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South Africa:

## Prospects for peace and democracy

Political Report of the Anti-Apartheid Movement

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# Anti-Apartheid Movement Political Report South Africa: Prospects for peace and democracy

## Introduction

As we enter the final quarter of 1992, South Africa stands at a turning point. Will the country take the path to peace and democracy? Or will it sink deeper and deeper into crisis and chaos as the National Party tries to impose a form of 'neo-apartheid'?

South Africa has now reached the stage at which the possibility of a new democratic constitution is on the agenda. This is due to the sustained sacrifice and struggles of the country's anti-apartheid forces together with the peoples of the region combined with the pressures of international solidarity. Through these actions the question of apartheid moved high up the international agenda during the 1980s and the resultant diplomatic pressures helped to compel the Pretoria regime to the negotiating table.

However these pressures were not sufficient to convince the ruling National Party of the necessity of a genuinely democratic constitutional order for South Africa. Moreover new countervailing forces aimed at preventing the democratic transformation of South Africa - especially those resulting from political violence - went on the offensive and are capable of destroying the entire 'peace process'.

With South Africa now at a turning point, its future will depend substantially on both the extent to which the African National Congress (ANC) and the wider democratic movement can strengthen internal pressures and on the form and content of international pressure.

For the Anti-Apartheid Movement this means that we continue to face the challenging task of mobilising in Britain and internationally for the maximum possible support for those struggling for peace and democracy in South Africa. Above all else this means generating the most effective forms of international pressure. The current crisis provides the opportunity to rekindle the hope and expectations which united the world when it celebrated the release of Nelson Mandela and to translate this into practical action in support of the cause of peace and democracy in South Africa.

## The negotiating process in crisis

The new year 1992 opened in a spirit of hope as a result of the successful convening of the First Plenary Session of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa) on 20/21 December 1991. Following on from the signing of the National Peace Accord on 14 September 1991, Codesa promised to provide the forum which would ensure conditions in which negotiations could flourish, and agreement be reached on a fair and democratic mechanism to draw up a new constitution, and on transitional arrangements for the governing of the country.

The convening of Codesa, in itself, represented an important breakthrough for the ANC and other democratic forces. An All-Party Congress was the goal which the ANC had set in its January 8th Statement of 1991 and it was achieved without having to accept President de Klerk's agenda. However the absence of both the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) and the Azanian People's Organisation (Azapo) meant that the country's anti-apartheid forces were not fully represented.

The spirit of hope following the first plenary session of Codesa turned out to be excessively optimistic. The obstacles to peace and democracy proved to be far more intractable than many had believed. Within six months popular confidence in the negotiating process had all but evaporated, largely due to the escalating political violence and the intransigent positions of the De Klerk regime. The situation was further aggravated by the deepening economic crisis facing the country which was resulting in the further impoverishment of large sections of the black community.

It is important to recall that the internationally agreed basis for a political settlement in South Africa had been laid down in the United Nations (UN) Declaration adopted by consensus at a Special Session of the UN General Assembly in December 1989. The Declaration envisaged a negotiating process for the stated purpose of transforming South Africa from an apartheid state to a united, non-racial and democratic society. Moreover the Declaration laid down specific conditions to be met so that negotiations could take place in a climate free of violence and repression.

The significance of this UN framework was that it represented a fundamentally different approach to that envisaged by the Pretoria regime. The regime wanted what were purported to be 'negotiations' but which were in reality intended to secure the co-option of representatives of the black community into the structures of the apartheid state.

The convening of Codesa, in the presence of observers from the UN, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the Commonwealth and the European Community, appeared to provide the negotiating framework envisaged in the UN Declaration and it was warmly welcomed by the international community. The Declaration of Intent adopted at the First Plenary Session stated 'that South Africa will be a united, democratic, non-racial, non-sexist state in which sovereign authority is exercised over the whole of its territory'.

However Codesa was to flounder over the primary issue on its agenda, namely the question of the constitution making body for a new South Africa. The ANC advocated a sovereign and democratically elected Constituent Assembly to draw up a new

constitution, whilst the National Party and those grouped around it – mainly administrations and ruling parties in the bantustans – insisted, using a number of guises, on what amounted to a white veto over change.

Bona fide negotiations will only be able to move forward when the De Klerk regime is compelled to concede the need for a genuinely democratic settlement, and in particular an elected Constituent Assembly, and acts accordingly. This will mean that it will have to abandon its plans for a second chamber with veto powers; constitutionally entrenched powers for so-called regional government, including the bantustans in a new guise; and a long drawn out transitional period.

However, following the Boipatong massacre of 17 June 1992, the question of political violence assumed such significance that it posed an even greater threat to the negotiating process. Popular confidence in negotiations had been all but destroyed within the black community due to the failure of the De Klerk regime to act to end the violence, and evidence that it was being deliberately perpetrated by the regime's forces. Unless this issue is seen to be addressed effectively it is difficult to envisage how negotiations can regain sufficient popular support for them to produce meaningful results.

## Political violence

The root cause of political violence in South Africa is the system of apartheid. Since the period of colonial conquest successive white minority regimes have been maintained through violence and repression, culminating in the so-called 'total strategy' of the 1980s when the Pretoria regime resorted to the most brutal forms of repression and aggression to defend apartheid.

Although, since February 1990, violence and repression now take different forms, they continue to be the ultimate weapons available to the apartheid system to prevent the democratic transformation of South Africa. It is within this context that the political violence, which now threatens the very future of South Africa, needs to be understood.

Since F.W. de Klerk assumed the State Presidency, political violence has taken the lives of over 7,000 people. A state of fear now exists throughout South Africa. Although much of the violence is seemingly random and apparently has no explanation, evidence collected by human rights and legal bodies points to a pattern of violence involving assassinations, massacres, train attacks, etc. This evidence confirms that it is the ANC which has paid the highest price both directly and indirectly. For example during the 28 month period from January 1990 to April 1992 the Human Rights Commission (HRC) recorded 119 political assassinations of which 88 were activists or supporters of the ANC or linked organisations.

Despite the revelations of 'Inkathagate' which exposed the covert funding of Inkatha by the SADF, there has been no diminution of violent attacks associated with Inkatha. Again, according to the HRC, of 49 massacres recorded between July 1990 and June 1992, 34 were carried out by people linked with the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), 3 by vigilantes, and four by security forces. Only six massacres were linked to people associated with the ANC.

However, in many respects, the wider political price paid by the ANC has proved to be even higher. The 'state of fear' means fear of the consequences of participating in political activities, fear of demonstrating allegiance to the ANC, and especially fear of joining the ANC. Even more fundamentally the political violence has given rise to widespread alienation and frustration within the black community especially in Natal and the townships in the Transvaal. There are signs that this could develop into outright hostility to the negotiating process, which would pose a special threat to the ANC because of its continued commitment to a negotiated settlement. The disruption of the ANC's local structures by the violence accentuates this problem since it hampers communication between its leadership and activists.

It is this pattern of political violence which has convinced the ANC that the situation is best characterised as a war against the black majority. Central to the conflict must be the apartheid war machine and its dirty tricks operations. With 50% of the Rand 10 billion South African Defence Force budget allocated to a special secret fund, and widespread evidence of security and police force operational involvement, the violence can be seen as being deliberately instigated. By successively exploiting localised tensions, conflicts can be fomented which then take on a dimension of their own. By the very nature of such operations, conclusive evidence of direct security force control is limited. But the objective is clear; it is to undermine the ANC and other democratic forces and thus prevent democratic change.

In unleashing this war against its own population, South Africa's military machine has drawn extensively on its own experience in Mozambique and Angola where it funded, armed, equipped and controlled Renamo and Unita with such deadly and destructive consequences as well as on the operations of the DTA in Namibia. The fact that Pretoria has had to resort to such methods within its own borders is a sign of weakness and not of strength.

Faced with such a conflict, the ANC has spearheaded campaigns for peace through locally based community defence structures together with the promotion of local, regional and national structures aimed at conflict resolution. Central to these are the National Peace Committee and National Peace Secretariat set up under the National Peace Accord signed on 14 September 1991.

The National Peace Accord was an impressive framework aimed at bringing about conditions of peace. But, like Codesa, it failed to meet up to expectations because it has been effectively sabotaged by the De Klerk regime and its allies in the bantustans. Moreover it was further undermined by the regime which failed to take effective measures to end the violence such as the banning of dangerous weapons and phasing out the hostels.

Linked to the structures of the National Peace Accord is the Commission of Inquiry regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation, commonly known as the Goldstone Commission. After a faltering start the Commission has begun to focus on some of the central issues, such as the role of the SADF and police; the role of hostels; train attacks; etc, as well as producing a devastating critique of the police investigation of the Boipatong massacre. The Commission is now producing an impressive series of recommendations which, if acted upon, could play an important role in curbing the violence.

Despite their limitations it has been the structures set up as a consequence of the National Peace Accord which have provided the framework through which the international community has sought to contribute towards an ending of political violence. The teams of observers being sent by the United Nations, the Commonwealth and the European Community are to work in co-ordination with the National Peace Secretariat whilst additionally the EC are seconding experts to work with the Goldstone Commission's investigative task forces. Similarly the ANC and other democratic forces remain committed to ensure the effectiveness of these structures because of the importance they attach to securing conditions of peace.

## **The National Party – resisting democracy**

Much of the confusion surrounding South Africa flows from the lack of a clear and shared analysis of the policy objectives of President de Klerk and the ruling National Party. In certain quarters the De Klerk regime is viewed as representing no real break with the previous four decades of National Party rule. Just as Vorster warned of the need to 'adapt or die' and Botha advocated 'power-sharing', now De Klerk continues to defend white minority supremacy but from different trenches. In contrast, there are many who believe that on assuming the Presidency, De Klerk concluded that there was no alternative for South Africa other than a settlement with the ANC. Whilst he remains wedded to the concept of power-sharing, he can be reluctantly compelled into accepting the democratic transformation of South Africa provided that the pressures are maintained.

The events of the past twelve months provide conflicting evidence. In September 1991 the National Party published its constitutional proposals which made clear that its objective was 'power-sharing'; in effect the National Party sought to guarantee itself a permanent role in Government through a constitutionally entrenched coalition. Other elements of the proposals likewise showed that it was still far away from accepting a democratic model for a future South Africa.

President de Klerk has also sought, during this period, to underpin his plans for 'power-sharing' by the systematic restructuring of the state apparatus in order to minimise the influence of democratic control. This has also been reflected in new fiscal policies and the privatisation of key state industries. All these measures have been designed to minimise the capacity of a democratic government to address the legacies of apartheid.

Mirroring these developments have been even more sinister moves at a strategic level. The regime has embarked on a programme of re-equipping and modernising the SADF. It is restructuring the command structure of the police to minimise the capacity for national control. It is privatizing Armscor to likewise prevent democratic control over arms production. All these moves appear designed to deny a democratically elected government the capacity to exert effective control over South Africa's military and security complex. This has the most serious implications not only for South Africa but for peace and security in the region as a whole.

The National Party entered Codesa with the objective of securing sufficient support from amongst the bantustan and tri-cameral parties at Codesa for a constitutional

order which would ensure continued white control over the levers of political and economic control. However the convening of Codesa was seen, both within South Africa and internationally, as heralding the start of the transformation of South Africa into a new non-racial democratic society. Soon the National Party saw the initiative shifting dramatically towards the ANC, as positions of the democratic movement increasingly influenced both the agendas and decisions of the Codesa Working Groups.

Sensing that he was losing electoral support amongst the white constituency to the ultra-right and at the same time his control over the negotiating process, President de Klerk called the 'whites-only' referendum of 17 March 1992. During the referendum campaign De Klerk re-affirmed his commitment to 'power-sharing' with the publication of the National Party's so-called 'bottom-line' on 10 March. This spelt out its basic constitutional requirements including 'representation of more than one party in the executive as well as in the presidential college'; 'a second house of parliament which is specifically composed to safeguard the interests of minorities'; 'strong devolution of power to autonomous regional, local and neighbourhood government structures'; 'control over schools for those cultural groups which require this'; etc. These requirements, F.W. de Klerk stated, will '*ensure the maintenance in our country of the time honoured norms and standards of South African society.*'

The 'yes' vote in the referendum – whilst presented both inside South Africa and internationally as a vote for negotiations – was interpreted by De Klerk simply as a mandate to resist proposals which would lead to a new genuinely democratic constitution and he pursued this agenda, which was to have devastating consequences, in the period up to Codesa 2 and beyond.

When the second Plenary Session of Codesa convened on 15/16 May 1992 there were high expectations that agreement would be reached on an interim government and a body to draw up a new constitution. However the National Party had different objectives. Its primary concern was to ensure that the decisions at Codesa 2 guaranteed a 'white-veto' over change. It therefore insisted that a 75% majority would be necessary to adopt key elements of the constitution; that powers for regional government – the bantustans in a new guise – would be permanently entrenched; and that there would be a second, non-elected, chamber with veto-powers. Such positions were clearly unacceptable to the ANC and other democratic parties represented in Codesa, since it would have enabled the National Party to impose a constitution of its choice. Codesa 2 was therefore deadlocked and matters were referred to its Management Committee, where no progress was made.

During this period there was also a marked escalation of political violence – for example during the period January to May 1992, there were 175 attacks on commuter trains in the Transvaal resulting in 168 deaths and 312 injuries. A climate of fear was being created which reached new heights with the events at Boipatong on the night of 17 June when 45 residents of the township were brutally massacred by residents of a nearby Inkatha-controlled hostel.

Tension was further heightened by De Klerk's provocative action in visiting Boipatong the Saturday following the massacre and the unprovoked murder of unarmed demonstrators by the police later on that day. Other moves by De Klerk including his

presence in Ulundi, the capital of KwaZulu on June 16 (the anniversary of the Soweto massacre), the enactment of new repressive legislation and the unilateral convening of a session of the tri-cameral parliament for October 1992, all served to demonstrate the arrogant and authoritarian nature of the De Klerk regime.

In these circumstances the ANC had little choice other than to suspend its participation in the negotiating process. It did this at a meeting of its National Executive Committee on 23 June 1992 when it set out 14 demands which the regime had to address if bona fide negotiations were to resume. It is important to see this decision within the context of the deadlock in the negotiations. The ANC's negotiators had already reported back on Codesa 2 to its membership at its National Policy Conference at the end of May. The regime's intransigence so angered delegates that they had approved an escalating programme of mass action for peace and democracy.

The response of De Klerk to the crisis following the Boipatong massacre further demonstrated his lack of democratic credentials. Instead of seeking a solution, he threatened to exclude the ANC from the negotiating process and embarked on a crude anti-ANC campaign reminiscent of those conducted by his predecessors. At the same time he accelerated his efforts to construct an alliance around the National Party largely consisting of bantustan rulers and some of the parties in the tri-cameral parliament. Ironically this grouping was meeting on 7 September, ostensibly to discuss possible 'federal constitutional models', when the Bisho massacre took place – a massacre carried out by the troops of Brigadier Gqozo, one of De Klerk's closest allies in building an anti-ANC alliance.

The massacre at Bisho illustrated the dilemma facing De Klerk. Repression in the bantustans and political violence serve to weaken the ANC and therefore help create conditions in which he can seek to impose a 'neo-apartheid' constitution. But such repression and violence serve to isolate him internally and externally and reduce the prospect of the National Party being a significant political force in a democratic South Africa.

## **The bantustans – the cornerstones of apartheid**

The strategy of the National Party has increasingly been based on breathing new life into the bantustan structures. Created out of the 'reserves' which served as a pool of cheap labour during the rise of the mining industry from the late 19th century, the bantustan policy served two purposes. It enabled apartheid apologists to propagate the myth that the African majority had democratic rights in their 'homelands', but it also created local political elites and related bureaucracies in the bantustans which had a vested interest in the maintenance of apartheid.

In response to the Soweto uprising of June 1976, the bantustanisation of South Africa was accelerated with the Transkei being declared 'independent' in October of that year, to be followed by Bophuthatswana (December 1977), Venda (September 1979) and the Ciskei (December 1981). The six other bantustans, Gazankulu, KaNgwane, KwaNdebele, KwaZulu, Lebowa and QwaQwa were further strengthened although, for differing reasons, they continued as so-called 'self-governing' states.

As the mass movement against apartheid gathered momentum during the 1980s, all the bantustans experienced the popular expression of democratic rights. In some cases this was met with brutal repression, but in others led to the overthrow of pro-apartheid bantustan leaders or their re-alignment towards the democratic movement.

The question of the re-incorporation of the bantustans into South Africa has always been fundamental to the democratic transformation of South Africa, but it has assumed an added significance since the convening of Codesa. The bantustans were all represented at Codesa 1; the so-called 'independent' states by their administrations and the others by their ruling parties. However amongst these representatives were a number which were fully aligned with the positions of the democratic movement, most notably KaNgwane; KwaNdebele; Transkei; Lebowa; and Gazankulu.

In the opposing camp were the bantustan leaders who had a vested interest in the maintenance of the system, especially Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, and the ruling party in KwaZulu – the IFP. Whilst accepting, in principle, the re-incorporation of the bantustans into a united South Africa they envisage a form of 'federal' constitution. Under this model, South Africa's new constitutional order would be based on a revised structure of bantustans. It was the determination of the National Party to entrench these so-called regional structures in any interim constitution which was one of the key reasons for the deadlock at Codesa 2.

## **Mass action for peace and democracy**

The decisive force which has brought about the progress recorded during this period has been popular mass action by the democratic movement. Such action has not only taken the form of highly publicised national initiatives but there have been numerous locally based actions relating to community issues including land rights, wages, employment, etc as well as locally based initiatives against violence.

It was the strength of the united mass action against the introduction of VAT in early November 1991 which created the necessary pressures for the convening of Codesa. The country was brought to a halt for two days in response to the call by Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) and the National Council of Trade Unions (Nactu), backed by the Patriotic Front. The Patriotic Front Conference, convened by the ANC, PAC and Azapo had taken place at the end of October 1991 in Durban – although disagreements over the basis for unity led to Azapo withdrawing on the eve of the Conference. The Declaration adopted by the Conference was seen to provide the basis on which the great majority of the country's anti-apartheid forces could be represented in negotiations aimed at establishing an interim government and an elected constituent assembly. However when pre-Codesa negotiations took place at the end of November, the PAC was unable to secure support for positions which it regarded as of fundamental importance and therefore withdrew from the negotiations and subsequently refused to participate in Codesa.

With the prospect of rapid agreement at Codesa during the first months of 1992, mass action at a national level received a lower priority. However with the deadlock at Codesa 2, the ANC's Policy Conference at the end of May 1992 agreed a comprehensive programme of escalating mass action. The first stage of the mass action was on June

16 when strike action brought most of South Africa to a standstill. With the Boipatong massacre the following day, mass action took on a new dimension with protests throughout South Africa during July, culminating in the massive general strikes of 3/4 August and mass marches including the march on Pretoria on 5 August.

The programme of mass action organised by the ANC, within the framework of the alliance with Cosatu and the SACP, demonstrated the extent of the mass popular support for the ANC's positions and the capacity which the ANC and its allies had to bring the country to a halt. The popular response to the general strike was greatly enhanced by the deepening economic crisis facing South Africa and the successful linking of political and economic demands by the ANC and Cosatu. The business community, fearing the prospects of escalating industrial action, moved on the eve of the 3/4 August general strike to defuse the situation by drawing up with Cosatu a draft Charter and Programme for Peace Democracy and Economic Reconstruction. This would have involved a one-day closure of business by joint agreement between employers and unions. Although the regime initially appeared sympathetic, De Klerk apparently intervened to prevent endorsement of the draft Charter. De Klerk may have calculated on a poor response to the ANC's appeal or that the mass action would lead to violence which would discredit the ANC. Neither was to happen and so the regime found itself on the defensive.

With the De Klerk regime on the defensive, the ANC decided to place greater emphasis on the need for free political activity within the bantustans. The first major protest march was planned for 7 September at Bisho in the Ciskei. The tragic murder of 29 ANC demonstrators on this march by members of the Ciskei Defence Force under orders from officers on secondment from the SADF, further intensified the crisis.

## British and international policy

The crisis within South Africa following the deadlock at Codesa 2 and the Boipatong massacre also generated a major crisis for British policy. In the period since the release of Nelson Mandela the thrust of British policy has been to 'reward' President de Klerk. It has actively promoted the end of South Africa's international isolation and the lifting of sanctions, despite Britain's endorsement of the UN Declaration on South Africa, which stressed that there should be no lifting of sanctions measures until there was 'profound and irreversible change'. The effect of the relaxation of these external pressures was to allow De Klerk greater scope to determine the nature and extent of change in South Africa.

Although during 1991 some pressures were exerted by the international community, especially by the European Community, for the release of political prisoners, over the return of refugees, and to end the violence, very little effort was made to promote and encourage the negotiating process.

During the first few months of 1992 this trend continued with the European Community moving to lift two packages of sanctions. Firstly in January two EC economic sanctions, the bans on gold coins and iron and steel products, were ended when the Danish Parliament lifted its veto over their relaxation. Then, following the 'whites-only' referendum, on 6 April the EC lifted its oil embargo – and Britain also ended its

commitment to the Commonwealth oil embargo. However moves by the UK to secure agreement over the lifting of the EC's nuclear ban and other EC strategic sanctions imposed in September 1985 failed.

This relaxation of governmental sanctions was reflected by similar moves in the banking and commercial sectors. South Africa had broken out of its isolation in the international capital markets when it successfully negotiated its first public bond issue in September 1991 (lead managed by Deutsche Bank for the 'Republic of South Africa'). Likewise there were similar moves by importers of South African goods, with even the Co-operative Wholesale Society lifting its ban in response to the 'yes' vote.

However the banking community, on the whole, in Britain and the US continued to be reluctant to invest in South Africa without further political progress and clearer signs of political and economic stability.

In many respects the most disturbing trend has been that in the military, nuclear and security spheres. Although international embargoes covering the import and export of arms, nuclear collaboration and bans on the export of strategic equipment remain in force, including the UN Security Council's mandatory arms embargo, there have been numerous breaches of these restrictions. Moreover the UN machinery to enforce the arms embargo, which was never very effective, is now largely inoperative. These developments assume a special significance in the light of the regime's strategy to prevent effective future democratic control over the military and security forces.

Moves to lift further sanctions were halted following the deadlock at Codesa 2. However the initial response of Britain, the EC and the USA to the deadlock was characterised by remarkable complacency and indifference. This was even the case immediately following the Boipatong massacre. It was only when the ANC President, Nelson Mandela, signalled his intention to suspend participation in negotiations that the west intervened, and then to pressurise the ANC not to break off negotiations. However as the destructive consequences of the crisis became clear and pressures mounted, there was a small but significant shift in British policy.

Within South Africa, the ANC and the wider democratic movement had already signalled the need for greater international involvement if the negotiating process was to be kept on track. Nelson Mandela, during a visit in early April to Alexandra township, where he witnessed the consequences of a particularly brutal massacre, made an emotional call for international monitoring of the violence - a move which was backed at a special OAU meeting in Arusha on 28 April. The ANC NEC went further at its meeting on 23 June when it issued an 'Appeal to the International Community' urging it to 'compel the De Klerk regime to bring violence to an end and to commit itself to solutions based on internationally accepted democratic principles'.

The first major breakthrough, following this Appeal, came in July 1992 with the convening of the UN Security Council at the request of the OAU. Addressed by the Presidents of the ANC and PAC, as well as some of the parties represented at Codesa, the Security Council decided to send a Special Representative of the Secretary-General to South Africa. Cyrus Vance was appointed to the post and he visited South Africa for ten days at the end of July. He reported back to Secretary-General Dr Boutros Boutros Ghali who published a report on 7 August. This led to the adoption of a

further resolution on 17 August, which authorised the Secretary-General to send a team of observers to South Africa.

Although this fell far short of the proposals which they had put to Cyrus Vance, the ANC welcomed the resolution as a positive step forward. The Report of the Secretary-General and the 17 August resolution also addressed many of the demands which the ANC had made at its NEC meeting of 23 June, including the release of political prisoners and action to end the violence. The first contingent of observers flew out to South Africa in mid-September to work in co-operation with the National Peace Secretariat.

At the same time economic pressures were building up on the De Klerk regime, in particular, its lack of access to international financial markets. In August 1992 the para-statal Escom abandoned plans to launch a new bond issue in September, stating that such a move would have to await the establishment of an interim government. These pressures became even more intense following the Bisho massacre giving rise to speculation that South Africa would face problems in the re-negotiation of its international debts due to take place during 1993.

Meanwhile, the OAU, the Commonwealth and the European Community made preparations to monitor the violence and peace process. The OAU, which had sent its first mission to South Africa in May and was instrumental in securing the Security Council debate, drew up plans for its own monitoring team. Likewise the Commonwealth established a team which was due to be in place in mid-October. After much delay the European Community sent its Troika Mission to South Africa on 2/3 September led by Douglas Hurd, when it announced plans for an observer team of 15 as well as 5 EC observers to work with the newly established investigating task forces set up by the Goldstone Commission.

The Troika Mission also reportedly insisted on firm action by the De Klerk regime to end the violence. As Douglas Hurd wrote on behalf of EC Foreign Ministers: 'we urged them to ban all dangerous weapons in all areas, to deal effectively with the problems posed by the township hostels and to convert the police from a force whose job it is to root out the enemies of apartheid to a force for the protection of the citizen.'

A number of these moves reflected a shift in British policy. Following the Boipatong massacre the British government ruled out any form of international monitoring of the violence and simply insisted that the ANC return to the negotiating table. But as the crisis deepened it took a more realistic position and increasingly exerted pressure on the De Klerk regime in line with the ANC demands, as well as endorsing monitoring of the violence by the UN, the Commonwealth and the EC.

Linked to the moves to establish teams of monitors and observers, has been a much more active intervention by the international community as a whole in the entire negotiating process. For example, the UN Security Council is to receive reports each quarter on progress towards a united, non-racial and democratic South Africa. This new approach was reflected by the protests following the Bisho massacre including statements by the UN, the EC, and Britain that Pretoria was ultimately responsible and should bring the Ciskei security forces under control.

## The role of international solidarity

The events of the past twelve months have demonstrated the important role which the international anti-apartheid movement can play in supporting the struggle for the democratic transformation of South Africa.

In the Anti-Apartheid Movement's 1991 Political Report, the main priorities for international solidarity during this period of transition were identified as:

- how best to support the peace process now underway in South Africa and to prevent it from being aborted;
- how to help most effectively to ensure that the peace process leads to a genuine end to apartheid and the creation of a united, non-racial, non-sexist and democratic South Africa;
- how to prepare, during this process of transition, for the maximum possible on-going solidarity with the people of South Africa and the region as a whole in their struggles to overcome the consequences of apartheid;
- how to ensure a capacity to respond effectively should the peace process breakdown irreparably.

These perspectives continue to provide the overall framework for anti-apartheid activity in Britain and internationally.

The Anti-Apartheid Movement has demonstrated a proven capacity during this period to respond effectively in order to help prevent the peace process from being aborted. When President de Klerk took the dangerous and high-risk strategy of calling the whites-only referendum, the AAM responded with an Emergency Campaign in defence of the negotiating process. The aim of the campaign was to make clear that should the referendum lead to a slowing down or reversal of the negotiating process then South Africa would face unprecedented international isolation. Likewise, in the wake of the Boipatong massacre, the AAM responded by promoting action in Britain and internationally, aimed at compelling the De Klerk regime to respond positively to the demands put forward by the ANC.

From this experience it is clear that continued international pressure is essential if the peace process is to lead to a genuine end to apartheid and the creation of a united, non-racial, non-sexist and democratic South Africa. Such pressures must involve the maintenance of governmental and people's sanctions including financial sanctions, in order to secure rapid agreement on the establishment of an Interim Government and an elected Constituent Assembly as envisaged in the phased programme for the lifting of sanctions agreed at the ANC National Conference in July 1991.

The most immediate priorities continue to be the need to end the violence and create a climate of free political activity throughout the whole of South Africa including the bantustans. Continued international pressure will be essential so that comprehensive measures are adopted to ensure such a climate is created as well as to secure the implementation of agreements already reached. Moreover it will be necessary to press for more effective programmes of international monitoring should the existing teams prove unable to achieve the desired objectives.

However as progress is made towards creating a climate of free political activity, further pressure will be required to secure the rapid implementation of the agreements reached over an interim government, an elected constituent assembly and the re-incorporation of the bantustans.

## **The Southern African dimension**

The advances which have been achieved in South Africa would have been impossible without the sacrifices and solidarity of the governments and peoples of the region. The role of the Front Line States in their support for the freedom struggles in Zimbabwe, Namibia and now South Africa may well be judged by history as being without precedent. The price they have paid and continue to pay in human suffering and economic damage is incalculable.

Exploiting the vulnerability of many of the states in the region - a vulnerability which is a direct consequence of South African aggression and destabilisation - the United States, in particular, is seeking to shape the future direction of the region on the basis of its vision of a 'new world order'. This has found expression in certain of the policies pursued by the IMF and the World Bank in the region.

A key target has been Angola where it poured in hundreds of millions of dollars in support of Unita in advance of the country's first multi-party elections. The mandate given to the MPLA by the Angolan electorate when it went to the polls on 29/30 September was a powerful rebuff of this strategy - as well as of Pretoria which had armed, equipped and trained Unita. However, the prospects for peace and national unity were seriously threatened by Jonas Savimbi's refusal to accept the election results.

In Mozambique the future remains uncertain, with Renamo refusing to implement the ceasefire agreement, due to take effect from 1 October. The untold human suffering resulting from the war waged by Renamo is now being compounded by the devastating famine which is hitting the entire region.

At a regional level, however, some progress is being made. The Southern Africa Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) is being transformed into the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) to promote greater regional co-operation.

Namibia, the youngest of the independent states of the region, celebrated two years of independence in March 1992. It achieved an important breakthrough with the agreement to establish a joint administration of Walvis Bay which is due to become operational shortly and it also reached a settlement with Pretoria on the debt inherited from the South African illegal administration.

## Recent developments

By September 1992 pressures on the De Klerk regime were mounting. Throughout August there had been almost continuous mass action with the prospect of it escalating further. The growing disquiet of the international community had been conveyed personally to President de Klerk by two of South Africa's closest international allies, Britain and Portugal, during the EC Troika Mission at the beginning of the month. At the same time all economic indicators were telling the regime that the country was heading for economic devastation, unless political and economic stability could be assured. These pressures escalated dramatically in the aftermath of the Bisho massacre and lead directly to the meeting between Nelson Mandela and President de Klerk on 26 September. An agreed 'Record of Understanding' provided the basis for the ANC to return to the negotiating table.

The 'Record of Understanding' revealed significant shifts by the De Klerk regime on most of the demands of the ANC, especially the release of political prisoners, bans on the carrying of dangerous weapons, and a programme for hostels. In doing so the regime had to abandon its attempt to link the question of the release of political prisoners to its insistence on a general amnesty to cover crimes committed by its police and security forces. Moreover the regime acknowledged the right of the ANC and others to organise mass action and agreed in principle to an Interim Government and an elected Constituent Assembly.

However the continuing deterioration of the country's economic position is also increasingly influencing the ANC's negotiating position. Real fears exist that the economy is now spinning in a downward spiral at such a rate that it will make a return to overall stability an almost impossible prospect. As a result the ANC is determined to speed up the negotiating process so that rapid agreement can be reached on the establishment of an Interim Government - a stage which is anticipated will generate renewed confidence both within South Africa and internationally.

Clearly the agreements reached on 26 September, if honoured in letter and spirit, open the way to rapid progress towards the establishment of an Interim Government and an elected Constituent Assembly to draw up a new constitution for a united South Africa. It is, however, essential that the De Klerk regime is judged by its deeds and not just its promises. It is also important that the virulent attacks on these agreements by Chief Buthelezi are not used as an excuse by the regime to renege on them.

## The way forward

The Anti-Apartheid Movement now faces a very difficult period. The immediate crisis following the Boipatong massacre may have passed with the decision of the ANC to return to the negotiating process. However it is essential that international pressure is sustained in order to ensure that the agreements reached between the ANC and the De Klerk regime are implemented. We therefore need to win the maximum possible support for the policy positions of our Movement, of which the most urgent and important are:

- to support the peace process and in particular:
  - the need for a climate of free political activity throughout *all* South Africa, including the release of all political prisoners and the repeal of repressive legislation;
  - an end to political violence including the implementation of *all* the measures proposed by the ANC, the UN Secretary-General and Justice Goldstone together with effective international monitoring;
  - rapid implementation of agreements to establish an Interim Government, an elected Constituent Assembly, and the re-incorporation of the bantustans;
  - and throughout this period to campaign against violence and repression in order to ensure a climate for democratic change.
- to ensure that the elections for a Constituent Assembly are 'free and fair' including mobilising support for the ANC and other democratic movements so that they have the necessary resources to contest the elections;
- to keep up the boycott and other campaigns for economic and financial sanctions and to strive for the maintenance, monitoring and strict enforcement, and the universal application of all sanctions and other measures aimed at isolating apartheid South Africa until there is agreement by the ANC and other democratic movements that they should be lifted;
- to campaign for the maintenance, monitoring, strict enforcement and universal application of all military, nuclear and other strategic sanctions until a democratic government is in power, including the need for the effective operation of the UN Security Council 421 Committee on the arms embargo;
- to step up solidarity with the Front Line States and with the newly formed Southern Africa Development Community;
- to work for further changes in British policy so that it makes a decisive contribution towards the creation of a united, non-racial and democratic South Africa and in the development and re-construction of the region as a whole;
- to promote these policies where appropriate in co-operation with other Anti-Apartheid Movements and anti-racist movements within the European Community, the Commonwealth and the United Nations.

## Conclusion

The challenges facing the Anti-Apartheid Movement are immense. We must ensure that we have the human and financial resources for this critical stage. This means that we must continue to address how best to fundraise, win and maintain membership and ensure the maximum participation in our work of our local and regional structures, our national and local affiliates as well as all our individual members.

We must also reach out to new sections of the population who can be won to support our efforts to help in the building of peace and democracy throughout Southern Africa.

We must stand firm and loyal to our principles and campaign for them. We must not relax until peace and democracy triumph.

*This report was adopted unanimously by the National Committee of the Anti-Apartheid Movement at its meeting on saturday 3 October 1992.*