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SUMMARY: REPORT AND EVALUATION, ELECTION 1994
PRESENTED TO THE RGC, ANC EASTERN CAPE REGION,
11 JUNE 1994, BY G. NKWINTI ELECTION CO-ORDINATOR.

INTRODUCTION:

It is important to the attention of the RGC to some pertinent issues regarding the elections campaign.

1.1 The campaign was fought under the auspices of an ANC - led Electoral Front, whose core components were the Alliance member.

1.2 The plan provided for a number of organisational components:

.2.1 The Elections Political Committee (EPC), which was the supreme political body to steer the campaign.

.2.2 The Strategy Group thrust to the campaign.

.2.3 The MDM - PF Forum, which was meant to provide a political platform to MDM and PF formations.

The Elections Co-ordinating Team, whose task was to implement the decisions of the above political formations. It was the Co-ordinating Team, which through various Task Teams, implemented and co-ordinated activities on the ground.

The function of the first three components (1.2.1; 1.2.2; 1.2.3)

The function of the last component was to provide the campaign with the necessary organisational and administrative support, including logistics.

These two processes, in terms of the formulations of national planners and strategists, should have operated very organically. A number of national and regional workshops were conducted to facilitate our understanding of the global plan, particularly emphasising the implementation aspect of the plan. This bias in favour of the implementation aspect became more and more as the campaign intensified, with special focus on voter training, ID acquisition, street sheets for household data, etc. In other words, there was a dramatic shift in favour of the non-political aspects of the campaign. There are a number of factors which led to that situation.

2. IMPLEMENTATIONAL BIAS

The EPC's did not function; the strategy groups worked extremely well at the beginning, but collapsed towards the end. The People Shall Govern!

of the campaign due mainly to the departure of: ugeu nova; uu
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Matdi to the Transkei; and the MDM/PF Fora never took off. This inability was not peculiar to the Eastern Cape. It was a national phenomenon. On the other hand, the Co-ordination Team worked quite effectively.

2.1 Six subregional offices were established with all the basic infrastructure to implement and co-ordinate the campaign.

2.2 Some Branches opened up offices, and, towards the end of of the campaign, the subregional offices were fitted with extra telephone lines to provide more access to the Branches and regional elections office. 2.3 The Co-ordination Team decided on an incentive for volunteers conducting training and collecting household information.

2.4 More volunteers were deployed in the regional office, especially in media production. This ensured more visibility for the ANC, and created the atmosphere necessary for campaign periods.

In an attempt to involve political leadership in the campaign, the National Elections Commission decided to set up Central Command Centres at Head Office and the regions. the Regional Command Centre was decided upon, and key regional leaders were identified to run it. This did not happen. When candidates were consolidated, they were drawn into the regional campaign team. This added a new impetus to the campaign, but these comrades were drawn into the implementation side of the campaign.

All these factors ensured that the Co-ordination Team took or assumed more and more responsibilities. These circumstances ensured that the co-ordination Team encroached into the political function of the campaign, not only as a facilitator but tactually run the political campaign, e.3. addressing rallies, meetings, people's fora and the like.

3. ORGANISATIONAL LAY-OUT OF THE CAMPAIGN

The following diagram is meant to assist the RGC to understand the conceptualisation of the campaign, so that when it evaluated the campaign it would be able to identify the strengths and weakness of the formulation.

Paragraph 2 above has given a narrative of this diagram, including some of the hidden factors, e.g. eubregionel offices, the eight Task Teams of the Co-ordination Team (ECT) uncountable Branch activities, etc. A copy of the overall administrative/organieational report is available, to put comrades on a broader picture of the support system of the election campaign.

From the diagram above, it is clear that each of the layers has specific functions to perform in relation to the campaign. The specific functions of each layer had an impact on other layers, and all the layers impacted upon the electorate, and the electorate impacted on all these layers.

Put the other way round: if any one layer failed to perform its specific functions, it impacted negatively on other layers and the electorate. The task of the campaign was to mobilise and organise as many voters as possible if not all, to go to the polls and vote for the ANC on the 27th of April, the subgoal was to ensure that once they are at the polls, they were able to cast an effective vote. This is what the campaign was all about.

The democratic process in the campaign was to be located within the first three layers of organisations, the Strategic Groups, the Elections Political Committee and the MDM/PF Fora. It is in these layers that the policies and vision of the ANC-led Front were to be explicated and sold to the Electorate through rallies, people's fora, meetings of all sorts etc. At the level of implementation, there ought to be no democracy. This is the level of the Elections Coordination Team. The implementation of the campaign ought to be autocratic, close to military discipline. There should be no confusion between the process (which ought to be democratic), and the implementation (which ought to be autocratic) in an election campaign.

4. PROBLEM AREAS / CHALLENGES

The best and most effective way of expressing the problem-areas and challenges is through a SWOT - ANALYSIS.

STRENGTHS:

4.1.1 We had a long history of struggle, and a powerful leadership to carry us through the campaign. It did not matter what other parties said, the voters, especially the African voters, were only going to vote for Cde Mandela. We carried these with us.

4.1.2 We were ignorant about how to conduct an election campaign. This ensures that we remained relaxed during the whole campaign, but not complacent.

4.1.3 We had a very enthusiastic local and subregional leadership, and a steady regional support system.

4.1.4 A host of other advantages, including a critical political leadership which never ceased to ask about progress, the sharp minds of the veterans of our movement,

4.2 WEAKNESSES

4.2.1 We lacked experience in conducting election campaigns. We had nothing to judge ourselves against.

4.2.3 We lacked the kind of discipline necessary to run an effective campaign. In this regard paragraph 3 above is pertinent. particularly concerning the organic relationship between the political and implementational process.

4.2.3 Most of other weakness are consequent on the two above

4.3 OPPORTUNITIES

4.3.1 The world was in full support of the ANC, and was prepared to put its money where its mouth was.

Numerous workshops were held at which prominent persons from overseas shared their experience and know how with us.

4.3.2 The good relationship which existed between the ANC and institutions such as churches, schools, cultural organisations, business, labour movement. Not that these were utilised to the full. In some instances the good relationship was never topped at all.

4.3.3 The fact that most, if not all, non-governmental organisations had members of the ANC or its supporters. They guarded ANC interests.

4.3.4 Lack Of real challenge from opponents, etc.

4.4 THREATS

4.4.1 Complacency. This was the biggest threat.

4.4.2 The democratic culture of our movement. This was rating very high on the list of threats.

4.4.3 The absence of the culture of work in the Movement.

4.4.4 Lack of commitment to discipline. especially amongst the leadership.

4.4.5 The dissipation of the spirit of volunteerism amongst our cadrehip. whilst one does understand and accept the poverty and hunger caused by unemployment, one cannot condone the break down in discipline which constantly threatened the effective implementation of the campaign.

This SWDT-ANALYSIS has not exhausted our strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats. But it has done sufficiently to enable the REC to evaluate the election campaign. This analysis does not touch on the winding-up problems, for example, the huge financial debt (t_ R650 000) which remains our greatest problem to date. This debt is not one which is unique to the Eastern Cape Region. it is a national treasury. These are unforeseen costs which relate to the Movement's lack of experience in election campaigns.

5. OVERALL PERFORMANCE

Considering all the above matters, this region did not do badly. The ANC lost a few votes here and there e.g. Humansdorp ? lost the National (NP), but won the Provincial, Port Nolloth (NP), generally lost in Northern Areas of PE, Joubertina (NP). Even in these places, we were right there close to the winner except in some of the estates in P.E. town and Northern Areas.

In terms of survey which were conducted in the run-up to the election date, our region was expected to win between 64Z/732 of the votes cast in the election. The election process itself was hampered by the gross underestimation of the African component of the total electorate. This resulted in stoppages due to the lack of this or that tool. The other major factor which was expected to affect the overall performance of the ANC was the high rate of illiteracy amongst its supporters.

When the results were announced for our part of the Province, they surpassed all our imaginations. The ANC won 84% of the total votes cast, and the remaining 16% was shared by the NP, DP, PAC, IFP, ACDP, and others. This staggering victory should, however, not cloud the importance of the issues raised in this report, and those which may have been left out.

THANK YOU