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ATTACKING THE POOR: SOUTH

AFRICAâ\200\231S LABOUR LEGISLATION

The latest proposal by the government to extend the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCE A)

and ultimately the Labour Relations and Wage Acts to domestic and farm workers, represents an

expedient sop to entrenched elites, like Cosatu, to buy-off economic  $\hat{a}\200\234$ stability $\hat{a}\200\235$  at any cost.

Importantly, there are no economic gains to be made by the implementation of the proposed 1 abour

legislation over these two large sectors of the economy. The driving force behind the extension of

the BCEA to domestic and farm workers, rests on the notions that it is a response to the wi despread

 $\hat{a}^200^234$ exploitation $\hat{a}^204$  and  $\hat{a}^200^234$ unfair labour practices $\hat{a}^200^235$  which ostensibly take place in these sectors.

# 1. IS LABOUR A SPECIAL CASE?

The major problem confronting conventional thinking about labour relations generally, is the view

that labour, due to its human face, is not a commodity, but something special that requires protected

rights and privileges. Arguments advanced for removing wages and labour from the competitiv  $\hat{\mathbf{p}}$ 

nature of the market system, such as demands for a  $a\200\234$ living wage  $a\200\234$  or attempt s to define  $a\200\234$ unfair

labour practices  $\hat{200}235$ , have invariably been couched in ideological and sociological rhe toric. This has

tended to cloud the economic realities that govern the voluntary interaction of employees a  $\operatorname{nd}$ 

employers in the market place.

Labour is a commodity - something of value. The employee sells labour and the employer buys labour. Wages are the price paid for this labour. Contrary to those calling for social or e conomic

 $\hat{a}\200\234$  justice  $\hat{a}\200\235$ , there are no objective standards of justice which can be applied to the arbitrary determi-

nation of wage levels, or to what may constitute an  $\hat{a}\200\234$ unfair labour practice $\hat{a}\200\235$ . The determination of

what constitutes a  $\hat{a}^200^234$  fair wage  $\hat{a}^200^235$  or  $\hat{a}^200^234$  fair labour practice  $\hat{a}^200^235$  is based on highly subjective values, rather

than market reality, and are therefore impossible to quantify. Both these aspects can only be

effectively solved by the impersonal determination of wages by the market and the terms of the

employment contract.

### 2. THE DESIRE FOR LABOUR LEGISLATION

Labour relations are invariably directed by the state; driven by the misguided belief that employees

can only benefit via the forced collectivization of their efforts, rather than through voluntary

arrangements. In the search for  $a\200\234$ social justice $a\200\235$ , unions are invariably granted  $a\200\234$ exclusive agent $a\200\235$ 

status on behalf of employees in terms of a battery of government-enacted labour legislatio  ${\tt n}$  which

very often discriminates not only against the employer, but also against the employee.

The case that is advanced for government intervention in the labour market is the  $\hat{a}$ 200\234 market failure

principleâ\200\235: the argument being that the market cannot define  $a\200\234$ fair wagesâ\200\235 or  $a\200\234$ fair labour practicesâ\200\235

 $\hat{a}\200\224$  which are themselves indeterminable and heavily value-laden concepts. The problem is that

governments cannot intervene without cost to  $\hat{a}200\234$ correct $\hat{a}200\235$  what are perceived to be imperfect markets.

Somebody has to pay the price for government intervention, whether it be the consumer, the employee or the employer. The result is that while certain sectors of society may benefit from labour

legislation in the short run, the long term costs of intervention far outweigh any perceive d benefits.

The pursuit of  $a\200\234$  economic justice  $a\200\235$  through state intervention in the labour market fails three crucial

tests: a) it does not increase employment; b) it does not increase economic growth; and c) most

importantly, it does not maximise greater personal economic freedom.

#### 3. THE ATTACK AGAINST THE POOR

Notwithstanding the theoretical debate as to whether there is a case for specific labour le gislation

of any kind, on a practical level, the desire to bring South Africaâ $\200\231s$  labour legisl ation in line with

internationally accepted standards, as laid down by the International Labour Organisation, is ill

considered. As a developing country, South Africa is not suited to the super-imposition of the type

of labour legislation which is found in developed countries, on economic sectors that are a wash with

 $\hbox{unskilled or, at best, semi-skilled labour. Basic conditions of employment-especially aspects such}\\$ 

as minimum wage legislation — are far easier to apply in developed countries, where the tar  $\operatorname{\mathsf{get}}$ 

groups affected by such legislation (ie, those who fall below set basic conditions of renum eration),

are far smaller than those found in developing countries. The greater the number of people affected

by minimum renumeration requirements, the greater the dislocation to the economy and the th

of increased unemployment in the labour market. Nowhere is this more clearly illustrated th an with

the introduction of minimum wage legislation.

# 3.1 An Ally of Unemployment

One of the most destructive weapons in the legislative armoury of labour market interventio nists

is the statutory setting of minimum wages. Though South Africa does not have a national min imum

wage level, the current Wage Determination Act defines certain minimum requirements for spe cific

economic sectors, as do the country's twelve Industrial Council Agreements. While there is no

immediate plan to extend the Wage Act to domestic and farm workers, it is certainly the lon  $\operatorname{\mathsf{ger}}$  term

objective of both Cosatu and the government.

The demand of the South African Domestic Workers Union (SADWU) for a flat R450,00 per month minimum wage level for domestic servants, best illustrates the problem. A recent World Bank

report by economist Peter Fallon is critical of minimum wages saying they  $\hat{a}\200\234$ signific antly reduce

employment in labour intensive sectorsâ\200\235. The fundamental problem is that any define

d wage level

discriminates against, for example, the youth, women, the unskilled, and the unemployed, who are

willing to sell their labour for less than the set wage level. Simply put, it denies entry into the job

market for many people, resulting in higher unemployment. With up to 40 percent unemploymen t

in South Africa, there is a need to equalise access to job opportunities in the market place rather

than to enact legislation that will protect workers at artificially high renumeration level s.

### 3.1.1. Impact of the BCEA

Logically, this analysis can be extended to the consequences of the proposed extension of the  $\ensuremath{\mathsf{BCEA}}$ 

to domestic and farm workers. Almost every aspect of the BCEA, whether it be the setting of fixed

working hours, outlawing  $\hat{a}200\234$ child labour $\hat{a}204$ , or setting compulsory pay for overtime, all constitute

higher barriers of entry into the labour market for prospective job seekers. Such legislati on strips

the poor or unemployed of their most effective bargaining weapon  $\hat{a}\200\224$  their ability to voluntarily

provide a cheaper service than their protected counterparts who fall under legislation such as the  $\ensuremath{\mathsf{BCEA}}$ .

Given that unemployment will inevitably increase as a result of state intervention in the  ${\tt l}$  abour

market, the suggestion by some, that employers must simply  $\hat{a}\200\234$ bite the bullet $\hat{a}\200\$  and pay more, does

not solve the unemployment problem. Short of introducing draconian Stalinist-type legislati on

forcing employers to employ  ${\tt X}$  number of employees under pre-determined conditions of employ

ment, the market will deal harshly with any coercive tampering of the going wage or renumer ation

rate, either by increasing unemployment or inflation.

Contrary to trade union objectives, it is the employee and consumer rather than the employe  $\mathbf{r}$ , who

bears the greater brunt of any manipulation of the labour market.

#### 3.2 Unions: Enemy of the Poor

Most unions specifically dislike competition in the market place, espe \_aily in the market for labour.

Stripped of their humanitarian facade of improving worker conditions, unions demands for collective

bargaining clauses; work preservation clauses to ensure that dismissals do not occur; the l ast-in first-

out (LIFO) principle; picketing rights to deny employers the ability to employ workers from outside

the union; and minimum employment  $\hat{A}$  conditions, all essentially constitute a protection rack et to

shield their members from  $a\200\234$ irritants $a\200\235$  such as  $a\200\234$ scab $a\200\235$  labour and the intrusions of the poor and

unemployed into the labour market. Furthermore, trade unionists and labour relations expert  $\boldsymbol{s}$ 

concede that there might be a  $a\200\234$  few  $a\200\235$  dismissals or a knee jerk reaction to the implementation of the

BCEA, but merely an aberration that will soon correct itself. This expedient approach once again

underscores a cynical, at best ambivalent, consideration for workers who, however small the ir numbers,

may lose their jobs.

Though difficult to quantify, the South African Agricultural Union (SAAU) has estimated that the

extension of South Africa $\hat{a}$ 200\231s current labour legislation to the farming sector could result in ten percent

of 1.3 million farm workers facing unemployment. A similar assessment could be made for the country  $a \ge 0$  and  $a \ge 0$  and  $a \ge 0$  and  $a \ge 0$  and  $a \ge 0$  are the prospect of part

time employment, resulting in a real drop in earnings

No proponents of state intervention, though, have bothered to consider the fundamental question

as to whether an individual has a right to offer his or her labour at a lower rate than the legislated

minimum requirement. Instead, labour legislation has served to entrench a labour aristocrac y

increasingly immune to the forces of market competition. The extension of the BCEA to all s ectors  $\frac{1}{2}$ 

of the economy will further entrench this elite who are essentially hostile to the poor, the unskilled

and unemployed who threaten their protected position.

# 4. THE REQUIREMENT FOR FLEXIBILITY IN WORKING CONDITIONS

A major flaw in extending the BCEA to domestic and farm workers is that it attempts to stan dardise

working conditions for sectors of the economy which require a degree of flexibility. Though not

finalised, the proposed legislation for farm workers, for example, does not take into consideration

the seasonal requirements of farming which, under certain conditions, may require lengthy w orking

hours to ensure the successful production of a crop.

Similarly, household work for domestic servants may also require working hours that fall ou tside the

proposed legislated maximum of eight and a half hours per day, as well as during weekends. Not

only does inflexible legislation concerning work place conditions inconvenience the employe r, it also

penalises employees who desire extra income from extra work.

## 5. PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS VS â\200\234WORKER RIGHTSâ\200\235

A potential area of conflict which has not been duly considered is that of the rights of property

owners vis a vis the rights of union organising. Importantly, the proposed new labour legis lation for

domestic and farm workers recognises the right for these sectors to organise freely into tr ade unions.

Freedom of association is a fundamental pillar of economic freedom.

 $\_$  This right, however, should not include the right of trade unions to organise workers on private

property without the consent of the owner. Any legislation which undermines any aspect of property

rights needs to be strongly opposed. Furthermore, any legislation overruling common law tre spassing

laws protecting property owners from outsiders, will result in conflict, especially with regard to

union organising in rural areas. Trade unions should be treated no differently to any other entity

concerning access to private property.

# 6. LETTING THE MARKET FIND SOLUTIONS

For a number of years, long before the current legislation was considered, Western Cape win

farmers had already voluntarily taken important steps to improve overall conditions for the ir

labourers. In some instances, worker committees have been set up to liaise with the farmer over

various issues, as well as to deal with worker $\hat{a}$ 200\231s problems on a social level. This d evelopment has

helped minimise victimisation and heavy handed law enforcement measures. Most wine farmers have already implemented aspects contained in the pending legislation concerning new employ ment

conditions for farm workers. In the long run. farmers with a contented labour force will perform

better than farmers who continue to cling onto poor employment practices.

Furthermore, non-governmental organisations are also playing an important role in facilitating this

process on the farms. Groups such as the Rural Foundation have helped introduce farmers to new,

more participatory, concepts of management, and improved working conditions for labourers. In

all these instances, no state intervention was required.

In the final analysis, the labour market should not be excluded from the general consensus that to

reduce employment and boost economic growth, massive deregulation of the economy is needed. In the long run, only the free market, rather than administrative fiat, can successfully raise living

standards for all employees in South Africa.

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Issued by IFF (Southern African Office), P.O. Box 67926, Bryanston, 2021, Republic of South Africa.

Telephone (011) 339-2621/2/3.

Head Office: 200 G Street NE, Suite 300. Washington, D.C., 2000 2

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