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Norsk bkumemsk Komite tor det serhge Atnka - NbKSA
Norwegian Ecumenical Committee on Southern Africa
Oslo June 22,1992
The Chief Representative
Afn'can National Congress
Thandi Rankoe
Nordahl Bruuns gt 7.2
0165 Oslo 1.

As Chairman of the Norwegian Ecumenical Committee on Southern Africa (NEKSA) I have received copy of a letter sent to you from "Centre for Partnership in Development (DiS)

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The letter was dated May 8,1992 and signed by sttein 'fveter. a
The letter referred to the Annual Meeting of NEKSA which took place at
Diakonhjemmet,Oslo where the First Secretary of the South African Embassy in Oslo ,Miss
Greta Buys, was invited to give a report on : " Developments towards a new South Africa -
new constitution, new elections and new Parliament". At the same meeting journalist Paul
Heisholt,NTB gave his report on : " What is happening in South Africa today"
Enclosed we are sending you copies of both reports.

The abovementioned letter from DiS was discussed at the NEKSA Board-meeting on June
9,1992 and we would like to communicate to you the following comments.

1. The Annual Meeting of NEKSA,1992 aimed at discussing the latest developments in
South Africa.Journalist Paul Heisholt had just returned from his last visit to South Africa
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where he had concentrated on registering the reactions of ordinary South Africans - both
Blacks and Whites, as to the developments in the country.

For years members of NEKSA have followed very closely the liberation struggle in Southern
Afn'ca in order to give our support in building a new South Africa. Consequently we are
therefore concerned about the work of Codesa and the negotiating process towards a new
election, new constitution and new Parliament.

For its Annual Meeting the NEKSA - Board aimed at an , presentation as to the
structure of Codesa, the 5 Working Groups and the complexity of problems to be dealt with
by the different Working Groups. With this purpose in mind we invited the First Secretary
at the South African Embassy in Oslo.

In the DiS letter we are criticized for not inviting-a representative from ANC to sit on
the

same platform. However, the aim was not a confrontation between ANC and NP, but an
presentation as to the working process of Codesa and the " results "forthcoming so
far.

Should this programming be interpreted as being insensitive " to those who suffer to give

legitimacy to the oppressed" ,we can only say that we are sorry. Our concern and support are continually on the side of the oppressed.

2. The NEKSA-tmembers are all supporters of the liberation struggle in Southern Africa, and in different ways we have been and are still engaged in the liberation process towards a new democratic South Africa with all democratic rights granted to all its citizens - regardless of colour and race.

This is clearly stated also in the constitution of NEKSA, which reads : " It shall be the aim

of NEKSA to gather churches and Christian organizations in Norway to work for human rights in Southern Africa through the abolition of the Apartheid system. . . " We assure you

that this is the very motive behind our contributions towards a new South Africa.

3. In order to follow the developments on the South African scene NEKSA invites to its Board-meetings and seminars representatives from liberation movements, churches and recognized news agencies. This last year we had the privilege to receive as our guest Mr. Ellwin Bech of ANC, a visit much appreciated. But we have also had visits by Mrs. Sowasi, Swasiland, Rev Liv Rosmer Fisknes ,Church of Norway, NRK-reporter Kari Saastad, dr. Frank Chicane ,SACC, Praeses F.Gtaz of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in South Africa. During the month of January,1992 NEKSA sponsored the visit of Dr. and Mrs Zephania Kameeta,the Vice-President of the Namibian Parliament.

Through lectures, reports and active participation in our discussions these friends have all

greatly contributed to the work of NEKSA. In this context we are also thankful to ANC for the contributions we received from Mr. Ellwin Bech.

Chairman, NEKSA

Copy to: Centre for Partnership in Development

Fellesridet

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I spent nearly three weeks in South Africa in March covering the white referendum and trying to get a better idea of what is going on in this country, which I and many of my Norwegian and Nordic colleagues have been barred from entering for many years.

It was my eighth visit to Southern Africa, but only my first time in South Africa.

In this short presentation I will try to share with you some of the impressions I was left with during my brief visit, which unfortunately only allowed me to see a limited part of this vast country.

We visited a number of black townships in Johannesburg and Cape Town, but didn't have time to go to any of the bantustans or rural areas. We tried to concentrate on meeting and talking to ordinary people. Interviewing political top shots was not part of our agenda - this time.

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Let it be clear - apartheid isn't gone. Laws have been abolished, but apartheid is still very much entrenched in South African society. They've still got a long way to go.

One can easily be left with the impression that the struggle is practically over. That this evil system of racial oppression and hatred has been eradicated. But to many a black South African the job has just barely begun.

The coming weeks and months will be crucial. The second plenary session of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa - better known as CODESA - is scheduled to open just a week from now.

The peaceful negotiation process has raised expectations, created hope. But it's taking place under extremely unfavourable conditions - economic hardship, rising unemployment and drought combined with an escalating violence - basically in black townships throughout the country.

No doubt South Africa has reached a turning point in its history. Most will agree that there is no way the clock can be set back. But the question seems to be how much more suffering the black majority will have to endure, before a new, non-racial democratic South Africa is established.

IMMORAL

Let me take you back a couple of months to the disputed white referendum on March 17th. President FW de Klerk and the ruling Nationalist Party got the backing they asked for to continue the negotiation process. Two out of three whites voted 'Yes'. The majority was overwhelming.

The result was a great boost to de Klerk: A sigh of relief went through large parts of the world, and many black South Africans cheered, despite their condemnation of the whole idea of a white referendum.

The day after the results were clear a black man approached me in Soweto, threw his arms into the air and shouted "We love you" - adding "for voting 'Yes'". God only knows what would have happened if there

had been a 'No'- majority. Some say that the black townships would have exploded in violence. Judging from the tension among people we spoke to, I have no doubt that they are right.

But what did the result actually mean. That a majority of white South Africans have realized that apartheid is wrong and unjustifiable? That the system - which for decades has had the full support of the Dutch Reformed Church - is immoral?

FEAR

Hardly. Judging from the campaign that was obviously not the case. The campaign slogans were with very, very few exceptions based on fear! Both sides did their best to scare people into dropping a ballot into the box.

The Nationalists ran slogans claiming that a No-vote would mean continued rejection by the rest of the world, reimposition of the sports boycott, of economic sanctions etc. That's particularly interesting considering that the Nationalist for years pretended that sanctions didn't really matter. Now they were telling whites that continued international sanctions would mean economic chaos. '

"Can anyone be so naive as to believe that the 'Yes' was based on the South Africans voters sense of moral justice." asked one white South African in a readers column.

The attitude among many whites I spoke to didn't exactly leave the impression that they felt that apartheid was morally wrong. However they obviously had come to the realisation that it now was economically unsound.

A wealthy white wine farmer I met in Paarl made it quite clear.

He had voted yes and was very proud of that. "It was the only right thing to do. Anything else would have meant economic disaster to me. Now I have a chance to compete on a larger market", he stated optimistically.

But his attitudes towards blacks - or bantus as he called them - were less than charming. Bantus weren't really capable of doing much. It would take 16 bantus to do the work of one white man, he explained and went on to place various other racial groups somewhere in between whites and bantus on this mathematical scale of what he called the Arbeitsmoral.

PARTY REGROUPING

The fact of the matter is that the white community is realizing that apartheid doesn't work or that it isn't working any more - thanks to international pressure, a strong anti-apartheid and liberation movement, an increasingly forceful labour union and changing economic tides. t

Economy spiced with a dash of cricket: That's what the referendum seemed to be all about to most white South Africans - the cricket factor being particularly true among the English-speaking whites. The result of the referendum has however created renewed tension and poses a threat of division within several South African parties - both white and black. A regrouping of players on the political scene seems imminent. .

The so-called liberal white Democratic Party has already seen five of its MPs leave to join the ANC. Others may follow.

Within the Nationalist party there have been calls for the creation of a new party slightly to the right of centre (in South African

terms) to replace the NP. But so far the idea hasn't gained much momentum.

Within the right-wing Conservative Party there is quite a lot of rumbling. The anticipated split between the more moderate fraction, which favours participation in CODESA, and the hardliners has not taken place. Some may join the Nationalists eventually, others are more prone to link up with the neo-nazis in the AWB, BVB and the rest of the alphabet soup on the extreme right.

The militant black liberation movement PAC is strictly anti-CODESA, but there is mounting pressure on PAC from Frontline states, the US and other countries to join the negotiation process.

Chief Buthelezis Inkatha Freedom Party is badly discredited following the disclosure of what has been dubbed the Inkatha-gate affair. And it didn't exactly help the movements credibility much that the IFP played ball with the CP and Boputhatswana for a while before the referendum - airing ideas of a confederate solution - and then finally settling for a 'Yes'-vote.

But the main political contenders will never the less still be the Nationalists (in some form or shape) and the ANC.

VIOLENCE

In the space of the three weeks I spent in South Africa some 200 people were killed in political violence: in clashes in townships, assaults on trains - now more popularly dubbed rolling coffins - and in the ongoing taxi wars. That's an average of 10 killed pr. day. According to the Human Rights Commission 374 people were killed in March alone. 794 others injured.

This is obviously one of - if not the major - threat to the ongoing peace process.

Before the referendum analysts were saying that a 'Yes' majority would give president de Klerk the necessary backing to effectively counter the violence and clean up the South African Defence forces and the police. But so far little has happened. There could be several reasons for that:

- We may be wrong in thinking that FW has the power to do anything about it.

The violence has got completely out of hand, some argue.

- He is quite simply unable to confront the hardliners within his own security forces, others would say

- The violence in many ways suits de Klerks and the NPs purpose, according another line of thinking.

The more fighting and killing amongst blacks, the weaker ANC will become.

There are strong indications of SADF/police involvement in the violence, although no one has actually been able to prove that there exists a so-called third force - as has been claimed by the ANC. And if there is one, it would probably be very hard to detect.

However there is little doubt that there are groups within the security forces and police that don't like the course of events SADF has got units that have been created and trained specifically to fight secret wars against internal and external enemies for decades. What is there to prevent them from using their skills in black townships?

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ALEXANDRA

I'd like to share one particular experience with you.

We visited Alexandra - a black township in northern Johannesburg where we were going to cover an Inkatha-funeral. Alexandra is considered to be ANC territory, but in a small section surrounding the Madala hostel, there are people who support the Inkatha.

On this particular Saturday - four days before the referendum - the Inkathas had announced that they were going to bury a member who was killed in a clash a few weeks earlier. Hundreds of Inkatha-members armed with so-called traditional weapons were bussed in to Madala. By noon there were some 20 minibusses there and a crowd of 600.

The police had so far done nothing, but move in a sizeable amount of armoured vehicles. Then they announce that the Inkatha-member would not be allowed to march down to the graveyard until they had laid down their weapons. The Inkathas refused.

Tension arose, they negotiated, fetched higher officials, kept negotiating. The 600 armed Inkatha-supporters were contained behind the fence that surrounds the hostel. Then suddenly there was a buzz, a lot of shouting, the crowd went wild, ran down the fence and then marched into a section of Alexandra which is basically ANC-dominated. The police didn't even try to stop them.

With a rattle in front of the crowd and one behind them they walked and ran through the streets killing and injuring several people on their way - without anyone stopping them. Meanwhile back at the hostel snipers started firing at the police. Reporters and locals had to dive for cover.

At the end of the day three people had been killed and a dozen others injured. Adding to huge violence related death toll in black townships.

Now the 64 dollar question is: Why in the world didn't the police stop the Inkathas from busing hundreds of armed supporters into Alexandra that day. The SADF had men from its special combat force posted at the main roads leading in to the township. We saw several of them leaning on a lamp post as we drove in.

The funeral was well announced. Everyone knew that they would be coming in from other townships. Wouldn't it have been easier to disarm 20 minibusbuses - than to confront a mob of 600 angry IFPs? We never got an answer....

DOUBLE AGENDA?

This is what every day life is like for many urban black South Africans. People live in constant fear. Back in the townships they have to leave their children while they themselves go to work in the white city centres. Often not returning until late in the evening. In a squatter area in a township called KTC in Cape Town I asked a 15 year old boy what hopes he had for the future. -Well, he said, I wish my family could move into a house that can't be penetrated by bullets as easily as the shack we live in today.

Violence may serve a purpose for the NP and possibly even boost the parties support in the short term, but it certainly isn't going to encourage investment. In the long run it's detrimental to all parties. If it actually is true that FW is unable to control the security forces, I dread to think of the possible consequences as the process moves closer to majority rule.

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The political violence obviously induced criminal violence and a state of lawlessness. Every day that passes makes the task of bringing peace to South Africa more difficult.

INTERNATIONAL FORCE

Mandela has called for an international force to end what he says is government-inspired carnage in SAs black townships. -As long as the SAP and SADF continue to be the private armed forces of the NP, so long will the slaughter of our people continue, Mandela stated.

Minister of Law and Order, Hernus Kriel, has ruled out an international force claiming that it would be impractical.

There is also mounting evidence that Renamo in Mocambique is still receiving support from South Africa - another indication that things are either out of control or that the government does have a double agenda.

New accounts from refugees, a United States intelligence report and the high concentration of Renamo attacks along the Mocambican border seem to indicate that support for the rebels is still coming from South Africa.

CODESA

With more than two out of three white voters in favour of negotiations, it's been full steam ahead for CODESA since the referendum. But still there seems to be a lot of rough going ahead.

The second plenary session is set for May 15 thru 16th. The most optimistic say they may by then be in a position to endorse several agreements. But recent newspaper reports seem to indicate that the major stumbling blocks have not been removed.

The NP has all a long called for an open-ended process, ANC wants time frames, a clear out time table. ANC is in favour of an interim government, followed by election of a constituent assembly which in turn will draw up a constitution. The Labour union (COSATU) has threatened to call a mass strike if the interim government isn't established by July.

NP also keeps hammering the issue of minority rights: The ironic will ask: What for? And they'll answer: As an award for having oppressed blacks and raped the country for 350 years - of course.

One element in this discussion is the composition of a constituent assembly. The NP wants a second house, based on regional and minority party representation - which would effectively have veto powers.

Accepting the NPs constitutional proposals would be like buying a used car already advertised as being held together with chewing gum and sawdust, argues Weekly Mail journalist Philip van Niekerk.

ECONOMY

Among whites there is obviously a notion that once the ANC gets into power - it means nationalisation and expropriation. No one can accuse the ANC of having put forward a clear cut and comprehensive study of what South Africa's economy will look like under majority rule.

However at the end of this month the ANC will stage a four day conference to debate what they call a "comprehensive set of policy guidelines". It's a follow up to last years national conference in Durban.

A 48 page discussion paper has been released which calls for a more flexible approach to economic policy - less based on an ideological framework. This must sound like music in some ears.

But at the same time the paper argues that the ANC's economic policy should include increased public sector activity through nationalisation (subject to compensation), support for trade liberalisation through GATT and a national health service - among others.

Where individuals have been deprived of land by apartheid statutes, a land claims tribunal would restore such rights "whereever feasible" - and it would include a system of compensation, the paper suggests. Many will agree that without some kind of redistribution of wealth and property - economic apartheid will live on for many decades. 90% of all wealth is controlled by less than 10 % of the population. Substantial resources ought to be available when South Africa now longer has to spend huge sums to circumvent sanctions. Freeing the country from the reigns of apartheid should also result in a generally more efficient use of all resources in the country. .

REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS

Finally, let me point out a few regional aspects. South Africa will obviously have a key role to play in regional integration and will be crucial for the future economic growth in Southern Africa. The ten SADCC countries have a population 60 million. South Africa will add another 30 million. Harmonizing the regional economies, regional trade, transport etc. will be a major task. In 1989 inter-regional PTA-trade was 4,6 %. The aim is to reach 20 % by year 2000.

But the prospect of a post-apartheid South Africa also has some unforeseen consequences for the rest of Southern Africa. Some of the transport routes that donor-countries - among them Norway - have been pumping huge amount of money into could be threatened. Particularly the Beira corridor which runs from the Indian Ocean through Mozambique to Zimbabwe.

Despite huge investments, cheaper tariffs, shorter distance, the most efficient transport system is still through South African ports/-roads /railways. Delays in goods, poor storage facilities, lack of security, poor advertising, inadequately trained labour force etc. create obvious problems for traders. .

One other interesting effect: Many african countries can expect a stronger and more critical opposition. Apartheid has been a menace to the entire continent, but to some of its leaders it has also been extremely convenient to focus attention on the "big bad guy" in the south, while suppressing internal discontent.

FINALE

Let there be no doubt: There are NO quick and easy solutions to the problems facing South Africa. I must admit that I left the country with a lot more unanswered questions than when I arrived. Getting things straight in South Africa is going to be a long and tough process.

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DEVELOPMENTS TOWARDS A NEW SOUTH AFRICA - A NEW ELECTION,
CONSTITUTION, PARLIAMENT

1 INTRODUCTION

Gentlemen,

Thank you for this opportunity to speak to you about South Africa and in particular about the current developments in my country - developments concerning the creation of a completely new political dispensation in a post-apartheid era. More than ever, South Africa is experiencing a time of history-in-the-making and I consider myself privileged to speak to you about this very exciting, yet complex process.

The biggest news and the centre of political attention in South Africa at the moment, is of course, the negotiation process with its focal point, namely the Convention for a Democratic South Africa, or CODESA, in short. I am going to approach the topic given to me by mainly focusing on CODESA as this is the main source of ideas and decisions concerning new elections, constitution and parliament.

Just to put the whole discussion into perspective, I will start off by giving a brief background on the process that gave birth to CODESA. Hereafter I will give attention to the declaration of intent Which was signed at the first plenary session of Codesae this will give you an idea of the guidelines along which the whole negotiation process started. Thirdly, I will give attention to the proposals currently on the table with reference to the opinions of the most important participants. In my conclusion I will attempt to give an overview on how radically the situaion in SA changed during the past two years.

2 BACKGROUND - BIRTH OF CODESA

The road to CODESA was set in motion on February the 2nd, 1990 when the State President, Mr FW de Klerk, in opening Parliament, announced the unbanning of a number of organizations, including the African National Congress (ANC), Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and the South African Communist Party (SACP), as well as a wide range of other initiatives to create a more relaxed and stable political climate. Mr de Klerk's announcements of February 2 were followed by the release of the ANC leader, Mr Nelson Mandela, on February 11. '

The months following saw further actions in the building of a new South Africa. These included the release of security prisoners, described by the ANC, PAC and others as political prisoners, the return of exiles who had left South Africa for political reasons and the ending of the national state of emergency as well as the start of "talks about talks", first at Groote Schuur in Cape Town on May 4, 1990 and then at the Presidency in Pretoria on August 6, 1990.

A further important step in the normalisation of the political climate was when the De Klerk Government piloted legislation through Parliament at the beginning of 1991 to repeal several laws which were seen as the cornerstones of apartheid, including the Group Areas Act, the Land Acts, the Population Registration Act and the Development of Black Communities Act. Against the background of these developments, political parties and organizations began preparing for the substantive negotiations that would be necessary to draft a new constitution for South Africa. It was generally acknowledged that the two main players, at least for the present, would be the ruling National Party (NP) and the African National Congress. It was also generally acknowledged that, as negotiations proceeded, alliances would be

forged, reconsidered and, in some cases, replaced by other group formations.

Throughout the process leading up to Codesa a major obstacle to a negotiated resolution, has been the continuing violence in the country, starting in 1984 with opposition to the establishment of the tricameral Parliament and to the policies of the Government. It was characterized in the years immediately following by black-on-black violence as Black political groups became engaged in a power struggle for the support of the masses in expectation of a new political and constitutional dispensation. In the more recent past it was joined by violence resulting from a white backlash to the Government's policies of forging a democratic, non-racial South Africa. Concerned about the ongoing violence that was tearing South African society apart at the very time that expectations were running high for national reconciliation, 29 political, State and trade union organizations, among them the Government and the African National Congress, signed a National .Peace Accord in Johannesburg on September 14, 1991 and agreed to establish a National Peace Commission and Peace Secretariat for the resolution of conflict. The meeting at which the accord was signed, was so far the most representative to have been held in South Africa. Although the Accord did not result in an end to the Violence, it was a significant step towards creating the right climate for negotiations.

On November 29 and 30, 1991, parties and governments from a broad range of the political spectrum, met at a hotel at Jan Smuts Airport to make plans for full-scale negotiations. This meeting reached an agreement to launch full scale negotiations for a new constitution on 20-21 December 1991. Here it was agreed that the forum would be known as the Convention for a Democratic South Africa.

At the moment 19 parties or groupings, with 12 delegates each,

are represented at Codesa and attempts are continually made to draw in those still outside the process, namely the PAC on the left and the CP on the right.

3 CODESA I - DECLARATION OF INTENT

With the convening of CODESA I - that is the first plenary session of Codesa - a greater degree of clarity concerning constitutional development and points of view, was attained. From the declaration of intent which was signed by the important political parties/groupings/administrations (except two) represented at CODESA, it appeared that there is, in principle, agreement with respect to a wide range of aspects. These include a commitment to an undivided South Africa, a single nationhood, a common citizenship, freedom, equality and protection of all irrespective of race, colour or conviction, the rejection of discrimination and domination, a free and open society based on democratic values, the protection of the dignity, values and rights of all South Africans, and the promotion of economic growth and the creation of a constitution with the following aims:

t A united, democratic, non-racial, non-sexist state in which sovereign authority will be exercised over the territory as a whole;

t A constitution that shall be the supreme law and monitored by an independent, non-racial and impartial judiciary;

t A multiparty democracy with regular elections held on the basis of universal adult suffrage on a common voters' role with the right to create political parties and to join them; in general the basic electoral system shall be based on proportional representation;

t A separation of powers between legislative, executive and judicial authorities with appropriate checks and balances;
 x Respect for language, cultural and religious diversity of the people of South Africa;
 t Universally accepted human rights, freedoms and civil rights, including freedom of religion, speech and association, which shall be protected in a Bill of Human Rights and by a legal system which will guarantee equality before the law.

4 HOW CODESA WORKS

As you will see on the pamphlet I handed out on the structure of Codesa, the forum consists of a Management Committee, Daily Management Committee and Secretariat under which five Working Groups handle different aspects to be negotiated. These Working Groups are:

- 1) Creation of a climate for free political participation and the role of the international community.
- 2) General constitutional principles, the constitution making body/process
- 3) Transitional arrangements/interim government/transitional authority
- 4) Future of the TBVC states
- 5) Time frames and implementation of Codesa decision.

Each Working Group consists of a representative. of all the various participants at Codesa.

An important decision at Codesa I concerned a decision-making structure with the aim Of keeping as many parties in the debate as possible. An official decision-making procedure, providing for 3 variables, was set out in the Standing Rules of procedure

adopted at Codesa 1. Here the rules of "consensus" and "sufficient consensus" were introduced. In order to prevent the process from reaching deadlock, a second state of agreement was added: "Agreement by sufficient consensus will have been reached when consensus is of such a nature that the work of the Convention can move forward effectively."

All Working Group decisions are passed through the Secretariat to the Management Committee who prepare the agreement for adoption at Codesa's next plenary session, scheduled for May 15 and 16. Failing any form of agreement, disagreeing participants have the right to record their objections or dissent. For example; the Inkatha Freedom Party and the Bophuthatswana delegations took the latter route when they declined to sign the Declaration of Intent.

5 PROPOSALS ON THE TABLE AT THE EVE OF CODESA II

The best way of making sense out of the complexity of proposals at hand, will be to separate them along the lines of the tasks allocated to the five Working Groups. For the purpose of this discussion, I will mainly focus on Working Groups 1, 2, 3 and 4, and will only briefly touch on and 5.

WORKING GROUP 1, dealing with the creation of a climate for free political participation, has a very worthwhile agenda. As violence continues to rage in various areas throughout SA and division and mistrust - dating back from years of apartheid - stil exist in our society, this Working Group has a very important task. Issues on which agreement has been reached concerns the role of the security forces, the electrenic media and the involvement of the international community.

The group tentatively agreed that the security forces should be under the control of a transitional government. The security

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forces would fall under the control of a multi-party preparatory committee/sub-council.

It was also agreed that Codesa should recommend members for an independent regulatory body for the electronic media to ensure a more objective representation of information.

The group agreed that a Codesa task force would invite members of the international community to ensure that elections for a transitional government were fair.

Also on the agenda is the finalisation of matters relating to the release of political prisoners, the return of exiles and their families and the successful implementation of the National Peace Accord. This Working Group also emphasizes the need for an improvement in socio-economic conditions, the fostering of a spirit of tolerance among political parties and the importance of informing and educating people in respect of political tolerance, the working of democracy and the processes of Codesa.

WORKING GROUP 2, dealing with constitutional principles, used the principles entailed in the declaration of intent as a foundation and added further detail concerning the structure of the government. It was agreed that the government shall be structured at national, regional and local levels. At each level there shall be democratic representation and appropriate and adequate legislative and executive powers to enable it to function effectively. Further was added that a new constitution should provide for effective participation of minority political parties consistent with democracy.

Concerning national government, the major parties agree that there should be a parliament composed of two houses. The first house (lower house) should be constituted in a proportional manner while the second house (upper house) should make provision

for the representation of the different regions. However, the nature of representation, the number of regions and the powers that authorities at this level of government enjoy are still to be debated. The NP's view, that the second house must protect the specific interests of minorities could cause problems. The same applies to the decision-making powers which the party desires to allocate to this house.

A second chamber (or upper house) and the recognition of regions thus make the territorial division of governmental functions important. The majority of the participants at Codesa are in favour of a federal system. For the other participants; for instance, the ANC, the regions should not have original powers, but should be subordinate to the central government.

The biggest stumbling block for consensus in this Working Group is the differences of opinion concerning the proposal for an elected Constitution-making body. The NP and Inkatha is against it, while the ANC strongly advocates that this body should be elected.

WORKING GROUP 3 has to the task of negotiating transitional arrangements.

There is a wide degree of consensus among the participants concerning the need for transitional arrangements and an interim government. There are, however, differences concerning the precise nature and form of such arrangements.

For certain players an interim government, as a forerunner to a constituent assembly, represents an important phase in the process of constitutional change.

Apparently a breakthrough was reached at Codesa on 4 March 1992 regarding a new transitional executive structure. Both the

Government and ANC in essence envisage the appointment of several multi-party transitional bodies invested with executive authority to take joint control of specific areas of government, as an important first post-Codesa phase. Such committees/councils would be instrumental in seizing executive control of strategic areas. Areas that are most likely to be put under multi-party control are: preparations for elections, the security forces, finance and local government. Disagreement exists on the exact amount of power of these councils and what they should be called, has taken place, but the bottom line for both is that they should be Codesa-appointed executive bodies which would have to be given constitutional legitimacy through parliamentary legislation. This will introduce the first phase of transition.

This past Wednesday we received information that agreement has still not been reached in Working Group 8.

The proposals for the second stage of interim government are less vague. The long-term future of the country is dealt with in five points. Point one says Codesa will agree to a legislative instrument (in effect an interim constitution) in terms of which a constitution-making body will be established. Point two says Codesa will consult the TBVC states in drafting this document. Point three says Codesa will agree on a set of general constitutional principals (many of which have been provisionally agreed upon at Codesa). Point four says the interim body will draft a new constitution by a "special majority" and act as an interim legislature. Point five says Codesa will agree on special mechanisms to ensure that a national assembly adopts a new constitution within a specified period of time.

WORKING GROUP 4 discusses the future of the independent homelands of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei or the so-called TBVC countries.

It announced on Tuesday (5 May) it has formally accepted that the TBVC states should have full participation in the process of Transitional Arrangements and Constitution-making, including elections. It said in a document that the Group has accepted that participation would take place on the understanding that Transitional Arrangements would impact on the TBVC Territories in the same way they impacted on the rest of South Africa.

Participation would be arranged in such a way that the votes in a national election would signify support for or against re-incorporation. "The results of such an election shall constitute a sufficient test of the Will of the people".

The document stated that SA citizenship would be restored to citizens of the TBVC States immediately after the testing of their Will. -The Bophuthatswana Government reserved its position on the document, agreeing only that it has no objection in principle to the re-incorporation of the TBVC States in South Africa. The Chairman of the Working Group and senior sources within the ANC and the Government hailed this as a breakthrough. The proposals of WORKING GROUP 5, that deals with time frames and implementation of Codesa decisions, is directly dependent on the decisions of the other Working Groups, and therefore it has not finalised any proposal yet.

5 CONCLUSION

To sum up, it seems as if the immediate future of South Africa will be a process in two phases: firstly, either an elected or Codesa-appointed transitional executive body, and secondly, the actual drafting of the new constitution. The proposal for interim government before elections (being discussed by Working Group 3) and the proposal for an interim legislature after elections (Working Group 2) provide a crucial focus for the

debates to come. They provide the foundations for future discussions and a framework for the future political nature of SA. '

The proposal on how the country will be governed before elections revolves around the precondition that the political playing field is level and that the climate for political participation is free. All other proposals flow from this precondition.

When I started, I mentioned that political development in South Africa is a complex process. I used the word "complex", not merely to cover for myself if I did not completely succeed in explaining the situation, but because the complexity has occurred to more than only myself: one official at CODESA complained that decisions have not been taken in a one-by-one fashion and he likens the process to "a blob of grey matter", confusing for delegates, never mind the public. However, he notes that the most important fact is that the "blob" is growing, meaning that the process is dynamic and involving more and more issues.

This past Monday, the fourth of May, was a very important political anniversary for South Africa. Exactly two years ago, the world watched amazed as the erstwhile sworn political enemies, the South African Government and the ANC, gathered in the historic surrounds of Groote Schuur to look for a way of finding each other. It was called "talks about talks", and it signalled hope that the impossible might happen - that South Africans might be able to reach a negotiated settlement instead of fighting each other to the death. Talks about talks are now a long way behind us, and real negotiations have been under way for some time. These latter are a confusing and frustrating business, and their end is not yet in sight. But it is better to consider the distance that has been travelled, rather than bemoaning the length of the journey ahead-

In the two years since the Groote Sohuur Minute, South African political life has "normalised" to an extraordinary degree. The fact that ordinary people express impatience and irritation with Codesa is in itself an indication that it has become accepted as a part of normal political life. The fact that the majority of South Africans still have no vote is certainly abnormal - but who would have believed, in 1989, that within such a short space of time the majority of whites would have voluntarily conceded that one person, one vote was inevitable, and necessary? By this I refer to the outcome of the Whites-only referendum, by which the State President asked for a mandate to continue the negotiating process, resulting in a 68,7% yes-Vote from 85% of the White voters.

If anything, the Codesa process will become more fraught and confusing in the coming months. It is a fact that 11th-hour problems are the most serious, precisely because they are about the most serious issues - the bottom lines. But the framework is intact. There simply is no rational alternative, as Codesa's participants realise, and the only way to go is forward. In 1989, going backwards was a deadly serious option. Monday, therefore - in spite of the violence and the obstacles still to be negotiated - we had something to celebrate.

You as representatives of the Church community in Norway, has been very critical of apartheid and all it entailed in the past. Personally, I have appreciation for that - I think the continual criticism of the wrong moral foundation of apartheid, coming from influential groups like you, eventually made an impression on the propagators of apartheid. One cannot ignore the fact that it was amongst the factors that contributed towards the changes in South Africa. My plea to you today is not to stop looking critically at South Africa. Go on applying the same moral standards to a future Government in SA and speak up for the principles that will ensure prevailing righteousness and

democracy. However, more than anything else, we need your prayers, because South Africa still has quite a distance to travel to become the peaceful, prosperous country we would all like to see.