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
November 9, 1982

Bush likely to feel sting of black Africa's anger at US

By Paul Van Slambrouck
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Johannesburg

The "costs" and "benefits" of President Ronald Reagan's reported tilt toward South Africa should come into sharper focus this month.



United States Vice-President George Bush this week begins a 13-day trip to seven African states — Cape Verde, Senegal, Nigeria, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Kenya, and Zaire — to, in his words, "learn what key African leaders are thinking."

The trip makes Mr. Bush the highest-ranking member of the Reagan administration to visit black Africa.

The Vice-President will no doubt get a feel for the costs of Reagan administration policy in Africa, a policy that stresses a friendlier attitude toward South Africa and that thereby strains relations with black Africa.

Another spotlight on US-Africa relations will light up later this month when South African Minister of Foreign Affairs Roelof Botha is

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THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

November 8 1982

Peaceful leadership change in Africa

Smooth hand-over by Cameroon leader offers example to troubled continent

By Tom Gilroy

Special to The Christian Science Monitor

Douala, Cameroon

The voluntary resignation of President Ahmadou Ahidjo offers new hope to other Africans that there is an alternative to the pattern of military coups and assassinations that have marked most changes of government on the continent.

The peaceful transfer of the presidency Nov. 6 to Mr. Ahidjo's longtime prime minister, Paul Biya, would also appear a fitting political end to a man who forged this extremely diverse nation of 8.5 million into one of Africa's few peaceful and prosperous countries.



Ahidjo resigns unexpectedly

The decision to step down after presiding over the country since independence in 1960 was vintage Ahidjo.

"No one knew about this, no one," said a northern Cameroon businessman who liked to think he was well-informed of the President's activities.

In his Nov. 4 announcement of the change, Ahidjo simply thanked the population for its untiring support during his rule. He called on

them to show the same kind of loyalty to Mr. Biya, a career politician from a small tribe near Yaounde. He gave no reason for the move, which caught the nation completely by surprise.

Speculation at first tended toward the notion that he was ill. But the consensus view here, among both Cameroonians and Western diplomats, is that Ahidjo, who has said several times over the years that he wanted to "rest," decided that the time was ripe.

"Politically, I think it's a very good move," said a French diplomat. "He goes out in all his glory, with the country in good shape."

In fact, Cameroon's economy ranks among the strongest in black Africa. Real growth has averaged 6 percent a year for several years, and is expected to continue that pace for the foreseeable future. Rapidly expanding oil production — about 100,000 barrels per day currently, and perhaps double that in a couple of years — a low debt ratio, and what a French banker called "prudent management" by the team of technocrats Ahidjo has placed in the key economic posts in recent years, has brought businessmen flocking to the coun-

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CORD MEYER

A last chance for peace in Namibia?

The vultures are beginning to circle above President Reagan's stalled peace offensive in southern Africa. Influential voices within the administration are already predicting that Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker is doomed to fail in his effort to negotiate the phased withdrawal of South African forces from Namibia and of Cuban troops from Angola.

If Crocker's subtle strategy to get all sides to accept U.N. supervised elections in Namibia does in fact fail, much more will be lost than most Americans realize. In the ensuing struggle, the black front line states would feel compelled to turn to the Soviets and Cubans for increasing military aid against South Africa. The U.S. would have to watch as an impotent bystander while violent polarization ended all hope of peaceful compromise.

As the architect of Reagan's African policy, Crocker himself firmly denies that negotiations have reached a stalemate. Pointing out that remarkable progress has been made towards resolving most of the constitutional issues involved in establishing an independent Namibia, he concedes that by far the most difficult remaining problem is the question of Cuban troop withdrawal.

But contrary to recent statements by the Angolan foreign minister at the U.N., the MPLA regime in Luanda has not refused to negotiate on the removal of Cuban troops. The Americans have tabled new proposals, and the hard bargaining goes on.

Because they are anxious to protect the secrecy essential to the possible success of these talks, State's African experts have been unwilling to answer the skeptics with detailed proof of progress. But European allies of the U.S. who maintain diplomatic relations with Angola are

reporting an intense struggle behind the scenes in Luanda between President Eduardo dos Santos and MPLA moderates on one side against Marxist hard liners on the other.

There is even encouraging recent evidence that the moderate faction is gaining majority support within the one party regime. Dos Santos himself is reliably reported to believe that when the negotiations with the Americans reach the bottom line he will have to come up with a specific time table for the phased withdrawal of all Cuban troops.

The Angolan moderates will put off having to face this necessity for as long as possible, because the non-elected MPLA regime continues to rely on Cuban forces to contain Jonas Savimbi's UNITA guerrillas within his tribal enclave in central Angola.

The price of Cuban withdrawal for the MPLA is some form of settlement.

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November 9, 1982

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

By Robert I. Rotberg

The Namibia conflict will not soon be concluded. Despite recent widely promoted expectations that an internationally validated resolution of this bitter problem was imminent, it will be next year, at least, before Namibia can be deleted from the list of serious global problems.

Namibia, a land of desert bounded north and south by rivers, is the size of two Californias. Its population is about 1.1 million, of whom about 900,000 are African, 100,000 white, and 100,000 of mixed descent.

South Africa has controlled Namibia, formerly called South-West Africa, since World War I. From 1946 this control was exercised in defiance of the United Nations. In 1977 South Africa, under pressure from the Carter administration, agreed to negotiate Namibia's future. In particular, South Africa agreed with the "contact group" (the United States, Great Britain, West Germany, France, and Canada) to let the United Nations oversee a ceasefire between South Africa and the guerrilla army of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO). After the ending of the war along Namibia's northern border with Angola, South Africa promised to permit free, national elections supervised by the UN. Following the elections to a constituent assembly, and the drawing up of a constitution by a two-thirds majority, Namibia would become independent.

This is the general plan, but South Africa, SWAPO, the contact group (led vigorously by the US), and the leading nations of black Africa have since 1978 been arguing over the precise implementation of the plan. In 1982,

Namibia and the Cuban connection

The Reagan administration hopes that the Angolan government, which it has refused to recognize, will begin to send Cubans home in exchange for American assurances that the South Africans cease occupying and harassing southern Angola. But the Angolan government remains appropriately suspicious and skeptical.

after reaching basic understandings about the number and disposition of UN troops and UN responsibilities, and about how the election could be arranged, the negotiating initiative has stalled over the question of Cuba.

About 20,000 Cuban troops and technicians have bolstered the fortunes of the ruling government of Angola since late 1975. They helped combat a South African invasion of Angola in 1975. Since then they have helped the government counter the effectiveness of the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), a South African-backed antigovernment guerrilla group which dominates southern Angola.

Since the late 1970s, too, the South Africans have carried their anti-SWAPO activities into Angola. Their air force and army oversee a swath of territory 160 miles deep into Angola; South Africa's might has clearly overpowered

SWAPO in the region.

Although there is little evidence of hostile contact between South African troops and Cuban soldiers in Angola, the Reagan administration has been attempting for most of this year to couple a Namibian settlement with the withdrawal of Cubans from Angola. South Africa has also been insisting, and that insistence has been more pronounced lately, that a Cuban departure is a precondition for a settlement. The South Africans say that Cubans might assist a Marxist-oriented independent Namibia in ways detrimental to South Africa.

For their part the Angolans have for long said that a Namibian settlement would both trigger and ensure a Cuban exodus. But the Angolan government naturally worries that the removal of Cuban troops would leave itself vulnerable both to UNITA and to South Africa.

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The Namibian Conundrum

Ronald Reagan took office convinced that he could wring more concessions from South Africa with a handshake than Jimmy Carter had with a cold shoulder. The administration gave the theory a fancy name—"constructive engagement"—and an immediate focus: negotiations for the independence of Namibia. But two years have now passed, and the negotiations—along with the administration's Africa policy—appear to be getting nowhere. Announced deadlines pass with no solutions in sight. Black African leaders complain about Washington's insistence on the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. Even the unity of the Western negotiating partners appears to be unraveling. This week Reagan is sending George Bush to Black Africa with reassurances. The vice president's trip, says one top aide, is designed to provide "a concrete demonstration of the fact that the Reagan administration is serious about Africa."

During his two-week good-will tour, Bush is to visit the leaders of two frontline African nations—Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and Robert Mugabe of Zim-

babwe—plus American friends Abdou Diouf of Senegal, Shehu Shagari of Nigeria, Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire and Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya. In a Nairobi policy speech, the vice president will discuss ideas for an "economic partnership" between the West and African countries willing to adopt free-market policies. Bush will insist that only the West has offered constructive help to Africa—while the Soviets have provided only arms and exploited regional conflicts.

He will also have a lot of explaining to do. Frontline leaders are warning that Reagan must reverse his policy and put pressure on South Africa to compromise. Black Africans also complain that Reagan has placed undue emphasis on military aid to counter Soviet advances in Africa while cutting back contributions to the International Development Association. Even some U.S. officials are frustrated with Reagan's policies. "We had Wick [Charles Wick, head of the U.S. Information Agency] through recently," said one U.S. diplomat in Africa, "and he was giving the same line about the Soviet threat and so on. Africans are just not pay-

ing attention to that. They're worried about their own internal security or economic problems—not being bombed by the Soviets."

Deadlock: For now, Namibia remains the key to U.S.-Africa relations. Negotiations began five years ago between South Africa and a Western group composed of the United States, France, Britain, Canada and West Germany. By last June, the talks appeared on the verge of success. Then South Africa said that it could not withdraw from Namibia for security reasons until 19,000 Cuban troops left neighboring Angola. The U.S. negotiators, led by Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker, demanded that the Cubans withdraw. Angola, protesting that it needs the Cubans to protect it from South Africa-backed UNITA guerrillas, refused—and the talks stalled. Last month in Nairobi, French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson said that the Cuban issue was the only obstacle to an agreement—and that France, West Germany and Canada had all told Washington that "linkage is not acceptable."

A Color-Line Collision

President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia ranks as an elder statesman of Black Africa and a leader of the frontline black nations arrayed against South Africa. In Lusaka recently, Kaunda discussed black-white tensions in the region with Katharine Graham, chairman of the board of The Washington Post Company. Excerpts of his remarks:

On the Future of South Africa: I don't think we have a [historical] parallel to what is taking place in South Africa today. . . . We have heard of explosions or revolutions that are the result of "haves" and "have-nots" colliding . . . but not where the haves and have-nots are drawn along color lines. . . . This one is building fast. . . . I can see it now—in a couple of years, three years, four years. I can see an explosion taking place in South Africa that will give no one an opportunity to quench the fire before it exhausts itself. I take no joy in saying this.

On Frontline Policy: Our foreign policy hinges on the liberation of southern Africa. We decided to fight against British colonialism because it was wrong. When we succeeded, we were obliged to give liberation movements a place in Zambia. I sent a message to [former Portuguese Prime Minister António] Salazar in 1966. My message was: "You people are frightened of Marxism and Leninism. If you grant independence to Mozambique and Angola, you will be granting independence to national leaders. If you wait you will be granting independence to the very ideologies you fear." I was right. Today we have Marxist-Leninist governments in Angola and Mozambique.

On Western Policy: You are applying economic sanctions against Poland, and you

have a right to make such decisions. But you have not taken any serious measures to take South Africa to account for its mistakes. The investors for some unknown reasons are afraid of black-majority rule in South Africa. But the more they invest in South Africa, the more they support the oppression of the black man.

On Cubans in Angola: We knew clearly that if we didn't have a government of national unity in Angola, the forces of East and West would exploit the situation. Now we have problems. The Cubans came in and the South Africans came in. And now there is the demand that the Cubans must be withdrawn from Angola. What does it mean? America is saying South Africa and UNITA should be given [the right] to invade Angola. We cannot accept that. We don't see why there should be any connection between the withdrawal of the Cubans and independence for Namibia. We in the frontline countries have all made an undertaking that we will support our Cuban brothers. We want them to be there to defend Angola against the South Africans.

Kaunda: 'I can see an explosion'



On U.S.-Zambian Relations: In 1975 I went to America to see President Ford. He spent 45 minutes with me, just 45 minutes to discuss serious matters. In 1978 I went to see President Carter. He gave me three hours of his time the first day of my visit and three hours the second day. Then we had an hour without aides. I see a lot of difference between Carter and Reagan. Ronald Reagan said that South Africa is [America's] ally. This shocked me. Are we talking about strategic minerals? There is not one independent African state that has denied strategic minerals to America. All strategic minerals are being sold to America by independent Africa. There is no basis to demonstrate we are anti-West. We still need your investments, your technology.

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Uprising reveals growing anger of Kenya's poor

By Smith Hempstone
WASHINGTON TIMES STAFF

NAIROBI, Kenya — This East African nation's 17 million people have looked their own version of Master Sergeant Doe in the face and been profoundly shocked by what they saw there.

The Aug. 1 abortive coup staged by junior officers and enlisted men of the air force cost hundreds of lives and was accompanied by vicious vandalism and looting that caused a loss of \$130 million. More than 200 women of all races, at least one of them an American, are believed to have been raped.

A special target both of the rebels and of the army that hunted them down appears to have been Kenya's 80,000-strong Asian community.

Kenya's Asians were brought here at the end of the 19th century to build the railway from Mombasa to Uganda. While they account for less than 1 percent of Kenya's population, Asians control 80 percent of the retail trade here. They are widely believed by Africans to be exploitative in their business practices, and disdainful of blacks (six Asian

Financial Times

women raped by blacks are said to have committed suicide).

Asian property was nationalized by Tanzania in the 1960s. Idi Amin expelled 72,000 Asians from Uganda in 1972. But until August, Kenya's Asians had escaped the virulence aimed at them elsewhere in East Africa.

There has been no wave of Asian departures from Kenya, but that is largely because most of them have nowhere to go. Less than a quarter of them hold British passports (most of the country's 40,000 whites, in contrast, either hold a second passport or are eligible for citizenship elsewhere).

But Asian money is said to be leaving the country illegally and moneyed Asians are believed to be holding back from long-term investments in favor of greater liquidity.

While the government of President Daniel Arap Moi continues to suggest the Luo (Kenya's second largest tribe) were heavily involved in the abortive August coup — 71-year-old Oginga Odinga, the Luo leader and former vice president, has been placed under restriction

and his son is charged with treason — there appears to have been no significant tribal component to the uprising.

The rebels, like Sergeant Doe's followers in Liberia, appear to have been the have-nots, those who have benefited least in Kenya's 19 years of independence (the haves tend to be the Kikuyu cronies of the late President Jomo Kenyatta, many of whom have taken over intact most of the 2,700 lush farms in Kenya, once owned by whites).

Because of its high annual birthrate, there is no more arable land left. The minimum wage is \$45 per month and unemployment (not to speak of underemployment) now approaches 30 percent.

In a post-coup mea culpa, Arap Moi has admitted that some government officials have "exploited the general public through misappropriations, corrupt practices, blackmail and bribery."

Arap Moi is believed to be personally honest, and his government is

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November 1 1982

Ethiopian threat bolsters Siad Barre's support

Rick Wells, recently in Mogadishu, on Somalia's useful Italian and U.S. links

PRESIDENT Mohamed Siad Barre of Somalia, who recently celebrated his 13th anniversary as ruler of one of the world's poorest nations, continues to confound observers and critics of his pro-Western military regime who have been predicting his imminent downfall for years.

This year the anniversary was marked by the visit of Sig Lelio Lagorio, the Italian Defence Minister, along with a destroyer and two other ships of the Italian fleet.

Italy maintains close links with its former colony and is the country's dominant trading partner. The highlight of the celebrations was a military parade including colourful displays of traditional costume, youth and women's militias and fire-eaters, as well as regular troops.

Despite the obvious shortcomings of the Somalia forces in terms of weaponry and dress, observers said the parade was more impressive than in recent years. Among the more antiquated military hardware, a number of new U.S.-made armoured personnel carriers mounted with missile anti-tank systems were to be seen.

Mr Siad Barre seems to have successfully capitalised on the recent incursions into Somalia by Ethiopian-supported Somali dissidents. By focusing attention on this renewed conflict over the long disputed Ogaden region he has forced the U.S. to produce more tangible support for its strategic ally in the Horn of Africa and rallied — if only temporarily — the support of the Somali people, whose traditional

dislike of the Ethiopians remains deep-rooted.

Observers in Mogadishu say that at the end of June the Addis Ababa-based Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), formed in October last year, persuaded Col Haile Mariam Mengistu, the Ethiopian leader, that the time was ripe for an invasion, with the aim of provoking a revolt in the demoralised Somali army and ultimately toppling the Somali regime.

Significantly, this occurred shortly after the arrest in Mogadishu of seven leading members of the Government, including the third vice-president, Mr Ismail Ali Aboker. While those arrested had certain criticisms of the way the country was being administered, there appears to be no evidence that they were plotting a coup.

Ethiopian forces are reported to remain inside Somali territory, particularly around the town of Balem Bale, but their advance has halted and there appears to be a stalemate.

With their vastly superior military back-up it is possible that the Ethiopians could succeed in breaking the strategic road link between the north and south of the country, but Western diplomats feel they would not risk the consequences of mounting such an invasion.

Meanwhile, as one Western diplomat said: "Siad's position has been rather strengthened by all this." As long as Ethiopian forces remain inside Somali territory he is likely to make his Western allies feel uncomfortable while distracting the people from real and pressing grievances.

Rhodesia's rebirth as Zimbabwe a reverse step

By Smith Hempstone
WASHINGTON TIMES STAFF

HARARE, Zimbabwe — What's in a name? In this part of south-central Africa, more than a little.

To the handful of whites who in the course of less than a century brought this land from the iron age to the era of the computer, this jacaranda-graced city is still Salisbury, and it is the capital of Rhodesia. To the Africans who now control it, this city is Harare and it is the capital of Zimbabwe.

A brooding statue of that enigmatic empire-builder, Cecil Rhodes, once looked down this city's main street, named after his dashing lieutenant, Leander Star Jameson. Today, the spot where the statue once stood is vacant and the street has been renamed after Mozambique's Marxist president, Samora Machel.

Rhodesia, a former British colony that unilaterally and illegally declared its independence under a white regime in 1975, used to feed half of south-central Africa. Zimbabwe's citizens line up to buy bread and rice. (While there is still a surplus of corn, there are periodic shortages of everything from gasoline to cheese).

Rhodesia, which sent a higher proportion of its colonists to fight in World War II than any other British colony, closely identified itself with Western European traditions. Zimbabwe's prime minister calls himself "comrade" looks to Red China as his mentor and asserts he will impose one-party rule after the next election.

Rhodesia, despite a 15-year world embargo on its goods, managed an average annual growth rate of 8 percent without a penny of foreign aid. Zimbabwe, with the markets of the

world open to it, this year will record no growth, despite millions of dollars of international handouts. (Some pessimists suggest there may be a negative growth rate of 5 percent).

In 1980, its last year under the multiracial rule of Bishop Abel Muzorewa (whose election the West declined to accept as legitimate), Rhodesia showed a visible trade surplus of \$116 million. Last year, under "comrade" Robert Mugabe, Zimbabwe had a trade deficit of \$42 million. Farm output will fall by at least 20 percent this year, while mineral-rich Zimbabwe's mining output fell to its lowest level in 10 years last year.

Which is not to say that everything is gloomy in Zimbabwe these days, even for the country's 180,000 whites (down from a high of 275,000). The sun still shines and the living is easy, with the servants serving gin-and-tonic around the swimming pool.

Twice as many African children are in school under Mugabe than under his predecessor, even if the quality of the education is only half as good. Health care is free, no one can be fired from his job and the minimum monthly wage has been doubled, to \$59. But even some Africans have noticed that nobody is being hired, and that the rise in the rate of inflation from 4 percent to 15 percent has devoured all the new benefits. Most of those rural Africans who were landless in Rhodesia remain landless in Zimbabwe.

Tribal animosities between Mugabe's ruling Gbana tribe and nationalist father-figure Joshua Nkomo's warlike Matabele (17 percent of the total population of 10 million) threatens a breakdown in

law and order. About a dozen whites and some 450 Africans (mainly Matabele) have been detained without trial, the 65-year-old Nkomo has been ousted from the Cabinet and more than 2,000 Matabele members of the army have deserted with their arms and formed rebel groups. Three British tourists were murdered this year and six other whites (including two Americans) were abducted by dissidents.

All Zimbabwe's problems cannot fairly be blamed on Mugabe. The drought that has afflicted all southern Africa has taken its toll here and the world recession has resulted in a softening of demand for Zimbabwe's products. The devaluation of the South African rand has worsened Zimbabwe's terms of trade.

Nevertheless, Mugabe's Marxist rhetoric has not helped matters (only one western corporation, Heinz, has made an investment here — and that for only \$15 million — since he took office). Well-documented cases of torture in his prisons and his insistence on moving to one-party rule have not contributed to the sense of political security here.

Rhodesia was so blessed with resources and enterprising people that it seemed nothing, not even a war, an international boycott and the uninspired leadership of Ian Smith, its last white prime minister, could ruin it. In comrade Robert Mugabe, Zimbabwe's anti-capitalist prime minister, the land may have found the man incapable or unwilling to prevent its slide toward dependency.

A rose, it seems, is not always a rose by any other name.

November 12, 1982

THE SUN,

New African fossil trove called possible link to man's ancestors

Nairobi, Kenya (AP)—Paleontologist Richard E. Leakey yesterday announced the discovery of a rich new fossil lode that he said may contain the bones of distant ancestors of man.

Mr. Leakey, the internationally known specialist on human origins and director of Kenya's National Museums who spoke in Baltimore last month, called the find "a tremendously important turning point in our science" and said it would help fill in the story of evolution as it occurred 14 million to 15 million years ago.

The 20 fossil fragments—mostly teeth and jawbones—were discovered in Kenya's Samburu Hills on the eastern edge of the Great Rift Valley October 15, the last day of three months of fieldwork by a joint team from Japan's Osaka University and the National Museums.

"Other material like this has been found, but

never in this quantity," Mr. Leakey told a news conference at which he displayed some of the fossils. "That's really the importance of this, because with the quantity there's the potential for getting the component parts that will tell us what it is."

Mr. Leakey and Dr. Martin Pickford of the museum staff, who found the new site near the Rift Valley town of Maralal, said it was too early to determine whether the fossils are of an ancestor of contemporary apes or of man.

The new fossils have been dated from geological strata in that area at about 15 million years old, still long before the appearance of upright two-legged creatures generally considered human.

Mr. Leakey and other paleontologists have placed the origin of man between 3 million and 4 million years ago in East Africa.

African unity's toughest test: deciding who rules W. Sahara

By Colin Legum

London

The cloud hanging over the future of the 50-nation Organization of African Unity has temporarily lifted, but its troubles are a long way from being settled.


The pan-African group came close to a breakup this summer in a dispute over whether to admit Western Sahara guerrillas to full OAU membership. Now a compromise plan may put the organization back on track — in part by pushing this most divisive issue temporarily into the background.

The plan, crafted in three months of difficult diplomacy led by Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere, calls for Polisario guerrillas to stay away from an OAU summit scheduled for Nov. 23. This gives Morocco, which now rules the Western Sahara, a temporary diplomatic victory. But the compromise also requires Morocco to agree to a referendum to determine the wishes of Western Sahara's inhabitants.

Morocco's King Hassan II had agreed to a referendum in 1981, but discussions on how to carry out the vote ended in deadlock.

So if all goes according to plan, the OAU can hold its annual meeting without grappling with its testiest issue. The group's summit was originally called for July, but was canceled — permanently, some worried — for lack of a quorum. The Morocco-Polisario dispute, which had split the organization almost down the middle, as well as objections to the choice of Libya as the conference site were the key reasons the July conference never got off the ground.

Fully a third of OAU members stayed away from that summit for one or both of these reasons. Some of the nations that objected to Libya as the conference site may stay away from the November meeting, too,



because the conference host — in this case the controversial Col. Muammar Qaddafi — automatically becomes OAU chairman for the next year. So far only Sudan and Egypt have declared they will continue a boycott.

But the thorny issue of Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (the Polisario's shadow

"government" in the Western Sahara) remains in serious contention. Under the compromise, the issue of its membership in the OAU remains in abeyance until after an internationally supervised referendum in the Western Sahara.

In 1981, referendum discussions deadlocked over the question of who should be eligible to vote in the region — a difficult issue to resolve because traditional Saharan peoples are nomadic and because there are large numbers of Saharan refugees in neighboring countries.

But the future of the OAU itself hangs in part on resolving these issues. Thus a meeting of African foreign ministers, scheduled to be held next week and before the official OAU summit, is critical for the OAU and the disputed Western Sahara. The main item on that agenda will be Western Sahara. Morocco and its 14 OAU supporters have agreed to attend. In theory this meeting will relieve OAU members from having to hash out the Polisario-Moroccan matter at the annual summit.

And with this arrangement, it seems reasonably certain that the required two-thirds of OAU members will be present for the official summit.

It is certain that the bargaining at the pre-summit meeting in Tripoli will be tough. Polisario's friends (particularly Algeria) are likely to be just as determined as Morocco and its supporters to try to obtain the best conditions for their side.

Unless the referendum questions are settled, most observers say there is no way out of the Saharan crisis. And so long as that issue remains unresolved, the deep divisions among African governments will remain a continuing threat to the effective functioning of the OAU.

The only hopeful factor in this situation, diplomats say, is the determination shown by the overwhelming majority of African leaders to put African unity above all other considerations. It was only this desire that enabled President Nyerere to win support for the compromise.

If it can find a way through the tangle of the Saharan conflict, the OAU will demonstrate its usefulness as an important mediating body in Africa. Failure would almost certainly contribute to further polarization in Africa, knowledgeable observers say.

Morocco has been engaged in a costly war with Polisario's forces (heavily backed by Algeria and Libya) ever since Spain surrendered control of its Saharan colony in 1976.

THE NEW YORK TIMES NOVEMBER 10, 1982 *South African Bars a Black Role In 3-House Parliamentary System*

Special to The New York Times

JOHANNESBURG, Nov. 9 — Any suggestions that blacks might be given representation in a projected three-chamber South African Parliament have been denounced as "purposeful lies" by the Cabinet minister in charge of putting the new system into effect.

Speaking Monday night at a political meeting at Brits, near Pretoria, J. Chris Heunis, the Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning, said that neither blacks in the rural homelands set aside for them nor those in the white areas of South Africa would be incorporated into the new constitutional arrangements. These proposals, which became official policy of the ruling National Party a month ago, envisage replacing the present single-chamber Parliament with a three-chamber one in which whites, Indians and colored groups, as South Africa calls people of mixed ancestry, would sit separately.

The National Party, he declared, will not deviate from its policy that all blacks should exercise their political rights in the homelands. He maintained that blacks were excluded from the new constitutional arrangements not because they were black but because they were peoples with their own traditions, beliefs and economic values.

His remarks came as the leaders of the four homelands declared independent by the South African Government — Transkei, Ciskei, Bophuthatswana and Venda — were gathering in Pretoria for a conference to be held with the South African authorities on Thursday. They were scheduled to discuss economic cooperation, including the possible creation of a development bank.

Shortly after assuming office just over four years ago, Prime Minister P. W. Botha hinted more than once that blacks living in the white areas might be given political rights outside the homeland system. Mr. Heunis's speech was taken by many as a further indication that any changes in this policy that Mr. Botha might have contemplated have been abandoned.

Referring to the racial makeup of the population of nearly 30 million, Mr. Heunis said that if blacks were included in the new legislature, the racial ratios would be 36 blacks to 9 whites to 5 colored people to 2 Asians.

"What would then remain of the principle of maintaining civilized standards?" Mr. Heunis said. "It is just not possible. That is why a different path is being followed for blacks."

Meg Greenfield

Gambling on Democracy

I was away for several weeks right before the recent elections. As a result, you will be relieved to learn, I—perhaps alone among the commentators of your acquaintance—have nothing to say on the subjects of negative advertising, the high cost of campaigning or what the citizenry was really implying about Ronald Reagan in its votes for a host of other people. That's the good news. The bad news is that I want to talk about my trip.

I was in three countries of Black Africa—Zimbabwe, Zambia and Kenya—and it really is not fanciful, I think, to say that even a tourist-journalist's hasty study of these places arrives at precisely the same topic that is lurking beneath all that great rockslide of commentary on our own elections: democracy, how and if it can be made to work. Before you say the two settings are utterly unrelated, I should inform you that coming home to read in *The Washington Post* about the New York gubernatorial race ("Mailings have been made to Jewish, Irish and Italian voters, with straying Italians being encouraged to return to the GOP fold" and "Mario Cuomo's ethnicity is emerging as an essential reason to vote for him") I felt as though I were happily back among the Shonas and Matabeles. Don't talk to me about African tribalism.

Actually, the strength of "tribal" feeling in this enlarged context is one of the familiar, universal elements of politics that you recognize when you are there. The other familiar, universal impulse is that toward freedom and independence, even if only for the tribe, as distinct from the larger geographical entity. These struck me as the two most powerful political forces in the countries I visited. When you leave South Africa, the organized, efficient industrial state, and enter the social confusion of Zimbabwe, you feel a weight lift off you. For you encounter a general ebullience and excitement generated by independence, and you appreciate the intangible worth of this value we take for granted. These people are liberation junkies.

But, comes the immediate smart reply, look where it has got them, all this freedom and independence. Politically and economically, it is surely true, these countries, like much of the rest of Black Africa, are a mess. Although there are variations among them, there are certain dolorous similarities as well. They are all having foreign-exchange crises. Their economies range from severely troubled to just plain not working. Political repression, personal corruption and managerial inefficiency are constant, engulfing facts of life. So from all this many people conclude that Black African freedom and independence have been a washout, that they not only don't work, but are in fact a source of those countries' present grief.

There are two dominant strains of this argument. One is basically racial. It speaks in hints and indirection, but contains a barely suppressed gloat. "These people,"

it says, just aren't up to managing their own affairs. To some degree this is of course the case, although the reason for it is not the one advanced. The creation of widespread managerial skill in a population with virtually no experience in running anything other than someone else's kitchen or a guerrilla operation cannot be an easy or immediate thing. Many of the current leaders have given over much of their professional lifetimes to resistance, combat, political organization and/or incarceration by the British. The necessity, even relatively modestly fulfilled as in Zimbabwe, to provide some benefit to the newly independent population (e.g., schooling) costs plenty and can have a terrible impact on an economy already suffering from the effects of such disasters as severe drought and worldwide recession.

To the first "anti-independence" argument must be added the second, which is "anti-democratic." It says that the economic failures that have occurred since independence suggest that strong-arm, authoritarian methods of governing are required, that democracy is a frill that a struggling, newly independent society can't afford. No examples are provided of a place where such a change improved the economy.

My own feeling after a look at these three countries was that independence and, yes, some form of democratic government were the only possible means to their salvation. The caveat is this: I think the particular form of British parliamentary government that was grafted onto these societies and that was eagerly adopted by some of their own elites is probably wrong. It is surely not organic nor even quite right. In certain features it is preposterous. All that white-wigged parliamentary encumbrance, for instance, all that nonsensical Western apparatus. (Zimbabwe actually has a heraldic seal bearing in part this explanation: "Behind the shield are placed in saltire an agricultural hoe, blade pointed to dexter and an A.K. automatic rifle in bend sinister, forefront uppermost, all proper.")

These countries need to maintain large segments of their white populations and large numbers of their white investors, not because God played some genetic trick on them, but because for now that's where the experience and the money and the know-how are. But at least as important, they also need to come up with their own forms of governing. There are indigenous customs and methods of reaching consensus among these peoples that are relatively free and fair, although utterly different from our own. And I think too that at some time, probably violently, the borders of Black Africa will be redrawn better to reflect ethnic (as we say in New York state) realities.

We really do not know how to look at Black Africa. We see in Robert Mugabe only a "terrorist"—until he becomes, as now, the leader in whom many whites re-

November 10, 1982

pose their principal hope. We denounce tribal practice unaware that often within it lies the best capacity for reasonable rule. And we apologize for democratic practices and regret independence there, even though arguably it has been the absence of these things in colonial Africa, not their sudden availability now, that is the source of the problem. I figure that after a great deal more chaos and corruption and bad acting, they will turn both democracy and freedom to their indisputable advantage. I only hope I am around when these countries have the luxury of arguing over negative ads and the rules governing PACs.

The Washington Times

NOVEMBER 5, 1982

Election aids mixed races in S. Africa

JOHANNESBURG (UPI) — South Africa's ruling National Party has won a third parliamentary by-election and observers said the victories were an apparent endorsement of the government's plans to share power with mixed-race and Asian citizens.

The National Party's slim victory in the key rural constituency of Parys contrasted with convincing wins in two other districts, but together they were evidence of growing support for the prime minister's reformist initiative.

A fourth contest in wealthy Johannesburg North was won by the opposition Progressive Federal Party. The by-elections were held Wednesday.

The National Party now has 114 seats in the whites-only Parliament, a gain of one. The Progressive Federal Party still has 26 seats, the Herstigte (Purified) National Party eight, and the Conservative Party 18, the Associated Press reported.

Although the results did not change the balance of power in Parliament, the victories were seen as an endorsement of Prime Minister P.W. Botha's reform proposals, which would allow Indians and people of mixed race to run for Parliament, but not blacks.

South Africa has been denounced and boycotted by the world community for apartheid policy against blacks and other minorities.

The NP's four provincial congresses already have backed Botha's plans to give a limited share of power to Asian and mixed-race colored people, but not to majority blacks, in a multiracial parliament.

The right-wing Conservative Party and the Herstigte Nasionale Party (Reformed National Party) condemn the plan because they say it weakens the ability of minority whites to decide their future and undermines white supremacy.

Lisbon offers itself to Africa — not as overlord but mentor

Diana Smith in Lisbon

A NEW relationship is developing between Portugal and the African nations which emerged from the violent, painful decolonisation process it underwent in the 1970s.

After a period of inevitable coolness and only humdrum trade, Portugal and the governments of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde and Sao Tome are exploring every possible area of activity in search of common ground.

The ice was broken by the visits of President Antonio Ramalho Eanes, first to Mozambique, then to Angola. It melted further with a tour of Mozambique in June by Premier Francisco Balsemao. In all cases, groups of Portuguese businessmen were in the retinue and eagerly took the opportunity to build up contacts.

Personal contacts are essential: the Angolans and Mozambicans, largest of the ex-colonies with the most substantial potential resources, want to see with whom they are dealing.

Despite evident goodwill on both sides, the delicate matter of trust is paramount. There have been bitter experiences not only with Comecon countries imposing the wrong merchandise for the wrong climate at the wrong time with multiple political strings attached, but with some Western nations eager to do quick, but not necessarily useful, business.

Portugal — small and penurious — is trying to be as constructive as possible. Serious thought is being given to setting up an entrepot for goods from the ex-colonies, adding to their chances to sell to European markets. The first step towards this was taken with the formation of a Portuguese-Mozambican trading company, where the Mozambican capital belongs to the state, and the Portuguese to private enterprise.

Despite the financial limitations of Portugal itself and of many of its businesses, a strong move is being made toward industrial co-operation with Angola and Mozambique. There is a desperate need in both countries to recycle or to requip factories for light mechanics, furniture, shoes, textiles (which had some importance before decolonisation), and shipyards — to build fishing vessels among others.

Portugal has considerable experience in equipment for these sectors and Portuguese businesses are already beginning to help to restructure plants which are run down or obsolete.

The Lisbon Government is encouraging businessmen to contemplate signing management contracts with African partners, particularly in Mozambique's textile sector. This would bring Portuguese managerial knowhow, equipment, training of

African staff, and marketing assistance.

Since Portugal cannot offer much in the way of finance, it is trying to make up by offering services. The response has been enthusiastic. Portuguese civil engineering concerns have been strongly sought after by the African governments for participation in major projects in hydro-electricity, port improvements, railways and communications.

Portugal is diversifying its imports from Mozambique, which now consist largely of sugar, cotton, tea and coffee, some minerals and amianth (asbestos). It is interested in importing Mozambican coal in due course.

To encourage Angola and Mozambique to buy Portuguese goods and services, the Bank of Portugal has maintained credit lines of \$125m and \$130m respectively, which it tries to increase within its very modest facilities.

Both African nations have grave financial problems — as does Portugal — but the desire for co-operation reaches far beyond economic considerations into the gnarled roots of 400 years of colonialism, abandoned by the Portuguese after 14 years of war that demoralised its armed forces, embittered civilians, and directly led to the April 1974 coup.

Nostalgia for Africa, war or no war, has lingered in many Portuguese walks of life. As Europe's problems grow, many Portuguese see Africa as an alternative — not only as a market but as a place where people with energy can take part in development, all colonial sorrows forgotten.

The drift to Africa has already started, albeit cautiously. Hundreds of contract workers have begun to operate in Mozambique and a further 100 in Angola.

Recent kidnappings of Portuguese nationals by apparently South African-backed rebels — Unita in Angola and the Mozambique National Resistance — are not the best advertisement for a sojourn in Africa, but they have not weakened the official Portuguese resolve to pursue close co-operation with the former colonies.

Given the many debts owed by Angola and Mozambique to the Comecon bloc, which rushed in when the West shied away, Portugal's relations have charted a careful course. The imminent accession of Angola and Mozambique to the Lomé Convention on trade with the European Community, however, shows how much distance has been covered since independence in 1975, when the West was their avowed enemy.

McNamara's Warning

As World Bank president throughout the 1970s, Robert S. McNamara spent much of his time wading through Africa's economic morass. While in office he avoided public comment on the continent's single most explosive political issue: the building black-white confrontation over South Africa's unyielding apartheid. But McNamara has retired—and last week he attacked official segregation on South Africa's home ground. Unless repealed, apartheid “will eventually lead to a catastrophic racial conflict,” he told an audience at the University of Witwatersrand. “South Africa . . . will become as great a threat to the peace of the world in the 1990s as the Middle East is today.”

McNamara's scenario for disaster was based on South Africa's entrenched racial injustice: a rigid system of laws that denies blacks political rights, segregates them and bans them from decent jobs and adequate social services. As young blacks turn to revolutionary violence—an estimated 8,000 have left so far for military training abroad—the Soviet Union can anticipate burgeoning opportunities to meddle in southern Africa, McNamara said. He added that black frontline states, growing in confidence and economic strength, will step up support for antiwhite guerrilla forces. “A violent explosion appears inevitable,” he concluded—probably within 5 to 10 years.

Any racial war in Africa is bound to damage U.S. interests. “Many Americans—both blacks and whites—will have intense personal feelings about the issues,” McNamara predicted; Washington will “almost certainly not find it morally or politically possible to support the white South Africans.” In retaliation, Pretoria might cut off supplies of chromium, manganese and other strategic minerals. McNamara suggested that the West prepare for that possibility by building up mineral stockpiles. To defuse the crisis before it reaches such international proportions, he urged “liberal South African business leaders” to promote economic reform. More importantly, he called for a “negotiated” settlement providing “full participation in genuine political power” for blacks and protection for whites against “a winner-take-all form of majority rule.”

McNamara's university audience greeted his words warmly, and the English-language Cape Town Argus editorialized that “his somber analysis is shared by many informed South Africans.” But the Afrikaans-language newspapers buried McNamara's warning on inside pages. Not surprisingly, Pretoria refused comment. “We have of course heard all this sort of thing before,” said one government spokesman. Outsiders have been bearding Pretoria on the dangers of a racial explosion since at least 1960, when British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan warned that “winds of change” were transforming Africa. McNamara's contribution ranked among the more powerful—and those who agree with him could only hope that repetition would drive the message home.

FAY WILLEY with bureau reports

Angola reports attack by Pretoria

From Wire Services

Lisbon, Portugal—South African marines have staged a raid on the southern Angolan coast, blowing up two key bridges before being forced to withdraw, the Angolan news agency Angop said yesterday.

It was the first time the Angolan press has referred to the South African navy's penetration of Angolan waters. Angop said the raid "should be seen as proof of an imminent escalation in the undeclared war which racist South Africa wages against the people of Angola."

Meanwhile, South African-backed rebel forces in Angola claimed they captured a strategic military base near the Zambian border, killing 102 government troops and 10 Cubans.

Angop said the South African naval units entered Angolan territorial waters

before dawn Monday and landed a raiding party north of the city of Namibe (formerly known as Mocamedes), 190 miles up the coast from the border with Namibia (South West Africa).

The raiders blew up two bridges on the Giraul River running north of the city, cutting the rail line to Menongue (Septra Pinto) linking the interior with the Atlantic, Angop said.

Angop said Angolan armed forces dispatched the raiders but did not mention any casualties on either side.

The raid means Angola now faces greatly increased problems in bringing supplies to the cities and military garrisons of the south and will have to rely almost exclusively on air transport.

Although the Namibe-Menongue railroad itself was frequently struck by sabotage by guerrillas of the rebel movement,

UNITA, it was still the main supply route for the city of Lubango (Sa da Bandeira).

Road transport is even more risky in the south because of mines and guerrilla ambushes. Trucks usually move in convoys under military escort, according to Angolan rail sources.

The rail line was also used to carry iron ore exports from the Cassinga mines, which Angola is trying to revive with the help of the Austrian firm Austromineral.

In a statement issued Wednesday in Lisbon, UNITA said it took 318 militiamen and 7 government troops prisoner Monday in the attack on the Gago Coutinho base in southeastern Moxico province, 43 miles from the border with Zambia.

The rebels have waged war throughout southern Angola since losing a civil war in 1976 to the governing Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola.

THE WASHINGTON POST

November 6, 1982

Washington Times NOVEMBER 11,

U.S. Planning War Games In Oman, Somalia, Sudan

Reuter

The United States is planning major military exercises in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean next month to include U.S. Marines landing in Oman, defense officials said yesterday. The officials said the exercises also will take place in Somalia and Sudan.

About 2,500 American troops will participate in the week-long exercises, to include separate maneuvers with Omani, Somali and Sudanese

forces, they said. The operation will be the first in the strategic region since war games in November and December in Egypt, Sudan, Somalia and Oman.

The maneuvers also will include air defense exercises by F15 fighters and possibly overflights by Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft, the officials said.

As with last year's exercises, they said, those next month are designed to underline the U.S. ability to make good its pledge to support Middle East friends if they face an external threat.

Angola rebels overrun town

LISBON — Angola's main rebel movement said yesterday it had overrun the town of Gago Coutinho near the eastern border with Zambia, capturing more than 300 of the defenders and seizing large quantities of weapons and military vehicles.

In a communique, UNITA, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, said the town, 45 miles from the border with Zambia, had fallen on Monday.

Washington Times NOVEMBER 10, Odinga seized in Kenya

NAIROBI, Kenya — Former Vice President Ajuma Odinga Odinga, an outspoken critic of President Daniel Arap Moi, was placed under house arrest yesterday at the Lake Victoria town of Kisumu, the Daily Nation reported.

PEACEFUL LEADERSHIP CHANGE IN AFRICA (Continued)

try in the last five years.

And while Mr. Biya must name his own government — something he is expected to do early this week — neither Westerners nor Cameroonians expect any dramatic shifts.

"It's in their interest to stick with continuity," said a French economic analyst here.

A northern businessman concurred, saying, "There may be a few changes, but nothing dramatic."

Cameroon's evolution into a stable, prosperous country has astounded many longtime observers — particularly those who knew the country at independence. An unlikely product of colonial convenience, Cameroon comprised more than 200 ethnic groups, mutually distrustful populations of northern Muslims and southern Christians, and an English speaking minority that had been administered as part of Nigeria and had little in common with the French-speaking majority.


Until the early 1970s a bloody civil war raged in the mountainous western region, threatening to plunge the country into chaos.

But after crushing the revolt, Ahidjo sought no retribution. Instead, he engineered a power-sharing arrangement within his government that took account of all the major eth-

nic and regional groupings. Though there were countless ministerial shifts over the intervening years, the tenuous balance remained constant and there has been no serious civil disturbance in the country since the end of the war in the early 1970s.

Some regional tensions, particularly between the northerners and westerners, remain. And Ahidjo's autocratic style, as well as his harsh measures during the war, have left some detractors. But the mood of the country after his announcement was clearly one of loss, and not a little uncertainty about the future.

"I don't know if we'll ever have another leader like him," said a government worker, and a member of the anglophone community, which has not always been content under the Ahidjo government. "He brought peace to Cameroon, and I think that's what Cameroonians will always remember."



Portuguese Eager for Africa Role

By RICHARD WALLIS, *Reuters*

LISBON—Portuguese soldiers who patrolled Angola's border with Namibia (South West Africa) as part of a colonial army are ready to do it again, this time as members of a United Nations peacekeeping force.

Keen for any chance to strengthen links with its former colonies, particularly Angola, Portugal would like its troops to be invited back to Africa in an international role.

Lisbon politicians are eagerly canvassing for Portugal to be included in a multinational force that is due to supervise South Africa's withdrawal from Namibia and the holding of free elections when the territory finally gains independence.

This would bring the Portuguese back to Africa eight years after they pulled out of a colonial war in three black states.

The Portuguese believe that their army is cut out for a peacekeeping role in Namibia because of the knowledge it built up on the area before Angola became independent in 1975.

Guerrillas of the South West Africa People's Organization operate from Angolan hideouts in a bush war they have fought for 16 years against South African rule in Namibia.

The projected U.N. Transitional Assistance Group, consisting of up to 7,500 men, would patrol the borders and ensure the safeguarding of a cease-fire in a period before a Namibian government takes over.

Cuban troops and other Soviet Bloc advisers who have helped Angola defend itself against South African cross-border raids in pursuit of the guerrillas still cannot match the Portuguese army in experience on the terrain.

Diplomatic Prestige

A return to Africa to help Namibia achieve independence would boost Lisbon's diplomatic prestige on the continent.

It would also help Lisbon's efforts to start military cooperation with its former colonies in hope of lessening their dependence on the Soviet Bloc.

Prime Minister Francisco Pinto Balsemao told the U.N. General Assembly recently that Portugal would accept any role the world body invited it to play in Namibia.

Namibia, a former German colony, is moving slowly toward independence as a result of a five-year

mediation effort by the United States, Britain, Canada, France and West Germany.

Western officials say most issues holding up a final agreement have been settled in talks with South Africa, the guerrilla group and Namibia's black neighbors.

But the backstage negotiations have taken longer than expected, and the West is now uncertain whether it can stick to its goal of getting a cease-fire by the end of 1982.

The biggest problem is that both the United States and South Africa want a simultaneous agreement on the withdrawal of an estimated 18,000 Cuban troops from Angola.

Angola has refused to acknowledge any formal linkage between the Cuban issue and a Namibian settlement, but is still talking about the Cubans with the United States.

Before Angola's independence, Portuguese and South African forces cooperated closely to keep the Namibian border free of guerrillas, and official sources in Lisbon say Pretoria could do a lot worse than accept Portuguese troops in the U.N. group.

At the other end of the spectrum, guerrilla leader Sam Nujoma welcomes a Portuguese role in the peacekeeping force.

Whatever Portugal would bring in experience, the number of men it could field would be limited by huge logistical problems.

The Portuguese forces have shrunk to a quarter of their size since Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau gained independence. Even sending a small contingent to Namibia would require a major effort and probably foreign help.

Inclusion of the Portuguese in the U.N. peacekeepers also raises delicate political problems. The Portuguese forces spearheaded a bloodless coup in Portugal in 1974 precisely because they no longer wanted to fight in Africa.

The Angolan press also often points out that many former Portuguese settlers and ex-servicemen who fled after Angola's independence now serve with South African-led forces in Namibia.

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL November 12, 1982

South African Import Surcharge

JOHANNESBURG, South Africa—Import surcharges in South Africa will be cut to 7.5% from 10% on Dec. 1, one month earlier than scheduled, Finance Minister Owen Horwood said.

MOZAMBIQUE KEEPS TO MARXIST ROUTE

By ALAN COWELL

Special to The New York Times

MAPUTO, Mozambique — Although Mozambique appears to be trying to improve relations with the West, there has been no matching domestic move to deviate from Marxist theory.

While some foreign diplomats attribute Mozambique's poor economic performance to unsuccessful socialist ventures, the ruling Mozambique Liberation Front has made what one diplomat called "only a pious bow" in the direction of looser economic controls to provide greater incentives. Instead, recently published guidelines for next year's party congress call for "the reinforcement of the controlling position of our Marxist-Leninist party."

The guidelines are framed in what are called the "eight theses" up for discussion at the fourth party congress of the Mozambique Liberation Front, known as Frelimo. The first of these says: "Our conquests result from the socialist nature of our revolution. Only the people's struggle under the direction of Frelimo can defend, consolidate and widen them."

A Western diplomat said that behind this kind of language is a desire to regenerate support for the party after seven years marked by economic decline resulting from natural disaster, wars along the borders and inside the country, unsuccessful attempts to implant socialist agricultural systems and a dire lack of managerial skills.

Return to Old Methods

The way to revive the party's fortunes, according to the guidelines and senior Mozambican officials, is to return to the methods the party used when, as a liberation movement in the war against Portuguese colonialism, it administered tracts of land in the north that were called liberated zones.

"Then," Information Minister Luis Cabaco said, "the people would debate and find solutions to their problems. Now there is a tendency to call in the engineer to solve the problem, without discussing it with the people."

Mozambique gained its independence in 1975 after a long guerrilla campaign against the Portuguese, who imparted little literacy and few skills to their subjects. At the end of their rule, the Portuguese left in droves, taking their expertise with them.

The result was a critical shortage of trained people to help the nation counter destructive incursions across its borders during Zimbabwe's war for independence and, later, a spreading insurgency by Mozambicans said to be trained and sponsored by South Africa.

Both military campaigns damaged installations important to the economy. According to Mozambican sources, the insurgency has spread so much that virtually all routes to the hinterland are attacked spasmodically by the rebels.

Deficiency in Food Grain

Western economists add that a devas-

Continued on Pg. 11

Angola: South Africans win battles, but not war

SMITH HEMPSTONE

Oshakati, South-West Africa

Make no mistake about it: while South Africa may have lost the political war to retain control of this League of Nations mandate, it is winning all the battles against Sam Nujoma's Cuban-backed SWAPO guerrillas.

South African officers at this big military base in the heart of Ovamboland, the core of SWAPO's support, seldom bother to wear side-arms. The paved roads are busy, and without check-points, the war, it seems, is far to the North.

When three largish bands of guerrillas recently sought to pass through Ovamboland to hit the white settlement areas to the South, the South Africans wiped out each of them to the man. With the exception of the occasional landmine explosion, the war is far away to the North, deep in the black heart of Angola.

The South Africans refuse to say how many troops they have along the border between South-West Africa (Namibia) and Angola. But from what one reporter has seen at three South African bases, Pretoria cannot have fewer than 25,000 men here. Thousands more are flown in from the South when the South African army launches one of its major offensives into Angola (last year, the South Africans captured more than \$200 million in Soviet military hardware in the North).

Indeed, the 16-year-old war in the North has provided excellent training for the 60,000 South African youths called to the colors for a two-year stint each year. There cannot be better bushwar fighters than the veterans of the 201st (Bushmen) Battalion or the 32nd Battalion, made up largely of Rhodesian, Portuguese (black and white), British, Irish and German and American soldiers of fortune.

SWAPO losses in recent years have been averaging 1,500 annually, with the South Africans sustaining losses of about one-tenth of that.

Nevertheless, Nujoma seems able to recruit or abduct enough youngsters from Ovamboland to keep his strength at a level of about 6,000 fighters, and the Russians appear willing to keep replacing SWAPO's arms at the same rate the South Africans destroy them. It is axiomatic of insurgencies that guerrillas need to avoid being destroyed to win and SWAPO, although pushed far north into Angola, has not been destroyed.

The Russians, Cubans and East Germans who assist SWAPO are even more careful to keep out of harm's

way: In its five major cross-border operations in recent years, the South Africans have been able to capture only one Russian and four Cubans.

In their forays into Angola, the South Africans are indirectly assisted by Jonas Savimbi's 25,000 UNITA guerrillas, who are locked in a death-struggle with the Cuban-supported Angolan troops. When South African troops clear an area of Angola, Savimbi's troops are quick to occupy it before SWAPO or Angolan units can move back in. Much of the war materiel captured from SWAPO seems somehow to end up in UNITA's hands.

In 1976, South African troops and their UNITA allies pushed to the very gates of Landa, the Angolan capital. There they encountered stiff resistance from the Cubans, and an even frostier reception from the leaders of the so-called Free World. Isolated diplomatically, the South Africans had to pull back to the South. Savimbi withdrew the remnants of his forces to his stronghold in southeastern Angola, where he rebuilt his forces. It is from this situation that the military stalemate that exists today has emerged.

South Africa is committed to the

MOZAMBIQUE KEEPS TO MARXIST ROUTE (CONTINUED)

tating combination of drought and floods in the last two years has crippled agricultural production. According to Western figures, Mozambique will need to buy 544,000 tons of food grain for 1982-83 but has the money for only 364,000 tons. The rest is being supplied as aid by the United States, West Germany and other nations.

Mozambique earns over half its foreign exchange by exporting sugar, cashew products, cotton, tea and prawns, and, despite its pro-Soviet diplomatic alignment, its leading market for the first two of these is the United States. In 1981, exports earned only \$387 million while imports were over \$700 million, Western economists said, reflecting lower domestic production, reduced prices on world markets for traditional crops and reliance on foreign supplies of petroleum, food, raw materials, machinery and other items.

Some Westerners attribute the poor economic performance in part to failed ventures in state farming, collectivization and the establishment of cooperatives and communal villages now said to house 1.2 million Mozambicans, a tenth of the population.

Only in January, Western economists said, did the one-party Government raise producer prices for staple foods to provide incentives for peasant farmers to grow more, and requirements that farmers sell their products at controlled prices through official markets have recently been relaxed.

granting of independence to Namibia. But Pretoria is very much concerned about what sort of government may take power in Windhoek, who its friends will be and what policies it will pursue.

If Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker's shuttle diplomacy can produce a Cuban withdrawal from Angola, leaving a government dependent on South Africa in Namibia, Pretoria is perfectly willing to pull its troops back to the Orange River. But the South Africans are unwilling to yield hundreds of square miles of territory if it means Cuban troops in Windhoek and guerrillas of the South African National Congress on the Orange River.

If a solution satisfactory to Pretoria cannot be reached, the South Africans are perfectly prepared to stay right where they are here on the Cunene River, foraging deep into Angola to destroy guerrilla units and arms dumps when it pleases them.

The war along this trackless frontier is costing Pretoria nearly \$3 million a day. But in the process, South Africa is creating a battle-hardened army for the major conflict that lies ahead in the white-ruled republic itself.

Anomalies in Fish Marketing

Yet anomalies in the official pricing system remain: residents of Maputo, hard by the Indian Ocean, complain of a shortage of fish in the official market. Yet, a little way out of town, fish is available privately in abundance, at substantial prices, from fishermen who will not supply the official market because it is not worth their while.

The shortage of fish is also attributed to an agreement with Moscow that allows Soviet trawlers to fish Mozambican waters provided a percentage of the catch is delivered to Mozambique.

The guidelines promise little in new approaches to economic problems and insist that the "socialization of the countryside, rather than any tilt toward capitalist-leaning production methods, is the path to development." Politically, too, the guidelines foresee no fundamental change in Mozambique's approach, although a Western diplomat said that the dialectic methods of the liberated zones may not solve the problems of the much larger and more complex nation.

The guidelines do not refer directly to the insurgency. Mozambique's official position is that the insurgents are illegitimate because they are the creation of outsiders. Some Westerners say, however, that the inability of the Government to alleviate the nation's problems has helped the insurgents in areas traditionally opposed to it.

Zulu seeks 'power sharing' in South Africa

INTERVIEW

Zulu Chief Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi of South Africa on apartheid and resistance.

Chief Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi, chief of the Zulu tribe of South Africa, head of the largest black liberation movement in that country and a thorn in the side of the South African government for many years, recently was awarded the 1982 George Meany Human Rights Award by the AFL-CIO in Washington.

The award, shared posthumously by Dr. Neil Aggett, a white officer of a black workers union in South Africa who was found dead in a Johannesburg jail in February, is the second George Meany award to be presented by the AFL-CIO. The first went last year to Lech Walesa of Poland's Solidarity Union. When International Federation of Labor President Lane Kirkland introduced Buthelezi as the chief minister of Kwa Zulu, his tribal state, he called him "the single most potent force in resisting the onward rush of apartheid."

Buthelezi has led relentless opposition to apartheid in South Africa since the government imposed a system of "Bantustans," or homelands for his 5 million people, a system he has refused to accept. He has prepared an economic and political case for merger with the white-controlled region of Natal. In addition he is head of Inkhata Yenkululeko Yesize, a national cultural liberation movement of 350,000 which is putting up increasing resistance to the system of apartheid.

State Department reporter Peter Almond caught up with him here and prepared this edited interview:

Q: How do you feel about the International Monetary Fund's giving a huge loan (\$1.1 billion) to South Africa?

A: The needs of black people are really vast, the disparities and the backlogs are of horrendous proportions, and in terms of these — education, housing and whatever, you name it — the basic needs of having enough to eat and so on, basic needs of schooling the numbers of desks and teachers that are needed in terms of the rate the population is growing.

The problems are so vast I couldn't possibly discourage it (IMF loan) and have them turn around and say, "Well, it's your leader, Buthelezi, that you should blame." But I wouldn't say they should be given loans to buy guns to keep us in oppression. If there is a way of safeguarding it I don't see why they shouldn't be given loans.

Q: Tell me about Inkhata. What is its role in South Africa?

A: Our main aim is to bring about

change in South Africa through non-violent means. Our aim is to bring about the participation of black people in power sharing with white people.

We are struggling, we have been under this for a long time, we're determined to continue, to get people to use their worker power to force whites to negotiate with them. We want them to use their consumer power, which is rising all the time.

We have, through the Kwazulu Assembly, Inkhata has produced the Buthelezi commission which spells out a formula from which you can start, where it calls for Kwazulu and Natal as one region with all race groups — coloreds, Indians, whites and blacks — to participate in one government.

Q: Can you tell me some specific things your people have done in terms of consumer or economic power?

A: When I left South Africa to come here I started a boycott by blacks which is catching on throughout South Africa because the government raised the price of bread. They wouldn't subsidize it, and the price skyrocketed. I was addressing a meeting of the Inkhata Women's Brigade and suggested to them that they could easily remove the bread from the table by boycotting it. When I arrived in Soweto I addressed thousands of people at black alliance meetings, and the black alliance passed a resolution, so that when I left it was just beginning.

Q: It sounds very difficult. To remove bread from the table?

A: Ah, white bread. This is white bread. There is a difference. Brown bread is available. There are spinoffs to boycotting white bread because white bread is in any case not nourishing. Black people are malnourished, children suffer from malnutrition. Brown bread is cheaper, so they will be saving money and having good nutrition.

Q: It sounds like racism in itself. White bread is boycotted and brown bread is good?

A: (chuckle). If you say so. It's a new play on those words. People have already played on them.

Q: You reject the idea of violence to achieve your goals. Do you also reject the African National Congress, which has formed guerrilla units outside South Africa?

A: What do you mean by the African National Congress?

Q: The ANC that is banned.

A: No, you see I was a member of the African National Congress myself. It was a movement that was committed to peaceful strategy right through. There was not a single

national conference of the African National Congress that ever passed or endorsed any violent strategy. But then a few people established an external mission that has opted for violence which I perfectly understand even if I don't endorse it myself. People glibly call them the African National Congress, but they are not us.

Q: Did you not say at one point that you would be prepared to take up the gun, if you couldn't succeed with your mission through peaceful means?

A: That is a distortion of what I said. I've said that the options I'm pursuing are my people's options. If my people want me to decide to do that, then I will lead them through those dark waters, if that's what they want. There's a difference between this and what you said.

Q: OK. But are you not a dangerous person to the (Prime Minister Pieter Willem) Botha government?

A: Actually, when I left home, I can show you some of the clippings of threats which I had a few days ago. There is nothing I have gone through that all black people in South Africa have not gone through. I've had my passport taken away for nine years...

Q: Do you have a South African passport?

A: Yes.

Q: Not Zulu?

A: No, I rejected that... Transkei has its own passport and I think some people have actually traveled on it.

Q: What do you see in the next 10-20 years for South Africa, particularly for the blacks?

A: I'm very worried about the future. It seems to me that after Mr. Botha has had the mandate from the four provinces of South Africa, then he's quite ready to impose his federal concept, with all the independent homelands around him. We don't accept it in Kwazulu. So if they pursue this I cannot predict what may happen. It narrows our options in such a way that it might make it a Hobson's choice situation in terms of violence. Now I'm not saying that I'm going to violence. I'm just being analytical in terms of the situation. And that is why I said that a few days ago the minister of law and order threatened me because I said this.

Q: What do you think the United States can do to help?

A: I think the United States is very creative. I believe the United States has started to move in the right direction in setting up the fund which the members of Congress, like Mr. Solarz, were responsible in setting up. That is a fund for the education of black people. But my only feeling is that the money should be used in South Africa itself. It would be easier than to bring students here.

Continued on Pg. 15

Once Afrikaner Paragon, Conscientious Churchman Now Pariah

JOHANNESBURG—Every Sunday in a modest social hall in a suburb of Johannesburg, a 67-year-old white man who once was a pillar of the Afrikaner establishment that enforces the strict system of racial segregation here, joins a handful of black domestic servants in a worship service and a little African dancing.

The process that brought C. F. Beyers Naude from a position of prominence in the powerful Dutch Reformed Church and the Afrikaner secret society Broederbond to virtual house arrest and social ostracism illustrates the contradictions and doubts felt by many whites about their privileged role here.

Naude's punishment for becoming what is regarded as an ethnic traitor was extended last week when the government served its second banning order on the Afrikaner community's most implacable dissenter.

Banning is a severe form of restriction that prohibits people from speaking publicly, limits their movements and prevents them from having social contact with more than one other person at a time. The original, five-year banning order was due to run out Sunday, and Naude's many admirers here and abroad hoped he would become free at that time.

Although he has not softened his condemnation of apartheid as immoral, they hoped the government would relent because of his age and because his wife Ilse, 69, is in poor health which doctors say is due to the strain of living under the banning order.

But there has been no relenting. The new banning order, imposed for another three years, repeats the restrictions of the old one, save for a minor concession that Naude no longer has to report weekly to a police station.

The government's action has met with strong condemnation from religious leaders and members of the political opposition here.

There has been no comment from any government spokesman, including the minister of law and order, Louis Le Grange, who issued the banning order.

Naude's credentials as a member of the Afrikaner *volk*, the Dutch-descended settlers who after 300 years

regard themselves as indigenous to South Africa and have ruled it with a zealous group nationalism for 35 years, are impeccable.

His father, Jozua Naude, was chaplain to a famous general on the side of the Boers (as Afrikaners were then called) in their war of independence against imperial Britain at the turn of the century. He named his son after the general, Christiaan Frederick Beyers.

At the war's end Jozua Naude, a fanatical Afrikaner nationalist, was one of a handful of *bittereinders* (bitter enders) who refused to lay down their arms at the signing of the peace treaty with Britain.

He was also one of six men who founded the Broederbond, the secret society widely considered to be a controlling influence in Afrikaner political and religious affairs.

Beyers Naude was a member of the Broederbond for 23 years. Like his father, he was a minister of the Dutch Reformed Church, South Africa's biggest faith to which 64 percent of all Afrikaners belong and which wields enormous influence over the community.

Naude rose to be the moderator, or leader, of the church's biggest division, the Southern Transvaal Synod. He was one of the rising stars of the *volk*—bright, articulate, charismatic. Some people spoke of him as a possible future prime minister.

Then Naude's whole philosophy began to change. It was a slow process, but gradually his Biblical studies convinced him that the Afrikaner government's policy of apartheid was in conflict with the Scriptures.

It is said of Afrikaners that they are *konsekwent* in their thinking, meaning they follow a Teutonic pattern of logical consistency that requires that one face up to all the consequences of one's convictions.

This is one reason the South African government has been so slow to start with small reforms, like integrating sports or park benches, because logical consistency requires that the implications of such steps be followed all the way to permitting people of all races to vote.

Naude is an archetypal Afrikaner in this respect. A one-time associate has said of him: "The trouble with Beyers is that his ideas continually have little ones." Thus his initial

doubts procreated others and sent the minister back to his Bible for more searching. "It was a frightening experience," he recalls, "like a pincer movement closing in on the foundations of your life."

What made it particularly frightening is that he realized the shattering implications if he ever began voicing his doubts. It was like staring over a precipice. One step and he would be gone.

That step came when Naude formed an ecumenical group called the Christian Institute in the early 1960s to establish contact with black Christians. The Dutch Reformed Church disapproved, ordering Naude to quit the institute or forfeit his ministry. He chose the institute.

With Naude as director, the institute became a multiracial body that sought to exert pressure on the Afrikaner oligarchy to change their ways. But during the 1970s, Naude reached the conclusion that trying to achieve change in South Africa through appeals to the ruling whites was a forlorn hope.

The institute began supporting black initiatives and in time to endorse a black vision of the country's future. Naude started coming into confrontation with the government.

Government spokesmen, and even a commission of inquiry, hinted that Naude and the institute were supporting the black underground. In 1977 the institute was outlawed and Naude was banned.

In the lonely life he has led since then Naude has undertaken what he calls "pastoral counseling," which is giving personal advice to individuals who call on him—one at a time.

Many are young whites anguished about being conscripted into the Army for what they see as an unjust war against African nationalist guerrilla movements. Others are young blacks anguished about whether they should leave the country to join these guerrilla movements.

Early last year Naude gave up his membership in the whites-only Dutch Reformed Church which had played such a big part in his earlier life. He joined the black branch.

Now the one-time church leader and Broederbond worshiper with the few blacks who live in his Johannesburg suburb. He is the only white member of the congregation and often the only male, but he mixes easily and without artificiality.

BUSH LIKELY TO FEEL STING OF BLACK AFRICA'S ANGER (Continued)

scheduled to call on US Secretary of State George Shultz. The meeting will be mainly a "get acquainted" visit, according to diplomatic sources. But the two leaders are expected to discuss the troubled negotiations on Namibia (South-West Africa). Settlement on Namibia, a territory South Africa has illegally occupied since the mid-1940s, has been held out as one of the main benefits of closer US-South African ties.

The State Department calls reports that Namibia talks are stalemated "grossly inaccurate," but diplomatic sources concede there is a growing "nervousness" on the part of the United States. The concern is over rising impatience within black Africa — particularly among the "front-line" states of Angola, Zambia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, and Mozambique — that Reagan's tilt toward South Africa has failed to achieve its goals, at least on a Namibia settlement.

Some senior State Department officials are expected to visit South Africa in the next few weeks and may lay groundwork for talks between Shultz and Botha.

Holding of such a meeting also may suggest there is no present plan to shift policy on South Africa. But critics are likely to raise questions about what the meeting achieves.

President Reagan's policy of "constructive engagement" toward South Africa is built on the premise that the United States can better encourage change through friendly encouragement than harsh criticism. Officially, the US remains opposed to apartheid, but it is not aggressively critical of South Africa's racial policies.

President Reagan "normalized" relations with South Africa after severe strains during Jimmy Carter's administration. For example, the number of defense attachés at embassies in Washington and Pretoria have been returned to full strength. And President Reagan has liberalized trade policy with South Africa.

The United States also has been a high-profile defender of South Africa on some occasions. Last year the United States vetoed a United Nations Security Council resolution condemning South Africa's invasion of Angola — an act that marked an important split between the US and its West European allies.

Earlier this month the US spoke out in defense of South Africa receiving credit worth \$1 billion from the International Monetary Fund. The US supported the IMF loan on the basis that politics should not enter into such decisions. Still, during a UN debate on the loan, a US representative reportedly spoke of "constructive change" taking place in South Africa.

Indeed, the Reagan administration has looked favorably on limited proposals for "power-sharing" that have been introduced by South African Prime Minister P. W. Botha. The US considers them a step in the right direction.

These reforms would give Coloreds (persons of mixed race descent) and Indians representation in the central government. But they would continue to leave out blacks, although blacks make up some 70 percent of the South African population. Many critics dismiss this step as mere window dressing; others say it would cause white-black relations to deteriorate further.

THE NAMIBIAN CONUNDRUM (Continued)

The Western allies and black African nations fear that South Africa is playing Washington for a fool. Pretoria has used its time during the deadlock to move hard against SWAPO guerrillas fighting for Namibian independence. Black Africans believe South Africa wants the impasse over the Cubans to continue so it can destroy SWAPO and then overthrow the Marxist regime in Angola. Critics point out that when the Western group appeared to be making progress on the Cuban issue, South Africa staged a raid into Angola against SWAPO guerrillas, derailing the negotiations anew.

Administration officials insist that the negotiations are proceeding well. One senior official called in reporters last week to deny the "grossly inaccurate" reports of a stalemate. He said contacts were continuing among all of the parties and that he saw "no evidence of any party running for the exits." Reagan is involved in the negotiations, he said, and has written letters to black African leaders on the progress of the talks. Reagan "would feel he has been double-crossed if [the South Africans] raise other conditions," said another official. "South Africa would run a terrible, terrible risk."

American officials are considering several possible compromises on the Cuban issue. An area along the Namibia-Angola border, or even a strip within Angola, could be declared a neutral zone patrolled by a pan-African force or by troops from Europe or the United Nations. That would be followed by a phased withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and of South African troops from Namibia. In addition, Angola, Zambia, Botswana and Mozambique have privately proposed a number of similar face-saving compromises. "There are at least half a dozen scenarios," said one U.S. official. "The question is finding the right mix."

'Up for Hire': The black Africans' willingness to talk compromise with the Reagan administration instead of confrontation is an indication of hard economic realities. Because of a sharp drop in the price of virtually every African export—from oil and copper to cocoa and coffee—many nations are facing their most dismal economic outlook since independence. They need U.S. aid and investment—and as a result, they have restrained their criticism of Reagan's policies. "Yes, Nigerians are bitter about Reagan's Namibia policy; yes, we're

bitter about his meddling in Angola," said one Nigerian diplomat. "But the mood of the country right now is to get closer to the United States, to get what we can from them." As a result, said one senior Western ambassador in Africa, "in many ways the times have never been better for dealing . . . Most of Africa, at the moment, is not up for grabs in the old sense of Moscow expansionism, but is most definitely up for hire."

The United States needs to move fast. The crumbling African economies present severe dangers in countries that already are politically fragile. In Nigeria last week, authorities finally put down rioting by radical Muslims in which as many as 500 people died. In Cameroon, Ahmadu Ahidjo, president since independence in 1960, took to the radio and announced that he would resign the next day. The resignation left everyone in Cameroon wondering what would happen next. Throughout Africa, that is always anyone's guess. Black Africans will expect Bush to show up with some new and better ideas for peace and stability.

JOHN BRECHER with JANE WHITMORE in Washington, PETER YOUNGHUSBAND in Cape Town and TOM GILROY in Douala

UPRISING REVEALS GROWING ANGER OF KENYA'S POOR (Continued)

the most pro-Western in East Africa. Mombasa is the only port for thousands of miles between Mogadiscio, in Somalia, and Cape Town where the American Indian Ocean fleet is welcome.

Yet with all the good will in the world, his ability to deal with Kenya's economic crisis, of which the August uprising was only symptomatic, is highly suspect.

Kenya experienced rapid economic growth in the decade following independence. Between 1964 and 1973 (the year OPEC quadrupled the price of oil), annual economic growth averaged 6.6 percent. The rate of growth dropped to 4 percent between 1973 and 1977, and has averaged around 2 percent for the past three years (Arap Moi took office on Kenyatta's death in 1978). For the past three years, there has been a decline in real per capita national income.

Kenya's problem is that the prices of its principal exports, coffee and tea, have declined. Tourism has stagnated and manufacturing has de-

clined at a time when the cost of its imports has risen. Inflation is running at a rate of 25 percent annually, and the servicing of Kenya's \$2.9 billion foreign debt absorbs 25 percent of its foreign exchange earnings.

The country, once the breadbasket of East Africa, no longer can feed its expanding population, and Kenya for the past three years has run an \$800 million deficit in its current accounts.

Arap Moi has disbanded his 2,300-man air force, jailed some 100 university students who supported the uprising and vowed to put Kenya's house in order. But the betting is no more than even that he will long survive as president of this one-party state.

Asked how the West could help Kenya, one diplomat replied: "Pray for frost in Brazil." Brazil is Kenya's main competitor in the world coffee market.

Smith Hempstone is executive editor of The Washington Times.

A LAST CHANCE FOR PEACE IN NAMIBIA? (Continued)

ment with Savimbi, perhaps in a loose confederation that gives him wide local autonomy. Another nagging fear of MPLA moderates must always be their well founded suspicion that the Russian, East German and Cuban advisers will plot to overthrow them in order to abort any promising negotiation with the U.S.

While Crocker needs more time to persuade an insecure and divided MPLA regime that it can do without the security blanket of Cuban troops, time may be running out on his ability to keep the South Africans hitched to their part of the agreement. Prime Minister P.W. Botha is threatened on his right by the growth of two new extremely conservative parties.

If, as expected, the SWAPO independence movement wins U.N. supervised elections in Namibia, Botha must expect an angry backlash from the thousands of white colonialists who will return from

Namibia to swell the growing ranks of right wing opposition.

In an effort to propitiate these frustrated whites, some South African cabinet ministers are making noises that sound as if they would not accept a SWAPO electoral victory even if Cuban troops were withdrawn. The fragile consensus that allowed South Africa to go along with the American strategy may be beginning to unravel.

As Crocker tries to herd one reluctant negotiating partner into the corral before the other escapes, there is encouraging advice from a Western European diplomat who has been involved in the Namibian negotiations for five long years. He confirms the fact that the talks with the Angolans to get the Cubans out are still very much alive and he stresses that "it would be a tremendous plus if we can get a break-

NAMIBIA AND THE CUBAN CONNECTION (Continued)

There is a current stalemate. The Reagan administration hopes that the Angolan government, which it has refused to recognize, will begin to send Cubans home in exchange for American assurances that the South Africans cease occupying and harassing southern Angola. But the Angolan government remains appropriately suspicious and skeptical. It also wonders what will become of UNITA, a yet-to-be-resolved question.

The South Africans could, admittedly, drop their insistence on a Cuban withdrawal. They could argue that the cost of the war and of Namibia (at least \$1 billion annually) is too

heavy at a time of recession. Prime Minister P. W. Botha of South Africa could also decide to take such domestically unpleasant political consequences as may follow a Namibian settlement now, and not later. Very conservative forces among whites are menacing his control of South Africa from the right, and turning Namibia loose later might be much more difficult the longer he delays.

The Reagan administration also tells the South Africans that they will obtain no better treatment from subsequent American and Western governments. This is the time to make arrangements firm.

ZULU SEEKS 'POWER SHARING' (CONTINUED)

Because with \$20,000 you could do much more for black people than bring one student here.

I think this country is the most highly developed in the world for medical needs. We need projects for people to help themselves.

Q: Inkhata is closely allied with the trade union movement. How do you feel about increasing labor action and strikes as a political weapon?

A: Yes, that should be done. But at the moment there are such enormous problems that I think in a recession it would be unwise to indulge in that before they are even on their feet. I've always been cautious in that respect. One shouldn't do a good thing before its time has come.

THE WASHINGTON POST

November 10, 1982

• White trade union organizer Alan Morris Fine was acquitted of charges of violating South Africa's Terrorism Act. Fine had pleaded not guilty to charges of furthering the interests of the banned African National Congress (ANC) or of taking part in activities which fulfilled aims of the congress.

through."

He identifies two types of circling vultures who are hoping for failure. On the left, there are those who are looking forward to a breakdown in the negotiations as an opportunity to impose a U.N. sponsored economic blockade against South Africa, even though such attempts in the past have always failed.

On the right, there are those who would welcome the collapse of the negotiations as a green light for assisting the South Africans to impose their own internal solution on Namibia, as if they had learned nothing from Bishop Muzorewa's sad experience in Zimbabwe.

The bankruptcy of these two extremes only demonstrates the wisdom of Crocker's middle course. What the U.S. is offering may ultimately prove attractive to all the parties because the only alternative appears to be descent into bloody polarization.

But fear that a black government in Namibia would have adverse political consequences among whites in South Africa, a desire to prosecute South Africa's wars 1,000 miles or more from its own territory, and the usefulness for South Africa of retaining Namibia as a bargaining element with the West, all militate against a sure solution to the Namibian problem soon. So long as a Namibia settlement and a Cuban withdrawal are linked, too, progress will be very slow

Robert I. Rotberg is professor of political science and history at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Doing something about Africa

By M. Peter McPherson

Development experts in Africa and among the international donor community have been shocked by the evidence of sub-Saharan Africa's serious economic condition.

Documenting these feelings of discouragement and dismay are the statistics on Africa's dismal economic progress to date and poor development condition. A recent World Bank report points out that in the 20 years or so since African countries gained their independence, there has been little or negative economic growth per capita.

Food shortages and resulting malnutrition aggravate already serious health problems for most Africans. Infant mortality is substantially higher in Africa than in Asia or Latin America.

As an African economist said in a recent conference on African development, "the past strategies of African and donor governments have been a failure; new approaches are needed."

During the Reagan administration, the Agency for International Development (AID) has tailored its priorities to deal with the African crisis. Agriculture, policy reform, building institutions for technology transfer, and private sector development are the four cornerstones of our assistance policy in Africa. They reflect the belief that resource transfers alone are not sufficient if the condition in Africa is to be turned around.

United States assistance to Africa has increased substantially. The administration's request to the Congress for fiscal year 1983 is 84 percent greater than aid to Africa was in 1979. Much of this growth has occurred under the current administration.

Over half of this assistance is for agricultural development — nearly double the amount available for agricultural programs three years ago. A similar expansion is occurring in reforestation and fuelwood production — an integral part of the agricultural system. Increases in agricultural productivity are basic to African economic growth — to export earnings, employment, and food availability for rapidly growing populations.

The key to agricultural productivity is agricultural research — practical, farmer-oriented research. Until recently there has been little research on African food production as most research programs inherited from the colonial period have emphasized export crops. New production technologies developed in Africa for African farming conditions are vital, but institutional capabilities in Africa are seriously underdeveloped. AID, through American universities and agricultural organizations, is now working in 36 countries on agricultural research and related education and extension projects with other agricultural projects in seven other countries.

Linkage is necessary to the development and application of new agricultural technologies and for successful agricul-

tural production programs. AID has for many years been a major contributor to the international research centers such as the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA) in Nigeria. The fruit of the work of these centers come with the ties with national research institutions and their extension to Africa's millions of small farmers — the backbone of African economies.

Over the next several years, AID will be carrying out — in concert with African regional and national organizations and other international donors — a comprehensive approach to developing new technologies for food production and to intensifying their application by African farmers. By linking the basic research and extension services, a sound institutional base can be laid for future agricultural growth. The process will take another 15-20 years, but the possibilities for changes in Africa's economic condition and well-being of the African people are dramatic. In the US, it took 30 years of institution building in research and extension with the land grant institutions to bring about the food production achievements we know today.

Similar progress is being made in health programs in Africa. Closely associated with improved health services will be an expansion of family planning assistance as more and more African governments adopt population policies.

US assistance to Zimbabwe has become a milestone in AID's work in Africa. Since the major commitment of assistance by AID's administrator during Zimbabwe's Conference on Rural Development two years ago, US assistance has made an extraordinary contribution to that country's economy. Using the flexibility of economic support funds, AID designed a program which is achieving the double effect of providing vitally needed foreign exchange for the modern economy while generating Zimbabwe dollars for expenditure in the traditional African areas which have been so badly neglected in the past. It has been possible with these funds to rehabilitate from war damage hundreds of rural schools, clinics, rural roads, animal health centers, agricultural training schools, primary and secondary teacher training facilities. New programs will expand activities in agricultural production among the African farmers and build up Zimbabwe's capacity for training the vast numbers of skilled workers, professionals, and managerial staff required by a growing and more equitable economy.

The rapid pace with which AID has been able to carry out its programs in Zimbabwe has been possible owing to the capable administrative and technical services of the Zimbabwe government. Therein lies the heart of the African development challenge in which AID joins with African leaders. The building of competent African development institutions with African management and technical staffs is the vital task of the next 20 years.

M. Peter McPherson is administrator of the Agency for International Development.

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