

Alliance Campaigns Committee
Discussion Document

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CAMPAIGN FOR PEACE AND DEMOCRACY
CHALLENGES IN THE NEW PHASE

INTRODUCTION:

The ANC and the rest of the alliance entered Phase N of the Campaign for Peace and Democracy with the challenge to step up the all-round offensive to achieve the 14 demands around constitutional and peace-related issues. Envisaged were: unprecedented massive actions such as city occupations and the PAYE Campaign as well as actions on socio-economic demands and free political activity.

In developing this programme, a number of lessons from previous campaigns were noted. On the positive side: demonstrating our support and capacity; revitalisation of grassroots

structures; exposing the false glorified image of De Klerk and the NP: international intervention and so on. On the negative side: tendency to treat the campaign as series of events; lack of clarity on perspectives; etc.

It was also noted that the regime's strategy in this period consisted in intensified Low intensity Conflict to undermine the campaign; shifting centres of violence to outlying regions such as Ciskei and Natal and intensified attempts to divide and weaken the liberation movement. _

CHANGES IN THE SITUATION:

The most dramatic change in the objective situation has been the adoption of the Record of

Understanding between the regime and the ANC. Real palpable victories have been scored as a result of the mass campaign: basic elements of a Constituent Assembly, political prisoners, hostels and dangerous weapons. More than any other development, this has demonstrated the effectiveness of our actions and has the potential of reinforcing popular confidence.

However, it is clear, a few weeks after the Summit, that the regime has set in place a strategy to undermine these achievements.

5.1. By shifting centres of violence to areas such as Natal and Ciskei and intensifying destabilisation in quieter areas such as NOFS, Far Northern Tvi and Transkei, the regime seeks to undermine the capacity of the democratic movement on a wider front.

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5.2. The campaign waged by the IFP against the Record of Understanding and aimed also at complicating the whole negotiations process enjoys the support of at least certain powerful forces within the NP/government establishment.

5.3. This campaign has created the platform for the mobilisation of a wide array of right-wing forces to create a third front to delay and even reverse the transition both from within and outside the negotiations terrain, and to set in motion a programme to subvert democratic transformation in the future.

5.4. Basing itself on these developments, the regime now seeks to renege from the agreement on hostels. Progress on the issue of dangerous weapons has been strikingly slow.

The question has been posed whether there is a united approach on the part of the NP leadership on these issues. No doubt certain individuals and structures in the senior ranks of the NP and the state machinery are more directly involved in counter-mobilisation. But it might be too presumptuous to believe that, in so far as this approach

benefits the common interests of all elements within the state, those reported to be taking

a more positive approach would deliberately work against this strategy. Most probably, the differences are of a tactical nature, relating more to the balance between approaches rather than a divergence of strategic perspective. Yet the differences do impact on a strategic issue in the current phase: whether or not there is to be a decisive movement forward.

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RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS:

One of the major changes in the situation is that negotiations are resuming in earnest. This has got serious implications for the campaign for Peace and Democracy.

7.1. Our successes in mobilisation were registered in a period in which negotiations had been suspended. These successes do not necessarily entail an appreciation of a balanced combination of negotiations and mass action (see below). The danger of demobilisation in the period of resumed negotiations is real.

7.2. Ideally, the ANC/government talks should result in many strategic gains for the liberation movement. But there is also a strong possibility of deadlocks on some crucial questions. Further, the liberation movement might make a number of compromises aimed at facilitating the whole transition to democracy. All these factors will impact directly on the programme of action.

7.3. Indications are that, when multi-party negotiations resume, new forces, including the extreme right-wing will come on board. Essentially, this is to be welcomed. But complications will arise at two levels:

1. there will be a concerted attempt from both the extreme right and the so-called extreme left to review the structure (and even venues) of the negotiating body; and

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these forces, especially the extreme right, will seek to review all the agreements thus far sealed in Codesa, e.g., the Declaration of intent, constitutional principles, phases of the transition, iG Phase 1, etc.
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as our tactics - needs to be elaborated further. This applies to the two months leading t
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the assumption of office by the new administration and the period thereafter.

CHARACTER OF THE CAMPAIGN:

Whatever the changes in the situation, the principle underpinning our approach to the transition remains: the masses are the key. in the final analysis it is our strength and, particularly, our links with the people, their continued involvement in the process, and their confidence in the liberation movement which will determine progress or otherwise in the transition.

A number of issues have been identified around which the campaign should be conducted in the coming period as well as their relevance to the strategic perspectives:

10.1. The demand for speedy movement to an interim Government and a Constituent Assembly should occupy a central place in all our actions.

10.2. Free political activity, including actions against repression and violence and for the levelling of the media playing field, is crucial both for the negotiations process and the forthcoming elections.

10.3. Socio-economic issues are close to the hearts of the people. and the Asinamali Campaign aims at engaging people in improving their conditions, empowering them on a whole range of fronts including education, heusing and health, and positioning the alliance positively for elections.

10.4. There are other campaigns being taken up at regional level with a variety of aims related to the above, e.g., the march to the Mozambican border.

10.5. It is crucial for us to claim and celebrate our victories, e.g, the release of political prisoners, international intervention.

In the past few weeks, a number of weaknesses have already started to manifest themselves in this phase of the campaign:

1 1 .1. After the Record of Understanding and the consequent (and objectively necessary) de-scaling of mass action, enthusiasm for mass mobilisation has dissipated both at national and lower levels. A new sense of demobilisation has set in. This is partly a result of the inherent tension between mass action and progressing negotiations. But it is also a reflection of:

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confused about what they could and could not do after the Summit; and lack of creativity and initiative on the part of grassroots structures outside the realm of big marches and rallies.

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11.2. There has been a tendency to make a fetish of one form of action in a given campaign. Thus, in the public consciousness - as a result both of our statements and behaviour as well as media distortions - the campaign for free political activity in the bantustans has been reduced to marches to the bantustan capitals.

11.3. There is a manifest failure to bring on board or at least engage broader society in our campaigns. The SACC initiative on Mmabatho has been more or less parallel to ours; and the Asinamali Campaign still has to involve the broad anti-Vat structures.

11.4. More thorough assessment is starting to reveal that the strengthening of organisation that we have boasted about after the previous phases might in fact be ephemeral. Situations might differ from area to area, but the organisational weaknesses before the campaign seem to persist in many areas.

11.5. Overall planning has stagnated at the level of the original plans as adapted, without due regard to the changed and changing environment.

V. CAMPAIGN ISSUES:

12. The Campaign for Peace and Democracy is aimed at achieving precisely these objectives through a process which shifts the balance of forces in our favour. But what is a campaign? Failure to answer this seemingly simple question in a coherent manner lies at the core of our woes. Mass action is thus seen as an end in itself, and besides, viewed

as a series of events. It is crucial that when we engage in a campaign a number of inter-related questions are addressed:

12.1. Identify the issues around which a campaign is being waged as well as the mission or objectives to be achieved.

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12.2. Work out the variety of forms of action that are "One mission.

12.3. Identify and engage the forces needed to fulfil the objectives and seek to widen this all the time.

12.4. Work out a process of building up the campaign, including the crests and troughs in the waves.

12.5. Arising out of such a methodology, it will be possible to employ an integrated strategy to achieve our demands. Mass action will form a crucial part of this; but, where practicable, so will negotiations at national, regional and local levels and a systematic

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engagement of NPA structures and international monitors. We shall thus be able to bring all our strengths to bear on the adversary.

What are the immediate campaign issues? These have been correctly identified by our structures (see 10 above). Given the new situation, consideration needs to be given to the following:

14.1. Measures needed to address the problems in the implementation of the Record of Understanding.

14.2. An integrated mass approach to the iekgotla and its aftermath, including:

' celebrating and defending the achievements that will emerge from it;

addressing whatever deadlocks might emerge;

continually shafting the balance of forces to advance our bottom-lines,

minimise the nonconflict impact of Ccmprcmicoc otn

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various sectors of the alliance should directly engage the potential base of counter-revolution: civil service, army, etc; rather than trying to reach out to them through compromises simply with the NP.

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14.3. A campaign to prevent prolonged negotiations around a new negotiating forum and the reopening of Codesa agreements.

INTEGRATED APPROACH:

As stated earlier, our campaigns should be seen as more than just programmes of mass action. Each campaign should entail a variety of strategies and stages, in order to have a

maximum impact.

15.1. From the outset it is necessary to ensure clarity among our activists and members about the issues at stake.

15.2. A campaign should be consistently "legitimised": the appreciation of the moral correctness of our demands by ourselves does not necessarily mean that this is the case among the wider public. Besides, all kinds of distortions will be made by

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our adversaries to undermine it.

15.3. We should win over other forces and strive to capture the imagination of the public at large. For instance, it is difficult to understand why up to now we have not had the NPC and international observers pronouncing on the lack of free political activity in Bop, Ciskei and KwaZulu; and why in the midst of our Asinamali Campaign we have not creatively exploited the Banana Board furore.

15.4. Central in each campaign is the question of the role of the primary structures of an organisation, the branch. How does it ensure mass action in the locality, rather than simply taking part in or mobilising for regional marches and rallies;

. . how does it use the campaign to strengthen its links with the local community;

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how does it, through a specific campaign, assert its presence and leadership where it is based: how does it (and the region) raise funds; etc?

15.5. Negotiations - either at national, regional or local level or a combination of all three - should form part of any given campaign. On the socio-economic front, the setting up negotiating forums for housing, local government, etc is opening up new possibilities which need to be exploited.

15.6. A campaign should include working out the role of NPA structures and international monitors in advancing the democratic demands: both to empower the people and improve the work of these structures. For instance, does it make sense that UN monitors should seem helpless to intervene in Bop and other bantustans!

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An integrated campaigns approach presupposes integration in the structures of the ANC and other components of the aiiiance: campaigns, elections, organising department as a whole, negotiations, peace process, at: White the NWQNEC, CC and CEO should play this role, new creative ways of linking these structures up even at an operational level is crucial. This should be combined with a greater emphasis on regions and branches/Iocais when summits and campaigns fora, etc are planned: we need more regional summits and fora than national ones, and the latter should be few and far between.

immediate CHALLENGES:

Ail campaigns should be reviewed in the context of this approach. More immediately, a number of areas should be concentrated on for the period before year-end:

17.1. Election date: as short-hand to address all constitutional issues such as CA, iG and negotiations process as outlined above.

17.2. Free political activity - as above with emphasis on:
Bop - local actions, other activities as in V above and the march;

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Ciskei - attempts to secure regional peace accord meeting, engaging business and other forces, start preparing for another march; etc and

' SABC - refer.

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17.3. Asinamati Campaign linked to the festive season to highlight problem of high food and other prices.

17.4. Building broad coalitions: revival of the CASMAC initiative and engaging other forces such as business and churches.

Organisational questions: 5 w. .__

As indicated earlier better co-ordination is required among various departments. But more immediately, it is doubtful, given the intimate link between the campaigns structure and elections commission, whether their separation is still justified.

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18.2. Need to urgently work out a programme of regional forums/summits - involving branches - to address the integrated approach and ensure its implementation on the ground.

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