## Death by the State ++++++

. . continued from page 7

made up of vigilantes, teachers, traders etc, leaves no one untainted.

While damning in its implications, the contents of the Signal Message Form are hardly surprising given that it originates from one of the 11 regional structures of the JMC.

In understanding the role of the regional JMC's, it is important to locate the structures within the National Security Management System.

onceived in 1978 with the election of PW Botha as National Party leader and then Prime Minister, the objective of the NSMS was to defeat the revolutionaries and regain the (political) initiative.

Two basic principles guided the activities of the intricate security management structures spawned to achieve the NSMS's objective:

\*the need to restore law and order and 
\*the need to implement socio-economic reform before any political reforms could be initiated.

This implied that security action and social reform would have to run their course before political reform could be implemented. Superficially, these objectives seemed legitimate for any government to pursue.

In South Africa's case, however, the implications were chilling. What flowed from this broad brief given to the security management system were assassinations, detentions, vigilante violence and the silencing of popular leaders.

NSMS remained independent of the stitution and were therefore not accountable to parliament.

Despite its constitutional independence, the NSMS remained organically linked to the government, with the SSC at its apex.

The SSC brought together the most important cabinet ministers and the

country's security chiefs.

Its regular members were the State President as chairman, defence, foreign affairs, constitutional development, finance and justice ministers.

Included were a number of politically important ministers such as FW de Klerk, current chairman of the SSC.

Security officials regarded as permanent members of the SSC are at all times the incumbent heads of the various divisions of the SADF. This includes the chief of staff of the SADF, chiefs of the army, navy, airforce and medical services.

Director of the National Intelligence Service, Neil Barnard until recently, the commissioner of police, chief of the security police, the director of security legislation and the director-general of the office of the state president were also permanent members of this supreme command structure.

What is clear from this is that, of the 23 permanent members of the SSC, excluding the state president, 12 were security officials.

The council is known to have met every fortnight on Mondays, a day before cabinet meeting on Tuesdays.

Between June and July of 1985, at the height of the political resistance in the eastern Cape, the SSC is known to have met in Port Elizabeth on several occasions

ed by PW Botha, Pik Botha and FW de Klerk is known to have been convened shortly before the crucial June 7 Signal Message, which proposed the assassinations, was sent to the secretariat of the council.

The secretariat represents one of four pillars of the SCC and is known to conduct the day-to-day affairs of the security council.

Personnel for the secretariat are drawn from the SADF, foreign affairs and NIS.

According to the Africa Confidential of 8 July, 1987, the secretariat was heav-

ily loaded with SADF personnel - it estimates that 70 percent of the secretariat's staff were drawn from the defence force.

Some of its major responsibilities were to interpret intelligence, formulate strategy and in fact, manage the security management system.

Implementation of strategy is diffused and occurs through at least 13 interdepartmental committees, covering almost every field of activity of the state. These include, manpower, security and civil defence committees.

Although implementation of strategy occurs through these committees, the Joint Management Centre network, with its 500 or so regional, district and local management centres, is the lifeblood of the National Security Management System.

his JMC network coordinates the activities of the SSC secretariat above it. There are all in all 11 regional JMC's, each corresponding to an SADF command.

And it is likely that it was at this level that the proposal for the assassination of the Cradock leaders was conceived. These JMC's are responsible for gathering information about political activists and their organisations, identifying their places of work and abode as well as their movements and links.

This information, together with analysis and proposals, is fed upwards to the SSC via the security council's secretariat.

The SSC in turn digests this information and forms a security profile. This informs its decisions on how to respond to a given set of conditions and instructions are then sent down through the secretariat to the JMC's for implementation.

It is now a known fact that the SSC had during its meetings in the Eastern Cape, given the instruction for everything to be done to bring the situation in the eastern Cape under control. And it was in all likelihood, in response to this order that, the Eastern Cape JMC, under Van der Westhuizen's command,

proposed the "permanent removal from society" of Goniwe and Calata.

Given the fact that both leaders were killed within three weeks of the JMC's proposal being made to the SSC secretariat, it must be assumed, on the basis of the line of command in the SSC, that the council, chaired by PW Botha, had in fact sanctioned the plan of action.

The probable origin of the proposal could be narrowed down even further to one of four functional committees of the regional JMC – namely the Security Committee.

This was known to be the repressive arm of the National Security Management System. It acted on the information gathered by the Intelligence Committee.

Staffed by operatives from the riot police, security branch officers, military officers, officials of the municipal police, commando and civil defence units, it co-ordinated the implementation of security strategies formulated by the secretariat of the SSC and approved by the SSC.

The security committee was ostensibly scrapped when De Klerk renamed the SSC as the Cabinet Committee on Security and refashioned the JMC's as the Joint Co-ordinating Centres.

A question that remains unanswered is which structure of the JMC executed the order to kill the leaders. Once the proposal was approved by the secretariat, instructions to carry out the order to kill could have gone down to any one of a number of structures linked to the JMC's through the police and military intelligence representatives.

What is certain, is that everyone upward from Van Der Westhuizen, current chief of staff of military intelligence, associated with the National Security Management System, must be considered culpable in the eastern Cape assassinations in 1985.

### The message of death

The signal message form that turned out to be the death warrant for the eastern Cape activists was first sent anonymously to Transkei's Major-General Bantu Holomisa. In the letter below, he communicates the documents chilling message to the Transkei's director of military intelligence.

TO: DIRECTOR OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE: Lt Col Ndzwayiba

FROM: MINISTER OF DEFENCE: Major General B. Holomisa

### TOP SECRET DOCUMENT IN MY POSSESSION

Please find attached hereto a copy of, the self-explanatory memorandum in Afrikaans. This document was amongst the opened mail for my attention without a covering note. I tried to reach the acting commander of the TDF, Brig. T.T. Matanzima but I was told that he has already left his office for the Easter Weekend.

### My Observations:

This is a copy of a signal message from the Eastern province command to state security council Pretoria, sent by Senior Staff Officer Intelligence, Lt. L. Du Plessis.

This message was transmitted on 7th June 1985 through the Eastern Province Command Signal Unit in Port Elizabeth and signed by Du Plessis whose extension telephone number was 112. This signal message was for the personal attention of General van Rensburg who was probably one of the security personal holding a key position in the state security council.

This signal message refers to a telephone con-

versation between General van Rensburg and Brigadier V.D. Westhuizen on 7 June 1985. If I can still remember correctly, Brigadier V.D. Westhuizen was the Commander of the Eastern Province command at the time.

It is clear that Brig V.D. Westhuizen called L. Du Plessis to confirm in writing the telephonic conversation between General Van Rensburg and himself – hence this written signal message.

The most striking aspect of this signal message is para 3 which categorically states the urgency for the PERMANENT REMOVAL OF MATTHEW GONIWE, MBULELO GONIWE AND FORT CALATA from the community. Matthew Goniwe has taught in Transkei for a number of years; he taught at Ngqamakwe and at Holomisa Senior Secondary School, Mqanduli. He was well known in Transkei and his mysterious death in Port Elizabeth/Uitenhage has aroused intense concern up to

I doubt very much if 14 days passed after this signal message was written before the Goniwe and Calata were found dead. The commemoration of

Godolozi, Hashe and Galela had disappeared and people are eager to know the mysterious circumstances surronding their vanishing. The signal message para 4 envisages a wide reaction which can assume national proportions, in view of the importance of these persons, especially Matthew Goniwe, should they dissapear like Godolozi, Hashe and Galela (PEBCO officials). Reaction of leftist politicians like Molly Blackburn. Protest in the case of Oscar Mpetha in sympathy (with his arrest).

There is no doubt that the physical elimination of Goniwe and Calata was approved at the highest echelons of the state security council comprising President P.W. Botha, General Malan, Mr. Adriaan Vlok, Mr Pik Botha, the commissioner of police, the chief of the SADF and the head of National Intelligence Services.

I hope that I have properly translated the conter of the signal message from Afrikaans linto

English. (Stem u saam?). The RSA government has hotly denied its complicity in perpetration of the atrocities. The job of the politicians concerned has been made very easier. Concerned groups can check and verify the authenticity of the document by calling on handwriting experts to prove the truth.

### RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Bring this to the attention of the commander of the TDF Brig. TT Matanzima on his return from the Easter Holidays..

2. Because of the sensitivity of the matter, it should be brought to the attention of political organisations and lawyers for Human Rights for their scrutiny as well as the RSA president. Hopefully he was not a member of the state security council at the time.

3. If you concur with these recommendations, I will immediately dispatch this information to these bodies and persons. It is hoped that political organisations will learn the lesson of avoiding reliance on the state for the investigation of political murders in which it is deeply involved.

Finally I would like to state clearly that the attached copy seems to have been detached from files in South Africa. There is no doubt that it is the first copy (1 of 1 pages) of the original stamped on 7-6-85 at Eastern Province counsel signal unit, communication centre P.E.

Kindly advise (H.B. Holomisa) Maj. Gen

Comments: I read the memo and the contents of the signal. I fully endorse the suggested actions. I'll brief the commander when he arrives.

M. NDZWAYIBA DIRECTOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE











# Comment & People & Politics

## Death ow the Suale

State President's Office

### State Security Council

Chaired by the state president, it includes senior Cabinet ministers responsible for foreign affairs, defence, law and order and finance. (Meets every two weeks)

### THE SECRETARIAT

(Manages the activities of the Joint Management Centres below it)

Four sub-branches: 1) Administrative 2) National Intelligence 3) Strategic Communications 4) Strategy

### NATIONAL JOINT MANAGEMENT CENTPE

Chaired by deputy minister of Law and Order, it includes the directors-general of all departments

### REGIONAL JOINT MANAGEMENT CENTRES (11)

Sub-committees:

- 1) Joint intelligence committee
- 2) Joint operational centres
- 3) Communications committee
- 4) Constitutional, social and economic
- committee 5) Security committee

### SUB-JOINT MANAGEMENT CENTRES (60)

Sub-committees:

- 1) Veikom (Security)
- 2) Semkom (Political, economic and social
- 3) Komkom (Communications)
- 4) GOS (Joint operations)
- 5) GIK (Intelligence)

### LOCAL MANAGEMENT CENTRE

Headed by SAP station commander and SADF company commander, these centres cover the area of jurisdiction of each police station

### COMMUNITY LIAISON FORUM

Incorporates churches, youth groups, neighbourhood associations, vigilantes, traders, sports clubs, interest groups, journalists, opinionmakers, shebeen-owners, cultural groups, moderate political organisations, teachers etc.

### WORKING GROUP

Chaired by deputy minister of Law and Order, it includes all heads of departments

### JOINT LIAISON FORUMS

The security committees act as the repressive arm of the Regional Joint Management Committee's. It is likely that it was the eastern Cape security committee that was the source of the signal message form recommending the execution of four eastern Cape activists.

JOINT LIAISON FORUMS

### INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEES (13)

Each of the 13 committees deals with a specific area of State Security Council functions that involves more than one department:

1) Manpower 2) Security forces 3) Civil defence 4) Transport 5) Security 6) National supplies and resources 7) Government funding 8) National economy 9) Telecommunications and electrical power supply 10) Science and technology 11) Community services 12) Culture 13) Political affairs

### MINI-JOINT MANAGEMENT CENTRES (350)

Sub-committees.

1) Velkom (Security) 2) Semkom (Political, economic and social 3) Komkom (Communications) 4) GIK (Intelligence) 5) GOS (Joint operations - area of jurisdiction approximates the local municipality

### JOINT LIAISON FORUMS

Graphic based on material in the book 'South Africa at the End of the Elighties - Policy Perspectives 1989' published by the Centre for Policy Studies, Graduate School of Business Administration, University of the Witwatersrand

here is little doubt that the State Security Council (SSC), the central command structure of the National Security Management System (NSMS), has been and remains at the centre of violent destablisation inside and outside South Africa.

But much of blame for the assassination of political activists, that has been heaped on the SSC, now refashioned as the Cabinet Committee on Security, has been little more than a product of careful speculation and analysis.

And the failure to progress beyond accumulating circumstantial evidence has enabled the government to rebut allegations of its culpability in the numerous political killings.

Until this week, the state remained safely cocooned in its web of secrecy, which has fortified by the lack of documented evidence.

But damning State Security Council documentation, containing the death warrants of two prominent eastern Cape civic leaders, Matthew Goniwe and Fort Calata, has come into the possession of

NEW NATION. And for the first time since the military intelligence and the security police gained ascendency in the management of state security, there is unquestionable proof of the state's hand in the assassina-

Part of the evidence that has come to light, is in the form of an official "Signal Message Form" containing the proposal to eliminate Goniwe and Cala-

Originating from the security committee of the Eastern Cape Joint Management Centre, the Signal Message Form, contains an unambiguous but chilling proposal - Goniwe and Calata must be permanently removed from society.

The Signal Message Form, dated June 7, which details a dialogue between a General Van Rensburg of the SSC secretariat and the then commander of the Eastern Cape Joint Management Centre, Brigadier CP van der Westhuizen, was signed by an L du Plessis.

Marked for the personal attention of a General Van Rensburg, the proposal was communicated to the secretariat of the SSC in Pretoria.

Three weeks later between June 29 and July 3, 1985, Goniwe, Calata and two fellow activists travelling with them, Sparrow Mkonto and Sicelo Mhlauli, were brutally executed.

Although Van der Westhuizen, Van Rensburg and Du Plessis are the only security officials directly implicated in the Signal Message Form, the line of culpability goes much further.

An analysis of the line of command, which stretches down from the state president, as chairperson of the SSC, to Community Liaison Forums,

continued on page 8...

In face the Nation, we speak to Sam Shilowa, assistant general secretary of Cosatu, on the future of the alliance between the ANG, SACP and Cosatu as we move towards interim rule.

Double act —the need to identify the source of white begemony that continues to marginalise black theatre talent, plus the Triennial reviewed and Culture Corner.

Pick of the Week -your bandy entertainment guide, plus a review of "The Birth of a New Afrikaner" and focus on controversial British playwright Harold Pinter.