

REPORT ON TRIP TO DAR TO ATTEND AN OAU LIBERATION COMMITTEE

SEMINAR

On arrival in Darâ\200\224es-Salaam on the 23.05.88 I was informed that the seminar was cancelled the previous Friday. No explanation given. The, guess was that it was either because there weren't enough funds as the senior members of the Liberation Committee would be absent.

In the circumstance the chief rep asked me not to attempt to return via Nairobi but to stay for the rally on the 25th and to assist tî-\20lnlin.visits he intended to make to some embassies. â\200\231 On the 25th as we drove to Party HQ we were surprised to find that life was as usualâ\200\224shops open and no rally mood. At Party HQ we were informed that the assembly point was the Youth HQ. Inmediately all enthusiasntdisappeared and we guessed that the Secretary General of Chama Cha.Mapinduzii was not going to address the rally.

On arrival at Youth HQ we were informed that the marches that wereto have started from three points were never publicised. NObody infact had heard of then a.ndnister without potfolio was to address the meeting. The only people who were there were ANC and PAC with one or two from SWAPO. The rest was a company of Mgambo and the National Service Board. we narohed the 400 yards to Mnazi Mbja and passed the guest of honour and regional party members. Frankly I do not think anybody was serious. The lady, who spoke last had no written speech.

I have seen thenu Their spokesnan had apparently gone there to show that he had started to learn Swahili each sentenced being half Swahili and half English â\200\224 every now and again apologising that he could not speak Swahili properly but felt it important that he should address the people in their own language. he will do better next time. Fbr He that is all I could understand except for mending SHukurus.

The PAC was clowning even.nore than

At least our address was broadcast twice that day. Perhaps they had understood our Shukurus better. SWAPO had asked us to speak on their behalf.

Among the embassies we saw were Ruanda and Burundi. Ruanda invites the President or his representative to attend a conference of the party this month. Burundi is inviting the President ostensibly among other things to receive money that has been collected from the population for the liberation.novements. Bburundi went on to explain that they have no dealings with PAC. Both would like indication so that they should.nake the necessary arrangements.

The Chief Representative informed.ne that MWaliHM.sent his secretary to informlnhinlthat venezuela is giving an honarary degree to Nelson Mandela and invites the President to receive the degree on behalf of Nelson accompanied by cde Johnny Makatinii and a named SWA comrade. They do not insist on the President going but would wish he attended as there would at the sametime be a colquium on Africa and Latin America, meaning perhaps that there would be delegations fronlother Latin American countries. Mwalimm, it was reported, stressed the importance of attendance even if the President is unable to attend.

M. PILISO

1.6.88

had been a sustained political offensive by the Botha regime against him, with elements such as Pik Botha and Magnus Malan issuing aggressive statements. Pretoria persists with the line that it is interested in peace while Mozambique, Angola and the rest of the FLS are opposed. Strangely, Pik Botha is presenting the idea of a regional conference as originating from the government of Mozambique. Another issue which Strauss raised was that the prospect of improving relations between Mozambique and South Africa was being blocked by elements within the Pretoria regime. Pres Chissano was of the view that there is an element of truth in this. After the Homoine massacre, the representatives of the South African Department of Military Intelligence had pulled out of the Joint Liaison Committee which meant that this committee could not meet even to finalise discussions that had been taking place concerning the issue of Cahora Bassa. Pres Chissano mentioned this to Strauss. Pres Chissano said that in his view any meeting between him and Botha would have to be preceded by other steps including the reconvening of the Liaison Committee with the DMI present, holding of a series of meetings at Ministerial level, guarantees for the safety of Cahora Bassa and the South Africa â\200\224 Maputo railway line, routing of SA exports to Maputo, an end to the sacking of Mozambican mineworkers and a commitment to dismantle the bandit group. Pres Chissano had thought that it might be necessary to convey his views to Botha concerning both the proposed regional conference and the bilateral meeting, partly to ensure that the Western powers could not argue that we are not prepared to talk under any circumstances. He had however decided not to do this without consulting the FLS in the first instance. We were all involved in a dangerous game. The situation had been worsened by the February 24 bannings of organisations within South Africa. The FLS are still faced with the question of what strategy to adopt. Should they launch their own initiative? Should they leave this to other African states such as Kenya and Gabon which seemed to be thinking of one initiative or another? The Soviet ambassador in Maputo has seen Pres Chissano and proposed to him that the FLS should take the lead on the question of a peaceful resolution of the Southern African question. He suggested that the FLS should call for the convening of an international conference, under the auspices of the UN, to address this issue. This would ensure that we do not allow reactionary forces to take the lead. Pres Chissano also pointed out that the Nordic countries are themselves proposing the calling of a UN Conference on Southern Africa. At the Nordic â\200\224 FLS conference in Arusha the Mozambican delegation had said they would support the idea of such a conference so long as it did not result in a retreat on positions already adopted by the international community such as the need to reinforce the defence capability of Mozambique and other FLS. Pres Chissano said that he would speak later on other questions such as the Cahora Bassa, the MNR, the amnesty law and the Africa Fund.

11. Pres dos Santos then briefed the meeting on the situation in Angola. He said that the situation had been worsening since October 1987 when the SADF intervened to stop FAPLA's offensive against UNITA. Fighting was still going on around Cuito Cuanavale. The SADF is using a number of battalions supported by armoured units, artillery and fighter bombers. The intention of the enemy forces was to take the municipality of Cuito Cuanavale. By March 19, the fighting was at a distance of between 12 and 20 km of the town. The SADF was supported by units of UNITA. The overall objective of the Pretoria regime and UNITA was to take Cuito Cuanavale, advance further north, attacking and capturing Luena and other places, and reach the Zairean border. This would split the country in two, with UNITA claiming to be in control of the eastern part. During February, UNITA had formed a "government" with the aim of installing this in Luena when the SADF offensive had reached the Zairean border. But because of the successes of FAPLA, UNITA had been forced to install this "government" in Jamba. Because of the offensive by the Pretoria regime, a general movement of Cuban troops southwards had taken place from January 13 onwards. Elements of these forces were involved in the defence of Cuito Cuanavale. Fighting was also taking place along the entire southern part of Angola affecting Cuando Cobango, Huila and Kunene, involving the SADF and the SWATF, but not UNITA. The enemy has massed large forces just south of the Angolan border, including 3 infantry

8th Mechanised Brigade. Some of these were moving northwards towards the Angola border. During the fighting, the enemy had suffered heavy losses including 47 aircraft of various types which had been brought down in the period since October 1987. (A representative of the General Staff of FAPLA gave a detailed report on the military situation with the aid of a map on which this situation had been plotted.) Destabilisation from Zaire was continuing with infiltration of UNITA groups from that country. The government of Zaire continues to deny this. The government of Angola continues to look forward to the meeting with the Zairean government which Pres Kaunda is supposed to convene.

brigades of the SADF and elements of the

12. Pres dos Santos also briefed the meeting on the negotiations that were taking place between the governments of Angola, the US, Cuba and the Pretoria regime. He mentioned that this entailed a series of agreements, including: an agreement between Angola and South Africa, an agreement between Angola, Cuba and South Africa, an agreement between SWAPO and South Africa, an agreement between Angola and the US and the implementation of Res 435. (N.B. A written document explaining all this was distributed to all Heads of State but not the Heads of the liberation movements. It is important to obtain a copy of this, especially as it was not easy to take coherent notes as this document was being presented.)

13. General Obasanjo was then invited to join the meeting to

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by a gradual withdrawal. 20,000 of these should have pulled out after a period of 12 months. The Cuban force as a whole would leave Angola over a period of 48 months.

15. Pres Kaunda said that the question what would happen if and when the Cubans left is important. We know what happened after Pretoria had agreed to withdraw its troops from Angola and signed the Nkomati Accord. Angola should not depend on promises made by Washington and Pretoria. As long as she does not feel safe, the Cuban troops should stay.

16. Pres dos Santos said that once various matters had been agreed, the next step would be the convening of a tripartite ministerial meeting involving Angola, Cuba and the USA. If this meeting reached agreement, then the US government would convene a meeting between these three and the Pretoria regime. After this, there would be a meeting between three or four of these with SWAPO.

17. Pres Kaunda reported that 4 days before, the Soviet ambassador had approached him to say the FLS should take an initiative regarding a peaceful resolution of the problems of Southern Africa and to assure him that the USSR would support such an initiative. He read an excerpt from a report given to him by the Soviet Ambassador dealing with the last meeting between Schultz and Sharvanadze where they had discussed Southern Africa.

18. Pres Mugabe said the idea of a regional conference was not bad per se, provided the situation was right and the objectives acceptable. The strategy of the Pretoria regime was aimed at denying the people of South Africa any political status that was in keeping with democratic principles. The struggle within South Africa is continuing. As in Namibia, the parties in conflict are the oppressed and the oppressor. Those who should confer are those in conflict. If this were to be agreed, then the FLS might assist that dialogue. Before we act, we need to be convinced that the Botha regime is ready to talk to the genuine leadership of the people of South Africa as represented by the ANC, the UDF etc. In the present situation in which Botha is acting against these forces, the environment is not right for the FLS to talk to Botha. But given the fact of destabilisation, he has no objection and would give his full support to dialogue between Angola and Mozambique on the one hand and Pretoria on the other. A regional conference outside these two contexts would only serve to legitimise the Pretoria regime and get them off the hook with regard to the need for it to talk to the people it should be talking to in Namibia and South Africa. If the Botha regime was indeed moving to create a climate conducive to negotiations, we could then look at the issue of a regional conference which would aim to encourage Botha to move further. Perhaps we should only

present his reports. He explained (together with Pres Mugabe}, that the Vancouver Summit had decided that the Commonwealth should extend nonâ\200\224lethal defence assistance to the FLS that are members of the Commonwealth as well as Mozambique. He was visiting the region to begin the process of assessing the needs of these countries, at the request of the Commonwealth. As he was just beginning this work, he was not really in a position to brief the meeting about progress that he had achieved. He was however interested in any collective input that the FLS could make, including any general regional emphasis that the FLS might suggest he should include in his report. At the request of the meeting, he also gave a brief report on the InterAction Council that had taken place in Harare. He thought that the session on South Africa had been very good. He explained that they had extended invitations to representatives of the Pretoria regime so that they could hear the views of all the important political forces within South Africa.

on Southern Africa issued by the Council at the end of the meeting was not bad. Pres Nujoma commended the input of our supporters, such as Gen Obasanjo and Malcolm Fraser, at the meeting of the Council. (N.B. No substantive comment was made by the FLS on any of the issues that Gen Obasanjo raised. A separate report on the meeting of the InterAction Council is being prepared.)

He also thought that the statement

14. President dos Santos continued to report that, at this point in time, the Angolan government is seeking an understanding with the US Government and the Pretoria regime involving the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola over a period of 4 years. In the negotiations they present these troops as a "dissuasion force" protecting Angola and therefore, in principle, the rest of Southern Africa from Pretoriaâ\200\231s aggression. The question that remains unanswered is what would happen after the withdrawal of these troops if, at that point, the apartheid system remains in place. Pretoria and Washington want the Government of Angola to talk to UNITA. The FHA rejects this and will continue to do so. They are argue that as long as external assistance is extended to UNITA, then the UNITA problem cannot be described as internal to Angola. Once such support ceased, then the problem would become an internal one. The Angolans would then be able to solve it themselves. The FHA accept that the problem will not be solved by military means. After the ending of external support to UNITA, the problem would then be solved politically. The PRA and Cuba have, in the negotiations, abandoned the concept of southern based and northern based contingents of the Cuban troops. Over the last few months, further reinforcements have arrived from Cuba. Some of these have moved into the southern part of Angola. What the PRA is currently proposing to the US government is that an agreement be reached providing for the gradual movement of these troops to be located above the 13th Parallel, accompanied

9. Pres Kaunda said it was important that Pres Chissano had met Strauss. He proposed that he should meet P.W.Botha and present him with facts concerning the MNR despite the fact that, as Pres Kaunda believed, Botha knew exactly what was happening. Pres Kaunda also proposed that he could write to Botha to say that the FLS wanted to meet him to discuss the implementation of the preâ\200\224conditions that had been spelt out by the EPG.

10. Pres dos Santos said that we are dealing with three (3) conferences. These are:

- (a) a regional conference which would be attended by the FLS Heads of State and P.W.Botha;
- {b) a regional conference proposed by Pretoria to discuss Angola and Namibia and which would also be attended by UNITA;
- (c) a UN international conference on Southern Africa.

Angola had already expressed its opposition to the conference suggested by Pretoria. UNITA has no juridical or international status and could not be allowed to participate in any conference. If such a regional conference as proposed by Strauss were to be held, it would have to include the South African and Namibian liberation movements as well as the mass democratic movement. At this stage, the only international conference that might be useful for our purposes would be one that would deal with security in Southern Africa enabling us to use this issue as a propaganda instrument against the Pretoria regime. He was not sure that the Strauss idea should be treated as a credible proposal which he had been mandated to put forward. As far as he knew, the order of priorities of the FLS was the liberation of Namibia first, to be followed by the emancipation of South Africa. Meetings of the FLS should serve as a point of contact for the coordination of strategy and tactics to accomplish these goals. It is necessary to pose the question whether we should meet the South African regime at this point, when it is isolated and when that isolation is growing. Would we not helping Botha by meeting him? We should look for ways of ensuring that we act in unity with the West on the Namibian question, to isolate Pretoria and increase pressure on it regarding this question. We should treat the Namibian question as priority. After it is resolved, then we could consider whether to meet Botha or not on the South African issue. He said it was logical that Mozambique should maintain relations with Pretoria. Despite the Ruacana hydroelectric project, Angola has no economic relations with Pretoria. He proposed that Mozambique should differentiate between economic and political relations. It should encourage economic relations but not the political. He did not believe that Pretoria could stop supporting the MNR. Such support might decrease but would not end as long as apartheid exists. The main problem is the apartheid system.

consider the idea of a UN international conference in the event that the Angolan and Mozambique initiatives fail. The question of timing is important. The Soviet ambassador in Harare had talked to him about the possibility of an international conference on Southern Africa discussed during the Gorbachev/Reagan Summit. The Soviet ambassador had also asked him whether the Soviet Government should meet the Pretoria regime.

and informed him that this matter would be

19. Pres Mwinzi agreed with Pres Mugabe. We should not help the Pretoria regime to break out of its isolation. We should not give them the political lifeline they seek. He agreed that Mozambique and Angola should talk to the Botha regime.

20. Pres Masire noted that in its diplomatic offensive, the Pretoria regime presented the FLS as being unwilling to talk. This might confuse some governments as nearly seems to have happened with the Canadians. Therefore the FLS needs to look for ways in which they could call Pretoria's bluff without giving the racists the lifeline they seek. We could possibly repeat that the Lusaka Manifesto is still on the table and thus demonstrate that Pretoria is engaged in a game of make belief designed to mislead us while that regime does what it really intends to do. Pretoria is not ready to talk to the region seriously. Perhaps the US and the USSR could push Pretoria to a meaningful conference, but he doubted this.

21. Pres Tambo said that the Malan strategy was to knock out everybody to force them into discussions. Recent statements on Angola and at the Security Council showed that Pretoria was still bent on pursuing a tough line of force. Botha had proposed the idea of a regional conference at the time of the signing of the Nkomati Accord. At that time, as now, he was very keen to break out of his isolation. Our people would feel betrayed if at this time, when they are being trampled underfoot, the FLS met Botha. Strauss went to Maputo via Pretoria to pick up the idea of a regional conference. If such a conference took place now, it would encourage Botha to be even more stubborn. Botha is also contributing to his own isolation through his own blunders. He would like to demonstrate contact with the FLS particularly at this stage. The first problem is therefore one of timing, given what is happening inside South Africa. Pres Tambo said he was happy with the conditions laid down by Pres Chissano for a meeting with Botha. Botha knows what is happening in Mozambique. Botha is only after perpetuating white domination throughout Southern Africa. Pres Tambo said that he was not sure that Pres Chissano should not stick to the conditions he listed as a requirement for his meeting with Botha. Perhaps it would be correct to demand that the Pretoria regime prove its bona fides by abiding by the agreements already reached concerning Namibia.

10.

We ourselves are poised to intensify the campaign for sanctions. Any international conference should be directed at putting pressure on Pretoria. He would endorse the view that if the Cuban troops pulled out, Pretoria would move back to try to impose Savimbi on the Angolan people. Pretoria does not want a settlement in Angola but victory. The central issue facing our region is to get rid of the apartheid regime. At may agree to negotiations: at this point he is not interested. We should take advantage of the blunders of the enemy to isolate it further. We are also aware of Pretoria's record of betrayal. Botha is in trouble. Instead of rewarding him, we should pursue him.

me time Botha

22. Pres Chissano said that if an international conference is to be called, even by the UN, the FLS should decide whether the Pretoria regime participates or not. We also need to understand better what is meant by the proposed international conference. Perhaps the foreign ministers should probe this issue. We should keep the idea of a regional conference in our minds as a possible strategic or tactical move in future. He said he would prepare for the meeting with Botha slowly. He would not rush into it. We also need to sensitise our friends before we get involved in such a meeting. In general, we need to be on the offensive politically, militarily and diplomatically. Pres Chissano also reported that the Italians and the EEC have agreed to provide non-lethal assistance for use by Mozambican troops guarding their projects in Mozambique. He agreed with Pres dos Santos that a distinction should be made between political and economic relations with Pretoria. The only political contact between themselves and Pretoria have related only to the MNR and the ANC. He agrees that Pretoria will continue to support the MNR but is of the view that we should fight the regime to stop this support. He also explained that they, together with the Portuguese, have prevailed on Pretoria to finance the repair and other costs of the Cahora Bassa dam and the transmission lines. To protect the project, Mozambican and not South African troops will be used. He also explained that the amnesty law adopted by the Mozambique parliament was directed at individuals and not at the MNR as a group. It is not a starting point for negotiations. There is no need to negotiate with the MNR. There is a visible improvement in the situation in the country, especially in the provinces of Zambezi, Manica, Inyambane and Niassa. In the last 3 months, 500 former bandits have been granted amnesty. Thousands of civilians are coming out of the bush in areas formerly dominated by the bandits. With the training and deployment of a militia, the population was becoming more involved in the struggle against the bandits. A serious split had developed among the bandits. Pretoria is continuing to support the MNR. A Colonel du Preez of the SADF operates as an MNR controller in Malawi. Air intrusions are continuing. Journalists have been flown into Gorongosa by the

and Botha's manoeuvres. It is true that the soe

levels. Pretoria itself was becoming more sensitive to the question of the need for negotiations. Accordingly Botha floated the idea of a National Statutory Council as part of his "reform" process. He won the May white elections on the platform of security and interpreted the results as giving him a two-part mandate, namely: (a) to destroy the ANC and the extra-parliamentary forces and (b) having achieved this, to continue with his "reform" process. At the same time he set up a mechanism, through Stoffel van der Merwe, to promote negotiations. Stoffel however failed to attract anybody to the National Council. Botha then shifted the emphasis to the issue of economic growth, hoping to rally everybody around the perspective of prosperity which would benefit both black and white. In the meantime, the struggle had been going on despite the state of emergency (soe)

has had an adverse effect on the momentum of the struggle because of arrests etc. But by the beginning of this year, the regime admitted that the soe had not worked as it had wished and that it would have to adopt new measures of repression. This it did on February 24. Botha's strategy is to stamp out the national liberation movement in order to clear the way for him to talk to and enter into agreements with the "moderates". The February 24 clampdown has angered the people and will not fundamentally affect the ability of the people to organise. New elements are joining the struggle as exemplified by the heightened involvement of the church. We should expect a continuation and escalation of the struggle. Sanctions are also having an effect on the economy as admitted by such people as the professor of economics at the University of Stellenbosch and Pretoria's Minister of Finance. We will continue to work for more sanctions among other things, to deny Botha the possibility of increased economic growth. Real and effective sanctions would contribute greatly to compel Botha to recognise the need to negotiate with the genuine leaders of our people. The struggle inside is advancing. Armed struggle continues with the additional factor of training of cadres within the country. We continue to encourage our people to act against the apartheid regime and reinforce them with our own actions. We have been meeting many of our people from inside the country to guide and strengthen them and have found their morale to be very high. The Bantustan system is in crisis as exemplified by events in the Transkei and Bophuthatswana. Even the traditional chiefs have combined to form their Own democratic organisation. The Bantustan chiefs have refused to serve in Botha's National Council. building up our contact with various forces and individuals within the white population. The reality however is that our offensive evokes a counter-offensive on the part of the regime. The perspective ahead of us is one of a tough and worsening situation characterised by a drift towards a violent explosion. We will ourselves continue to watch the international situation to see how it affects our struggle.

We continue to work to isolate the core of reaction by

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beginning to abandon the

5. President Nujoma then made a presentation concerning the situation in Namibia. He thanked the FLS for inviting SWAPO to attend the meeting and to report on the struggle it is conducting. He said that since the last FLS Summit, Pretoria has increased its troops in Namibia and has even started conscripting women. Attacks against Angola have increased. The Botha regime has no intention of finding a solution for the Namibian question. As evidence of this, Pretoria is now organising a whites-only election in Namibia and is reverting to the division of the country into Bantustans. It is even concept of the multi-party conference. The white elections will be followed by Bantustan elections. Some of the puppets are not keen to involve themselves in this process. Botha has produced a bogus constitution for Namibia to circumvent the agreements contained in UNSC Resolution 435. SWAPO therefore has no alternative but to intensify the armed struggle, especially through the infiltration of underground units into the townships and cities of Namibia. SWAPO has accepted UNSC Resolution 601. The UN Secretary General has not received any response from Pretoria on this resolution. He has informed Pretoria that all outstanding questions concerning the independence of Namibia have been resolved. Even the question of the electoral system has been agreed. Furthermore, SWAPO accepts the proposals of the Government of Angola for the settlement of the Namibian issue. SWAPO is concerned at the manoeuvres of the government of the FRG to reactivate the Contact Group and to gain support for the linkage issue. SWAPO would support the idea of the reconvening of the Contact Group if the purpose was to put pressure on Pretoria to cooperate with the UN Secretary General. The FLS should put pressure on the Government of the FRG to ensure that it does not work for the reopening of negotiations. The FRG continues to be one of Pretoria's principal supplier of weapons and is committed to the protection of the German population in Namibia. It was involved in drawing up the bogus constitution and is working to channel "development" funds into Namibia despite the call for sanctions. SWAPO will continue to intensify the armed struggle until Botha accepts Res 435 and enters into the UN process leading to the independence of Namibia.

6. President dos Santos asked President Tambo whether it would be possible for the ANC to continue the armed struggle if the general international tendency to find political solutions to regional questions results in attempts to find such a solution to the South African question.

7. Pres Tambo replied that the socialist countries have indicated an interest in seeking a negotiated settlement of the South African question. They have however assured us that they will continue to supply us with arms as long as we think that the armed struggle is necessary. They understand the reality that we might be ready to negotiate but that the Botha regime is not.

3.

SAAF. MNR posts as far afield as Lisbon and the FRG are linked to the SADF/MNR base in Phalaborwa by radio. The security situation in the province of Maputo remains a serious problem.

23. Pres Nujoma said that we should test Botha's seriousness about negotiations by calling on him to implement Res 435. The regional conference is intended to take the pressure off the regime. The West is trying to avoid imposing sanctions against Pretoria. Botha is not serious even about the idea of a regional conference.

24. The Summit then discussed, amended and adopted a communique for distribution to the press and the public at the end of the Summit.

25. In closing the meeting, Pres Kaunda said mutual trust holds the FLS group together. This is very important and is what had made Pres Chissano to seek the view of the FLS before proceeding with any meeting with Botha. Mozambique and Angola should go ahead with their diplomatic initiatives. We should approach the Soviets carefully and tell them that the time is not ripe for any conference on Southern Africa. We should request them to keep the FLS briefed on their discussions with the US administration.

26. At the suggestion of Presidents Tambo and Nujoma the meeting agreed that Jesse Jackson should be invited by the OAU Chairman to attend the 25th Anniversary celebrations of the OAU.

27. The meeting ended with a short press conference at which the communique was read.

ENDS

They are aware of the fact that in other situations, the prospect for negotiations became a reality precisely because of the intensification of armed struggle. An element in the willingness of the regime to negotiate may be Botha's determination not to do anything which his constituency might interpret as giving away white privilege and a commitment to leave any new initiatives to his successor.

8. Pres Chissano said that the Summit should discuss the question how we should respond to positive initiatives from the West. We know that our region is one of the subjects of discussion in East-West negotiations though we may not know precisely what is said about us. When Kohl visited Mozambique, he said that he wanted to help by increasing Mozambique-FRG cooperation. He also said that he wanted to be more active on the issue of Southern Africa. It became clear with the visits of Genscher and von Strascher to Southern Africa that this was the general position of the government of the FRG. Kohl said that Strauss was best placed to persuade Pretoria to play a constructive role. Pres Chissano therefore invited Strauss who visited Mozambique as a messenger for Kohl. One of the issues that Strauss raised was the need for a REGIONAL CONFERENCE involving the FLS and Pretoria to find a global solution for all issues affecting Southern Africa. The impression that Pres Chissano had was that Strauss raised this question not just as his own private initiative but on behalf of the government of the FRG. He told Strauss that apartheid South Africa was isolated vis-à-vis the OAU and the UN. The states in our region would not like to weaken this isolation and would only meet Botha if there were signs that the situation in South Africa was changing for the better. He said for any meeting to take place there would have to be specific issues to discuss. Botha would have to recognise the ANC, release political prisoners, abandon apartheid and commit himself to democracy for all as well as withdraw all South African troops from Angola, Namibia etc. If all of this happened, a climate for a regional conference might then be created. Pres Chissano advised Strauss to talk to the Chairman of the FLS about the idea of a regional conference. On his return to the PEG, Strauss mentioned this idea to the press, thus indicating that it was more than a chance proposal. The question therefore is how should the FLS respond to it. Strauss also suggested that Pres Chissano should meet P.W. Botha to discuss bilateral issues. He said that Botha was not informed about what was happening in Mozambique. If they were to meet, Pres Chissano should therefore inform Botha in detail about the activities of the MNR and continued support of the bandits by the SADF. According to Strauss, Botha is ready to talk to Pres Chissano. He said that the Botha regime is under the impression that Pres Chissano is personally against the Nkomati Accord. He therefore urged that should a meeting take place, Pres Chissano should also explain his position concerning this Accord. Pres Chissano said that in the aftermath of the Strauss visit, there

REPORT ON THE FRONTLINE STATES SUMMIT MEETING HELD IN LUSAKA,
ZAMBIA: MARCH 24, 1988.

1. The following attended the meeting:

President Kaunda, President Mwinyi, President dos Santos,
President Mugabe, President Masire, President Chissano, President
Nujoma and President Tambo. (Brig Hashim Mbita also attended.)

2. The AGENDA was as follows:

South Africa,
Namibia,
Mozambique,
Angola,
Proposals concerning a regional conference,
Briefing by General Obasanjo,
Any other business.

3. President Kaunda opened the meeting. He stated that the East-West conflict was easing. He characterised this tendency as favourable for our region. During his last visit to the USSR he had met Cde Gorbachev for 3 hours. He is convinced that the Soviets are genuinely interested in peace, especially nuclear disarmament. President Kaunda asked Cde Gorbachev for his views on Southern Africa. His general opinion was that all regional conflicts, including those afflicting our region, were capable of resolution by peaceful means. Pres Kaunda's own view was that the international situation contained both positive and negative elements. He proposed that the FLS Summit should address the question whether the issue of apartheid can be solved peacefully. He said it may not be possible to finalise our views on this matter until more Summits between the "superpowers" have taken place. The forthcoming change of presidents in the United States constituted a factor favourable to our region. This was counterbalanced by the fact that Thatcher continues as British Prime Minister. She seems to exercise a great deal of influence over the EEC and would probably have a similar level of influence over the new president of the USA. Pretoria was able to do what it does against the FLS because of its economic strength. The FLS should therefore revamp and strengthen their economies. A positive factor in our region was that the SADF has been stopped at Cuito Cuanavale. He did know what impact this has had on the Pretoria regime. He thanked Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Tanzania for cooperating to ensure the defence of Mozambique. He called on Pres Tambo to report on the South African situation.

4. Pres Tambo thanked Pres Kaunda for his words of welcome. He expressed appreciation for the existence of the FLS grouping. As background to the current situation, he recalled that the EPG had published its report concerning the issue of negotiations in 1986. At this time there was considerable pressure on us on this issue, as exemplified by Howe's subsequent mission to South Africa. Both the US and UK governments had met the ANC at high