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held in Zambia in June 1985. In very widely publicised statements, the ANC billed this Consultative Conference as an event in which it will receive a mandate from the people. The people, however, could not get there. Only approved delegates could get there, so no mandate could have been given to them there. But even if one puts this consideration aside, there is evidence from the Conference documents themselves that it was not really a Consultative Conference at all. Nowhere is this fact so blatantly apparent as it is in the paper which I want to look at with you

today. It is the Report of the Commission on Cadre Policy, Political and Ideological Work, Internal Commission Report, and Commission on Strategy and Tactics. These Commissions were

working commissions during the Consultative Conference. They were given the Movement's basic documents and had to work on them and then to make recommendations to the full session of the Conference.

The whole document is too lengthy for me to go through in every detail and I am therefore going to concentrate on the 'Commission on Strategy and Tactics' section of the document. This Commission had before it the Strategy and Tactics document adopted by the 1969 Morogoro Conference. What was known as the 1980 Green Book which, however, was not made available to the Conference, and a new draft Strategy and Tactics document which the Commission was called on to consider. These were the main documents which the Commission was asked to look at and they also had other documents such as Planning for a People's War.

In their report to the Conference, the Commission says - and I quote from their report:

"a) A document which embodies our strategy and tactics and which is intended to provide guidance for some years to

come, requires the most careful and widespread discussion by all levels of our Movement. In the case of the document which was before us, there has been no

circulation to the regions and even Conference delegates saw it for the first time a few hours before proceedings began. It should be noted that when our Commission convened, the overwhelming majority of its members had not yet managed to read the draft, and we had to adjourn for some hours to enable them to do so. We concluded that we would be reporting to a Conference which itself had no real possibility of preparing effectively for such a detailed discussion.

b) There was yet another reason why we decided not to attempt to place an amended draft before you. We are of the opinion that a document such as this should not only serve as a basic guide to all levels of our organisation, but also as a means of spreading our analytical message to all sectors of the broad front of our struggle to racist rule. We considered that the style of the document was not suitable for both these purposes. We considered the

formulations in the document needed to be examined more carefully for the purpose of presenting its content in a style and language which is more accessible to a wider audience. This is a task which the Commission considered was impossible to do justice to in the time available."

Mr. Speaker, Sir, Honourable Members, what kind of a Consultation could this have been. Tactics and strategies give rise to the most crucial of all considerations in South Africa. It is not on end goals which Black South African politics flounders. It is on the question of tactics and strategies. Yet here we have a Consultative Conference in which the Commission on Tactics and Strategies simply could not do its work as you have just heard from the Commission's own pen. The report then goes on to state: "We therefore recommend that the task should be entrusted to the incoming NEC which should avail itself on the opportunity of circulating an amended draft for the kind of thorough discussion throughout our ranks, which such a document merits."

Mr. Speaker, Sir, Honourable Members, I made the point earlier on in this speech that it is tragic that the old ANC became leadership heavy and that it did not develop its on-the-ground structures. That is an idiom which has persisted abroad in the ANC Mission in Exile. It is the idiom which is totally in tune with a leadership which dictates what people should think. Here we see evidence of just how cleverly the Conference was manipulated, and how it was made impossible for the Conference itself to pay the detailed attention to the question of tactics and strategies. It is always at the very top of our priority list when we consult the people.

Not only was there insufficient time for the Commission to do its work, but in the Commission's report to the Conference they also

say: "Apart from the above, there was a broad agreement with the general approach contained in the draft Strategy and Tactics/ document." But then Mr. Speaker, Sir, Honourable Members, the Commission on Strategy and Tactics makes the astounding observation: "It was, however, felt that a number of important questions which bear on our strategic approaches had been omitted and would have to find a place in a revised document. The

Commission then devoted most of the discussion to these questions." And here we have the Commissioners stating that they were given documents, on which they did not have the time to work and had in the end to refer their mandate back to the National Executive Committee, and that they then devoted most of its discussion to questions which were not contained in the documents they had before them.

Mr. Speaker, Sir, Honourable Members, I go on to quote from the document:

"Our discussion on strategy and tactics (more particularly in the area of armed struggle) must be informed by two basic realities about our situation. Since there is unanimity among us that there can be no destruction of the regime leading to the capture of People's Power without some form of revolutionary violence, we have to recognise two fundamental characteristics (one negative, the other positive) which, in combination; are very unique and special to our situation."

We must remember, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, the ANC Mission in Exile has now for close on a quarter of a century promoted the armed struggle as the primary means of bringing about radical change in South Africa and that the Commission on Strategy and Tactics at the ANC Consultative Conference goes on to say: "We have never had, we have not got, and we are unlikely to ever have a rear base in the classical sense." The admission, Mr. Speaker, that they have an army with no rear base. The only army, Mr. Speaker, I have ever heard of with no rear base is an army running from an enemy who has destroyed its rear base. An army with no rear base is a homeless army.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, this is where the censure which the South African Government exercises over political matters, and the unlawfulness of quoting banned organisations, is so terribly destructive. Black South Africans have been led to believe down through the last two and a half decades, that the ANC Mission in Exile has powerful bases from which it will bring forth its liberation army. Black South Africans need to know this vital fact which we are now looking at. They need to know that the ANC Commission on Strategy and Tactics has informed the Consultative Conference that: "We have never had, we have not got, and we are unlikely to ever have a rear case in the classical sense."

The Commission Report then goes on to state: "So when we begin to examine the concept of a people's war, guerilla activity, guerilla

zones, problems of arming the people, creating, sustaining and supplying a people's army in the initial stages, we must accept that all these objectives have to take off and grow within the

limitation of the absence of an effective rear base with a friendly border."

Mr. Speaker, I hope that Honourable Members will begin to have a clearer insight into some of my objections to the armed struggle as a primary means of bringing about change. Members know that I come from a line of descent in which my forefathers were proud generals and military advisers to successive illustrious Zulu kings and that I am a descendant of the Zulu Kings warriors in their own right. Members knew that the Zulu people know more about war than anybody else in Africa. King Shaka's fame spread across the very length and breadth of the continent and he was a superb tactician and strategist. I have beating in me the blood of these tacticians and strategists and I ensure every Member that nowhere in the

history of the world is there an example of an army assuming power in a country which has not had a rear base from which to spring attacks.

I have always argued another thing, Mr. Speaker, Sir, Honourable Members, about the armed struggle and it is that the violence which erupted in South Africa is the violence of desperate and frustrated poverty. It is a violence of a people driven beyond the extremities of human endurance. The violence in South Africa has not been led by the ANC Mission in Exile. They have ridden on the back of violence which they did not themselves establish and violence over which therefore they themselves have no control. Having noted the absence of any real rear base, the Commission then goes on to say that: "The key to the future unfolding of our strategy and tactics is, on the one hand, to compensate for and to find ways of overcoming the weakness of the absence of a rear base. On the other hand, we have to exploit to the maximum our strength, which is the people in political motion. In this connection we should remember that when we think of revolutionary violence, we must not restrict ourselves only to the organised presence of MK combat units. We must also pay attention to the way in which the people's revolutionary violence (organised or spontaneous or semi-spontaneous) relates to the unfolding of the revolutionary struggle as a whole. In short, we must find ways of harnessing the combat potential of the people, whether in the kind of small combat units referred to in the NEC's recent call on the nation, the creation of larger para-military formations in the shape of workers' and people's self-defence units, etc. We must also be ready at the right moment, to provide guidance and lead the people in mass actions involving revolutionary force, such as land occupation, factory occupation, people's control over townships in the face of constituted authority, etc. Our capacity to play an effective role at this level will depend largely on our combat presence and the

availability of minimum armouries of weapons."

Here we have from the ANC Mission in Exile Commission on Tactics and Strategies direct confirmation of what I have said so often. The ANC Mission in Exile has to run behind the violence which is flaring in South Africa and frantically seek to claim a place in it. This is a very far cry, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, from the message which the ANC Mission in Exile sends out to the whole world

that it is they who have produced the violent situation in South Africa.

Mr. Speaker, I have also long said that the ANC Mission in Exile is making the terrible tactical error of attacking the enemy where it is the strongest. The Commission says and I quote:

"The present disparity in strength between the enemy's forces and our own determines the protracted nature of the struggle in which we need to reduce the enemy's resources, reserves and

endurance, whilst gathering our own strength to the point where we are capable of siezing power."

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Now hear this, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members: "Some bantustans are strategically located along or near the borders lending themselves as routes for penetrating the rest of the country. Yet others are run by brutal puppets like Sebe and Mphahlele, who do not hesitate to employ the most savage repressive measures against the people." No wonder, Mr. Speaker, that the ANC Mission in Exile pulled out all stops to exploit the weaknesses which they saw in the leadership of Mr. Mabuza in KaNgwane. Elsewhere in the report, they say: "Clearly the bantustans should also be either the targets of our movement's efforts to render South Africa ungovernable. However, the scope and pace of our efforts will be determined by our movement's organised strength in these areas."

The Commission then goes on to say: "One of the questions most extensively debated was whether we should seek to advocate the overthrow of the bantustan administrations or whether we should focus exclusively on the struggle against Pretoria. If the former applies, it would involve the establishment of (if only for a short period) a radical administration with sympathies for the liberation

movement. Would such an approach weaken our direct policy of unconditionally rejecting the legitimacy of the bantustans? It was generally felt that we should be flexible in our approach." The

ANC Mission in Exile has in fact shown this flexibility. They concentrate on wooing Mr. Mabuza and they concentrate on trying to destroy me.

The Commission, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, paid special attention to my position. They reported: "The openly counter-revolutionary role that Chief Gatsha Buthelezi has assumed was noted. Buthelezi, unlike Mphahlele, cannot be dismissed as a mere puppet of the racists." And then, Mr. Speaker, the report goes straight on to say: "He projects the illusion of autonomy from the enemy and pretends to pursue national aims." This sentence, Mr. Speaker, illustrates so well how difficult it is for a National Executive Committee based in Lusaka and spread thin in responsibility around the world, to keep in touch with political reality at home. Mr. Speaker, every Member of this Assembly works with me and every Member of this Assembly is deeply aware of just how autonomous in fact we are from the South African Government. Every Member of this Assembly knows that we are the gravest stumbling block which Mr. P.W. Botha has to deal with, just as we were the gravest stumbling block his predecessors had to deal with. Every Member of this Assembly knows that I enact the will of the people and am totally immovable to every force that successive National Party Governments have exerted on me to bend to their political desires.

The terrible misassessments that are made of my position lead the

Commission to report to the Conference that: "His counter-revolutionary role must be exposed and we must work to win over his supporters and deprive him of his social base." We find ourselves

faced with a political fact here, Mr. Speaker. The ANC Mission in Exile can manipulate Mr. Mabuza because he is weak but they have to

attack me because I am powerful. The political fact I am referring to Mr, Speaker is that the ANC victories wherever they take place, and to the extent they take place, take place amongst the weak. They have rotten bed-fellows in this country, Mr. Speaker. They have llily-livered fly-by-night puppet surrogates, Mr. Speaker. They rely on their yes men, Mr. Speaker. They do not know the meaning of the power of the people because they do not recognise it when they see it in Inkatha and the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly. If they cannot even recognise the power of the people, how in hell are they ever going to harmonise the power of the people.

This Consultative Conference took place in June 1985 and since that time, we have experienced an upsurge of ANC Mission in Exile energy being spent on us. The ANC Mission in Exile dream of establishing no-go areas for us in KwaZulu and Natal. They indulge in political character assassination, and Members know that all and sundry have been invited to assassinate me by the way the ANC speak of me as a snake which must be hit on the head, and by all the other poisonous attacks they make on me.

Throughout the report of the Commission on Strategy and Tactics, emphasis is exclusively laid on Party political advantages. There is no talk whatsoever in it on the broad national responsibilities a Black liberation movement has to reconcile the people of South Africa and to encourage the development of the country's institutional life which is so vital for democracy. Speaking about the working class they say that 1969 Strategy and Tactics document of the Morogoro Conference "stressed at that time was the observation that the military and political consciousness as a revolutionary task of workers will play no small part in our victory and the construction of a real people's South Africa." There, Mr. Speaker, we have the terrible confusion in the minds of the ANC Mission in Exile which equates the good of the State with the good of the Party. We work for a new South Africa in Inkatha and in the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly. We work for the country we love. The ANC Mission in Exile narrow-mindedly works for themselves and they are looking simply at the working class as cannon fodder to be used in the achievement of their Party political goals.

I quote, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, when I read: "We recognise that the working class is the key force in our revolution and this find expression in the three fundamental detachments of our struggle - i.e. the broad mass democratic movement, our underground and our army." The Commission goes on and on analysing the situation in terms of Party political gain. They see a South Africa in ferment and all their tactics and strategies revolve around their deepest need which is somehow to become part of the ferment and dictate the events as they opportunistically involve themselves in that which they did not initiate. Again, Mr. speaker, Honourable Members, I will illustrate the extent to which the ANC Mission in Exile propaganda which says it has the government on the run and that it is near the final victory, is

false propaganda. The Commission reports to Conference that: "The Commission argues that it is high time that the movement applied the principles of military combat work to the question of armed struggle. These principles have been ignored too long even though they are a key element in the training of our cadres. Military combat work involves the preparation of combat forces of the revolution according to specific principles, methods and structures. Military combat work derives from the experience of the Bolsheviks in three revolutions and the experience of revolutionary movements throughout the world."

The Commission says that the guidelines of military combat work are composed of three components. Firstly there is the advance combat formations which are the nucleus of the revolutionary army and the Commission sees the Umkhonto we Sizwe as its nucleus. The second principle is the people in arms who are "prepared and trained by the vanguard formations" and thirdly, elements of the enemy forces "ready at the decisive movement to side with the revolutionary forces."

How far, Mr. Speaker, is the State's armed forces ready to go over to side with the ANC Mission in Exile forces in the Commission's own thinking? That is precisely how far they are off victory. Mr. Speaker, this is a crucial point I am making about the falseness of the ANC's claim that it is ready for a final onslaught and victory. This Commission, Mr. Speaker, says that "Military combat work builds up the revolutionary army of the people, wages an all-out war against the enemy, works to disintegrate the enemy armed forces by undermining them from within and whilst engaging in combat utilises all forms and methods of struggle, involving all the progressive forces of the people, to a stage where power can be siezed by a nationwide insurrection."

Mr. Speaker, how ready is South Africa for the final victory which the ANC Mission in Exile dreams of? They themselves propagate the view that that victory is now in sight but when you look at a working document like this, the one we are looking at today, and you read the next sentence of the Commission's report to the Conference, then you know just how empty the ANC Mission in Exile propaganda is. This next sentence is: "Unless the above is attended to as a matter of strategic necessity, we are afraid we will continue to remain distanced from the internal situation and therefore unable to properly enter the fray." Mark these words, Mr. Speaker: "...We are afraid we will continue to remain distanced from the internal situation..." The Commission, reporting to conference here knows that the ANC is: "distanced from the internal situation."

In talking about people's power in townships, it says: "...The Commission noted that the NEC of the ANC had issued a call to the nation which included a call for the creation of people's committees in every Black area which could become the embryos of