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Zulu King says there will be no major
change which Zulus do not support

In what was only the second Imbizo, or national gathering convened by King Goodwill Zwelithini ka Bhekuzulu during his 19 year reign, up to 75 000 people packed a Durban stadium on 19 November to hear the king call upon people to put aside party political differences and strive for black unity.

King Goodwill, calling upon Zulus to remember their heritage, stressed both the martial prowess of the Zulu nation culminating in the defeat of the British at Isandlwana, and the role of prominent Zulus in the ANC prior to its being banned.

Innoting the "ever-increasing attack against us as Zulus in recent years," the king pointed to famous ANC leaders such as Dr Pixley Seme, Dr John Dube, and Chief Albert Luthuli as evidence of there being no problem then of Zulu leaders being denigrated, or of these people having to hide their Zuluness. Yet when Dr Buthelezi "goes forth to do battle for South Africa, he is sworn at because he goes forth from KwaZulu."

King Goodwill said that he was fully aware of the differences between Inkatha, the ANC, the PAC, the UDF, etc. He said though, that he was not a party political king because "the throne stands aloof and independent." However, "How can I not condemn divisiveness among my people? How can I not condemn Black killing Black among my people? Hov: can I not say enough is enough...?" He said that for the violence to stop, the mud-slinging and vilification had to stop as well.

Contents

Politics

Zulu king says the Zulus cannot be ignored

PAC forms new internal group

What happens to Mandela after his release?

Buthelezi says a "final big conference" is not the solution

Era of mobilisation can benefit government too

Transkei favourably disposed towards the ANC

Separate Amenities Act repeal

Government "no" to interim government

O WndH W

Snippets

Buthelezi on De Klerk; Hint on US sanctions changes 9

Security changes; Hit squad allegations 10

Economics

Taiwan, South Korea and South Africa 11

Other

November at a glance 12

This did not mean that people had to support any particular organisation: "Let the people challenge Inkatha if they will. Let them challenge the ANC if they will. Let them challenge the UDF and COSATU if they will. It is the right of the people to challenge the political parties in their midst." He said though, that Zulus should be allowed to do their Zulu thing "so that the whole of South Africa can be liberated from racism, so that we ... can now have a multi-party democracy."

King Goodwill then commented on the recently-released prisoners. After noting that the "Zulu people" had been excluded from the welcoming reception of Walter Sisulu and his colleagues, this despite the fact that Inkatha's Dr Buthelezi had campaigned ceaselessly for Mandela's release, the king said that "The Zulu nation was spurned by this rejection."

He then made a plea. He invited the released prisoners to sit down with himself and Buthelezi to talk about the issues he had raised. "Let us now put Black divisiveness aside. Let us go forth as the Black oppressed to scale the very heights of achievement as we put together a united South Africa which apartheid has so attempted to keep divided."

"If we are not reconciled now before liberation - I fear that we may have the terrible experience of black killing black going on even after liberation, such as we have seen in some countries in Southern Africa."

On 20 November Walter Sisulu said that it was a "highly welcome" sign that the king and Dr Buthelezi wanted to speak to the released leaders. He said that the first thing they would want to discuss would be the resumption of the Natal peace talks: "If by talking we can inject new life into it, so much the better for everybody." Significantly, he said that were there to be honest and successful discussions about peace, this "really would open up discussion in other, wider fields."

While it was perhaps more than coincidental that this Imbizo was held three weeks after the ANC's Johannesburg rally, it is significant that each event drew a roughly equal crowd.

With the anti-apartheid political limelight recently shining almost exclusively on the activities of the ANC and its allies, the Imbizo was a confirmation that the Zulus and Inkatha are able to mobilise as effectively as any other organisation, and that they cannot be ignored. Sisulu's "discussion in other, wider fields" points a realisation that this is the case. He may not approve the "Zuluness" of the Imbizo, but he must realise that it can be as much an opportunity as a threat if unity is achieved.

Politics

PAC forms new internal body opposing any dialogue with government

Any hopes by either the government or the ANC that the

militant Pan Africanist Congress would tamely leave the field of mass mobilisation to the ANC-aligned Mass Democratic Movement or Inkatha, were put to rest with the announcement on 9 November of the imminent formation of a political movement under the Pan Africanist umbrella.

Spokesman Benny Alexander said on 13 November that the new organisation, the Pan Africanist Movement, to be officially launched in Soweto from 1-3 December, would share the ideology and goals of the Pan Africanist Congress.

ANC's "incorrect tactics"

Alexander told the WEEKLY MAIL on 9 November that PAM would comprise organisations such as the African Women's Organisation, the Azanian National Youth Unity and cultural organisations. Although PAM would draw together organisations embracing PAC principles, and the two were thus, "ideological bedfellows", he said that PAM was not a PAC front.

However, although the new body claims to be independent of the PAC, there is little doubt that there is more in common between them than merely the sharing of the same political ideology. It is intended as an Africanist counter to the MDM/ANC's mobilisation of Charterist support.

Echoing the official PAC line, Alexander said (13 Nov) that a peaceful solution was possible in SA "only when the Government capitulates from its position of domination and exploitation." In what can be seen as unveiled criticism of what it views as a false position held by the ANC and its affiliates, he said: "We intend to intervene in the diplomatic offensive in which the Government has taken the advantage, due to incorrect tactics by some elements in the liberation movement."

A few days before this (9 Nov), Alexander said that the PAC's proposed 24 November Harare meeting would "definitely restate the fact that we are a colonised people and that colonisation meant land dispossession with all its natural wealth below the ground, above it and in its waters." Given this, "cosmetic reforms ... make a mockery of all the excitement about negotiations. Apartheid and all its manifestations must be eradicated, not reformed."

"We are prepared to negotiate if the following conditions exist: one person, one vote in a unitary state without any constitutional checks and balances for any group; and the

redistribution of resources, of which land is primary."

"Once these two conditions are met, such things as unbannings and release of political prisoners will fall into place." Therefore, he said, the preconditions for negotiations as prescribed by the MDM were of "very little significance" to the PAM.

The uncompromising hostility of the PAC towards the idea of negotiating a political settlement with the current balance of power is well known. The PAM (15 Nov) echoes this: "The Government cannot be regarded as a vehicle for social change. We have identified the correct vehicle as the oppressed masses. Its heroes are our villains, and its villains are our heroes. There can be no convergence of interest between the thief and his victim."

Asked whether the PAM would espouse violence, Alexander said it believed that all means of changing the status quo

were legitimate; but that it would not form an armed wing. One of his colleagues however, said that this was an option that could not be ruled out.

Certainly, if the PAM were to openly espouse the use of violence, it is highly unlikely that the government would tolerate its existence, despite its new-found tolerance of internal ANC/SACEP activity. If the prime purpose of the PAM is to form a counter to the MDM in mobilising more radical black youth, calling for violence would be counter-productive at this stage. It is because the ANC and SACP are banned that they have been unable to campaign openly within the country, a task left to its allies dominating the MDM, the UDF and COSATU. But even they have had much of their overtly political activities circumscribed by the February 1988 restrictions on their activities - thus the forum of the MDM.

With the PAC's major domestic allies also severely restricted/banned, especially AZAPO (the Azanian People's Organisation) and AYO (the Azanian Youth Organisation), the PAC desperately needs an internal vehicle for mass mobilisation. Having the PAM banned now would be a strategic reversal it could ill-afford.

PAC/ANC unity

The formation of the PAM and its critical approach to the ANC/MDM position does not however deny the possibility of unity. Two days before his release with the seven ANC prisoners, the PAC's Jafta Masemola flew to the Cape where he spent seven hours with Nelson Mandela. And on 9 November he returned for more talks, "just short of three hours" according to Masemola's aide, Benny Alexander.

Although this meeting was reported as the beginning of a "unity pact" between the two organisations, the PAC commented afterwards that: "The PAC has said many times before that it stands for principled unity with all organisations of the oppressed and that we have no objection to the two [Mandela and Masemola] discussing it. Masemola has no specific mandate to do so, but we have full confidence in him and, after the meeting, he will report to the PAC president and the issue will be democratically discussed ..."

While the leadership of the ANC among the "radicals" is unquestioned, with the Black Consciousness and Pan Africanist groups still nowhere near challenging this predominance, there are definite indications that the latter is gaining support in the townships, particularly among militant youths impatient at

the pace of change. It is notable for example that at many protest marches/meetings, there are more SACP flags than ANC flags. It is notable also that the PAM's 13 November press conference was held under the banner of PASO (the Pan Africanist Student Organisation), which in October was very active in attempting to unify the various Pan Africanist groups.

After a long period of relative quiescence, during which the PAC-aligned groups were being seen to be losing out to the highly prominent ANC/MDM in the mobilisation stakes, the PAM then, is setting out to win the hearts and minds of SA's militant black youth whom the PAM hope will have no truck with a compromise sell-out settlement.

The success or otherwise of this programme will have major implications for the future of negotiations in SA, and will be followed closely by the major political organisations. m

Politics

What happens to Nelson Mandela after
he is released?

In what might be a deliberate attempt by the MDM to defuse widespread expectations that imprisoned ANC figure-head Nelson Mandela will play the central role in ANC after his release, a leading MDM figure, Cyril Ramaphosa (head of the National Union of Mineworkers) has publicly denied that Mandela has any special claim to the leadership of the ANC.

Mandela has no special status

In an interview in the 20 November issue of LEADER-SHIP, Ramaphosa said that "Mandela is a member of the ANC, and his status is no different from the status of any other member of the ANC."

This is because Mandela, together with the other Rivonia trialists did not at the time of their imprisonment hold any official position in the ANC. This resulted from the fact that at the time of their trial, they were all either in detention or banned (which prevented them from holding office).

Prior to their imprisonment six of the seven held positions only within the ANC's provincial structures rather than nationally. After the banning of the ANC and the imprisonment of these leaders, the ANC was completely restructured, especially at the 1969 Morogoro congress at which much of the present leadership was elected, and because the provincial leadership structures were done away with, the positions they held no longer exist.

This applies equally to Mandela, whose "leadership" of the ANC was described by an ANC spokesman in Lusaka in early October as a popular myth. He also said (before the release) that there might be a role for those released if they had the strength and will to continue in the struggle, but that they could only be elected to an official position at a properly constituted congress.

Ramaphosa did however, note the peculiar position Mandela in particular holds: "his stature as a leader is such that his views have a lot of bearing on the leadership of the ANC. Once he is released and the processes start unfolding, he is one of those people who may have to be considered for a leadership position in the ANC."

Constitutionally, the position of the ex-leaders is clear. Academic ANC specialist Dr Ian Phillips said before the release of the seven that the ANC was a "rigid, strictly ordered organisation. It is inconceivable that anyone would be allowed to merely come in and take over a post, even allowing for the

obvious special status accorded to long-term prisoners."

As to whether those released could form the nucleus of an officially tolerated internal wing, Dr Phillips said this was unlikely "because the internal wing of the ANC is already alive and well inside the country."

Phillips doubted that those released had any major role to play: "The point of their release is not what they can contribute to the ANC, or even any message they might carry to the leadership from the government. The main point of their release is just that it has taken place, which may contribute to fostering the kind of atmosphere in which talks about negotiations might get under way."

While the ANC is not yet undergoing a leadership crisis, Oliver Tambo's illness is sufficiently severe for the organisation to have to think seriously about the choice of a successor in the fairly near future. Although secretary-general Alfred Nzo is

currently deputising for Tambo, and there is no shortage of possible contenders for the presidency (such as Thabo Mbeki and Chris Hani), the imminent release of Mandela in the near future may prove to be a tricky complication.

Mandela has assumed such a high-profile leadership position (thanks to the ANC itself), and is viewed by so many South Africans as the "father of the nation", that were the presidency to represent popular opinion, Mandela would almost certainly be the almost automatic choice. In one opinion poll after another conducted over the past decade and more, he is seen as the most popular ANC political figure in the country.

government looking for ANC to split

That the government has long wished to separate the "moderates" from the "hardliners" in the ANC is clear. As long ago as 1986 PW Botha called on the non-communist members of the ANC "to come back to South Africa and ... take part in constitutional action." So will the government hope for something significant in Ramaphosa's trebly careful statement that Mandela has no special status - that he is "one" of those people who "may" have to be considered for "a" leadership position.

While it would be an exaggeration to see his views reflecting a distancing of the MDM from Mandela, the government will hope that it nevertheless might reflect some caution from a segment of it. Why should this be so?

Among the issues that might have given them reason to think so are the following: his 5 June meeting with PW Botha which caught the ANC and MDM by surprise; his subsequent statement confirming that he was committed to finding a solution by peaceful means; his apparent willingness to deal with the government as a de facto ANC leader; Inkatha's respect for Mandela; and the widespread view that Mandela, as a "senior statesman", might transcend party differences.

The government harbours the hope that in the interests of obtaining both a speedy and peaceful resolution to the conflict, Mandela might be prepared to negotiate a compromise political settlement with the government, or to put it less crudely, that he might not be as fully committed to the ANC's publicly stated strategy as his colleagues abroad and internally.

It is well known that the government is toying with the idea of legalising an internal wing of the ANC even though Sisulu and his colleagues dismissed this on their release. But if

Mandela is the facilitator they hope he will be, Mandela as ANC president or Mandela as "internal leader" can play a crucial moderating (or if it is wrong, rigidifying) role.

Ramaphosa said that "On the MDM's side, we can't wait to have Mandela among our leaders. We are ready to have him released into our hands." And Dr Diliza Mji, spokesman for the five-man MDM delegation which met Mandela on 27 November said that Mandela had spoken of his role as a facilitator in bringing about a settlement. "He emphasised that he was not negotiating. Negotiations could only take place between the committee of the ANC based in Lusaka and the South African government."

Clearly, despite the independence of certain of his actions, Mandela still remains "accountable" to the ANC's formal leadership. He may facilitate negotiations, but the government cannot therefore rejoice in the prospect of an imminent split. =

VOL 1 NO 9 SOUTH AFRICAN UPDATE 15 NOVEMBER - 30 NOVEMBER 1989

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Politics

Buthelezi says the solution will not come from a "final big conference"

"All of us by now should know that there is no easy solution to South Africa's problems and we all most certainly know that there is definitely no overnight solution to South Africa's problems. We must understand that there is no one thing that needs to be done. One national negotiation will not achieve what has to be achieved. We are not waiting for a final big conference when all matters will be solved."

no quick-fix solution

This was said by Inkatha leader Dr Buthelezi at Durban's 19 November Imbizo. In his address he added: "We are not going to put South Africa right in one week, one month or even one year. We will be very lucky if we put South Africa right in one decade. Some say it will take at least one generation; others say it will take more generations. There is just no 'quick-fix.'"

He said that the experience of other African countries such as Mozambique, Angola, Nigeria and Zambia show that "independence does not automatically fix things." It is for this reason that Inkatha calls for a multi-strategy approach in the black struggle for liberation, and the cessation of the killing: "if we kill each other now before liberation, we will kill each other after liberation..."

He called for national unity across all race groups so that democracy can work. But this is impossible nationally if within Natal "we cannot have unity ... in one race group." Within Natal, people must put South Africa first, and blacks in the region must put South Africa first.

Buthelezi said however, that unity goes much further than a truce between political parties, and there was much that could be done to bring the people of the region together - the churches, unions and educators all had an important contribution to make.

He asked whether the churches could not "become involved in the development of national unity". Although disunity would be reflected in the lack of substantial political progress, it follows also that there would be no socio-economic progress - "more people will die; more people will be maimed by malnutrition diseases; more people will come to feel hopeless because there is no work, no money and no food." This leads to an increase in crime, and "a kind of brutality creeps into society." Given this, the church must not be divisive, he said, but should concentrate on its mission of reconciliation.

Unions also had a role to play. "If there is no peace there will be no political progress and we will only know economic

depression. In these circumstances there will be less employment and less job advancement amongst those who are employed. There will be less the unions can do for their members and the unions themselves will be weaker." He asked unions to concern themselves first with the interests of their members.

Educators also had a role to play in bringing about the kind of stability required to put South Africa first, he said. "Our young people have been born into a situation of conflict, and have grown up in a situation of conflict. They now need to be enthused by a vision of the future in which peace demands more power ... more dedication ... more courage and ... more hard work than any war could demand." Buthelezi said that educators should become part of a "vast effort to make our new generation strong enough to maintain peace. Do not weaken them by preparing them for war."

The reason the Inkatha leader sees certain churches, unions and educators as divisive lies in Inkatha's perception that they assume that the people can wrest power from whites. Inkatha does not see this as a realistic position, and that negotiating is thus the best way to create a democratic future.

He said that this unity was critical to the negotiating process, and he emphasised that it would be a process: "I can assure that I am right when I repeat that there will be no one-off national conference that will solve all South Africa's problems. This country's problems will have to be solved by a process. There will not be only one final negotiation. There will be a process that leads to that negotiation." This is why he saw unity as so important - it is needed so that the process can get under way among all the people of SA.

It is clear that Inkatha's perception of both the concept of unity and the negotiating process are far removed from those of the ANC. In essence, Inkatha believes that there is no way in which the government will voluntarily accede to a sovereign national convention to hammer out a new constitution - only force can do this. However, the cost of this will be prohibitive for the simple reason that the government commands sufficient resources to maintain its monopoly of power for a long period into the future. Thus the prospect of an insurrectionary seizure of power by the people must be remote for at least the foreseeable future. In the meantime, the desperate socio-economic plight of the masses will only worsen.

Inkatha's view is that it is vital to recognise the balance of power in the country and to commence negotiations fully aware of the fact that the negotiating partners are unevenly balanced in certain respects. However, and this is the crux of the issue, Inkatha believes that because negotiations are a process rather than a one-off event, there is far greater scope to achieve a satisfactory outcome than the ANC and its allies would give credit for. Inkatha recognises the government's hidden agenda, but rather than simply dismissing it out of hand, says that it is something to work from. And in the process of working through various issues, the government will slowly but surely come around to a position where a solution can be found.

government won't hand over power

Inkatha believes there is no point in giving the government an ultimatum which it cannot accept - nowhere do governments simply hand over power to their opponents. Only weak governments are overthrown - the SA government is not weak. A united population can defeat a strong government, but there is no unity here yet, and there is unlikely to be unity if it means that all blacks must accede to the ANC's strategy. In any event, even with unity, the cost of a seizure of power would be

civil war. Therefore, Inkatha believes it is necessary to work towards a democratic future by accepting that it will not come overnight, but will take time.

The fact that the government has started on a negotiation process does not mean that Inkatha accepts the government's constitutional proposals. Far from it - Inkatha's call for universal franchise with one sovereign parliament is the antithesis of the government's five year plan of action proposals. But Inkatha does see the government's initiative as an opportunity to start on a road which will inevitably lead whites into accepting the necessity for a democratic solution. =

Politics

Era of Mass mobilisation can benefit the government as well as the ANC

In the period of intense political activity that South Africa is now entering, mass mobilisation is increasingly the name of the game. The MDM has been running a defiance campaign for some months now, the ANC held a mass rally in late October, as did Inkatha on 19 November (it was an Imbizo, but adopted Inkatha's line). On 9 December the MDM is holding its Conference for a Democratic Future. The PAC is forming the Pan Africanist Movement to mobilise Africanists in SA. Once the now-banned organisations are legalised again, it can be expected that this process will move into high gear, with all the major organisations wooing the masses for support.

are there limits to "radical" mobilising?

Although the ANC and its allies see the government's giving way on this purely as the result of the pressures that they have put on it, the government appears committed to seeing the process through to its conclusion. But since it is to be expected that opposition to the government's negotiating initiative is going to be very intense, with the ANC, MDM and PAC all doing their best to frustrate the government, it might be thought (as the white right wing contend) that the government will lose control of the process and be forced to capitulate.

However, the government's negotiating initiative appears to be based, at least partially, on the assumption that there are limits to the mobilising capacity of these organisations.

The government's reform measures are as much proactive as reactive, in so far as it recognises that it is best to negotiate from a position of strength. This refers not only to its own organisational and military/security strength, but equally to its perception of what the "silent majority" would accept by way of a settlement.

The securocrats (and probably most of government) believe that most blacks would settle for far less than the kind of liberation that the ANC promises them if the alternative was increased civil strife and a worsening of the socio-economic crisis than already exists. For the government, roughly 50% of blacks are essentially apolitical, more concerned with their often desperate living conditions than with liberation. Another 30% or so are viewed as politically aware but moderate, favouring political liberalisation but fearing "radicalism" and revolution. Only a minority of 20% are seen as politically radical. And of this 20%, only a percentage of them are activists.

How accurate this is may be impossible to assess until mobilisation is freely permitted, but if there is even a glimmer of truth in it, it means that the greatest challenge facing all the parties is how to woo the neutral half.

It may be that this group is less apolitical than politically neutral, and that they will sit on the fence until they see which way the wind is blowing. But whether this is the case or not, no organisation can afford not to ignore them if the political process becomes a numbers game.

It is within this context that the 20 November meeting between ten black Christian churchmen and De Klerk should be seen. The message of the delegation, headed by Bishop Isaac Mokoena and Archbishop Mzilikazi Masiya, must have been music to de Klerk's ears.

Bishop Mokoena is chairman of the Reformed Independent Churches Association with 4,5 million members,

while Archbishop Masiya heads the Council for Apostolic and Zion Churches in Southern Africa with 2,5 million members.

A constituency of seven million (even if inflated) cannot be ignored. In fact, all the mass rallies that the ANC, MDM, Inkatha or any other movement have ever held are put to shame by the annual pilgrimage to the northern Transvaal meeting which over a million members attend.

What delights the government is their conservatism (PW Botha was an invited guest a few years ago). At the 20 November meeting there was agreement by both sides:

- that all discrimination be repealed as soon as possible;
- that certain clergy were misusing the church for political ends;
- that sanctions and disinvestment were counter-productive; and
- that moderate blacks be consulted before the state of emergency was lifted.

â\200\234silent majority"

Claiming to speak for the "silent majority" of peace-loving, non-militant blacks, the churchmen called on the government to ensure that they enjoyed their full right to work, to send their children to school in safety, and to take part in dialogue to ensure that these rights were protected in the future South Africa.

De Klerk said after the two hour meeting that : "The key message they got across was that the government's initiative on renewal and reform is welcomed, and there is support for the government's emphasis that this be achieved in an orderly fashion." He said that although they had criticised the government, and had called for the repeal of discriminatory legislation, "The route they wish to follow is not that of confrontation, not the route of blackmail, not the route of mobilisation of international forces against South Africa."

From a strategic perspective, the root cause of the political hostility between the ANC and Inkatha lies in their contrasting and competing strategies of non-participative and participative opposition. Both effectively deny the government the ability to foist "solutions" onto an unwilling populace, but in bridging the gap between reform and revolt, Inkatha also helps frustrate the immediacy of the ANC's national democratic revolution.

Whether these black Christians are part of what the

government would see as the 50% apolitical or the 30% conservative is not clear (perhaps the leadership is the latter and the bulk of the membership the former). But irrespective, the divide between the ANC and Inkatha, despite the violence, is potentially far less than that of the ANC and groups such as these "Zionists" if they assume a higher political profile.

While they remain "silent", there is no problem, but in the era of mass mobilisation that the country is now entering, the government is sure to attempt to maximise the demonised image of the ANC by promoting the mass mobilisation of the "silent majority." This will include the independent churches, moderate urban blacks and any other group which might have a potentially large constituency.

So while the ANC will seek to maximise whatever advantage it can from the era of liberalisation ahead, it is by no means certain that the government cannot do the same. =

VOL 1 NO 9 SOUTH AFRICAN UPDATE 15 NOVEMBER - 30 NOVEMBER 1989

Holomisa: The Transkei is favourably

disposed towards th

e ANC

Political developments in the Transkei confirm the increased importance the ANC is placing upon the nominally independent homeland.

Ata26 November rally in Umtata attended by 50-80 000 people (Daily News - 80 000, New African - "more than 50 000") gathered to listen to the recently released seven ANC leaders, Walter Sisulu praised Transkei's military leader, General Bantu Holomisa, "for carrying forward the struggle against tribalism" and for seeking "reunification" with South Africa.

"Today we call on all our people in other bantustans to follow General Holomisa's example", he said, adding that Holomisa was "proudly carrying forward the struggle against tribalism as you fight to reunite our people into a single and undivided nation."

Coming so soon after Holomisa's 1 October sharing of the platform with the ANC/MDM at Chief Sabata Dalinyebo's reburial, his 7 November lifting of the state of emergency and his stated intention of unbanning the ANC and other banned organisations, this large rally confirms the popular support for the ANC in Transkei.

What the ANC would probably most like is for Holomisa to encourage the workings of Contralesa (Congress of Traditional Leaders of SA) in Transkei. Contralesa was formed in KwaNdebele in September 1987 to fight the homelands "independence", but is now no longer exclusively based there. In line with the ANC and MDM, it espouses a non-racial, democratic and united South Africa, though by seeking to mobilise traditional leaders who are often conservative.

This has not necessarily been the case in Transkei however, where Chief Dalinyebo, who vigorously opposed Transkei's "independence", was hounded by the Matanzimas into exile, dying in refuge with the ANC in Lusaka in 1986. SOUTH-ERN AFRICA REPORT (10 November) state that Dalinyebo's son, Buyekhaya Dalinyebo, attended the funeral incognito despite threats of his assassination, and that he is under Holomisa's protection. Furthermore, among the steady stream of visitors to Nelson Mandela have been traditional chiefs from Transkei whom he has urged to support Holomisa. And Holomisa's brother Pathekile, is a Contralesa leader.

Mandela to live in Transkei?

Adding to this traditional dimension was the formal declaration on 27 November by Chief Dalilanga Balizulu of the

setting aside of a four hectare plot in the Qunu administrative area as the rural home for Mandela after his release.

Chief Balizulu said that he had received formal notification of the request by Mandela from Chief Dalagubha, who in turn said that Mandela had indicated that after his release he wanted to return home to his rural accomodation. Chief Balizulu said that Mandela's previous request had been turned down by the late Paramount Chief Bambilanga Mtirara during his paramuncy of the Tembus. Interestingly, both General Holomisa and Nelson Mandela are Tembus, as is the protected Buyekhaya Dalinyebo.

Mandela's request puts paid to suggestions some months ago that neither he nor the ANC would countenance his return to Transkei as this would be seen to be legitimising the despised homeland system. Mandela's return home (even if it is no more than a base while he travels the country) would undoubtedly

give a significant boost to the ANC in Transkei's rural areas. possible dangers

But this support will not be unanimous. In his address at the mass rally, Andrew Mlangeni attacked the homeland system and warned Holomisa that his progressive policies would earn him many enemies. "You will succeed in your objectives if you carry the people along with you" he advised the military council.

Holomisa said on 27 November that the only reason for caution in unbanning the ANC was that there was a real danger of a counter-revolutionary group attempting to create instability in Transkei. In response to the police teargas attack two days earlier on a smaller meeting in Umtata attended by four of the ANC leaders, Holomisa told the crowd at the mass rally the following day that "no force, whether internal or external, would deter the military government from its commitment." A commission of enquiry was to investigate the "distasteful" incident and report back to him by 1 December.

Other than this reactionary possibility, the only cause for concern the ANC might have is that although Holomisa said that Transkei was favourably disposed towards the ANC, his views on negotiations might not be identical to those of the ANC.

He said on 27 November that the ANC, PAC and government were responsible for creating a favourable negotiating climate, and that once these three have reached a ceasefire, the rest of the groups fighting for freedom could sit down with them. :

Certainly, in stressing the need for a ceasefire and of avoiding bloodshed, there is the implicit assumption that the opposition should not see victory coming through insurrectionary means. He said that because all three groups, the ANC, PAC and SA government, were involved in violence - "either through bombs, counter-insurgency strategies, harassment, propaganda, oppressive structures and counter-accusations" they had to reach a ceasefire agreement. He also saw the "greatest hurdle facing negotiations" being "the lack of trust necessary for a ceasefire to be agreed upon."

If the omission on the ANC's constituent assembly proposal was deliberate, then his position may not equate exactly with the ANC's negotiating strategy. For one thing, the PAC have rejected negotiations as a viable strategy for the present. For another, in the absence of his acceptance of the Harare Declaration (being studied he said in early October), his

comment that black opposition groups need "flexibility" might refer to the preferability of abandoning rigid positions.

Despite this qualification (not that the ANC has expressed any doubts) the ANC has good reasons to be pleased with the turn of events in Transkei.

Confirming the ANC's mobilising strategy, SACP stalwart Govan Mbeki told the crowd at the rally that "We see the beginning of the formation of an army prepared to defend the cause of the people - to establish a non-racial, united and democratic South Africa." His martial imagery will give little comfort to the SA government - the war to win the hearts and minds of the people has entered a new phase of intensity in which the government can do little more than sit back and watch. m

Politics

Government claims "deep conviction"
for the demise of petty apartheid

The Reservation of Separate Amenities Act was introduced to parliament by Justice Minister CR Swart in 1953 (later State President) with the admonition that the only whites who could oppose the act were dangerous "renegade Europeans, communists and neo-communists and ultra-liberals ..."

Separate Amenities Act to go

It has taken almost 40 years for the current state president to state that: "In line with our stated goal to eliminate discrimination, we have for considerable time now developed and promoted a growing pattern of opening public amenities. The stage has now been reached where the Separate Amenities Act itself must be looked at. The time has arrived to repeal this act. The government has decided to do so as soon as possible."

De Klerk's statement, together with his presidential decree repealing beach apartheid, drew a favourable response from most white opinion and foreign governments despite his simultaneous qualification that it would have to be done carefully as there were "a few sensitive areas...". Only the Conservative Party would now agree with Swart's assessment.

The repeal of the act has been on the cards since at least as long ago as 1987 when PW Botha said he favoured it - though he almost immediately changed his mind. Since its very beginning, a multiplicity of anti-apartheid pressures, domestic and international, compelled the government to make increasingly common exemptions (hotels, post offices, bank queues, cinemas, sport, etc). Yet despite the inevitability of its eventual repeal, the government was too pre-occupied with its conservative white right-wing opposition to do the necessary.

In his speech, De Klerk claimed that the government was not interested in short-term popularity, nor in satisfying foreign governments - "We are doing it out of deep conviction, because we believe this is the right thing for South Africa."

The reality is that no Nationalist Party government does anything positive unless it is forced to, and the repeal of this act is on the cards for two simple and related reasons. In the first place, the Mass Democratic Movement's defiance campaign promised the government a scenario of indefinite mass protest against apartheid, which the deliberations of the 9 December Conference for a Democratic Future are likely to reinforce. Secondly, and again as a result of the intense pressures placed upon the government, De Klerk has been forced to declare himself in favour of reform failing which, as he has said himself, whites will have to face a revolution. The repeal of the act is also a pre-condition for Inkatha's negotiating participation.

The ANC's view is that the intended repeal of the act is quite simply meaningless. In a Radio Freedom broadcast of 17 November, the ANC said that: "At this time, when the people of our country are calling for fundamental change, when the people are calling for the doing away with the fundamental pillars of the apartheid system, at the time when we are marching and demonstrating to do away with the entire system of white minority domination, to tinker with the apartheid laws and tell us that we can now swim and bathe together, doing nothing that is meaningful [sic]."

Since the stated aim of the defiance campaign is to make apartheid unworkable, or as COSATU's Jay Naidoo said after the July congress endorsing the campaign, "to end apartheid", it

might be expected that as each objectionable law is revoked, the ANC would encourage and thus perhaps accelerate the process of change by giving the government some credit.

But no. The nearest the broadcast comes to this is to state that "It is true, De Klerk has released some of our prisoners" and "has allowed political demonstrations to continue." But because in respect of the former the government has "left behind bars thousands of political prisoners and still treats those who advocate democratic values contrary to the racist ideas of the nationalist party as criminals", and in respect of the latter "has left intact the state of emergency and other hosts of security laws that empower him at any time to declare such demonstrations and freedom of expression unlawful", the ANC believes in both instances that "to us this is no change."

removing petty apartheid meaningless

For the ANC, "apartheid can and is continuing without petty apartheid" - "for us, removing petty apartheid means nothing." The crux of the matter is that: "Our struggle is about the issue who rules like all other struggles. It is this issue which is being raised by the millions of the people of our country. The demands of the time is that the regime must move fundamentally towards the transfer of power to the government that will be representative of all the people of our country."

The decision to repeal the act is, of course, an integral part of the government's reform initiative, essential to the process of "normalising" the country and "removing" racial discrimination, by which is meant "unnecessary" discrimination. Although the Group Areas Act is of greater importance to Afrikanerdom than the Separate Amenities Act, it too, is ultimately vulnerable. The fundamental piece of legislation underpinning the whole edifice of apartheid, determining the workings of the system, is the Population Registration Act. Only when this goes will the government's opposition believe that racial discrimination is to end.

On 16 July Inkatha said that prior to negotiations taking place, certain "pillars of apartheid" would have to be repealed - the Separate Amenities Act, the Group Areas Act and the Population Registration Act. Other discriminatory laws were to be phased out via a negotiated timetable. Inkatha leader Buthelezi told the (UK) Conservative Party on 10 October that

â\200\234ultimately the present constitution ...and legislation such as the

Population Registration Act, the Group Areas Act and the Separate Amenities Act will be scrapped.â\200\235 But he did not pin his negotiating hopes on De Klerk the man: "I am positive because I see history as having moved the whole of South Africa, including the National Party, to the point where change must now happen."

The government's problem is simply that once the Population Registration Act falls away, it is left with nothing by which "groups" can be defined. And for government, defense of group rights remains the core negotiating position.

This enshrining of group rights in any new constitution was reiterated yet again by De Klerk in a 26 November Washington Post interview: "We must get away from white domination in as much as it exists. But to exchange that for a situation where the white minority or another minority suddenly becomes dominated would not be a solution."

Given this, negotiations will remain a long-term goal. m

VOL 1 NO 9 SOUTH AFRICAN UPDATE 15 NOVEMBER - 30 NOVEMBER 1989

Politics

Government "no" to ANC's Harare Declaration and interim government

The Washington Post of 26 November reported De Klerk as saying that he did not accept the ANC's Harare Declaration negotiating proposals because they embodied "the setting up of preconditions." Hardly surprising was his comment that "We are not prepared to move into a situation where a lawfully elected government will be suspended and interim governments will come about."

government no to ANC's proposals

The government's insistence on negotiating in office is not something it will give up. While the ANC believes that a constituent assembly whose representatives should be democratically elected by universal adult suffrage is the only democratic means by which a new constitution should be devised, there is no way that the government could accept this while the current balance of power is in its favour.

Accepting the ANC's position now would be suicidal - it would result in the government:

- immediately losing the negotiating initiative;
- definitely losing any chances of its "power sharing" plan being accepted;
- perhaps losing any "group" concessions it might wrest from a future settlement; and
- being immediately vulnerable to the likelihood of a right-wing sponsored coup.

In calling for a constituent assembly and interim government which the ANC knows full well that the government will not and cannot accept, the ANC is in effect doing no more than giving itself more time to build up its domestic power base so that when "genuine" negotiations do occur, the present disparity in power will have been equalised or preferably reversed.

Since the ANC cannot afford to be seen by the international community as unwilling to negotiate, and since it had been expecting the government to commence a negotiating offensive to buy the white minority time and compromises, it formulated the Harare Declaration as its negotiating position.

But this should be taken as indicating that the ANC do not want to negotiate - this has always been its goal. The

problem lies more in the government. Back in 1986 the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group, in its attempts to foster a process of negotiations to establish a non-racial and representative government concluded: "It is our considered view that that despite statements and appearances to the contrary, the SA government is not yet ready to negotiate such a future except on its own terms. Those terms, both in regard to objectives and modalities, fall far short of reasonable black expectations and well accepted democratic norms."

It was the government that then backed out of an imminent pre-negotiating ceasefire agreement. The ANC is quite simply highly sceptical of the government's bona fides, and with good reason. ANC president Oliver Tambo said in 1988 that: "If the key to negotiations was in our hands we would have long used it to open the door. ... The Pretoria regime is refusing to negotiate, not because there is an armed struggle, but because it is unwilling to give up minority domination."

The government now claims that all this has changed - it promises to abolish both apartheid and white minority rule. Yet the ANC simply does not believe this, and so is content to mobilise until the government is compelled to give way.

Inkatha's view is that this will only occur as a result of force, because the government will not capitulate unless compelled to do so. This means that the stage will be set for a massive heightening of confrontation, insurrection, civil unrest and even civil war. Not only will this be disastrous in purely physical and material terms, and which if it results in a protracted conflict can reduce the country to another Lebanon or Sri Lanka. Equally important, the country will be sown with bitterness that reconciliation is made that much more difficult.

But Inkatha does not intend that the government should be permitted to cement white minority rule. Instead it recognises the imbalance of the negotiating parties power, recognises that this is a weakness, but believes that under the right circumstances, whites will transfer power to the majority.

Inkatha - encourage whites to change

In essence, given the government's incrementalist goals, the first of these circumstances is that the government can be forced into giving way one step at a time, over a protracted period if necessary. That is why Inkatha sees negotiated local and regional "solutions" as an important part of the process.

The second circumstance is that whites should be encouraged to change by making it attractive for them to do so. In other words, instead of demanding the whole loaf at once, they should be encouraged to part with it slice by slice. This not only makes the process of transition easier and more peaceful, but as their fears are dealt with one by one, they will be more ready to give more and more. Inkatha sees successful negotiations as being based on a win-win situation. Clearly the ANC's version would be the same, but only for a future stage where the cost of conflict is so high that the cost to whites of not capitulating outweighs the benefits of doing so (Mozambique, Rhodesia, etc). But this is an ugly, and to Inkatha perhaps an unnecessary route. Inkatha does not discount the necessity of using force, but states that all other alternatives must first be exhausted. For Inkatha, apartheid is so riddled with contradictions that its demise (under pressure) is inevitable anyway.

Third is the idea that certain white fears, while groundless, are there as a reality that cannot be ignored and that for the sake of a peaceful transition to a democratic future, some means of assuaging these should be examined so long as they do

not perpetuate minority rule. It also suggests that the idea of a transitional government should not be discarded so long as there is a clear and brief timetable to a normal democracy.

It is interesting that De Klerk expressly criticised not the constituent assembly idea, but the interim government. Of course, since for the ANC the constituent assembly is sovereign, this perhaps amounts to the same thing. But it is conceivable that at a future stage a (non-sovereign) constituent assembly could feature in the government's plans. And it is also conceivable that in contrast to its present proposal of racially-based elections, this could result from a non-racial franchise. For an astute government strategist there would be much to gain from this if and when the "silent majority" is mobilised.

While De Klerk's vision of the future is myopic compared to that of Inkatha or the ANC, Inkatha believes that once the negotiating process commences, the government will have to give way or, to quote De Klerk, face a revolution. It may control the means, but it will, in the end, sacrifice the ends. m

Buthelezi: De Klerk must do
"not what whites want - but
what blacks now demand."

Inkatha leader and Chief Minister of KwaZulu Dr Buthelezi
said at a 7 November Ulundi dinner hosted by South Africa's largest
insurance company, Old Mutual, that president de Klerk was the first
state president to face the fact that prescriptive politics had to end.

He said that "Mr de Klerk's predecessor did not consult any
blacks when he established an entirely new political dispensation for
South Africa. He did not consult any blacks before he disbanded the
old provincial council system and replaced it with what really are
despised regional services councils. We were not consulted when the
South African government formed the homeland policy which has
caused such political strife for so long."

He added that so far De Klerk had not been seen to make major
decisions without consultation. "My guess is that in the very first year
of his presidency, Mr de Klerk will at least attempt to set matters right.
Mr de Klerk cannot succeed without blacks, and I, as a black cannot
succeed without whites. Both he and I must give effect to the already
established fact that political interdependence between black and
white must follow the already irreversible economic interdependence
that there already is."

But it was essential that de Klerk must succeed in doing "not
what whites want - but what blacks now demand."

Of the political situation in South Africa, Buthelezi noted that
it differed markedly from that in Mozambique or Zimbabwe prior to
their obtaining independence. He said that although the ANC saw
itself as a "liberation movement coming home to form a government,"
there were no prospects for a revolutionary movement bringing the
South African government to the point where it had to sue for peace
as in Mozambique or Zimbabwe.

"There will be no final and definitive military advantage to
revolutionaries in South Africa as there was in both Mozambique and
Angola", he said, adding that it was such a military advantage that
brought the Portuguese and Rhodesian governments to the point
where they had to negotiate "for humanitarian reasons." Because the
governments knew they were beaten, it was vital for them to capitulate
"before they were put into the revolutionary shredding machine."

South Africa, he said, presented a different picture: "Nobody in
their right mind would look at Mr FW de Klerk and say he is doing what
he is doing because he is driven by despair and is trying to capitulate
in order to save lives in South Africa."

What characterises the South African political scene is the fact
that "behind Mr de Klerk is a very vast as yet hardly used military and
state might that could be employed to not quite perpetuate, but
certainly greatly prolong, the balance of power in the state-revolu-
tionary equilibrium."

His address reflected Inkatha's view that insurrectionary or

revolutionary strategies are inappropriate in South Africa. Not only had they failed during the mid-1980s, but they had failed without seriously testing the government's military capability. Should the situation demand it, the government has the wherewithall to apply far more draconic measures than it did then.

But this does not mean that Inkatha believes the government is free to operate as it sees fit. Rather, Inkatha feels that since prescriptive politics is being abandoned, blacks should, once certain preconditions have been met, enter into negotiations with the government. However, these negotiations cannot be about the cementing of white minority rule in another guise, but must be for the creation of a genuine, multi-party democracy. ®

US hints at sanctions
modifications

At a 21 November closed-door function at Georgetown University, US Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Herman Cohen said that SA was starting to meet the requirements of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA), and that this could lead to the modification or suspension of sanctions.

He said that "the state of emergency is virtually lifted on a de facto basis" and that "the ANC has been virtually legalised." He saw the ANC as "so active" in SA that its external wing was "almost a bystander."

If this sort of progress continued, he hoped to sit down with Congress in "June or July" next year to "discuss" the "relaxation" of the trade and new investment bans imposed by the CAAA.

The act permits the President to "suspend or modify" its sanctions if the SA government, in addition to releasing all political prisoners, fulfils three of four further conditions. These are:

- ending the state of emergency;
- unbanning political parties;
- repealing the Group Areas and Population Registration acts; and
- agreeing to enter into "good faith negotiations".

Once the US president announces his intention to repeal certain measures, only a majority in both the Congress and Senate can block it.

Although the Cohen was quoted as saying that "there is still a long way to go", he was "very excited" by the steps de Klerk was taking.

Since it is virtually certain that three of these conditions will be fulfilled shortly (the repeal of the Group Areas and Population Registration Acts is unlikely in the near future), Cohen's views, if they reflect the administration's view of the political progress here, will please the government.

This applies particularly since the ANC's view is that there should be no repeal or modification of sanctions, indeed that they should be increased, until the momentum towards a negotiated settlement becomes irreversible. Not only does the ANC fear that the

government could at any stage pull out of the process if things are not going its way, but the premature relaxation of sanctions could give it a signal that the West is happy with the government's negotiating process. Such a signal would undoubtedly be taken very seriously into account by other countries whose restrictions on trade with SA are even less stringent than those of the US.

Were the trade and new investment sanctions repealed, this would enable SA not only to trade with the US openly, but would also permit a fresh inflow of funds that the economy desperately needs. The biggest constraint on SA's economic growth, and thus the single most important economic factor exacerbating the economic crisis the country is in, is the present export of capital.

In short, coming so soon after the failure of the ANC to have SA's foreign debt rescheduling halted, a move such as that which the US president is empowered to contemplate would be a severe blow.

Although hardliners on Capitol Hill thought Cohen's remarks a bit premature, the SA government could benefit from the US's other more pressing foreign policy concerns, particularly developments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union with which it is now fully pre-occupied. If South Africa becomes a more marginal domestic issue in the US, then the president would be more likely to give the SA government the recognition and reward it hopes for. There are signs that this is a far more possible scenario than it was even a month or two ago. -

For the ANC, it is vital that South Africa remain a high-profile issue. The Paris Indaba in late November, the December Conference for a Democratic Future and attempts in December to get the United Nations to adopt the ANC's Harare Declaration will all attempt to do this. The question though, is will it be sufficient to sway the US? w

De Klerk puts security back
in the hands of the cabinet?

President De Klerk was widely praised for placing the control of national security back in the hands of civilian government following his 28 November announcement at Pretoria's Police College of the scrapping of the National Management System (NMS) and the downgrading of the State Security Council (SSC).

Introduced as a reaction to the government's perception of its opponents' "total onslaught" strategy, PW Botha built up the NMS/SSC into a vast seccrocrat-dominated bureacracy perceived by many to virtually an alternative government.

Conceived and dominated by security strategists as part of an anti-revolutionary "total strategy", the NMS's policy was aimed at achieving two goals. First was the containment of the militancy of the

masses physically by means of appropriate security measures. Second was the application of its WHAM (Winning the Hearts And Minds) programme of buying off the propensity of the masses to revolt by materially upgrading black living conditions in the affected townships.

By 1986, when the national state of emergency was imposed, when the National Joint Management Centre was created, and when the post of deputy Minister of Law and Order was created, the system was at its height. By then, with government so dominated by the security situation, the NMS, a pyramid built up from 320 mini-joint management centres, 82 sub-joint management centres, right through to the SSC at the apex, was in many ways the real government.

Although the government defended the system against those claiming that it was sinister, draconian and completely undemocratic, it is undoubtedly true that it was highly effective in quelling the outward manifestations of the unenfranchised masses' frustrations. From what many proponents of ungovernability and people's power viewed as an imminent mass insurrection and seizure of power came the slow but inevitable realisation that the state could not be so easily overthrown. If nothing else was achieved, to the government, this alone would have justified the system.

But thereafter this style of governing increasingly became a liability. The strategic adaptations of government during the decade of PW Botha's rule were highly significant: an executive presidency which grew into an "imperial presidency"; the National Security Management System ("security" was later dropped), the "total onslaught" and "total strategy"; and the tricameral system. The liability lay both in the fact that the National Party itself grew increasingly disgruntled by Botha's imperial, finger-wagging and domineering rule, and in the fact that while this heavy-handed means of governing could quell the unrest, it could not buy peace.

The National Party's ignominious rejection of Botha and election of De Klerk as party leader and then president, and its "give De Klerk a chance" cry in the September (white) general election pointed to the realisation that change was necessary. De Klerk was a party man through and through, with no security or defense background.

With an action plan developed by the Broederbond in terms of which white security was seen as both indefensible and impossible without power sharing, De Klerk commenced the government's negotiating initiative with gusto. The steps his government have taken to date are part of what the government sees as the normalising of society in the creation of a political climate conducive to negotiations. What is common to these moves and to those he is expected shortly to undertake (lifting the state of emergency, releasing Mandela and other prisoners) is that they are in effect little more than the meeting of others' pre-conditions (Inkatha, ANC, foreign governments).

However, and this is what makes De Klerk's disbanding of the NMS different, is that this step is not one that has been called for by any of the government's opponents as a negotiating pre-condition. It is the National Party's return to civilian rule, to a more normally accountable form of parliamentary government. While the lifting of the state of emergency is both inevitable and desirable, the demise of the NMS

need not necessarily follow from this.

The essential characteristic of the NMS and presumably of most securocrats, was the aim of crushing opposition rather than accommodating it. That De Klerk saw this as a *cul desac* was evident from the moment he assumed office: first he went to Lusaka to meet Kaunda, then he allowed the MDM's mass marches to go ahead with relative freedom, and then he abolished the NMS post of deputy Minister of Law and Order, all against the recommendations of the securocrats.

However, the NMS has been replaced with a new system of regional and local co-ordinating committees, which, in the absence of sufficient information on their workings, might be seen as a continuation of the JMCs in another guise. Certainly, it would be too much to expect the dismantling of the entire internal security structure, and there might be very good reasons for caution. Nevertheless, the significance in returning to a more normal approach to security lies in the implicit assumption that the "total onslaught" no longer exists in a form requiring an appropriate "total strategy" response.

This in turn signals that the government, which can hardly be expecting a smooth passage in years ahead, has developed a game plan which it expects to be able to cope with any scenario. It does not, of course mean that the government is about to capitulate to the ANC but given that the era of mass mobilisation ahead is going to be one requiring great delicacy from government once the state of emergency is lifted and the now-banned organisations are legalised, it does imply a high level of confidence in the ability of the civilian-controlled security forces to control the situation. =

Government reels under hit-squad allegations

Since at least the early 1970s with the killing of Natal University lecturer Dr Rick Turner, opponents of the government have been killed under circumstances which many have thought confirm the existence of a secret hit-squad whose *raison d'être* was the systematic elimination of "enemies of the system".

Victims ranged from academics (Turner, Webster), to civil rights leaders (Griffith and Victoria Mxenge), to ANC cadres both in and out of South Africa. The last category was obviously part of the government's security/military onslaught against the ANC, and could perhaps be inherently viewed as different to the former, which had far more sinister connotations.

That the government denied it had a "dirty tricks" department responsible for foreign assassinations was to be expected, though the actions of its military in pre-emptive and hot pursuit raids into neighbouring countries left no one with any illusions. However, the killings of political opponents within the country, although part of the same pattern, was obviously of a different order, not least because they constituted murders whose killers were legally liable to face the sanctions of the courts if caught.

In many ways, this is the crux of the issue, because not one of the murders was ever solved, and not one of the killers was ever brought to the courts for punishment. For many, given the acknowledged ability of the police to solve other crimes, this remarkable inability to apprehend even one of these killers, despite the fact that the cases were still ostensibly open, proved not only that the perpetrators were to be found within the ranks of the police force itself, but also that the killings were officially approved at a high level - that within the police, there was an official (though obviously secret) hit squad.

That the police force is politically more conservative than the military is common knowledge, and there always remained the possibility, no matter how remote, that the killings were the sole responsibility of "rogue" members of the force unofficially taking the law into their own hands in the manner of South/Latin American death squads.

However, the revelations first of death row prisoner Butana Nofomela, and then of ex-police captain Dirk Coetzee and David Tshikilange of the existence of a Security Branch "assassination squad" brought the issue immediately to the forefront of SA politics. Nofomela admitted that he had been involved in about eight assassinations and numerous kidnappings. In his statement he claimed that he served in the Security Branch from 1981 until his death sentence in 1987, and that he was appointed a member of the "assassination squad" in 1981, serving under Captain Dirk Coetzee.

Coetzee, now abroad and under protection at a secret venue, then stated in an interview that he was the head of the hit squad operating from the farm called "Vlakplaas". He said that the squad had orders to murder and eliminate political and security opponents of the government. The squad was said to comprise turned ANC and PAC cadres, who were paid to join the police or to do certain jobs for them.

On 17 November, members of the police "counter-insurgency" unit at Vlakplaas denied the allegations, claiming that they were indeed ex-ANC/PAC men, but that acted only in self-defense. The head of the police public relations division, Major-General Stadler, said that the Attorney-General of the OFS (McNally) and the chief of CID (Lt General Conradie) had been appointed to lead the investigation. The cabinet said it had decided to wait until this was completed before making any decisions, despite the growing clamour for a full judicial probe into the allegations. Meanwhile, the Vrye Weekblad, which first published Coetzee's story, followed it up on 24 November with more allegations, this time about the farm "Daisy", which the police countered with a statement that it was not a counter-insurgency or spy base, but only an intelligence training camp.

For the security forces (the military were similarly involved according to the confession of one Mervyn Malan), already reeling from the various steps De Klerk has already taken to restore civilian government, the prospect of these covert operations being confirmed by either the McNally/Conradie report or a judicial commission of enquiry is highly unpleasant. Despite the fact that De Klerk will be very wary of alienating the police, if proved true, it will give De Klerk more ammunition against the securocrats and create the possibility of his re-establishing the government's now tarnished image which he has invested so much in improving. m

VOL 1 NO 9 SOUTH AFRICAN UPDATE 15 NOVEMBER - 30 NOVEMBER 1989

What do Taiwan and South Korea know
that South Africa doesn't?

Between 1980 and 1987, SA's GDP growth was 1,3 %, while GDP per capita shrank by -1,1 %, explained by the fact that population growth easily outstripped economic growth.

Aubrey Dickman, chief economist at the Anglo American Corporation pointed out in the 1987/88 Race Relations Survey survey how other developing countries with which SA should compare itself had had real increases in per capita incomes. South Korea, Singapore, Brazil and Mexico, some of the newly-industrialized countries (NICs), on average expanded their GDPs twice as fast as the older industrialized countries during the 1970s. Between 1970 and 1986, Taiwan and South Korea had, together with Hong Kong and Singapore, doubled their share of world trade in manufactures.

SA's decline in world trade

Within the same period, SA's share of total world exports had actually decreased from 1,3 per cent in 1970 to 0,68 percent in 1986, according to Seifsa president Willem van Wyk. Much of the astonishingly good performance of the NICs has been put down to the fact that these countries made a breakthrough into MANUFACTURING GOODS which led to rapid EXPORT-LED ECONOMIC GROWTH. In contrast as van Wyk pointed out, SA is still importing a substantial amount of manufactured products while exporting mainly primary products.

A comprehensive approach to development is essential to distinguish the case of small, backward countries which overnight become rich and developed because of major foreign exchange earnings resulting from a sudden international increase in the price of their raw materials.

This has special significance for SA's economy which is so dependent on gold exports and the international gold price. Gold revenues, according to the Standard Bank June 1989 review account for approximately 40 per cent of SA's export earnings, and at the start of the 1980s, this figure was as high as 50 per cent. When the gold price is buoyant, the SA economy has little problem in achieving good results with export earnings and growth thus bolstered. However, when the gold price declines, the economy is forced, in view of foreign debt obligations, to restrain imports by curbing domestic spending, and in turn growth. This profoundly and undesirably impacts on the STABILITY of the economy and for this reason alone it is essential that focus is placed on SA's non-gold exports.

The rapid and continuous GROWTH experienced by the famous Asian Tigers, namely Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea, lends weight to the argument that SA should emulate them. The burning question therefore is: What

common features distinguished these countries? Generally: an emphasis on labour-intensively manufactured exports, a drive to create new wealth, curbing of government spending, and conservative monetary policies. More specifically:

(1) Since their early industrialisation was geared to import-substitution, Taiwan and South Korea both have fairly significant production for their domestic markets.

(2) In the early 1950s, the US gave both Taiwan and South Korea large amounts of economic and other aid. However, foreign aid/loans do not guarantee success, as the balance sheets of many developing countries will testify. What is crucial is that these two countries used foreign funds productively.

(3) Land reforms: In Taiwan land belonging to absent landlords was bought with bonds and stock shares in public enterprises and given to the tillers of the land, thus motivating them to increase productivity and hence their own wealth. In South Korea similar land reforms were carried out which eliminated the landlord class.

(4) Export-oriented industrialisation in earnest:

(a) From the mid-1960s, the growth in incomes of consumers in the advanced countries offered a growing market for imported manufactured goods made by labour-intensive methods in low-wage countries, and both Taiwan and South Korea were able to emulate the Japanese very well along this path.

(b) Foreign corporations were attracted by cheap labour and various facilities offered by these two countries.

(c) In Taiwan, the system of sub-contracting where small, and even home-based industries did work for the larger industries, operating at minimal capital cost has worked very well - as much as 98 per cent of all enterprises are said to be small or medium businesses, a figure quoted by Theo Rudman.

(d) Government policies in both countries have guided and encouraged private investment and private enterprise.

(e) In Taiwan, nine-year compulsory education and vocational training programmes have nearly eradicated illiteracy and increased the level of skills in the country significantly, and Theo Rudman of the Self-Employment Institute quotes the gap between the rich and the poor in Taiwan to have decreased to the extent that the income of people in the top bracket is only 4,17 times that of people in the bottom.

Negative conditions accompanying some multinational corporate employment in the Third World such as excessively long hours, low pay, unhealthy working conditions, sexual harassment, and repression of political dissent and labour organisations would have to be countered by a strong unionized labour force for such development to be desirable in SA. Export-oriented economies are also prone to recession in the markets of the advanced countries, competition from other industrialising countries and protectionist backlash in response to reluctance to open up their home markets to foreign imports.

SA needs an export culture

SA'S OPTIONS: Willem van Wyk has argued that the spare capacity in South African manufacturing should be used to increase exports in the short-term from which new investment in this area will naturally follow. Board of Trade and Industry chairman, Helgaard Muller said that South Africans still did not think of themselves as an exporting society, and he

stressed the need to change from a inward-looking culture to an outward-looking exporting culture. While trade sanctions are a negative factor against an export drive by SA, it is financial sanctions which dry up offshore investment funds which may in fact turn out to be the most inhibiting factor against new investment in manufacturing. Short of SA embracing a democratic dispensation, financial sanctions remain a South African reality and ways of releasing investment funds domestically will probably have to be found. In fact, broadly speaking, creative options such as those of the Taiwanese and South Korean experiences, and new markets will have to be considered by this government and a post-apartheid one, in order to ensure the SA economy's long-term growth and stability. =

November at a glance

1st * Operation Hunger's Ina Perlman is quoted in the press as saying: "Every hour of every day in this country three children die of hunger. Jobs are being lost daily, and for every job lost that means around 10 people will be destitute within two months."

2nd *] award Order Minister Adriaan Vlok says that the status quo cannot be maintained, and that political action had to be handled by counter-political action. Security action, he says, is at best a holding operation.

* The government senior negotiator, Gerrit Viljoen, says that "political enemies" can take part in negotiations: "We do not suppress differences in political views as such, that is why the agenda is open."

3:1'd * PAC leader Jeff Masemola sees Nelson Mandela for the second time in less than a month to talk about unity.

5th * PAC stalwart Clarence Makwethu tells a 6000 crowd of mourners at the funeral of Stembiso Mlokothe that one could not win at the negotiating table if one did not win on the battlefield.

6th * Inkatha's Dr Buthelezi says he would be "overjoyed" if the ANC returned as a political party with the right to go to the people and seek to become a government. But, "I will also not be the one who lays himself down before the ANC's war machine to be left mangled and trampled upon ..."

7th * The Transkei government lifts the state of emergency and withdraws all the emergency regulations connected with it.

* Buthelezi says: "There cannot be a future in which whites enjoy racist protection and advantage," and "there cannot be a future in which the rich grow richer and the poor grow poorer." "There can only be a future in which we are all treated as equals and that can only happen if there is give and take now about what and who should take what."

9th * De Klerk invites the leaders of two right-wing organisations (Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging and the Boerestaatspartij) to participate in the constitutional electoral process. He says: "I sincerely believe they do not represent a substantial number of people in South Africa."

* Transkei's military ruler Bantu Holomisa says that political activity in Transkei will remain suspended despite the lifting of the state of emergency because "we are a military government..."

10th * Buthelezi says "There will be final and definitive military advantage to revolutionaries in South Africa as there was in both Mozambique and Angola."

11th * Walter Sisulu says that despite the government's softer line on apartheid, "pressures from the international community will have to be even greater until we have reached the point of no return."

* Chief director of the Bureau for Information Major-General Groenewald says that five thousand people, all but two of whom were blacks, have died in unrest incidents during the past five years, and more damage had been caused than during the Boer War:

25 859 vehicles, 8 034 houses, 1 757 schools and 1 243 shops and factories have been damaged.

12th * Government says there should be no problem granting Walter Sisulu a passport and a visa for him to visit Lusaka.

13th * Constitutional Development Minister Gerrit Viljoen says he wants to hold talks with Inkatha soon.

* The government lifts restrictions on eight anti-apartheid activists, including Eastern Cape UDF regional president Edgar Ngoyi.

* De Klerk tells foreign newsmen that a new dispensation meant a new constitution which would "allow all South Africans, irrespective of race, to vote and to participate in government at all levels." But he qualifies this with the comment: "there are still many who insist upon the imposition of equality rather than the sharing of freedom."

* Inkatha's Central Committee says the time to negotiate a new constitution in South Africa has arrived. Reacting to this, Gerrit Viljoen says he welcomes Inkatha's positive attitude.

14th * In Namibia, SWAPO gets 41 of the 72 Constituent Assembly seats. Its 57% of the votes means that it is short of the two thirds majority required to write the future constitution single-handedly.

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* Radio SA says that much has been achieved in the pre-negotiating stage, but that "a clear focus" of the policies and goals of the different political groupings is lacking. It notes without comment or criticism, Inkatha's goal of a united South Africa, with one sovereign parliament in a multi-party democracy, etc.

16th * De Klerk announces that the Separate Amenities Act is to be scrapped, and declares that in the meantime all beaches are to be opened to all races. "Sensitive areas" would require appropriate action.

* De Klerk tells the President's Council that "Clinging to power means facing a revolution" and that the government is "deadly earnest" about reform. He tells his opponents: "We are not playing games, so stop playing games." .

* Zambia's president Kaunda tells Namibia's Sam Nujoma that were Namibia to host the ANC in Namibia, it would "commit suicide." :

* Kaunda also says of De Klerk's reforms that he had "behaved well."

18th * Deputy Minister of Constitutional Development Roelf Meyer says his meetings with the five "self-governing territories have paved the way to real negotiation, and that there had been a general recognition of the government's serious intention to build a new South Africa.

19th * King Goodwill told 75000 supporters that the Zulu nation had been snubbed by the freed ANC leaders, by their failure to invite himself or Dr Buthelezi to the 29 October welcoming rally.

* The ANC said in Lusaka that it hoped to win increased support from white South Africans and Francophone countries attending the Paris "indaba" later this month.

20th * De Klerk meets with Bishop Mokoena and Archbishop Masiya, jointly representing seven million members of the Indepen-

debt Churches. Claiming to represent the "silent majority" they welcome the government's reform initiative.

* Responding to King Goodwill's 19 November statements, Walter Sisulu says that talks between the released ANC leaders and the KwaZulu leaders would be "highly welcomed."

* MDM leader Cyril Ramaphosa says Nelson Mandela has no special status within the ANC and that "he is one of those people who may have to be considered for a leadership position."

21st * The Namibian Constituent Assembly unanimously adopts the 1982 constitutional guidelines as a framework for its deliberations, thus defusing a potentially major stumbling block to the process of drafting the new constitution.

* Gold finally breaks the \$400 an ounce mark in Europe. If this signifies the start of a bull trend, it will have major repercussions for the SA economy.

* US Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Herman Cohen says that sanctions could be modified or repealed if SA continues making the progress it is. He is "very excited" by De Klerk's moves.
22nd * Natal Indian Congress leader Farouk Meer says nine activists are due to visit Mandela this week. Dozens of government opponents have visited Mandela this year, as has a stream of government ministers and officials.

* A 26-strong Mass Democratic Movement delegation including Cyril Ramaphosa, Jay Naidoo and Murphy Morobe commence talks with the ANC in Lusaka.

* The three co-leaders of the Democratic Party meet Walter Sisulu and released colleagues for "an exchange of views" in Soweto.

26th * The Washington Post report De Klerk as saying he hoped to lift the state of emergency "as soon as possible" because "I think we have succeeded to a great extent ... to create a much more positive climate."

27th . * The ANC's Paris Indaba, with about 100 SA delegates (25 from the ANC), begins today under a thick veil of secrecy.

28th * Dr Diliza Mja, spokesman for a five-man MDM delegation meeting Nelson Mandela, says Mandela "emphasised he was not negotiating. Negotiations could only take place between the committee of the ANC based in Lusaka and the South African Government."

29th * The government receives the McNally report on the alleged existence of a police hit-squad.

* The Anglican Bishops of Southern Africa say that a number of De Klerk's decisions were praiseworthy and warmly welcomed.

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DURBAN DURBAN sions are raising expectations of fundamental change which current 000 4001 ; government policy offers little prospect of fulfilling."

Eif%â\200\231Ã©â\200\230i;â\200\231f 3?612)26304% m;i-\201iâ\200\230;';hm Steel 30th * Delegates to the Paris Indaba differ markedly on sanc-

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