

**B: VIOLENCE**  
**VOLUME THREE**

B: VIOLENCE

18.	NIC	14/05/93	Outline of submission.
19.	Cape Traditional Leaders	14/05/93	Position paper on violence
20.	Peace Secretariat	17/05/93	Report of the Directorate: Internal Peace Institutions
21.	Gender Advisory Committee		Report to Codesa
22.	IFP	26/04/93	Opening statement by Dr Mdlalose to the Negotiating Council
23.	Goldstone Commission	8/03/93	Curbing violence in relation to a general election.
24.	Cape Delegation of Traditional Leaders	19/05/93	Position paper on the causes of violence.
25.	Intando Ye Sizwe	19/04/93	Submission
26.	TIC/NIC	19/05/93	Proposals for submission.
27.	Transkei	19/05/93	Second input.
28.	Ciskei	19/05/93	Proposals for submission.
29.	United Peoples Front	19/05/93	Submission
30.	Inyandza National Movement	19/05/93	Submission
31.	IFP	18/05/93	First position paper



# NATAL INDIAN CONGRESS

FOUNDED BY MORRIS GORDON IN 1892

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## MEMORANDUM

**TO: PLANNING COMMITTEE**  
**MULTI - PARTY NEGOTIATIONS**  
**FROM: NATAL INDIAN CONGRESS**  
**TRANSVAAL INDIAN CONGRESS**  
**DATE: 13 MAY 1993**  
**RE: SUBMISSIONS TO TECHNICAL COMMITTEE**

1. We refer to the circular from the Planning Committee dated 11 May 1993 inviting participants to make submissions to the Technical Committee (TC).
2. At this stage we wish to submit an outline of our submissions to the TC's. Our submissions will be made to the following TC's.  
Violence, Constitutional Matters, Fundamental Rights During the Transition, Transitional Executive Council.
3. The following is an outline of our submissions to the above mentioned Technical Committees:-
4. **VIOLENCE**
  - Causes of Criminal and Political Violence
  - Mechanisms to Combat Violence
  - Mechanisms for an Anti-Crime Coalition
  - Mechanisms for Community Policing
  - Mechanisms to Combat Political Violence

National Peace Accord  
Joint Control  
Improving Policing Resources  
Retraining of Police  
Independent Monitoring of Investigations.

## 5. CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS

Form of state: Central & Regional Government

Constitutional Principles:

- Affirmative action
- "Minority Rights"
- Other Constitutional Matters

## 6. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS DURING THE TRANSITION

## 7. TRANSITIONAL EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

Additions to the Terms of Reference:   a) Levelling the Playing Field  
b) Creating a Climate of Free Politi-

cal Activity

Composition

Sub-Councils: to include Education

Decision Making



CAPE DELEGATION OF TRADITIONAL LEADERSPOSITION PAPER ON CAUSES OF VIOLENCES WHICH THREATEN THE  
NEGOTIATION PROCESS AND THE UNDERMINING OF THE EFFECTIVE  
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE N.P.A

## =====

1. CAUSES OF VIOLENCE:

Violence is caused by one or more of the following :-

1. Political intolerance between political groupings.
2. Vying for political positions within the groupings.
3. Propaganda against other politicians and political groupings.
4. Illiteracy amongst the greatest populace which make them susceptible to cheap propaganda and heavy reliance and dependence on those who appear to be knowledgeable.
5. Lack of hope.
6. Lack of sufficient and meaningful social upliftment i.e. development.
7. Escalating unemployment.

In the South African situation the following have repeatedly been mentioned by various bodies, persons and organisations as causative factors for violence and therefore worthy of mention.

- !
1. Third force violence
  2. Use of provocateurs

3. Political assassinations
4. Involvement of the armed forces.

The complexity of the violence in South Africa is therefore a consequence of a combination of any of the causative factors mentioned above.

2. THREAT TO THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS AND UNDERMINING OF EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATIONAL PEACE ACCORD


There is no doubt that political violence will impact detrimentally to the negotiating process since it is also a political process. There is a general feeling and apparent lack of complete commitment by the negotiating parties to the negotiations. It appears quite often as if the parties are here merely to test the waters.

Experience throughout the existence of the current peace arrangement has shown that the existence of this "institution" is merely symbolic. Assuming that this institution was accountable for peace how would it acquit itself from the situation wherein this country over 20 000 people lost their lives through violence in the past year during its existence.

Infact it is known that signatories to the peace accord are main perpetrators of violence and the peace accord does not

3  
appear to be calling anyone to account even though these are  
its own signatories. It appears therefore Peace Accord is a  
dog with no teeth.

DATED AT UMTATA THIS 23 APRIL 1993.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Nkosi G D Gwadiso', is written over a horizontal dashed line.

NKOSI G D GWADISO

FOR AND ON BEHALF OF CAPE DELEGATION OF TRADITIONAL LEADERS



B20



1993

**REPORT  
OF THE DIRECTORATE:  
INTERNAL PEACE  
INSTITUTIONS**



# **REPORT OF THE DIRECTORATE: INTERNAL PEACE INSTITUTIONS**

**RP 86/1993**

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TO: MR D P A SCHUTTE, MP,  
MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS

I HAVE THE PLEASURE OF SUBMITTING TO YOU IN TERMS OF SECTION 10(1)  
OF THE INTERNAL PEACE INSTITUTIONS ACT, 1992 (ACT NO. 135 OF 1992),  
MY REPORT FOR THE PERIOD ENDED 31 MARCH 1993.

T D RUDMAN  
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR:  
INTERNAL PEACE INSTITUTIONS

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## CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Directorate: Internal Peace Institutions was established in terms of the provisions of Chapter II of the Internal Peace Institutions Act, 1992 (Act No. 135 of 1992) (the Act), which came into effect on 4 November 1992.

1.2 However, in compliance with the Government's undertaking in paragraphs 7.2 and 7.3.4 of the National Peace Accord, the Directorate had been functioning as a component of the Department of Justice since November 1991. In terms of State President's Action 139 of 25 March 1993 the functions relating to the National Peace Secretariat in terms of the Act have been transferred to the Minister of Home Affairs.

1.3 In terms of section 9 of the Act the Directorate exercises the powers and performs the functions and duties conferred upon it in order to achieve the objects of the Act and of the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation Act, 1991 (Act No. 139 of 1991). In addition, the Directorate has to perform the administrative duties relating to the performance of the functions of the National Peace Secretariat, regional dispute resolution committees and local dispute resolution committees. The Directorate also makes arrangements for the payment of the remuneration, travel and subsistence allowances and any other allowances of the members of the Secretariat and of members of regional and local dispute resolution committees, and it exercises control over money appropriated by Parliament for the purposes of the Act. The Directorate uses this



money to promote the objects of the Act. The Directorate is also responsible for the appointment of staff for regional and local dispute resolution committees.

1.4 Advocate T D Rudman was appointed Executive Director: Internal Peace Institutions in terms of section 8 of the Act. He has been performing this task since November 1991, however. *Ex officio* he is the only permanent member of the Secretariat.

1.5 The initial staff establishment of the Directorate comprised 6 persons. The Executive Director is at present assisted by a complement of 22 officers. On 31 March 1993 all these officers were officers of the Department of Justice designated for this purpose by the Director-General of Justice. To maintain continuity and so as not to lose the experience gained by these officers the Director-General of Justice and the Director-General of Home Affairs agreed that the officers of the Department of Justice who were involved with the activities of the Directorate on 31 March 1993 should be seconded to the Department of Home Affairs with effect from 1 April 1993 to be designated for service with the Directorate.

1.6 The Executive Director holds the rank of Deputy Director-General additional to the staff establishment.

1.7 Since this is the first report to you from the Directorate, and for the sake of a comprehensive review of activities, the

report covers the activities of the Directorate since November 1991.

1.8 Despite the best efforts to give a complete picture, a mere review of the functions performed by the Directorate would not reflect the circumstances and the demands related to the work performed by the Directorate unless specific attention was given to some of the surrounding circumstances.

1.9 There is virtually no activity of the Directorate in which the principle of consultation with all interested parties and consideration of the political sensitivities of the many players in the peace process is not applied. Consequently, it is not only the lawyers in the Directorate (who, as indicated below, also played a facilitating role) who had to display the greatest degree of tact, diplomacy and negotiating skills, but also the administrative staff who, even when dealing with otherwise routine activities such as obtaining accommodation and appointing staff, had to obtain consensus among differing views and interests, whether real or imagined. In this manner staff found themselves not only ideologically, but often physically, caught between the conflicting parties. But even officers who dealt with remuneration and subsistence claims and were otherwise involved with the players in the process only by telephone, showed such a degree of patience, objectivity and sympathy that they remain acceptable participants in the peace efforts.



1.10 The aforementioned circumstances are inherently demanding and time-consuming. Furthermore, the nature of the process of dispute resolution and conciliation is such that the day-to-day activities of the Directorate are characterised by matters unpredictable and urgent - the virtually impossible usually has to be achieved in crisis situations and at all times of the day or night. The remark made by the Director-General of Justice in his Annual Report that the Directorate has a corps of particularly dedicated, competent and enthusiastic officers, can therefore be endorsed without reservation.

## CHAPTER II: ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIVITIES WITH REGARD TO THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY REGARDING THE PREVENTION OF PUBLIC VIOLENCE AND INTIMIDATION

2.1 The Directorate provided a secretarial service to the Commission of Inquiry regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation (the Commission).

2.2 The service to the Commission included the following:

- (a) Preparing documents for the Commission.
- (b) Finalising reports of the Commission and the committees of the Commission.
- (c) Operating a filing system and indexing the investigation documentation of the Commission.
- (d) Arranging sessions for the Commission and committees of the Commission.

- (e) Arranging payment of the remuneration, allowances and claims of members of the Commission and of the committees.
- (f) Making travel and subsistence arrangements for members of the Commission and of the committees.
- (g) Providing typing and messenger services to the Commission and committees.
- (h) Dealing with correspondence and provisioning administration for the Commission and the committees.
- (i) Answering media enquiries and finalising media statements of the Commission.
- (j) Operating a programme for the protection of witnesses giving evidence before the Commission.

2.3 In terms of the above-mentioned State President's Action these functions are no longer performed by the Directorate, but are continued by the Department of Justice from 1 April 1993.

### **CHAPTER III: SECRETARIAL SERVICES WITH REGARD TO THE NATIONAL PEACE SECRETARIAT**

The Directorate provides a secretarial service for all meetings of the National Peace Secretariat and its committees. This service involves preparing and distributing documents for meetings of the Secretariat, recording proceedings and executing the resolutions of the Secretariat.



### **3.1 SECRETARIAT MEETINGS**

3.1.1 In addition to other meetings referred to elsewhere in this report, the Secretariat has held 52 formal and 13 management committee meetings since November 1991.

3.1.2 The meetings are held in Pretoria, Johannesburg, Cape Town or Durban, depending on the availability of the members of the Secretariat.

### **3.2 JOINT MEETINGS**

3.2.1 Meetings of the Secretariat with the chairmen of regional dispute resolution committees

The Secretariat met on 7 occasions with the chairmen of the 11 regional dispute resolution committees, and the Directorate made all the relevant arrangements.

3.2.2 Meetings of the Secretariat with the observer groups from the United Nations, the European Economic Community, the Commonwealth of Nations and the Organization of African Unity

Since the introduction by various international organisations of observers in the Republic, the Directorate has arranged 14 meetings that the Secretariat held with representatives of these groups.



### 3.3 MEETINGS OF COMMITTEES OF THE SECRETARIAT

#### 3.3.1 TRAINING COMMITTEE

The Directorate provided the secretarial services at 23 meetings of the Training Committee held during the period under review. In addition to the meetings of the Training Committee, the Directorate was involved in the presentation of 28 training seminars, which are discussed elsewhere in the report.

#### 3.3.2 MARKETING COMMITTEE

Secretarial services were provided at 11 meetings of the Marketing Committee. R2,5 million has already been allocated by the State, specifically for the work of the Marketing Committee. At 31 March 1993, R1 061 968 of the R2,5 million had already been expended. It is expected, with the continued co-operation and sponsorship of the print and electronic media, that the value of publicity received will exceed ten times this amount.

#### 3.3.3 RESEARCH COMMITTEE

During the year under review this Committee held 4 meetings. The Research Subcommittee also met on 3 occasions with researchers, academics and training officers in the field of conflict management, mediation and negotiation skills.

## **CHAPTER IV: SUPPORT SERVICES**

Logistical support services were provided by the Directorate in respect of a variety of the activities of the Secretariat and its committees. These activities may be set out as follows:

### **4.1 INAUGURAL MEETINGS FOR REGIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION COMMITTEES AND LOCAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION COMMITTEES**

4.1.1 In terms of section 4 of the Act the Secretariat is responsible for the establishment of regional dispute resolution committees and also for assisting the regional committees in the establishment of local committees. Eleven regional committees and 85 local committees have been established. The functions of the Directorate as regards the establishment of regional committees entail the following:

- (a) Liaison with national organisations in religious, political, social and business spheres so as to identify representatives at regional level.
- (b) Liaison with national, regional and local authorities of all population groups so as to identify representatives.
- (c) Liaison with other organisations that may be involved with local and regional government affairs so as to identify representatives.

- (d) Liaison at national and regional levels with the security forces so as to identify representatives.
- (e) The arrangement of an inaugural meeting in consultation with members of the Secretariat and the identified representatives.

4.1.2 The inaugural meetings are usually attended by an average of 30 people.

4.1.3 For most regions the process had to be repeated once or more than once before a committee could be established successfully. In all, 22 meetings were arranged in this manner.

4.1.4 In the case of the establishment of 5 local committees, the identifying and bringing together of local representatives and community leaders were dealt with from the Directorate's office. This was because the need for the establishment of the local committees was too urgent to wait until all the regional committees had built up an effective administrative infrastructure.

## **4.2 INFORMATION SESSIONS FOR FOREIGN OBSERVERS**

As each team of foreign observers arrived, it was fully briefed on the National Peace Accord, the structures established in terms of the Accord and the support and co-operation that they could expect from the Secretariat and the Directorate. Such information sessions were held on 31 July and 14 and 15 September 1992 for the observers from the United Nations; on 21 October 1992 for the



observers from the Commonwealth of Nations; on 30 October 1992 for the observers from the European Economic Community and on 24 November 1992 for the observers from the Organization of African Unity.

#### **4.3 GOODWILL VISITS BY THE FOREIGN OBSERVERS**

4.3.1 The Directorate was responsible for arranging several goodwill visits by the foreign observers to governments in South Africa and members of the Directorate accompanied them on these visits. Representatives of the following governments were visited:

KwaZulu on 8 October 1992  
Qwaqwa on 23 November 1992  
Lebowa on 26 November 1992  
KaNgwane on 2 December 1992  
Gazankulu on 12 February 1993  
KwaNdebele on 4 March 1993  
Qwaqwa on 19 March 1993

4.3.2 These visits took place with the co-operation of the South African Air Force, which was much appreciated.

#### **4.4 OTHER MEETINGS**

4.4.1 In addition to the services already mentioned, the Directorate also provided supportive and logistical assistance at meetings held by the Chairman and members of the Secretariat with a wide range of persons and organisations. The most important of

these were meetings with government officials from, and other important players in, Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Ciskei and Venda. Transkei and Venda were visited once, Ciskei 9 times and Bophuthatswana 5 times. The Directorate is indebted to the officials of the Department of Foreign Affairs and the officers attached to the offices of the heads of state and ministers in the States in question for their friendly and helpful co-operation. They were sometimes contacted at very short notice and at inconvenient times.

4.4.2 In addition to the above-mentioned meetings, the Directorate arranged a further 118 meetings with a variety of organisations, Cabinet Ministers, Government departments and political leaders, which in 71 cases were attended either by members of the Directorate or together with members of the Secretariat or as representatives of the Secretariat.

#### **4.5 TRAINING IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND THE FACILITATING OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION**

In terms of section 4(e) of the Act the Secretariat may use the services of competent persons in order to achieve the objects of this Act and the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation Act, 1991. The resolution of disputes plays an important part in achieving these objects.



#### 4.5.1 The Secretariat's training function

4.5.1.1 It has already been pointed out that the Directorate provided assistance at 23 meetings of the Training Committee of the Secretariat. In addition to this, however, additional planning meetings and two workshops were arranged for October and November 1992 with a view to the refinement of the Secretariat's training programme.

4.5.1.2 The Directorate also dealt with the arrangements for the presentation of 42 training seminars with a view to training chairmen and members of regional and local committees in conflict management, mediation and dispute resolution. The services of a training officer, a fellow training officer and a training facilitator are usually used, since the seminars offer intensive training for two to three days.

4.5.1.3 A total of 37 people have already been appointed to a training panel, the services of some of whom are used for training. Since 1 January 1993 the training function of the Secretariat has been funded out of a donation of R1 million made to the Secretariat by the Danish Government for this purpose. Up to 31 December 1992, State funding amounting to R280 387,35 was used for training, and from 1 January 1993 to 31 March 1993, R47 107,26 has been used out of the donated funds.

#### 4.5.2 Facilitating functions

4.5.2.1 In terms of the National Peace Accord and the Act the National Peace Secretariat and the regional and local committees are called upon to combat violence and intimidation at grassroots level. The object envisaged, which has in fact been achieved, was that the regional and local committees would, by negotiating with the parties involved, resolve disputes that cause or could cause public violence and intimidation, that they would consult with the authorities concerned, especially on planned public action of a contentious nature in order to prevent conflict and to monitor the implementation of agreements that may result from the above. The facilitating role that underlies the above functions leads more often than not to the establishment of a local committee in those areas in which the various parties have not yet had the opportunity to meet in a joint forum. The facilitating function is therefore of vital importance, since continued discussion is the key to the peaceful resolution of disputes. Although the National Peace Secretariat and the regional and local committees are principally responsible for this facilitating function, the services of professional facilitators are often used owing to the extent of the need. Senior staff members of the Directorate, who are all trained lawyers, have themselves successfully resolved municipal disputes in Potgietersrus, Phola, Parys, Naboomspruit and Ogies.

4.5.2.2 Since this function is by its nature a very sensitive one, great care must be taken in appointing a facilitator. The



Directorate obtains, within the shortest time possible, all information on the nature of the conflict and the community in which it is present and also information indicating the desired qualities of a particular facilitator. As soon as the appointment and mandate of a facilitator have been approved by the Secretariat, a letter of appointment compiled by the Directorate and containing the conditions for the appointment is sent to the facilitator.

4.5.2.3 During the year under review 32 persons were appointed as facilitators for periods of up to 3 months. The cost of these appointments, including the persons' travel and subsistence expenses, amounted to R420 855,82.

## **CHAPTER V: ADMINISTRATIVE AND PERSONNEL AFFAIRS**

### **5.1 OFFICES FOR REGIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION COMMITTEES**

5.1.1 The Secretariat established regional committees in compliance with section 4 of the Act in the areas that chiefly correspond with the 11 development regions into which South Africa is divided at present. Consequently, the regional committees are situated in the following centres:

- (a) Pretoria (Northern Transvaal Dispute Resolution Committee)
- (b) Bellville (Western Cape Dispute Resolution Committee)
- (c) Bloemfontein (Orange Free State Dispute Resolution Committee)
- (d) Durban (Natal/KwaZulu Dispute Resolution Committee)
- (e) Johannesburg (Wits/Vaal Dispute Resolution Committee)



- (f) Kimberley (Northern Cape Dispute Resolution Committee)
- (g) Pietersburg (Far Northern Transvaal Dispute Resolution Committee)
- (h) East London (Border/Ciskei Dispute Resolution Committee)
- (i) Port Elizabeth (Eastern Cape Dispute Resolution Committee)
- (j) Witbank (Eastern Transvaal Dispute Resolution Committee)
- (k) Klerksdorp (Western Transvaal Dispute Resolution Committee)

5.1.2 Regarding the administrative and personnel affairs of regional committees, it is appropriate to express appreciation for the contribution made by the South African Communication Service in establishing offices and providing personnel for the regional committees. As the Communication Service already had the personnel and considerable administrative abilities at its disposal in all of the above-mentioned centres, the Head of the Communication Service offered the assistance of the Service with regard to accommodation and the provision of personnel to regional offices. However, political opposition led to the scaling down of the contribution of the Communication Service at most of the offices, and in some cases the suspending of it altogether.

5.1.3 In terms of section 9(2) of the Act, the Directorate, which is also responsible for the administrative work in connection with the performance of the duties of the regional committees, may appoint personnel for the committees on such conditions, remuneration and allowances as the Minister with the concurrence of the Minister of State Expenditure may determine. Consequently, provision was made initially for the provision of a core staff of two or

three people at every regional committee to get the ball rolling in the region. As the Directorate was also directed to provide for the personnel needs with regard to the Subcommittee of the National Peace Committee for Socio-economic Reconstruction and Development, the chairmen of regional committees were requested, in considering candidates for the filling of the available posts, to note at that stage already any characteristics of such candidates that would render them suitable to make contributions in the field of socio-economic development co-ordination.

5.1.4 Since the idea of involving Public Servants in the committees was entirely unacceptable to certain political players in the peace structures, it was decided to appoint personnel for the committees on contract and not to employ them as officers. The regional committees were offered the services of experienced officials to take care of their provisioning administration needs and to serve as a link with the Directorate in Pretoria so that the other personnel members could apply themselves exclusively to the work of the committee. With the exception of two, the regional committees all made use of this offer.

5.1.5 All regional committees have well-equipped offices at their disposal, with the exception of the Northern Cape Committee which is in the process of vacating the offices provided by the South African Communication Service as a result of objections that were raised against the officials at a very late stage. Alternative accommodation will probably be provided by the Directorate in



co-operation with the Department of Public Works within a few weeks.

5.1.6 In addition to the offices for regional committees, so-called branch offices were established in some of the regions so that the personnel at the regional offices would be able to reach the remote parts of the region more easily.

5.1.7 In addition to the committees that were established under the Act as a result of the National Peace Accord, various "operational centres" also exist as part of the peace structures. These centres were created at the recommendation of Mr Cyrus Vance, special envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, after his visit to South Africa during July 1992. The chairmen of the regional committees requested, and it was also the viewpoint of the Directorate, that these "operational centres" should not form a separate structure, but should be administered as part of the functions of the regional committees. Where they have been established, therefore, the "operational centres" function as branch offices of the regional committees, are manned by personnel of the regional committees and often also form the core of the administrative abilities for one or more local committees.

5.1.8 The establishment of the above-mentioned offices and the provision of equipment and furniture had to be accomplished within the short space of only a few months. The understanding and co-operation of the Government departments involved, and more specifically the heads of departments and the senior officers of the



Departments of Justice, State Expenditure and Public Works under the unique circumstances in which the Directorate had to accomplish this task is recorded with much appreciation.

5.1.9 Of the 24 offices that were established, 10 offices were for regional committees, 4 for branch offices and 10 for "operational centres". A further 4 offices are being established for "operational centres" and 1 office for a regional committee.

## 5.2 PERSONNEL PROVISION

5.2.1 The private sector and various non-government organisations participate enthusiastically in the activities of the structures of the Peace Accord, not only as members of the various committees, but also by providing personnel, whether for compensation or on a seconded basis. Organisations of which particular mention may be made are ENGEN, the Independent Media Service of South Africa and the Consultative Business Movement. It has already been noted that the Department of Justice and the South African Communication Service play an important role in the provision of personnel to the regional committees.

The following personnel were appointed at regional and local committees and at operational centres:

- 6 Regional Managers
- 9 Office Managers
- 2 Assistant Office Managers

1	Marketing co-ordinator
1	Training co-ordinator
10	Co-ordinators
22	Field Workers
1	Media Officer
19	Secretaries
7	Receptionists/Typists

### 5.3 MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS

5.3.1 The contracts in terms of which personnel were appointed to regional committees do not make provision for any fringe benefits. Since the inception of the Peace Institutions, this state of affairs has resulted in regular calls being made upon the Secretariat and the Directorate to make provision for a transport allowance and for life insurance.

5.3.2 Since the Government Garage is not always able to meet the transport needs of the committees at short notice in crisis situations, 26 motor vehicles were purchased for use by the regional committees.

5.3.3 To date no insurer willing to provide cover for members and personnel of the committees could be found. At present the Directorate is once again taking up the matter with donors and the insurance industry in order to investigate the possibility of a special fund for members and personnel of committees who may become the victims of violence.

**GENDER  
ADVISORY  
COMMITTEE**





## REPORT OF THE GENDER ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO CODESA 2

Due to enormous public pressure about the lack of representation at CODESA of women, 40% of the population, and subsequent suggestions and submissions by women's organisations, political parties and other organisations, the Management Committee of CODESA decided to form the Gender Advisory Committee. The GAC is a subcommittee of the Management Committee charged with the special task of looking into the Terms of Reference, minutes and decisions of each of the Working Groups, and those of the Management Committee, and advising on their gender implications. All CODESA participants have so far sent representatives to the GAC with the exception of the Bophuthatswana and Venda Governments.

The GAC met for the first time on 6 April and has diligently studied the Terms of Reference, minutes and most of the decisions already taken by the Working Groups as well as internal and external submissions from women's organisations and political parties, with an unusual spirit of unity. The GAC has reached consensus on many issues, but consensus was not reached on others.

## 1. RECOMMENDATIONS AND ADVICE ON THE GENDER IMPLICATIONS OF ISSUES RAISED IN WORKING GROUP 01

### 1.1 The Free Political Participation of Women

Noting the Terms of Reference of Working Group 01, Items 1.1.4 (k), (p) and (r), the GAC recommends the following:

- 1.1.1 The rights of access of women to public facilities and meeting venues should be ensured, as should their right to meet with political organisations. This recommendation is necessary so that women can participate without fear and on an equal footing in the political process.
- 1.1.2 The right of access of political organisations to public facilities, and their right to meet with potential voters, is meaningless unless women may participate in the democratic process on an equal footing without fear of public or private harassment and intimidation.
- 1.1.3 That the roles mentioned here (Item 1.1.4 (o) of the Terms of Reference of Working Group 1) concerning educative and informative campaigns should be broadened to include specific educational campaigns informing women of, inter alia, their right to vote, particularly in areas where women are unlikely to be reached by usual media.

### 1.2 Agreements on Political Intimidation and Women

With regard to the agreement reached by sub group 2 of Working Group 1 on the Definition of Political Intimidation, the GAC recommends that the following additions be made to the activities which would, as per the aforesaid agreement, be considered, in particular, as forms of political intimidation (refer to Item 4.2 of the Minutes of the meeting of Sub-Group 2 of Working Group 1, 2 March):

- 1.2.1 To compel women, both within and outside the home, by virtue of the "power" vested in men with whom they may associate, to adopt a particular political position; or to similarly prevent women from engaging in free political activity.
- 1.2.2 To use political patronage in any form that threatens or denies an individuals political, social and economic rights, especially noting that women are frequently the victims of such practices.
- 1.2.3 To sexually harass any individual and thereby prevent him/her from the freedom of the right of expression/opinion, association and movement.

With regards to item 1.3.3 above the GAC defines sexual harassment, in general terms, as sexual advances without express consent, including innuendoes or language of a defamatory or offensive nature, in all spheres, including political, social and economic life and in the media.

### 1.3 Agreements of the Interpretation of the National Peace Accord

With regards to agreements reached by Sub-Group 2 of Working Group 1 re the implementation and interpretation of the National Peace Accord, the GAC recommends that the following additions be made (refer to Item 6.1.6 and Item 6.4.1, respectively, of the minutes of Sub-Group 2 of Working Group 1, on 7 April):



- 1.3.1 That the reference to "Business representatives" in clause 7.4.4.3 of the NPA be interpreted to include representatives from professional and women's organisations.
- 1.3.2 The NPA make special efforts to include representatives of relevant local and tribal authorities as well as local women's structures into all RDRC and LDRC structures.
- 1.3.3 With regards to item 1.4.2 above (and with specific reference to items 6.1.6, 6.3.2, 6.4.2, 6.5.2, 6.6.2, 6.6.3 and 6.8 of the minutes of the meeting of WG1 SG2, 7 April) the GAC recommends that as part of its input on the interpretation and implementation of the NPA Working Group 1 recommend that women be included in all structures created by the NPA, RDRC's and LDRC's to ensure that gender implications of all decisions and functions of these structures, are considered.

#### 1.4 On the Security Forces, Free Political Activity and Women

Noting that the many acts of violence committed against women allegedly by the security forces are a source of grave concern, the GAC recommends that:

- 1.4.1 any such crime be immediately investigated;
- 1.4.2 violent crime against women be treated with stricter and more stringent disciplinary action;
- 1.4.3 when searches of homes are conducted, women police must accompany male police;
- 1.4.4 the position of high ranking officers who are unable or unwilling to maintain adequate control over their forces be urgently reviewed;
- 1.4.5 any peace keeping force should include women within their structures at all levels;
- 1.4.6 the gender sensitivity of these forces (refer to item 1.5.5) be monitored;
- 1.4.7 all individuals be informed of their rights with regard to the role and functions of these forces (refer to item 1.5.5);
- 1.4.8 these forces (refer to item 1.5.5) be trained to be gender sensitive and to ensure that they do not violate the rights of women.

Noting the lack of agreement in Working Group 1 over the definition of political prisoners, no recommendations with regards to the gender implications of this issue could be agreed upon.

The GAC also recommends that any Security Force established in the country, including the TBVC states, must begin to immediately redress race and gender imbalances both in their composition and functioning at all levels and introduce a Code of Conduct and norms which will create confidence among all the people of South Africa.

#### 1.5 Working Group 01 Terms of Reference

The GAC proposes that item 1.1.4 (c) of the Terms of Reference of Working Group 01 should be amended to read as follows:

"The amendment and/or repeal of any remaining laws militating against free political



activity including the elimination of racial and gender discriminatory laws.

1.6 The Media in the Transition (Recommendation to Working Groups 01 & 03)

The GAC recommends that Working Group 1 and Working Group 3 agree upon a politically neutral Independent Communications Authority which shall:

- \* include gender conscious persons;
- \* facilitate media access for women;
- \* monitor and discourage sexist programmes, articles and advertising;
- \* encourage non-sexist, non-discriminatory publications;
- \* ensure the participation of women on all media bodies, at all levels;
- \* organise that radio and television programmes which educate women about the democratic process and their right to participate therein without fear of intimidation, are prepared as a matter of urgency

2. Recommendations and Advice on the Gender Implications of the Issues Raised in Working Group 02

2.1 Constitutional Principles

The GAC advises that:

- 2.1.1 It fully supports a Justiciable Bill of Fundamental Human Rights to be attached to the constitution.
- 2.1.2 It fully supports the concept of a qualified Equality Clause in the Bill of Rights and the Constitution.
- 2.1.3 It recommends that Working Group 2 address the problem of redressing and eliminating gender inequalities.
- 2.1.4 It recommends to WG 2 that they take note of the desirability of a document containing a set of ideals regarding gender issues, which should be accepted by a future Constitution Making Body as a document to be used by the courts to assist women in claiming and exercising their rights under the constitution and Bill of Rights to ensure gender equality.
- 2.1.5 The GAC further recommends to Working Group 02 that the Bill of Rights include some form of rights and protection for children.

2.2 Constitutional Language

The GAC recommends that the terms "men and women" and "men, women and children" be used wherever respectively appropriate, in the drafting of the Constitution, in place of the terms "people" or "persons".

2.3 On Agreements Reached Regarding Constitutional Principles

Regarding the "Provisional Areas of Commonality that Already Exist" in Working Group 02 as adopted by the Steering Committee of WG 02 on 27 April, the GAC recommends the following (refer to Document prepared by the Steering Committee of Working Group 2 on 27 April):

- 2.3.1 Item 1.1.3 should be amended to read "The diversity of languages, cultures and religions will be acknowledged, within the non-racial and non-sexist principles of the Constitution."
- 2.3.2 Item 1.1.7.1 should be amended to read "A judiciary that will be independent, non-racial, impartial, gender sensitive and inclusive of women."
- 2.3.3 Item 1.1.7.2 should be amended to read "An entrenched and justiciable Bill/Charter of Fundamental Rights, which will protect the rights of women and children."
- 2.3.4 Item 1.2.2 should read "At each level there shall be democratic representation, consistent with non-racial and gender sensitive principles."
- 2.3.5 Item 1.3.1 should read "A new constitution shall provide for effective

participation of minority political parties consistent with democracy, non-racialism and non-sexism"

#### 2.4 Constitution Making Body/Process

- 2.4.1 The GAC recommends that when drawing up the electoral procedures, methods should be sought to encourage full participation of women. This should apply to both encouraging women to exercise their political rights to campaign and stand for election as well as to vote. These provisions would include, among others, education programmes, elimination of sexual harassment (refer to item 1.3), drawing up of electoral lists and giving women reasonable exposure in the media.
- 2.4.2 The GAC strongly recommends that all parties include a fair proportion of women in their electoral lists. It is essential that women are evenly distributed within the lists, to ensure their inclusion in the elected body.
- 2.4.3 The GAC recommends that any committees set up by the Constitution Making Body must contain an adequate number of women.
- 2.4.4 The GAC recommends that the Constitution Making Body should consider a sub-committee to monitor and raise gender issues in the drafting of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.
- 2.4.5 The above 4 proposals should apply to future elections at a local, regional and national government level.



3. Recommendations and Advice on the Gender Implications of the Issues Raised in Working Group 03

3.1 The Funding of Programmes for Women

The GAC advises that Working Group 3 reach an agreement on the principle of funding and programmes to ensure the meaningful participation in, and education about the democratic electoral process.

In order that women be timeously informed about the franchise, and thus enabled to participate in interim elections without fear or pressure or intimidation, it is suggested that such agreement be expeditiously concluded.

3.2 The Technical Report to the Steering Committee of Working Group 3

The GAC advises the Technical Committee, Working Group 3 and its Steering Committee on the following points concerning the Technical Committee's recommendations made on 27 April:

3.2.1 In addition to Item 7.1 of the report:

"\* Shall include women in its composition."

3.2.2 Item 10 of the report should state:

"The transitional executive structure will be constituted by legislation agreed to by Codesa, will have a multi-party character, including women and be . . ."

3.2.3 The reference to "persons" in line 14 of Item 10 of the report should be replaced by a reference to "men and women".

3.2.4 Line 5 of Item 14 of the report should read:

"Save for agreement that the TEC must have multi-party character, including women, the precise criteria . . ."

3.2.5 It is also recommended that the proposed TEC should include a Gender Structure, the exact nature of which is still to be determined.

3.3 Women and Local Government

The GAC advises that special mechanisms be created to promote the participation and representation of women in local government structures, so that these structures more closely reflect the gender composition of the populace.

Any projects undertaken during the life of CODESA and the Interim or Future Governments should be aimed at the interests of all groups in local communities including women.

3.4 The Media in the Transition (Recommendation to Working Groups 01 & 03)

The GAC recommends that Working Group 1 and Working Group 3 agree upon a politically neutral Independent Communications Authority which shall:

- \* include gender conscious persons;
- \* facilitate media access for women;
- \* monitor and discourage sexist programmes, articles and advertising;

- \* encourage non-sexist, non-discriminatory publications;
- \* ensure the participation of women on all media bodies, at all levels;
- \* organise that radio and television programmes which educate women about the democratic process and their right to participate therein without fear of intimidation, are prepared as a matter of urgency

### 3.5 Women and the Foreign Service

Noting that South Africa's foreign relations have mainly been conducted by men, as from the interim government women should be trained, employed, promoted and recognised on an equal basis with men within the diplomatic service. Any existing discriminatory regulations and practices with respect to gender and race in South Africa's foreign service need to be removed.

### 3.6 Land and Women

The GAC wishes to place on record that no consensus could be reached on the following proposals concerning land and women:

**Proposal 1:** That Working Group 3 suggest an urgent Commission of Enquiry into legislation which prevents women's access to land ownership in South Africa and the TBVC states, and that the results of such an enquiry be immediately embodied in legislation.

**Proposal 2:** That Working Group 3: (1) look into those laws which prevent/inhibit women's ownership of or access to land in South Africa and the TBVC states, with the intention of amending or repealing those laws and (2) that there should be an immediate moratorium on the sale and transference of all state property to private or corporate individuals and organisations.

4. General Recommendations to Codesa (to all Working Groups)

4.1 Non-Sexist Language in CODESA documentation

The GAC recommends that CODESA documents should explicitly define the word "person" as referring to both men and women.

4.2 Gender Discriminatory Legislation

The GAC recommends the repeal of all legislation in South Africa and the TBVC states which discriminates on the basis of race, creed or gender which circumscribe and impede free political, economic or social activity. We suggest that this be attended to by a general law asserting certain basic civil and political rights, combined with an omnibus law repealing all legislation in accordance with a schedule of Acts to be provided by the GAC. We advise Working Groups 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 to assist in the identification of such legislation.

5. Conclusion and The Way Forward

In conclusion, and in view of the short period of time which the GAC had had at its disposal, the GAC wishes to point out that, as of 7 May, proposals and recommendations on the proceedings of Working Group 4 and 5 have not yet been formulated, and that there are certain areas in other Working Groups on which consensus has not yet been reached. The GAC would also wish to look at present discriminatory legislation which needs to be repealed or amended. The GAC therefore recommends that it continues with its work after CODESA II both in terms of uncompleted work, feed-back on its submissions from the relevant Working Groups and forthcoming agreements emanating from the various Working Groups and committees.





# INKATHA

Inkatha Freedom Party

IQembu leNkatha Yenkululeko

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## OPENING STATEMENT BY DR FT MDLALOSE NATIONAL CHAIRPERSON OF THE INKATHA FREEDOM PARTY

### TO THE NEGOTIATING COUNCIL

ON MONDAY 26TH APRIL, 1993  
AT THE WORLD TRADE CENTRE IN JOHANNESBURG

When we met barely three weeks ago we did so deeply aware of the need to achieve something constructive after a wasted ten month hiatus in negotiations. From May 1992 to date, nothing of substantive value has been achieved in bringing democracy to our land other than the formation of this body to replace Codesa.

Yet we gather today under the menacing shadow of ever-increasing violence. Our party has lost yet more leaders in the last month. Mr Sipiwe Gumede, a member of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, was assassinated by unknown assailants. Mr Leonard Ngubo, Ntuzuma vice-chairperson and our representative in the imminent formation of an Ntuzuma LDRC, was likewise assassinated. Mr Ephraim Ndebele, Umlazi unit 17 councillor and IFP leader and prominent in the region's peace process, was murdered. Mr Robert Sikobi, Mr John Thembani and Mr Roy Mpisane, all IFP leaders in Umlazi, were all killed during the past month. A prominent member of our Central Committee, Professor Maphalala, has been subjected to police harassment and his property damaged.

We would point out that the murders of yet more IFP leaders have followed inflammatory statements by ANC leaders. Addressing mourners at the vigil for Mr Chris Hani, the ANC's Southern Natal chairman, Mr Jeff Hadebe, called on ANC followers to "rid" South Africa of Dr M G Buthelezi. After our President, Dr M G Buthelezi, had expressed his horror at the murder of Mr Chris Hani and offered his condolences to the family, ANC and SACP leader, Mr Blade Nzimande, publicly rejected these at a rally in Pietermaritzburg on April 12, saying the ANC said "no thanks to the tears of Mangosuthu Buthelezi."

It is this sort of denigration that fans the flames of violence. Mr Nzimande's utterances are not words spoken in the heat of the moment. They form part of a campaign of killing talk by senior ANC leaders that has gone on for years. Many senior leaders of the ANC, including the late Mr Chris Hani, have in the past publicly called for the murder of Dr Buthelezi and members of the IFP's Central Committee.

This is what State President, Mr F W de Klerk, said in Parliament on April 20 about the role of the ANC in violence: "Its major role in creating a climate for violence and politically motivated murders is undisputed. The many graves of members of the leadership of the IFP who have been systematically decimated by the ANC and its structures, bear testimony to this. (Hansard, disc 481)

None of us can forget the fact that over 270 officials of the IFP have been slaughtered with modern weapons. Our entire organisation and the bereaved families demand to know who is behind in the systematic and serial killing of IFP officials. All the sophisticated institutions and organisations of our country are unable to provide an answer to this fundamental question.

There is great hope that this multi-party forum will succeed where Codesa failed, that the foundations have been laid for genuine and inclusive negotiations that will produce the settlement we have waited so long for. The IFP is pleased with progress to date - particularly with the recognition given to the need to review Codesa's agreements and to prioritise debate on the form of our future state. This bodes well for moving forward. We would also like to believe that the negative bilateralism of the recent past and the attempted marginalisation of parties participating in negotiations, is now over.



However, since we are less than confident of a fundamental change of heart among those involved, only unfolding developments will reveal whether this is the case or not. Certainly we are not impressed with the manner in which SACP leader Chris Hani's murder is being cynically used as a gambit to take make unilateral demands over the timetable of change.

Boipatong was likewise seized upon as an excuse first to walk out of Codesa and then to present a series of totally unreasonable demands backed up with mass action that culminated in the tragedy of Bisho.

Mass action is again being seized upon as an instrument to force the pace of change and to secure the ANC's grip on the reigns of power, though this time we suspect the ANC's haste is partly motivated by a desire to crack down upon the very grassroots militants it exhorted to render the country ungovernable. This, together with apartheid, was responsible for nurturing the culture of violence that has reduced the country to the state it is now in.

Hani's assassination and the latest proposal for six weeks of mass action remind us that irrespective of what we negotiate as leaders in this forum, and irrespective of whatever World Trade Centre bonhomie the nation perceives in us through the media, it must be recognised that we are not negotiating in a vacuum. Talks that broke down have been resumed, but what is being done about the political violence?

The Inkatha Freedom Party believes it is time to get serious if this body is going to have any meaningful role to play in charting the way forward. We believe it is time this multi-party forum came to grips with the realities of what is happening in this country, instead of pushing unpleasant matters under the carpet as though their disappearance from the agenda of this body will make the problem go away.

Frankly, we hold out little hope for a successful transition to democracy unless the question of political violence is addressed, and addressed properly. Constitutional negotiations cannot succeed on their own, in taking the nation forward.

Negotiations, if they are the success we pray they will be, can merely reflect the consensus reached by us on the rules of the game of the future political system within which normalised politics should be played out. This is transparent politics which respects multi-partyism, respects political opponents, and respects the broad values that underpin true liberalism.

However, the political violence tearing our society apart renders this completely meaningless. What good is a decent constitution superimposed upon a lawless people, with no respect for themselves or their political opponents? What good is a transition to democracy founded upon savagery? Where are the values going to come from to ensure that the document we negotiate lasts longer than the first crisis that befalls the first government? Violence threatens all of us and our future. Violence is no foundation upon which to make the transition to democracy.

Far from decreasing since February 1990, political violence has in fact increased steadily. Last year we recorded at least 759 attacks on our party, and 590 supporters were killed, 388 of them in Natal/KwaZulu. Violence appears to have a life of its own, consuming more and more of our fathers, mothers and, tragically even children, in its evil flames. A further casualty is the hopes and dreams we have of peace. Cynicism, withdrawal, anguish, fear and hatred become the dominant emotions. Constant threats of mass action are designed to cow people into accepting the supposed inevitable take over of power by those for whom the ground rules of politics are intimidation and the denial of freedom of choice. Our politics has degenerated to that of territorial hegemony and rule through the barrel of the gun - yet certain parties blithely talk of setting an election date as if we are lying in a bed of roses.

We are convinced that much of the violence is not accidental and that it is no mere inevitable by-product of the transition. There is an agenda behind it whose goal is to subvert the democratisation process and to deny the people of South Africa their freedom of choice in the forthcoming elections.

In addition to its thousands of ordinary members who have been hacked, stabbed, burnt and shot to death over the past few years, the Inkatha Freedom Party has seen over 270 of its office bearers assassinated. Office bearers - branch chairpersons, secretaries, organisers and the like - are the life blood of a political organisation. We believe our opponents are working on the axiom that if you remove the head, the body dies. The agenda we believe, is simple - marginalise the IFP through any means fair or foul, to prevent it maximising its opportunities in the election to come.



We know with a certainty born of direct experience, that the IFP has been deliberately targeted by certain organisations. We have traced the events of the past decade in detail. We have the words of senior and mid-ranking leaders indelibly etched in our memories. We have their strategy documents. We have their agendas. We have their hit lists. It is appalling of course, but not surprising for that is the way of revolutionaries.

But even more disturbing is the fact that there is collusion at the most senior levels of government to downplay this. We believe that the Government has failed in its responsibility to put an end to this nefarious agenda.

- \* We find it totally incomprehensible that the SA Police have seemingly failed to establish who is behind these serial murders of our leaders over a period of several years.
- \* We find it totally incomprehensible that the Government has known for a very long time that trained MK killers are deployed from Transkei to assassinate our leaders, but that the first steps it took to deal with Transkei were occasioned by APLA's killings of whites at the end of last year - still no mention is made of MK, however.
- \* We find it totally incomprehensible that despite the provisions of the Groote Schuur and Pretoria Accords, let alone the National Peace Accord, the Government was party to an agreement permitting the continued training of the selfsame cadres now being deployed against us in South Africa.
- \* We find it totally incomprehensible that the Government was party to another agreement that chose to put all the blame for political violence on the IFP, whose hostel supporters were to be fenced in like animals, while totally exonerating those attacking them.
- \* We find it totally incomprehensible that the Government acceded to a demand that traditional accoutrements be banned while such instruments were responsible for at the very most, less than 5% of deaths in political violence. Yet it legitimised others' military training.
- \* We find it totally incomprehensible that the Government gives the leaders of those found to be involved in gun running every opportunity to distance themselves from the incidents and that it takes steps to prevent the release to the media, of incidents of profound significance relating to the planned assassination of IFP leaders.
- \* We find it totally incomprehensible that the Government is committed to double standards vis a vis its relationship with organisations responsible for deliberately perpetrating acts of political violence as instruments of political strategy. That it threatened to break off negotiations with the PAC over as-yet unproven APLA killings but continues to negotiate with the ANC when its military wing has been proven to be involved in violence is reprehensible.
- \* We find it totally incomprehensible that intelligence agencies of the Government are actually involved in a smear campaign against the IFP and are involved in providing support to those seeking our demise.

The mere fact of this political violence is in itself, a national crisis. However, the Government's unwillingness to deal with it, and indeed its covert connivance in permitting its continuance, lead the IFP to assert with total conviction that the implications for both the transition to democracy and the fledgling democracy yet to be born are so profound, that it is absolutely vital that we deal with it, and that we do so now - in tandem with negotiations, not afterwards.

The fact of the matter is that the IFP cannot see its way through to negotiating a constitutional settlement if this forum continues to pretend that the violence only need be sorted out later. When is later? What happens in between? Are we to lose another five or fifteen or twenty five leaders? Is there to be a repeat of the 9 massacres in Natal/KwaZulu that took place in the last few months of last year, mostly committed by trained hit squads in uniform? Will there be the standard refrain decrying the hideous violence in which women and children are mown down like animals but an unwillingness to point fingers at and take steps against, those guilty of perpetrating the dastardly acts? It seems to us that the prevailing attitude is that it doesn't really matter if the victims are IFP people because the IFP doesn't matter.

This attitude, I am afraid to say, seems to be the IFP's to be that whilst certain parties have purposively adopted



precisely in order to minimise public perceptions of the severity of the slaughter and the culpability of those involved. Violence is decried, but one of the most fundamental causes is ignored. Yes, apartheid is to blame, but we are sitting here transforming that. Socio-economic deprivation is another factor, and that too, is being addressed, albeit in a very limited fashion.

The State's covert agencies have an ugly past, but we are assured, though why we should believe it I do not know, that such activities have been stopped.

But why is absolutely nothing being done about the proliferation and the activities of private armies in South Africa?

Every effort must be made to deal with the threat of violence emanating from the right wing both within and without the security establishment. Conservative militants refusing to participate in negotiations and vowing to subvert the democratisation of South Africa have to be emasculated if we are to avert the potential of the counter-democratic forces.

We observe that it is suggested on all sides that the strongest action be taken against APLA and that pressure be exerted on the PAC leadership.

But when attention is focused upon Mkhonto we Sizwe, suddenly we are in a new ball park. Suddenly, the rules of the game change. The IFP is extremely disturbed by this. We know that the Government and the ANC have a cosy agreement on MK being permitted to train its cadres and we know they are being trained overseas and in Africa, as well as in Transkei whose independence is not recognised by the ANC and which is defined by them as an integral part of South Africa.

There may be no formal agreement between the Government and ANC to this effect, but we also know these cadres are being deployed in Natal/KwaZulu and that they are coming into the region with hit lists of IFP leaders; that they are importing large quantities of arms and ammunition; and crucially, that the Government is fully aware of this. The Government knows what MK is up to, but it does nothing. Not only this, it actually assists the ANC and covers up incidents which might prove highly embarrassing.

For instance, when MK arms smugglers were recently arrested near the Swaziland border, the Government gave the ANC intelligence department access to the prisoners and later set up a press conference for them in its Durban security headquarters to enable the ANC leadership to state that it was ignorant of the gun running. Again, when MK cadres were apprehended entering Natal with maps of Durban townships, a list of IFP leaders and their addresses, together with silenced weapons, there was a prohibition on the release of this incident to the media.

The IFP wants to know why. We want to know why the people of South Africa are denied information in the Government's possession pertaining to persistent attacks upon the IFP by another party's armed wing. We have requested the Goldstone Commission to subpoena the Government to release all the information in its possession, but to date, we have heard nothing. We want to know why the South African taxpayer is funding MK training. The fiscus cannot cope with our people's horrendous socio-economic plight, yet it pays for MK training. We want the Government to explain to us and to our people why it is so silent on this and what purpose is being served. We want a public explanation of a possibly clandestine agenda determining one approach towards APLA and another towards MK?

There is an election coming up in the near future. We don't know yet exactly when it will be, but in terms of our proposals being put before this body, we envisage the entire negotiations, transitional and electoral processes being finalised by the end of next year at which stage the first democratic governments ever in South Africa can take office. We sincerely believe this is possible, and we are determined to avoid lengthy delays in the finalisation of the new constitution and democratisation of our land.

But we must also be quite frank in admitting that there are major problems with our timetable if the violence directed against us is permitted to continue unchecked. If there is to be a general election in South Africa, it must be clearly understood by this forum that it is to be a fair and free election. It is not to be an election premised upon the politics of victory at all costs backed up by private armies devastating communities and sowing fear and mayhem.

What kind of election are we talking about when our party, and others for that matter, are prevented from



violence from mobilising actual, let alone potential supporters? -

- \* When, following attacks upon the IFP in Sebokeng that sparked 1990's "Reef War", the President of an opposing party explicitly endorses what he calls "the community's resolution to ban Inkatha members from the Vaal Triangle", and when aligned organisations presently repeat the call that none but the so-called "democratic forces" may mobilise on the Reef?
- \* When, for fear of the assassin's guns, our party officials live every day as though it were their last - of 32 IFP branch chairmen in the Natal Midlands in 1987, only two were still alive in 1991? It was a planned attack on our branch chairman in Table Mountain that resulted in the murder of six children earlier this year.
- \* When masked hit squads run amok in communities - such as in Gengeshe, Hlanzeni, Zimeleni, Folweni, Felekisi, Umgababa, Bhomela and Mkhobeni in the second half of last year - slaughtering 93 people and in the process rendering the communities paralysed with fear?

This is what is happening now. This is the reality before us. It is simply not good enough that this multi-party forum concentrates its energies exclusively upon constitutional matters. It is our responsibility to take the lead in directly the country towards peace, failing which our constitutional deliberations will come to naught.

Some steps are fairly obvious. We would have thought it obvious that we require as a top priority, some public form of political reconciliation between the ANC and the IFP. We are committed to this and to our jointly spreading the peace message to violence-torn communities, but we fear our counterparts have little commitment to pursuing this, in large part because they have given in to pressure from their militants to avoid conciliation at all costs.

Notwithstanding this, the IFP believes there are other steps that can be taken. First, the National Peace Accord must be strengthened; there must be penalties for infringements of its provisions; and much more financial support must be given to boost the peace process, particularly at the local level. Second, more effective policing is needed, both in preventing violence and in arresting the perpetrators. Third, a review of the judicial system must be undertaken in parallel with this, to prevent the release on bail of suspected killers, to provide a witness protection programme, and to speed up the processing of cases.

But these will remain essentially palliative unless private armies are stopped in their tracks once and for all. Nearly three years have gone by since the ANC ostensibly committed itself first to peace and then to a suspension of the armed struggle.

It may sound cynical to declare that at one level the ANC has in fact fulfilled its side of the bargain - there is to all intents and purposes a cease fire between itself and the Government. Perhaps this is in part why the Government is content to accept the status quo. Its Members of Parliament, its branch chairmen, its leaders are not being assassinated, so what's the problem?

And the ANC is happy that the CCB is disbanded since ANC members were in the main the target of the State's covert security organs. It is likewise more than satisfied with the Government's preparedness not to force the organisation to hand over its weapons of war. What has happened to the Operation Vula arms caches established in Natal? We have no assurance whatsoever that they are not in fact being used by MK now against us, yet the caches remain in the ANC's possession and the individuals responsible for the smuggling of these weapons figure prominently in these multi-party talks and did so in Codesa without a care in the world.

But where does this leave the IFP? We, who were as much a target of the ANC as was the Government during the ungovernability years, remain a target. In the 1980s the KwaZulu Government was to be destroyed though attacks on councillors, schools and the like. In 1990, it was to be disbanded, and despite PAC and Azapo warnings to the ANC of impending doom, this was precisely the result. And in 1992 it was to be overthrown through mass action. In the 1980's, there were frequent calls for our leaders to be assassinated, as indeed they were - but in a brief few months last year, 17 IFP and traditional leaders were assassinated in Natal/KwaZulu alone.

As already mentioned, the week before Mr Chris Hani was slain, a member of the KwaZulu Legislative



Assembly, Mr Siphwe Gumede, was assassinated - hardly a word appeared in the media and no one other than us gives a damn. After all, he was an IFP man.

I am not attempting to be melodramatic. This is indeed the perception of our constituency. Our supporters believe that the war declared on Inkatha many years ago has never come to an end, and that it is now continuing - in fact getting worse - precisely because the deployment of armed cadres and hit squads has been legitimised by a Government unwilling to do anything to upset the bilateral apple cart it is so busy trying to balance.

This will not do. The negotiating process is not being authored by the Government and the ANC. This is a multi-party forum, not a bilateral forum, which means we either make progress together or we do not do so at all.

What do the participants in this forum expect of the IFP? Are we to concur that it is right to take a hard line on APLA because its activities clearly lead to loss of innocent life, exacerbate racial tensions, nurture hatred and generally render the political climate extremely tense, but are to accept that this does not apply to MK whose activities are of a far greater magnitude? Where is the integrity in condemning in the most strenuous terms APLA's killing of whites, but in remaining silent on an assault on a fellow participant that has taken the form of a low-intensity civil war?

The IFP will not accept these double standards. We believe all private armies must be disbanded forthwith. APLA, MK, AWB or Wit Wolf members wishing to join the future defence force can do so, providing they satisfy whatever minimum criteria are in place. *See Addendum*

We have no problems with this. So why are these private armies needed? Apartheid cannot be resurrected, so there is no need for liberation armies to renew their assault upon the apartheid state. So why are they needed? The fact of the matter is simple. Private armies not only serve absolutely no useful purpose whatsoever, but, as instruments of violence, are the most serious threat to the potential success of these multi-party talks. Our hopes for a future democratic South Africa are underpinned by nothing less than the efforts we collectively put into resolving the problems facing us of which violence is a key.

Constitutional negotiations have to go hand in hand with the peace process since neither can succeed without the other. We have had enough of failed negotiations and we have had enough of failed peace. Now is the time for us to put the past behind us and to do everything in our power to bring both peace and democracy to our land.

We demand that this forum immediately set up a Commission supported by military and technical experts to organise and supervise the disbandment of private armies, the identification and control of arms caches, measures to prevent any further recruitment and military training of citizens abroad, and the rehabilitation of former members of private armies.



EMBARGO: 12:00 : MONDAY, 8 MARCH 1993

PRESS STATEMENT BY THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE R J GOLDSTONE, CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY REGARDING THE PREVENTION OF PUBLIC VIOLENCE AND INTIMIDATION

1. The Commission is to hold an enquiry into ways and means of curbing the potential for public violence and intimidation in and in relation to a national election.
2. In order to assist and advise the Commission with regard to the enquiry it will appoint a panel of South African experts. Appropriate international experts will also be consulted and will be requested to act with the local panel.
3. All interested parties are requested to furnish written submissions to the Commission by 31 May 1993 on any relevant matter relating to the above terms of reference and in particular:
  - (a) the rules of conduct and procedure (including policing and security) which should apply in order to curb public violence and intimidation in relation to public meetings held and any other activity relating to an election conducted in the period prior to such an election by political parties and organisations;
  - (b) the relevance to public violence and intimidation of the time period during which voting should take place;

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- (c) the location of polling stations;
- (d) the security and policing of polling stations;
- (e) the conduct and procedures relating to the counting of votes;
- (f) relevant measures during the period following the conclusion of the election;
- (g) with regard to the foregoing matters:
  - (i) the role of relevant Government Departments;
  - (ii) the role of the South African Police;
  - (iii) The role of the international community.

4. The Commission requests submissions to be furnished to it in particular by:

- (a) relevant Government Departments;
- (b) the South African Police;
- (c) political parties and organisations;
- (d) international organisations which have an interest and a role to play;
- (e) church organisations;
- (f) welfare organisations;
- (g) relevant university departments and institutes.

5. The Commission hopes that this enquiry, apart from any other purpose, will in effect be a consultation with all the people of South Africa in order to:

- (a) ascertain their fears, concerns and wishes with regard to possible public violence and intimidation in a forthcoming national election;

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(b) educate the public of South Africa with regard to political tolerance which is essential for a free and fair election and one unaccompanied by violence or intimidation.

6. In order to achieve the aforesaid goals, the Commission appeals to non-governmental organisations, churches and welfare organisations to actively consult with their constituents and members with regard to the enquiry and so involve all of the people of South Africa in a matter which is primarily their concern.

7. Submissions should be furnished to the Secretary of the Commission, Private Bag X858, Pretoria, 0001.

PRETORIA  
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CAPE DELEGATION OF TRADITIONAL LEADERSPOSITION PAPER ON CAUSES OF VIOLENCE WHICH THREATEN THE  
NEGOTIATION PROCESS AND THE UNDERMINING OF THE EFFECTIVE  
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE N.P.A.1. CAUSES OF VIOLENCE:

Violence is caused by one or more of the following :-

1. Political intolerance between political groupings.
2. Vying for political positions within the groupings.
3. Propaganda against other politicians and political groupings.
4. Illiteracy amongst the greatest populace which make them susceptible to cheap propaganda and heavy reliance and dependence on those who appear to be knowledgeable.
5. Lack of hope.
6. Lack of sufficient and meaningful social upliftment i.e. development.
7. Escalating unemployment.

In the South African situation the following have repeatedly been mentioned by various bodies, persons and organisations as causative factors for violence and therefore worthy of mention.

1. Third force violence
2. Use of provocateurs

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appear to be calling anyone to account even though these are its own signatories. It appears therefore Peace Accord is a dog with no teeth.

DATED AT UMTATA THIS 23 APRIL 1993.



NKOSI G D GWADISO

FOR AND ON BEHALF OF CAPE DELEGATION OF TRADITIONAL LEADERS

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**INTANDO YESIZWE SUBMISSION TO THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ON VIOLENCE**

1. Needless to say IYP is a signatory to National Peace Accord and it therefore supports and subscribes to its policies and all efforts to actualise peace in our land.
2. We, in IYP believe that National Peace Accord should be elevated to a status of a statute with penal clauses so that the National Peace Accord can legally be enforceable and seen to be having teeth.
3. We, believe non-signatories to the National Peace Accord should be encouraged to become signatories. The strength of the Peace Accord lies in voluntary compliance with the spirit contained in the document and so parties must give effect to the intention and the spirit of the Accord.
4. Political parties, organisations and administration must take all reasonable and necessary steps to promote political tolerance. We believe that the need to stop "War-talks" cannot be overemphasised.
5. In the spirit of and to foster the co-operation and comradeship that is ever growing in multi-party talks political parties, organisations, and administration must be seen to be working together even outside World Trade Centre conference rooms.
6. Inter-Party rallies, seminars, workshops conferences should be encourage to signal to party/organisations followership that things are changing and there is hope and we must be beginning to re-build our nation together.
7. Parties, organisations and administration taking part in multi-party talks or not taking part must re-commit themselves or commit themselves to solving our political differences peacefully.
8. Political assassinations should be dealt with by Law and Order apparatus ruthlessly.

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9. Cut-off date for indemnity should be finally be fixed. This lack of certainty encourages some rogues to murder political opponents hoping to be indemnified.

MEMORANDUM

TO : THE PLANNING COMMITTEE OF THE NEGOTIATION COUNCIL

FROM : TRANSVAAL INDIAN CONGRESS / NATAL INDIAN CONGRESS

DATE : 19 MAY 1993

RE : PROPOSALS FOR SUBMISSION TO THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ON VIOLENCE

SECTION A - CRIMINAL VIOLENCE1. CAUSES

- 1.1. Breakdown in law and order coupled with the belief that the police are unable, if not unwilling to combat crime;
- 1.2. Lack of resources/ineffective allocation of limited resources to combat crime;
- 1.3. Worsening socio-economic conditions.

2. MECHANISMS TO COMBAT CRIMINAL VIOLENCE2.1. AD CAUSE 1.1

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to assist them in the process of combatting crime. Notwithstanding wide powers of arrest, search, seizure, and questioning of suspects a perception still exists that "the criminals are getting away with murder". What is needed are local initiatives which involve all players in the community ranging from representatives of educational and religious institutions, community organisations and civics, local authorities and welfare agencies to representatives from the criminal justice system. In the past police and community liaison has been limited to very few interest groups and have in any event been ineffective given the domination by the South African Police in such a process.

We therefore propose that all the interest groups referred to above come together to form local anti-crime coalitions that would be charged firstly, with the responsibility of monitoring whether the law and order machinery is working as effectively as it can and also initiate legitimate programmes to educate the community on crime prevention techniques which would ensure that ordinary citizens do not become soft targets for criminals. We are of the view that a crime prevention network which enables various sectors of the community to become committed in the process of crime prevention would empower the community in their quest to encounter criminal opportunism.

Such an anti-crime coalition, secondly, will also ensure police accountability in community-police consultations in that local communities could ensure that

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their respective communities will be kept informed of all developments pertaining to an investigation into an act of criminal violence. This would promote trust between the police and the community in that there would be greater transparency and appreciation of progress made with regard to investigations into specific criminal acts as well as general measures to combat criminal violence. Such an anti-crime coalition would promote understanding of the constraints, pressures and expectations of both the police and the community. It would develop a commitment to jointly solve the problems regarding crime in a community. And more fundamentally it enables a community to feel that it has some control over the criminal justice system.

Finally, such a coalition could also play a pro-active role with regard to organising self-defence classes, creating an awareness of what to do once victimised, liaising with the various authorities with regard to orientating our physical surroundings to reduce the opportunity of crimes eg. lobbying for greater street-lighting, public telephones, crime-lines, etc.

- 2.2. We further propose the incorporation of lay citizens in the actual process of maintaining law and order. However, over the last few months we have seen the growth of neighbourhood watches as well as self-defence units. Whilst these initiatives are useful in that it increases the human resources available to combat crime the negative feature is that, if left to their own such formations could actually result in escalating the incidence of violence. Such

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citizen forces should at all times be accountable to and be supervised by an independent body so that they are guided at all times. Recent suggestions of youth peace brigades who are under the command of an envisaged joint security force has our fullest support.

2.3.

**AD PARAGRAPH 1.2**

In the past the debate around the resource required to combat crime have focused essentially on the role of policing. We are of the view that we should creatively look at other avenues to resolve crime which may require resources that are within our means. Crime cannot be combatted by simply only instilling a fear for being apprehended by the police. Instead crime can also be prevented by reducing the opportunity for crime. In this regard the need for neighbourhood surveillance programmes, footpatrols, etc are important and so to are environmental factors such as more street lighting, the setting up of more satellite police stations, etc.

2.4.

**AD PARAGRAPH 1.3**

Statistics have shown that in South Africa the majority of criminal offenders are persistent offenders. This can be directly attributable to factors such as inadequate education, child poverty, lack of appropriate housing, lack of employment, etc. It therefore becomes clear that more extensive interventions

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are required. Programmes for job creation, stimulating economic growth, providing adequate housing and education is paramount. Such initiatives need to be comprehensive, addressing not only the symptoms, but the root causes of crime.

### 3. GENERAL COMMENTS

- 3.1. An important factor that would assist in combatting crime would be to accelerate the negotiation process towards a democratic South Africa. This would reduce the prevailing anxiety and give all South Africans an opportunity to focus their attention towards reconstructing a society that would alleviate some of the socio-economic root causes of criminal violence.
- 3.2. Whilst the above has focused on mechanisms to combat crime, on the other hand it should not be forgotten that the rights of the accused should also be protected at all times. There has already been a tendency to cut back on rights and privileges that an accused had previously enjoyed. Hence the creation of a category of special offences in terms of which bail cannot be granted, is a regressive step. In our eagerness to combat crime, we should ourselves not act in a way that disregards an accused's/suspect's legal rights.

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## SECTION B - POLITICAL VIOLENCE

### 1. CAUSES

- 1.1. Political rivalry and fear of losing political support and/or dependency that the negotiation process will not yield the desired party political results;
- 1.2. Lack of control by political formations of their rank and file members;
- 1.3. Impatience with the negotiation process and uncertainty of the future;
- 1.4. The existence of disparate armed formations;
- 1.5. Deteriorating socio-economic conditions;
- 1.6. The improper conduct in the course of investigating and/or lack of capacity by the police to effectively investigate acts of political violence.

### 2. MECHANISMS TO COMBAT POLITICAL VIOLENCE

#### 2.1. AD PARAGRAPHS 1.1 AND 1.2

There is no need to reinvent the wheel. Several processes are already

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underway and what should be considered by the parties in the negotiation process is how we could improve the workings of these mechanisms. In this regard we propose that :

2.1.1. parties to the negotiation process immediately sign the National Peace Accord (NPA);

2.1.2. systems need to be devised to ascertain whether parties to the NPA are implementing the various recommendations made within the NPA framework eg. the Goldstone Commission, Peace Committees, etc. Presently it appears that parties use the findings and recommendations to score political points rather looking at how peace can be attained. Unless all parties see peace as having intrinsic value and not as a political football, all other attempts to combat political violence will have very little chance of success;

2.1.3. the NPA is informed by a spirit of voluntarism. Whereas criminalisation, therefore, may not be the most appropriate means to ensure compliance, this should not mean that there should be no sanction for non-compliance with agreements and recommendations designed to practically attain peace. In the absence of incentives for self-sanction, we suggest that the international community could play a vital role. More particularly we propose that the role of the UN

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monitors be enhanced to include meeting with and enquiring from the respective parties what they have done or are doing to ensure compliance with agreements and recommendations that emanate from the NPA and its structures. Furthermore, the subject matter of these meetings and inquiries should form part of the UN Secretary General's monthly report. It is our view that the international community, notwithstanding its present limited role, is already having a positive effect.

2.2. AD PARAGRAPH 1.3

In this regard we wish to repeat the point referred to in Section A paragraph 3.1.

2.3. AD PARAGRAPH 1.4

The composition of the SAP and SADF is one of the major stumbling blocks to the curbing of political violence. In its present form it does not enjoy the legitimacy of the majority of South Africans. The curbing of political violence is further hampered by the existence of other armed formations and private army. We therefore propose that there be an amalgamation of all police forces under the auspices of the SAP and that such a police force together with the SADF, MK, APLA, the Transkei Defence Force, the

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KwaZulu Defence Force, and all other armed formations be brought together under a single joint command structure. Such a structure should not only be charged with the responsibility of monitoring the activity of all these formations but should also effectively control all these formations as a single entity and with the power to act decisively.

2.4. **AD PARAGRAPH 1.5**

In this regard we wish to refer to the points contained in Section A paragraph 2.4.

2.5. **AD PARAGRAPH 1.6**

2.5.1. From the various reports that we have received, we are of the view that the police are :

- (a) either, ill-equipped to combat political violence in that in some police stations telephones are out of order; there are no fax machines, nor vehicles to transport policemen to areas of violence; and at times local policemen are not armed nor do they have bulletproof vests thereby inhibiting their willingness to effectively intervene;

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- (b) or, the manner in which the police investigate acts of political violence reveal a lack of appreciation of the sensitivity of the task they have to perform. In certain areas the internal stability unit has been used with no understanding of local conditions, without liaising with the local police station, and have failed to use local policemen in the process of investigation, alternatively, when such policemen have been used they are used as interpreters for white policemen rather than as investigators of political crimes.

2.5.2.

We therefore propose that :

- (a) local police stations be upgraded, more adequately equipped, that outside units be compelled to report to a local station commander before entering an area, and that all arrests, searches, and seizures be reported to the local station commander, and that the local station commander be further empowered to dutifully perform their task;
- (b) police officers be adequately trained on matters such as debriefing, taking statements, and to be meticulous in their investigation of crimes;

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- (c) when individual police members are accused of a crime, they should be suspended immediately pending the outcome of the investigation. This will help to restore community confidence in the police. Furthermore, we propose that the system of Police Reporting Officers whose function in terms of the National Peace Accord is to oversee investigations into alleged police misconduct and crimes itself be supervised by an independent body;
- (d) the use of monitors needs to be enhanced. Presently local monitors are not taken seriously by the South African Police and the authorities. Due to this lack of power they are less effective when it comes to taking up issues. As regards foreign monitors/observers we are of the view that those with specialist and expert skills have proven to be most effective. Of particular use are those people trained in conflict resolution, people who are involved in the police force, experts in forensic science, private investigators etc. This factor should therefore be considered when appointing such monitors/observers in future. In addition input from the community may be advisable with regard to identifying further important tasks that monitors could perform;

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- (e) greater use should be made of satellite police stations to ensure greater accessibility and to ensure effective and timeous action on the part of the police.

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**(A) VIOLENCE (SECOND INPUT BY TRANSKEI GOVERNMENT - 19-05-1993):**

1. In our previous input to the Technical Subcommittee we dealt with a number of basic principles and the overall approach to be adopted in handling this matter. We add the following input thereto:

(a) the Technical Subcommittee should deal with the draft proposals which the Planning Committee had presented to the Negotiating Council. Further details in this regard, as well as the current views of Planning Committee on this matter, can be obtained from Dr T. Eloff;

(b) We propose that the following points be taken into account when devising solutions to the violence issue:

(i) the need for a speedy settlement at the ongoing national negotiations;

(ii) the need to embark on mass education programmes on the need for peace in our land;

(iii) the need for a scientific analysis to be conducted on the manner in which violence has changed the outlook on life by the young people who have grown up in a violent atmosphere or environment and the

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**Identification of remedial measures;**

- (iv) the need to strike a deal which addresses, on a uniform basis, the future of the armed wings of liberation movements and of all the White right-wing armies. Such a deal should not discriminate as between organisations and should give equal treatment to all. The timing of the implementation of suggested solutions should reflect this principle;
- (v) the need to have extra-parliamentary parties participating at the negotiations assuming joint control of the armed forces (armies, police and prisons) controlled by the SATBVC States and the six homelands, immediately after the installation of the Transitional Executive Council;
- (vi) the need to embark on extensive social upliftment projects to rid our society of the suffering and poverty which contributes to violence;
- (vii) the need to identify the defects inherent in the current law enforcement mechanisms;

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- (viii) the need to identify the reasons why the success of the police in solving politically-motivated crime is so low;
- (ix) the effect which the present secret structures of the State security apparatus have in fanning mistrust amongst the various parties in South Africa and an identification of appropriate remedial measures which would include access to information on decisions taken at State Security Council level;
- (x) the need to remove from office all security personnel involved in all the covert operations - such as those who masterminded Operation Katzen;
- (xi) the need to consider the influence which certain political parties have on the security machinery serving particular States or homelands;
- (xii) the need to ensure that all the TBVC States and the homelands are properly equipped in terms of their machinery, infrastructural and manpower needs, to cope with violence;

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(xiii) the need to ensure that National Peace Accord structures address meaningfully the threat posed by the White right-wing. At present the emphasis is on so-called Black-on-Black violence; and

(xiv) the need to involve the heads of all the security forces referred to above in the formulation of a solution and the drafting or compilation of an action plan.

2. We have noted with dismay and a sense of shock the Inkatha Freedom Party's handling of its allegations relating to the killing of certain IFP members allegedly by persons known or unknown to that organisation. In Transkei during the years 1990 and 1991 we buried thousands of Transkeians who had been killed by IFP supporters in Transvaal and Natal. The killings still continue albeit on a lower scale. We have files containing all the relevant information and will present them to you when so requested. We also have in our possession affidavits identifying the perpetrators of the crimes as well as information linking them directly to the IFP. We therefore urge the Technical Subcommittee not to finalise the consideration of the IFP document referred to above without giving the Transkei Government the opportunity of placing the information contained in voluminous files, before it.

It is however the Government's view that a mudslinging match will get us

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nowhere and that the solution to the IFP "problem" lies in the proposals the Transkei Government has presented to the Technical Subcommittee on the issue of violence generally.

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## 1. POLITICAL VIOLENCE

## 2. CRIMINAL VIOLENCE

BECAUSE OF THE LAWLESSNESS OF THE POLITICALLY INTOLERANT POPULATION (AND TO THE EXTENT EXPERIENCED BY SOUTH AFRICA), IT TAKES LITTLE TO EXPOSE THE CRIMINAL OPPORTUNIST. THE LACK OF LAW AND ORDER HAS ENABLED COMMON CRIMINALS TO GO UNCHECKED TO THE DETRIMENT OF OUR COUNTRY.

OUR RECOMMENDATION IS THAT ALL ARMED FORMATIONS/MILITARY WINGS BE BANNED IMMEDIATELY AND THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN SECURITY FORCES TAKE CONTROL OF THE SECURITY ISSUES IN OUR COUNTRY.

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## SUBMISSION BY THE UNITED PEOPLE'S FRONT ON VIOLENCE

INTRODUCTION

IT IS THE VIEW OF THE UNITED PEOPLE'S FRONT THAT THE BEST RESULTS OF ANY DISCUSSION CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED WHEN CONDUCTED UNDER A CLIMATE WHICH IS PEACEFUL AND STABLE. WE ARE THEREFORE DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE SPIRAL OF VIOLENCE THAT CONTINUES TO INSTILL TERROR AMONG PEOPLE AND DELAYS THE PROCESS OF RECONCILIATION IN THE COUNTRY. AS A REMEDY WE WISH TO URGE THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE TO USE THE NATIONAL PEACE ACCORD SIGNED IN SEPTEMBER 1991 AS A PRIMARY INSTRUMENT TO RESTORE PEACE AMONGST OUR PEOPLE. WE FURTHER WISH TO POINT OUT TO THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE THAT AS THE POLITICAL PROCESS OF CHANGE CONTINUES TO UNFOLD CONFIDENCE AND CERTAINTY WILL RETURN TO THE SOCIETY AND THESE WILL HAVE A SIGNIFICANTLY POSITIVE EFFECTS TOWARDS PEACE. PEACE CAN THEREFORE RETURN AS WE EXPEDITE CHANGE IN THE COUNTRY.

IN THE VIEW OF THE UPF, THERE ARE NUMEROUS CAUSES OF VIOLENCE, PRINCIPAL OF WHICH ARE THE FOLLOWING:-

POLITICAL INTOLERANCE

WITHOUT POLITICAL TOLERANCE, MEMBERS AND SUPPORTERS OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND ORGANISATIONS WOULD CONTINUE TO VICTIMIZE EACH OTHER. IT IS THEREFORE NECESSARY FOR THE POLITICAL PARTIES AND ORGANIZATIONS TO FAMILIARIZE THEIR MEMBERS AND SUPPORTERS WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL PEACE ACCORD AND TO TAKE IT UPON THEMSELVES TO EDUCATE THEIR MEMBERS AND FOLLOWERS ON THE NEED FOR FREE POLITICAL ACTIVITY.

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THE EFFECTS OF APARTHEID

THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE POLICY OF APARTHEID HAS RAVAGED THE SOCIAL FABRIC OF THIS COUNTRY. APARTHEID IS VIOLENT IN NATURE. APARTHEID COULD ONLY BE SUSTAINED THROUGH VIOLENT COERCION. DESPITE THE REMOVAL OF CERTAIN DISCRIMINATORY LEGISLATION, THE EFFECTS OF APARTHEID ON THE GROUND STILL SUBSIST. IT IS THEREFORE IMPORTANT THAT A MASSIVE SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAMME BE EMBARKED UPON AS PROPOSED BY THE NATIONAL PEACE ACCORD.

THE SLOW PACE OF THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS

THE SLOW PACE AT WHICH THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS PROCEEDS INSTILLS IN THE MIND OF THE PEOPLE OF THIS COUNTRY A FEELING OF UNCERTAINTY AS TO WHICH DIRECTION THE PROCESS IS GOING. IT IS THEREFORE INCUMBENT UPON ALL OF US TO PROCEED AS SPEEDILY AS POSSIBLE TOWARDS A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.

DISTABILISATION ACTIVITIES

IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN THE FEELING OF A LARGE SEGMENT OF OUR SOCIETY THAT THE VIOLENCE THAT CONTINUE TO SWEEP OUR COUNTRY IS THE PRODUCT OF DELIBERATE ORCHESTRATION FROM CERTAIN QUARTERS. IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN FELT THAT THERE IS A THIRD FORCE IN PLAY HERE. OTHERS DISMISSED THIS VIEW AS A FIGMENT OF OUR IMAGINATION. BUT EVIDENCE HAS, IN THE LAST FEW MONTHS, BEGUN TO EMERGE IN SUPPORT OF THIS VIEW.

THE SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM IS TO ATTEMPT AS HARD AS POSSIBLE, TO IDENTIFY THIS NEFARIOUS FORCE, ISOLATE IT AND REFUSE TO HAVE THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS DERAILED THEREBY BY MOVING AS FAST AS POSSIBLE TOWARDS A SPEEDY RESOLUTION OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS.

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IN CONCLUSION, THE UPF URGES THAT THE STRUCTURES SET UP BY THE NATIONAL PEACE ACCORD BE STRENGTHENED AND THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL PEACE ACCORD BE MADE ENFORCEABLE AGAINST TRANSGRESSORS.

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INYANDZA NATIONAL MOVEMENT'S  
SUBMISSION TO THE TECHNICAL  
COMMITTEE ON VIOLENCE

We condemn violence without qualification and submit that no effort should be spared in bringing perpetrators of violence to book.

Violence may continue to be with us for a long time if we address the symptoms thereof instead of the causes. On the strength of the initial submissions on violence by different organisations, it is suggested that the Technical Committee addresses the following issues:

1. Identify the causes of and suggest measures to curb violence;
2. Devise a mechanism to strengthen the National Peace Accord, ensuring that provocative and inciting speeches by leaders are closely monitored;
3. Consider and suggest an interim arrangement for the joint control of the security forces and all other armed formations - private armies, police forces and police services of the Self-governing Territories as well as the armies of the Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei;
4. Prepare a draft "Declaration" for the parties to observe and heed the Goldstone Commission's recommendations;

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**B: VIOLENCE**

**VOLUME FOUR**



*"Democracy means freedom to choose"*

# INKATHA

Inkatha Freedom Party

IQembu leNkatha Yenkululeko

**MULTIPARTY NEGOTIATION PROCESS  
TECHNICAL SUB-COMMITTEE #2  
ON VIOLENCE**

**FIRST POSITION PAPER OF THE  
INKATHA FREEDOM PARTY SUBMITTED**

**WORLD TRADE CENTRE : 18 MAY 1993**

This is a further submission to the IFP document, "Opening Statement by Dr FT Mdlalose to the Negotiating Council" of April 26, 1993, and the resolution "To Ensure Peaceful Conditions for Constitutional Negotiations and Free Political Activity in South Africa" which have already been lodged with the Technical Committee on Violence.

**A MULTI-PRONGED APPROACH TO THE REDUCTION OF VIOLENCE IS NEEDED:**

There are a multitude of reasons for violence in South Africa, and no single approach to the elimination of violence could possibly succeed. We would suggest that action to bring about a reduction in the levels of violence be considered under the following headings:

**Socio/Economic Causes of Violence:**

Widespread poverty will continue to generate violence until there is full employment and the hideous backlogs in the provision of social, health, educational and housing facilities have been eradicated. A great deal can nevertheless be done on the socio/economic front to reduce the economic causes for violence.

The social reconstruction and development approaches advocated and adopted during negotiations to establish the National Peace Accord envisaged urgent action being taken in social reconstruction and development in Black townships torn apart by violence. The IFP believes that urgent attention should be given to the implementation of the reconstruction and development programmes of the Peace Secretariat and the peace structures. Urgent attention should be given to the establishment of a top level technical team of experts on reconstruction and development programmes.

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We would also suggest that a National Multi-Party Social Reconstruction and Development Forum should be established to give the necessary backing to the work of the peace structures in this field. The mandate for this Forum should include the drawing up priority lists of Black areas in which socio/economic development programmes could be initiated.

### **Development of Job Opportunities**

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Very clearly the unemployment problem is a contributing factor to violence and the South African Government should make substantial funding available to local authorities in poverty stricken areas to be used for the temporary employment of people doing work which facilitates community development and the development of healthier living circumstances.

### **Urbanisation**

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The urbanisation process is going to continue gathering momentum for as far as we can see ahead, and urgent attention should be given to schemes for the settlement of rural people, and for the relief of the pressure of numbers on existing squatter and informal settlement areas. In this regard the National Housing Forum should be given substantial funding to enable it to undertake joint projects with the Urban Foundation and the Independent Development Trust.

### **Community Development**

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Communities devastated by violence and poverty have lost their capacities to solve problems and mediate in conflicts between their members. In many areas a state of social pathology is developing. Concerted efforts should be made to undertake community development with the specific intention of developing community leadership and community conflict avoidance and problem solving mechanisms.

### **The Political Causes of Violence**

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The focus today is on current events and current relations between political parties, and the Peace Accord itself focuses on what parties are doing today.

That focus is inadequate on its own. That focus should be one facet of a broader focus in which the political causes of violence taking place today can be traced to:

- a) the idiom and the degree to which political parties and organisations precipitate heightened tensions and

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- b) the extent to which the aims and objectives and the strategy and tactics employed by political parties and organisations end up providing mythological charters for the continuation of violence.

### **The Responsibilities of Organisations and Political Parties**

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Historically speaking, revolutionary organisations who developed a war mentality in Black society and acted to militarise civil society, made significant contributions to the high levels of violence that are now evident.

Those revolutionary organisations must now accept the responsibility of countering their own past instigation of violence in concerted programmes aimed at mass education and motivation for peace.

The National Peace Committee should set up a Political Strategy Investigation Commission to focus the peace process and its structures on the activities which are legal but which none-the-less contribute towards the escalation of violence, by:

- war talk;
- mass action programmes;
- militant strikes and stay-aways for primary political reasons;
- the recruitment of civilians into military formations and their training;
- the establishment of activist groups who are committed to aggression under the name of self defence, etc.

### **The Culpability of Organisations**

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Quite clearly political organisations and parties who are guilty of escalating violence should be penalised for what they are doing, both in terms of culpability for damages caused by violence which they instigate, and in terms of the disruption of orderly progress and the phasing out of apartheid.

The National Peace Committee should perhaps recommend statutory mechanisms that prohibit action which results in heightened tension and violence, and political parties - who are guilty of gross violations of the Peace Accord Codes of Conduct and statutory provisions, should forfeit their right to participate in the democratic process.

### **The Disbanding of Private Armies**

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The IFP submits a list of its leaders who have been assassinated simply because they are leaders of the IFP at local and regional level. They have not died in general violence, they have been specifically targeted for death. See Appendix C.

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Quite clearly the IFP has been subjected to attacks which amount to nothing less than the ongoing serial killing of its leaders. This gravely disadvantages the IFP both in seeking and receiving mandates from communities and reporting back to them, and in the negotiating process.

The IFP claims that it is specifically the ANC's private army, Umkhonto weSizwe, which cannot escape blame directly or indirectly for these killings. We therefore seek disbandment of MK as a contribution towards reduction of violence and progress in negotiations.

The IFP adopts the position that all private armies should be disbanded in terms of Clause 733 of the National Peace Accord and we propose the establishment of the necessary mechanisms to ensure that this takes place as seen in our Resolution to "Ensure Peaceful Conditions for Constitutional Negotiations and Free Political Activity in South Africa."

The IFP's charge against Umkhonto weSizwe is clearly stated in the Opening Statement to the Negotiating Council - see Appendix A.

#### **THE NATIONAL PEACE ACCORD AND ITS STRUCTURES:**

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The idiom of the National Peace Accord is established by its primary intention of making the signatories of the Accord voluntary participants in common action to reduce the level of violence. Clearly this idiom is of immeasurable value but also clearly is, in itself, insufficient. (see Appendix D 'The Submission of the Inkatha Freedom Party to a Technical Sub-Committee of the Nation Peace Committee').

In addition to the specific attention being given to the language and the provisions of the National Peace Accord, attention should also be given to ways and means of referring offenses against the Peace Accord, which cannot be resolved by the Complaints Investigating Committee, to a Review Tribunal which could make recommendations to a statutory instrument for the codification of measures needed to eliminate violence.

#### **CODESA AGREEMENTS AND THE WORK OF THE NEGOTIATING COUNCIL:**

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The IFP believes that the Technical Committee on Violence should explore ways and means of completing the negotiations which commenced in CODESA Working Group I and which led to preliminary agreements and formulations. The Technical Committee should gather together all the statutory and voluntary instruments working for peace and seek to find ways and means of privatising the initiatives for peace work and developing statutory responses to infringements of the Peace Accord and the peace process.

The IFP believes that it is vital to have this dichotomy because the Peace Accord should not at the same time be the peace



watchdog and the facilitator of voluntary action for peace, as well as undertaking investigative tasks and developing retributive capacities.

**A SECOND CONVENTION FOR PEACE:**

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The Peace Accord and the signatories to the Peace Accord have been indulging in introspection and self-analysis for some time and it is valuable that they are doing so. What they are doing, however, needs to be located in a broader perspective of what needs to be done. That broad perspective cannot be developed by introspection and self analysis. We need a National Peace Convention in which all institutions of society, all political parties and all security forces and civil and administrative authorities join with organised mining, banking, agriculture, commerce and industry, to express the abhorrence with which ordinary South Africans deplore violence, and to develop a nation wide response to the call for peace.

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# INKATHA

Inkatha Freedom Party

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OPENING STATEMENT BY DR FT MDLALOSE  
NATIONAL CHAIRPERSON OF THE INKATHA FREEDOM PARTY

TO THE NEGOTIATING COUNCIL

ON MONDAY 26TH APRIL, 1993  
AT THE WORLD TRADE CENTRE IN JOHANNESBURG

When we met barely three weeks ago we did so deeply aware of the need to achieve something constructive after a wasted ten month hiatus in negotiations. From May 1992 to date, nothing of substantive value has been achieved in bringing democracy to our land other than the formation of this body to replace Codesa.

Yet we gather today under the menacing shadow of ever-increasing violence. Our party has lost yet more leaders in the last month. Mr Siphwe Gumede, a member of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, was assassinated by unknown assailants. Mr Leonard Ngubo, Ntuzuma vice-chairperson and our representative in the imminent formation of an Ntuzuma LDRC, was likewise assassinated. Mr Ephraim Ndebele, Umlazi unit 17 councillor and IFP leader and prominent in the region's peace process, was murdered. Mr Robert Sikobi, Mr John Thembani and Mr Roy Mpisane, all IFP leaders in Umlazi, were all killed during the past month. A prominent member of our Central Committee, Professor Maphalala, has been subjected to police harassment and his property damaged.

We would point out that the murders of yet more IFP leaders have followed inflammatory statements by ANC leaders. Addressing mourners at the vigil for Mr Chris Hani, the ANC's Southern Natal chairman, Mr Jeff Hadebe, called on ANC followers to "rid" South Africa of Dr M G Buthelezi. After our President, Dr M G Buthelezi, had expressed his horror at the murder of Mr Chris Hani and offered his condolences to the family, ANC and SACP leader, Mr Blade Nzimande, publicly rejected these at a rally in Pietermaritzburg on April 12, saying the ANC said "no thanks to the tears of Mangosuthu Buthelezi."

It is this sort of denigration that fans the flames of violence. Mr Nzimande's utterances are not words spoken in the heat of the moment. They form part of a campaign of killing talk by senior ANC leaders that has gone on for years. Many senior leaders of the ANC, including the late Mr Chris Hani, have in the past publicly called for the murder of Dr Buthelezi and members of the IFP's Central Committee.

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This is what State President, Mr F W de Klerk, said in Parliament on April 20 about the role of the ANC in violence: "Its major role in creating a climate for violence and politically motivated murders is undisputed. The many graves of members of the leadership of the IFP who have been systematically decimated by the ANC and its structures, bear testimony to this. (Hansard, disc 481) .

None of us can forget the fact that over 270 officials of the IFP have been slaughtered with modern weapons. Our entire organisation and the bereaved families demand to know who is behind in the systematic and serial killing of IFP officials. All the sophisticated institutions and organisations of our country are unable to provide an answer to this fundamental question.

There is great hope that this multi-party forum will succeed where Codesa failed, that the foundations have been laid for genuine and inclusive negotiations that will produce the settlement we have waited so long for. The IFP is pleased with progress to date - particularly with the recognition given to the need to review Codesa's agreements and to prioritise debate on the form of our future state. This bodes well for moving forward. We would also like to believe that the negative bilateralism of the recent past and the attempted marginalisation of parties participating in negotiations, is now over.

However, since we are less than confident of a fundamental change of heart among those involved, only unfolding developments will reveal whether this is the case or not. Certainly we are not impressed with the manner in which SACP leader Chris Hani's murder is being cynically used as a gambit to take make unilateral demands over the timetable of change.

Boipatong was likewise seized upon as an excuse first to walk out of Codesa and then to present a series of totally unreasonable demands backed up with mass action that culminated in the tragedy of Bisho.

Mass action is again being seized upon as an instrument to force the pace of change and to secure the ANC's grip on the reigns of power, though this time we suspect the ANC's haste is partly motivated by a desire to crack down upon the very grassroots militants it exhorted to render the country ungovernable. This, together with apartheid, was responsible for nurturing the culture of violence that has reduced the country to the state it is now in.

Hani's assassination and the latest proposal for six weeks of mass action remind us that irrespective of what we negotiate as leaders in this forum, and irrespective of whatever World Trade Centre bonhomie the nation perceives in us through the media, it must be recognised that we are not negotiating in a vacuum. Talks that broke down have been resumed, but what is being done about the political violence?

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The Inkatha Freedom Party believes it is time to get serious if this body is going to have any meaningful role to play in charting the way forward. We believe it is time this multi-party forum came to grips with the realities of what is happening in this country, instead of pushing unpleasant matters under the carpet as though their disappearance from the agenda of this body will make the problem go away.

Frankly, we hold out little hope for a successful transition to democracy unless the question of political violence is addressed, and addressed properly. Constitutional negotiations cannot succeed on their own, in taking the nation forward.

Negotiations, if they are the success we pray they will be, can merely reflect the consensus reached by us on the rules of the game of the future political system within which normalised politics should be played out. This is transparent politics which respects multi-partyism, respects political opponents, and respects the broad values that underpin true liberalism.

However, the political violence tearing our society apart renders this completely meaningless. What good is a decent constitution superimposed upon a lawless people, with no respect for themselves or their political opponents? What good is a transition to democracy founded upon savagery? Where are the values going to come from to ensure that the document we negotiate lasts longer than the first crisis that befalls the first government? Violence threatens all of us and our future. Violence is no foundation upon which to make the transition to democracy.

Far from decreasing since February 1990, political violence has in fact increased steadily. Last year we recorded at least 759 attacks on our party, and 590 supporters were killed, 388 of them in Natal/KwaZulu. Violence appears to have a life of its own, consuming more and more of our fathers, mothers and, tragically even children, in its evil flames. A further casualty is the hopes and dreams we have of peace. Cynicism, withdrawal, anguish, fear and hatred become the dominant emotions. Constant threats of mass action are designed to cow people into accepting the supposed inevitable take over of power by those for whom the ground rules of politics are intimidation and the denial of freedom of choice. Our politics has degenerated to that of territorial hegemony and rule through the barrel of the gun - yet certain parties blithely talk of setting an election date as if we are lying in a bed of roses.

We are convinced that much of the violence is not accidental and that it is no mere inevitable by-product of the transition. There is an agenda behind it whose goal is to subvert the democratisation process and to deny the people of South Africa their freedom of choice in the forthcoming elections.

In addition to its thousands of ordinary members who have been hacked, stabbed, burnt and shot to death over the past few years, the Inkatha Freedom Party has seen over 270 of its office bearers

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assassinated. Office bearers - branch chairpersons, secretaries, organisers and the like - are the life blood of a political organisation. We believe our opponents are working on the axiom that if you remove the head, the body dies. The agenda we believe, is simple - marginalise the IFP through any means fair or foul, to prevent it maximising its opportunities in the election to come.

We know with a certainty born of direct experience, that the IFP has been deliberately targeted by certain organisations. We have traced the events of the past decade in detail. We have the words of senior and mid-ranking leaders indelibly etched in our memories. We have their strategy documents. We have their agendas. We have their hit lists. It is appalling of course, but not surprising for that is the way of revolutionaries.

But even more disturbing is the fact that there is collusion at the most senior levels of government to downplay this. We believe that the Government has failed in its responsibility to put an end to this nefarious agenda.

- \* We find it totally incomprehensible that the SA Police have seemingly failed to establish who is behind these serial murders of our leaders over a period of several years.
- \* We find it totally incomprehensible that the Government has known for a very long time that trained MK killers are deployed from Transkei to assassinate our leaders, but that the first steps it took to deal with Transkei were occasioned by APLA's killings of whites at the end of last year - still no mention is made of MK, however.
- \* We find it totally incomprehensible that despite the provisions of the Groote Schuur and Pretoria Accords, let alone the National Peace Accord, the Government was party to an agreement permitting the continued training of the selfsame cadres now being deployed against us in South Africa.
- \* We find it totally incomprehensible that the Government was party to another agreement that chose to put all the blame for political violence on the IFP, whose hostel supporters were to be fenced in like animals, while totally exonerating those attacking them.
- \* We find it totally incomprehensible that the Government acceded to a demand that traditional accoutrements be banned while such instruments were responsible for at the very most, less than 5% of deaths in political violence. Yet it legitimised others' military training.
- \* We find it totally incomprehensible that the Government gives the leaders of those found to be involved in gun running every opportunity to distance themselves from the incidents and that it takes steps to prevent the release to

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the media, of incidents of profound significance relating to the planned assassination of IFP leaders.

- \* We find it totally incomprehensible that the Government is committed to double standards vis a vis its relationship with organisations responsible for deliberately perpetrating acts of political violence as instruments of political strategy. That it threatened to break off negotiations with the PAC over as-yet unproven APLA killings but continues to negotiate with the ANC when its military wing has been proven to be involved in violence is reprehensible.
- \* We find it totally incomprehensible that intelligence agencies of the Government are actually involved in a smear campaign against the IFP and are involved in providing support to those seeking our demise.

The mere fact of this political violence is in itself, a national crisis. However, the Government's unwillingness to deal with it, and indeed its covert connivance in permitting its continuance, lead the IFP to assert with total conviction that the implications for both the transition to democracy and the fledgling democracy yet to be born are so profound, that it is absolutely vital that we deal with it, and that we do so now - in tandem with negotiations, not afterwards.

The fact of the matter is that the IFP cannot see its way through to negotiating a constitutional settlement if this forum continues to pretend that the violence only need be sorted out later. When is later? What happens in between? Are we to lose another five or fifteen or twenty five leaders? Is there to be a repeat of the 9 massacres in Natal/KwaZulu that took place in the last few months of last year, mostly committed by trained hit squads in uniform? Will there be the standard refrain decrying the hideous violence in which women and children are mown down like animals but an unwillingness to point fingers at and take steps against, those guilty of perpetrating the dastardly acts? It seems to us that the prevailing attitude is that it doesn't really matter if the victims are IFP people because the IFP doesn't matter.

This attitude, I am afraid to say, seems to the IFP to be that which certain parties have purposively adopted precisely in order to minimise public perceptions of the severity of the slaughter and the culpability of those involved. Violence is decried, but one of the most fundamental causes is ignored. Yes, apartheid is to blame, but we are sitting here transforming that. Socio-economic deprivation is another factor, and that too, is being addressed, albeit in a very limited fashion.

The State's covert agencies have an ugly past, but we are assured, though why we should believe it I do not know, that such activities have been stopped.

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But why is absolutely nothing being done about the proliferation and the activities of private armies in South Africa?

Every effort must be made to deal with the threat of violence emanating from the right wing both within and without the security establishment. Conservative militants refusing to participate in negotiations and vowing to subvert the democratisation of South Africa have to be emasculated if we are to avert the potential of the counter-democratic forces.

We observe that it is suggested on all sides that the strongest action be taken against APLA and that pressure be exerted on the PAC leadership.

But when attention is focused upon Mkhonto we Sizwe, suddenly we are in a new ball park. Suddenly, the rules of the game change. The IFP is extremely disturbed by this. We know that the Government and the ANC have a cosy agreement on MK being permitted to train its cadres and we know they are being trained overseas and in Africa, as well as in Transkei whose independence is not recognised by the ANC and which is defined by them as an integral part of South Africa.

There may be no formal agreement between the Government and ANC to this effect, but we also know these cadres are being deployed in Natal/KwaZulu and that they are coming into the region with hit lists of IFP leaders; that they are importing large quantities of arms and ammunition; and crucially, that the Government is fully aware of this. The Government knows what MK is up to, but it does nothing. Not only this, it actually assists the ANC and covers up incidents which might prove highly embarrassing.

For instance, when MK arms smugglers were recently arrested near the Swaziland border, the Government gave the ANC intelligence department access to the prisoners and later set up a press conference for them in its Durban security headquarters to enable the ANC leadership to state that it was ignorant of the gun running. Again, when MK cadres were apprehended entering Natal with maps of Durban townships, a list of IFP leaders and their addresses, together with silenced weapons, there was a prohibition on the release of this incident to the media.

The IFP wants to know why. We want to know why the people of South Africa are denied information in the Government's possession pertaining to persistent attacks upon the IFP by another party's armed wing. We have requested the Goldstone Commission to subpoena the Government to release all the information in its possession, but to date, we have heard nothing. We want to know why the South African taxpayer is funding MK training. The fiscus cannot cope with our people's horrendous socio-economic plight, yet it pays for MK training. We want the Government to explain to us and to our people why it is so silent on this and what purpose is being served. We want a public explanation of a possibly clandestine agenda determining one approach towards APLA and another towards MK?

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There is an election coming up in the near future. We don't know yet exactly when it will be, but in terms of our proposals being put before this body, we envisage the entire negotiations, transitional and electoral processes being finalised by the end of next year at which stage the first democratic governments ever in South Africa can take office. We sincerely believe this is possible, and we are determined to avoid lengthy delays in the finalisation of the new constitution and democratisation of our land.

But we must also be quite frank in admitting that there are major problems with our timetable if the violence directed against us is permitted to continue unchecked. If there is to be a general election in South Africa, it must be clearly understood by this forum that it is to be a fair and free election. It is not to be an election premised upon the politics of victory at all costs backed up by private armies devastating communities and sowing fear and mayhem.

What kind of election are we talking about when our party, and others for that matter, are prevented with violence from mobilising actual, let alone potential supporters? -

\*When, following attacks upon the IFP in Sebokeng that sparked 1990's "Reef War", the President of an opposing party explicitly endorses what he calls "the community's resolution to ban Inkatha members from the Vaal Triangle", and when aligned organisations presently repeat the call that none but the so-called "democratic forces" may mobilise on the Reef?

\* When, for fear of the assassin's guns, our party officials live every day as though it were their last - of 32 IFP branch chairmen in the Natal Midlands in 1987, only two were still alive in 1991? It was a planned attack on our branch chairman in Table Mountain that resulted in the murder of six children earlier this year.

\* When masked hit squads run amok in communities - such as in Gengeshe, Hlanzeni, Zimeleni, Folweni, Felekisi, Umgababa, Bhomela and Mkhobeni in the second half of last year - slaughtering 93 people and in the process rendering the communities paralysed with fear?

This is what is happening now. This is the reality before us. It is simply not good enough that this multi-party forum concentrates its energies exclusively upon constitutional matters. It is our responsibility to take the lead in directly the country towards peace, failing which our constitutional deliberations will come to naught.

Some steps are fairly obvious. We would have thought it obvious that we require as a top priority, some public form of political reconciliation between the ANC and the IFP. We are committed to this and to our jointly spreading the peace message to violence-torn communities, but we fear our counterparts have little

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commitment to pursuing this, in large part because they have given in to pressure from their militants to avoid conciliation at all costs.

Notwithstanding this, the IFP believes there are other steps that can be taken. First, the National Peace Accord must be strengthened; there must be penalties for infringements of its provisions; and much more financial support must be given to boost the peace process, particularly at the local level.

Second, more effective policing is needed, both in preventing violence and in arresting the perpetrators. Third, a review of the judicial system must be undertaken in parallel with this, to prevent the release on bail of suspected killers, to provide a witness protection programme, and to speed up the processing of cases.

But these will remain essentially palliative unless private armies are stopped in their tracks once and for all. Nearly three years have gone by since the ANC ostensibly committed itself first to peace and then to a suspension of the armed struggle.

It may sound cynical to declare that at one level the ANC has in fact fulfilled its side of the bargain - there is to all intents and purposes a cease fire between itself and the Government. Perhaps this is in part why the Government is content to accept the status quo. Its Members of Parliament, its branch chairmen, its leaders are not being assassinated, so what's the problem?

And the ANC is happy that the CCB is disbanded since ANC members were in the main the target of the State's covert security organs. It is likewise more than satisfied with the Government's preparedness not to force the organisation to hand over its weapons of war. What has happened to the Operation Vula arms caches established in Natal? We have no assurance whatsoever that they are not in fact being used by MK now against us, yet the caches remain in the ANC's possession and the individuals responsible for the smuggling of these weapons figure prominently in these multi-party talks and did so in Codesa without a care in the world.

But where does this leave the IFP? We, who were as much a target of the ANC as was the Government during the ungovernability years, remain a target. In the 1980s the KwaZulu Government was to be destroyed though attacks on councillors, schools and the like. In 1990, it was to be disbanded, and despite PAC and Azapo warnings to the ANC of impending doom, this was precisely the result. And in 1992 it was to be overthrown through mass action. In the 1980's, there were frequent calls for our leaders to be assassinated, as indeed they were - but in a brief few months last year, 17 IFP and traditional leaders were assassinated in Natal/KwaZulu alone.

As already mentioned, the week before Mr Chris Hani was slain, a member of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, Mr Siphwe Gumede,

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was assassinated - hardly a word appeared in the media and no one other than us gives a damn. After all, he was an IFP man.

I am not attempting to be melodramatic. This is indeed the perception of our constituency. Our supporters believe that the war declared on Inkatha many years ago has never come to an end, and that it is now continuing - in fact getting worse - precisely because the deployment of armed cadres and hit squads has been legitimised by a Government unwilling to do anything to upset the bilateral apple cart it is so busy trying to balance.

This will not do. The negotiating process is not being authored by the Government and the ANC. This is a multi-party forum, not a bilateral forum, which means we either make progress together or we do not do so at all.

What do the participants in this forum expect of the IFP? Are we to concur that it is right to take a hard line on APLA because its activities clearly lead to loss of innocent life, exacerbate racial tensions, nurture hatred and generally render the political climate extremely tense, but are to accept that this does not apply to MK whose activities are of a far greater magnitude? Where is the integrity in condemning in the most strenuous terms APLA's killing of whites, but in remaining silent on an assault on a fellow participant that has taken the form of a low-intensity civil war?

The IFP will not accept these double standards. We believe all private armies must be disbanded forthwith. APLA, MK, AWB or Wit Wolf members wishing to join the future defence force can do so, providing they satisfy whatever minimum criteria are in place.

We have no problems with this. So why are these private armies needed? Apartheid cannot be resurrected, so there is no need for liberation armies to renew their assault upon the apartheid state. So why are they needed? The fact of the matter is simple. Private armies not only serve absolutely no useful purpose whatsoever, but, as instruments of violence, are the most serious threat to the potential success of these multi-party talks. Our hopes for a future democratic South Africa are underpinned by nothing less than the efforts we collectively put into resolving the problems facing us of which violence is a key.

Constitutional negotiations have to go hand in hand with the peace process since neither can succeed without the other. We have had enough of failed negotiations and we have had enough of failed peace. Now is the time for us to put the past behind us and to do everything in our power to bring both peace and democracy to our land.

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We demand that this forum immediately set up a Commission supported by military and technical experts to organise and supervise the disbandment of private armies, the identification and control of arms caches, measures to prevent any further recruitment and military training of citizens abroad, and the rehabilitation of former members of private armies.

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RESOLUTION TO ENSURE PEACEFUL CONDITIONS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL  
NEGOTIATIONS AND FREE POLITICAL ACTIVITY IN SOUTH AFRICA.

We the parties of this Negotiating Council in Session do resolve  
that :-

WHEREAS : The Multi-Party Negotiating Forum believes that the  
maintenance of law and order is the primary  
responsibility of the South African State ;

WHEREAS : the basic responsibility of the state to safeguard the  
lives and property of citizens and to guarantee  
conditions for peaceful economic development has been  
questioned as a result of decades of political conflict  
and the absence of democratic institutions acceptable to  
all;

WHEREAS : in consequence thereof armed liberation movements,  
military wings of political parties and organisations,  
military formations, many of which possess vast caches  
of modern weapons have sprung into being;

WHEREAS : Not surprisingly there has been an alarming escalation  
of violence accompanied by large scale loss of life and  
property;

NOW THEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing the Multi-Party  
Negotiating Forum Resolves to :-

1. Appoint a Multi-Party Commission charged with the task of  
working out and presenting detailed measures to take control  
of and supervise the disbandment of all military wings of  
political parties and organisations with immediate effect.



2. Call upon the South African Government to provide a detailed report to the Multi-Party Negotiating Council on all agreements understandings or working arrangements reached bilaterally with it and any political organisations, military wings or military formations.
3. Commit and bind ourselves to the immediate disbanding of all private armies and "liberation armies" and to plan, attend to finalise and set in place the mechanism to monitor the disbandment of all private armies and other armed forces not organised for legitimate or statutory law-enforcement activities.
4. Agree and propose the special enactment by the present government including mandatory prescribed punishments as a deterrent to ongoing violence or actions detrimental to peaceful democratic processes.
5. Before the Negotiating Council enters into discussions on constitutional principles as well as the stages and modalities of the process of transition to a new democratic South Africa,
  - 5.1 Ensure the termination of all armed actions.
  - 5.2 Identify all members of private armies by submitting the names and identification of APLA, MK and all other private armies to the MPC.

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- 5.3 Locate members of private armies in locations mutually agreed to by the members of the MPC.
- 5.4 Identify and declare the location, maps of the location and inventories of all arms caches in South Africa and in foreign countries and place them under the control of a commission agreed upon by the MPC.
- 5.5 Stop all military training, both in South Africa and outside the borders of South Africa.
- 5.6 Introduce comprehensive social measures for the rehabilitation of former members of private armies, military wings or military formations.

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# **INKATHA FREEDOM PARTY**

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## **REPORT ON VIOLENCE**

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# INKATHA

Inkatha Freedom Party

IQembu leNkatha Yenkululeko

## VIOLENCE AGAINST LEADERSHIP AND MEMBERS OF THE IFP

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### INTRODUCTION:

The Inkatha Freedom Party has, since the signing of the National Peace Accord on 14 September 1991, compiled all known incidents of violence instigated against Inkatha Freedom Party members and supporters.

It had long been obvious that so-called "independent" violence monitoring and alleged "human rights" organisations, here and abroad, were not accurately reflecting the proportion of IFP members and supporters being attacked.

In fact, there was and continues to be an active policy to downplay attacks on IFP leaders, members and supporters. For the most part many of these monitoring and other organisations rely on newspaper reports for their information and IFP deaths and injuries are seldom given a mention, or any prominence whatsoever, so that attacks often go unnoticed.

Indeed, attacks on members of the Central Committee of the Party and other leaders within the Party, are more often than not either entirely ignored or buried in overall "unrest" reports.

We venture to suggest that if Ministers and Deputy Ministers of the SA Cabinet, the leadership of the National Party and the Executive Committee of the ANC/SACP alliance, had been subjected to the same ongoing assassinations and assassination attempts there would have been a national and international outcry and very different governmental action than there has been.

We do not know of any statistics compiled by the Government or the SAP/SADF in this regard and yet there has been an open campaign to smash the leadership and the structures of the IFP.

The statistical data presented is a reflection of all recorded incidents of political violence committed against Inkatha Freedom Party members and supporters in 1992.

It should be noted that the data recorded includes incidents of verbal abuse and threats, but that these are not reflected in the statistical data, as political violence constitutes physical assault or attacks or where a person's movement was impeded.

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To be able to emphasise the specific trends in violence committed against Inkatha Freedom Party members and supporters, a twelve-month span of political violence, from January to December 1992, was statistically analysed.

A total number of **759 attacks** and **590 deaths** were recorded during this period. In total, since the signing of the National Peace Accord on 14 September 1991 up to 31 January 1993, **958 attacks** and **694 deaths** were recorded.

It is also important to note that the data in itself represents a trend and is not exhaustive.

The reason for this is two-fold: firstly, as most attacks occur in the rural areas of Natal/KwaZulu, immediate relaying of information is impeded due to a lack in communication devices, e.g. telephones; secondly, as the number of attacks in a specific area drastically increases, attacks that are perceived as important are sometimes the only incidents reported.

In total, recorded data indicates that since the signing of the National Peace Accord **1,89 attacks** and **1,17 deaths per day** were recorded against Inkatha Freedom Party members and supporters.

In the period from 01 January - 31 December 1992, **2,73 attacks** and **1,34 deaths per day** were recorded.

In the 17 months of data compilation it became evident that specific patterns in violence were emerging; for example, reports from one area would be dominant one month, followed by an increase in reports from a neighbouring area thereafter.

It is clear that the violence against our members is deliberately shifted to various localities.

Therefore, the analyses of attacks were sub-divided into Provinces and thereafter into regions, to establish patterns.

#### NATIONAL & PROVINCIAL STATISTICS:

The statistical data on attacks in 1992 in itself seem erratic, with no specific pattern.

By breaking the data down into the two Provinces most affected, namely Transvaal and Natal/KwaZulu, a specific wave pattern emerges, with a **rise in attacks in the Transvaal** in the first quarter of the year, whilst **attacks in Natal/KwaZulu decreased**, and the reverse was seen in the latter part of the year.

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With this shift to Natal/KwaZulu, there was also a shift in attacks on predominantly IFP supporting communities in rural areas and, in particular, on traditional leaders.

In the Transvaal there is a definite wave pattern of attacks. If the wave pattern was to follow the trend, an increase in attacks in January 1993 should have been reported. **This was indeed so** with 9 attacks recorded. A regional analysis will reveal the specific nature of attacks. In Natal/KwaZulu there was a shorter wave pattern, also with regional specifications.

Statistical data concerning deaths of Inkatha Freedom Party members and supporters indicate a definite wave pattern, with high monthly deaths in April (80 deaths) and October (76 deaths).

The reason for this is the alternate massacres in the Transvaal and Natal/KwaZulu during these periods. A below average death rate is also found in the months following specific massacres. The data has to be sub-divided into specific regions, to be able to specify if trends are followed.

When all recorded attacks and deaths are cross-referenced another wave pattern emerges, indicating that high levels of intolerance (verbal attacks/ANC/SACP mass action, visits by Umkhonto we Sizwe leaders to various areas, in particular Chris Hani's visits to the Empangeni area) lead to increases in deaths, with a sharp decrease immediately afterwards, followed again with a steady rise, culminating in more massacres.

REGIONAL SUB-DIVISION:

1. TRANSVAAL:

In the Transvaal five regions were identified, namely Eastern Transvaal, East Rand, Western Transvaal, West Rand and Vaal Triangle. As attacks in the Eastern and Western Transvaal were infrequent these attacks were grouped together.

The data concerning recorded attacks reflect another wave pattern, in that if there is a rise in attacks in one or two areas, there is a decline in attacks in another.

For example, this was shown with the decline in attacks in the West Rand, and East Rand in May, and the increase in attacks in the same period in the Vaal Triangle. In all, attacks in the Transvaal have declined since August, although a specific wave pattern was still followed concerning rises and decreases.



It is interesting to note that attacks in the Vaal Triangle against Inkatha Freedom Party members and supporters ceased in September, following the ANC's admission that they had lost control over the actions of their membership in the Vaal (in particular "Defence Units" in Phola Park) and that they would investigate.

## 2. NATAL/KWAZULU:

Natal/KwaZulu was sub-divided into three regions, namely North Coast, Midlands and South Coast.

The sub-division of data in Natal/KwaZulu reflects exactly the same pattern as in the Transvaal. As the number of attacks in one or two areas rise, there is a decrease of attacks in another.

Attacks in the Natal Midlands are consistently higher than in any of the other regions. This is due to the large number of attacks in both rural and urban areas, for example Bruntville, Wembezi, Imbali, Vulindlela, Richmond and Mpumalanga.

It is important to note that although attacks in this region are high, that the attacks are also sub-region specific, for example if there is a large number of attacks in Bruntville, a low number or no attacks are recorded in Imbali.

The ANC/SACP leader in the Natal Midlands is Mr Harry Gwala, a self-confessed Stalinist, who has already been called before the National Peace Committee complaints committee, concerning contraventions of the National Peace Accord.

Mr Gwala has notably and publicly stated that "Make no mistake, we will kill Inkatha warlords". Although Mr Gwala was found to be in contravention of the National Peace Accord, the high number of attacks and deaths in the Natal Midlands continues.

There have been numerous instances of ANC/SACP members and cadres of Umkhonto we Sizwe being arrested and implicated in violence specifically perpetrated against Inkatha members. Various ANC/SACP/Umkhonto we Sizwe arms caches have also been uncovered, including arms, ammunition and IFP membership cards found in ANC offices. ANC/SACP and Umkhonto we Sizwe members have been found in possession of SAP, KZP and SADF uniforms.

An example of sub-regional movements can also be found in the North Coast of Natal/KwaZulu, where in the first half of 1992 attacks were concentrated in the rural areas around Empangeni.

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By October attacks were concentrated in the Nguthu/Vryheid area, and this year attacks have shifted to Newcastle, the constituency of the National Chairman of the IFP, Dr F T Mdlalose.

#### CONCLUSIONS:

Statistical analysis of all data available concerning attacks and deaths of IFP members and supporters, indicate a definite wave pattern on provincial, regional and sub-regional levels.

The violence is often imported into these areas or specifically instigated.

With this wave pattern trend of violence I would suggest that there is clear group movement involved in the instigation of violence.

In areas where fear and mistrust are already high, and the figurative gun is already cocked, all that is needed is to pull the trigger.

Violence thereafter in these areas breeds on its own, subsiding over a period of time, with levels of fear and mistrust still high. Therefore, all that is again needed is manipulative hands to pull the trigger.

Specific incidents can be more easily identified in areas where the IFP-supporting residents are living in isolation and under seige.

#### ALEXANDRA:

Many of the persons now living in the Madala hostel and the surrounding informal settlement are displacees who were forcefully displaced since March 1991 from other areas in Alexandra. This area was dubbed "Beirut" by the African National Congress and the media.

On 19 January 1992 IFP member, Mr Thokozani Xaba, was shot and killed. On his funeral day, 7 March 1992, unidentified assailants armed with AK-47 assault rifles opened fire on the mourners, killing two. IFP members were also informed that no IFP member could be buried in an "ANC graveyard". The already tense situation in Alexandra exploded.

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Following the upsurge in violence in Alexandra many reports and statements were released. Most of the reports blamed the Inkatha Freedom Party for this violence. These reports also indicated that the violence was area specific, namely in Beirut (the area where IFP refugees sought shelter). Are we therefore to conclude that IFP members and supporters are actually committing acts of violence against themselves?

An SAP report of 30 April 1992 suggests another possible explanation. The report states that a **well organised attack** in which AK47 rifles and hand grenades were used, was launched on a "Zulu squatter camp".

The number of confiscated weapons are also indicated in this report. Most notably is the use of sophisticated weaponry, namely launch levers for F1 hand grenades and a M75 launch lever.

The SAP further states that the attackers were "**possibly trained Umkhonto weSizwe members**".

Another example of the sophisticated weaponry used in attacks on IFP members and supporters in Alexandra is the attack on 27 May 1992, in which a **mortar attack** was launched against the Madala hostel. One mortar landed inside the hostel, whilst two exploded outside the hostel. Two people were injured in this attack.

The use of such sophisticated weaponry directed at the people in "Beirut", and the specific location of attacks, rules out self infliction.

#### RICHMOND:

All attacks in the region of Richmond are also area specific, namely in Patheni and Gengeshe, both predominantly IFP supporting.

The same pattern emerges as in Alexandra, namely that the occurrence of violence in this area is blamed on Inkatha Freedom Party members, without consideration of who is being killed and exactly where. Incidents of violence in the predominantly ANC supporting area of Ndaleni, is extremely isolated.

Of late, due to the large number of attacks and deaths in Gengeshe, and their isolation, the survivors in this area have moved to Patheni.

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IMBALI:

The occurrence of violence in Imbali differs from other areas, due to the allegations of involvement of 121 Battalion. The Inkatha Freedom Party members and supporters in the Imbali Stage Two area, can also be considered as living under seige. All attacks occurring in Imbali are also largely area specific, namely Imbali Stage Two.

Since the withdrawal of 121 Battalion earlier this year, the number of attacks have decreased, but since this SADF Battalion was allowed to return, the increase in violence in this area has drastically increased, starting with the murder of IFP Youth Brigade Chairperson, Nhlalayenza Ngcobo, on 4 December 1992, by unidentified assailants armed with R-4 rifles.

Mr Ngcobo was previously highly critical of 121 Battalion and instrumental in the removal of this Battalion from Imbali. The situation at present is still extremely volatile.

THE FOLWENI/MPUSHINI MASSACRES:

On the weekend of 22 - 24 October 1992, two massacres occurred in the Umbumbulu area south of Durban. The first was at Folweni where five alleged ANC supporters were killed. This was followed by the killing of 20 IFP members and supporters at nearby Mpushini. Even the SAP speculated that the Mpushini attack could have been a "revenge attack".

On 19 November it was reported that nine people were arrested in connection with the Mpushini massacre of IFP supporters, of which four of those arrested were ANC members.

One of the ANC suspects was also linked to the Folweni massacre of ANC members, raising speculation that there is deliberate assassination of ANC members in order to implicate the Inkatha Freedom Party.

WEAPONRY ANALYSIS:

The above was an indication of specific trends concerning attacks and deaths. Regional breakdowns of the weaponry identified in the killing of IFP members and supporters indicates another specific trend, namely the influx of firearms.

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Under normal circumstances the perception would be that the usage of firearms would be more prevalent in urban areas and that incidents of common assault and stabbings would be predominant in rural areas.

And yet, the reverse occurs in the South Coast region of Natal.

Attacks and deaths in this area were recorded in the rural areas of KwaZulu, and data analysis indicates that a total of 87,84% of those killed were shot. The weapons identified were predominantly AK-47 assault rifles.

In total 71,9% of Inkatha Freedom Party members and supporters killed in 1992 were shot, whilst 8,79% were stabbed to death.

These figures reflect the insignificance of so-called "cultural weapons" in attacks on IFP members and supporters.

This data also correlates with general statistics, in that firearms, specifically of Eastern bloc origin, are the main cause of politically-related deaths, whilst in comparison instruments capable of causing hack and stab wounds are not specifically significant.

Data on weaponry used to kill IFP members and supporters was also quarterly sub-divided. In all, the number of IFP members and supporters killed over a three-month span did not vary greatly, but did increase in Natal and decrease in Transvaal. The breakdown is as follows:

Jan/Feb/Mar 1992:	150 deaths,	86 in Natal and 64 in Transvaal
Apr/May/Jun 1992:	150 deaths,	64 in Natal and 86 in Transvaal
Jul/Aug/Sep 1992:	142 deaths,	107 in Natal and 35 in Transvaal
Oct/Nov/Dec 1992:	148 deaths,	131 in Natal and 17 in Transvaal

Note the definite shift in violence to Natal/KwaZulu in the second half of the year.

In the first and second quarter 64% of persons killed were shot. This percentage increases in the third quarter to 81.69% and decreases to 76,35%.

Follow up with statistics, lists of deaths.

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# **INKATHA FREEDOM PARTY**

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## **STATISTICAL DATA**

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# **INKATHA FREEDOM PARTY**

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## **LIST OF OFFICE BEARERS KILLED, AS OF 1985, TO 14 SEPTEMBER 1991**

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INKATHA FREEDOM PARTY LEADERS ASSASSINATED IN POLITICAL VIOLENCE:

1.Mrs.J.Mkhwanazi	Vice-Treasurer	Zola North (Soweto) stabbed 1985
2.Mr.S.Dlamini	Chairman	Kwamakhutha petrol bomb 01.01.85
3.Miss.N. Gumede	Secretary	Dambuza hacked 24.03.1985
4.Mr.C.Buthelezi	Vice-Chairman	( H a r e W o o d ) stabbed 21.4.85
5.Mr S Ndlovu	Chairman	Sobantu Shot 1986
6.Mr.M.Ngcobo	Chairman	Dambuza stabbed 11.05.86
7.Mr Msizi Skhosana	Vice-Chairman	Imbali Ward 4 (PMB) stabbed 15.06.86
8.Mrs Evelyn Sabelo	IFPWB Organiser	Umlazi (Durban) 08.1986
9.Mr.F.T.Dlamini	Central Committee	Kwamashu (Durban) shot 28.10.86
10.Mr.P.Lembede	Deputy Treasurer	Sewula stabbed 1987
11.Mrs.D.Ndlovu	Treasurer	Munywini branch stabbed 1987
12.Mr.Mtolo	Publicity Secretary	Inanda Newtown stabbed 1987
13.Miss Ntshapa	Branch Committee	Willowfontein Stabbed 1987
14.Thulani Majola	Y/B Committee	Kidnapped and stabbed 1987
15.Mr Eliot Mncwabe	Y/B Committee	Dambuza Stoned and stabbed 1987
16.Mr.B.M.Dlamini	Central Committee	Kwamakhutha petrol bomb 01.87
17.Mrs.S.Ntshangase	Organiser	h a n d - g r e n a d e 03.01.87

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18.Mr.N.Ngubane	Treasurer	(Mpumalanga) shot 03.1987
19.Mr Bhekithemba Nene	Organiser	KwaMncane (Elandskop) hit & run 05.06.87
20.Mr Sizwe Zondi	Organiser	Imbali Ward 4 (PMB) stabbed 05.05.87
21.Mr.A.Dlamini	Organiser	(Henley) (PMB) stabbed 06.05.87
22.Mr Joseph Duma	Committee Member	Sweet Waters (PMB) shot 07.05.87
23.Mr.W.S.Hill	Youth Leader	(Kwamakhutha) stabbed 28.05.87
24.Mr.O.R.Dlamini	Chairman	(Inanda Newtown) shot 07.08.87
25.Mr.Kubheka	Chairman	Henley (PMB) stabbed 16.08.87
26.Mr.N.M.Shange	Chairman	(Woody Glen) shot 09.87
27.Mr.S.Ngubane	Youth Chairman	Sweet waters (PMB) stabbed/shot 13.09.87
28.Mr.V.Mnomiya	Executive	(Inanda Newtown) decapitated 10.1987
29.Mrs. Mlambo	Chairlady	(Emachobeni) stabbed 11.1987.
30.Mr.Gunundu	Chairlady	(Inanda Newtown ward 1) stoned 12.1987
31.Mr.Moses Majola	Vice-Chairman	Ashdown Shot 1988
32.Mr.J.Ngcobo	Vice-Chairman	Mbabane (PMB) stabbed 1988
33.Mr.Nzuza	Chairman	(Ekuthuleni) shot/stabbed 1988
34.Dumasani Awettha	Chairman	Imbali Ward 4 (PMB) 1988
35.Mr.M.Nkosi	Committee Member	(Mpumalanga Ward 10) necklaced 01.1988

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36.Mr.S.S.Cele	Chairman	(Mpumalanga Unit 9) burned 01.1988
37.Mr.S.Sibiya	Secretary	(Kwamashu Ward 2) shot/stabbed 2.01.1988
38.Mr.Mthethwa	Chairman	(Mpumalanga Unit 4) 09.01.88
39.Mrs.Dlamini	Chairperson	(Mpumalanga Unit 7) necklaced 02.1988
40.Mr.M.Makhanya	IFPYB Organiser	Ntshongweni stabbed 4.1988
41.Mr.A.Mtolo	Chairman	Mpumalanga Ward 8 hacked 10.5.88
42.Mr.Ndebele	Chairman	(Inanda Newtown Ward 8) necklaced 16.05.88
43.Mr.S.Ngcobo	Vice-Treasurer	(Munywini) petrol bomb 23.05.1988
44.Mr Musa Ndlovu	Chairman IFPYB	Dambuza Stabbed 07.1988
45.Mr.B.Dlamini	Secretary	(Mpumalanga) shot 08.1988
46.Mr.H.Bhengu	Induna/Organiser	Dindi Branch (PMB) stabbed 06.08.88
47.Mr.Mbele	Committee Member	(Bhambayi) stabbed 10.1988
48.Mr.D.M.Mbanjwa	Chairman	(Kwamakhutha) shot 18.11.88
49.Mr J.Zikhali	Chairman	Tongaat petrol bombed 12.1988
50.Mr.Nxumalo	Secretary	(Inanda) stabbed 12.1988
51.Miss.T.Nkehli	Youth Secretary	(Mpumalanga) shot 19.12.88
52.Mr Mandla Zondi	Chairman	Slangspruit (PMB) stabbed/shot 29.12.88
53.Mr.D.Bhengu	Chairman	Ngcolosi (Swayimane) shot 1989



54. Mr. Phungula	Publicity Secretary	(Inanda) stabbed 1989
55. Mr. M. Mkhize	Organiser	(Kwa Ngcolosi) throat slit 1989
56. Mr. B. Mkhize	Publicity Secretary	(Kwa Ngcolosi) shot 1989
57. Mr. Gwala	Vice Chairman	(Ezimangweni) shot/burnt 1989
58. Mr. H. Nxumalo	Chairman	Umlazi (Durban) shot 01.1989
59. Mr. Ntobelo	Publicity Secretary	(Inanda Newtown B) stabbed/burnt 01.1989
60. Mr. Dladla	Vice Chairman	(Ekuphakameni) shot/burnt 01.1989
61. Mr. J. Majola	Secretary	(Ecabazini) shot/stabbed/burnt 01.1989
62. Mr. Ntimbane	Vice Chairman	Dalmeny Farm 01.1989
63. Mr. Luthuli	Vice Chairman	Dalmeny Farm stabbed 01.1989
64. Mr. Khuzwayo	Publicity Secretary	Dalmeny Farm stabbed 01.1989
65. Mr. Dlamini	Publicity Secretary	(Bhambayi) necklaced 01.1989
66. Mr. M. Zondo	Induna/Organiser	Inanda (Durban) stabbed 01.01.89
67. Mr. Z. Mkhize	Youth Publicity Secretary	(Inanda Newtown B) stabbed 02.1989
68. Mr. M. Kubheka	Treasurer	(Ntshongweni) shot/stoned 13.02.89
69. Mr. Shabalala	Vice Publicity Secretary	Inanda Newtown hacked 03.1989
70. Mr. M. Nzama	Publicity Secretary	Inanda Newtown stabbed 03.1989

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71.Mr.S.Ndlovu	Youth Leader	(Mpumalanga) hacked 03.1989
72.Mr.Z.Nkehli	Central Committee	(Mpumalanga Ward 10) shot 03.03.89
73.Mr.M.Gwala	Organiser	(Ntshongweni) shot/burnt 06.03.89
74.Mr.Cele	Chairman	(Amawoti) shot 13.04.89
75.Mr.T.M.Ngubane	Chairman	(Mpumalanga Ward 7) stabbed 06.1989
76.Mr.P.Blose	IFP Organiser (Induna)	KwaNdwalande (Nobamba) (PortShepstone) hacked/burnt 16.06.89
77.Mr.S.Gwala	Youth Chairman	(Emophela) shot 17.10.89
78.Mr Simon Buthelezi	Chairman	Swaymane (Wartburg) Shot/stabbed 29.10.1989
79.Mr Soto Makhathini	Organiser	Swaymane (Wartburg) Shot/stabbed 29.10.1989
80.Mr M. Gcumisa	Organiser	Swayimane (Wartburg) shot 29.10.89
81.Mrs.Phakathi	Secretary	(Inanda Newtown C) stabbed 11.89
82.Mr.Hlongwane	IFPYB Chairman	(Inanda Newtown) stabbed 11.1989
83.Mr.Mhlongo	National Executive Committee	(Matikwe) shot 11.1989
84.Mr Buthelezi	Committee Member	Inanda shot 11.1989
85.Mr.A.Gasela	Vice-Chairman	Imbali Ward 6 shot 06.11.89
86.Mr.D.Manyoni	IFPYB Secretary	Imbali Ward 5 decapitated 17.11.89
87.Mr.J.Mtolo	Treasurer	Imbali Ward 4 (PMB) stabbed 28.11.89
88.Mr.Shame	Publicity Secretary	(Bhambayi) necklaced 12.1989



89.Mr.M.Mbewu	Committee member	(Ezimangweni) necklaced 12.1989
90.Mr. Nkosi	IFPYB Committee Member	(Ezimangweni) stabbed 12.1989
91.Mrs.J.Hlophe	Vice-Secretary	(Matikwe) burnt 12.1989
92.Miss.Margaret Hlope	IFPYB Committee	(Matikwe) throat slit/burnt 12.1989
93.Mrs.Mbele	Treasurer	(Matikwe) burnt 12.1989
94.Mr.B.Gcwensa	Organiser Induna	(Mkhazini) shot 12.89
95.Mr.G.Gumede	Chairman	(Matikwe) shot 12.1989
96.Mr.B.Khumalo	Vice Chairman	(Inanda Stop 8) burnt 12.1989
97.Mrs.Khumalo	Vice Chairlady	(Inanda Stop 8) burnt 12.1989
98.Mr.Mhlongo	Publicity Secretary	(Inanda Newton B) 12.1989
99.Mr.Mhlongo	IFPYB Secretary	(Inanda Newtown) shot 12.1989
100.Mr.Ngiba	Executive Committee Member	(Ohlange) shot 12.1989
101.Mr.Z.Mkhwanazi	IFPYB Secretary	(Ecabazini) shot 12.1989
102.Mr.M.Mthethwa	Youth Publicity Secretary	(Ezimangweni) shot 12.1989
103.Mr.L.Mbonambi	Vice-Secretary	(Ezimangweni) shot 12.1989
104.Mr.Dlamini	Vice-Chairman	(Ezimangweni) shot 12.1989

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105.Rev. J Ngcobo	Chairman	Smero (PMB) stabbed/throat slit 25.12.89
106.Mr.B.Msomi	Induna/Organiser	(Mkhazini) shot 31.12.89
107.Rev. A Ngobo	Chairman	Smero Branch Shot 1990
108.Mrs D.Luthuli	Organiser	(Ndwedwe) burnt 1990
109.Mr.W.Luthuli	Committee Member	(Ndwedwe) burnt 1990
110.Mr.Mbhele	Publicity Secretary	(Matikwe) burnt 1990
111.Mr.Nzimande	Publicity Secretary	(Bhambayi) throat slit 1990
112.Mr.M.Shinga	Chairman	(Emawoti) shot 1990
113.Mr.Z.Phungula	Vice-Secretary	stabbed 1990
114.Mrs D Dlamini	IFPWB Committee	Ndwedwe burnt 1990
115.Mr.T.Nkwanyana	Publicity Secretary	(Ezimangweni) 01.1990
116.Mr.Mzizi	Chairperson	(Inanda) throat slit 01.1990
117.Mr.T.Ngcobo	Vice-Chairman	Imbali ward 3 (PMB) shot 01.01.90
118.Mr.B.P.Mhlongo	Chairman	(Umbumbulu) stabbed 11.01.90
119.Mr.Mgenge	Vice Chairman	(Bhambayi) 02.1990
120.Mr.F.Mbongwa	Induna/Organiser	(Mbabane) shot 02.90
121.Mr.T.Ndlovu	IFPYB Chairman	(Ntuzuma) throat slit 01.02.90
122.Mr.B.Manyoni	Organiser	Imbali (PMB) shot/stoned 07.02.90





140.Mr E.Mkhize	Chairman	(Emagabheni) shot/stabbed 26.05.90
141.Mr.Gwala	Branch Committee	(Ndwedwe) stabbed 06.1990
142.Mr.S.Nokwe	Chairman	(Tongaat) stabbed 06.1990
143.Rev.T.Xaba	Secretary	(Greytown) shot 09.06.90
144.Mr.S.Sibisi	Publicity Secretary	Imbali Stage 2 (PMB) shot 10.06.90
145.Mr.B.B.Mbhele	IFPYB Secretary	(Emagabheni) shot 14.06.90
146.Mr.A.P.Shange	Chairman	(Azalia) throat slit 20.06.90
147.Miss.B.Dlamini	Secretary	Imbali (PMB) shot 07.07.90
148.Miss P Shandu	Secretary	(Umgababa) burnt 20.7.90
149.Miss.N.Shandu	Branch Committee	(Umgababa) burnt 20.07.90
150.Mr.D.Mchunu	Secretary	(Umgababa) shot 08.1990
151.Mr.S.Khumalo	Vice Secretary	(Ezimangweni) shot 24.08.90
152.Mr.M.Msani	Vice Chairman	(Emagabheni) shot/burnt 09.1990
153.Miss B.Majola	Secretary	(Greytown) shot 09.10.90
154.Mr.L.Lombo	Chairman	Mvundleni (PMB) shot 30.10.90
155.Mr.P.Mbatha	Chairman	(Dube) shot 10.11.90
156.Mr.C.Cele	Chairman	Wema Hostel (Meerbank) Burnt 14.11.90
157.Mr K. Mkhaye	Chairman	Sweetwaters Shot 01.12.1990



158.Mr Jack Maphumulo	Chairman	Swayimane Shot 1991
159.Mr Frank Dube	Organiser	Mbubu Shot/hacked 10.02.1991
160.Mr P. Mthalane	Organiser	Mnkangala hacked 10.02.1991
161.Mr Alfred Zuma	Organiser	Zayeka hacked 10.02.1991
162.Mr Dulumizi Msindane	Organiser	Zayeka Hacked 10.02.1991
163.Mr.C.Ndwalane	Organizer	(Mbotsha) 08.03.91
164.Mr.M.Maphumulo	Vice-Chairman	(Maqongqo) shot 24.03.91
165.Mr Mkhize	Organiser	(Richmond) shot 29.03.91
166.Mr P Mthembu	Youth chairman	(Vosloorus) shot 07.04.91
167.Mr K.Lamula	IFPYB Chairman	(Murafe) handgrenade 07.04.91
168.Mr Thulani Mlambo	Chairman	Transvaal shot/burnt 07.04.91
169.Mr Ntanzi	Organiser	Richmond stabbed 09.04.91
170.Mr S J Hlela	Chairman	(Kwamashu Hostel) shot 14.04.91
171.Mr Moses Khumalo	Vice-Chairman	(Kwamashu Hostel) shot 14.04.91
172.Mr M. Khumalo	Mayor/chairman	(Meadowlands) shot 19.04.91
173.Mr Z.Ngubane	Induna/Organiser	(Mpande) shot 29.4.1991
174.Mr K.Mthembu	Induna/Organiser	(Umgababa) bombed 30.04.91
175.Mr M. Gasa	Youth Leader	(Emalangeneni) shot 18.05.91

176.Mr Ntama Mtolo	Organiser	Ndaleneni (Richmond) stabbed 27.05.91
177.Mr S Sibisi	Publicity Secretary	Imbali (PMB) shot 10.06.91
178.Mr V.C. Zulu	Chairman	Malukazi stabbed 28.06.91
179.Mr M.Nsindane	IFPYB Treasurer	Phatheni (Richmond) shot 07.07.91
180.Mr P.S.Nzimande	Organiser	(Swayimane) stabbed/hacked/stoned 27.07.91
181.John Nzuza	Chairman	KwaMashu shot 03.08.91
182.Jotham Mkhize	Treasurer	(Mafakatini) shot 08.08.91
183.Matanyai Zondi	Chairman	Wembezi (Estcourt) shot 14.08.91
184.D.J.Ndlovu	Organiser Inkosi	Ixopo shot 16.08.91
185.Sibusiso Bhengu	Secretary	(Umkomaas) stabbed 26.8.91
186.Mr. Nxele	Organiser	Table Mountain (PMB) shot 28.8.91
187.Ndodi Thusi	Organiser	Ndaleneni (Richmond) shot 30.08.91
188.Absolom Zulu	Organiser	(Mjika) handgrenade 04.09.91
189.Wilfred Sabelo	Publicity Secretary	Ngwelezane shot 08.10.91
190.Petros Ngcobo	Secretary	Imbali (PMB) shot 12.10.91

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# **INKATHA FREEDOM PARTY**

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**LIST OF OFFICE BEARERS  
KILLED SINCE THE SIGNING OF  
THE NATIONAL PEACE ACCORD,  
14 SEPTEMBER 1991 -  
12 FEBRUARY 1993**  
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**LIST OF INKATHA FREEDOM PARTY OFFICE BEARERS KILLED**  
**SINCE THE SIGNING OF THE NATIONAL PEACE ACCORD,**  
**14 SEPTEMBER 1991, TO 12 FEBRUARY 1993**

	DATE PLACE	NAME	POSITION	WEAPONRY
1.	16/10/91 PMB/ Imbali	Bangukufa Cele	Chairperson	shot
2.	23/10/91 Reagile	Kedibone Mokalao	Organiser	stabbed
3.	24/10/91 Greytown	Obert Cele	Organiser	shot
4.	03/11/91 Umbumbulu	Nfunzelwa Ngcongo	Organiser	shot
5.	04/11/91 Elandskop	Walter Ndlovu	Organiser	stabbed
6.	04/11/91 Secunda	Mbhekiseni Gwala	IFPYB NasExe	shot
7.	21/11/91 Bhidla	Sipho Mthembu	Organiser	burnt
8.	23/11/91 Matimatolo	Doris Caluza	IFPWB Secr.	shot
9.	24/11/91 Mathulini	Mr Mgoduso	Chairperson	shot
10.	10/12/91 Mthengwane	Wiseman Mthembu	Organiser	shot
11.	16/12/91 Soweto/Dube	Canwell Ngidi	Chairperson	shot
12.	17/12/91 Maqongqo	Thomas Gcabashe	Chairperson	shot
13.	22/12/91 Murchison	Ndwalane Monomo	Chairperson	shot
14.	02/01/92 Empangeni	Mlozane Mhlongo	IFPYB Chair.	shot
15.	21/01/92 Empangeni/ Enseleni	Joshua Jezangeni	Chairperson	shot
16.	07/02/92 Umlazi	Winnington Sabelo	Centr. Comm.	shot



	DATE PLACE	NAME	POSITION	WEAPONRY
17.	08/02/92 KwaMbonambi	Mr Mandlala	Organiser	shot
18.	22/02/92 Escourt/Wembezi	Mnandi Dladla	Organiser	shot
19.	07/03/92 Umlazi	Simon Ngubane	IFPYB D-Secr	shot, stabbed
20.	28/03/92 Port Shepstone	Elton Gumede	<del>Organiser</del>	shot
21.	15/04/92 Wesselton	Chris Ngwenya	IFPYB Chair.	shot
22.	15/04/92 Isitingisi	Tobias Mdlalose	Chairperson	shot
23.	27/04/92 Inkanyezi	John Khanyile	<del>Organiser</del>	shot
24.	11/05/92 Soweto/Dube	Alson Gogo	Organiser	shot
25.	15/05/92 Alexandra	Simon Nxumalo	Chairperson	shot
26.	23/05/92 Esikhawini	Robert Zungu	Organiser	hand grenade, hacked
27.	12/06/92. Richmond/ Patheni	Mnyeale Dlamini	Organiser	shot
28.	12/06/92 Richmond/ Patheni	Masenti Madlala	Organiser	burnt
29.	13/06/92 Esikhawini	Alson Mbambo	Organiser	shot
30.	13/06/92 Mandini/ Nembe	Mr Khumalo	Chairperson	shot
31.	20/06/92 Mooi River/ Bruntville	Meshack Xaba	Comm. member	shot, stabbed
32.	22/06/92 Enseleni	Jotham Mkhwanazi	IFPYB Org.	shot

	DATE PLACE	NAME	POSITION	WEAPONRY
33.	23/06/92 Umbumbulu	S. Hiyabekhala	Organiser	shot
34.	23/06/92 Umbumbulu	Mdelwa Shozi	Organiser	shot
35.	25/06/92 Escourt/ Wembezi	Isaac Mswane	Treasurer	shot
36.	26/06/92 Murchison	Bhabhalaza Dladla	Organiser	shot
37.	27/06/92 Umlazi	Jabulani Nxumalo	IFPYB Org.	stoned
38.	28/06/92 Nomganga	D. Thusi	Organiser	shot
39.	28/06/92 Richmond/ Gengeshe	Johannes Matula	Organiser	shot
40.	28/06/92 Murchison	Samson Majola	Organiser	shot
41.	03/07/92 Empangeni/ Sigisi	John Mlondo	Organiser	shot
42.	04/07/92 Nomganga	Mvimbezeli Mchunu	Chairperson	shot
43.	10/07/92 Empangeni/ Ondondolo	Mr Simelane	Comm. member	shot
44.	14/07/92 Umbumbulu	Dominic Mhlongo	Organiser	shot
45.	16/07/92 Umlazi	Mr Ngobese	Chairperson	shot
46.	16/07/92 Boipatong	Oupa Smith	Publ-Secr.	necklaced
47.	02/08/92 Empangeni/ Matshana	Khulekani Magubane	Organiser	shot
48.	10/08/92 Alexandra	Zoleka Miya	IFPYB Secr.	shot



	DATE PLACE	NAME	POSITION	WEAPONRY
49.	23/08/92 Richmond/ Mkhobeni	Fana Nzimande	Chairperson	shot
50.	23/08/92 Richmond/ Mkhobeni	N. Nzimande	IFPWB Chair.	shot
51.	28/08/92 Richmond/ Ndaleni	Mapu Sobiso	Organiser	shot
52.	00/09/92 Kwanyavu	Z. Zuma	Comm. member	shot
53.	08/09/92 Enkanyezini	Bheki Shelembe	Secretary	shot
54.	15/09/92 Table Mountain	Sigaxa Dlamini	Chairperson	shot
55.	26/09/92 Richmond/ Gengeshe	Bheka Phoswa	Organiser	shot
56.	26/09/92 Richmond/ Gengeshe	Mbovani Nxele	Organiser	shot
57.	26/09/92 Richmond/ Gengeshe	Namawakhe Jili	Organiser	shot
58.	30/09/92 Ningizimu	Gideon Sibiya	Chairperson	hand grenaded
59.	30/09/92 Ningizimu	Mthembeni Xulu	Organiser	hand grenaded
60.	08/10/92 Hlathikulu	Velias Ndlovu	IFPYB Chair.	shot
61.	11/10/92 Pietermaritzburg	T. Nhlangulela	Chairperson	shot
62.	12/10/92 Umbumbulu	Ndondiya Ngcobo	Organiser	stabbed
63.	12/10/92 Umbumbulu	M. Ngcobo	Organiser	stabbed

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B 32/45

	DATE PLACE	NAME	POSITION	WEAPONRY
64.	15/10/92 Empangeni/ Eniwe	Bhekuyise Gadali	Organiser	shot
65.	16/10/92 Alexandra	Jotham Xaba	IFPYB D-Secr.	shot
66.	18/10/92 Odlameni	Alison Khanyile	Organiser	shot
67.	18/10/92 Odlameni	Zakharia Bhengu	Organiser	shot
68.	15/11/92 KwaMakutha	Timothy Sithole	Organiser	shot
69.	18/01/92 Odlameni	Zachariah Bhengu	Organiser	shot
70.	04/12/92 Imbali	Nhlalayenza Ngcobo	IFPYB Chair.	shot
71.	16/12/92 Izingolweni	Anthony Zulu	Chairperson	shot
72.	23/12/92 Empangeni	Enoch Mkhwanazi	Organiser	stabbed
73.	23/12/92 Empangeni	Bongekile Xulu	IFPWB Chair.	shot
74.	23/12/92 KwaNzuza	Mr Msweli	Organiser	shot
75.	06/01/93 Tembisa	Sesi Khumalo	IFPWB Org.	shot
76.	12/01/93 Sundumbili	France Mlaba	IFPYB Chair.	shot
77.	15/01/93 Kwayavu	Mthokozisi Duma	IFPYB Org.	shot
78.	28/01/93 Boipatong	Silomo Gazu	Publ-Secr	necklaced
79.	12/02/93 Tigane	Andries Khoza	IFPYB D-Secr.	shot

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32/46



# **INKATHA FREEDOM PARTY**

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
## **STATISTICAL DATA OF OFFICE BEARERS KILLED 1985 - 1992**

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10 11 1993

B 32/47

# IFP OFFICE BEARERS KILLED




Total no. killed - 264

87/23  
32/48

1011103



# IFP OFFICE BEARERS KILLED WEAPONRY



Total no. killed - 264

32/49

**INKATHA FREEDOM PARTY**


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**NATIONAL AND PROVINCIAL  
STATISTICS OF INCIDENTS  
OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE  
REPORTED AGAINST IFP MEMBERS  
AND SUPPORTERS  
1992**  
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10 100 1003

B 32/50



# ATTACKS ON IFP - 1992




■ TOTAL NO. OF ATTACKS

Total no. of recorded attacks - 759

15/51 B

# ATTACKS ON IFP - 1992

## REGIONAL BREAKDOWN




Total no. of recorded attacks - 759

32/52



# IFP DEATHS - 1992




Total no. of recorded deaths - 590

B  
32/53

# IFP DEATHS - 1992

## REGIONAL BREAKDOWN




Total no. of recorded deaths - 590

32/54



# WEAPONRY - 1992



Total no. of recorded deaths - 590

101 103  
B  
32/55

# **INKATHA FREEDOM PARTY**

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
## **REGIONAL STATISTICS OF INCIDENTS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE REPORTED AGAINST IFP MEMBERS AND SUPPORTERS 1992 - NATAL -**

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# ATTACKS ON IFP - 1992

## NATAL




Total no. of recorded attacks - 556

32/57

# IFP DEATHS — 1992

## NATAL




Total no. of recorded deaths — 388

85/25



# NATAL - 1992


## DEATHS AND ATTACKS



32/59

# NORTH COAST — 1992

## DEATHS AND ATTACKS




101-103  
B 32/60



# MIDLANDS — 1992

## DEATHS AND ATTACKS



— TOTAL NO. OF ATTACKS


+ TOTAL NO. OF DEATHS

B 32/61

101 1003

# SOUTH COAST - 1992

## DEATHS AND ATTACKS




32/62



# WEAPONRY — 1992

## NORTH COAST




Total no. of deaths — 71

32/63

# WEAPONRY — 1992

## MIDLANDS




Total no. of deaths — 169

32/64



# WEAPONRY - 1992

## SOUTH COAST



Total no. of deaths - 148

32/65

# **INKATHA FREEDOM PARTY**

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
## **REGIONAL STATISTICS OF INCIDENTS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE REPORTED AGAINST IFP MEMBERS AND SUPPORTERS 1992 - TRANSVAAL -**

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# ATTACKS ON IFP - 1992

## TRANSVAAL




Total no. of recorded attacks - 203

32/67

# IFP DEATHS — 1992

## TRANSVAAL




Total no. of recorded deaths — 202

32/68



# TRANSVAAL - 1992


## DEATHS AND ATTACKS



3269

# WEST RAND — 1992

## DEATHS AND ATTACKS




32/70



# EAST RAND — 1992


## DEATHS AND ATTACKS



32/71

# VAAL TRIANGLE — 1992

## DEATHS AND ATTACKS




32/72



# WEAPONRY — 1992

## WEST RAND




Total no. of deaths — 106

32/73

# WEAPONRY — 1992

## EAST RAND




Total no. of deaths — 65

32/74



# WEAPONRY — 1992

## VAAL TRIANGLE



Total no. of deaths — 19

32/75

# **INKATHA FREEDOM PARTY**

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## **QUARTERLY ANALYSIS OF WEAPONRY USED IN INCIDENTS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE RESULTING IN DEATH 1992**

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B 32/76




32/77



# WEAPONRY

APR/MAY/JUN - 1992




Total no. of deaths - 150

1010103  
B 32/78



# WEAPONRY

JUL/AUG/SEP - 1992




Total no. of deaths - 142

44/28  
32/77  
8

# WEAPONRY

OCT/NOV/DEC - 1992




Total no. of deaths - 148

10:11:03  
B  
32/80



# WEAPONRY — TRANSVAAL

## JAN/FEB/MAR 1992




Total no. of deaths — 64

18/81

10 11 12 13

# WEAPONRY — TRANSVAAL

## APR/MAY/JUN — 1992



Total no. of deaths — 86

10 1 1 3  
B  
32/82




32/83



# WEAPONRY – TRANSVAAL

## OCT/NOV/DEC – 1992




Total no. of deaths – 17

13.1.1993  
B  
32/84



# WEAPONRY — NATAL

## JAN/FEB/MAR 1992




Total no. of deaths — 86

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32/85

# WEAPONRY — NATAL

## APR/MAY/JUN — 1992




Total no. of deaths — 64

32/86



# WEAPONRY — NATAL

## JUL/AUG/SEP — 1992




Total no. of deaths — 107

107  
32/81

# WEAPONRY — NATAL

## OCT/NOV/DEC — 1992



Total no. of deaths — 131

32/88



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**NEWSPAPER CLIPPINGS  
AND SAP REPORTS**  
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**32/87**

# African National Congress

PO Box 61884  
Marshalltown  
2107  
19th Floor  
51 Plain Street  
Johannesburg



Tel: (011) 330-7114/5  
Fax: (011) 29-1787  
Telex: 430094 ANCSA

TO: S/NATL REC

ATTENTION: CURRIE/REGIONAL SECRETARY

FAX NO: 031 1449

DATE: 4 SEPTEMBER 1992

NO OF PAGES: 2 1

SENT BY: SIPHO NYANDA - CHIEF OF STAFF

FAX NO: (011) 291787

MESSAGE: "MHO WOULD LIKE TO INFORM YOU THAT IT HAS  
BEEN APPROVED THAT THE FOLLOWING COMRADES IN YOUR AREA  
WILL BE FUNCTIONING ON A FULL TIME BASIS FOR THE  
REGIONAL STRUCTURE AND SERVICES. THE NAMES ARE 1. GAYO  
NYUMALO 2. Sipho Sethole 3. Tshika Tshiso 4. Mavini  
Ngobese.

PLEASE PHONE (011) 330-7000 IF YOU ENCOUNTER ANY PROBLEMS

10 1 1 30

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32/90



Masked gunmen in 'revenge attack'

# Bloodbath in township as 26 are killed

DURBAN — Twenty-six people died in two massacres in the sprawling Umbumbulu township south of Durban at the weekend.

At least 35 people were killed in various parts of Natal in the province's bloodiest weekend of political violence this year.

In the worst attack, 20 people died and 27 were injured when balaclava-clad men armed with AK-47 assault rifles opened fire at Mpushini Reserve in Umbumbulu on Saturday night.

The ages of the dead and injured ranged from five to 60. Four women and two children were among those killed.

Police speculated the massacre could have been a revenge attack for the killing of five ANC members at nearby Folweni the night before, but township residents pointed out that none of the 20 victims was affiliated to a political party.

The ANC members were also killed by AK-47 fire when two homes in Folweni were attacked, police said. A woman also died in the incident.

ANC Folweni branch spokesman Mdu Ngobese said the KwaZulu Police had to account for the fact that the killings took place right next to a police station.

Police said the second attack was carried out by 15 men on people performing tribal rituals in two rondavels.

Visiting sangomas were meeting locals when the first shots rang out. The gunmen fired through the windows and doors of the dwellings.

Twelve people died in one rondavel, six in the second, and two in the yard.

## Own Correspondent

Most of the wounded were shot while attempting to escape across a nearby stream and were taken to Prince Mshiyeni and King Edward hospitals.

There were several other incidents in Natal at the weekend.

Sapa reports five people were killed when groups from Umlazi and the Zamani shack settlement near Durban clashed.

Unrest monitors yesterday kept a close watch on two separate ANC and Inkatha meetings in Umlazi. No reports of violence were reported.

A man was shot dead outside his home at Murchison near Port Shepstone on Saturday night.

A policeman waiting at a bus stop at Umlazi near Durban was shot dead by the occupants of a passing car. Three men were later arrested.

At Ezakheni near Ladysmith, two men fired shots through the window of a home, killing a woman, before stealing her hi-fi. Also in the township a man was seriously injured when attacked by a group of men.

At Weneen, a man was killed when police returned fire after being attacked during an investigation. Another man was arrested and an AK-47 was seized.

Six men were injured when a group was fired on by an unknown gunman at the S T Smith Hostel in Mobeni.

In the Estcourt area, five people were wounded during shootings at Nkwazela and Wembezi.

10 1 1993

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32/91

The Star

11/11/92

## Natal massacre: 8 held

KwaZulu Police have arrested eight suspects in connection with the massacre of 22 people at the Empushini Reserve near Floweni last month. The arrests follow investigations by the KwaZulu Police and the SAP Special Investigation Unit. KwaZulu Police confirmed that eight men had been arrested in connection with the killings on the night of October 24. The gang struck while the Sabelo family were having a Sangoma party at their home. Twenty-two people were shot dead and 27 others seriously wounded. KwaZulu Police have also taken possession of an AK-47 rifle and 275 rounds of ammunition, four anti-personnel rifle grenades, three pistol magazines, two limpet mines, and several other weapons.

11/11/92

8

32/72



The Citizen 19/11/92

## Mpushini massacre: 4 ANC men held

DURBAN. — Three prominent ANC members have been arrested in the past week in connection with last month's massacre in Mpushini Reserve, south of Durban, which left 22 people dead.

Altogether nine people have been arrested in connection with the October 24 massacre by a joint special investigation team comprising the SAP and KwaZulu Police (KZP).

Four of the nine are ANC members, according to the organisation.

Among them are the

chairmen of the ANC's Folweni branch and the ANC Youth League, Elias Mkhize and Mdu Ngobese. Isipingo ANC branch member Sbu Magwana is also under arrest.

One of the suspects has also been linked by police to a massacre in Folweni, which left eight dead a day before the Mpushini killings.

The nine are in custody and have been refused bail. They go on trial on December 11, said the KZP.

The lawyer acting for the nine, Bheka Shezi,

yesterday claimed only six of the nine had appeared in court, and said the KZP was giving him "the runaround" as to the whereabouts of some of the others.

He added he had laid criminal charges against the KZP for allegedly assaulting and torturing the suspects.

Mr Magwana had been hospitalised, and Mr Shezi said he was in the process of arranging for a private doctor to see the others.

He said he had told the magistrate concerned of the alleged torturing. This had been noted. The KwaZulu Police denied the allegations.

Investigation team member Sergeant Musa Mkhize said: "It's always the case that these claims are made. They were never tortured."

— Sapa.

The Star

27/5/92

## Three explosions at Alex hostel

By Stan Hlophe

Three blasts shook the notorious Madala Hostel in Alexandra last night injuring an unidentified woman, according to residents.

Police spokesman Captain Henriette Bester said one explosion occurred shortly before 3 pm in front of the hostel on the corner of Sixth and Ruth streets.

Within seconds two further

blasts in the hostel's inner courtyard shattering windows.

When The Star visited the scene last night, police and army units were searching for clues.

A hostel resident said two men were seen running away after the explosions which were heard in Highlands North and Bramley.

"It is a miracle only one person was injured," the resident said.

The Madala Hostel has been at the centre of violence in Alexandra and hundreds of residents who lived in its vicinity have abandoned their homes to escape the conflict.

Two months ago hundreds of families were displaced by "outsiders" living at the hostel who allegedly turned the hostel into an Inkatha stronghold.

Civic leaders have repeatedly called for the hostel to be demolished.

32/74



=====

VREDESBERAAD  
SAKE VOORTSPRUITEND UIT POLITIEKE GEWELD EN INTIMIDASIE  
MIDVREDE.DTF 04/08/92  
=====

Streek WITWATERSRAND  
Stasie ALEXANDRA  
MR A30/04/92

Distrik RANDBURG

Ondersoekbeampte A/O LOEVE  
(Rang, Voorletters en van)  
Tel No ( 011 ) 4977291 X

Plek waar voorval plaasgevind het -  
Plek TUSSEN 4DE EN 5DE LAAN ALEXANDRA  
Datum van Voorval 04/02/92 Tyd van voorval 1:00  
(MM-DD-JJJJ) (HH-MM-SS)

Tipe Wapens Gebruik -

W1 HANDGRANAAT	W2 AK47-GEWEER
W3	W4
W5	W6
W7	W8

Oortredings -

BRANDSTIGTING	2 ONTPLOFFING VEROORSAAK
	4
	6
	8

Bondige Opsomming van Gebeure -

Ops. 'N GOEDGEORGANISEERDE AANVAL WAARTYDENS VAN AK47 GEWEER EN HANDGRANATE GEBRUIK GEMAAK IS, IS OP 'N ZOELOE PLAKKERSKAMP GEDOEN. ONGEVEER 30 PLAKKERSHUTTE IS VERNIETIG IN 'N BRAND. BESLAG GELE OP 95X AK47 DOPPIES, 3X 7,62 RONDTES, 2.38 RONDTES, 2X 9MM DOPPIES, 2X MAKAROV DOPPIES, 2X .222 DOPPIES, 2X F1-HANDGRANATE, 1X RGD-HANDGRANAAT, 2X AFWERPHEFBOME VIR F1 HANDGRANATE, 1X M75 AFWERPHEFBOM, 5X HANDGRANAAT VEILIGHEIDSPENNE. AANVALLERS MOONTLIK OPGELEIDE MK LEDE. MID WWR ONDERSOEK SAAK.

Is daar Persone Gedood (J/N)

Is daar Persone Beseer (J/N)

Lagoffers-	Wit/M	Wit/V	Swart/M	Swart/V
	Bruin/M	Bruin/V	Asiaat/M	Asiaat/V

ant. Dood -	W/M D	W/V D	S/M D	S/V D
	B/M D	B/V D	A/M D	A/V D
antal Beseer -	W/M B	W/V B	S/M B	S/V B
	B/M B	B/V B	A/M B	A/V B

Totaal Gedood - Totaal Beseer - 0

Is daar Enige Eiendomme Beskadig (J/N)

Eiendom Beskadig -

antal Voertuie -	Hoeveelheid	Voertuie R
antal Geboue -	Hoeveelheid	Geboue R
totale Skade -	R	

Veiligheidsmagte Betrokkenheid (J/N) -

indien Ja, wie (bv SAP / SAW)

antal Persone deur Veiligheidsmagte - P Gedood

antal Persone van Veiligheidsmagte - V Gedood

Persone Beseer  
V/magte Beseer

32/75

Arrestasies -

Uitsteldatums

(MM/DD/JJ;MM/DD/JJ;MM/DD/JJ;)

Datum van Verhoor  
Verhoor

(MM/DD/JJ) Uitslag van verhoor -

Datum van Dossier  
Dossier

(MM/DD/JJ) Beskikking oor Dossier -

Name van Verdagtes wat gesoek word -  
Name

Politieke Assosiasie van -  
Slagoffers INKATHA

gearresteerdes

Is die Slagoffer/s 'n Prominente Politieke Figuur (J/N)  
Indien Ja, wat is sy/ hulle Politieke Status -  
Status

Naam van Slagoffers wie prominente politieke figure is:

12.12.13

3

32/76



Translation of document concerning Alexandra - MR A30/04/92

Place where attack occurred -

Place BETWEEN 4TH AND 5TH AVENUE ALEXANDRA

Date of Incident 04/02/92 Time of Incident 1:00  
(MM-DD-YYYY) (HH-MM-SS)

Type of Weapons Used -

W1 HAND GRENADE

W2 AK47 RIFLE

.....

Crimes Committed -

1 ARSON

2 EXPLOSION CAUSED

Short summary of events -

Summary A WELL ORGANISED ATTACK IN WHICH AK47 RIFLES AND HAND GRENADES WERE USED, WAS LAUNCHED ON A ZULU SQUATTER CAMP. APPROXIMATELY 30 SQUATTER HUTS WERE DESTROYED IN A FIRE. 95X AK47 CARTRIDGES, 3X 7.62 ROUNDS, 2.38 ROUNDS, 2X 9MM CARTRIDGES, 2X MAKAROV CARTRIDGES, 2X .222 CARTRIDGES, 2X F1 HAND GRENADES, 1X RGD HAND GRENADES, 2X LAUNCH LEVERS FOR F1 HAND GRENADES, 1X M75 LAUNCH LEVER, 5X HAND GRENADE SECURITY PINS RECOVERED. ATTACKERS POSSIBLY TRAINED MK MEMBERS. MID WWR INVESTIGATING CASE.

|||\*

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32/77

The Citizen 27/5/92

## 3 blasts at hostel

THREE blasts rocked the Madala Hostel in Alexandra township last night. No-one was injured.

Police liaison officer, Capt Hennie Bester, confirmed mortar bomb fragments were found at the scene of one blast.

The type of explosives used in the other two blasts are not yet known.

Capt Bester said one explosion occurred shortly before 8 pm in front of the Madala Hostel on the corner of Sixth and Ruth Streets.

"Within seconds there were another two blasts in the inner courtyard of the hostel."

She did not know who was responsible, and no arrests had been made.

The Madala Hostel has been in the centre of ongoing bloodshed, and hundreds of Alexandra residents living in its vicinity have fled to avoid death. — Sapa.





# Suid-Afrikaanse Polisie South African Police

17

Verw. Ref: 32/5/2

Navrae. End: Brig C Langenhoven

Tel: 012) 3101-265

Afdeling Misdaadbestryding en -ondersoek  
Division Crime Combating and Investigation  
Hoofkantoor  
Head Office  
Privaatsak / Private Bag K302  
PRETORIA  
0001

11 September 1992

- A. Die Sekretaris  
Kommissie van Onderzoek insake die  
Voorkoming van Openbare Geweld en Intimidasie  
Privaatsak K358  
PRETORIA  
0001
- B. Die Voorsitter  
Nasionale Vredeskomitee  
Walkerstraat 260  
SUNNYSIDE  
0002
- C. Die Voorsitter  
Nasionale Vredesekretariaat  
Privaatsak K358  
PRETORIA  
0001

VEILIGHEIDSOORSIG GEDATEER 11 SEPTEMBER 1992

Aangeheg is 'n veiligheidsoorsig vir u inligting.

BRIGADIER  
C/AFDELINGSHOOF : MISDAADBESTRYDING EN -ONDERSOEK  
C LANGENHOVEN

11 SEP 1992

8

32/77

various taxi associations, e.g. the ALEXANDRA UNITED TAXI ASSOCIATION (AUTA), ALEXANDRA RANDBURG MIDRAND SANDTON TAXI ASSOCIATION (ARMSTA) and the TEMBISA TAXI ASSOCIATION regarding among other transport fees and transport agreements as well as rent, will continue in the short term and be associated with violence.

- 1.5 The involvement of SELF DEFENCE UNITS (SDU's) with violence, unrest and general crime on the WWR, in Soweto and especially the Vaal Triangle is under intense investigation since May 1992. 145 SDU members and 2 MK members have been arrested since March 1992 in Phola Park on the East Rand, various other areas on the WWR, in the Vaal Triangle and Soweto in connection with a variety of serious crimes among other including 57 cases of murder and armed robbery, 21 attempted murders and many incidents of the illegal possession of fire-arms and ammunition. 59 Arrests were made in Sharpeville, Boipatong, Sebokeng and Evaton, among other in connection with 11 incidents of murder, 1 attempted murder and 2 armed robberies. 4 Policemen and 23 IFP-members were murdered by members of the SDU's in the above-mentioned areas. A number of investigations concerning the activities of SDU-members in these areas, is at present still being conducted. Approximately 23% of the 1 113 identified SDU members have already at one or other stage been arrested by the South African Police. Especially murders on IFP members served as a trigger factor in the escalation of violence in the focus areas since the end of 1991.



district in June 1992, the murder of a white man at a farm stall during July 1992 in the Elliot district, attacks on 2 border farms in the Kalanga district near Elliot during August 1992, the starting of veld fires during August 1992 in the districts of Ugie and Maclear, arson in a farm stall and residence during August 1992 in the Ugie district and a petrol bomb attack on a farm house in the Queenstown district on 6 September 1992.

All the above-mentioned cases occurred on farms near the RSA/Transkei border and footprints leading to the Transkei were found at the scenes of some of the attacks.

- 2.2 In the most recent attacks no concrete evidence could thus far be found as to the identity of the perpetrators, but an APLA spokesman in Tanzania confirmed in the media after the attacks in the Kalanga district that the attacks are in line with the policy of the AZANIAN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY (APLA) and could possibly have been committed by some of their members. In the majority of cases the modus operandi corresponded with that employed in similar attacks made by APLA in the past. On various occasions information was received that leaders of APLA instructed their members to launch attacks on border farms to force farmers to leave their farms so that APLA could settle in the "liberated areas". According to recent information APLA intends to intensify their attacks on border farms and also to expand their attacks to sugar cane farms in Natal.

32/101

The attacks are especially aimed at the security forces of the Ciskei, civil servants, state institutions and state initiated institutions like the chieftainship system, the AFRICAN DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT (ADM) and municipalities. The above-mentioned attacks vary from petrol bomb attacks and arson to hand-grenade and AK47 assault rifle attacks. An indication of the degree of seriousness of the attacks is evident in the attacks on members of the Ciskei Police during the weekend of August 13, 1992 in which 5 policemen were killed in 2 attacks.

Emotions within the ranks of the Tri-Partite Alliance are running high and information has been received that MK cadres are being deployed to avenge the deaths and injuries inflicted on Tri-Partite Alliance supporters on 7 September 1992 at Bisho in the Ciskei. These developments result in increasing tension, which heightens the potential for violence in the area and especially in the corridor between the Ciskei and the Transkei.

Statements inciting violence by Tri-Partite Alliance leaders following the shooting incident on 7 September 1992, probably resulted in arson attacks on the houses of members of the security forces during the ensuing days and it is likely that such attacks against members of the Ciskei security forces will increase in intensity.

Events on the evening of 8/9 September 1992 at Queenstown and Tarkastad, as well as unconfirmed information indicates that so-called



revenge attacks will also be aimed at the S.A. Police, as the Ciskei security forces and the SAP/SADF are seen as two sides of the same coin.

2.7 On 8 September 1992 Ronnie KASRILS admitted in the media that there was a pre-arranged plan that a group would break away from the Bisho stadium and contrary to the permission granted for the march, would move to Bisho to execute occupation. The possibility of revenge attacks against the Ciskei after the incident on 7 September 1992 seems to be good, which would lead to a further deterioration of the security situation. According to the media, Chris HANI mentioned after the events on 7 September 1992 that there will be reciprocation and that "liberation" will not be achieved by talks around the conference table. In a press statement by the Eastern Cape region of the ANC, it was further stated that Brig GQOZO must be removed, dead or alive. The alleged involvement of MK members from the Transkei leads to a further deterioration of the already tense relations between the Ciskei and the Transkei.

2.3 Inevitably the situation has an overflow effect on the bordering areas like East London, King William's Town, Queenstown, Cathcart and Stutterheim in the RSA corridor between the Transkei and the Ciskei where the potential of violence by means of actions of resistance against the Ciskei, also aimed at the RSA government, is increasing.

The above-mentioned magisterial districts were declared unrest areas on 5 September 1992 as a result of the growing tension. It can thus be expected in the light of the above-mentioned that the security situation and climate in the region will remain fluid and depending on the developments in the Transkei and Ciskei, may further deteriorate even within days or weeks.

The intention of the ANC Alliance to launch similar actions against Bophuthatswana, Qwaqwa, KwaZulu and conservative white towns holds serious implications for the security situation in the RSA.

### 3. NATAL

3.1 The security situation in Natal is still characterized by a high level of political intolerance, assassinations, revenge attacks and a power struggle between the ANC and IFP, whilst the potential of conflict is intensified by mutual accusations between the ANC and IFP as well as inflammatory pronouncements by the leaders of both organisations.

3.2 During the period 1 June to 6 September 1992 111 unrest related incidents occurred in Natal emanating from the ongoing conflict between the ANC and the IFP. 47 Members of the ANC were killed in incidents and 36 seriously injured, whilst 80 members of the IFP were killed and 78 injured.

32/104



Keeping in mind the cycle of revenge and retaliation in the conflict between the ANC and the IFP in Natal, retaliation attacks can be expected as a result of the following recent incidents:

- On 18 August 1992 5 persons were killed and 2 injured in an attack seemingly aimed at the local IFP leader in the Mphusheni Reserve at Folweni. The attackers wore camouflage uniforms, similar to that of the Division Internal Stability (DIS) of the South African Police. A member of the ANC linked with the murders, was killed in a shoot-out with the South African Police on 19 August 1992 during a search of a residence in Murchison near Port Shepstone and three of his comrades were arrested. Several items of uniform and a P.38 service pistol of the South African Police were seized as well as hand-grenades and an AK47 assault rifle.

A local IFP leader Fana NZIMANDE and 5 members of his family were killed at his kraai in Umkobeni, Richmond on Sunday 23 August 1992, by unknown attackers clad in uniforms similar to those worn by the security forces and armed with among other AK47 assault rifles. A member of 121 Battalion of the SADF, Velazi KHUBONE, was arrested on 27 August 1992 in connection with this incident. He is also a paid up member of the ANC's Natal Midlands region (membership card no 1223778) and will again appear in court on 19 September 1992.

- After renewed violence on 1 September 1992 in Bruntville, Moot River during which an IFP hostel was attacked with hand-grenades presumably by members of the ANC, the hostel dwellers decided to suspend further co-operation with the Goldstone Commission.
- On 3 September 1992 4 alleged ANC members died at Langebebia, Port Shepstone after shots were fired at their house by presumed IFP members.
- On 4 September 1992 10 IFP supporters were shot in Bomela Paddock whilst they were waiting for a bus to transport them to an IFP youth gathering in Ulundi. Since December 1991 a number of attempts were made to kill the Deputy Minister of Works of KwaZulu, Mr V B NDLOVU. He lives in Plessislaer in an area mainly inhabited by ANC supporters.

3.3 The explosive situation in Natal is further aggravated by public pronouncements made by leaders of the ANC and IFP. Mr Harry GWALA, regional chairman of the ANC in the Natal Midlands, inter alia said the following on 16 July 1992 in Zwide, Port Elizabeth: "If our freedom depends on blood-shedding, so be it. If they say we shall perish in our struggle for freedom, let us perish in the attempt. We won't pray when they shoot at us, we will shoot back and fight until apartheid is defeated and a democratic government is set up."



The Chief Minister of KwaZulu dr Mangosuthu BUTHELEZI said on 5 September 1992 at a meeting of the Youth Brigade of the IFP at the Emandleni Matleng camp to the youth of the IFP that unless the ANC is "buggered up", the ANC will do the same to them.

According to Dr BUTHELEZI the ANC committed itself to usurp power and the youth will have to act in the interest of survival and democracy. The Inkatha youth must "politically wipe out" MK.

3.4 The existing tense climate and noticeable intolerance between the ANC and IFP could lead to further violence in the following areas:

- Bruntville;
- Empangeni;
- Eshowe;
- Foliweni;
- Inanda;
- KwaNdengezi;
- Melmoth;
- Mtubuwani;
- Nongoma;
- Port Shepstone;
- Sokhulu;
- Tongaat;

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32/107

- Umlazi;
- Umzimyath;
- Wembezi; and
- Zamane.

3.5 The conflict and potential for conflict in Natal must be judged against the background of the activities of the "Self Defence Units" (SDU's) and the so-called "strike units" of the ANC operating from the Transkei with the instruction to wipe out pre-identified targets, among other high profile IFP members, as well as the IFP's insistence to implement self-defence mechanisms. In a tense situation as that in Natal, a simple rumour can trigger off self defence mechanisms to change into attack mechanisms. It is expected that the IFP will concentrate increasingly on neutralizing the recognition the ANC obtained by means of mass action by launching their own actions. This could further detrimentally effect the security situation in the region, especially in the light of the threat by the ANC to overthrow the KwaZulu Government by means of mass action.

*Transkei*





# Suid-Afrikaanse Polisie South African Police

Verw/Ref:

S2/6/2

Navrae/End:

Kapt Kritzinger

Tel:

(012) 3101317

Afdeling Misdaadbestryding en -ondersoek  
Division Crime Combating and Investigation  
Hoofkantoor  
Head Office  
Privaatsak / Private Bag X302  
PRETORIA  
0001

2 Oktober 1992

- A. Die Sekretaris  
Kommissie van Onderzoek insake die  
Voorkoming van Openbare Geweld en Intimidasie  
Privaatsak X858  
PRETORIA  
0001
- B. Die Voorsitter  
Nasionale Vredesekretariaat  
Privaatsak X858  
PRETORIA  
0001
- C. Die Voorsitter  
Nasionale Vredeskomitee  
Walkerstraat 260  
SUNNYSIDE  
0002

**OPTREDE WAT TOT MOONTLIKE KONFLIK KAN LEI :  
BEPLANDE PROTESOPTOG NA ULUNDI, KWAZULU**

A.-C.1. Aangeheg oorsig vir u inligting.

KAPTEIN  
n/AFDELINGSHOOF : KOÖRDINEERDER VAN KOMMISSIES  
A KRITZINGER

lib01/180i

32/109

## PTREDE WAT TOT MOONTLIKE KONFLIK KAN LEI : BEPLANDE PROTESOPTOG NA ULUNDI, KWAZULU

1. Die ANC-alliansie beplan 'n protesoptog na Ulundi, Kwazulu as deel van fase 4 van die alliansie se massa-aksiekampanje. (Opmerking : daar is nog nie op 'n definitiewe datum besluit nie).
2. Woordvoerders van die alliansie voer as regverdiging vir hul beplanning aan dat daar nie "politieke vryheid" in die gebied bestaan nie.
3. Uit Kwazulu-geledere word die beplande optog in 'n totaal ander lig gesien. Koning Zwelithini en die Kwazulu-regering beskou dit as 'n direkte aantasting van die integriteit van die Zoeloevolk wat die voortbestaan van die Kwazulu regering ernstig in gevaar stel. Hoofminister Buthelezi is van mening dat dit daarop gemik is om hom te ontsetel en die gesag in Ulundi oor te neem.
4. Verskeie uitsprake en berigte in die media dra verder tot die reeds gespanne atmosfeer by.
- 4.1. Sommige van die gerugte en nuusberigte wat veral bygedra het tot die verhoging van die konfliktpotensiaal is die volgende:
  - Die sogenaamde dekreet wat deur die koning uitgevaardig sou gewees het wat alle manlike krygers oproep om na Zoeloeland terug te keer en gereed te maak om die "opmars" teen te staan;
  - bewerings dat Renamo-soldate en blanke werkloses betrek is om in die "stryd teen die ANC" behulpzaam te wees;
  - Die moontlikheid van verskerpte aanvalle op veral IVP-ondersteuners deur MK-lede, aangesien 'n aantal MK-lede na Natal oppad is om teen die Zoeloevolk op te tree; en



- Die uitlating van die koning op die Shakadagfeesvieringe oor die naweek van 26 September 1992 dat die Zoeloevolk nie sal toelaat dat hulle van die aardbol gegee word nie.
- 5. Die Nasionale Werkekomitee van die ANC het reeds die vrees uitgespreek dat die beplande optog die spanning in die gebied gaan verhoog en dat die IVP se weerwraak kan bestaan uit langdurige vergeldingsaanvalle.
- 6. Die Natalstreke van die ANC het na aanvanklike eensgesindheid oor die wenslikheid en metode van die beplande optog begin om ook ander opsies te oorweeg en na alternatiewe te begin soek. Woordvoerders van die Suid- en Noord-Natalstreke is veral hiervoor te vinde, maar mnr Harry Gwala, NUK-lid en voorsitter van die Middellande-streek van die ANC in Natal en Reggie Hadebe, senior lid van die Middellande-streek-bestuur is steeds besig met beplanning om die optog te laat plaasvind. Die teenwoordigheid en uitlatings van veral Gwala dra direk by tot die verhoging van die spanning wat reeds tussen die IVP en die ANC in daardie gebied bestaan.
- 7. Bevestigde inligting dui daarop dat opgeleide MK-lede (oa vanaf die WWR) na Ulundi gestuur word ter ondersteuning van die ANC se voorgenome massa-optog. Van dié lede is volgens inligting ten volle bewapen om oa aanvalle op lede van die IVP en veiligheidsmagte te loods, asook om lede van die ANC wat aan die optog sal deelneem, te beskerm.
- 8. Die IVP is volgens inligting besig om 'n teenstrategie te beplan wat oa behels dat moniteringsgroepe in Durban en op die pad tussen Durban en Ulundi ontplooi sal word om die omvang van die optog te bepaal.

1 OKTOBER 1992  
OOR/5-6

32/112



## Police find Transkei arms smuggling route

LLOYD COUTTS

POLICE say they have discovered a new arms smuggling route from Transkei into SA, complementing the two most commonly used passages from Mozambique and Swaziland.

SAP spokesman Capt Pieter Brandt said the Transkei route was used regularly, but would not elaborate.

He said arms were carried either directly from Mozambique or through Swaziland into Natal, the eastern Transvaal, the PWV and Soweto.

Brandt said cordial relationships had been developed with Mozambican authorities through a liaison forum to combat the smuggling of arms, a large proportion of which came from former Frelimo soldiers.

"The liaison forum is a great thing. From the Mozambican side they are doing their best to curtail (smuggling) and information is exchanged on a regular basis."

Brandt said police had paid R541 736 for the recovery of 6 448 illegal weapons recovered between January 1 and November 19 this year. This included 746 AK-47 assault rifles, 12 light machine guns and 2 215 pistols.

The cost of AK-47s on the black market was between R500 and R1 500 but prices could be reduced dramatically depending on circumstances, he said.

Police paid up to R6 000 for information leading to the recovery of an AK-47, and up to R2 500 for a carbine. However, the transaction was subject to investigation.

Law and Order Ministry spokesman Capt Craig Kotze said payment for the recovery of arms was part of a multidimensional strategy to remove illegal arms from the streets.

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32/113

Saturday 31 October 1992

## T'kei a springboard for MK, says SADF

Citizen Reporter

THE Transkei was being used as a springboard by Umkhonto we Sizwe and the Azanian People's Liberation Army for acts of violence against the people of South Africa, the South African Defence Force said yesterday.

The SADF said it had

information about MK and Apla infiltrations from Transkei into South Africa and this information was being used to expose the perpetrators of violence.

A SADF statement followed denials by the ANC and Transkei's military rule, Major-General Bantu Holomisa of any MK activity in the home-

land, as well as their accusing the SA Government of being behind the violence in the region.

The SADF said Transkei was also being used as a channel to smuggle weapons into South Africa and that all these actions were being committed with at least the knowledge of the Transkeian Government.

101 114 3

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32/114



The Citizen

18/9/92

## 255 members of ANC defence units now held

Citizen Reporter

**ALTOGETHER** 255 members of the ANC's Defence Units (SDUs), including two former Frelimo soldiers, have been arrested inside South Africa by the police for various criminal offences since May 1992, said a police spokesman in Pretoria yesterday.

These offences included 140 cases of murder and armed robbery, 27 of attempted murder and a number of charges related to the illegal possession of firearms.

According to police information there are nearly 100 such SDUs in existence in South Africa.

Any of these SDUs

are conducting their own private wars," a confidential police report on violence said.

As an example of the type of violence in which SDUs are involved, the police report gave as an example the arrest of 34 SDU members in Phola Park in April this year.

"Two of those arrested are externally trained members of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the ANC's armed wing, and two are former Frelimo soldiers. All are card-carrying members of the ANC."

Thirteen of those arrested had already been charged with a number of offences, including the

murder of two policemen at Bethlehem in the Orange Free State, the attempted murder of a farmer in the Bethlehem district, an attempted armed robbery in Bethlehem, the murder of a policeman, a traffic officer and a civilian on the East Rand and the possession of unlicensed firearms.

Charges are also being investigated against them in connection with the abduction and murder of two Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) supporters on the East Rand, the murder of four persons during an attack on a bus of the Rand Water Board in Phola Park, two attacks on IFP supporters in Phola Park and Katlehong in which 21 and six Zulus

were killed respectively, and seven armed robberies as well as various vehicle robberies and stock thefts.

The report said that the ANC's claim that it "has suspended the armed struggle while MK members, who form part and parcel of the SDUs, are continuing to murder their political opponents, members of the security forces as well as innocent civilians, defies logic."

32/115

# T'kei ANC denies it launches attacks on Natal

UMTATA. — The African National Congress in the Transkei yesterday denied allegations that armed ANC cadres were launching attacks in strife-torn Natal from the country.

In a statement, spokesman Mr Nat Serache said the South African Government's claims were a blatant lie and an excuse to destabilise the Trans-

kei and overthrow military ruler Maj-Gen Bantu Holomisa.

Mr Serache was echoing Gen Holomisa's rejection of claims by South African Defence Minister Gene Louw that Umkhonto we Sizwe cadres were infiltrating Natal from the Transkei.

The ANC spokesman

said it had always been South Africa's priority to remove Gen Holomisa from power, "since he was not like other South African surrogates in other homelands who denied people free political activities".

The ANC viewed the deployment of troops along the Transkei border

as an act of extreme provocation, and said claims against MK were a pretext for the South African Defence Force to destabilise the country.

It said State President De Klerk was not addressing the issue of violence at all, but was targeting the ANC for victimisation.

"Given the experience of ANC members at the hands of the South African Police and Defence Force, we have no doubt Mr De Klerk is issuing a licence to kill ANC members under the guise of hunting down MK 'infiltrators'.

"Transkei itself appears to be a target of this propaganda offensive, particularly given the SADF's acknowledgement that it has deployed its spies in that territory."

The ANC accused Mr De Klerk of echoing the claims of the Inkatha Freedom Party and demonstrating a readiness to act against the ANC, while remaining silent on the actions of the KwaZulu Police. — Sapa.

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32/116



# MK link in killing

Allegations have been made that the ANC's armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe, is systematically killing Inkatha supporters in Natal.

PETER WELLMAN  
investigates.

**I**F WE marked all the present-day battlefields in Natal, there would be more memorials than hotels in this blood-soaked tourist province.

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Spokesmen for the Inkatha Freedom Party claim the ANC's armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), is being deployed there, particularly in the Midlands and the south, to take out IFP members.

I have just returned from a week in Natal and there is no doubt that individual MK members, and probably small MK groups, are operating there.

But there is absolutely no proof that they do so with the approval of the ANC leadership, which raises other questions.

## Bloody war

The trend began when ANC-aligned communities asked MK members for help against Inkatha warriors, the way besieged Mexican peasants used to call on hitmen in spaghetti Westerns. Claims that KwaZulu policemen are brutally employed on the Inkatha side may have played a part in this new strategy.

I was unable to establish a date when MK members entered the fray, but some observers have suggested it began after the bloody seven-day war around Maritzburg in March 1990.

Some of these gunmen are from the communities they are operating from, but I'm not convinced that all of them are home-grown.

The size of these groups does not really matter; a few automatic rifles in the hands of ex-



Massacre scene . . . bullet holes (left) scar the wall of the Nzimande home, where five Ink

32/117

perts will easily earn a grisly place in the history books.

ANC sources who acknowledge the MK activity say the purpose is to defend communities from attacks by IFP warriors, and there is no doubt those warriors have been busy. Defence, it should be understood, includes pre-emptive attacks to ward off the danger of yet another massacre.

But ask whether some of the

MK activity is straightforward aggression in this brutalised province, and I would say "yes".

The nature of the conflict varies in different areas. Some are undisputed ANC or IFP areas. While both sides declare their love of peace and free political activity, we are talking about strongholds here.

Some are close to each other. In Richmond's lush hills, the ANC controls the town and

some villages. But pick any valley there, and you will probably find the ANC on one side and Inkatha on the other.

This is convenient for killing on both sides, and the area one of the most violent in the province.

Inkatha and the police allege that MK members are increasingly using security force uniforms to move through Inkatha territory and gain access to



# ing fields

# Slaughter in Natal's midday sun



na supporters were killed.

Picture: Peter Wellman

katha households.

Some of these allegations appear to be flimsy. But in a recent massacre of IFP members, recounted in the accompanying report, there seems no doubt the killers wore uniforms.

A curious new trend has seen alleged MK members apparently leaving security force uniforms behind at the scenes of their attacks, and this is hard to understand.

Would armed men on a killing mission carry a pile of clothing with them when their greatest need is mobility? And even if they did, why would they leave it all behind so regularly? Or do they strip off, and flee naked into the night?

These are some of the many mysteries of the fighting in Natal, but as one observer said: "Mandela can't control his men and neither can Buthelesi." □

CITY shoes won't do if you want to hike up the steep, rutted Natal hillside to the home of Inkatha's Fana Nzimande, who was shot dead recently with five members of his family in the noonday sun.

My Inkatha guide wore city shoes, and the crusted mud and sandpaper grass gouged into the slick leather in the 25 minutes it took to get up there.

Nzimande built halfway up the hill, in the Mkhobeni district, where people too sick to walk either get better or die unless they are carried over the tough terrain.

I had a guide because the car track dies on the opposite hill, and it was a question of which path to take across two streams in the valley, through long grass blowing like sugar cane in the hot wind.

At the Nzimande home, bullets had taken fist-sized chunks out of the mud walls, but Thembisile Nzimande (20) needed no reminders — she was there at the time. When I asked her to tell the story she sighed softly, "Hayyyiiiiii ..." and massaged a bullet scar on her arm.

She stood straight, refusing to look at us. She spoke with a deadened voice, and her eyes never moved once.

Each time we asked a question, she took longer to reply, and finally there were no more words; she simply stood there silently in the sun, with the tears running. As we left she picked up a crying baby and suckled it under the shade of a solitary tree near the house, and she still did not look at us.

This is her story:

"A group of six armed men came over the top of the hill at noon, apparently from the ANC area on the other side.

"Five were in security force uniforms and one was in a police uniform, so we were not suspicious.

"They asked my father, who

A woman tells how five members of her family were lined up and shot dead. PETER WELLMAN reports.

was a very forceful induna in this area and an Inkatha organiser, what firearms he had, and he said the KwaZulu Police had issued him with two G-3s for his protection. Confidently, he allowed them to search the house, but they took both his weapons.

"Even after he produced his licence and identity document, they said he was not entitled to them, and were going to arrest him.

"The men asked what could be done about the violence in the area, and my father said he did not know.

"They lined us up outside the house. I was standing near my mother and father. And they opened fire.

"I was not hit, and as the bodies fell, I ran. I went to the right, with the men shooting at me. I was wounded in my left arm, above the elbow, but I did not fall.

"Then I was hit above my left hip, and in my right thigh, but I was still running. I dodged behind two huts and ran across a small valley to neighbours.

"The killers did not follow me. The neighbours carried me across the valley, to where the road begins. A messenger was sent to Phateni (about 3km across another valley) and he telephoned for a police van to fetch me."

The dead were: Fana Nzimande (45), his wife Nkonango (45) and their sons Sibongiseni (15), Mduduzi (12) and Lindelane (5). □

32/118



# MK link in killings fields

Allegations have been made that the ANC's armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe, is systematically killing Inkatha supporters in Natal.

PETER WELLMAN  
investigates.

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
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Massacre scene . . . bullet holes (left) scar the wall of the Nzimande home, where five Inkatha supporters were killed.

Picture: Peter Wellman

32/120



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NEWS

## Transkei a base for MK raids, Inkatha claims

INKATHA has called on Maj-Gen Bantu Holomisa to investigate allegations that Transkei is being used as a springboard by Umkhonto we Sizwe to mount incursions into Natal to eliminate Inkatha members, and to transport weapons and SAP uniforms.

Inkatha youth brigade national organiser Otto Kunene said in Durban yesterday the Transkei Defence Force was involved.

Holomisa said he viewed the allegations as serious and that Inkatha president Mangosuthu Buthelezi should furnish this information to Foreign Affairs Minister Pik Botha. The matter could then go through diplomatic channels.

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## News

# Man with SADF uniform arrested

ANOTHER member of the African National Congress has been found in possession of a South African Defence Force uniform — the third such incident in four days.

Police yesterday arrested a man as he made his way to an ANC meeting at the Glebelands hostel at Umlazi, near Durban.

The man was dressed in the uniform and when confronted by

ANIL SINGH  
Crime Reporter

members of the Montclair Fire-arm Unit he said he had been given the uniform by a friend.

On Thursday police arrested two prominent members of the ANC and took possession of two sets of army uniforms and a gun.

On Friday morning a pair of trousers, part of an army uni-

form, were discovered in a caravan at Umlazi.

Earlier members of the Reaction Unit and detectives from the Durban Murder and Robbery Unit shot and killed three suspects — one of whom had been identified as a member of Umkonto we Sizwe, the armed wing of the ANC. They had been wanted in connection with armed robberies.

Police spokesman Captain Bala Naidoo today repeated the SAP statement that it was not the first time that members of the ANC had been found in possession of uniforms belonging to the security forces.

"Allegations were often levelled against the security forces for attacks carried out by their members, particularly in areas where there were no records of any security force activity."

32/123

The Citizen 14/7/92

## SADF uniforms: ~~X~~ Durban man (23) in court

DURBAN. — A man appeared briefly in the Umlazi Magistrate's Court near Durban yesterday on a charge of possessing SADF uniforms.

Mr Sipho Khuzwayo (23), is facing charges in terms of the Defence Force Act. He was not

asked to plead, and released on bail of R100.

Police say Mr Khuzwayo was arrested at an ANC meeting at Glebelands Hostel south of Durban on Sunday.

The case was adjourned to August 3. — Sapa.

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The Citizen 14/7/92

# 60 detained after arms cache found

By Rika van Graan

SIXTY men were taken into custody in Vosloorus late on Sunday night after police found a cache of AK-47, shotgun and 9 mm ammunition, an AK-47 rifle, an RGD 42 handgrenade and a F1 handgrenade at houses in the Sotho section of the township.

Police liaison officer for the Witwatersrand, Colonel Frans Malherbe, said a combined patrol of SADF and SAP members saw a group of men gathered around a fire. When they approached to address them, the group scattered.

This reaction caused suspicion and the patrol decided to cordon the area off and, with re-

inforcements, they started a search.

In a house in the Sotho section they discovered hidden behind a fridge an F1 handgrenade and an RGD 42 handgrenade. When they searched a ditch in the garden they discovered 15 rounds of AK-47 ammunition.

In another house nearby, police found an AK-

47 assault rifle, one 9 mm cartridge and two 12 bore shotgun rounds.

In the search the 60 men were found hidden in cupboards, and under beds in the houses.

The men, however, denied all knowledge of the arms cache, but were, however, taken to the Vosloorus police station for questioning.

32/125



# Suid-Afrikaanse Polisie South African Police

Verw/Ref: S29/36/2(79)

Navrae/End: Kol Nel

Tel: (012) 3101739

Kantoor van die Bevelvoerende  
Offisier  
Onlus- en Geweldmisdaad  
Hoofkantoor  
Privaatsak X302  
PRETORIA  
0001

31. Augustus 1992

Die Sekretaris  
Kommissie van Onderzoek insake die  
Voorkoming van Openbare Geweld en Intimidasie  
Privaatsak X858  
PRETORIA  
0001

Die Voorsitter  
Nasionale Vredeskomitee  
Walkerstraat 260  
SUNNYSIDE  
0002

W OORD : HOOFFMAN : Fana NZIMANDE EN GESIN : RICHMOND MR  
11/8/1992

Op 23 Augustus 1992 om ongeveer 12:00 het 6 persone by die kraal van hoofman Fana NZIMANDE te Nkoben, Richmond opgedaag. Vyf van hulle was geklee in bruin oorpakke soos die van die Suid-Afrikaanse Weermag en een het 'n blou trui soos die van die S A Polisie aangehad. Sommige van hulle het ballaclavas opgehad.

Aanvanklike inligting was dat een van die persone 'n blankeman was, maar hierdie inligting is positief deur vyf ooggetuies weerlê.

Volgens 'n getuie wat die aanval oorleef het, het die groep hoofman NZIMANDE meegedeel dat hulle van die S A Polisie vuurwapeneenheid is en oor inligting beskik dat daar ongelisensieërde vuurwapens in die kraal is.

4. Die twee G3 gewere wat deur die Ontwikkelingsraad van Kwa-Zulu aan die hoofman uitgereik is, is aan die besoekers oorhandig, waarop laasgenoemdes met outomatiese gewere op die hoofman en gesin gevuur het.

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5. Die volgende persone is gedood:

Fana NZIMANDE	(Vader)	45 jaar oud
Nkonako NZIMANDE	(Moeder)	40 jaar oud
Sbongiseni NZIMANDE	(Seun)	15 jaar oud
Nduduzi NZIMANDE	(Seun)	12 jaar oud
Nannlanla NZIMANDE	(Dogter)	9 jaar oud
Lindelani NZIMANDE	(Seun)	4 jaar oud

6. Die volgende kinders is verwond en het ontvlug:


Tembifile NZIMANDE	(Dogter)	21 jaar oud
NZIMANDE	(Dogter)	5 jaar oud

7. Die volgende ammunisie is op die toneel gevind:

14 X AK47 doppies  
37 X R4 doppies  
2 X AK47 koeëlpunte  
1 X R4 koeëlpunte

8. Die plaaslike Kriminelerekordsentrum en Forensiese Laboratorium personeel het die toneel besoek. Videoopnames, foto's en lugfoto's is geneem.

9. Verdere verwickelinge sal rapporteer word.

  
w/BEVELVOERENDE OFFISIER : ONLUS- EN GEWELDMISDAAD  
D HUGGETT

GENL-MAJ

/mdp/lib01/fana/p1-2

10 : 11:30  
B 32/127



# Suid-Afrikaanse Polisie South African Police

Verw/Ref: S2/6/2  
Navrae/End: Kapt Kritzinger  
Tel: (012) 3101317

Afdeling Misdaadbestryding en -ondersoek  
Division Crime Combating and Investigation  
Hoofkantoor  
Head Office  
Privaatsak / Private Bag X302  
PRETORIA  
0001

2 Oktober 1992

- A. Die Sekretaris  
Kommissie van Onderzoek insake die  
Voorkoming van Openbare Geweld en Intimidasie  
Privaatsak X858  
PRETORIA  
0001
- B. Die Voorsitter  
Nasionale Vredesekretariaat  
Privaatsak X858  
PRETORIA  
0001
- C. Die Voorsitter  
Nasionale Vredeskomitee  
Walkerstraat 260  
SUNNYSIDE  
0002

OPTREDE WAT TOT MOONTLIKE KONFLIK KAN LEI :  
BEPLANDE PROTESOPTOG NA ULUNDI, KWAZULU

A.-C.1. Aangeheg oorsig vir u inligting.

n/AFDELINGSHOOF : KOÖRDINEERDER VAN KOMMISSIES  
A KRITZINGER

KAPTEIN

lib01/1801

10 1 1993

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32/128



## OPTREDE WAT TOT MOONTLIKE KONFLIK KAN LEI : BEPLANDE PROTESOPTOG NA ULUNDI, KWAZULU


1. Die ANC-alliansie beplan 'n protesoptog na Ulundi, Kwazulu as deel van fase 4 van die alliansie se massa-aksiekampanje. (Opmerking : daar is nog nie op 'n definitiewe datum besluit nie).
2. Woordvoerders van die alliansie voer as regverdiging vir hul beplanning aan dat daar nie "politieke vryheid" in die gebied bestaan nie.
3. Uit Kwazulu-geledere word die beplande optog in 'n totaal ander lig gesien. Koning Zwelithini en die Kwazulu-regering beskou dit as 'n direkte aantasting van die integriteit van die Zoeloevolk wat die voortbestaan van die Kwazulu regering ernstig in gevaar stel. Hoofminister Buthelezi is van mening dat dit daarop gemik is om hom te ontsetel en die gesag in Ulundi oor te neem.
4. Verskeie uitsprake en berigte in die media dra verder tot die reeds gespanne atmosfeer by.
  - 4.1. Sommige van die gerugte en nuusberigte wat veral bygedra het tot die verhoging van die konfliktpotensiaal is die volgende:
    - Die sogenaamde dekreet wat deur die koning uitgevaardig sou gewees het wat alle manlike krygers oproep om na Zoeloeland terug te keer en gereed te maak om die "opmars" teen te staan;
    - bewerings dat Renamo-soldate en blanke werkloses betrek is om in die "stryd teen die ANC" behulpsaam te wees;
    - Die moontlikheid van verskerpte aanvalle op veral IVP-ondersteuners deur MK-lede, aangesien 'n aantal MK-lede na Natal oppad is om teen die Zoeloevolk op te tree; en

- Die uitlating van die koning op die Shakadagfeesvieringe oor die naweek van 26 September 1992 dat die Zoeloevolk nie sal toelaat dat hulle van die aardbol gevee word nie.

5. Die Nasionale Werkekomitee van die ANC het reeds die vrees uitgespreek dat die beplande optog die spanning in die gebied gaan verhoog en dat die IVP se weerwraak kan bestaan uit langdurige vergeldingsaanvalle.
6. Die Natalstreke van die ANC het na aanvanklike eensgesindheid oor die wenslikheid en metode van die beplande optog begin om ook ander opsies te oorweeg en na alternatiewe te begin soek. Woordvoerders van die Suid- en Noord-Natalstreke is veral hiervoor te vinde, maar mnr Harry Gwala, NUK-lid en voorsitter van die Middellande-streek van die ANC in Natal en Reggie Hadebe, senior lid van die Middellande-streek-bestuur is steeds besig met beplanning om die optog te laat plaasvind. Die teenwoordigheid en uitlatings van veral Gwala dra direk by tot die verhoging van die spanning wat reeds tussen die IVP en die ANC in daardie gebied bestaan.
7. Bevestigde inligting dui daarop dat opgeleide MK-lede (oa vanaf die WWR) na Ulundi gestuur word ter ondersteuning van die ANC se voorgenome massa-optog. Van dié lede is volgens inligting ten volle bewapen om oa aanvalle op lede van die IVP en veiligheidsmagte te loods, asook om lede van die ANC wat aan die optog sal deelneem, te beskerm.
8. Die IVP is volgens inligting besig om 'n teenstrategie te beplan wat oa behels dat moniteringsgroepe in Durban en op die pad tussen Durban en Ulundi ontplooi sal word om die omvang van die optog te bepaal.



Verder word 'n lokval by die Undunduluberg naby Empangeni beplan  
waar busse met vuurwapens aangeval sal word.

  
.....BRIGADIER  
SENTRUMHOOF MISDAADENLIGTINGONTLEDING  
-EN VERTOLKINGSSENTRUM  
S J P ABRIE

1 OKTOBER 1992  
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The Citizen 18/9/92

## 255 members of ANC defence units now held

Citizen Reporter

ALTOGETHER 255 members of the ANC's Se. Defence Units (SDUs), including two former Frelimo soldiers, have been arrested inside South Africa by the police for various criminal offences since May 1992, said a police spokesman in Pretoria yesterday.

These offences included 140 cases of murder and armed robbery, 27 of attempted murder and a number of charges related to the illegal possession of firearms.

According to police information there are nearly 100 such SDUs in existence in South Africa.

Many of these SDUs

are conducting their own private wars," a confidential police report on violence said.

As an example of the type of violence in which SDUs are involved, the police report gave as an example the arrest of 34 SDU members in Phola Park in April this year.

"Two of those arrested are externally trained members of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the ANC's armed wing, and two are former Frelimo soldiers. All are card-carrying members of the ANC."

Thirteen of those arrested had already been charged with a number of offences, including the

murder of two policemen at Bethlehem in the Orange Free State, the attempted murder of a farmer in the Bethlehem district, an attempted armed robbery in Bethlehem, the murder of a policeman, a traffic officer and a civilian on the East Rand and the possession of unlicensed firearms.

Charges are also being investigated against them in connection with the abduction and murder of two Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) supporters on the East Rand, the murder of four persons during an attack on a bus of the Rand Water Board in Phola Park, two attacks on IFP supporters in Phola Park and Katlehong in which 21 and six Zulus

were killed respectively, and seven armed robberies as well as various vehicle robberies and stock thefts.

The report said that the ANC's claim that it "has suspended the armed struggle while MK members, who form part and parcel of the SDUs, are continuing to murder their political opponents, members of the security forces as well as innocent civilians, defies logic."

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## Murder suspects MK men: SAP

**Citizen Reporter**  
POLICE yesterday disclosed information confirming that two suspects in the murder of an elderly Ogies woman on October 17 are members of the ANC's military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe, following the organisation's denial of the claim earlier.

One of the suspects arrested for the murder of Mrs Cornelia Steyn (72),

Mr Venti Nkosi — whose MK codename is Canada Moroka — left South Africa on July 4, 1990 with the intent of joining the ANC, according to a police statement.

During May the same year, he received his training in guerrilla warfare at the Hugo Nkabinde camp at Uganda and during September last year, he received further training in Intelli-

gence, safeguarding of VIPs, as well as assassinations.

On April 23 this year, Mr Nkosi returned to South Africa under the ensign of the United Nations High Commission for refugees.

The second arrested suspect, Mr Moses Mhlanga — MK codename Monde Mesbane — left for Swaziland during 1985 where he requested political asylum during 1986 and was recruited by the ANC, the statement continued.


He did his basic training during February 1987 at the Gaculama camp and, during August 1987, he underwent training in intelligence at the Moses

Mabida camp.

"It appears the ANC can or will not accept the fact that members or supporters of their organisation become involved in criminal activities.

"It is clear that both these suspects are trained MK members, which cannot be denied by the ANC," the statement said.

The statement added that the ANC's denial that members of MK or the ANC were involved in the killing, was "once again another attempt of the ANC to discredit the SAP by implying that false information regarding the suspects were made known".



Saturday 31 October 1992

## T'kei a springboard for MK, says SADF

Citizen Reporter

THE Transkei was being used as a springboard by Umkhonto we Sizwe and the Azanian People's Liberation Army for acts of violence against the people of South Africa, the South African Defence Force said yesterday.

The SADF said it had

information about MK and Apla infiltrations from Transkei into South Africa and this information was being used to expose the perpetrators of violence.

A SADF statement followed denials by the ANC and Transkei's military rule. Major-General Bantu Holomisa of any MK activity in the home-

land, as well as their accusing the SA Government of being behind the violence in the region.

The SADF said Transkei was also being used as a channel to smuggle weapons into South Africa and that all these actions were being committed with at least the knowledge of the Transkeian Government.

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32/124



## Suspect shot dead in Tigane after 2 killings

Citizen Reporter

AN ANC member was shot dead yesterday after police identified him in a street in the western Transvaal township of Tigane as a possible suspect in the earlier killings of two IFP supporters, one of whom was shot dead in his hospital bed.

A Western Transvaal police spokesman, Lieutenant Koos Degenaar, said an IFP member died in a hail of automatic gunfire on Friday night and his companion subsequently killed in a hospital ward.

ANC Youth League member, Mr Oupa Kraai (21), died in the latest of three incidents, while the other two shooting victims were Mr Andries Khozo (20), vice-secretary of Inkatha's Youth Brigade in the town, and Mr Koos Seokolo (19), an IFP member.

Lt Degenaar told The

Citizen Mr Khozo and Mr Seokolo had been walking home down a Tigane street at 11 pm on Friday.

They came under fire from four men with an automatic weapon and Mr Khozo collapsed and died at the scene.

Mr Seokolo was wounded in the upper right arm.

Mr Seokolo was admitted to the Tshepong Hospital, near Klerksdorp.

Lt Degenaar said four armed men wearing balaclavas entered the hospital at about 2.30 am.

"One of the men remained with the nurse. The other three went directly to the bed where Mr Seokolo was lying. He was shot dead.

Between 2.45 pm and 2.50 pm yesterday, four police detectives noticed a suspect.

The man was followed by two policemen who warned the suspect in

Tswana to stop.

Lt Degenaar said the man ignored the warning and a shot was fired in his direction, after which another of the constables on the assignment fired another two shots.

The suspect collapsed, wounded.

"Residents congregated at the site and the policemen reported seeing stones in their hands, although none were thrown."

The group threatened to kill one of the Black policemen, said Lt Degenaar.

"The policemen went back to the police station, leaving the wounded man at the scene.

"Bystanders reported that he was later removed by unknown residents," said Lt Degenaar.

A neighbour of the Kraai family said police had fetched the body from Mrs Magda Kraai's home.



## IQembu leNkatha Yenkululeko

JOHANNESBURG : MAY 19, 1993

2.7 All political parties shall submit a quarterly report to the National Peace Committee detailing the initiatives they have undertaken at regional and national level to promote peace and the curtailing of violence and intimidation, as well as other measures that they have promoted to implement the letter and the spirit of the National Peace Accord. The National Peace Committee may develop award programmes to reward individuals working in any organisation of each of the signatories who have excelled in the promotion of the goals of the National Peace Accord.

2.8 The National Peace Committee may submit to each of the signatories a list of peace initiatives which if implemented within the organisation of each of the signatories could foster the cause of peace and the goals of the National Peace Accord. The National Peace Committee shall also promote peace initiatives throughout the country on its own accord.

2.9 The following peace initiative shall be conducted under the supervision of the National Peace Accord and shall be funded through a domestic and international fund-raising drive on the basis of a separately identified and managed budget. A Peace Corps shall be established recruiting individuals with special attention to youth from violence-torn communities. Such individuals shall be trained and educated on the values of peace-making and reconciliation, utilising the structures and the facilities of the National Service. The programme should aim at the professional qualification and re-insertion of the members of the Peace Corps in their respective communities after the time of their service. After the training stage, members of the Peace Corps shall operate in their original communities under the supervision of the



Peace Corps structure. The National Peace Secretariat shall ensure that highly qualified professionals in various fields of social disciplines participate in the programme and provide their support to the training stage. The National Peace Secretariat and National Peace Committee shall ensure that the Peace Corps receives high visibility in each community. The Peace Corps can be employed under the direction of the National Peace Secretariat during the electoral phase.

2.10 The National Peace Committee shall establish a specialised Sub-Committee which reflects the composition and the rules of operation of the National Peace Committee and which shall be charged with the task of providing a forum of appeal from any decision of a Magistrate denying the right to conduct a demonstration or mass initiative. In doing so, this Sub-Committee shall work with the Magistrate concerned to develop in co-ordination with interested parties guidelines and conditions to ensure that the proposed event does not cause violence and intimidation. In doing so, the Sub-Committee shall take into account the circumstances of the case and the experience of similar and prior events. The Sub-Committee will express an advisory and not binding recommendation to the Magistrate asking him to reconsider his decision on the basis of such a recommendation. The Sub-Committee shall be convened within 12 hours of the request of the aggrieved party and shall express a recommendation within 24 hours. This procedure shall not preclude the recourse to any other existing legal procedure. The Sub-Committee shall also work with public authorities charged with the task of regulating demonstrations and mass initiatives to ensure that Magistrates require the organisers to abide by strict guidelines which can only be derogated with the consent of the Sub-Committee on the basis of the procedure set forth herein.

3.2.4 The National Peace Committee shall submit legislation to Parliament to establish an independent police reporting office appointed in terms of Clause 3.2.4 of the National Peace Accord responsible for supervising investigations into alleged police misconduct and police crimes. No public official shall interfere with the exercise of the function of this office or shall refuse full assistance as it may be needed. This office shall draft and submit to Parliament its own budget. This office shall have regional and local branches. This office shall submit a report to the National Peace Committee. It shall also have the power to compel the appearance of witnesses and the production of documents and records relevant to its investigation.



- 3.3 The Police Board shall have independent resources and submit its own budget to Parliament. It shall have the power to hire its own personnel as required. All members of the Police Board shall be appointed by, and will serve at the pleasure of, the National Peace Committee.
- 3.6.5 Dangerous weapons as defined in this sub-section shall not include traditional cultural weapons when carried in areas which are not declared unrest areas, and are not used as a tool of intimidation and to arm others. The National Peace Committee shall propose legislation to Parliament to ensure that this definition is reflected in the applicable provisions of the law.
- 3.7.3 No private armies shall be allowed or formed. The National Peace Secretariat shall conduct and/or commission a survey of all information related to the presence and operation of private armies and other armed formations in the country which have not been established for a legitimate and statutory law enforcement purpose. Within four weeks to date the Peace Secretariat shall finalize and submit to Parliament a bill to establish a Commission charged with the task of detailing procedures for the disbandment of such private armies and other armed formations which have not been established for a legitimate and statutory law enforcement purpose, including procedures for the identification of arsenals and weaponry-availability within and outside the boundaries of South Africa, control, retraining and monitoring of cadres and military personnel, post-disbandment, monitoring and surveillance and other measures necessary to ensure that no armed formations can operate outside the parameters of the law. The legislation establishing the Commission shall delegate to the commission the power to adopt legislative and administrative measures required for the achievements its goals, including the power to summon witnesses and subpoena documents and information implementation in the possession of any government office or any signatory of the National Peace Accord. Parliament is requested to adopt the Bill proposed by the National Peace Secretariat or to motivate to the Peace Secretariat why it deems that it should not be adopted, or it should be adopted with modifications and amendments. Should the Peace Secretariat be unable to comply with the requirements and time frame set forth in this Section, the legislative initiative provided for in this Section shall be prepared by an independent credible organisation selected by the Secretary of the National Peace Secretariat, with the advice and consent of the Chairman of the National Peace Committee. The Commission shall be composed so as to provide an opportunity for representation to the signatories of the National Peace Accord but should



not operate so as to recognize a veto power to any of the signatories.

- 3.8 The National Peace Committee shall finalise a list of "lay monitors" on the basis of nominations received from Regional and Local Dispute Resolution Committees. These lay monitors shall operate in the areas of each of the Local Dispute Resolution Committees and shall have the power to enter any police station in their area and speak to any prisoners held there at any time and report on their findings.
- 8.3.1.6 recommend legislation to give effect to the National Peace Accord. The National Peace Committee shall initiate and submit to Parliament all legislation related to violence, control of police and armed forces, amendments to criminal law and procedure, emergency legislation and other legislative measures which may affect violence and intimidation in South Africa. Parliament is requested to adopt such legislation or to motivate to the National Peace Committee why it deems that it should not be adopted, or it should be adopted with modifications and amendments. Parliament is also requested to refrain from adopting any legislation on the above indicated matters without the advice and consent of the National Peace Committee.
- 10.8 The National Peace Committee shall finalise and submit to Parliament legislation to provide legal assistance to those who cannot afford it and are charged with political crimes so as to ensure that they can benefit from a fair trial and that all indemnity possibilities are equally administered in favour of all those who are entitled to indemnity. This legislation shall also set objective parameters to determine what crimes can be considered political crimes, and ensure that all trials are conducted in pursuance of the highest standards of criminal justice without imposing emergency and exceptional measures such as mandatory sentences, detention without trial, seclusion of the accused before trial, et cetera.
11. Within one month to date the National Peace Committee shall finalise and propose legislation to Parliament to privatise all existing structures of the National Peace Accord so as to take them out of Government control and interference, and to provide them with the power to submit their budget directly to Parliament.

#### Comments related to the strengthening of Chapter 9

The IFP agrees that it is necessary to strengthen Chapter 9 to increase the sanctionary aspects of the National Peace Accord and therefrom its deterring capability. However, it needs to be



realised that the National Peace Accord operates in the sensitive environment of political life and expression and it can not sanction political behaviour with criminal sanctions unless such behaviour amounts to a crime in itself. The IFP rejects the notion that the National Peace Accord could create a parallel system of criminal justice. Simply put, either any given conduct is a crime under existing legislation, or it should not be treated as a crime for the purposes of the National Peace Accord.

The National Peace Accord should focus on the political liability and accountability of political parties and organisations rather than on the criminal liability of the perpetrators of crimes. In fact, there comes a time where a political party can be held accountable at a political level for the criminal conduct of its members over and above the concept of accessory in crime used to establish legal culpability. Sanctions should be attached to a finding of political culpability rather than legal culpability and therefore should mainly consist of political sanctions.

One of the greatest shortcomings of the NPA is the lack of effective mechanisms to sanction breaches in defiance of the agreement. The arbitration procedure in itself does not necessarily constitute a sanction, for it is secret and discreet. Moreover, the arbitration procedure is not empowered to administer any effective sanction.

It is extremely difficult to conceive sanctions which could be effective on political parties and still remain balanced and impartial vis-a-vis the political process. Usually political parties are sanctioned through liability and accountability. Therefore, sanctionary mechanisms should be aimed at increasing the political liability of the political party for its action.

Some of these techniques can be identified to provide greater publicity regarding the conduct of political parties which are not in compliance with the provision of the NPA. Among them could be motions of censorship and recommendations. The recommendations should be adopted by a special body created under the structure of the NPA and empowered to analyze various instances of violence or other types of breaches of the NPA and formulate of its own independent accord recommendations to any given political party containing specific and proactive actions or peace initiatives aimed at solving the problem. If the recommendation is not implemented, a motion of censorship should follow.

A judicial or semi-judicial entity would also be necessary. However, this tribunal should operate to ascertain political accountability and responsibility, not criminal or civil liability. For instance, it should determine the degree of political responsibility of the leadership of a political party for the violence caused during demonstrations. The leadership of such party could be found politically guilty of the violence caused by the demonstrators even if the leaders can not be



considered accessory in crime for purposes of civil or criminal liability. Similarly a government could be charged with the political responsibility of not doing enough to curtail violence and identify the culprits of mass assassination strategies. Therefore, it becomes important that the judges of the tribunal are not only legal experts, but are also political scientists and sociologists. The procedure of the tribunal should be highly visible. It will be necessary to have preliminary stages of procedural admissibility of any complaint to ensure that the tribunal is not manipulated into an instrument of illegitimate propaganda.

Additional sanctions could be coordinated with transitional mechanisms and the activities of the TECs. For instance, when the TECs determine time allocation for political propaganda on television and other media of mass communication, the NPA could have the authority to use some of the time allocated to a party which has been found in breach of the NPA to reiterate the content of the motion of censorship adopted against it.

A party which shows a constant pattern of violations of the NPA could also be prevented from accessing other political opportunities made available through the actions of the TECs. Additional sanctions for extreme cases could cause the suspension of the benefits provided through the National Peace Accord or even of the powers and functions exercised by the party within the NPA structures.

Pecuniary penalties seem to be inappropriate for two reasons: in the first place it would be difficult to adjust them so as to reflect the great financial imbalance between and among the political formations in South Africa. Secondly, they could also lead to a pecuniarisation of the offence, i.e. the offending party knows in advance how much the offence is going to cost and may accept the risk and be willing to pay the price.

Other sanctionary mechanisms could involve the direct participation of the signatories who could be called to answer to accusations or to reply to adverse findings in a public forum. In this respect an independent body not under the control of the signatories should be empowered to call a meeting of the signatories and to set items on the agenda for such a meeting. Accordingly, the meeting of the signatories should be not left at the discretion of the parties of the NPA and no one should have a practical veto power.

Additional sanctionary aspects could be connected with broadened investigative powers. In fact, the process of investigation is not only a fact-finding exercise but it is also of eminently relevant political significance.

The investigating activities of the NPA would not have judicial or quasi-judicial natures and its purposes and operational modalities would differ from those of the Goldstone commission. The investigating activities of the NPA would be aimed at sanctioning the political parties rather than the perpetrators



of violence. The hearings could heavily rely on the findings of the Goldstone commission which could be asked to intervene, but they would operate on a different level.

If the NPA had the capability of holding public hearings and compelling the participation of witnesses on the style of the Congressional Hearings held in the United States of America, this would be a moment of great public significance. The hearings would receive media coverage and would prompt broader political, intellectual and cultural debate. It would also be a powerful mechanism to sanction, from a political point of view, political conducts in breach or defiance of the NPA. In this respect the NPC or another structure created under the NPA should have the power to summon and interrogate witnesses including the signatories of the Accord.

This process would have a very strong impact in the process of the determination of political liability for breaches of the NPA and it would provide a sanctionary mechanism far more powerful than the arbitration procedure currently set forth in the NPA. The political liability would effect both those who perpetrate violence and those who do not operate effectively to stop it.

Public hearings could be modelled after US-type Congressional hearings.

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