THE PRESENT PHASE OF MASS DEMOCRATIC STHUQGLE>

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The present phase of the mass democratic struggle has taken as its reference point the gains that have been made through the anti-tricamera

election campaign* This is so, mainly because the whole period building up to the August 'elections* was the period where mass democratic organ isa-

tions had shelved most of their individual specific programmes which wer e unrelated to the cappaign in favour of the anti-election pappaign* Now

that this struggle of active rejection of the racial elections has been fought and won, democratic organisations are in a situation where they a re

to re-embark on their programmes and make a drive to take them to greater

heights* This move to forge ahead to even greater heights, of course, has

been enriched by the leean one and experience drawn from the campaign itself*

The lesson and experience of utmost importance undoubtedly is the form idable

strength of unity in action of the struggling people* The level of this co-operation of the population groups was reminiscent of the level of our struggle in the 50 *s*

The UDF, being the front through which the campaign found its organisat ional

expression, has tremendously raised the expectations of the people in its

capacity and ability to organise them for bigger struggles and more decisive

voctories* This has definitely placed an urgent and bigger challenge in front of the UDF* The question now facing different organisational forma-

tions of our struggle! how to make what they have rejected unworkable how to sustain the current state of mobilisation and defiance and transfo rm

it into more co-ordinated and organised fighting* This organised fighting once neatly co-ordinated with the strong underground development and military

activity of the ANC (as the vanguard of our people's struggle, will put our struggle on the footing truly defined as the people's war)

This pahse of struggle is also going to bring up more acutely political and

organisational problems of mass democratic struggle which had been shelved

prior to the intensification of the campaign against the 'elections'* Some of these problems are going to be inevitable in a heightening mass strugg le

Because of its broad character and little experience in dealing with a front organisation, these problems are more pronounced in the UDF*

A) UDF

1* The most positive impact of tha UDF has been in the drawing in of a b road spectrum of mass organisations into common programmes and common id entification under one organisational umbrella of a front, the orchestration and

champeioning of the anti-election campaign and the creation of a largescale political olimate* Its biggest shortcoming has been its limited succe ss

in broadening the definition in practice through anti-PC activities so as to draw a common denominator of struggle for both Coloured/Indian and the

African communities* The UDF was formed with the express purpose of fighting

against the PC and Koornhof Bills* These two elements provided a very broad premise

premise for mobilisation whighh the UDF did not adequately explore* The

definition of struggle against the PC and Koornhof Mils should abave been J]

broadened to actively involve the African oppressed majority* This would

have been done by drawing a parallel in practical campaigns between the PC

AND THE Bantustans (eg repression in the Ciskei, Inkatha impis etc)} between

the Koornhof Bills and the denationalisation of the Africans through the removals etc* Hie UDF did, however, put the regime against the wall and

force it to make some retreat on the Koornhof Bills* This skirmish did not,

however end there because the regime is trying to smuggle the provision of

these bills through some other legislation*

2) Another indue of the amount of work still to be done in the UDF is the line-up of affiliates which reflects an imbalance towards community and y outh

organisations away from labour organisations* It is only a small number of T.U*s which have affiliated with the front egSAAWU^, OAHU* Larger fede rated unions like FOSATU have taken a 'negative neutrality' against affiliation'

Several reasons have been advanced for the position against affiliation, among othersv they are*

- The front is a large, loose unprincipled formation which will dilute the shop-floor structural organisation of unions (example is made with SACTU and the congress alliance and the alliance is blamed for 'weakening* SACTU)
- Affiliation to the UDF will divide these unions because part of the membership supports the NFC*
- T*U*s should not get involved in politics of mass organisations* Their struggle is only at the factory floor*

The UDF's attempt to win these unions into the front has been largely in the

addressing shop stewards of the different unions and political addresses and

articles in progressive community media* What the UDF has not done is to

take up issues which the working class will immediately identify with and then

draw up a parallel with that the UDF stands for* It shall immediately make

such schools of thought irrelevant in the ears of the working people* Such

programmes should also involve the grooming of our own people within these

unions, people who can articulate correct politios of a front* A good exam ple

can be made using the split in MAWU and Cosol Glass in Bellville* There sire

several of such simmering splits in other FOSATU and CUSA unions*

3) The UDF has also been seen as failing to provide strategic clarity and ideological strategic pace* (videi 4OI646E; 4OI524E) This has been linke d to the weakening rather than the strengthening of the affiliates by the UD F (vide* 401525Ef 401524E) These two questions will come up mores sharp ly in this post anti-election periodf the time when the UDF is called upon to cha

this post anti-election periodf the time when the UDF is called upon to chart out

its programme for the future* All the progressive forces should definitely express the desire to see the UDF strengthening its affiliates* This is the

way to ensure the strength of the UDF itself*

The question of providing strategic and ideological clarity has got differen t aspects and approaches to it* For example (vide* 4OI646E) the leading group

in Natal ie Pravin (Jordan, Yunus Mohammed, Zac Yacoob is sadi to argue that

sach region should have a structure through which it can discuss and caucus

questions at both senior and activist 1evils and the position adopted should

be a regional one* This is one way of trying to answer some of the questions

experienced by the P*E conference*

What is important to note hare is that the UDF is still young and still grappling with many political and organisational questions* So it is a bit unfair to expect the UDF to immediately give ideological and strategic clarity* By its very nature a front rests on a loose minimum basis and this

dictates the indirect way in which ideological questions can be taken or at

least catered for* The strategic clarity also lies in the UDF co-ordinating the national struggle and pushing it towards a commong goal* Another p roblem

which is closely associated with this one is that our people dont have the scperience of a front* The least that they can refer to is the Congress Alliance and as a result some people see the UDF as the ANC trying to a dapt

to the semi-legal condition of struggle*

4) The dimension that the development of the RMC is taking is a worryin g one,

(vide* 401525, 401527|401846g) Some key .people .in the EMC want to transform

this issue orientated organisation into a non-racial African organisation* The

idea here is the formation of a national African organisation within which

the African constituency can be able to causus as an African component within

the UDF* These people feel that because the Indian community through the NIC

and TIC and the coloured community through its strong civic organisation s are

able to caucus and come to the UDF as stronger forces it is necessary for the

African community to have their own organisation which will enable them to participate in the UDF on an equal footing* They have accused the Indian

community of playing the dominant role which is made possible by their s tronger organisations* These accusations a ave taken the following forms

- The dominant role played by the Indian community in the DBF has infus ed an elitist and petty-bourgeosie tendency in the UBF (vide*401524E)4015 25E)
- This petty-'bourgeoaie tendency has gone to the extent where in the U DF meetings people are told not to sing ANC and MK songs* This is Bean as

stifling growth and militancy and reducing people*s confidence in the UBF* ^n example can be made fro® conflicting instructions between Casasand the UBF given to the boycotting students (vide* 401427Bj4018 46e)

 African comrades who are seen not to be questioning this non-African dominant position in the UBF are said to be viewed with bus pi cion and a re even called names* Some of this suspisions ahave assumed racial conno

tations*

Here it must be stated that some of this information <fis from people who do not

necessarily like us and actually sometimes work at variance with our tactical

and strategic line eg AvH9 Aubry, Jabu eto* But at the same time there 1 b

some truth in the saying that sometimes it is your enemy who will tell you

the truth where your ftiend flatters you* In this particular ease some of thses allegations have actually been confirmed by people inside the country

whom we consider to be on our side*

So if wertheink that sane of these issues are likely to be true, although coming from some quarters where they have been distroted and exaggera ted, then

they need investigating or at least our own interpretation* For an example

it would be an anamoly if the Africans are not seen to be playing a decisive role

in a political formation like the UBF* Thar is an issue dangerous enough to destroy the UBF in the long run* We always say that the liberation of sou th

Africa is primarily the liberation of the African majority and hence that that

liberation can be ensured by them playing a central role* So how do we e in ensure this if it is not happening now* Aubrey, Jabu, Curtis and others thi

that the solution is transforming the RMC into and African national organi

sation*
This move brings the following questions to mindl

- The RMC has not yet achieved its objective, that role is still there and very much so* To fight for the release of political prisoners is a veryimportant site of struggle and mobilisation* If the RMC is transformed into Something that might place confusiog in its orignal raison d* etre*
- An African national organisation is still in existence and that is the ANC* The formation of any other might create confusion*

The question however still stands* How do we ensure greater African part icipation and their leading role in the UBF? This question needs a thorough discussion* Part of the solution lies in*

- Streamlining UBF progrmmes and gearing them towards the aspirations of the African working and rural people*
- Consolidation of African community, civic, T.U*s youth Student organisa tions*
- Employment of many African UBF full-time organisers to concentrate in African areas* It is relevant to mention here that there is an observation which says that coloured and Indian communities have a better unde r-

standing of grassroot organisation tha* the African areas*

A deliberate attempt should be made to have an ANC leadership talk to some

RMC people eg Aubrey* It should also be observed that the RMC is not homo-

geneous* There is bad blood between the Natal RMC and the TV1 RMC because

the former is being seen to be close to the NIC*

There is also a cerain push by some people to have the UBF developing into a

United Bemocratic Movement* This is the feeling of those people who say the UBF can only be more decisive in its actions and decisions if it becomes a movement, (vide* 4018460) this view however, oamtet has got no substantial support*

5) There are forces within the UBF who say it is not enough to boycott but the UDF should be able to come with an alternative to the tri-oamgral fraud*

These people are pushing the iea of a national Convention* t first people

were confuted as to the origin of the call but later it seemed to be establi shed that the idea cmae from some caucus in the NIC* Of oousse this issue has not

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h have already made the call publicly in his article in the RDM* Also the fact that the origin is being seen as the NIC is a problem because people

still have the 'referendum experience) The result of it is that the African comrades are going to be scepticla and there is some militancy to contend

with* This militant group is going to see this as a deviation from the INC line of fighting to overthrow the regime. 'Hie possibility of the UBF effectively making the National onvention issue a mobilising factor to the advantage of our struggle is a real one*

6) The UBF leadership has also been put in a *4 bad light by some oppor tunis-

tic elementt within the UDF* They have not failed to amplify whatever min or

slip (vide* 49I646E} 401524E etc) Part of this problem is the extension of the straggle between the AIH grouping and the UDF* The main target is

the Indian community which he accuses of hampering democratic white partici-

pation (vide*401846c) He says the reason of the hostility is that the Indian community feels threatened by the democratic whites because the y have

the education, skills and resources* The cricicism of the UDF leadership has

also come from African comrades who are wither close to the RMC or the AvH

grouping* It is, however, true that some of the things which have been associated with the UDF leadership are regrettable*

CHIC AND KARS

Much has been said on the negative role these two resource centres have begun

to play as weapons of the AvH grouping against other orgsations in the UDF

(vide* 401437D| 401644G| 401426D etc) This is AvH most powerful wearon next

to his finanoial connections with the Social Democrats abroad* These centres

enable him to have control over these organisations and individuals becuase

of the much-needed resources there* This control provides him with info rma-

tion of what happens, where, when and who is involved* This control has

been made more effective by the attainment of a large building oalled Freeway House in Braamfontein* Several important organisations have been

pulled in to share the offices, Cosas, RMC, SASpa youth organisations* ^here

is an attempt to pull in SAAWU as well* CRIC has employed many Africa

n youth from Cosas, Soyoo and other organisations*

AvH's attempt to control and the suspioiouns accrueing from thee have s pread

even to the W/cape and Border* For eg in the w/Cape, Saspu and AvH h ave come under heavy attack from people like Johnny Issel* There are also s trong

suspiciouns between CRIC and ERIC (Education Research Information C entre) mainly

arising from areas on control, (vide* 401426D) Even the conflict between

between the Jonathan group and AvH grouping* An example of financial control

can be seen in the relationship between CRIC and Veritas - avH had pro mised

Veritas R5 OOOanri suggested that Veritas fall under CRIC* When this move

was resisted then the R5 000 did not come*

Another very disturbing development is that some of the material which is

being produced by the media which is under the control of these cnetres is

now questionable in terms of the policy and ideology pushed (vide* Upda te

July or August) Update is a 3AFU affiliate*