

# Police make a promise to curb Maritzburg bloodshed

MARITZBURG — Brigadier Jack Buchner has spend only one month in Maritzburg, but he admits "in all my experience in the South African police, I have never before known anything like the violence here".

He heads the security branch in the Natal capital and he and District Commissioner (Natal Inland) Brigadier Gert Kotze, pledged themselves to clean up Edendale and the other stricken townships that sprawl to the east of "white" Maritzburg.

How? they were asked, when they and other senior officers took a press party through the Edendale complex.

"First of all by giving the people back their dignity by removing the fear which now dominates," Brigadier Buchner said.

"By stopping the killings, the brutality of necklacing, burning, shooting and stabbing and by a return to law and order.

"The co-operation we need from the people is information. We want the names of alleged murderers and arsonists. We are not looking for informers or sell-outs — we will act anonymously on information we receive. We have a special telephone for these callers and a special postal box number."

Right now the two brigadiers say they are not interested in political organisations such as Inkatha or the United Democratic

Front — "All we are aiming for is a stop to the killings.

"There had been 246 deaths up to January 10 this year, since monitoring began last September, and 1 002 incidents." Forty-two people have died since New Year's Day.

Yet last weekend, when just two people were murdered, was the quietest one since the lid blew off last September.

"We don't know why this is so," Brigadier Kotze admits, but the smile he wore when he said this confirms his delight.

Mobs which have apparently gone berserk have been the major factor in those killings. Police believe people are recruited by some controlling agents and told: "You will take part in a killing."

This, they say, explains why often the victims have been stabbed anything from 50 to 100 times, with the last knives stuck in after death had occurred.

"Failing to comply with the order to 'stab' would render the person liable to be butchered well," the police officers agreed.

The press party was taken to a partially gutted and comprehensively smashed homestead where on December 12 four people died — two women aged 37 and 46 and two youths who were 16.

The women and one of the youngsters who were found in the house were stabbed over and over again and then burned. The fourth vic-

tim fell beside an outside toilet he too had been butchered. Gutted also was the family's kombi.

Brigadier Buchner and Brigadier Kotze agreed that children are involved in the violence — "They have been misused by their elders sometimes for political gain".

Brigadier Buchner says this "has helped put us (the SAP) in a bad light. We have had to put many children under 16 in detention, something I personally do not like.

"To counter it I will try to reinforce the authority of their parents as well as the traditional authority, unless, of course the children were responsible for killings, then of course they must come before the courts."

"One of our great problems until recently has been that people would not come forward and tell us of these events.

"We do believe now that this is changing," Brigadier Kotze said.

Just a few kilometres away the police party pointed out a house and two rondavels where on January 3 a man and his young daughter were cut to pieces.

At Plessislaer police station an exhibition of seized firearms and other weapons is open for inspection.

Some of these are quaint to say the least but Brigadier Kotze gives an assurance that although most of them are homemade this does not detract from their

killing powers.

The man responsible for assembling these weapons has now been arrested. It costs R36 to put together one of them.

Home-made rifles, shotguns, pistols as well as knobkerries, pangas, stabbing knives, traditional Zulu shields and assegais, sticks heavily weighted with nuts and bolts, even a schoolgirl's conventional hockey stick are all part of that display of seized arms.

"They all worked — they all killed or maimed," is Brigadier Buchner's comment.

Brigadier Buchner pointed out that the eldest victims of the killings so far was aged 85, the youngest a child of just seven with many others who were 10, 11, 12...

"Maritzburg must come right," he said. "If it doesn't, the people who have orchestrated the killings here will ensure that the killings will spread elsewhere in the land — the ANC is monitoring the situation here — I believe in due course they will claim they caused it for political purposes," Brigadier Buchner says.

That pattern might have been set by some of the graffiti which has been scrawled, scratched or painted on walls in parts of Edendale.

Graffiti that reads among other things "Viva ANC", "Viva UDF", "Viva Angola" and "Angola City". — Sapa.



Buthelezi looks at Maritzburg unrest and says . . .

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Various reasons have been mooted for the explosive violence in Maritzburg which shows no sign of abating. Here, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi focuses on the unrest and details his understanding of the reasons for it, his problems regarding the situation, prospects for peace in the troubled area and the role he is prepared to play in resolving the conflict.

KwaZulu Chief Minister and president of Inkatha, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, said as long as racist legislation damned South Africa and shackled black democracy, conflict was inevitable.

Chief Buthelezi was commenting on the violence in Maritzburg.

He said apartheid had crippled black unity and had also subjugated blacks economically. Therefore, the roots of the trouble in Maritzburg were also socio-economic.

"The area has, for many years, had an extremely high rate of unemployment and crime and I believe it is relevant that — for the most part — it is in depressed areas where violence is taking place."

He said Inkatha had been attacked because it supported multi-racial democracy in a free enterprise system. The African National Congress (ANC) wanted a one-party socialist Marxist state. This characterised the violence throughout the country.

"You cannot have one analysis of the violence in the Maritzburg area in which Inkatha is blamed and then go on to explain, in different terms, the same phenomena of the

# Apartheid to blame for Natal violence

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same violence in the Eastern Cape where Inkatha has no presence," he added.

"I am totally and absolutely opposed to violence as a means of sorting out political differences. I have nothing to gain by creating a revolutionary climate in any part of South Africa."

Chief Buthelezi said elements in the United Democratic Front (UDF) and Cosatu were trying to use the "appalling deprivation" of the area for their own political purposes. They supported the tactics of the ANC which perpetuated the view that the country was ripe for revolution and there was nothing left to do except to kill for political purposes.

However, the overall aims and objectives of the ANC/UDF/Cosatu did not differ radically from those of Inkatha. All professed to be liberation movements working to-

wards the eradication of apartheid and to the establishment of a free, democratic, united South Africa with justice for all.

"There is nothing in Inkatha's Statement of Belief that could be offensive to any of these other organisations. However, it is with regard to tactics and strategies that the nub of the problem is exposed."

The ANC and its supporters in other organisations saw Inkatha, and those committed to non-violence and negotiation, as an obstacle to their success in making the country ungovernable, he said.

He said the ANC had placed on record that he was a "snake which must be hit on the head" and Inkatha neutralised.

"It is therefore obvious that the ANC has concentrated its efforts in Natal where Inkatha was launched and obviously enjoys considerable support.



Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi . . . poverty breeds violence.

There is no doubt in my mind that the External Mission of the ANC has been involved in fomenting the violence."

Chief Buthelezi said there was ample evidence of ANC activity in the area and as KwaZulu's Minister of Police, he had access to information that left no doubt in his mind about its involvement.

He dismissed allegations that Inkatha's "recruitment drives" were a key factor in the Maritzburg conflict as UDF propaganda.

"Any leader of any organisation would be a fool to seek support by force. I unequivocally denounce any such alleged behaviour."

He said on the surface, the Maritzburg violence appeared to be black versus black but there were whites and Indians who were actively involved in the ANC/UDF/Cosatu alliance who would like to see Inkatha's

power base destroyed.

On prospects for peace in Maritzburg, Chief Buthelezi said: "I support (and always have done) calls for peace and will do everything I can to diffuse the situation. The carnage must stop and I am completely and utterly genuine about this. Having said this, it is also obvious that there will, of course, be little prospect of peace as long as certain individuals and organisations are committed to annihilating Inkatha."

On the role he was prepared to play in resolving the conflict, he said: "I have done everything I believe I can. I have talked with church and civic leaders, I have instructed senior colleagues to do everything possible to meet with the UDF/Cosatu leadership and others.

"I have offered (as previously noted) to stand publicly with the leadership of the UDF and

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others to call for peace. I have involved Inkatha structures at all levels and have exhorted them to do what they can to diffuse the situation. Various members of Inkatha have been asked to leave their jobs and to work full time in the area (at our expense) in an attempt to bring various factions together to resolve their differences. Inkatha was the first to endorse the church leaders' draft peace statement. We have endorsed a subsequent statement. Any other suggestions would be welcome."

On his relationship regarding the Maritzburg peace talks with UDF president, Mr Archie Gumede and Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Chief Buthelezi said: "Mr Gumede and Archbishop Tutu have been strangely silent about my offer to stand shoulder-to-shoulder with them on a public platform to bury our differences and to call for peace and black unity. I am prepared to assist in organising the biggest prayer rally for peace this country has ever seen to achieve such an end. It will serve no purpose to again articulate personal differences that have been expressed by us all — they are documented.

Regarding his leadership of the KwaZulu government, Chief Buthelezi said the background to his role in KwaZulu and his traditional and elected positions in the region were well documented. "My only crime is that I have refused to allow Inkatha to become a surrogate of the External Mission of the ANC.

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Tuesday 19 January 1988



Chief Minister of Gazankulu, Prof HUDSON NTSANWISI.

# Ntsanwisi *CITIZEN* calls for Black unity

Citizen Reporter

GAZANKULU Chief Minister, Professor Hudson Ntsanwisi, returned from the United States yesterday and appealed for Black unity and an end to preconditions which were retarding negotiations between Blacks and Whites.

During the two-week visit to the US, Prof Ntsanwisi met officials of the State Department and a group of Ghanaian academics. He also met Black American leaders and appeared on television. His visit was by invitation of the South African embassy in Washington.

On his return at Jan Smuts Airport yesterday, Prof Ntsanwisi said that sanctions and violence had failed to cause the demise of apartheid, and the only option left was negotiation or the country would be "doomed".

The stalemate regarding the National Statutory Council had to be broken and he appealed to the government and Black leaders to "put their pride in their pockets" and abandon their preconditions such as the renunciation of violence by the African National Congress and the release of political detainees by the authorities.

People overseas were uncertain about South Africa's future, pondering how the country was going to overcome its

present problems and build a viable future.

"If we keep on setting conditions for talks, we will bring the curse of our ancestors on this continent," said Prof Ntsanwisi. "Who wants this state of affairs to continue? I don't.

"If we don't make things happen ourselves, nothing will happen. As long as we quarrel we remain on square one.

"Both White and Black have a stake in this country and we must work together in a spirit of give-and-take and interdependence. The days of South Africa for the White man or for the Black man are over.

"What worries me is that we are refusing to come together to do what it is that we all want."

Prof Ntsanwisi said sanctions had destroyed job opportunities for Blacks and had enriched South African Whites who had bought foreign companies for low prices. Violence, on the other hand, had proved ineffective because of the vast difference in military power between Whites and Blacks.

He also slammed school boycotts, saying "ignorance is not a force for reform; education is power". The raising of educational standards among Blacks and the economic control this would bring was their route to progress.



Inkatha has 'right to defend itself' in Maritzburg

# Buthelezi sees little prospect of peace

IN A definitive statement at the weekend on his position on the Maritzburg violence, KwaZulu Chief Minister Mangosuthu Buthelezi said there would be little prospect for peace as long as "certain individuals and organisations" were committed to annihilating Inkatha.

However, he said the prime cause of the conflict was apartheid.

Buthelezi said: "As long as the curse of racist legislation damns this country and shackles black democracy (as well as democratic opposition to apartheid) conflicts of this kind are inevitable."



● Buthelezi

ROGER SMITH

The roots of the Maritzburg conflict were socio-economic, but elements in the UDF and Cosatu were trying to use the appalling deprivation in the area for their own political purposes.

## Committed

"The ANC and its supporters in other organisations see Inkatha and those who are committed to non-violence and negotiation as an obstacle to their success in making the country 'ungovernable'."

Buthelezi said there was ample evidence of ANC activity in the area "and as KwaZulu's Minister of Police I have access to information that leaves no doubt in my mind that the External Mission of the ANC has been involved in fomenting violence".

The conflict was not an "ethnic" one, "but there are whites

and Indians who are actively involved in the ANC/UDF/Cosatu alliance who would like to see Inkatha's power base destroyed".

Buthelezi denied Inkatha recruitment drives were a key factor in the conflict. "Any leader of any organisation would be a fool to seek support by force."

Buthelezi said he continued to support calls for peace but Inkatha believed it had a right to defend itself. "We will not be intimidated out of existence."

## Campaign

With regard to the right of the UDF and Cosatu to campaign and organise in KwaZulu, Buthelezi said any lawful organisation had a democratic right to put its views to the people and to seek their support.

But, he said, when any organisation abused that right, "the people have a right to lawfully oppose their actions".



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THE CITIZEN

# Buthelezi blames ANC for fomenting violence

By Tony Stirling

CHIEF Mangosuthu Buthelezi, Chief Minister of KwaZulu and president of Inkatha has blamed the ANC for fomenting violence that has left about 300 people dead in clashes between supporters of the United Democratic Front (UDF) and Inkatha in Pietermaritzburg.

"There is ample evidence of ANC activity in the area and as KwaZulu's Minister of Police I have access to information that leaves no doubt in my mind that the external mission of the ANC has been involved in fo-

menting violence," said Chief Buthelezi.

He said, however, elements within the UDF and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) were attempting to use the "obvious and appalling deprivation" for their own purposes, but noted there was also a criminal element involved, of which account should be taken.

The overall aims of Inkatha and the ANC/UDF/Cosatu did not differ radically.

But it was in regard to tactics that the "nub" of the problem between Inkatha and these organisations was exposed.

"The ANC and its supporters in other organisations see Inkatha and those who are committed to non-violence and negotiation as an obstacle to their success in making the country 'ungovernable'," said Chief Buthelezi.

He said his "only crime" had been that he was not prepared to permit Inkatha to become a surrogate of the ANC's external mission.

"For many years there were no problems between the ANC, its president, Oliver Tambo, and myself," he said, but differences arose between the two men at a meeting in London in 1979.

"I am now called upon to abandon my role in KwaZulu and yet I have used this position to do precisely what the former leadership of the ANC (Chief Albert Luthuli and

others) requested me to do," said Chief Buthelezi.

This included blocking independence for KwaZulu as well as mobilising grass roots support against apartheid throughout the region.

"It is obvious why the ANC and its supporters want me removed and this is why they do everything possible to destabilise my position and to stir anti-KwaZulu and anti-Inkatha sentiment among the people," he said.

Criticism of himself and his government, which had to operate within the structures of apartheid "much as we loath it", were one thing and his government was not above public censure and

had to be prepared for criticism at various levels.

"But it is another matter entirely when violence and other disturbances are fomented which go way beyond civilised and universally acceptable norms of opposition," he said.

"The implications, therefore, are that either I defend my position or I capitulate. I have chosen the former. Inkatha has made the same choice," said Chief Buthelezi.

"The ANC has orchestrated this battle, not I," he said.

The ANC opposed his multi-strategy approach to liberation, and had concentrated its efforts in Natal where Inkatha had

considerable support, with about 1.5 million members.

Chief Buthelezi said that Inkatha, as was obvious from his answers, did not support the "armed struggle" approach to liberation and its formal and only position was that of non-violent opposition to apartheid.

"I support (and always have done) calls for peace and will do everything I can to diffuse the situation.

"Having said this it is also obvious that there will, of course, be little prospect of peace as long as certain individuals and organisations are committed to annihilating Inkatha," he said.



# Buthelezi's Indaba dream fades as township fighting escalates

**Jon Qwelane**

PERHAPS the immediate casualty of the furiously escalating war in Maritzburg's black townships — besides truth — is Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi's dream of a jointly governed Natal incorporating kwaZulu.

He has convinced many whites and all his followers in Inkatha of the ideal of a kwaZulu-Natal area, governed by a common legislature.

Most of the white population — and the provincial administration — back the idea.

Superficially, the struggle in Maritzburg townships is one for ideological supremacy which the stronger of the two combatants — either the United Democratic Front or Inkatha — must win to assert its political authority over hundreds of thousands of township residents.

## No winner

But a closer look indicates it will be a war with no winner: the political implications for victor and vanquished alike would be tremendous. It could well be a fight to the death.

Says a resident who has closely followed and documented the fighting:

"Victory for either Inkatha or the UDF in Maritzburg will be a great psychological boost for the supporters of the organisation and may open the way for similar showdowns elsewhere in the country where the victor would want to stamp out the adversary once and for all.

"On the other hand defeat

might not be interpreted as such by the vanquished.

"The organisation might see it only as a major setback requiring adequate correction before resuming hostilities."

## Neutral

The man speaking claims that is not personally involved, but has changed cars at least nine times in the past few months because, he says:

"I have strong reason to believe members of the one side are convinced I take sides, simply because I have refused to be on *their* side.

"That does not mean I have agreed to side with the other group, for I am completely neutral in the whole business."

He answers his telephone to say he is not there and only when he is convinced of the caller's bona fides does he confide his identity.

He explains: "It is what a number of other people do as well.

"How do you know the caller is not telephoning from a call-box opposite your office, only to be lying in ambush when you step out into the street?"

Ambushes are a feature of township life, a fact attested to by those brave enough to be interviewed.

## Butchered

People are now fearful of attending friends' funerals because "too many people have been ambushed at the gates of the cemeteries and killed", says another man.

Yet another says it has happened "several times",

and is becoming a pattern, that people are removed from buses and taxis and butchered.

The origins of the fighting are shrouded in the ideologies of the two organisations and territorial sovereignty is an important factor.

Both claim to be fighting white domination and apartheid, in the struggle for liberation.

But the differences between Inkatha and the UDF are almost irreconcilable.

The UDF strongly supports international sanctions against South Africa; Inkatha has throughout campaigned against all punitive economic measures.

The UDF is opposed to racial, ethnic and cultural divisions and to the homelands policy.

Inkatha has its roots in the kwaZulu homeland where it is the only political organisation and its president is also the homeland's political leader.

## ANC ideals

But perhaps most glaring of the differences — and least mentioned — is the question of legitimacy as successor to the ideals and principles of the outlawed African National Congress.

Chief Mangosutho Buthelezi often recalls his ANC membership and has said Inkatha is continuing on the non-violent path and other ideals of the early ANC movement.

There is no love lost between Inkatha and the ANC.

But there is no evidence of hostility between the ANC and the UDF. Indeed, though

the UDF has gone to great pains to explain it is an independent organisation with no links to any outside body, there appear to be similarities in their approaches, such as the adoption of the Freedom Charter and the opening of membership to blacks and whites.

In Natal's urban areas, particularly Durban and Maritzburg, Inkatha is not the dominant force it is elsewhere in Natal.

Before the advent of the UDF there had been a level of resistance in Natal townships.

Matters gradually deteriorated with the cooling of relations between the Inkatha leadership and the exiled ANC.

Inkatha refused to support protests mounted in the townships and lost the support of the politicised youth.

Shortly after the murder in kwaMashu township of Victoria Mxenge, a prominent lawyer and UDF supporter, things got bad.

## Spilt over

A week after the slaying, houses and business belonging to Inkatha members went up in flames, and about 20 people were killed as Natal's black community turned on itself.

The fighting spilt over into Maritzburg, where things had been relatively calm up to just over a year ago.

Truth has been a casualty: there are as many reasons as there are respondents to the question of who started it all. UDF and Inkatha members alike say they are "defending themselves".



*Brian Day*

## Continuing 'war' threat to Indaba

19/1/88 ✓  
ROGER SMITH

THE continuing war between Inkatha and UDF supporters in the Maritzburg region is being seen by KwaZulu/Natal Indaba officials as a threat to the future of the Indaba.

"It doesn't create the environment for negotiation," Indaba director Professor Dawid van Wyk said in Durban yesterday.

In stressing the Indaba's concern about the situation, he referred to an earlier statement supporting calls for an end to the violence.

In the statement, he urged all Indaba supporters in affected areas to prove their commitment to powersharing and constructive change by doing everything possible to strengthen the hands of peacemakers and discourage violence.

Asked whether the fact Inkatha supported the Indaba while the UDF and Cosatu opposed it did not undercut its position on negotiation politics, Van Wyk said the Indaba was not for or against anybody.

He said: "Our main intent is to bring people together. We are committed to bringing together everybody committed to peaceful change."

He said the Indaba had dissociated itself from perpetrators of violence.



# Buthelezi's views on violence in capital

*"THE NATAL MERCURY" JANUARY 19, 1988*

**T**HE MAIN reason for the violence in the Pietermaritzburg area, says Dr Buthelezi, is apartheid, 'which has crippled black unity and subjugated blacks economically. Therefore the roots of the trouble are also socio-economic.'

The area had, for many years, had an extremely high rate of unemployment, crime and for the most part it was in the depressed areas that violence was taking place.

Inkatha was attacked because it was strong on the side of multi-racial democracy in a free enterprise system economy. The ANC wanted a one-party socialist-Marxist state. This characterised violence across the length and breadth of the country, whether Inkatha was there or not.

He was totally opposed to violence as a means of sorting out political differences, and had nothing to gain by creating a revolutionary climate in any part of South Africa.

## Politics

Elements within the UDF and Cosatu were attempting to use the appalling deprivation in the area for their own political purposes. There is also a criminal element which should be taken into account. The documented ANC policy was to make South Africa 'ungovernable'.

There was also ample evidence of considerable UDF/COSATU support for the tactics and strategies of the ANC, which desperately needed to perpetuate its view that the country was ripe for revolution and that there was nothing left to do except to 'kill' for political purposes.

Dr Buthelezi continues: 'The overall aims and objectives of the ANC/UDF/Cosatu do not differ radically from those of Inkatha. We all profess to be liberation movements working towards the eradication of apartheid. We all subscribe to the establishment of a free, democratic, united South Africa in which there will be justice for all. There are, of course, obvious and well-documented differences of opinion and policy regarding post-apartheid economic —

This is an edited version of a statement issued to the South African press at Ulundi yesterday by the Chief Minister of KwaZulu and president of Inkatha, DR MANGOSUTHU G BUTHELEZI

specifically capitalism-socialism — and political systems of government which are fundamental and about which political opponents of Inkatha express their hostility in no uncertain terms. This is a major factor in the current and overall conflict.'

However, the ANC and its supporters in other organisations saw Inkatha and those who were committed to non-violence and negotiation as an obstacle to their success in making the country 'ungovernable.'

They saw the ANC as the 'sole and authentic representative of the people' to which all organisations should defer, and did not subscribe to Inkatha's 'multi-strategy' approach to the liberation of South Africa. The ANC had concentrated its efforts in Natal, where Inkatha was launched and obviously enjoyed considerable support, with a membership base of 1 500 000 members.

The ANC received arms, ammunition and financial aid for the so-called 'armed struggle' from various well-known sources. That the media and others could be so naive as to question the involvement of the ANC in Pietermaritzburg was something which never ceased to baffle him.

## Activists

However, certain decision-makers in the UDF and Cosatu were activists whom the ANC claimed as their own. The ANC talked of the UDF as 'their' organisation. They praised the UDF, and the UDF leadership praised the ANC. They sat together in foreign places to plot the advantages of the ANC and they worked here at home to further the aims of violent revolution.

As KwaZulu's Minister of Police he had access to information that left no doubt that the External Mission of the ANC had been involved in foment-

ing violence.

Dr Buthelezi said his only crime was that he had refused to allow Inkatha to become a surrogate of the External Mission of the ANC. For many years there were no problems between the ANC, its President Oliver Tambo, and himself. Problems emerged only after their meeting in London in 1979.

He was now called upon to abandon his role in KwaZulu and yet he had used this position to do precisely what the former leadership of the ANC, Chief Albert Lutuli and others, requested him to do: He had blocked so-called 'independence' for KwaZulu and had done everything possible to thwart the racist designs of successive SA governments. He would continue to do so.

It was obvious why the ANC and its supporters wanted him removed, and this was why they did everything possible to destabilise his position and to stir anti-KwaZulu Government and anti-Inkatha sentiment among the people.

Specific issues were taken up by his opponents with the aim of creating more than democratic opposition to his leadership.

'I am not above public censure, and my Government must be prepared for criticism on various levels,' he said, 'but it is another matter entirely when violence and other disturbances are fomented which go way beyond civilised and universally acceptable norms of opposition. I have chosen to defend my position, and Inkatha has made the same choice. The ANC has orchestrated this battle, not I.'

This was not an ethnic conflict. On the surface the violence appeared to be black versus black, but there were whites and Indians who were actively involved in the ANC/UDF/Cosatu alliance who would like to see Inkatha's power base destroyed.

Replying to allegations that so-called Inkatha 'recruitment drives' were a key factor in the conflict, Dr Buthelezi said any leader of any organisation would be a fool to seek support by force. He unequivocally denounced any such alleged behaviour. To say this was a 'key factor' was neat pro-UDF propaganda but did not go to the heart of the matter.



Dr Buthelezi

## Non violent

Inkatha did not support the 'armed struggle' for liberation, and its formal and only position in this regard was that of non-violent opposition to apartheid.

He had always supported calls for peace and would do everything he could to diffuse the situation. The carnage must stop. Obviously there would be little prospect of peace as long as certain individuals and organisations were committed to annihilating Inkatha.

Inkatha believed that it had a right to defend itself, and would not be intimidated out of existence.

'I am a black leader leading in the midst of violence. I am a leader of angry people. I have always seen it as my responsibility to use that anger constructively, and to employ that anger in tactics and strategies that will be for the ultimate good of the country. I want nothing to do with pyrrhic victories. Where violence is concerned the end rarely justifies the means.'

'Inkatha believes it has a democratic right to defend from aggression that which it cherishes, from whatever quarter it comes. Certain individuals and the ANC have no desire whatsoever to es-

chew violence in the Pietermaritzburg area or elsewhere. Inkatha is committed to the peace agreement. I cannot answer for others.'

Referring to his relationship (re the Pietermaritzburg peace talks) with UDF President Archie Gumede and Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Dr Buthelezi said these men had been strangely silent about his offer to stand shoulder to shoulder with them on a public platform to bury their differences and to call for peace and black unity. For some reason the Press had not picked up on his repeated statements in this regard.

To achieve such an end he was prepared to assist in organising the biggest prayer rally for peace this country had ever seen.

He had been informed this week that Mr Gumede had yet again seriously defamed him and Inkatha in an interview. His vilification went beyond the realms of what he believed to be acceptable political polemic in these troubled times. Mr Gumede's reply was circulated to the Press.

There had been ongoing initiatives from Inkatha to end the violence, and ongoing discussions between Inkatha and the UDF. Mr Archie Gumede had been party to these discussions, and time and again he had left meetings to seek confirmation from the UDF's national leadership that agreements should take place.

## Tried hard

'Time and again we did not hear another thing from him. As far as Archbishop Tutu's involvement is concerned, it is also documented that Inkatha immediately endorsed his and the other church leaders' draft peace statement on November 6. We were therefore somewhat shocked that he did not come back to us, as promised, after discussing the draft with the UDF and, instead, issued a completely new and separate statement.'

'I have done everything I believe I can to resolve the conflict. I have talked with church and civic leaders, I have instructed senior colleagues to do everything possible to meet with the UDF/Cosatu leadership and others. I have offered to stand publicly with the leadership of the UDF and others to call for peace. I have involved Inkatha structures at all levels. Inkatha was the first to endorse the church leader's draft peace statement. We have endorsed a subsequent statement. Any other suggestions would be welcome.'

On the question of whether the UDF and Cosatu had the right to campaign and organise in KwaZulu, he said any lawful organisation had a democratic right to put its views to the people and to seek their support. It was when any organisation abused that right and placed the lives and property of the public in danger to achieve their aims and objectives that the people had a right to lawfully oppose their actions.

The people had the right to choose their own leaders and affiliations without hindrance or coercion of any kind. No organisation had the right to demand of non-supporters absolute conformity to its views. No organisation could claim to be the 'sole and authentic' voice of the people. The people must decide.



# Black South African editor who challenged the Government dies

From David Beresford  
in Johannesburg

The black South African newspaper editor, Percy Qoboza, died in Johannesburg yesterday on his 50th birthday. He had failed to regain consciousness after collapsing on Christmas Day.

Mr Qoboza, winner of several international awards for journalism, is best remembered for his confrontation with the Government in the aftermath of the 1976 Soweto uprising, culminating in the closure of his newspaper, The World, and his detention without trial for five and a half months.

In 1985 he became editor of City Press, the country's biggest circulation "black" newspaper, which had been taken over the previous year by the pro-Government Afrikaans press group, Nasionale Pers.

The proprietors allowed the

newspaper editorial independence and it maintained a determinedly anti-Government line under Qoboza's editorship. Shortly before his illness the newspaper had established a new circulation record of over 200,000.

Meanwhile, violence continued in Natal at the weekend as the Zulu monarch, King Zwelithini Goodwill, and his chief minister, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, took turns to lecture the US ambassador on the "realities" of the South African conflict.

Police yesterday reported a series of incidents in the Pietermaritzburg area of Natal — focus of vicious fighting between followers of Chief Buthelezi and supporters of the United Democratic Front — including a man hacked to death and petrol bomb and gun attacks. Another two men were

shot dead by security forces in political violence in other parts of the country.

Chief Buthelezi told the black US ambassador, Mr Edward Perkins, at a weekend meeting in the province that "forces of destruction" were conjuring up visions of "hideous bloodbaths which justify any means to avoid them". He said there was sufficient goodwill among all groups to work together for a just society in South Africa.

King Zwelithini told the diplomat that it was time the US and others stopped regarding his people's aspirations as "tribalistic".

Such "propaganda" was depriving the poorest people in the region of humanitarian aid. He added that it was not the South African Government which would be punished by sanctions, but the victims of apartheid.

*I wonder whether this reporter is in the payroll  
of the Guardian or the UDF or both!  
He remains a bitter person!*

*Handwritten notes and signatures in the right margin, including "L. C. ...", "J. ...", and "T. ...".*

THE GUARDIAN

18-JAN-88 LONDON.

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## COMMENT

## Beyond Hillbrow

**J**OHANNESBURG has come face to face in Hillbrow with a problem which is really SA's problem: how to house the country's rapidly growing multi-racial population.

In the centre-city flatland there are already dangers that services like sanitation and water supplies will break down. They were not designed to cope with a population which has been estimated at 128 per hectare — perhaps the highest in the southern hemisphere, and more than three times that in Rio de Janeiro.

The city council has begun a survey into the overcrowding. This will confirm what is already obvious: thousands of black, coloured and Indian people have flooded into the high-rise area because they have nowhere else to live. In some cases, apartments designed for perhaps four people are accommodating as many families. Landlords and estate agents, unable to find white tenants, may be exploiting the situation, but more often than not it will be found that people are cramming in for economic reasons — this is the only way they can afford to live.

In seeking solutions — even in Hillbrow — the answer is not in a "quick fix" via the Group Areas Act, either through ruthlessly enforcing the law or scrapping it entirely.

It is too late now to impose racial segregation in an area which even Nationalist MP for Hillbrow Leon de Beer regards as an established nonracial society. Amending the Act to allow more

"grey" areas would take some of the pressure off the central city, but create similar problems in the limited number of new mixed suburbs. Scrapping the Act altogether, on the other hand, would open up residential areas — posh or poor — to everyone, so that people could find their level in society, irrespective of race.

This would be the moral thing to do, and for that reason the Act will eventually have to go, but such bold action today would have serious consequences for the Nationalists in white politics. Given their embattled position, they can hardly have the stomach for a scenario in which the security forces are deployed against right-wing vigilantes chasing would-be black residents out of their suburbs.

When it took the historic step of scrapping the pass laws, government promised "orderly" urbanisation. This cannot be achieved through a crumbling Group Areas Act, and it will be a pipedream unless far greater resources are thrown into meeting the country's housing needs. Decisions on how this is going to be done — through self-help housing, controlled squatting, the creation of new Sowetos (or Norwetos) or massive apartment blocks in black areas — cannot be made in isolation. Commitments have to be made now to economic and social policies, based on free enterprise and freedom of choice, in which ordinary people of whatever race are given a fair chance of making a go of their lives.



More jobs to go, but vow of no layoffs

# Staff of Sats down by 30% in six years

*Business Day*  
19/1/88

SATS has cut its labour force by more than 30% in the past six years, according to figures supplied by the organisation, and the process has probably not yet been completed.

Sats has adhered to an undertaking given by the Minister of Transport that there will be no retrenchments. The labour-cutting will, instead, be carried out through a process of natural attrition.

In fact, according to the Sats spokesman, there are at present 2 000 "redundant" employees on the payroll, who will be placed in posts as these become vacant through retirement, resignation or death.

But unionists in the sector say workers nevertheless have some fears over their job security.

From a peak of more than 279 000 in 1982, the Sats workforce fell by 84 500 to 194 600 by December.

Employment at SAA fell by about 10% to 10 500 in that period. But the bulk of the decline was in the railways section, which now employs just over 166 000 workers.

The recently publicised "rationalisation" of mainline passenger services is one reason for this.

However, as Federal Council of

Sats Staff Associations general secretary Abraham Koekemoer pointed out, goods transport services represent a far more significant proportion of railways activities.

Tonnages carried have varied with the fortunes of the economy. But, the Sats spokesman said, better technology and work methods, and particularly the blockload fastfreight system, have enabled Sats to move greater tonnages with far fewer people.

Koekemoer said the unions had often asked management when the process would end. There had not, however, been a definitive reply.

Koekemoer expressed concern about the 2 000 surplus staff, most of whom, he said, were artisans.

"If they keep on reducing the number of available posts, what will they do with these people?" he asked.

He noted that while five years ago whites comprised the majority of the workforce, the majority was now black.

Koekemoer said he thought this was because blacks were now permitted to do jobs previously reserved for whites.

ALAN FINE



**I** THINK we can agree that America is one of the most open societies in the world. Perhaps that it is why it so terrifies the South African government's representatives here and forces them to hire so many mercenaries to do their work for them.

The price you pay for this terror — if terror indeed it be and not shame or the lassitude of defeat — is in the region of R5m a year. No embassy in Washington has such a phalanx of hired guns to deliver its message to the polity spread before it, and few score less success for their money.

The situation is not new; it is merely getting more baroque with each passing year. It seems that the worse the US treats SA, the more lobbyists the embassy — and, presumably, its masters in Pretoria — see fit to engage.

Sadder still, SA's condottieri are required not only to push their employer's cause but to find out and interpret what is going on here. Forgive me, but I had always thought that was one of the prime reasons for having a diplomatic presence.

**T**hanks to the Foreign Agents Registration Act, Team South Africa is required, as are all foreign lobbyists, to report in detail on its activities, expenses and emoluments. The reports, which must be filed every six months, are public.

Let's run through a few of the latest submissions and see what the team has been up to.

There are seven contractors in all — eight if we count a certain Donald G Johnson, who was paid US\$14 250 between March and September last year for the following:

"During the past six months, I've compiled data from data sources on the types and numbers of news articles concerning the South African issue.

"My particular concern was the number of pro and con articles and whether the content of those articles were (sic) accurate with respect to the anti-apartheid question in the US."

**T**he need to pay a man close to US\$30 000 a year to read the newspapers suggests, shall we say, a small deficiency in the Department of Foreign Affairs' entrance requirements. But at least the fellow knows where to get his data.


The most richly-rewarded member of the team is John Sears, the former Reagan campaign adviser. Nothing propinquies like propinquity, as they say, however erstwhile such propinquity may be.

Still, Sears is the biggest cheese available to the embassy, which

# Team South Africa mercenaries who earn R5m a year

SIMON BARBER in Washington

*Business Day 19/1/88*



□ REAGAN ... does SA want to hire him?

must share him with the City of Frankfurt and Japan Airlines. The Department of Foreign Affairs pays him US\$410 000 a year, plus expenses.

His account of how he has been earning this is by far the most laconic of the reports. Between last February and November he:

"1. Assisted in analysing US Press articles and editorials on SA (another reader) and provided research for responses by the embassy;

"2. Assisted in preparation of materials in connection with the embassy information programme; and

"3. Advised regarding various legal matters."

Other registrants tend to list in agonising detail the government figures they have talked to in the course of their duties. Sears does not. Perhaps he believes he is too grand for such minutiae. Or perhaps he has not been doing much propinquity.

William Keyes, on the other hand, tries a trifle too hard to prove that he has been earning his US\$360 000 a year and US\$30 000 expense account.

Keyes, officially known as International Public Affairs Consult-

ants Inc., is Team South Africa's black player, and his employers seem to believe his colour alone is worth a couple of hundred grand.

His contract states that he is to be Pretoria's conduit to black America. Since, unsurprisingly, most of the latter's most prominent constituents regard him with contempt, his task is a difficult one. To this he appears comfortably resigned.

His latest registration papers are overdue, so we must make do with his description of what he did in the six months ending last March. It covers four rather vaguely-worded pages in which he identifies a fair number of South African officials he has met but very few members of the target population.

For example: "Communications with State legislators has (sic) been, and will continue to be, ongoing."

**A**nd: "We continued our on-going effort to facilitate greater business relations between black Americans and black South Africans."

"Much of this effort consisted of responding to requests for information about SA ... in some cases, we simply provided verbal assurances in telephone conversations."


Names? Results? And exactly what kind of assurances?

No, that is not altogether kind. Keyes does mention having "met with Mr Jim McCotter, president of the Great Commission Inc."

The latter is a controversial fundamentalist sect which owns the fringe Washington radio station from which the South African embassy has just bought 26 hours of air-time.

McCotter is president of the station, but the embassy claims to have been entirely unaware of his connection to the Great Commission until last week.

Keyes was possibly too busy to brief his control. For one thing he



□ KOORNHOF ... the man who gets the hired guns' reports

had to go to New Orleans, where he "attended South African wine-tasting ... attended by several leading businessmen".

I hope they didn't spit the stuff out; it was the last they were going to get in a while. It was banned soon afterwards by the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA).

A newcomer to the team is Thomas A Bolan. He does his thing in New York for US\$300 000 a year and US\$15 000 expenses. Like most of his colleagues, he does a lot of reading. He summarises last March to October thus:

"Read material furnished by government of SA (I can see one might want to be paid for that) and met with people knowledgeable in affairs of that country ... monitored numerous newspapers in New York area for matter relating to SA; furnished extracts to Consul General and discussed same when deemed appropriate."

When his nose was not in a newspaper or he was not preaching to the choir, Bolan accompanied various local eminences — Republican Senator Alfonse D'Amato and columnist William Buckley, for example — to see the Consul General, Thomas Wheeler.

Most of the team share this kind of task. The only explanation is that SA's diplomats feel unable to arrange appointments with any serious American without some sort of go-between. Are they so ashamed of what they represent? Or are they simply shy?

Bolan did not get to New Orleans, however. He went to Clearwater, Florida, instead, to attend a convention of Catholic war veterans and speak to "various representatives" of same "in favour of proposed resolution supporting SA".

**H**is success in this regard is not recorded — but, boy, wouldn't it be neat to have the Catholic war veterans on our side?

Before you get the wrong idea, Team South Africa does have a legitimate star, the impeccably professional Stephen Riley. Alone of the cadre, he and his partner, Albert Fox, may be said to earn only US\$300 000.

Want to hold a lunch for 24 senior Senate staff-members of all political stripes — not just complaisant conservatives — and have them all turn up? Riley will arrange it.

Unfortunately for SA's dignity, no one is more punctilious in reporting what he does. His minutely-scrupulous registration form is hilarious. It suggests that the SA embassy might even have trouble blowing its own nose.

I mean, was it really necessary for outside help to "obtain and provide" a copy of President Reagan's report on the first anniversary of the CAAA?

To be fair, some of the material Riley is asked to "obtain and provide" is more abstruse. For example, "information with respect to the International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators". That must have come in handy, as must "copies of Bills pending in Congress dealing with communications security".

**M**y own favourite, though, is "the 1986 return of organisations exempt from income tax filed with the Internal Revenue Service by TransAfrica Inc".

Picture, if you will, Ambassador Piet Koornhof clutching Randall Robinson's financial statement and muttering: "Gotcha now, my friend."

One of Riley's missions has me absolutely stumped.

"Information with respect to the remuneration of the President of the United States."

Can it be that the Department of Foreign Affairs wants to hire him when he steps down next year?

No doubt he would be grateful for the raise.



DAILY NEWS, TUESDAY: Jan 19, 1988

## Education before liberation

ONE of the more extreme political phrases bandied about in the townships was "Liberation before education". This was the rallying cry at the time of the school boycotts, which regrettably simmer on in various parts of the country and which have been especially disruptive in Soweto. Proof of this foolishness has been the 1987 matric

pass rate of only 33,1 per cent in Soweto, directly attributed by authorities yesterday to continued unrest and to the drop in school attendance in 1985 and 1986. An informed and educated young society would be better able to plan for the future but, sadly, school principals are not optimistic about the road ahead.



**T**HE sudden death of Dr Connie Mulder, the fallen crown prince of the National Party, who went on to fight his former colleagues (and beat them!) in Randfontein, was marked by unexpected magnanimity and sometimes almost-effusive praise from Nationalist commentators.

Given the nature of his disgrace and the fact that he was bent on Nat-wrecking ventures, this was all very surprising.

DIE VADERLAND, which reported his passing as a main lead, carried a short comment noting it with "regrets" and promising "a fuller tribute later".

In that fuller tribute, the paper said that it preferred to remember him as "a special friend" who had been a director of the newspaper group for years. He was "a dynamic man, driven by enthusiasm and ambition... a politician to the core... a leader by instinct". However, politics had gone wrong for him, "a personal setback"... but we believe he will be remembered for his positive contributions".

BEELD gave Connie the second most prominent spot on the front page, favouring for the main story a report about the resignation from Tukkies of Professor Carel Boshoff and his plans for devoting himself full-time to fighting for an Afrikaner homeland (a somewhat ironic juxtaposition!)

The paper said that he was "a tragic figure". It was clear that he was never at home in the Conservative Party and "only used it as a shelter from the phantoms of the past and a place in which to nurse his grievances against former colleagues".

RAPPORT noted that, because of "an objectionable department", Dr Mulder had "fallen from grace at the very moment when it seemed he was about to put the cap on an exceptional political career". The episode had shown just how "vulnerable" people were ("even those blessed with leadership qualities"). The overriding impression left by Dr Mulder's death did not concern the activities of "that inappropriate ministry" but was "of the tragedy of unfulfilled promise".

□□□

ATTEMPTS by the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging to break up a National Party meeting in Standerton had "boomeranged" on them, said


## AFRIKAANS PRESS

Jonathan Hobday



# Unexpected Nationalist praise for Connie Mulder

HY? NEE WAT, EK VAT HOM NET VIR 'N WANDELING?



Dr Treurnicht: "Him? O, I'm just taking for walkies!"

Cartoon by Orin Scott in BEELD.

BEELD. They had failed in the of breaking up the meeting their plan to force a debate their leader, Mr Terre'Blanche and the Nat Transvaal leader, Mr F.W. de

In any case, asked the paper was "a cultural organisation attending a political meeting was part of the AWB's cultural programme?"

BEELD said that Dr Treurnicht could not distance himself from the activities of the Many AWB members supported the Conservative Party and "the AWB members sat in the CP Silence from him on the "al behaviour" of the AWB strengthen conjecture that he prisoner of the AWB".

DIE VADERLAND said the methods used by the AWB were the same as those of "leftist organisations generally black", like those who disrupted the meetings of Dr Cruise O'Brien, Dr Denis V and Mrs Helen Suzman.

"If the AWB wants to represent conservative Afrikaners — especially as a cultural representative then it must act in a way that do shame Afrikaners. It is astonishing that people such as this are we in the Conservative Party and Afrikaner Volkswag".



'R50 000 cheques made out to Ministers'

# George Matanzima is not summonsed

By Michael Tissong

UMTATA — Former Transkei Prime Minister Chief George Matanzima could not be served with a subpoena to appear before the commission of inquiry probing alleged corruption involving politicians and former Transkei government officials, an official of the commission said yesterday.

The reasons that he had not been served with a summons were not stated and could not be established.

Transactions involving at least R2,5 million were the focus of the commission's hearing yesterday.

Chief Matanzima was allegedly involved in transactions involving about R2 million.

A further R510 000 involved the sale of gambling rights by a one-man company, Mzamba Development Company, to the Holiday Inns and the Transkei Development Corporation (TDC) in 1982.

The commission was told yesterday Mzamba was

registered in a Mr Monde Sihele's name.

Holiday Inns did not know at the time who the money was paid to as they had dealt with a group of lawyers. The money had to be paid for Holiday Inns to go ahead with development plans.

The probe into alleged corruption was ordered after the military, led by General Bantu Holomisa, took over the reins of government last year.

Mr Peter Barrable, who investigated the matter on behalf of the TDC, told the commission that the R500 000 was distributed to Mrs A Matanzima, Mrs E Pamla, a Mr Briarton, Mrs A T Nelison, Mr D C Haywood, Mr D White and Mr Sihele.

## FARMER QUESTIONED

Commission Chairman Mr Gerald Alexander also questioned farmer and hotel owner Mr G J Gouws who sold a farm in the Eastern Cape to Chief Matanzima for R1,4 million and distributed a further R500 000 on the chief's behalf.

Mr Gouws said he did not know where the approximately R2 million which was deposited into his account, came from. It was deposited soon after speaking to Chief Matanzima about the sale of the farm.

The commission established that the money came from a Cape Town attorney.

Mr Gouws said his bank informed him that telegraphic transfers were made into his account. A day or two later, he said, Chief Matanzima visited him at his hotel in connection with the money.

Gouws said that following advice from Chief Matanzima he had made out cheques of R50 000 each to the managing director of TDC Mr Monty Ntloko, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Interior Mr Mtutuzeli Lujabe, the Minister of Commerce, Industry and Tourism Mr Tsepo Letlaka and former Prime Minister Miss Stella Sigcau.

## COVER COSTS

A R100 000 cash cheque was also made out to Chief Matanzima, R26 000 to Coetzer Motors and a further R194 000 in cash in January 1987. Mr Gouws said Chief Matanzima borrowed R50 000 to buy a car.

Mr Lujabe told the commission that when Chief Matanzima gave him a R50 000 cheque in January 1987, he said: "This is the ticky I promised you."

Mr Lujabe said the money was to cover the costs of campaigning which he had suffered during the election the previous year.

Despite repeated questioning by Mr Alexander, Mr Lujabe declined to say how the figure of R50 000 was reached. Mr Lujabe said he used his own money during the campaign but declined to say how much it was.

Before adjourning, Mr Alexander noted that the former Paramount Chief Kaizer Matanzima and former private investigator of the Transkei Department of the Auditor General Mr John Trickey would appear before the Commission today.



# The Star

## Westminster rules — or Mr Botha's?

FROM STARTING as one of the slightly Gilbertian rows that periodically enliven the tricameral Parliament, the clash between the Rev Allan Hendrickse and Mr Carter Ebrahim, the coloured Education Minister who refuses to be fired, is developing into a full-scale constitutional crisis. Depending on how President Botha acts — or fails to act — to resolve it, it has the potential to do further immense harm to the credibility of the tricameral system.

Under the Westminster conventions that still govern the hybrid Parliament, Mr Hendrickse, as chairman of the Ministers' Council in the House of Representatives, appoints ministers. The Cabinet named by the leader of the ruling party is endorsed by the State President as head of state, but that is a mere formality — just as it was in the days of figurehead state presidents or governors-general.

The chief minister must clearly be entitled to dismiss ministers as well, for whatever reason. Mr Ebrahim has come out against the Labour Party line on the Group Areas Act, a key policy issue, and so has exposed himself to being axed. Yet he refuses to stand down, taking refuge in the plea that it was the State President who appointed him.

Group areas is the very issue which has led to the big rift between Mr Hendrickse and Mr Botha. Labour politicians are convinced that Mr Ebrahim's stand is directly inspired by the National Party, in the hope of overcoming the tactic of trying to force Mr Botha into an unwanted general election, perhaps even engineering a party split.

Is Mr Botha likely, therefore, to accede to the request which Mr Hendrickse has now formally delivered to dismiss the recalcitrant minister? Or will he ignore it, thus provoking a ludicrous situation in the Council of Ministers and a constitutional impasse that might have to be resolved in court?

The omens are not auspicious for Mr Botha following the correct Westminster path. Once before he unilaterally dismissed a minister in the House of Delegates — and that was merely in a fit of pique about the man's upstaging him in disclosing some important news. In this, as in other matters, Mr Botha has seemed not unduly concerned about the boundaries between his executive and figurehead functions.

If a similar situation is now to develop over the Ebrahim affair, the country will have taken one more ominous step down the path of an authoritarian, imperial presidency.



# Senegal steps out on the road to recovery

*The STAR 19/11/88*

The question is: will the World Bank medicine prove too strong? Nicholas Woodsworth reports from Dakar.

On the tree-lined avenues of Dakar, the former colonial capital of French West Africa, foreign visitors do not stroll, they dodge. Liable to be ambushed on every corner by small armies of fast-moving hawkers, the innocent tourist soon learns that this local variety of guerilla warfare involves not the Kalashnikov, but the rapid-fire sales pitch.

The results can, however, be devastating. Many are the experienced travellers who come away baffled from one of these street skirmishes, possessors of imitation Seiko watches or bogus ivory bangles they never intended to buy.

Of all the trading, commercial and business-minded people of sub-Saharan Africa, the Senegalese are indisputably the champions. While Dakar's aggressive street hawkers can sometimes make this irritatingly obvious, the Senegalese flair for business also operates on much more sophisticated levels.

Historically great travellers and traders, the Senegalese abound in entrepreneurial skill reputed throughout Africa. Astute and enterprising, they are the continent's grassroots capitalists *par excellence*.

This national talent may turn out to be Senegal's strongest card in the rigorous economic battle it is waging. While it may have an edge in terms of human resources, on almost every other count Senegal's lack of advantage has made it one of the poorer countries in Africa.

Of the four traditional pillars of the economy — groundnuts, phosphates, fishing and tourism — not one stands firm today. Drought, erosion, lack of natural resources, plunging world commodity prices and a soaring popu-

But Senegal is at last rounding a corner in its struggle towards economic development. Faced with a severe economic crisis in the early 1980s, it embarked on a far-reaching structural adjustment programme devised by the World Bank. Last May it entered the second phase of its Medium Term Adjustment Programme (1985-92), an initiative supported by a third World Bank structural adjustment loan package worth R186 million.

With sustained growth as its overall objective, World Bank strategy in this phase of the programme centres on the progressive withdrawal of the State from all sectors of production.

By this measure, the bank aims at

sacrifices to make this programme work," he says.

The World Bank does not deny that its reforms are causing difficulties. Despite the programmes it has devised to cushion the adverse effects of adjustment, there are complaints that the World Bank medicine is simply too strong.

"It is not the government that is making the sacrifices," says Mr Babacar Niang, an opposition MP. "It is the population. Reform is necessary, but we are being pushed too far too fast."

"The majority of Senegalese are poor peasants. In the past, the government has tried to guarantee them certain minima. Now they are being forced to suffer so that wealth may accumulate in the hands of private investors in the future."

Certainly, the average Senegalese will profit little from structural adjustment in the short term. Disruption in the pattern of rural life has been considerable.

## More unemployment

Belt-tightening will be even more severe in urban areas. The bank estimates that 10 percent of the industrial workforce will be laid off as uncompetitive enterprises collapse. This will only increase the unemployment caused by the liquidation of parastatal enterprises. While food prices rise, wage increases will be contained. Labour code modifications demanded by the bank will allow employers to hire cheap labour ineligible for social security benefits.

Measures such as these will make the years ahead testing ones. The World Bank may proclaim itself confident of the eventual establishment of sustained growth, but it is well aware of the socio-political risks of reform.

It is one thing to promise the country entrepreneurial scope by strengthening the free enterprise system. Providing that scope to the small farmer, the shopkeeper, and even the Dakar street hawker will be the full test of structural adjustment. — *Financial Times, London.*



promoting private sector initiative and investment, achieving greater efficiency in what will remain of government management, and restoring financial equilibrium and credit worthiness.

According to Mr Frans Kaps, chief representative of the World Bank in Senegal, rational compromise has been the key element in progress made so far.

"The government has realised there is no alternative and is making great

lation have all contributed to Senegal's ill health.

There is, however, little disagreement today among Western financial and aid institutions about the predominant cause of Senegal's stagnation. As a legacy of colonial rule, it inherited at independence a national economy in which the State played a leading and all-pervasive role. Unwieldy and inefficient, it has hampered the country's progress ever since, and made it a chronic debtor.



# South African sanctions: a questionable strategy

A WIDE-RANGING assessment of sanctions against South Africa, published yesterday by the Economist Intelligence Unit, comes to a pessimistic conclusion about their likely impact.

There have been three distinct phases in the escalation on international pressure against South Africa, according to Ms Merle Lipton in her 170-page report.

The first was sparked by the Sharpeville shootings of 1960; the second by the Soweto uprising of 1976, and the third by the political upheavals since 1984.

"Logic suggests that another upsurge of protest and violence inside South Africa would provoke a further series of sanctions. In practice...the dynamics of sanctions are so complex and unpredictable that one cannot rule out either a lurch into comprehensive mandatory sanctions, or a loss of interest in this particular strategy for ending apartheid, with a consequent winding down of the campaign."

Ms Lipton goes on to look at the background to the limited sanctions now in place, the costs and benefits of sanctions for Western governments who impose them, South Africa's role in the world economy, and she considers the political and economic effects of sanctions on South Africa itself.

There are, she writes, at least five possible scenarios:

- Existing measures remain in place, but provided there is no major upheaval in South Africa nothing further will be done.
- Gradual escalation of sanctions, including bans by the European Community and Japan on coal and agricultural imports, and by Israel in response to pressure from the United States.
- A more complex and differentiated approach, with the lifting of some sanctions, for example, on sport or on employers who meet certain criteria.
- A major intensification of sanctions, some or all made mandatory by the UN Security Council, prompted by a disaster within South Africa or the region.
- The erosion or lifting of some of the current sanctions either because of rising economic costs, or the overshadowing of concern about South Africa by, for example, developments in the Middle East or the state of the world economy.

Ms Lipman writes: "The most likely prognosis for the future is the continued escalation of sanctions." But she goes on to

A new report casts doubt on the value of boycotting Pretoria, writes Michael Holman

raise doubts about their practicality and their suitability as a force for constructive change in South Africa.

Ms Lipton points out that existing sanctions have had unintended effects. The effective end to Kruggerand exports in 1985-86 did not lead to a loss of South African gold sales. Instead, the country "benefited, along with all gold producers, from the increasing demand for gold, as the issuing and promotion of new coins in Canada, the USA, Japan and elsewhere has, in most cases, led to an unexpectedly large public response," notes the report.

Logic suggests that another upsurge of protest inside South Africa would provoke a further series of sanctions

Although gold, which accounts for between a third and a half of South Africa's exports, is a "tempting target" for sanctioners, Ms Lipton believes that any embargo would merely drive up the price. Attempts by Central Banks to force the price down by unloading their gold reserves could "threaten the tenuous stability of the international monetary system."

South Africa's black-ruled neighbours, vulnerable to retaliation by Pretoria, have growing reservations about sanctions, she says. Their attempts to build up alternative transport routes to those via South Africa, by rehabilitating regional railways, "provides the South African Defence Force with very exposed targets."

The report notes the self-interest that is one factor in the pro-sanctions lobby. Protectionist groups within the US (coal, textiles, agriculture) were active in shaping Washington's 1986 sanctions package.

The report questions the impact of disinvestment, noting that of some 100 US companies which "withdrew" by 1987, the

majority did not cut their links "but restructured their interests in a way which reduces their direct involvement but retains their business relations."

The last section of the report is a searching examination of the results of sanctions now in force, and the possible consequences of tougher measures.

The historical record shows that the effect of sanctions are unpredictable and indiscriminate: "even if they produce their intended, adverse economic effects, the desired political effects do not automatically follow."

There is a danger that the South African Government perceives itself "as being caught in a Catch 22 situation, where even genuine reforms did not secure the easing of sanctions, but could even lead to their intensification, on the grounds that the sanctions medicine was working and the dose should therefore be increased."

The impact of sanctions on "the highly diverse black community" will not be uniform, the report says, noting that while one leading black business group has moved towards support of sanctions, the more radical trade unions "remain highly ambivalent."

Far from weakening the Government, the threat of sanctions - and even more than their imposition - has contributed to its strengthening vis-à-vis other sections of society.

The report ends on a pessimistic note. Sanctions that really bite, eroding black living standards, possibly creating disillusionment and a reaction against their advocates, could have unintended consequences in the black power struggle.

It adds: "Continued incremental sanctions seem unlikely to unseat the Government, and more likely to impede than to accelerate reform...in the long run (they) might contribute to the erosion of white control. But the outcome might not be black rule over an undivided country."

"If sanctions have their intended effects, economic decline could erode those economic bonds that have drawn together the diverse people of South Africa, and strengthen fissiparous tendencies, thus making more possible, partition against a background of growing violence throughout the region."

*Sanctions and South Africa: The Dynamics of Economic Isolation, £125, Economist Intelligence Unit, 40 Duke Street, London.*

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