

By
Robert Davies
E Draft chapter for TJacklyn Cock and Laurie Nathan (ed),
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domestic equivalent .of calling covert aggression against neighbouring states "civil war" has been to describe vigilante assaults as "black on black violence". In both cases the ultimate controlling role of the apartheid state is concealed; the deployment of force is .cheap in terms both of direct SADF casualties and resourbes; and the level of violence and brutality can be raised at a lower diplomatic and ideological cost than would be the case if the state's regular security forces had been directly involved; There has, indeed, even been a documented case where MNR bandits in camps in South Africa were sent into action_ against members of the Northern Transvaal Youth Congress (Notrayoc) in Venda in 1986 - on this occasion they styled themselves "Abafana bakaBotha" (sons of Botha) (Weekly Mail 24-29/4/1987).

This chapter examines some aspects of the SADF'e covert war in Mozambique. It begins by documenting what is known from publicly available sources about the organisation and form of SADF involvement in that war. It then attempts to place this action in the context of Pretoria's overall regional policy in various phases. Finally it examines some of the contradictions of covert military action in Mozambiqueue Which have become increasingly evident.

1. BABE involvement with Rename

No serious observer can now doubt that the so-oalled MNR or Rename was created as a fifth column by the intelligence servicest of the illegal Rhodesian regime. This has been described in Some

detail in the autobiography of Ken Flower, the former head of the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organisation, who was the officer directly responsible for this project. The MNR was formed, in March 1974 as a "pseudo-terrorist" squad consciously modelled on the flechas, recruited by the Portuguese in Angola in the 1960s. See "Top Secret" document reproduced in Flower (1987), pp 300-3021.

It is also common knowledge that shortly before Zimbabwean independence, control of the MNR bandits was handed over to the SADF. Flower (1987), pp 262, 2731. SADF support for the MNR armed bandits in the period prior to the signing of the Nkomati accord in March 1984, has indeed been publicly acknowledged by senior members of the Pretoria regime. Foreign Minister, R.F. Botha as much in the House of Assembly in April 1985 saying, "There was a time when we helped to train Renamo and assisted it. There 'was such a time... They Renamo approached us for assistance and we realised that it would further the aims of South Africa to help them" (House of Assembly Debates, 25/4/1985 column 42141. -

Some details of SADF involvement with Renamo during this period have now emerged. See Weekly Mail 27/11 - 3/12/1987, Note 61 December 1987/January 1988, Southscan 2/12/1987, AIM Information Bulletin 141 April 1988 3. Direct operational responsibility fell to a Directorate of Special Tasks (DST) operating under the Chief of Staff (Intelligence). The DST was commanded by a Colonel (now Brigadier) Cornelius (or Charles) van Niekerk. The project of supporting armed banditry in Mozambique, which served as a pilot for similar actions in other countries was codenamed "Operation

Mile". The DST operated out of the Zanza building in Proes Street, Pretoria. It recruited or press ganged Mozambicans "illegally" in South Africa in search of work into the ranks of Renamo and provided them with a rudimentary military training before sending them on missions in Mozambique. Initially training took place at a base at Potgietersrus (closed in 1983 for security reasons) and later at what remains the main base at Phalaborwa. The DST also organised the airdropping of logistics, sometimes using airforce planes and sometimes those of a front company, Frame Intertrading. From Phalaborwa communications were maintained both with bandit groups operating inside Mozambique and with MNR spokespersons in Lisbon. Propaganda radio broadcasts were transmitted under the name "Radio Free Africa".

The "Gorongosa documents" (1985) discovered after the capture of former MNR headquarters in August 1985, show beyond any possible doubt that this support continued until June 1985, despite the signing in March 1984 of the "Nkomati Accord of Non-Aggression and good Neighbourliness". The documents recorded instances in which arms, communications equipment, medical supplies, and material to produce propaganda were made available to the armed bandits. They showed that the SADF had organised transport for MNR leaders to and from Gorongosa.

The "Gorongosa documents" also indicated that SADF officers continued to play a leadership role in the MNR in the sense of determining their military strategy the bandits should follow. Instances are recorded where SADF officers tell the bandits that in order to conserve ammunition they should avoid contacts with . t 1 .w, 1 5-9- v _j 1,7,; A, _., ,:: 5.31:3 ..-; '1 '- A. __ UNA, _ . a .. AJAszn-lmic:g.wjnmvgunmAM-m# - v e

the Mozambican armed forces and concentrate on economic (soft) targets. Moreover, the documents showed that involvement in these activities reached right to the highest echelons of the SADF command. Colonel van Niekerk was named as the direct liaison officer, but the extracts mention meetings with, and/or messages_ from inter alia both the former and current Chiefs of the- SADF, Generals Constandt Viljoen and J.J.Geldenuys respectively; Lt Gen P.J.van der Westhuizen, the then Chief of Staff (Intelligence); Lt (Gen A.J. (Kat)t Liebenberg, then General Officer Commanding Special Forces and now Chief of the Army as well as Brigadier van Tender and Colonel Greyling of Military Intelligence. Mention was also made of a Major Phillips, also of .Military Intelligence; who had a key role in directing MNR operations out of Malawi.

Since Gorongosa evidence of different types has emerged which, taken together provides an overwhelming prima facie case that SADF/ involvement with armed banditry in Mozambique continues. There have been:,

X Accounts by local residents of air and sea drops of supplies to bandits

- In the Manhica and Impaputo districts of Maputo province (Noticias 26/10/1985);

- in the vicinity of Ressano Garcia in Maputo province (Noticias 22/9/1986);

- off the coast of Sofala province 30 miles south of Beira EAIM despatch 8/7/1987.

. \$ Testimonies by captured bandits and those surrendering under the government's amnesty programme a

- _ about recruitment while in South African Police custody E Jorge Valoi in Noticias 5/11/1985) and by SADF personnel in Malawi (Weekly Mail 4/3/1988);

- about membership of a special commando unit sent to plant bombs in Maputo and Matola E South African passport holder George

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Infantry regiment. Oliveira also said that training is provided by No 5 Reconnaissance (Reece) Commando and that South African Airforce Dakotas are used to drop supplies to -bandits in Mozambique. Other sources have suggested that members of Special Forces command (the "operational arm" of Military Intelligence currently commanded by Maj Gen K. van der Waal) and No 5 Reece have from time to time travelled to Mozambique to conduct sophisticated sabotage operations beyond the capacity of bandit squads. 31 Battalion, based at Duku Duku, and airforce units based at Louis Trichardt and Hoedspruit are also thought to be involved (see Africa Confidential 28,24 2/12/1987).

2. ngert Ha: in the antext Qt Eretgria'a negignal strategy The deployment of surrogate forces has not been the only form of aggression against Mozambique. There has also .been economic action, including the cutback and eventual banning of new migrants labour recruitment as well as the restriction of South African traffic passing through the port of Maputo. In addition, there were' until 1984, a number of direct, acknowledged SADF raids. Together these actions (of which the deployment of surrogate forces has been the most persistent and damaging) constitute what is generally known as the policy of destabilisation Esee Davies and O'Meara (1985), Hanlon (1986), JOhnson and Martin (19863). The turn to such a policy has to be seen in the first instance against the background of the profound and dramatic change in the balance of forces in the southern African region brought about by the collapse of the Portuguese African empire and the subsequent

independence of Mozambique and Angola under governments formed by the liberation movements Frelimo and the MPLA respectively. This fundamentally undermined the entire basis on which South Africa's entire regional strategy had up to this point been constructed. Until the mid-1970s, Pretoria had been able to rely on the existence of a ring of colonially ruled "buffer states" to ensure that the impact of the gathering liberation struggle in southern Africa remained largely confined to regions far distant from its own borders and that regional territories continued to serve South African capitalism as labour reserves, markets and suppliers of specific services such as transport.

The initial response of the Vorster regime to the new situation created by the fall of Portuguese colonialism was vacillating and somewhat incoherent (see Geldenhuys (1984), Davies and O'Meara (1985)). Its half-hearted detente initiative launched in an attempt to win allies or at least neutralise potential adversaries within the OAU collapsed in 1976, partly as a result of the debacle of the first major SADF invasion of Angola and partly in the wake of the brutal response to the Soweto uprising. Two years of virtual stagnation followed during which no important regional policy initiatives were taken.

The regime of P.W. Botha thus took power, in September 1978, in the context of an acute crisis on the regional as well as the domestic planes of struggle. The Botha regime represented a new alliance within the dominant classes between the top military commanders and Afrikaner monopoly capital (drawing also an

unprecedented degree of support for a Nationalist Party regime from non-Afrikaner menopoiy capital). On coming to power, the new regime set about reorganising and reformulating both domestic and regional strategy in accordance with its well known "Total Strategy" doctrine. At the level of regional strategy, the vague notion of establishing a "constellation of southern African states" (Consas) which had first been put forward by Vorster in 1974 was substantially developed and defined as the ultimate objective of regional strategy. The ultimate aim of the Consas strategy was to create a South African-led alliance of "moderate states of Southern Africa" 'united against a common "Marxist onslaught" in circumstances in which they could not rely on the unqualified and unconditional support of the Western powers. As apartheid policies were recognised as 'a barrier to the immediate establishment of formalised alliances with neighbouring states, preparatory action to generate a "counter ideology to Marxism? in the region was deemed essential

The promotion of joint economic projects with neighbouring states was to be another main prong in a new regional offensive. The other was the luring of regional states into "Non Aggression Pacts". Through such action on the economic and security fronts, ties with neighbouring states were to be deepened and the objective basis created for what Foreign Minister R.F. Botha described as "a common approach in the security field, the economic field and even the political field" (Geldenhuys- and Venter(1979) p 541.

In addition to its direct impact on the regional plane, the

promotion of Consas was to lead to the de'facto international recognition of South Africa as the "regional power". This would lead to a general acknowledgement that southern Africa was a sphere of South African influence and this would reduce Pretoria's overall international isolation. Achieving these and other more immediate goals of regional policy (such as neighbouring states withholding support from liberation movements, maintaining and deepening economic ties with South Africa, and modifying the level of criticism of apartheid- Esee Geldenhuys (1981)) was seen as requiring the application of a "sophisticated" mix of economic, political/diplomatic and military tactics. There were to be both incentives and disincentives, but the well known formula of the time specified that the appropriate mix should be 80% political/economic/diplomatic and only 20% military action. In practice, however, after an initial abortive attempt from 1978 to 1980 to launch its Consas, the Pretoria regime rapidly fell back on aggression as the main instrument of its regional policy. Consas received a severe blow when Zimbabwe (which Pretoria had been expecting to be a ready adherent after being brought to an internationally recognised independence under a Mugabe/Smith regime) became independent instead under a ZANU-PF government. The Consas scheme suffered a further setback when all the independent states of the region associated themselves with the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) whose central objective was to reduce the level of economic

dependence of member states particularly, but not only, on South Africa.

These reverses to Pretoria's efforts to re-mould regional relations precipitated a second phase of South African action in the region lasting roughly from mid-1980 until the end of 1981. This period saw the application of destabilisation tactics in a fairly generalised and indiscriminate manner. Direct military action or the threat of such action was applied against a number of regional states. This was also the period in which surrogate force activity - by Units in Angola, the LLA in Lesotho and MNR in Mozambique - became a serious menace. At the same time, the first major attempts were made to apply economic "techniques of coercion".

This phase of generalised and indiscriminate destabilisation gave way to a third phase lasting from the early part of 1982 until the signing of the Nkomati Accord in March 1984. This can be described as a phase of intensified and more selective destabilisation. During it some attempt appears to have been made by Pretoria to categorise regional states and direct different tactics towards them. On the one hand, there were the more conservative states, such as Swaziland and Malawi, seen as potential collaborators. These were offered a range of economic and other incentives to encourage them to "cooperate" with South Africa. On the other hand, there were those states seen either as the most vulnerable or as Pretoria's principal adversaries in the region. States in this category included Lesotho, Angola and Mozambique.

As

far as Mozambique was concerned, the country provided political support to the ANC and allowed ANC members to reside in the country (although bases as such were never established). It was an influential member of the Front Line States alliance, and one of the prime movers of SADCC. Its ports and railways offered the only realistic alternative to continued dependence on south African transport facilities for many of the SADCC states. It maintained friendly relations with the socialist countries, and was itself ruled by a party committed to bringing about a process of socialist transformation. It thus represented a barrier to a number of Pretoria's regional policy objectives, as well as posing a direct ideological challenge and potential alternative to apartheid capitalism.

With the turn to destabilisation tactics, Mozambique was rapidly singled out as a prime target. It was subjected to a number of direct attacks by SADF units - the first being the raid against ANC residences in Matola in January 1981. Members of the SADF were also implicated in clandestine acts of sabotage against strategic transport installations - in one such attack a SADF lieutenant, Alan Gingles, was killed by his own bomb. Esee Johnson and Martin (1986) p 223. At the same time a number of "economic disincentives" were applied against the country. For example, a partial economic boycott was imposed against the port of Maputo and South African traffic in 1983 fell to half that of 1982 and only 16 per cent of the level of 1973 (National Planning

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Commission (1984) p 301.

The principal vehicle of South vAfrican destabilisation was, however, its sponsorship of the MNR. MNR action increased after the movement was taken over by the SADF in 1980 and escalated particularly rapidly during 1982 and 1983. Official sources estimate that by the end of 1983, 140 villages, 840 schools, 900 rural shops and over 200 public health installations had been destroyed. The total cost of this destruction was put at US \$ 3,8 billion (National Planning Commission (1984) p 381. As indicated earlier, the SADF's involvement with the MNR during this period has now been acknowledged by senior state officials even though it was strenuously denied at the time. What is more controversial is the continuation of this involvement despite the signing in March 1984 of the Nkomati Accord of "non-aggression and good neighbourliness". As evidence of continued support for armed banditry in Mozambique from within South Africa began to mount despite the signing of the Accord, one hypothesis which emerged was that this was the action of "rogue" elements within the military acting without the authorisation either of the government or the SADF command. This has been belied by the "Gorongosa documents" which, as indicated earlier, showed that the level of involvement and/or knowledge reached to the highest echelons of the SADF hierarchy. Another hypothesis advanced was that the Nkomati Accord had never been accepted by the SADF and that it was thrust on the military by the civilian politicians. How to respond to it had accordingly been a matter of disagreement and struggle between different forces within the I regime and wider ruling class. On the one side stood the Ministry

of Foreign Affairs (supported by "economic interests") favouring an approach relying on diplomacy and economic leverage. On the I ether side, were the SADF wedded to /"quick fix" military isolutions. There is more substance to this hypothesis than to the first. It does seem that both the initial idea and first draft of the Nkomati accord was put forward by the Mozambican side EJohnson and Martin (1986) pp 26/71. In the discussions which preceded it, Pretoria's negotiators had concentrated on demands for the complete Removal of the "ANC presence" from Mozambiquer and access to the country by South African capital. The insistence of- the need for a comprehensive security pact (implying obligations on both sides) does seem, initially, to have caught the Pretoria regime somewhat off guard. In addition, the "Gorongosa documents" do confirm that Foreign Minister R.F. 'Botha was mistrusted by military personnel. He was not briefed about the visit to Gorongosa of his own Deputy Minister, Louis Nel, military personnel were quoted in the documents describing him as a "traitor", a ?Spviet nark" and a stooge of Chester Crocker,t and conversations he held with the MNR delegation just before the October 1984 "Pretoria declaration" talks were bugged by the SADF.

However, while acknowledging all this, it is necessary to avoid the kind of oversimplification which tends to reduce the explanation of continued destabilisation entirely to the domination of military "hawks" over Foreign affairs "doves". In Ithe first place, 'such explanations exaggerate the differences, which have always existed and continue to exist within clear

limits. The Foreign Ministry accepts the basic goal of establishing Pretoria's regional hegemony as well as the other shorter term objectives defined by the "Total, Strategy". Moreover, it does not totally reject military action as one of the means of achieving these goals. One of the main tasks performed by R.F. Botha as Foreign Minister over the years has thus been to threaten and justify various forms of military action against neighbouring states. In the last analysis, the differences between Foreign Affairs and the military are differences of tactics or nuance. They are about the precise mix of military aggression and economic and diplomatic action, and not over whether or not military and economic aggression should be applied.

Secondly, it is necessary to locate any analysis of struggle between advocates of different options within the regime in the context of a prior analysis of the objective conditions and constraints on particular options created by the evolving struggle between the regime and its adversaries on both the regional and domestic planes. In this respect, it is clear that while Mozambique signed the Nkomati Accord in the hope of reducing the level of conflict in the region and establishing a pattern of regional relations based on the norms of international law, Pretoria's strategists saw the Accord in a wholly different light. For them it was a tactical device to advance specific objectives defined in the stalled Consas initiative. More precisely, and partly with the benefit of hindsight, it appears that Pretoria's strategists hoped that through Nkomati they

could: .

\$ achieve a reduction in vthe level of armed struggle and mass action inside South Africa (by depriving the ANC of its alleged bases in Mozambique); e
t broker a "power sharing" settlement which would place the MNR 'in a subordinate but influential role in government in Mozambique;
t pressure other regional states into signing security pacts as a first step towards as generalised acceptance of Pretoria's hegemony in the region; '

X significantly reduce the level of international isolation based on de facto acknowledgement of South Africa's position as the "regional power" and the gateway for foreign investment throughout the region.

It has been suggested elsewhere Csee Davies (1987)) that Pretoria's failure to capitalise on the Nkomati Accord in these ways at the same time as the struggle inside South Africa itself was advancing, Were major factors behind the steady drift back towards escalating and less concealed (if not openly acknowledged) destabilisation, particularly evident in the period after the SADF raid against oil installations in the Cabinda province of Angola in May 1985. In these circumstances, Pretoria's strategists increasingly saw themselves as having little to gain by attempting to put forward an (in fact tarnished) image of having peaceful intentions in the region(It suited them instead to project an image of ruthless, unassailable strength.

The expefience of the post-Nkomati period has, nevertheless, revealed much about military influence over foreign poliCy formulation and militarisation in general. The respohse of the Botha regime to the publication of the "Gorongosa documents" was particularly instructive. None of the officers named, who included the former and current chiefs of the SADF and the

current chief of the army, were in any way disciplined. On the contrary 'many were subsequently promoted, while P.W.Botha went out of his way to defend the then Chief of the SADF, General

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Viljoenn A commentator wrote at the time,
The deep trust which binds President Botha to General Viljoen and the Minister of Defence, Magnus Malan, can fairly be compared with the relationship that bound Mr John Vorster with General Hendrik van den Berg...Military Intelligence has assumed under President Botha the same behind-the-scenes influence on policy, and has therefore, acquired something of the same sinister reputation that BOSS had under Vorster" (Ken Owen, Sunday Times 13/10/1985).

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There can be no doubt that the SADF's eovert war in Mozambique thrwugh Rename has been relatively cheap and, at one level, a success. At the .cost of very few SADF lives and xcomparatively little in terms of material resources, great damage has been inflicted on the eeconomy and social fabric of Mozambique. Mozambique has been prevented from achieving its potential as a functioning alternative to apartheid capitalism and many of the specific gains of the Mozambican revolution (in .health and education in particular) have been undermined. According to the latest available figures, 'about a third of the health network (including 700 health posts)'and 2.049 rural primary schoole have been destroyed Or rendered _inoperative by bandit action ECENE/DPCCN (1988) pp 36/7).

At the same time, however, Pretoria'e resort to covert war has had contradictory effects at the political, ideological and diplomatic levels. These have become increasingly evident in more

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recent times. The turn to destabilisation in the first place defived from the Pretoria regime's chronic inability to produce a viable political strategy to advance its regional ambitions. The original aim of Consas was to win allies. In the last analysis its failure was due not so much to the particular tactics applied, but to the nature of the strategic objective sought 4 acceptance by independent states of the hegemonic ambitions in the region of a racist minority regime. The voluntary cooperation of -independent states ins such a project was never a viable proposition and, as indicated earlier, it was the failure- to achieve this which led to the fall back on aggression with covert military action as the principal instrument of this assault. The turn to this option and the fact that the Pretoria regime has been seen to have continued to pursue it desnite having signed a formal "non-aggression" accord, has undermined its credibility in the region even furthef.;

So, too, has the extreme brutality of the MNR assault. There is general unanimity among observers that Pretoria never at any time had any serious intention of trying to put the MNR in government in Maputo. Attempting to do so was recognised at a fairly early point as being too risky and costly for Pretoria. Even if the MNR had been able to overthrow the Frelimo government, Pretoria would then have been left trying to sustain an unrecognised puppet regime in charge of a war torn country -undeubtedly facing a challenge from Frelimo. Pretoria's unwillingness to take on such a burden was spelt out in discussions between a South African delegation '(including both 'R.F.Botha and General Constandt

Viljoen) and the MNR Just before tripartite discussions held after the October 1984 Pretoria Declaration. The "Gorongosa documents" record the South African side telling the MNR that they should seek a cease fire as a step towards "power sharing" because the Mozambican government, "...15 recognised internationally and you are not. And the RSA does not have money to help Renamo recuperate the economy' if it wins the war.." E Gorongosa documents (1985) "Desk Diary" entry under page headed "Week 39 September 1984"). As the prospect of forcing even "power sharing" on the Frelimo government increasingly receded as a realistic possibility, the overall objective of the MNR assault appears to have been downgraded to maintaining the country in a state of permanent crisis and attempting to render it ungovernable. The fact that the MNR is neither an indigenous political movement nor seen even by its sponsors as an alternative government, has shaped the way it has conducted itself on the ground. It has never produced a coherent political programme nor, in practice, sought seriously to mobilise positive support among the people in areas in which it operates. This has been confirmed in a report commissioned by the US State Department based on interviews with nearly 200 randomly selected refugees in forty two different locations in Mozambique and neighbouring countries I Gersony (1988)). This noted, "There are virtually no reports of attempts to win the loyalty - or even neutrality - of the villagers. The refugees report virtually no effort by Renamo to explain to the civilians the purpose of the insurgency, its proposed program or its aspirations" Ep 251. Instead, the bandits have relied on terrorism and intimidation in their relationship

with the people. Their basic modus operandi, is described in the Gersony report. Although they are supplied with arms by the SADF, they depend on local people to provide them with food and forced labour (mainly to transport supplies). Since there is little positive enthusiasm among local people, these demands are asserted through coercion. According to Gersony, the MNR divide the Vzones in which they operate into "tax areas" (where people are compelled to provide food and make available "a young girl or married woman for sex"); "control areas" (where Aforced recruitment and tforced labour praactices are common) and "deestruction areas" (where indiscriminate slaughters are perpetrated). The effect of the presence of the MNR in any area is to inflict misery on the local people. Gersony's 200 informants witnessed 600 murders - by shooting, knife/axe/bayonet killings, burning alive, beating to death, asphyxiation, starvation and drowning Ep 211. 91% of those interviewede hadt "very negative" and a further 5% somewhat negative" perceptions of the MNR, compared to 7% "very negative" and 10% "somewhat negative" perceptions of Frelimo government troops (p 231. The 'widespread and increasingly well known reliance 'on such terrorist tactics, has greatly undercut not only domestic but also whatever international legitimacy the bandit assault might have mobilised.h Despite the fact that the basic technique of "covert war" was undoubtedly partly modelled on the "Reagan doctrine" of supporting "anti-communist" insurgencies against "left wing" governments, the brutality of the MNR assault, in the context of active diplomacy by the Mozambican government, has led

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even the US administration to distance itself from it. At an emergency aid donors' conference held in Maputo in April 1988, a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Roy Stacy, accused the MNR of "one of the most brutal holocausts against ordinary human beings since World War Two" (The Citizen 3/5/1988). The passing of a law at the end of 1987 offering an amnesty to bandits surrendering to the authorities as well as the relative success of a number of military operations in early 1988, seem to have caused some considerable disarray within the ranks of the MNR -- both externally and on the ground in Mozambique. 911 former bandits had surrendered by the third week of April 1988 (Noticias 21/4/1988); a former senior MNR official (Paulo Oliveira) defected in March 1987 and there have been murders of others (Mateus Lopes and Joao Ataide in Malawi in December 1987 and of former Secretary General, Evo Fernandes, in Lisbon in April 1988).

All of this will clearly have some impact on the process of diplomatic activity underway at the time of writing (May 1988). While the main focus of the current "super-power" sponsored effort to seek a "political solution" to conflicts in the region on Angola and Namibia, Mozambique-South Africa relations and the question of continued South African support for armed banditry are also due to receive attention. Mozambique will clearly enter any such process with some political and ideological advantage. It remains to be seen to what extent this can be consolidated in effective pressure on Pretoria, and what concessions will have to

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be made to Pretoria's demands in the process.

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from the SA hardery hear Namaacha. There have been a
number of other 5lmilar reporta ln the past two wee%:g 3f
vialationa of Ma..amh.i:a .n airapace by aircraTt suphlyihg
armed bandits.

5511/19853

Jurgge, Valwi, an armed bandit recently captured in
Hamhita disatrict5 tella haw SA cuhtinuea ta train and
equip banditg. HE went to SA in May seeking work. He/wag_
detained_ by SQ golice and sen_ ta a bandit training'
camp. He was then given an FM rifle and told ta destray
communald villages, He pasged-himaelf uff at Rassanq
h rcia as an unsuccesful applicah for work as a miner
and was transported t0 Maputh. Pram there he made his
awn way t0 Manhica" He said ihatructarg in SA Shake Zdlu
and that the pilmtg hf aircrhft and helicoptwrh mgkihg
drwpa are whith. He said he burnt Q villages and killed
10 pwaple. '

' "A1985.1

Q ailway bridge 8% m5 fr3-m the SA harder :ahmtaged on
5/12!85 by "a Specializt sabotage grmup infiltrated from
Ecuth erica". The grmup ietmrned ta SH, In recent weeka
there haV% been a number hf denunciatiang by Moxambican
authmrities of violatimhg Of H01! ambiLah air apace hy-
aihcraft and halicaptera coming frmm Sh.

uf"/1985

Frmntpage editori.al reada:

"The xplosi 3n Of twm antimpersonnel mineg on the beach
at Costa do 801 in Maputo on Thursday 15 typical hf the
destabilisatieh action rte which cur country has been
Eubjected. It is part 5f a strategy pursued EinCQ the
independence. Of cur couhtry: enplmgive pens, bamb\$ in
the Scala. the parael bmmh which killed Ruth Fir5t5
xuhyuirxppLd Fading, GHDIHS ive deViCEE in vmhic.iw51.u
error are deliberately directed at the

.4

.hase acts mf t

mr dihary citi': en

he 'adult and the Child who were seriously Woundad an
Thurmday are part hf thmge defined by the Republic of
Ghuth erica' and the armed bandita 3% the enemy; the
Manambican peoplw. H11 hf us men, wgmnmn and childreng
yeung and old5 have harem defihcad as thm enemy, This
demancs theEFEfLFE an incruage ln mur level hf vigilahce
ahd espacial care Of mur children.

9' 11.

The EL.- bf tEFWUF geek tn affect the pe'chalbgic. 31
:ta Of the mitizeh and create a ciimate Of
j.n the capital mf Qur,cmuntryy Euch-acte bf
terrmr: have haVE alwe.ye ce.ih:ided with grave internal
CFJ 35 in neighbouring raczi: t etatee m yeeterday in
Rhmdeeia today in Smuth Africa m'anb they mccur in a
very dangerau mement tin the pmlitical preceee in
Seutherm African It 15 matEl thereforeg by Clance that
the ectimme NOW taking plane coincide with a eeriaue
crisie in the Scuth African gevernment and parliament.
The rewmccupatimn by Smuth Africe of part bf mngDEan
territmryg the threete by Pretowie ac Jainet Eatam wane and
Zimbabwe5 the tomb in Leeothc)9 the increaee in lthe
eupply Of arme and ammunition t0 the armed bandite in
stambiqueE are clear eigne that the hellicoe forces at
Pretoria are net only pledged nut t0 mempiy with -their
undertakings, they elem want t0 prbvmke ah eecalatibn bf
aggreseien,thr0ughmut the :mne, They are trying.thrbugh,
Such mean? tm prevent the continuatimn bf the impartant
Vlf tmrie v'un by the Hm;: .ambi..an, Zimbabwean and tholan
PWDVIQC .gainet deetabilieation during the past yeargh
They alga want thN make us target the eignificant
victbrie which the Sbuth African people have achieve in
mewe than half a aentury bf \$truggle and, in aarticlar,
in t e laat twm year\$.Of regellion.
In relation to Mozambique, the authorities of Pretoria
defined, .at the end of last November, 3 series of
actions to be carried out either by the armed bandits or
by Specialist units of the South African army.
The principal fedue Of thie inteneified action in "he
ravince of Maputo is-attacke on the railway eyetem and
etm"trlclty lines" tThie eecalatibn beg man in December,
with the eabotage of ae impbrtant rail.lway t-r; idge and wag
follbwd by regular attache en the railway linee
(trains) Mapu'O/swaellahd and, eabate gv Of the
hlGL_,lley line anqtlp3m"t/Maputbg
The murder mf defenceleee pereone mm the autekirts Of
Maputm and the planting of vartimue emblbeiwee directed
at civiliane, mompletee the picture at terrmri_t actj.nne
decided upon by the South african aLwtl gritiee,
With FBSDEct t0 theee actions;5 it 15 imwsrtant t0 recard
a baggage in the diary bf the armed bandi;e captdred at
Case Banana 3.; H51 august and made .public by SUP
gm ermment, In the column refehring-tc 18 an& iQIngust
19845 Brigadier van Tender eaye: Vt 3 '
tNith weepect to material fer urban guerrilla
warfareg we will eewd game but net all tygyee 0?
material asked far5 becauee there are Some bambe
H

Nmtiaia3

Th3

m3hufactured 1h the REA 3nd th13 wmuld cmmnrmmige 33
in relatiuh t0 the Nkomati Asmmrd. Ther mf3rh w3 will
send watch bomb devicze , 3nd tempLutxry memhani3m3 t0
detonat3 explmsives .

Thu3 Thuraday'E ?"qualmh4 3r3 hat ah 13313tea 33:30

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Whey are patrt uf the destahl11 atien action launched by
' aine:'t the .RM and 1.t3 peaple. Le 1-m

ta.k3h at thQ h1hheut level by Emnth

h311t1133. WE are facing a very specific tyha

Ts 'Sm: State terrarism Today there :an b3 n9

deLzht that the South African state 13 terroriat in the
fullast meaning 0? the termu

m 303.3mic ahmut ggate tarrar.ism is raging in weaterh
cmuht113. International n3w3 agencie 3 have given wida
hubliclty to the measureaa whi- h gm a3 far 33 the threu.

Of military action and the apl3licatiah hf ecmmmm.c

3ahctimn3, against 3tat . accwx 3d 3f r6 "- 'hility for
3:13 mf terror13m1

The camplaC3hcy with which the same we3t3rr cmunt.r133
treat South Afri: an 3tai :e terrorism i3 3 ymptmmatic".

11!2!198&

Maputm provi.ncial m11ltary cmmmahd 133ue3 the fml1awing

"Uh February 4 1?8&; a graup Sf armed handite

infiltrated la3t January daStrhyed threa pmats 3n tha

high ten313n 11.ne (Reasaho Earcl a/deLtU) 4 kms frmm the
harder with South African

It 13 stressed that this wa3 carried cut by a grmup

Spa cia alised in the Sabmtage hf high tenaiah lines,

During the actimh the bandit3 were 3urpr133d by umr

?DP333 who L illed & armed bandits (including the head cf
the group) and the group then fled ta Smuth African"

123m 15/8/1986"

Refers to FEpmrts from Mahutm quoting unidentifiad hug

Sources" as saying that the MNH 13 being Euppliad by

czargm planes frmm 333 The pl3n33 land at hu3h airstrip:

pxm3pared by tha MNF:u Th3 smurce 5313 that there waE

absmlute certainty about five penetratiun3 into Manica

pravinceu 3 1

titizeh ED/Q/1986. '

Repmrta GIN statemelt an helicshtsr landing3 and a

cwmment by a SQDF SDOHESm8Hn The latter readag "The

hssitimn Of the BADF and Eauth hffrica 33. far 133

Mozambique and Re mama are cohCQWhed ha3 bean explained

repeatedly at the highe 31: level ..uth13 pm3itimh ha3 hmt
changed".

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Guardian (Landon) 30/5/1987

Repmrte raid by BA cemmandQH On feur targetet Maputw
early in the morning of " 3 The RNC efficee and
three hDuHeH were attackedu Three Mexamhican were
kllled.F0urivcarH with four men each Were weed and the
Ht' HacierH were picked up by heat at a nmarhy bHach.
An SADF Hpekeemah FEfuged tn Comment thtuneubetentia ted.
allegations of involvement in incidents in M lHmhlqun .
Heweever, the attaek came within heure Hf an QNC
Htatement claimihg FeHweneibility qur the attack in
Jehanneeburg in Which faur membereref the Ba? were
lllllWI. The 89? Hwere to avenge the Hee the ref their
:Dlleagueeg "

AIM report 30f5/1987 (reprinted in M10 NewH Review) 4-/&/lQB?
A Mmzamhican guvernement Hommunique deecribee 'the SADF
attamk 35 "a gross vielatien ef the nerme and prlerlp19'
Hf international coexthenre"n It was even mare serious
in tha light at the fact that the two statee have "a
nanweggreeHien accnrd- which Hmuntry has Hcrupulequy
respected". 1

Fereigh; Minieter Pasceal Mocumhi telle 4cze diplematic
corpe that "The facts in Hur paeeeHelan end the context
in whi.ch the attack tmok place5 prove that the amt Nae
perpet ra-teH by Pretoriau He Haid the attack was "not
z-hly a violation of mar eevereignty, but a flagrant
vielatieh Hf the Nkmmati Aczcerd"u

The Sue rHian 15/6/1987. . . a
foicl.alHln Maputo Hey that about 1.9QQ hNR haVe
infiltrated frmm SA inte Gaza province in the previous
twm months One reason for the reperted infiltratiehvmayl
be t0 thwart the reopening of the Limpope line linking
Zimbabwe te the port of Maputeu

91H EEHHXlWB? (in.MIO NHwH Review lH/Y/1987).
SMASH annaunced the captLtre Hf a South Qirican pc"aeH pert
hulder who admitted reepenHibility fer a bemb blast in
Matnla on March 17. Geergm Ulimeim NunHH Alereon
cmnfeH Hed t0 ,being a member of a BA commando unit.
Alereon Nae horn in Angela and jmined thEI\$QDF in 1937Gu
In 198\$ he was placed in a Hpecial eammande unit, He and
ether members of the unit were sent to Mazambique to
murder memberH Of the QMC. He hed difficulty deing thiH
and left a Huिताaee containihg eHmeb DutHide the haueet
Of Home acquaintances whila he returned t0 8A for
further inetruccione. The hmmb explwded killing two
pemple. When AlerH on returned tm Mezambique he was
arr Eted. The Hecurity fmrcee fc:und a map at the
apartment Of en QNC, methr. HZHFFHHH said members Of the
grmup were infiltrated by Hea and uHHd land vehiclee t0
HWHHH land frentiere. Aleith Haid there were Sane,
AngmlahHgn Mmzambicane, Zaireane end Fartugueee in his

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unit: SQ trading companies were used as a cover. Members of his unit had also carried out missions in other Front Line States. The 'SNASP' statement says that Alersah's testimony confirms the existence of a plan of aggression. It warns that other attacks can be expected and Mozambican leaders and cadres as well as ANS members will be targets. The SA regime will try to frame the international community by blaming EJC's crimes on "internal ANC" or internal Mozambican problems". Another report by an MNR defector Nhone Sabina Ngala5 rwfara to continuing SA support for the MNR. He said had seen bandit leaders speaking to SA soldiers near the point where the BBJ Mozambican and Swazi border meet. Ngala said the South Africans sometimes threw crates of food over the barbed wire fence. Captured bandits also said that EA had supplied uniforms and foodstuffs by air. Another, - Sebastiao Magsitemba, confirmed the presence of SA troops inside Mozambique giving training and conducting same operations. Masaitemba himself was trained in Manica province. The team of instructors included four white men. v t u
Guardian 4/7/1987. . ' x

Reported the arrest in Maputa at the end of June of an Angolan carrying a South African passport. The man, named George Alereacm5 admitted responsibility for a bomb attack in Matola earlier in the year. Alereacm said he had joined the South African Defence Force after Angolan independence in 1975. For much of the time he had fought in BUDDOFT of Unita. But in 1985 he said, he had joined a special commando unit and was one of several men sent into Mozambique to murder members of the ANCH. At the end of the same month, three South African military parachutes were discovered at Vilanculos in Inhambane province, '

Guardian 4/7/1987u

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Guardian 29/5/1987n ' .x t .

In a speech over the weekend, Magnus Malah, has hinted at renewed SA support for the MNR. Although the MNR was not mentioned as such it is clear from the context that

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Atrm s Li. 'rvs. tc: .
, Southern Africa
a a cleav 'W s"
(35 N L"; b
It

of the far right has priority. The warning is- also
strange in view of the 'victoria' claiming by the police
that they had broken up two QNC networks. '
Says SA is using the Comokoa to supply aid to the 'AMNR.
SA suspended Renama aid (Via the Commrma) two years ago
but the shipments were resumed recently. The Cameras has
assumed a digprmpmthiohate impartahce following_
'Frontline states' pressure on Malawi" Indian Ocean News
I claimed SQ wash, preparing a plan with Bob Denard' to
overthrow Abdallah, who, expressed Feaervationa about the
use of the Iglanda in this way, Abdallah got wind of the
plan and decided to work more closely with SA. ' '
Nmticiaa 17/10/1987u hv , _
Hepmrts /DH. the sabotage of the railway line between
Maputo and Homatipour; On the 8th a bridge at kilometre
15, was attacked five days after the repair of another
bridge at kilometre 83. The latter was sabotaged in the
third 'week Of Baptembera ahmrtly before the flood in
Natal. The floods disrupted traffic between the Hand and
Durban. After Atthey begah attention. Ehiftwd to' the
hmgabilities of using 'Maput. 9h ShFTD delagatimh
arrived and the 'SamEhGrgahisatimn published adverts
Saying5 "Maput keeps trade going. When the bridge at
kilometre 83 was sabotaged a consignment of 'em.aoe
tcnheg was en route to Maput. The repair of this bridge
permitted 2.009 tohhes is being patched, but the
sabotage of the bridge at kilometre 51 prevented the
remainder arriving in Maput. This has created a serious
situation particularly for citrus exports. The
Theling in Maputo is that there are forces going to
dismobilisation that they are prepared to jeopardise
important 'Sachbrg even of the 8A economy. 'Gh the Chm
-hand the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and commerce
interests have threatened their interest in the pariah?
Maputo. Of the Ether hand, there are forces in SA that
'regularly order the sabotage of the Fair 3 I "
Examples, the bridge on 3.1 kilometre 83. In
February 1985 it was repaired with heavy machinery
the sabotaged again. '
w" Far
Communication of the FREQYMD Political Bureau and the
Imagacrw in the Tananga region and Gctmber E? gayg,
huhgThe' mhggatres how perpetrated jaina with a tradition
garhied Gut by "the armed bandits in Hammuiheg Mamiacae
VxDmihgm-i/iL/198?; ' g
and other places in the south of the IQUHFTu They prove
'that' the mass murder of peaceful populations? which was
solved by the methods used by the hand of 1% DOWr their
principal tactics. This- tactic 155 ahvimaly
acceptable and imperatialisised by the EButh ericam
'haaiat .regimay; which in the past months has organised
the mass infiltration of the South 75f
ambiged with the specific mission of practicing here
v
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this extreme and par ci.c:u3arly Her ltzle and ihhuman farm
Bf terrariem5 Carried nut ih::lie(:1331hately agaihet menE'
wwmen aha children; Thi.e tactic ef the apaftheid regimefl
Spurn; man the griszdnd by the hmde eat; at armed handitrya
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f lmw the failure of the attempt t0 divide the cemntry-
\$.5M3g the Zambezi. which wee frustrated by determined
actimn 'by the M03; amt3i.tan armed forcee ----- FF'LMn It elem
follow' a series ef verhcl aggrereions. threats and
hritle agairw t the People's Republic 0% H::ambi.que and
its; leadere by members cf the raciet Duth hf rican
?egimeg which have recently ihtenzif 163d" dThe abjective
of this Ftactic Qf ,pure terrtcr in ta sew fear and
ineeCUFity 'emohg the populacze ef thel eeuth 'Of the
ceuhtrye and cut eff uur capital from the FESt Of the
country; .Thie eecalation of South hffrican aggression
agaihef MozambiQe comes, also, at a mmhent in which the
interhatianal ieol: -tio:3.0f the apartheid regime 15 beihg
reinfrpcd I an-d .in WhiCh lt\$ ettempte t0 premwte
internationallyh armedr. banditry as a legitimate
'oppaeitimn ta the policy of .eur government are
faili.rtgg.gThe Political Bureau of the Frelimm Central
Cumm:& ttee calla Oh the, international cammunity t0
Velnf0rce still more the isolation of t.he apartheid
regime and increar we support to the People'e Republic of
meambique.rmhcbs Of barbarity euch as thoe that have
been .committed reinfmrce the Emnvictien Of the
Mozambican people, of their party and their government
that the renly dielmgue poeeible with banditry le' the
dialogue Of arme... "

Q m.llitary emurEe says that the bar3dit group reehne j.ble
fur the massacre had set up a camp -ih the Calahga zone
an the coast, where they received supplies by sea from
South AFFicen '3 '

16/11/1?B?. , .

Mozambican armed forcee eay that_tw0 SAAF Impala fighter
bnmbere vielated Mozambican air space in the Vicinity cf
Panto do Ogre on the 11th. Violations Of air space have
increased in recent days.

24/11./1987.

Two SA alrcraft viulated M02 -ambican airspace on the 22nd
ln the Mateequenha regian nmrrth Of Namaacha district.
The .plane Jwere detected by a unit Of the Frentier
Guards at iEonclock and stayed in mazambican territory
for about'33.minute. The general 'taff of the FPLMf do
not know the reaeoh far this incursinn which viola e5
ulaueee. in the Nkomati accord. Mateequenha'is about ED
kme from the frontier.

Wee! 3.y Hail 27/11 1 'x/12/1987 ' -

Tr.ish Hahekom tells how in 198: she was part 0? a three
ee.eo nuaspy ring which ob? .ained a truniwlead .of tap
secretdamumente from the directorate Of a epecial task

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farce Df the SADFu This had det.all15 Of deg tabi ligatian
QhwratiBng in Angola, Leg Luthw, Mozambique and Zimbabwen
The ether" in the ring wera Berek Hanekam and Raland
huntwr HUM 3" had baen a pergmnal assistant tm Col
3Ur3ellwc van Niekerk. van Niekerk headEd "Operation
M1161"a the cnde mama lfmr SQ Eupport' t0 Renamm:
"Qperation M133 was the mmmel project 1 regarded ae
affective and CM t efficient w for mther aperatimns with
the LLA, Unita and Zimbabwean disgidnt3. The grmup Q&t
hold Of infmrmatcn documenting: 1 . M
H The use by a civl3.lan Drganisa 3tlan Of the Hillbraw
Euat dffite t0 broadcast propaganda Tar ?The Vaice Of
Wee Africa": a
H Ck naignmmnts ta Rename of new AH 47 rifleg, with the
serial numbers eraaed:
TX M11ltary comrdinates and datea fer drmpa Of armg and
suppliea ta Renamn; - ,
k The use af 3 company, "Frama Intertrading" a3 a front
to transport officials invalved in "Operation M113";
1 R 5 .000 to fit Gut _Dhlakama and Dthe Dr Rename afficia 15
with clothing to attend 3 conference 1:1 Hes t Germany-
\$ The ipayment of wages to .enior Renamo offic."1a15 in
camp3, two near Phalaborwa and One north cf Pretoria;
1 The payment at mmnies ta Rename officials in Malawi.
Ether detailchannot be published in 8%" Much sf this
infmr3t10n found itE way to Mozambique. Hanekam said
tth severity of the Chargeg agaihat the three were
ruduzzed becauae memberg mf the State Security Council
mlt they could hat risk relmaa sing highly Sensitive
material eyen in an in canera tri alu
wln 3'1?W/1 .
Repmrtga an interview given by Trish Hahekam in Harare.
Tn addition tn the elements in the Weekly Mail report
EY/11 1 3/12 above), EhE 331d Col Cmrneliua van Nie MLEFL:
was head of "Operation Mila" (the code name fer .SQDF
support fur the M-NR). He wag a 53min? afficer in thE
Directorate of Special T1
133355 which fell under the Chief
9f Laff IntelliQEHQCQu .vah Niekerk wmrked nut of lthe
Zanza. Building in Pretoria, The grmup had g0tlhold Bf
top secret dwtuments Showing detaila Of the fmllawing
(in. additiOn to those things mentioned in the Weekly
Mail'repnrt): '
K thgignmentai t0 the MNR Of brand haw QH 4? W1fle 3,
with their serial numbers_eraaed. These came fram a
stock .Df Such weapahs kept ln 3 warehmuse' at
Voortrekkerhoagte;
Military caardina t35 and dates of dropa to MNR :ampa
h Muzambique. Nmrally Dakota aircraft were used;
. 6%
\$ The payment 31 mmmey under Civilian. cmvar t3 MNR
leaders in Malawi.
, .

MGtQ (Zimbabwe) December-1987/January 1988:

Article on Trish Hanekom adds that in addition to arms the SADF supplied fertilisers, propaganda leaflets and even stencils (with 'made in South Africa' stripped off) for an MNR 'hearts and minds' programme. 'Hanekom also reported that the killing of Umlando Cristina was carried out with SADF approval' 'A decision was taken by the Operations 'to eliminate him' amidst factional disputes' within the MNR. Col Cornelius van Niekerk is currently as the head of the Directorate of special Tasks.

.Africa Confidential 2/12/1987.

Nuticias

Article on RENAMO links with Special-Forces Command of the SADF saying that the key to RENAMO's political and even military strategy is to be found in military intelligence headquarters Special Forces Command at SADF HQ, and in the operations room of Five Reconnaissance Regiment at Phalaborwa. Special Forces 'tasked to run SQ'; secret weapons using techniques developed by the Portuguese and perfected in Rhodesia. Special Forces are 'the operational arm of Military Intelligence'. According to SA sources, RENAMO's operational centre is at Phalaborwa. It is here that recruits are trained and supplied organised and it is from here that members of 5 Recce travel to Mozambique to carry out sophisticated acts of sabotage. They receive air support from air bases at Lusitania and Haedspuit and the Electronic eavesdropping Centre at Marikamp. Special Forces are 5,000 strong; commanded by Maj Gen H. van der Naal. Each Recce has its own commandant, normally a Lt Col. The Special Forces have to operate with maximum discretion so as not to embarrass the government; A vital component is veterans of Rhodesian Special Forces and Salsas Scouts 5 Recce which supports RENAMO has about 750 people including 500 blacks. It has its own air, sea, land and sabotage specialists: 15 Becca is not the only one which supports RENAMO. Another is led by Breytahn (formerly of Breyten) and operates out of Lusitania. Thirty One Battalion based at Duku Duku also does Special Forces circulate information and a need to know basis and most do not inform civilian politicians of their work. EA agents captured in Maputa confirm the links. Jaime Mahdlane, captured in March 1953? worked as an interpreter for Haj Andre van Rooyen who was recruiting for RENAMO. A former unit operating in Nampula and Niassa provinces is now based in the Comoros. French intelligence sources confirm the use of the Comorpag 2/1/1988.

'On "official SDFCEV in the government denounces as a "flagrant and gross violation of the Nkomati Accord" the illegal entry into Mozambique in the company of armed hand-drawn SA irregulars 'Cloete Breytenbach.

Naticiaag

Nmtic.i-

E ylenhELu publissheD Eh article about hiE
bandit camps in Mapute pravihce in the Star Ef
7. The Nkmmati Accmrd prehibite each party frmm
Ehy vprmwaganda inciting a war Df aggFEEEEioh against
ether and E15 0 mhlige; Each party, individually and
Lallectively, t0 prEvent illegal "ErDer CFDESngS. The,
smurce said that the "attitude m? the SA author.itiEs ta
this incident cmuld mnly signify, Et minimum5
ummpliuit". Breytenbach, who entered v15 Ewaziland5 13
the hrnthEr of BPEytEn Eraytenhach Eahd alga therefnre
Of Col _Breytenbach5 cummandEr Ef.E Special FOFCEs' unit
?.DCETED Eat LDUiS Trichardt, which NDFEE CIEEEly with
RE mama 1 SEE Africa Confidential, 8f12/19873:
10/QKLEBSH

A bahdit "sector CDmmEndEf", Modesta SiHLElCE, :apturEd
ln Manica /in January tmld the .EWESE that 3% NEE
continuing ta LE my Eiw. He
Epuke of supplies Erriving EL nlght Oh planes piloted by
whiteE Hha EpokeE.Engl15h.

EXEXEQBBn

UrE Of the handitg who handed himEEIf aver t0 the
authoritiea under the Emheaty law, Rbilin Jamgjl-Hhez-1.i whm
Etht thrEE yEEFE with the bandits 1h Tete provincea
EEid that there were 8 \$9 black military pEFEmnnEl in E
Widit base in Furancungo zwhe. HE EaId theY NEFE
inatructmra who Elsa hianned GDEFatiOR\$u
LuIE EumaE, another fDFmEr b&mdit,l said that t. E bandite
had been QFDEFED tn intangify their attackg DH pOWER
llnEE Ehd rmEdE, particularly in the centre ef the
cmuntry. ThiE WEE based Oh several consideratiuha5
including the agreement ah C'Ehor: BEE 5a and an attempt
ta EFES\$K the MuzamL.1L can gmverhment t0 FE: anisa the
blndite

NEECBEZ .11; MEL. 4/31'19538 1(3/2/1CPERB

Article by Phillip vah NieKEFP sayE "Na Qhe in Maputm
hat even the western dlplomatic CQFpE, is in Ehv doubt
that Sputh afri .Ca 1: dixectihg Ranamo from aCFDEB the
burder". M11.itary SOUFCE\$ in Mahute EVE quated claiming
that the c:hly L.EFFitERY wtd czh Rename cantrwls 15 E Etrip
around Malanje :Milange '?) mm the Malawi border and Same
land Eta the north Qf BQFEHQQEE. The cLhEr" cri.tical war.
EFEEE incl lude Emutherr Manica5 northErn TE tm and the
Ecuth Of Inhambane. The"E RENamD strategy EEE.nE ta bE
dire:ted at EEEEEEEihEting lmcal lEEeDEFE and de Htr Dying
.infrastructure. A farmer tra-rrujJLt:i ihterviewEd duhing a
v.i:_t t0 N1EEEE province, EpDKE ahmut helhg taken ta E
:Emp in dalawi "wheVE Emma whit.E pEDple 1 the hEad of
the Lazaamz!JLLE,I Berhaam, tmld HQ thev NE re Smuth Africa-nE w
came and gaVE US a mEHl. L1El ihSpEctimh Enm :ElELLED uE
Euclmfding tn age fur trElnlhg", The military cummander
Of the EFEVihCEF. Brigadier MEHUEl.HENjiche, EaId "The

Smuth Africans are giving direct military aid to the bandits by air and by land. We knew they are dropping supplies from airplanes". 20,000 meals in Niassa w 202 hf the population are displaced but since September a train has been running to Lichingau - Nuticiag 23/3/1988

SQ supplied large quantities of arms and ammunition to bandits operating in the central part: cf Mozambique in December and January' according to a youth whom was involved in unloading the supplies" Fernanda Taps? who handed himself over to the authorities in Beira. The army had been landed by \$93 on the coast between Beira and the Zambezi river. He said GHQ, mines, ammunition and mortars had been supplied. He said the tomahawk of the base called Macioambnd? a had said he had come from South Africa. Eduardo Manuel, another former bandit said he had 599m large quantities of arms and being transported in the same base. The loading, during the first week of January had taken several days to complete, He said that the presence of Smuth Africans among the insurgents was a sacrilege to anyone.

3 Paula Oliveira 2/3 /88

----- Eve Fernandez and Artur Janeiro de Faria enter Harare. The BRA? Daka in January 87, w 'an Niekark helps install fax and cipher machine in contact Phalaborwa June 1987,.

the army supplies photographs handed over; _

the name Brig van Niekerk, Brig van Tonder, Col Grohelaar and \$01 du Free: as SADF officers directly involved with Renamo du Free: imprisoned out of Malawi;

Notes taken at Frelimo Conference with Paulo Oliveira 23/3 /1988

Oliveira is a Portuguese citizen, who lived in Mozambique between 1960 and 1972 when he left for family reasons. In 1981 he came into contact with Eva Terhahdes and Renamo. He was part of the external representation of Renamo between 1981 and 1983. In 1983 he was asked to go to SQ to take charge of the "Voice of Free Africa" radio station. This operated from various parts of SA. He also worked on the production of propaganda leaflets. This experience was a blow to 199. The degree of SA CD, literally over the MNH, while in EA he met. Dhlakama on, various occasions and in fact Dhlakama. was in SA more than half the time that Oliveira was there; The first time he met Dhlakama was at a farm owned by the SQDF located 30 kms north of Pruthria. The main centre, of the bandits in SA is located in Primes Street, Pretoria. Between June and November 1983, Oliveira was stationed at a base in Pmtgietergrustg where the general staff of Renamo were based until the camp was closed for security reasons in November 1983 and the headquarters moved to Phalaborwa.

Dliveira ,himself left EA on March 16 1984 (the day Of the Signing Of the Nkomati accord)a He Said everything indicatmw that the installatiana at Phalaborwa cantihue ta aperate: The tommunicatijng facilitiea have certainly mantihued ta fuhctimn. The lmcatimn of the base is ath 'thE cmhfluence of the Dlifiantg and Selati rivers" The bandita raceiveAlmgialtical augport from the barracks of the 7th SQ Infahtry r;-3t;;1'.mtsamt_a locatEd at Phalahurwan No 5 Remus tommandmg statiohad narth of Phalabarwa providea training support, DltveiraAalsa knows that thE bandits Faceivedn support ,frem Emma figures in the Portuguese military. C01 Farnandu Ramms, of the Informatimn (Intelligence ,?) Department of tha Staff at the Pcrtugueset armed forces was one such figure" Ramos was at _the farm outside Pretwria at the time whent Ovlahdc Cristina ?was murdered. Elementa in Rename who tried to intraduce politics _ihto Renamo tended to' disappear: Control jalways,remained firmly in South african handsg SA strategy today is the same a3 it wag in 1983 w when C01 Grobelaar wag in charge Of logistical support. BA'S .aim' ia hmt-to put Rehama in pcwervbut'ta create maximum ?qanfugion and destruction in Maiambique. Thia 15 alga tthe strategy of the main figures in the external wing, Eva fernandea never expected the war to end, but like SQ .HaS relying 'mn a continuation of the warn It is Vpreciaely thi% which 19d ta maagacrez and which pravmked Dliveira tD leave Renammlin.mctmher 1987. t 7 . t 4")

Q: What proof of SA impolvemaht deea he have .ALIn January 1987, EVD ferhandhs entered Mozambique frmm SR on a GA (SAAFB'DC E Dakotaa He left the game may, atcmpanied by Jansiro de Pangaea, secretary_for Fureign, Relationsu

Dn-E4 and 25 June 1Q87, Brig Charles vah Niakerk ar'ived in Lisbon land ,contacted Fernandes 'and Uliveirau Saphisticated. equipment t0, contact Phalahmrwa % including. a fax and_a cipher machine _ NEFE ihatalled, Thim cqmmunicatimna system cantinuas ta operate" There is anather maahina in West Germanyu Before this cammunication between SA and Renamo in Eurmpe wag by t phune. '

a-:,

Q. What about supply Cf weapons after Nkamati

Au Oiiiveira said he has photographg taken on baard 59/4 planes-gwing t0 MDzambtque Of Lmui\$_Nel, Brig van Tander and Jarge Emrreia together with arma and mmts cycles" One 3hmwa Mel on an antiwaircraft gunu I

G, On the attitudh Df_Portugal,

VA. There Was no prchlem far Renamm or Unita people living and operating in Portugal: They hai linkg with l&

IFLIQJ mf the Portuguege armed fmrcega erandm Cristina
wag paid 25 cantos a manth.

8. Un dmcumehthry promf an EA invslvement pasthkamatin
Q, Has given material ta the Mmznmbi.can authmr1.tles. 911
tha evidenc? suggeatg that SA is Cuntlrulng tm _upput
the MNRHbandi

Q. On 89 involvement in mdasrcredn

A" No prnmf, but 89 9a ther: informatimn which 15 paagad
on t0 bandit groupg who are teld to attack gne locatinn
OF another.

mu Dh thg West German an: US connectiensu

' L

Q. There'1\$ an active 1lhk between Pretoria and Bann and
this has a lat of tmntrol aver the handitgu There 15
another Washington -Far15 a::lm and there 15' competition
_between'.the twu. Janeirm de FanSeca 13 haaad in West
Germany, where Support comeq from the Dept Of thm
Defence rf the Congti utian (partly thraugh family
Lanhectimng Of F-erhandeg), the Ihfmrmatimn Minigtry and
Defencea There is alga suppart ln the FRB from advigera
to Chancellor thl and a Profesahr (Thoma: hauahn) from
Kiel Univargity (alsm the Unlverssity Of Smuth HTFica)a
In the 'US Lha re are lihka with Jeaee Helmg and the
Heritage foundation. Tom Echaff appeared one day saying
he had been in cant taszt with Dhlat:am.a.

In nguet 198\$ a meeting wag held in the White House
hetwwen MNR Offlc.1alh (Correia and Funaeca) and Patrick
BULhanan (then Reagan' 5 Dire .cztar Of Cmmmmunicat.iuns1
Ga Uh competltion far cmntralq

Q. Up to haw SA haa had a mDHOpoly Of cantral over
thnammu The US triad t0 get 1H3 but it was difficult for
them. Thia/ attempt created'cmnflicta within wnterhal
Rename w between _Nashingt看 and LisstH. (the latter
being pVONSA)n Thig alga had repercu551mh5 ln IVIc'xlewsJL,l
where many Renama live 6? paag through, '

G" What ha Hpened On the N19? .t. 0T Gctobar 1? 1W\$5 7

Au Qt dawn 'On the 20th, Oliveira was alerted by
Fernahdea- t0 he rmady far nmwa abmut the plane of
Preaideht'Machel He was a3 :0 contacted bV Eomeone from
Phalabmrwa. They CONT irmed the hewa Q? the craah5 gave
him a liat hf those on bmard5 and 531d that it may be
necessary'fariRenamo to claim thia actimn. They were on
tandby until midday, when they were told that thia
would hmt be necessary. , 1x 1 p '

341.. The??? 4: htiu. 53441;.
:35 355".ty 45
ER 555 534 5ur5 what 45 du
R5m5m5 might hav5 45
brimm down 4h5 515nm:
Eu Gm cmmmp5titinn 554 545 45541555 and 4h5 death5 Of
\$4aid5 5nd L5555 in .5lawiu
\$upwor4 frmm EA i5 effiaialg fram the U? it 55555
414 545 right wing granpEI Rtaide M55 link wiih
Of the 13445:. H5 5.nd L5555' 55:4 part 5? 4h5
wnnhwng45nukarl: aHiE. Th5y were prmbably kl13.5d bv 4h5
eretox"ia mli5bm5 5315; me55' F551 nam5 wa5 Jo55 mlfreda
55 CD545. Th5 5555 amnt. (31 R5rxam5 j.n Malawi. The main
' 5 15 5 \$51 d5 Free: 04 Military Ln45111genh . H5 is
gibla warticularly far 5p5rati525 in T5-.5 5nd w5n4
nh5F5 in December 198? when a Pmrtugue5e :jli55n 555
abdu545d. He L450 4r5VN135d in \$5 515555 carrying
54455155. 5 4rad5r in h5145Qq 555 15 a R5nam5 Suppar45r
r m5d that he -zaw war m545rial 5nt5ring M5:5mbique
M515wi 54 4H5 555 54 195 u
m
:4
f
43
G. Um ijva4e Suppnrt f"5m 4H5 U355 d555 4515 imclud
waapana V
5. N5 medicin555 bibl55 etcu
G" On cmntamts with For4ugu55e military p5r55nn5l,
Q. R5p0r45 w5r5 5554 45 4H5 Chi5f 54 Staff by Dth5r4
wiLHle42 54fic5r5u T5555 15 no evidenC5 m? Pvrtugm?
5upplying armS but medicima 5nd 54h54 5uppli55 5515
55H4 via 5 5554 Of? :55 hex in F'h5labmrwa.
5.4
G. On jmmrnali545 paid by 35"
5: Ricarmm N515 Of the m5gaxin5 erima
F5rmand55n nTenmndvr 81555 mf UF1 vi5'
" .. ("4
H 435: :3
rm!
3. On nonm35uth.%frican5 54 \$5 55555.
5, N5 5vidanc5 Of 4hi5; 0515555
prmvmk5d by SA mili45ry
4hwir in45 :545, SR
".d Cristina. F5rnandm
. . 555 in 5% 54 the ' M
Turward 5Dm5mne 553.155 Mamma55 :5
leF'IK... m... 5 4:31.14. m?! 5r 5va4 4
3.53114 n
33 En 55w di5eid5nt grmum5 in
5, N5 d5fml45 Lnfurmatlun
v I5 4M5 Hg Pilmunas 4r,in Q 45 rival SH far cmn4rsl

A. J:mEE "lanthard III and ChEFIEE C3::lmravide Ebmut \$
 SHGQO a month fOF:thE Infarmatian Office .in the U89:
 Blanchard is a EUEinEEEmEnu

G. 8m thE French connection End FEEEDHEE tn amnesty
 Q" There EVE pemple in the French prEEidenEy and li:kEd
 t0 Shiram,whu EVE \$UD\$Gftiv91 TheFE EVE at leaEt Emma
 EEEEEIE in LiEbDH wha want to rec .urn. 1

G. On SQ'E attitude to Sahara HeREE-.
 as In 1983 in SA EffiEEEE Eupparting armed bandite an
 photEE Of b.-Ewn up lineEu lf SA wanted the EEHEME ta
 functimn it cnuld EEE -hjly EHSUFE that it dues
 Q; Um Manuel Frank.

A" HE hEE been inv01VEE E'mxtE lW85XE and is a dELEQEte
 in LiEbmn, HE lE mat En l:hE National Cauncil Ef RENEmEn
 HE lE linked ta hE SAXFERnandEE grmupu
 : On POFTHgUESB military aid t0 Maxambique End Malawi.
 Q1 The Portuguese Chief of Sta.ff agreed td the EEnding
 Of nan lethal aid to the Muzambican QOVQFHmEHtu Malawi
 generally turnE a blind EyEl
 81 DR a political programmEu
 Q" There was a mini-plan in 19831 but thi.E WQS nEVEF
 implemthEdu Q FEEearch group under FPWHQNGEH tried tn
 draw up a new constitutimn but HQVEF had capable ?%FEGHHQI:
 91 On maEEacree,
 Q: Reports rEaching Lisbon Edicza .ted they WEFE caryied
 uut by Flemamo. The Etrategy iE tE SUFFO End the capitalnl
 BDmE in LiEbDn wanted ta try tn diEtanCE Renamo from
 the HDmEinE massacre, but the gEnEral view waE that it
 wEE Rehamuu TheFE lE a QEHE EFEE EriEntdllwn tn deny
 maEEacree and blame government fQWCEE:
 '1?

Q. Why did Renamw abandmn MEQ mtj.atie nE after NlJHEEl
 Eu Fernandes was taken by Surpri\$Eg The SQ military
 imflueHCED thie'dEciEiEn.
 Q1 Qn the Bmmba bFetheFEu
 Q, QnE war killed by EA military in 59; the other by
 Rename ,in Mozambique" UnE wEE invmlved in 12ill ing
 BriEtinan

19

.
r'x
x

Q. Why Neva Farnahdea and Jorge wmrreia Pemmmved tram
Renamm'g Natianal CDUhcil ?

Q. Fernandes Epnhe Of racigm lh Rename. He Said he wmuld
try to egtahligh annther 'pogitiuh fer his grmup.
Hmwever, by 1?87/8 his influence had QFDWH because at 39
Luppmrtt Cmrreia wanta t0 Succeam FEFhandes \$5
ecratary general. Fernandes and Fonseca manaeuvred to
lack thig.

C:
.4
b

9. On attackg against Zimbabwe.

9" ,Some Zimbabweana were in campa in 198\$; Wham Correia
want to the USA he met Sithole and iacusaed jmint
actimhu SA gave the green lightu

Q" Uh the relative influence Of Dhlakama and the
external wihg, '

Q. immng the 5A militaryg tha main prammccmpatioh i5
keeping h an eye. Oh Dhlakama and Fernandeg_ "and
aubardinating them to SA palicy.

RIM Information Bulletin 164 April 1988

Paula Uliveira Named BrigadiEF van Niekerks Brigadier
van Tondera C01 Graebbler (5lc m Grmhelaar ?) and C91 du
VPrae: a5 SADF mfficara invalvad with the MNRH Grmhelaar
had confirmed ta Dliveira that Sate abjective wag "net
t0 put the)MNR in government but t0 create maaaiva
confuaimn and difficulty inaida Mazambique". du Praez
had mperated amt mf Malawi for the HNR and cragged intm
'Tete pruvinde in December 1987" Uliveira Said that' the
SA military exerciaed strung central aver Malawi"
Uliveira gaid .hat in general the targeta far MNR
actiahg are ChOE h by the 8% military.
weakly M&il 25w3Q/3fl988n .

Rahrmducea page threa of banned New Nation which
includes a repnrt Of the trial Of Detective Sergeant
erert van der Merwe for murder at twm drug traffickera
and the attempted'murder at a third.r van der Merwe said
tin evidence that Emme'time laat year ha and a colleague
met a certain Emmmahder Jmhh Vurster at Nelspruitr "With
thim waa anwthet individual who gaid he wag reaponsihla
far linka between a certain ergahisatimn tM which we
understand to be Rename w and the Sauth African
gavernment".' "9% far as we could deduce he wag invelved
in aupwlyng the Mozambican reaistance movement with
whatever "they needed.a,l saw various weapong Of
aammunist origin in his garage, and I pragumad'thhy were
thwatihed fat that Qrgahiaatimn"a gaid van,deh Harman Ha
Said that Clandeatine DPEFatidHE invalvad thy the
mommahdihg officer and the officer carrying hut the
aparatimh. knDWing of it" "It ghems to me that such
actisns are illegal in terma of the iaw,t but I cqnsider

Naticias

Nmticiaa

them legal in terms Of ELlperiDF mrdarg"u van dar Merwm
admiLled killing Bernie Ugle and police infarmer F'etm
F'illay w bmth mf whmm werw idantiLied a5 CLFLAQ
erfLIq ,g He said he killed them becauSe he Iaas
CanvihCed Lhey were QNC mmmhergp He EaId he beliaved he
wag mm a C landestine operatiah autherisad by hig
Emmerior m thaCcused Le Brahge, HE campaFed this actiah
with assasainatimns Of RNC memberg in Bwa;: .ilard.
38/3/1988. . -

Q farmer bandit named Albino Avelihm told Ra im
Hazamhique that a South African jaurhalist? whm ante lei
CMQEambique illegally with thh handita waa killad by the
armed 'fmrceg during a bandit aLtzCL an a communal
village at Eaia in Smfala prmvihce last vaemheru
28/3fl988u

f Gr: 9.y told- a preag canfermnce held an NarCh 28 that a
Smuth African evangelia t Peter Hammcsnd5 Entered
Mmhdmbqlum thh.5everal QCCaEimn% in the company sf
mwrcenariea ffrom SQ. Hammnnd leads a group called
"Fhmhtline FelldWEhip" which mparatwg Cut hf Cage meh.
Hammond entered Mozambique en various CJCC aaionagin the
campahy of farmer membmrq Of the SADF in ,an 'aircraft
piloted by somaone knmwn aa "Fanny" (Fania) w a; former
member Of the BA Air Force. Hammond also Lravel ed to
IVL.'-.xlcz4m;:i.,I where he met Rmdnay Heine Qf the lbandit
" nu Grey said that in thE graup Of
mNFLOHAFLha wag a farmer mamher mf the Quatraliah armed
feres. The latterB howeveri did not enter Mmmamhique
be: age ha 'wag net authariged by Heiheu GPQyI\$
invlveht with the armed bandita began in March 1987
when he maved ta Blantyre t0 Hark far the "'heiiinah
cylunu u Hammond had Spread rumourh Chat Grey ,had
EEEEH turtured by thE Mazambicah authmrities w this was a
lien Grey 3130 spoke of the ihvolvemant .af certain
individualg'frmm the USA. Uh th accasion Grey had flgwn
mm a plana pilated by "Fanny" Lage:her with Michgel
Howard. They left the airgtrih aL N' Mtge and flew 10w
TLC Borahgmsa. A bugfneaamah named JaCk Miller and
anothar Chipmled -man were 313 an the flight. Grey
uppvuled t0 calleagues in the "Ziun bible callege" in
New Lx'ork nnt t9 Vwark with tha armed bandi te.a He
mentioned a ZimbabweEn named Tommy, whm had bash
agiigned to work with Greyu
8/4/1988.

QR official gmvarnment gaurce Epeaking t0 AIM ahmut the
attamped assaasination CL Albie Sach55 EaId "Thoae
reshanaihle far this attampt can mnly be the .2ame whm
mrganiae Land lead armed banditry against QUF CQUhtry,
that is, the apartheid regime", The aource characterised
thie Sachg _as a man of pwaCe and aakad "Until what
point will the internatiuhal-Cwmmuni.tv LLmlerate Lthis
atatev terrmrigm whiCh dmga nmL know waWhLEF" Cr Limita

53:31:. t. I 23m

Hat"

H

1t3 blmudy murder and 33351 n

13/4f1988u

:1 article in tha Sunday Star of April 1Q5. whi ch
quetes intell.igence SOUFTe\$ in SA 3aylng that a secret
3squad of highly trained prwfewulonul 33.333133 with an
unlimited 3ph3r3 of attinn and acce33 tn funds, had been
; 3ated t0 3trlk3 agaiHEt vh4m133 at the a3artheid
Fagime. The 3P133d i3 khmwn a3 2 Squad3 Incargnrated": A
"Z Squad" wa3 33tabli3hmd by BUS S j.n thm 1??03. the
pr333nt 3QL13d3 3r3 :mntrallmd by N.Sa HIS: Europ(:3n
H39 dqtarters ara in London: The '2 Squad3" mperating in
Europe wart. cammanded by Hifk Stmfberg, whn w33 recently
5nt:eroga atad at Heathrmw airport" H3 ham 3 li3t 3f 2D
members and symp3lh1 arzs Of the GNU. leiE \$ach3' name
w33 ammg.th3mu

African Report 22/4/19883

33y3 that Police investigating-the murdmr/ of Dulcie
September 3V3 f0cu33ing an an Drganiaatibm cf rightwing
Filler3 cmmprsed Q? Italian3, Spaniard3 and farmer EASY
Franchmen. They believe the33 may h3v3 been hired a3
"c antract" killer3,' Link3_' w; ith EA ara Ewing
inve3tigated Police 333 link3 with the attempt on the
life of .lbie Sach3, An Italian EEDmeECiStg M3rtm
(3:3.ang 33ld in evidence that mne at the 333313 linked
tm thi.3 group Of hitmantwa3 Giovanni Maria Riccin Craig
Njillam3om 3 bu3ine33 partne . Africa Analysis 3ay3 that
M? 3; if Ricci wa3 not directly involved he HDUld know
whom to turn far far "3yemial prmjact3". Th3r'..- 13
another link " General Gianablio Haleattiq former hr3aa of
internal 3ecurity at the Italian Secret Service5 fled ta
SQ after being implicated in the 33cap3 0: right wing
t3rrorist3.

9/4/1988 FF 3 ;

A farmer bandit LUiS Tama3 teld Radio Mocambique that
Smuth African 3oldier died during a r313 by
meambican airfarce on a 3333 at Chadar3 in Ha
prmvince. 'He had emt3re3 anambiqua 113t October with
mth3rt SQ military p3r3mnh31 t0 3uppmrt armed bandit3n
Th3 other three were evacuated byva SQ waligopter 310mg
with a Malawian Ci.t1:3n. Tb 3 group had b33h intending t0
erect 3 r3310 tram mi tern

,L6X5f198En

Imv33tigatimn3 .intw the C3333 Of th3 three F'Qrtugmezm
uit123n3 aFFECted ln conn3(:tien with the pr3paration 3f
act3 3? t3 Mrw or.13m have been almm3t angiwtmd a.ccardlng
ta 3 3curce in SNAP WP The thrae 313: Ante him d3 Carma
331335 31 yaar3 nldg and Antariu Gmhczalv335 4615 hath
r33133nt in Haputm M and Rntonim JD33 303 Santo3 15
2?, r331d3mt in M3331hil Swaziland. BNQSP Say3b Wt
33333 will 3hmrtly be 3ubmitt3d ta the caurt3,

