his wife.

On May 12th, Hintsa left the British camp escorted by Harry

Smith and 500 British troops and rode northâ\200\224east towards Nqabara

River where Smith and his men murdered him and mutilated his

corpse.

Κ

'The murder of Hintsa euui the punitive terms of the treaty imposed on hhntanVUrban caused an outcry amongst missionaries and liberals in Britain and the Cape.

Dr Phillip hastily

convened a deputation of two African converts, Cknlfrshatshu and Andries Stoffels, to accompany himself euui the Rev. James Read Snr to London to petition the British Government for redress.

Bowing to their eloquent accounts of the conditions in the Eastern Cape, Lord Glenelg, the Colonial Secretary, agreed to state an inquiry into the death of Hintsa.

Like many others

after it,ti¬\202mzinquiry was a farce.

D'Urban connived with Smith

to pack it witi¬\2011ti¬\202uair supporters and the commissioners allowed witnesses to suppress evidence.

The murder of Hintsa had two immediate results.

Pressure

was exertaitx>have the British coionial office repudiate D'Urban's treaty.

In 1836, Glenelg returned the land between the Kei and Keiskama to the Xhosa.

'The treachery of Smith and

D'Urban served as a lesson to Xhosa chiefs.

After this, none of

them were willing to place themselves in the custody of the British.

The most significant result, however, was the political

impact made by Dr Phillip's deputation to Whitehall.

African

-53..

1

49 of 1828 extended the same provisions to the Africans.

Taxation, restrictions of free movement and the trader collaborated, often unconsciously, to undermine the economic base of African society.

Along the frontiers between black and white, a multifaceted process of "interaction" unfolded, involving commerce, labour and a large measure of cultural interplay.

Despite its own

limitations, the settler colony was part of a vigorous empire on the ascemimnn Its onslaught against African society was total and many pronged.

Each prong reinforced the others.

The African societies, in contrast, suffered under a number of grave disadvantages.

They were technologically

unsophisticated and this held up the pace of internal change at a time when Europe was plunging headlong into the machine age.

Afrhxnmkdngdoms were virtually selfâ\200\224cohtained units, offering few opportunities for udtmm'cooperation or coordinated defence.

Thiseami¬\201i¬\202ed the colonialists to deal with each unit on a piecemeal basis.

The technical superiority of the settler community was its advantage.

They could produce faster and more abundantly.

Africans were forced to turn to EurOpean traders to meet their needs, in the process marginalising timatr own crafts and skills by disuse, which resulted in the dislocation of the traditional equilibrium between agriculture and crafts.

The missionary and the trader were the principal agents of these transformatummh. However, the Africans' need to adapt to the European presence was no less important a factor.

As the

process continued, previously homogeneous communities became divided, undermining the cohesion of African society.

The

The Transformation of South Africa - An Overview

Despite the valiant resistance of the indigenous peoples, by
the 1880Hsgnactically allii¬\202maihdependent African kingdoms had
been conquered.

It is therefore incumbent upon us to analyse the causes of this defeat.

'Niis can be best done by examining the society that the colonialists built on the ashes of Umalocal African civilisations.

'The Dutch East India Company, founded in 1602, was largely responsible for making Holland one of Europe's leading mercantile inations in the postâ\200\224renaissance period.

During the 1600's, the

Dutch merchants drove the Portuguese first out of the Indonesian archipelago in a number of fierce sea battles,gi¬\201nxung control over these waters by 1641.

By dint of their naval power and the unbridled corruption of local officials, they soon gained a foothold in Malaya, and later Ceylon (Sri Lanka), "at the expense of the Portuguese".

They suppressed the indigenous spice traders of the East and seized control of all Indonesian external trade. Indonesian opposition to the Dutch centred on the Sultanate of Bantam, the largest on the island of Java.

Under the

leadership of an Islamic scholar and mystic, Sheik Yusuf, who was employed as grand vizier and tutor in the royal court of Bantam, the patriots of Bantam began a war of resistance to Dutch colonialism in 1650.â\200\234 They succeeded in driving the Dutch merchants out of their ports and were gradually re-establishing control over their oil trade routes when the Dutch merchants began a concerted campaign to isQlate Bantam from her neighbours.

~129â\200\224

who provided their services for free.

The {Malitical.<3rganisation of these societies was based on territory rather than on blood ties.

These territorial political

units were governed by a complex system which may be compared to a pyrmmkh

At its apex was the king $\hat{a}\200\224$ in $\hat{a}\200\224$ council; on the tier

beneath him, regional chiefs; at the lowest rungs, local headmen and clan heads.

The pyramidic structure reflected different

levels of gxititical responsibility.

Though the system was

tmsically democratic in that every adult male had the right to attend the pmnni¬\201har assembly and express his views on matters of social concern, ultimate political authority resided.iJ1 the king and his counsellors.

These included both judicial and executive powers.

The king was also considered the religious head of his people and presided over all important rituals and festival days. Though living in separate units, the societies of preâ\200\224colonial South Africa interacted with each other to a degree not often realised.

Among the Khoiâ\200\224khoi, there lived the Sanâ\200\235 who had either attached themselves to Khoiâ\200\224khoi clans as clients or had been taken as war captives.

Amongst the Sothoâ\200\224Tswana

lived San and Khoi~khoi artisans, shepherds and retainers, providing services for their host communities.

Trade and

inter-marriage provided other levels ci'interaction, sometimes leading to absorption of formerly alien populations.

â\200\230Before the arrival of the EuroPeans, South Africa was traversed by a number of trade routes.

The main routes linked

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the Northern Transvaal with the regions beyond the Limpopo; another connected the Highveld with the eastfnni coastq ea third passed along the coast east of the Drakensberg, linking the Cape i z
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with Natal and what is now called Maputo.

Caravans of pack

animals and porters carried goods along these trade routes using livestock, iron and copper or marijuana as the medium of exchange.

Trade routes fell under the control of the chiefs and kings who thus acquired a political interest in their expansion. This was, in broad terms and very briefly,  $\hat{a}\200\224$  and by far not exhaustive, the situation in pre-colonial South Africa.

The Coming of the Europeans

Trade between the African communities and the EurOpean sailors and traders who began arriving in Southern Africa afterâ\200\234 1498, was ti¬\202u32Eirst form of intercourse between our country and Europe.

After an initial setback, the destraction of de Almeida and his men on the Salt River in 1502, the Portuguese established themselves during the early 16th Century at the mouth of the Maputo River and along the banks of the Zambesi.

Ihxmlthe

1590's, English and Dutch ships regularly calexieat the Cape of Good HOpe on their voyages between EurOpe and Asia.

The

transformative impact-these developments had on the region, forms the central theme of our investigation.

The Cape of Good Hope at first featured as a strategic foothold midway along the lucrative trade route linking East Africa, Asia and Western Europe.

Its strategic significance was

to set in motion a chain of events whose influence has lasted down to the present day.

At this time the Western Cape was shared by a number of Khoi~khoi clans: the Garinghaiqua, the Gorouchouqua and the

a b .\_

1867/78, they managed to retain their independence until the end of the 19th Century.

Both Boer and British colonialists tried to subjugate the Venda.

Although some chiefs, exnmmi¬\201ally Makhado and his successor Mphephu, called for an anticolonial front of all the Venda, this could not materialise because of the absence of ethnic consolidation, the rivalry amongst the ci¬\202rhefs and not least the activities of Beuster, a missionary of the Berlin Missionary Society.

The Transvaal Boers met with strong resistance from the Venda.

It was only after the deployment of huge forces that the heroic resistance of part of the clan was militarily suppressed. We say part of the clan because not all the Vendas supported Mphephu hnti¬\202mastruggle against the Boers.

This was due to the

influence of chiefs Tshivhashe and Mphaphuli who surrendered without any form of resisbmuxx

These contradictory traditions

of resistance which began in the 19th Century and the subjugation of the Venda can be traced up to the present.

But the struggle of the Venda belongs to the glorious chapter of the tradition of resistance of the Afrdxxni people of South Africa.

The Bambata Rebellion  $\hat{a} \geq 200 \geq 224$  1906

The Poll Tax Rebellion, which took place in Natal, has become popularly known by the name of its principal leader, Bambata, chief of the Zondi clan.

Its immediate cause was a Poll

Tax imposed on all adult African males in September 1905.

Increasing impoverishment as a result of cattle diseases in 1903

~122â\200\224

wagons were beginning to arrive.

Boer camp sites were dotted all

over ti¬\202ua countryside and reports about their scouting activities poured in.

When Retief and some followers visited the Zulu

capital on February 6, 1838 Dingane ordered them killed.

Не

followed this up with attacks on all the Boer camp sites annihilating all of them by August.

In November, a commando

under Andries Pretorius arrived.

The trekkers made immediate

preparations to attack the Zulu and built a laager<mit  $\frac{1}{202}$  maNcome River.

The Zulu armies attacked on December 16th employing the Shaka battle tactics.

From their defensive positions behind the

wagons, the Boers poured a hail of bullets into their ranks.

The

Zulu armies broke and retreated with heavy losses.

The waters of

the Ncome thmnrran red with the blood of the fallen.

To mark

their victory the Boers renamed the river

"Blood River".

The defeat of Dingane's armies greatly weakened his hold over his subjects.

In the following two years, he was faced with a rebellion led by his brother Mpande, who made off with a sizeable following and sought an alliance with the Boers.

In

1840, the Boers, assisted by Mpande, drove Dingane out of his kingdom into exile among the Swati where Sobhuza had him killed.

In return f0

'5 services, the Boers had Mpami¬\202fxqowned

king of the Zul

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nted them control of all the lands south
of the Mfolo i River as far south as the Mzimvnbu.

Ti¬\202ua
oers

renamed it
atalia, the fi st Boer republic with its capita
at
Pietermar tzburg, named aft r Piet Retief and Gerrit Maritz, two
leaders
f the Boer vanguard that entered/the Zulu kingdom.

M ande ruled as a Bee

puppet king for 32 years but was
unable to destroy the nationAl\id ntity or patriotic spirit<3f
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~60~

what we mean let us take the Morogoro Conference in 1969 as an example.

We studied all the documents presented to
the Conference by ANC branches/units from all over the world;
by ANC and Congress leaders; We make this distinction between
ANC and Congress leaders because then the ANC was an exclusively
African organisation.

The Second ANC National Consultative

Conference, held in Zambia in 1985, changed this situation. The doors of the ANC were opened to all South African revolutionari irrespective of race, colour or creed.

The ANC assumed the

responsibility of being the leader ndt only of the Africans but also of all the oppressed and-democratic forces in South AFrica. Thus the ANC became a truly national organisation, FEE? is, an organisation of like-minded people, united by their hatred of colonialism, racism, exploitation and national degradation, sharing a common goal - and whose activities

consist in propagating its ideas amongst the people and fighting in a constituency which it itself defines.

President

O.R. Tambo has been central in all these innovations and developments.

This has been our approach right through the book.

The book as a whole follows essentially this pattern and

procedure.'That is why the language in the book is the language  ${\rm \hat{a}}\$ 

Though in the book we do not deal directly with the enemy structures, his philosophy, ideology and practical politics we do deal with these questions insofar as they

relate to and affect the liberation struggle. However, our approach is different from that of the liberals who maintain that racism is a "human feeling", that is, divorced from the politics and economics of apartheid. But the ANC is AWUdt: nebulous on the question of racism: it analyses its economic

roots, its class character, its social effects and how to uproot it.

the whole structure was held up by the labour of the slaves, who did most of the productive work in the colony ami¬\202 constituted the lowest rung of the Cape colonial society. Side by side with the slaves were the growing number of labour tenants, the indigenous Khoi-khoi, nominally free, but held in bondage by hunger and terror.

As a general

rule, all the Blacks in the colony were either slaves or labour tenants, and practically all the Whites were freemen. These are the roots of class and colour in South Africa, something vi¬\201dxi¬\202i left an indelible inmmint on the future of the country under white rule.

The slaves of the Cape Dutch colony could be classed in two basic categories:

Those owned by the Dutch East India Company and those owned by private individuals.

Company slaves were

invariably the most exploited.

'They worked as stevedores,

millrnms, agricultural workers on the Dutch East India Company's property and were often hired out to private individuals for a fee.

Privately owned slaves could be found working as cooks, nannies, carpenters, agricultural workers, fishermen and sometimes ennmn as entertainers in the homes of the rich Whites. To keep the slaves under their control, the slave owners encouraged distinctions based on racial origin.

Asian slaves

were favoured as domestics and artisans, while arduous work was the province of the African slaves.

The Cape, however, dhjruï¬\2021rmove a very profitable venture for the EMNxï¬\202i East India Company.

Compared with the Far East,

the pickings from thekCape were slender indeed.

[hilike the

~132â\200\224

increasingly large numbers of Xhosa had begun migrating into the colony in search of work in the hope that wages would enable them to recoup their losses.

These workers, many employed on a

seasonal basis, became another facet ofncrossâ\200\224cultural interaction, as were the growing number of mission stations that sprang up in the area.

The demand for factory made goods

increased commensurately with this interaction.

In time,

EurOpean manufactured goods began to replace the wares of African craftsmen and artisans, upsetting the balance which had previously been obtained between these and the purely agricultural pursuants.

Social dislocation was the inevitable result.

After the death of his father, Sarili inherited this crisis-ridden kingdom.

On the west bank of the Kei, his cousin,

Maqoma's regency was coming to an end.

Sandile, Ngqika's heir,

acceded to the throne in 1840.

At his investiture, his elder

brothers Maqoma and Nyali spoke the words of admonition (ukuyala).

In his remarks, Tyali advised Sandile:

'Tï¬\201mï¬\202.your loins and carry your spear with you at all times because you shall need it to defend your patrimony". <8)

These words proved prophetic, for Sandile's 38 year reign as paramount chief of the Rharhabes witnessed cnm3<3f the bloodiest chapters imlti¬\202ua subjugation of the African people.

In spite of

the tenacity with which the young chief fought and carried his spear, he was compelled to witness the gradual erosion of his

Sekhukhune himself lost his brave son and heiry thoroamoche, and 14 other members chliis immediate family.

As the battle raged,

Sekhukhune was taken by surprise in the form of an attack from behind by 10,000 Swazi troOps in the service of the British.

These had been recruited on direct British instructions by Captain Macleod of Macleod  $\hat{a}\200\224$  British political agent in Swaziland  $\hat{a}\200\224$  and his Lieutenant Alister Campbell, R.N.

This surprise attack

virtually brought the war to a close.

Sekhukhune took refuge in the Mamatamageng, the cave on Grootvygenboom, high up in the Lulu Mountains, some 15 miles from Thaba Mosega.

There he was cut off from the outside world  $a\200\224$  from all sources of food and water.

When on December 2, 1879, Captain

ClarkeawuiCkmmmndant Ferreira were led to the cave and called him out, Sekhukhune had no choice but to comply.

He was

accompanied by his wife and children, his halfâ\200\224brother, Nkwemasogana, Makoropetse, Mphahle (a Swazi natitnutl) and a few attendants.

Commandant Ferreira, who was obsessed with the myth that

Sekhukhune owned large quantities of gold and diamonds, searched

diligently but, alas, there was nothing.

Thus ended the colonial war against Sekhukhune.

On December

9, 1879, SekhuMmmmz(then 65 years old) was led, together with those who were captured with him, to prison in Pretoria.

Не

remained there until 1881.

In 1881, Article 23 cï¬\202ftï¬\202ua Pretoria Convention, which was signed between Britainemmï¬\202 the Boers after the so-called First Boer War of Independence (the Boers had never accepted the British Annexation of the Transvaal) provided that Sekhukhune be â\200\224113~

many Africans had acquired guns in the north that a distinct stratunxcyf the jagtersgemeenskap arose composed of swart skuts ~ literally 'black shots' or 'black marksmen'.

The Venda in

particular so benefited from this proliferatHMItï¬\201mt they were able to Unnlit.to effective political use.

In 1865, 1866 and

1867, the Whites asked for their guns back and the Venda said 'no'.

And in refusing they were led by a man.vi¬\202u3â\200\230was himself a swart skut, Makhado". <28>

The Venda, who had rallied around Makhado and in a few hardâ\200\224 fought battles defeated the Boers, drove them pell-mellcmn:ci the region.

The Boersluuisxï¬\201ï¬\201ï¬\202ed at Schoemansdal in Vendaland since the beginning of the 1860's.

Ihxmlhere they provoked the

Venda. They recruited young men who were used in elephant hunting, as hunters, as servants, etc. and in the exploitation of the natural resources of the country.

As this escalated, the

Venda took up arms.

The defeat of the Transvaal Boers was a

shock to the whole Transvaal Republic.

Unfortunately, the Venda chiefs could not unite.

Since

1872, the Berlin Missionary Society had managed to cause conflicts amongst the three Venda paramount chiefs, Makhado, Tshivase, and Mphaphuli.

Until 1877, the Berlin Missionary

Society established mission stations in all three Venda areas and evangelised the people, converting them to the (Huristian faith. The political and territorial division of the clan and the absence of a central authority resulted in conflicts amongst the chiefs and also their neighbours.

These conflicts tended to

divert their attention from their main enemy, the white colonial conquerors, with the result that the Boers continued to expami¬\202  $^118\hat{a}\200\224$ 

## PRESIDENTS-GENERAL OF THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS (SOUTH AFRICA) 1912-1917 1917-1924

1912-1917 1917-1924 1924-1927 1927-1930 1930-1936 1937-1940 1940-1949 1949-1952 1952-1967

J.L. Dube (Dr)

1967 -

S .M . Makgatho

Z.R.Mahabane (first term) $\hat{a}$ \200\231

J.T. Gumede

P. ka Isaka Seme (Dr)

Z.R. Mahabane (second term)

A.B. Xuma (Dr)

J.S. Moroka (Dr)

Chief A.J. Lutuli

O.R. Tambo

SECREIARIES-GENERAL OF THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS

(SOUTH AFRICA)

1912-1917 V 1917-1919

-: 1

6â\200\2301919r1923

1923-1927

1927-1930

1930-1936

1936-1949

1949-1955

1955-1958

1958-1969

1969-

801 T. Plaatje\*

H.L. Bud Mbelle

S.Msane

T.D. Mweli Skota

E.J. Khaile

Rev. E. Mdolomba

Rev. J. Calata

W. Sisulu

O.R. Tambo

D . Nokwe

A. Nzo

\*From 1914 to 1917 Plaatje was in the United Kingdom, so R.V. SelOpefThema took over in 1915,  $200\2344$ 

seemed capable of holding it indefinitely.

After the Sothos' encounter with the Griqua and Koranna,

Moshoeshoe had demï¬\202xhai to acquire horses, firearms and EurOpean

skills which served the Coloured communities so well.

Thus in

1833 three missionaries from the Paris Evangelical Society settled in his kingdom.

That same year, Moorosi, chief of the tributary clan, the BaPhuthi, gave Moshoeshoe his first horse from amongst the spoils he had captured in a raid against the Cape colony.

He began negotiations with his immediate neighbours

to widen the alliance of Sotho people he had built during the

Difagane, appproaching the Korarma and Griqua.

Common interest

in resisting Boer aggression made both.communities amenable to these approaches.

The terms of the alliance included

undertakings of mutual assistance in the event of attack by an aggressor and trade agreements whereby the Griqua and Koranna sold their horses and guns to the Sotho in return for corn.

Within a few years, the Sotho had become excelltnuzrmarksmen and within a generation had bred the hardy "Basutoland pony" adapted to the rugged conditions of the mountainous country.

Through the

French missionaries, Moshoeshoe familiarised himself with European and Cape colonial politics and learnt about the conflicts and contradictions that divided the Boers from the British.

On the basis of this knowledge, he devised elaborate diplomatic strategies to isolate the Boers, who posed a real and ihmediate danger to African independence.

He entered into

negotiations with the British colonialists in the Cape from whom he extracted a treaty by whose terms the British agreed to recognise the borders of the Sotho§kingdom.

The skilful

~62»

I I Mphephu for a unitai¬\202euuicxxmi¬\202inated resistance of all Venda at the end of the 19th Century were more than necessary since the Transvaal Republic began to subjugate the last independent African communities so as to incorporate their lands into the extensive agriculture of the Boers and the emergent capitalist economy.

On October 16, 1898, the Boers occupied the mission station of Tshakoma, which lay in the centre of Vendaland.

Although the

Boers and their African collaborators later left the station and the territory of the Venda, this incident was a signaltx>the Venda that the danger was real and that it was necessary to take counter-measures.

In  $mid a 200 \ 2240$ ctober 1898 a strong Boer command crossed the border, the Doorn River, and marched to the mountain stronghold of Mphephu.

The commando was under the Boer general,

Piet Joubert.

1Wm2Venda army was estimated at 30,000 warriors who were armed partly with modern weapons.

Piet Joubert avoided

a direct confrontation.

The Venda came out unarmmxi'to the Boer

laager and started trade.

On October 21, 1898,1i¬\202m2Venda

successfully attacked the unsuspecting enemy.

The Boers

retaliated with their cannon.

The defeat of Mphephu had a

demoralising effect on the Venda people.

Mphephu was hunted

down.

Tshivhase had given Joubert a map of Vendaland which facilitated the Boer invasion of the unknown termrhn Joubert

called for more reinforcements.

'This needed time.

In the

meantime, Mphephu strengthened his defences.

But his appeal for

stronger unity was not successful.

On November 16, 1898, the

Boers stormed Mphephu's stronghold.

A few of the Venda warriors

w120~

from Boer oppression.

But Sechele had realistically to strive to

keep>'i¬\201mmace" between his people and the Boers.

Apart from other

African chiefdoms facing the same plight as himself} ti¬\202uare were no strong allies he could turn to for support.

His estimation of

the situation was vindicated when the Bathau $\hat{a}$ 200 $\hat{2}$ 24Sotho clan rose against the Boers in 1854.

A commandoiinvaded their territory

and besieged them in an enormous cave.

Cut off from supplies of

food and drinking water, the Bathau were starved into submission.

3,000 perished in the fighting and subsequent siege.

By the end of the 1850's, the Boers in the Transvaal had established a tenuous hold over the Tswana chiefdoms along their western tmnnuiaries.

The Pedi, Lohedu and Venda, however, still

presented an intractable problem - for the Boers.

The War of the Axe and the War of Mlanjeni

Between the 1770's and the 1840's, Britain had developed into an industrial nation thanks to a number of innovations, principally in the textile industry.

The spin-off effect of this

had generated a number of auxiliary improvements in the chemical industry, industrial lighting, transportation, etc.

By the

1840's,Âfhï¬\201ijsh exports were dominated by textiles.

The defeat

<3f revolutionary France during the wars that lasted until 1815,
had also won Britain a position of political pre-eminence on the
iEuropean continent.</pre>

But.it was the production of capital goods that catapulted Britain into her dominant position in international affairs.

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The production of iron and steelvmme fundamental to this process. The Napoleonic wars that raged i , ^{\circ}
```

the situation when he narrowly escaped capture by a group of Xhosa scouts who had been reconnoitering the fort.

He raced

back to the fort and was just able to call his men to arms before the battle for Grahamstown commenced.

Makhanda's challenge had in fact thrown away a tactical advantage by giving Wiltshire prior warning of the impending attack.

The Xhosa commanders also seem to have forsaken the tactics that had served them so well during 1793 and 1799.

r

Attacking across an open len, thexmnni $\neg\202$ rms charged the British positions only to be mownuéown by a hail of bullets from the rifles of the Redcoats.

They regrouped and attempted an

outflanking movement to complement their second charge.

At this

critical juncture in the battle, a party of coloured elephant hunters commanded by a Khoi-khoi chief, Boezak, (not to be confused with the Khoi-khoi leader of the 1799 revolt) rode into Grahamstown and came to the assistance of the beleaguered fort. Boezak knew the Xhosa military commanders well and broke the outflanking movement by ordering his marksmen to pick them off one by one.

 $\[ \]$   $\[\]$   $\[$ 

This

pause in the battle gave Wiltshire the opporunity to turn the cannons to face the next wave of assault.

When the attack

resumed, he ordered his men to fire a withering hail of grapeshot into the warriors' advancing ranks.

Mdushane, Makhanda's

 $\cos 200\224$  commander, fell during this assault and the ranks of the Xhosa army broke.

Makhanda and the surviving commanders tried in vain

to rally their'nmui, but their morale had collapsed.

The cream

of the 10,000 warriors who hadxnarched on Grahamstown with

\_34-

the traditional leaders, especially the counsellors of Sandile's ancient set, whose policies of war and messianism had ended in  $\frac{200}{235}$  failure  $\frac{200}{235}$ .

George Grey, the Governor whc>tuuizreplaced Cathcart in 1854, ordered the arrest of Maqoma in.December 1857 and had Ynï¬\2021incarcerated on Robben Island.

Nonggawuse herself survived

the disastrous episode and died a lonely death in the Victorha East district.

Sandile was spared arrest but was forced to look on helplessly while George Grey proceeded with the "civilisation" of the Xhosa.

The Cape colonial addministration built military roads through the Ciskei and planted a colony of German eX-Legionnaires on farms in the regicmw

The missionaries were

encouraged to set up new and larger schools; Lovedale, Healdtown and St Matthews were built during this time.

The sons amd

daughters of the Xhosa chiefs were shipped off to Cape Town where they were placed ai;ti¬\202ue Anglican Church school, Zonnebloem, on the slopes of the Table mountain.

Grey hoped to produce a

generation of Anglicised Africans so alienated from their own past and their people that they would become loyal subjects of the British crown.

Though the surviving chiefs tried to place obstacles in Grey's way, they no longer possessed either the Inilitary force or the political authority to back up these words with force.

Maqoma was finally released from Robben Island in 1869.

Two

years later, when the British were planning to renew hostilities agaijuï¬\202: the Xhosa, he was re~arrested.

This second term of

imprisonment ended his life.

He died on September 9, 1873,

luvxmmq spent almost all his adult years at the forefront of his  $\ensuremath{^{\sim}85^{\sim}}$ 

After Makhanda's escape from Robben Island, the British authorities decided to remove David Stuurman to axmnmzsecure prison colony.

He was transported to New South Wales, Australia, whemtalua subsequently died around 1826.

The wars of resistance

in the Cape continued but were superseded by other developments.

Mfecane and the Rise of Military Kingdoms

The period of South African history known as Mfecane in Nguni, and Difaqane in the Sothoâ\200\224Tswana languages, had its origins anmnu; the Nguni cf'the Northâ\200\224eastern belt in modern day Natal.

The area was divided amongst a number of small principalities of which the Ndwandwe, the Hlubi and the Ngwane were the largest.

Like the southern Nguni and their Sotho~Tswana neighbours, the northern Nguni were mixed farmers raising vegetables and grain in addition to rearing cattle.

Since Una

1500's the chiefdoms of the region had been engaged in the swiftly expanding trade with the Portuguese~held port at the mouth of the Maputo River, named Delagoa Bay hurti¬\202ua Portuguese. Acting through the Tsonga who lived around the bay, the chiefs of the region gathered hides and ivory at their capitals from whence they were transported by caravan to the Tsonga middlemen for sale to the Portuguese traders.

From the Portuguese the Nguni

obtained trade beads, copper, iron and a new grain, maize.

The significance of the introduction of maize was its novelty to Southern Africa.

It was a.hardy, easy to cultivate

and grew well in the plains and valleys of time areas

iIt Spread

rapidly Ifi¬\202hllting in a revolution in food production.

The high

tuï¬\202welf from dependence on the Khoi-khoi.

He wrote to the DEIC

suggesting cattle raids and enslavement of the Khoiâ\200\224khoi, but the idea was firmly rejected by the DEIC, who ordered him to re-open trade with clans further inland.

The Garinghaikhonaqua

intercepted the Dutch emissaries and agreed to relax the trade boycott in return for bettetherms for themselves.

Trade

recommenced, but Van Riebeeck had marked out Autshumayo as the author of his troubles and resolved to destroy him.

The Early Resistance

It was in part to overcome these difficulties, that the DEIC decided to release some of its men to become settler farmmnms in the Cape in 1657.

Land to establish farms was carved out of the pasturage of the Khoi-khoi behind Table Mountairllxuniing to the first armed clashes between the Dutch and the Khoi-khoi.

In her

article "Khoisan Resistance to the Dutch in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries" <1), Shula Marks has written at length about this resistance and her research forms the bashsci our analysis.

To discourage the Dutch farmers, the "tribesmen" drove their cattle into the fields and periodically seized Dutch cattle found on the common pasturage.

Van Riebeeck retaliated by seizing

Khoi~khoi hostages and holding them against concessions for grazing rights.

By employing this method, he was able to extract concessions from the Khoiâ\200\224khoi.

The opportunity to avenge

himself on Autshumayo came when the Khoi $\hat{a}\200\224$ khoi began a second trade boycott in 1658.

Van Riebeeck lured Autshumayo to his fort

people's resistance.

King Moshoeshoe and Sotho Resistance

The resistance of the Sotho people is closely connected with the name of King Moshoeshoe, a man known for his sagacity, Inilitary skillxs, political adroitness, qualities of leadership, steadfastness of aim and combination of appeals to reason and skilful negotiations.

Exmh at Menkgwaneng in about 1786, Moshoeshoe ruled for 46 yeart; kwefore he died in his capital on the slopes of Thaba Bosiu  $\frac{3}{200}$  Mountain of the Night  $\frac{3}{200}$  on March 11, 1870 at the age of 84. In about 1820, he left Menkgwaneng and settled with his people eight miles away on the slopes<af Butha $\frac{3}{200}$  Butha a natural fortress with a flat summit on which to graze and water livestock.

He married many wives ~ reputedly between 140 and 200 ~ to cement allienunas, linking him to potential allies and providing labour to fill the granaries with corn for food and beer.

Difaqane/Mfecane (or Shaka's wars as it is called) had begun two or three years before Moshoeshoe founded his village at Buthaâ $200\224$ Buthe.

We have already discussed these wars, but it is necessary to repeat that the Hlubi met and defeated the Tlokwa, then governed by a formidable woyman, Mmaâ\200\224Nthathisi, who ruled as regent for her son, Sekonyela.

After moving westward, attacking

a section of the BaFokeng on the way, and being again harassed by the Hlubi, sin200u travelled southâ20024east to settle close to Moshoeshoe's vilhage.

i

The Tlokwa besieged the mountain fortress

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had alitnmnxai their ancestral spirits by sinfulness.

To regain

the favour of the gods, the Xhosa should eschew sorcery, confess their transgressions against one another and return to the mores of their forefathers.

This would give them the moral and

physical strength to crush their enendes and regain their lost land on the west of the Fish River.

In a spectacular misinterpretation of the New Testament, he told his people that the European settlers and colonialists were fugitives from a far off land who had been driven from their homeland for a grave sacrilege.

They had murdered the son of

their God and werezrumy searching for a new home which they intended to seize by gradually taking over the land of the Africans.

Unity under the cults of Mdalidiphu and Thayi would enable the Xhosa to resist and drive the invaders:hir201xthe sea where they came from.

Eloquence was Makhanda's chief asset.

A missionary, Rev.

James Read Snr, remarked favourably about his power to sway multitudes after he heard him preaching in 1816.

Like other

prophets, Makhanda increased his credibility by "miracle working" and periodic retreats into the wilderness for meditation and seclushmm.

It was after one such retreat that he was called to appear beftuxathilambe.

After listening to the prophet, Ndlambe gave Makhanda his official backing.

Backed by a powerful chief's

prestige, Makhanda found it easier to win adherents.

Chiefs and

chmikeads gave him their support because of conviction or in response to pressure  $fin\201xmn$  their subjects.

He was consulted on

all matters of state and was accordedxnany privileges and marks of recognition normally the preserve of chiefs.

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the Boer republic to the North, the British colonial administration of Natal supported their resistance to theihmmr claims.

All this changed in 1877, when Britain annexed the 'Transvaal.auui Shepstxnue became its first British Administrator. To win Boer support for his administration, Shepstone began backing the Boer claims, even claiming to have discovered documentary proof to this effect.

Since then, no one has ever

produced these alleged "proofs".

The Natal colonial

administration was intent on breaking the power of the Zulu kingdom which they described as "the spearpoint of aggressive leadership" amongst the Africans.

Finally, in December 1878, the

Commissioner-General for Natal, Sir Bartle Frere, presented Cetshwayo with an arrogant demand that he surrender the sovereignty of his kingdom.

The battle proper started on January 22, 1879. Frederick Engels, the military theorist and historian, wrote about this battle, stating the Zulus â\200\235did what no European army can do. Armed only with lances and spears, without any firearms, they advanced under a hail of bullets from breechloadersxuato the bayonets of the English infantry - the best in the world for fighting in closed ranks â\200\224 and threw them into confusion more than once, yea, even forced them to retreat in spite of immence disparity in weapons".<16>

Three British columns consisting of 18,000 troops backed by wagon trains of munitions took part.

These included 2,000

cavalry, enï¬\201xillery and engineers; 700 wagons and carts, rockets and shells for the cannons and Gatling guns, and 2,000,000 rounds of ammunition.

They were armei¬\201 with the excellent Martin~Henry  $|\hat{\mathbf{A}} \ll 105|$ 

500 Redcoats, gnu: the Xhosa fields to the torch and drove 8,000 Xhosa men,1mmmxland children across the Fish River.

Chungwa,

Tshaka's successor as chief of the unnukhwebe, was killed during the fighting.

Amongst.ti¬\202u3 fugitives fleeing from the British war machine was a young diviner, Makhanda, usually misnamed as Makana, the son of Gwala of the Cwere clan.

Cradock's success owed much to

the treachery of Ngqika which the British repaid in 1812, by recognising him as "king" of the Xhosa.

Makhanda nursed a bitter

hatred of the traitor for the rest of his days and the experience in 1811 exercised an overwhelming influence on his later life.

The entry of the British after 1806, decisively shifted the tmlance of forces in favour of the whites in the Eastern Cape.

By the end ci¬\202fti¬\202ue 18th Century, Dutch maritime power was on the

The DEIC itself went bankrupt in 1799 and its assets were taken over by the Batavian Republic.

Ihi¬\202iain on the other

decline.

hand, was a rising industrial power, whose armies and navies were engaged in worldwide conquest to gain markets and sources of raw materials for her burgeoning manufacturers.

Facing this powerful

adversary, the African peoples of South Africa stood little chance of success.

The crushing defeat of the Xhosa under

Ndlambe was a portent of the future.

During the years after the expulsion of  $tin\201m2)in\201nosa$  from the Zuurveld, a mass movement swept the "Ciskei".

It was led by the

diviher, Makhanda, one of the thousands of refugees who had been driven across the Fish River by Cradock's Redcoats.

Makhanda had

grown up amongs Ndlambe's followers, <aast of the Sundays Rivera

â\200\230

<"\202isintegration.

Tshaka welcomed both Khoi-khoi and deserting

slaves into the ranks of his people.

These brought with them

valuable skills, such as horse  $200\224$  riding and gun  $200\224$  handling, which were new to the Xhosa.

iBeginning'iJlâ $200\2301789$ , the Boers and the DEIC made a number of efforts to drive the Xhosa back across the Fish River.

Each

attempt ended in failure. Massive cattle raids against the Xhosa were launched by settlers during the same year, renewing the cycle that had led to the last war.

At the same time,

the

number of Khoiâ\200\224khoi servants who deserted service on white farms increased, causing the settlers to complain bitterly that Tshaka was planning to renew hostilities against them.

The tensions

between the two communities gradually mounted until 1793, when a local commandant, Lindeque, attacked the Xhosa.ci¬\202rhefdoms kunping to evict them from the area west of the Fish River.

Lindeque scored an initial success and captured 2,000 cattle belonging to the Xhosa in the process.

But by thist $i \neg \ 201hm$ , the

Xhosa had overcome their fear of firearms and had adapted their military tactics to take account of them.

The Xhosa

counterâ\200\224attack, led by the unnukhwebe, was swift and effective.

Utilising the bushy terrain for cower, they managed to neutralise the settlers' guns.

Between 50,000 and to 60,000 cattle were

seized during the war and the Boers were driven out of the Zuurveld.

After futile attempts to dislodge the Xhosa, the DEIC finally agrtxxi to accept time status quo.

The Xhosa held on to

their lands and the Sundays River became the boundary between the colony and the Xhosa.

rifle: â\200\235Battalion volley fire against massed opponents could commence at upwards of 800 yards.

Average accuracy was 400

yards.

The .45 calibre bullet left gaping wounds and smashed bone.

Ini $\tilde{A}$ Oelaborate system of garrisons and communication lines was developed and fresh troops held in reserveâ\200\235.<17> The

British Commander, Lord Chelmsford, planned to advance on Cetshwayo's capital, Ulundi, capture it and force submission out of the Zulu king.

On the African side, it is said 50,000 men in Zululand were' under arms, organised in 35 regiments of various age groups  $\hat{a}$ 200\224 this out of a population of about 300,000.

The active corps

consisted of 26 regiments comprising 40,000 men of whom about 20,000 were under the age of 30.

The princes of Zululand were in

the Amasoka regiment which was regarded as "Cetshawayo's own". This was the best dressed regiment. The warriors carried pure

white shields.

Regimental uniforms were more or less the same except for minor features, headâ $200\224dress$  and colour<yfti202mzoxhide shields, which distinguished one regiment from another.

All

uWirriors were barefoot "and this accounted for the fleetness of foot".<18>

On 17 January, 12 Zulu regiments assembled at Ulundi in preparation to meet the invading British columns.

The 12

regiments were commanded by Ntshingwayo and Mavumengwane, two able Zulu generals who led the British a merry chase through the hills of the countryside while Chelsmford tidmxi to find an elusive enemy:

"The Zulu generals, amongst them Sigcwelegcwele,

Usubebu and Dabulamanzi were playirwgal<uat-andâ\200\224mouse game with the British, showing an elusive presence, now here and now there  $^{\sim}106^{\sim}$ 

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