P.5

NO.723

8:29

31.JAN. 20083

M h andd Quandlerin

Donwald PreÃ@sly

Six recent by-election results reconfirm the African National Congressâ\200\231s dominant position in South African politics â\200\224 but also shiow its percentage of the vote is falling as opposition parties are gaining support ADemocratic Alliance by-election victory in the eastern suburbs of

- Tshwane (Pretoria) may mark a turn-~

around in the party $\hat{a}\200\231s$ nosediving fortunes over the past year. The DA may have the Inkatha

 $a\200\234$ Freedom Party partly to thank for

its comfortable victory, which it tnumphantly ponltsd out was in the

(R

 $-1 \hat{a} \ 200 \ 224 \ 6.2 \ -03$

area where Ernie Jacohson, the New National Party leader on the Tshwane council, lives.

The result cofues on the back of the appointment of two DA members to the KwaZulu-Natal cabinet by IFP

.Premier Lianel Mtshali.

Another recent IFP boost for the

DA was their joint move to dissolve

the KwaZulu-Natal legislature, fore-

 \hat{a} 200\234ing the ANC to drop a controversial

clause from a national Jaw allowing foor-crossing in the provinces.

Last year, when the DA lost:a by- .

election in Betbal to the tiny Freedom Front, it wnspacuuusly did nol

.

bolding more medxa events than :]]

other political parties combined. The party lost about 300 councii-

lors during the floor<crossing period

when about half the NNP council-

lors elected under a DA ticket in 2000 returned to their previous home. It was also muddied by the Jurgen Hacksen party fundmg imbroglio.

The DA pushed its share of the Tshwane vote from 56,65% in 2000 to

69,47% (3237 votes). \hat{a} \200\235 L The election attracted significantly

fewer viobers \hat{a} \200\224 28,249 of the elec-

- torate compared with 54,61% $\hat{a}\200\224$ but had the highest poll of the six recent \hat{A}°

Cal A R e X X I N RARE A AR A A KRR RS A"â\200\231Aâ\200\231Qâ\200\231L AROICSIPRYI e Ly

â\200\230by-elections. The ANC retained aseat in werd 60 of Johanuesburg on a 2,2% poll
The DA victory was mirrored by the - performance of the IFP in KwaZulu-Natal It held-a ward in Umlalazi (Eshowe) where it pushed its percentage of the: vote from 85,5% in 2000 to0 91,95% (955 votes). The ANC received 8,05% of the vote (84 votes) compared wnhlz%]ast time.
In addition to' its poorer showing in

" Eshowe, the ANC won 71,3% (786
- votes) in Rustenbuxg, down from

79,1% in 2000. Standing for the first tirue, the DA achieved 25,6%. In Nketozna (Reitz) ward eight, the

= L

Inkatha helps DA break out of the doldrums

"ANC received 75,8% t401 vobes) coso-

pared with 77,3% in 2000. The Pan Africanist Congressâ\200\231s share climbed from 17,1% t0.24,2% (128 votes). .

In Maluti 2 Phofung (Qwa Qwa) the ANC received 82 4% (748 votes), compared with 855% three years ago. The IFPs share grew from 6, 99%" 10 17,5%. 'IheDAwhmh, mZOOO garnered 6,68%, stood back forthe IFP -

an this occasion. .

Other opposmon parties which stood $a\200\224$ including 2 variety of Christian parties and the Urited Democratic Movesuent $a\200\224$ fared poorly. The UDM polled just six votes in the Johannesburg ward.

DO SO o o PALLI R LDBADEIFLICTTRRT ¢ 71"

31.JAN.2083 8:30 ; % . P . 26 Mail&Guardian January 31 to February 6 2003 $a\200\231$.No. 723 P.6

Comment&Analysis . -

MailfGuardian

Mail; Letters, PO Box 91667, Auckland Park, 2006. Fax: (01 1) 727-7111. E-mail: letters@mg.co.2a

Time for Buthelezi

 \hat{a} 200\234toownhisdeeds .

hroughout the apartheid era Mangosuthu Buthelez proclaimed his opposition to the racist ideology even when it. " was patently clear to even the dimmest cretin thathewasin-bed with the National Party, - $^\prime$.

Ever the pious self-promoter, the Inkatha Freedom Party leader proclaimed himself a peace-loving civil rights and democracy campaigner. He even elevated himself to the status of Martin Luther King Jnr and Mahatma Gandhi and laid claim to being the custodian of the philosophies of Chief Albert Luthuli. _

How Buthelezi managed to sustain this myth successfully in many — quarters is not difficult to fathom. He had the full backing of the apartheid propaganda machine, the very machine that convinced white South Africans that they were living in 4 typical $a\geq 0$ 0\230Western—style democracy. He also had the support of the international conservative lobby, some of whom took to him because his party represented the Tarzan image of Africa that fascinates rightwingers. And Buthelezi, being the cunning political operator that he is, cynically exploited the base nationalist instincts of some within the Zulu peasantry to shore up his political support. — N e o

So when apartheid began to unravel, he resisted change with great - force. In the valleys and townships of KwaZulu Natal are the graves of thousands who were victims of violence initiated, instigated and perpetuated by Inkatha militias. Orphans, widows and widowerslost . loved ones simiply becahes they opposed the system that Buthelezigo loyally served. Roaming the length of that province (and indeed other parts of the country) aré many men who killed in the name of the IFP,

Whether Buthelezi sanctioned the violence that was carried out in his name is something that could only ever be established in a-court of law $a\geq00\leq24$ an unlikely event. So, until a court oflaw finds otherwise, we will presutne him innocent. R ot .

History, however, is not as kind as we are. A

In the final report of the truth commission, the most comprehengive -

* and authoritative record of South Africa under apartheid, history passes its judgement on the IFP leader. The report, which Buthelezi strenuously . fought, spells out clearly that he not only knew of the killing machine operated by his underlings and their security force handlers, but that he himself was partly responsible for its design. !

Today Buthelezi is a senior minister in the democratic post-apartheid

~ government, sometimes even running the country when President Thabo Mbeki and his deptity Jacob Zuma are abroad. Today he is fÃ@ted at state banquets and has his views sought by powerful interest groups. He even has the word $a\200\234$ dignitary $200\235$ attached to his name on official programmes, Abroad he is regarded as an architect of our democratic order. And in South Africa $200\231$ s promiscuous political set-up other opposition leaders are busy flashing their worn thighs in his direction,

A dangerous tendency is creeping into South African life, that of wanting to wipe the slate of our past clean and move on, 85 if the evil we exorcised nine years ago never existed, While we do not believe there should be too much dwelling on the past, we also do not believe that we will build 2 decent society by white-washing historical crimes.

Tt is in this contéxt that we applaud the truth coxamissionâ\200\231s stern decision to stand by its final report and not, in effect, to lie to future : generations. When Buthelezi supped with the Jikes of PW Botha and

*Magnus Malan, he was fully aware of what he was doing. Hé must start to take responsibility for his acts. $^\prime$

31.JAN. 2003

8:30

Mt and quaï¬\202ouhn

31â\200\224 6-2-03

he recent public spat between, Minister of Socigl Develop- . ment Zola Skweyiya and bis

 $\hat{a}\200\230$ provincial counterpart, Prince Gideon 7Zulu (who also happens to be asenior Inkatha Freedom Party leader), over

 \hat{a} 200\230how immature the latter is.

The distribution of food parcelsis part of the government's initiative t0 alleviate poverty. The programymie has Dbeen a success in other provinces and it is oply in KwaZulu-Ngtal that it has enÃ@ountered problems. Zulu proves how the IFP is failing the people' of this province. .

1 appeal 10 Lionel Mishali (who por trays himself as a 10-NONSEnse premier) to fire Zulu for incompetence.

| Tne JER g notondemued Zihh

o . w ets mag PP LTS PERIT] lultwia B 5 T4 ad®" WERE I Ve caeezedt]

ceptem _ara e

IFP .is \hat{a} \200\230fail;m'g the people

ion of food parcels shows

Η

which shows it supports his actions, $\{5 \text{ the national minister and } \}$

does not need Zulu's approval to im-

plement programmes in the province.

The Democratic Party is mum on the isgue, which indicates that it supports Zulu's actions. The DP always accuses the African National Congress-led government of failing 10 deliver * services to the people, but now it pretends as if nothing is happening. I this because the [FP and the DPbave 2 coalition agreement and the latteris

scared of ruining theix relationship?

T would be happy if NGOs and h community-based organisations voice their opinions on this despicable act. Theï¬\202â\200\231?.i&behavingasifitiamheb ently entitled to govern KwaZulu-Natal, â\200\224 Viogrii Mbhels, Dm;bgb;;w

e glern T AGE L G

i L.

```
-{Wâ\200\230(Mâ\200\230) and quaï¬\202a&c{u\3].1.â\200\224- £ 3d.03%
```

â\200\230-%
1EP HIT SQUADS
tramned by-SADF
For'useinl(ZN

8°d

This is a classic rerun taken from Zapiro: 2027002 "NUl " 122027 E2L°ON 122027:8

```
31. JQN 2003
17′
. . /\hat{a}\200\230Mao(\%6(?ucm&an)
NO.723 P.2
I i=6-a-03
The nallmg of Buthelezi
Inkatha leaderâ\200\231s
attempts to whitewash
history thwarted; says
truth commission
Jaspreet Kindra g
Inkatha Freedom Party leader Mango-
guthu Buthelezi has failed in his
attempts to \hat{a}\200\234whitewash history and \hat{A}^{\circ}
portray himself ag a peace-loving anti- .
apartheid activist\hat{a}\200\235, say former Teuth
and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)
members and investigatots.
Hailed ag a vindication of Buthelezi's .
innocence of apartheid-era wrong,
doing by his party and legal team, the .
settlement was described by.former
TRC commigsioner Yasmin Sooka asâ\200\231
proof that Buthelezi collaborated with
the \hat{a}\200\234most senior echelons of the
apartheid state \frac{200}{231}s security organs \frac{200}{235}
The settlement, reached on the eve
of what was expected to be a dra-
matic court battle this week, ended
Butheleziâ\200\231s long-running bid to have Old fnends. Aparthe-dleader PW Botha and IFP p
resident Mangosmhu Buthelezi clasp hunds in 1957
the TRC excise parts of the commis- .
sion \hat{a} \ 200 \ 231s final reports, which described
him as a primary human rights viola- 1
tor: The IFP interdicted the commis-
sion from finalising its report.in Sep-
_temberlast year, delaying the release
```

of the document, It also delayed the - drafting of the governmentâ\200\231s new amnesty policy and the compensation of apartheid victims by the state.

In terms of the settlement, the TRC's

_findings on Buthelezi will stand while the IFP leader will be allowed to publish an annexure spelling out his objections to the verdict,

Legal experts sald this week that the scttlement may clear the way for clvil litigation against other IFP leaders.

IFP national chairperson Lionel Mtshali sought to present the deal as a vindication of $a\200\234$ Prince Mangosuthu Buthelezi and the Inkatha Freedom Party $a\200\235$ as the TRC had $a\200\234$ Ginally conceded to change some m $a\200$ ndi.zigs in , its 1098 report.

However, the TRC said the changes were minor and that none of its core . findings have been excised or altered.

Political scientist and former truth \hat{A}° comrnisgion investigator John Daniel, now a researcher for the Humanâ\200\231 Sciences Research Council, described the settlendent as $\hat{a}\200\2342$ great victory for the TRC's version of the truth about

 $a\200\230$ Inkatha $200\231$ s gross human rights viola- 'tions ... It tried to bully the TRC and failed, $a\200\235$ he said.

However, he added: $\hat{a}\200\234$ The IFP has ghown yet again that it {s not willing, to open itself up for public scrutiny $\hat{a}\200\235$

Sooka pointed out that Butheleziâ\200\231s main demand had been for. the" removal of the TRCâ\200\231s most damning finding on the IFP,â\200\224 that it collabo-. rated with the former South'African Deferice Force (SADFY in the training

. of IFP youth as hit squad methbers in-

the Caprivi Strip in 1986. The reference and the finding remain intact.â\200\231 *While the minister will continue to claim the role of anti-apartheid campaigner and man of peace, history will treat him in the light of his actjons as uncovered by the work of the TRC, Other NVestgators and humm rights 1Ã@wyers,â\200\235 she said. The Mafl & Guardianâ\200\231s predecessor, The Weekly Matl, expoged the top-, secret operation, code-named Operation Mation and involving SADF train-

ing of 208 IFP members, in the early 1990s. Buthelezi has always maintained the menwemmnedfordefen . give purposes.

The TRC found that one of the

 $i \mid$ Caprivi hit squads was deployed in

KwaZulu-Natalâ $\200\231s$ KwaMakhutha townghip in 1987, where it killed 13'men,

Po =

```
731.JAN. 2003
d___\
0]
8:26
women and children at the homsofa -
United Democratic Front (UDF)
leader. The massacte was to become
the subject of the conapiracy to murder
trial of apartheid defence minister
Magnus Malan and 19 others in 1996. -
The trial, whil\tilde{\text{A}}© accepting that
Caprivi-trained hit men weÃ@re respon-
gible for the massacre, exonerated
- Malan, other senior defence officials
_and Buthelezi's secretary and now IFP
gecretary general, MZ Khumalo.
Sooka said that in its court applica~
der of the Miaba camp, Philip Powell.
These stand in the report. -
in his legal submissions on the
Caprivi training, the IFPs attorney,
Patrick Falconer, said: \hat{a}\200\234We accept that
unfortunately people from all sides of
the political spectrum were killed due
to illegal activity. We are, however,
instructed that it was never part of
Inkatha policy. We believe some of
these activities emanated from individ-
ualsvvith?nlnlcathn,whq did g0 in the
defiance of palicy on the matter, as did,
tion, the IFP had sought to rely on the; - sye believe, certain ANC members. \hat{a} \200\235 , ,
Malan trisl ontcome. However, the::
.commisgion was not bound tofollow.
court findings a\200\234particularly those it -
regarded as unreliable. If it were, the
TRC would have been bound by other
digcredited judicial findings such as-
those made by the Harms commis- -
gion and the Steve Biko inquest. *: : .«
a\200\234The TRC found that a\200\230backinga\200\231 was.
no mystery and was obviously sup-
plied by the military and Inkatha. It
could not agree with the courtâ\200\231s find-
ings that the word a\200\230 offensive a\200\231 [train-
- ing] in the military context did not.,
necessarily mean \hat{a}200\230attack\hat{a}\200\231, nor could it
concur with the court's view that'
thoge behind the Caprivi profect did -
not foresee that the trainees would
+ carry out deadly attacksâ\200\235 R
* Sooka pointed out that one of tie '
Caprivi trainers, Colonel Jan Nie-
would, hed stated in his amnesty .a^200^231
a\200\230application that the purpose of the
camp was \hat{a}\200\234to jdentify and eliminate
African Nationsl Congress, South
â\200\230Africdan Communist Party and Pan
- Africanist Congress targetsâ\200\235 .
a\200\234The TRC findings indicated that
```

Buthelezi was not an innocent andâ\200\235

```
independent activist, he had requested -
" help from the former apartheid regime \hat{200}
. andhadgotitâ\200\235sheadded. -
" In his application against the TRC
fndings, Buthelezi claimed he and the -
IFP consistently adhered to lawful -
methods. He wanted specific refer-
ences to himself, MZ Khumalo and the
current . KwaZulu-Natal MEC for
Soctal Welfare, Gideori Zulu, removed
a\200\224 from the TRUS Giial feport, In all the
party demanded that 37paragraphsin
\hat{a}200\230the TRC report be set aside.
These included references to its role
in the a\200\234Seven Day Wara\200\235 in 1990 afound
Pietermaritzburg, the a\200\234Toaster Ganga\200\235
that killed Tembisa residents in the
early 1990s, the Mlaba camp in the
Ewazulu-Natal Midlands set up for the
tilitary training of Inkatha a\200\234gelf-
protection unitsâ\200\235 before the 1994 elec-
tior, and jailed former police hit squad
Jeader Eugene de Kock's delivery of six
truckloads of weapons to the comman-
. Sooks:said that:there was over;
whelming evidence that Buthelezi -
worked. â\200\230closely with spartheid
. government to destabilise liberation
movements.' '_
She said the documents revealed that \hat{a} \geq 00 \geq 31
after the military decided to phase out .
support for offensive actions by the IFP
because of security problems, \hat{a}\200\234Buthe-- \hat{a}\200\231
lezi during 1989-expressed to senior
military officers hiz desire for offensive
-actiofis to bé carried outin \hat{a}200\230cells) ashe
- waslosing the a\200\230atmed struggle!
a\200\234Rxcerpts from tap-secret apartbeld -
era documents and feiterviews with,
genior security offitials abundantly
illustrate the sinister role
) IRl
played by
```

Inkatha and its leader.

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ Buthelezi's desire for $\hat{a}\200\230$ continued offensive staps, as in $\hat{a}\200\230$ hit squads) is evident from his discussions on October 311989 with senior Directorate of Special Tasks officers. In the same document, MZ Khumalo referred to the IFP leader $\hat{a}\200\231$ s wish for $\hat{a}\200\230$ cells that could take out thdesirable elements $\hat{a}\200\235$

Buthelezi's request. was put to Malan, who advised in 1990 that at that stage the $a\200\234$ violent option was a difficult matter $200\235$.:

The TRCâ\200\231s 1998 report found the IFP responsible for perpeirating about 9 000 gross human rights violations in KwaZulu and Natal from 1990 to May 1994, This has now been chatged to include the role of other organisations,

such as the ANC, the .UDF, the

KwaZsilu police and the SADF. * - The TRCâ\200\231s final report is expected

"to be ready by thé end of the year.

Sooka said the: settlement of the dispute with the IFP now.enabled the

"TRC to address the urgent questién y

of'repuaï¬\201ons fOlâ\200\230Victlg}ï¬\202. b The findings of the répgrt-could - also form the basis. fof â\200\230victirhs to make. civil claimgâ\200\231 agiinit: political organisations. ;"', W sy '