

Lum | ^{NO. 5} 062 | 0012 | 09

ARMS TRAFFIC WITH SOUTH AFRICA:

WHO IS GUILTY?

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November, 1976

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WHO IS GUILTY?

An ominous impression is gaining currency here and abroad that there exists some sinister relationship between Israel and South Africa.

This distortion is being created and broadcast by powerful forces in the militant, radical Arab and African blocs, abetted by the Soviet regime and its satellites. It is symbolized by references to "the Pretoria-Tel Aviv Axis;" its purpose, to discredit Israel as a fascist, racist state by linking it to the infamous "Rome-Berlin Axis" which the phrase ineluctably conjures up.

A recent and especially damaging case in point is the "Report on the Relations between Israel and South Africa" released on August 19, 1976 by the "Special Committee Against Apartheid," a creature of the United Nations General Assembly. (1) A glance at the composition of the Special Committee* is hardly likely to induce confidence in its findings, consisting as it does almost entirely of a congeries of military dictatorships, Communist tyrannies and otherwise repressive regimes. The Special Committee's even-handedness on the subject may be gauged by the fact that only five of its eighteen members have diplomatic relations with Israel.

Among the subjects on which the Report focuses is the alleged "military collaboration" between Israel and South Africa.

*Algeria, East Germany, Ghana, Guinea, Haiti, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nepal, Nigeria, Peru, Phillipines, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Trinidad and Tobago, Ukraine.

The evidence it adduces is minimal and largely based on rumors and speculative inferences. Yet because of its UN sponsorship, the Report must be taken seriously and examined rigorously. How extensive is Israel's military-sales relationship with South Africa? How does it compare with the arms other countries are selling to the Vorster regime?

We begin by citing a recent news item:

"Paris, Oct. 1. -- France is to sell two new Agosta 20-torpedo submarines to South Africa in a deal worth about \$65 million."

This dispatch, quoted in full and verbatim as it appeared in the October 2, 1976 issue of The Times of London, underscores the most significant aspect of the arms traffic to South Africa -- that the government of Prime Minister John Vorster has managed to evade the arms embargo in effect against it these past dozen years because of the cupidity and connivance of the Western powers, chief among them France, who have engaged in massive arms traffic with the apartheid regime.

Yet the UN Report ignores South Africa's huge purchases of weapons from the countries of Western Europe, concentrating instead on Israel, whose military sales to South Africa -- which are not to be condoned -- are in fact (as this study will show) minuscule by comparison. This double standard underscores the political purpose of such reports as that of the "Special Committee Against Apartheid," revealing its intention to be not a condemnation of those powerful states that provide South Africa with the great share of its military capability but an indictment of the State of Israel.

Because most of the countries that sell military hardware to South Africa seek to hide these transactions, a complete report is not possible at this point. However, enough facts can be assembled

to reveal the overall pattern of the flow of arms to South Africa and of Israel's share in it.

Historical Background

Historically, South Africa has always been closely associated with the West. It fought as a member of the British Commonwealth alongside the Western Allies in both World Wars; it participated in the Berlin Airlift of 1948 and sent a squadron of fighter-bombers to the United Nations Command during the Korean War.

As a consequence of this historical association and of its strategic geographical position, South Africa long occupied a special place in Western defense plans and, until the early 1960s, received a steady flow of arms shipments from Great Britain, the United States and Canada. (2)

The Simonstown Agreements, 1955 and 1961

South Africa's cooperative military relationship with Great Britain was especially strong, its armed forces followed the British model and were originally created and largely equipped by Great Britain.

In 1955, the two governments concluded the "Simonstown Agreement," under which Britain (a) handed over to South Africa control of its great naval base at Simonstown, not far from Cape Town; (b) retained important naval facilities there, which it was permitted to use independently in case of war; (c) undertook what was called a "joint seaward defense" system with South Africa; and (d) began a major re-equipment program for the South African Armed Forces chiefly the Navy and Air Force.

Under the latter provision, large quantities of new equipment were sold to South Africa: \$50 million worth of naval vessels, including seaward defense ships, coastal minesweepers and four frigates, as well as eight Avro Shackleton maritime reconnaissance aircraft redesigned for use also as tactical bombers and transports. (3)

At the insistence of the British Defense Ministry, the Simons-town Agreement had included an explicit distinction between defensive arms and arms to be used for internal purposes such as counter-insurgency. That distinction carried over when the Agreement was renegotiated in 1961. It remained an empty one, for it did not prevent the sale of spare parts for naval vessels (4), Centurion tanks, Saracen armored cars, Buccaneer marine bombers, six Canberra strike-and-reconnaissance planes, Westland Wasp helicopters and other military equipment that could be used as well for counter-insurgency purposes. (5)

During the same 1955-61 period, South Africa purchased 37 Sabre-6 jet fighters from Canada, helicopters from the United States and small arms and ammunition from Belgium and Switzerland. (6)

The Turn of the Hinge, 1960 and 1961

The years 1960, and 1961 marked crucial turning-points in the world standing of South Africa. In 1960, a massacre occurred at Sharpeville that shocked the world: South African police units fired into crowds of rioting black workers and students, killing 63. An aroused world opinion strongly condemned South Africa for its racial policies. But the wave of protests from every corner of the globe resulted only in more rigid and more brutal enforce-

ment of apartheid. In response, the nations of the British Commonwealth expelled South Africa from the Commonwealth.

Nevertheless, despite South Africa's growing isolation, it continued to find ample supplies -- and suppliers -- of armaments from abroad. In 1963 France for the first time became a major supplier and sold Pretoria the Mirage III, which became its prime fighter plane, and the Alouette II, which became South Africa's basic military helicopter. Large numbers of the more advanced Alouette III were ordered for later delivery. In addition, the United States delivered to South Africa 37 Cessna-185 liaison planes and seven C-130B Hercules transport planes between 1962 and 1964. (7)

The United Nations Arms Embargoes, 1963 and 1964

The pattern of censure, condemnation and exclusion begun in 1960 came to a head in a series of United Nations Security Council resolutions (August, 1963; December, 1963; and June, 1964) calling on all states to cease the sale and shipment to South Africa of arms and ammunition, military vehicles, equipment and materials needed for the maintenance of arms. Following these resolutions a series of embargoes by individual states was adopted.

Despite all the resolutions and embargoes, however, the major suppliers of arms to South Africa found ways and grounds of justification to continue the arms traffic.

Thus, in 1964, while supporting the UN resolutions, Britain and France exercised their right to supply South Africa with equipment for its external defense. When the British government announced its arms embargo of South Africa in 1964, it excluded already existing "firm contracts," which covered six Canberra B-(1)-58 bombers, four additional Westland Wasp helicopters and 16

Buccaneer bombers. (8) At the same time Britain continued to supply spare parts for these two types of bombers, as well as spare parts and ammunition for the Shackleton planes, the Centurion tanks and the Saracen armored cars sold in earlier years. (9)

.. In the same way, when the United States announced its embargo in 1963, it declared that existing contracts would nevertheless be fulfilled. The device used to negate the arms embargo was the so-called "dual use" doctrine, a loophole permitting the supplying of equipment and materials which can have both civilians and military uses. Under that same doctrine, the United States sold 12 Cessna-185s and six C-130E Hercules transports. Canada continued to supply spare parts for equipment it had sold in pre-embargo days -- sales which in 1969 alone amounted to \$1.2 million. (10)

The effect of these sales and the continuing supply of spare parts and ammunition, transport and communications equipment and helicopters has been to strengthen the South African Navy, allow its A Force to keep all its British aircraft in full operation and permit the use in aircraft supplied by third countries (chiefly France and Italy) of British engines produced under license. (11)

Indeed, one of the most effective and significant ways in which the Western powers and South Africa have evaded the UN arms embargoes has been through licensing arrangements. By 1965, for example, South Africa had acquired 127 licenses for the manufacture or assembly of foreign equipment, including French armored cars, Belgian automatic rifles, Italian jet trainers, and French jet fighter planes. (12)

The Extent of Collusion

Even a cursory examination of various summary surveys that are readily accessible provides a startling insight into the collusion of certain Western powers with South Africa in supplying armaments.

According to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, South Africa received in the decade 1965-1974 a total of \$358 million worth of military equipment. (13) The supplier-country breakdown is as follows:

France.....	\$224 million
United Kingdom.....	74 million
United States.....	24 million
West Germany.....	1 million
All others (unspecified).....	35 million

These estimates, based exclusively on official statistics provided by the various governments, are generally regarded as being considerably understated. A sobering estimate is provided by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (14) in a table listing the value of weapons and other war material imported by South Africa in the years between 1963 and 1975:

1963.....	\$118 million
1964.....	39 million
1965.....	142 million
1966.....	70 million
1967.....	60 million
1968.....	34 million
1969.....	35 million
1970.....	59 million
1971.....	53 million
1972.....	28 million
1973.....	28 million
1974.....	219 million
1975.....	137 million

Total -- \$1,022 billion

The result of all these arms sales? A detailed breakdown of the South African Armed Forces' equipment by the prestigious International Institute for Strategic Studies (15) lists the following kinds of war material and the various countries of origin:

Army:

Centurion tanks (British)
Comet tanks (British)
Eland armored cars (French)
Ferret scout cars (British)
Saracen armored cars (British)
Tiger cat missiles (British)
Crotale missiles (French)

Navy:

Daphne submarines (French)
Wasp helicopters (British)
Ford patrol boats (British)

Air Force:

Canberra bombers (British)
Buccaneer bombers (British)
Mirage jet fighters (French)
Piaggio transports (Italian)
Transall transports (French)
Alouette helicopters (French)
Cessna trainers (American)
Impala trainers (Italian)

Country-by-Country Countdown

France

South Africa's chief military arsenal for the past dozen years -- and continuing to today -- is France. A full report of the military hardware that French companies have supplied to South Africa has never before been compiled and the information that follows is probably not complete. But this is the first time so much detailed information has ever been pieced together from a variety of reliable sources, with names of companies, types and brand names of equipment, the years in which the arms were ordered

and produced, and their monetary value. It is an astounding portrait of the vast array of weaponry, for use on land, sea, and air, which France has provided to South Africa.

*In the years 1967-69, two French industrial giants, Matra and Thomson-Houston-Hotchkiss-Brandt, developed a \$100 million missile-and-radar system, adapted from their own famous Crotale system, to specifications of South African government experts who worked closely with them. The new system is called Cactus/Crotale, and first deliveries began in 1971. It is a low-level, surface-to-air system with all-weather capability, effective against supersonic aircraft, highly mobile on land and by air transport, able to go into action within five minutes, and with an ability to be integrated into other air defense systems, with particular reference to the British radar system installed by the Marconi Company in 1970, (See p.15) . (16)

*In 1968, South Africa purchased twenty AMX armored cars from the French manufacturer Panhard. This car is armed with 60mm. and 90mm cannon. (17) Three years earlier, in 1965, Panhard had licensed the production and assembly in South Africa of 1,000 of these cars. By 1975, 900 had already been produced; they entered the South African arsenal as the Eland AC. (18) In 1968, as part of the arrangement, South Africa bought 250 Panhard engines at a cost of \$850,000. (19)

*The giant French aircraft manufacturer, Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale (SNIAS), is one of South Africa's great military sources. For example:

-- In the early 1960s, SNIAS and its subsidiary,

Sud-Aviation, built the Atlas Aircraft Corporation plant in the Transvaal. Atlas has since become the major production center where the mainstays of the South African Air Force, the Impala and the Mirage, are manufactured and assembled under license. (20) The Atlas factory was constructed at a cost of \$42 million. (21)

--In the late 1960s, SNIAS sold an unspecified (i e hidden) number of AS-20 and AS-30 missiles to South Africa (22) and, in 1970, an unknown number of the more advanced Exocet missile. (23)

--In 1970, SNIAS sold nine Transall C-160 troop transport planes to South Africa, at a cost of about \$34 million. (24)

--In 1969, the SNIAS subsidiary, Sud-Aviation, licensed the assembly and production in South Africa of 20 SA-330 Puma helicopters (25) at a cost of some \$28 million. (26)

--From 1967 to 1969, SNIAS-Sud-Aviation sold to South Africa three different brands of military helicopters: six Alouette IIs costing over \$600,000; 50 Alouette IIIs (estimated at \$7 million); and 16 SA-3210 Super Frelons, at a cost of around \$30 million. (27)

--In 1974, SNIAS renewed its missile sales to South Africa by delivering an unspecified number of the advanced-generation Aerospatiale/MBB Milan light anti-tank missile. (28)

-- In 1975, South Africa ordered more advanced missiles from SNIAS: 40 Aerospatiale AS 11/12 air-to-surface missiles used to arm the Impala plane, on which SNIAS started delivery in 1975; and the Aerospatiale AM 39 Exocet air-to-surface missile to arm SNIAS' Super Frelon helicopter, with delivery due in 1977. (29)

*Second only to SNIAS as a source of missiles for South Africa is Matra, another major French weapons company. In addition to having shared in the production of the Cactus/Crotale missile system (see above), Matra independently made two separate missile sales to South Africa. In the late 1960s Matra sold 45 Matra R.530s at an approximate cost of nearly \$4 million. (30) In 1972, South Africa ordered a large number of more advanced Matra R.550 Magic air-to-air missiles (to arm the Mirage F-1 jet fighter) on which Matra began delivery in 1975. (31)

*In 1972, another French firm, Dubigeon-Normandie, sold three Cherbourg-class patrol boats to South Africa. That same year, it delivered three Daphne-class submarines, at a cost of over \$40 million. (32) And in 1975, there was a repeat order for three more Daphne submarines. (32)

Not to be outdone in sales by any of its confreres, the leading French airplane manufacturer, Marcel-Dassault, has for more than a dozen years been South Africa's major supplier of military aircraft. In 1963, Marcel-Dassault sold 16 Mirage III-CZ interceptor planes, and in 1967 three more of the same type. (34)

--In 1965-66, Marcel-Dassault sold South Africa 20 Mirage III-EZ pursuit bombers.

--In 1967, it sold four Mirage III-RZ reconnaissance planes.

--In 1965, it sold three Mystere-20 transport planes.

--In 1971, it sold 150 Mirage-Milan attack bombers. (35)

--Marcel-Dassault initiated its most ambitious and massive military supply arrangement with South Africa in 1971 when it licensed to the Atlas Aircraft Corporation the production and assembly of 48 of its renowned Mirage F-1 jet fighters at a cost of some \$300 million. (36) The first phase of this deal was consummated in early 1975 with the delivery by Dassault of the first 16 Mirage F-1 planes. (37) For the remaining 32 of that initial order, the engines were imported from France; all other components were produced in -- and the entire plane was then assembled at -- the Atlas factory. (38) It has been reported that a total of 100 F-1s have been licensed to Atlas (39)

--The South African Air Force also ordered four Mirage III-R reconnaissance planes in 1972. They were delivered in 1973 (40) In 1974 South Africa took delivery of 18 Mirage III-E jet fighters, ordered in mid-1972. (41)

*Ancillary to the massive Marcel-Dassault deal is South Africa's order of the A-300 Airbus tanker-transport, to support the growing Mirage force. (42) The order is for 1977 delivery. These planes are officially described as civilian in purpose, thus permitting their open sale to South Africa. Reportedly, however, they are readily adaptable to the task of in-flight refueling of fighter planes, thus greatly increasing their combat range and putting much

of Central Africa within aerial surveillance distance. (43)

*Three more French-South African military deals are worth noting:

--In 1971, the French firm Breguet-Aviation sold the Pretoria government eight Breguet-Atlantique anti-submarine destroyers at an estimated cost of nearly \$100 million. (44)

--As part of its naval expansion program, South Africa has negotiated the purchase of the CMN Corvette, a 750-ton boat that is armed with four Exocet SSM missile-launchers, also produced in France. (45)

--Negotiations have reportedly reached an advanced stage for the purchase of four new French frigates. (46)

*One of the most ominous developments in the Franco-South African relationship is the \$1.2 billion nuclear power deal announced in May of this year between the Electricity Supply Commission (ESCOM) of South Africa and a consortium of French companies -- Framatome Alsthom, and Spie-Batignolles.

The power station, South Africa's first, will be built at Koeberg, 17 miles north of Cape Town. Framatome will supply two nuclear reactors, and Alsthom will provide two turbine generators capable of producing 922,000 kilowatts of power each. Spie-Batignolles will provide general engineering services. The first unit of the power station is scheduled to go into operation in November 1982 and the second a year later. (47) The contract covers the supply of six fuel element deliveries; thus, the French consortium has committed itself to at least an 18-year involvement in the project. (48)

ESCOM has been preparing facilities for nuclear power in conjunction with the South African Atomic Energy Board. (49) The Koeberg power station will provide South Africa with her own fuel and fissionable materials; if a plant is built for treating irradiated material, South Africa will have all she needs to build an atomic bomb. While South Africa might already possess the know-how to produce nuclear weapons, France is both facilitating and speeding the process. (50)

The significance of France's involvement in the Koeberg project must be seen in the context of French nuclear cooperation with South Africa over many years. There has been a constant exchange of information and experts between the two countries. For example, the French firm SODETEG, which participated in the French nuclear program, has been established in Johannesburg since 1968. (51) Since 1964, the two governments have had an agreement whereby South African nuclear scientists and technicians have been receiving training in France. (52)

In explaining why South Africa awarded the contract for nuclear power development to the French rather than to the two other bidders (one American-led, the other Dutch), a South African spokesman described the French contractors as "more reliable and certain." For France the contract is another lucrative deal with an old customer, in keeping with a newly aggressive export policy in everything from nuclear plants to tanks to electronics. "It's strictly business," a French government spokesman said. (53)

It should be noted at once that companies in other countries are not being completely locked out of this "strictly business" deal.

Fuel elements for the initial charge and five reloads will be manufactured by Franco-Belgian Fuel Co. from enriched uranium hexafluoride provided by South Africa. (54) The enrichment services will, in turn, be supplied from two sources: a pilot uranium enrichment plant just completed and set up with West German know-how (55) and the uranium enrichment program agreed to by the United States last year (56) through the U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration, enabling the reactors (theoretically, at least) to supply as by-products enough plutonium to make 100 atom bombs of the type used against Nagasaki in 1945. (57)

Nor need the United States feel left out of the deal. Framatome is 15 per cent owned by Westinghouse Electric Corporation and is a licensee for Westinghouse's pressurized-water nuclear reactor. (58)

Great Britain

Commercial considerations, as well as the residue of tradition, are also the main force behind Britain's continuing military exports to South Africa, which was once Britain's largest African customer for arms. It is also true that the United Kingdom, like a number of other Western countries, has interpreted its obligations under the UN resolutions so narrowly that a wide range of military equipment is still supplied to the apartheid regime.

In the period 1968-1970, for instance, four separate deals of military consequence are a matter of public record:

*In 1968, the Marconi Communications Systems Company of England opened a new factory in South Africa which produces, among other items, the ADF-370 radio compass for the Impala jet trainers assembled in South Africa.

*In 1969, International Aeradio Southern Africa LTD was established by a consortium of British electronics firms -- EMI Electronics, Philips Telecommunications, and Racal Electronics. (60)

*In 1970, the Marconi Company confirmed a new, \$70-80 million contract for military radar and other electronically operated communications equipment now in use as part of the South African radar defense known as the Northern Air Defense System. According to the British Government, this sale was not a breach of the UN embargo, since it concerned electronics and communications equipment not covered in the embargo. (61)

*Also in 1970, South Africa imported the British twin Rolls-Royce Tyne engines for use in assembling the French Transall transport aircraft. (62)

In 1971, South Africa ordered six Westland Wasp ASW helicopters, which the British delivered in 1974 under their interpretation of the Simonstown Agreement. (63)

Recent investigations in England have exposed a whole series of commercial agreements in the past two years for the sale of military equipment to South Africa, revealing the inadequacies of controls imposed on the flow of arms by Britain. Many items of equipment, such as communications, electronic and radar systems, have never been covered by the terms of the arms embargo. At the same time, however, the supply of military hardware has continued through intermediaries in third countries.

In addition, the British Minister of Defense admitted in Parliament last May that copies of a military equipment catalog, listing all classified and unclassified British military equipment

Instead of crates containing one or two overhauled engines, deep-sea containers holding an average of 12 tons of material each began to be shipped regularly to South Africa. Between August and December 1975, at least 15 such containers were shipped by Aviation Jersey to South Africa.

Meanwhile, back in England, there was an equally large flow to Aviation Jersey's warehouses of engine parts and components from the Royal Ordnance Depot near Nottingham. No export licenses were required to move this equipment from Nottingham to Jersey because of the special customs relationship which the Channel Islands historically have with Britain.

The Sunday Times concluded: "Such are the vagaries of politics that, despite the existence and general enforcement of embargo rules, South Africa has been able to receive, quite legitimately, an entire squadron of 16 British Buccaneer ground-support tactical bombers (while being denied, subsequently, a single British Wasp helicopter.") (Emphasis added.)

Even more significant, because it is not dependent on the quirky political geography of the Channel Islands, is the actual effect of the British Government's interpretation of the arms embargo. While actual arms shipments are controlled, an enormous range of high technology products and materials can be sent to South Africa without any check at all; they need not even be declared at customs. Thus, while British industry cannot actually arm South Africa, it is free to provide most of the necessities for the South Africans to arm themselves. And while the sale of aircraft is banned, there is no ban on the sale of airborne radar.

Two sales by Marconi Communications Systems Ltd (which has pioneered advanced communications systems) reveal a loophole so large that, in the words of one British investigator, "you could drive a Centurion tank through it and not notice the hole". (67)

*A \$12 million sale of S600 data-link equipment to update the South African air defense system. (68)

*A \$14 million contract to supply sophisticated "tropospheric" communications equipment to the South African Arms Bureau. (69) This was for the supply of four sets of 600-800 kilometer communications links, to form the backbone of a computer-controlled defense system covering both South Africa and Namibia. Although South Africa already has the radar, detection devices and computer equipment to establish this system, it still requires communications equipment to link surveillance centers and strike bases to the main military control center, which is believed to be located at Silvermine, a huge underground complex near Simonstown, outside Cape Town. (70)

Among the items which may be exported to South Africa from England without controls are: communications, navigation, direction-finding and radar equipment; chemicals, including primary explosive and priming compositions; various engineering products, many of which are suited to the production of aircraft; a wide range of minerals which have a use in military equipment; and electronics components. (71)

Two recent instances of British sales to South Africa of equipment used in military aircraft are:

*A contract for the sale of 250 rocket motors, to be fitted to a new pilot-ejector-seat system manufactured by Martin Baker Ltd,

for use in South African-assembled Mirage jet fighters. (72)

*An agreement under which Rolls-Royce engines were licensed for manufacture in Italy and then shipped to South Africa for installation in the Impala Mk I aircraft. (73)

Project Advokaat and the NATO Powers

Advokaat is the huge military communications and intelligence system installed by the South African Navy at its base at Silvermine, near Simonstown. Advokaat maintains surveillance of all ship and air movements in an area reaching from the Cape to North Africa, across the Atlantic Ocean to the South American coast and across the Indian Ocean to Australia and New Zealand.

In April of this year, the London Observer reported the sale to South Africa of military equipment bearing NATO code numbers. This astonishing revelation came to light, the newspaper noted, through the participation of several NATO powers in the construction of Advokaat. For example, work on the surveillance center was initiated by West German firms, with the approval of the West German defense ministry; British, American, French, Danish and Dutch firms supplied equipment and spare parts. (74)

A few months later, in July 1976, the London monthly Africa reported that France had played a large part in the installation of Advokaat -- "linked to NATO," the magazine said. (75) This was not, however, Africa's first reference to this matter. Indeed, it had scooped the London Observer by six months. For, in its November 1975 issue, it reported that Advokaat had been installed with West German aid: the electronic equipment had been supplied by West Germany, and all spare parts "were given NATO code numbers with the

aid of the Bundeswehr material supply office," (76)

Both London publications could have discovered and reported these facts earlier, based on a report published inside South Africa itself. In 1973, the Sunday Times of Johannesburg reported the sale by various Western powers of equipment for Advokaat bearing the NATO code, noting further that Advokaat was directly linked with Royal Navy headquarters in Whitehall and with the U.S. naval base at San Juan, Puerto Rico.

Then, pointing out that it was "NATO firms (West Germany, Britain, USA, France, Denmark, Holland)" which had sold the coded military equipment, the paper added that, though these firms could not be identified from the NATO forms because the reference to them was disguised by the use of code numbers, it was clear that firms from those countries are involved. "Most striking of all," the Times concluded, "is the fact that the NATO system of codifying equipment and spare parts has actually been made available in this manner to South Africa." (77)

West Germany

Although the West German government, responsive to an alert public opinion, has been stricter than most Western powers in enforcing the ban on South African arms traffic, West German firms have nevertheless been able to engage in lucrative "dual use" trade with South Africa. For example, West German firms, along with French, Italian and American companies have consistently sold machine tools and other "non-military" equipment to the Atlas Aircraft Corporation, South Africa's sole producer of military aircraft. (78)

West Germany is also permitting its nuclear know-how to be exported to South Africa in partial exchange for South African uranium. (79) This is corroborated in some circumstantial detail by The Times of London, which reports that South Africa and Iran reached an agreement in 1975 under which Pretoria will sell uranium oxide worth some \$500 million to Iran. In return, Iran will participate financially in a proposed uranium enrichment plant to be constructed with West German assistance.

The feasibility study for that plant was done by a West German firm in the Ruhr capital, Essen. (80)

Even more startling is the revelation, in the arms trade register of the authoritative Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, of West German involvement in the sale and licensing of major military hardware to South Africa. SIPRI reports "advanced negotiations," for example, on a main battle tank. The actual consummation of the order is presumably awaiting the easing of tension and a cessation of public attention on Southern African affairs. (81)

Italy

Italy has been active in both the sale and licensing of military hardware to South Africa, especially several varieties of aircraft.

Since 1967, for example, an Italian light aircraft known in South Africa as the RSA-200 Falcon has been produced and assembled under license at the Atlas Aircraft factory. (82) The Falcon is a dual use light plane whose engine is imported from Italy. As of 1974, 40 had been produced for likely use with the South African Commando Air Force. (83)

As early as 1965, Italy had licensed the production of the Aermacchi MB-326M armed trainer, with accompanying parts and technical assistance. Known in South Africa as the Atlas Impala I, the plane is particularly well-suited to counter-insurgency activity. Sixteen of these planes were initially delivered from Italy in complete form, 10 in major component form, and 40 in sub-assemblies. By 1972, about 70 per cent of the parts (air frames and engines) were being built in South Africa. The remaining 30 per cent of the airplanes consisted of imported instruments. (84)

Three hundred of these planes were planned for production, which began in 1967. As of 1975, all 300 had been produced. (85)

In 1971, the South African Air Force ordered a quantity of the Piaggio P.166 transport plane. (86) Nine were delivered in 1973, along with a number of Aermacchi-Lockheed 60s. (87) Also in 1971, South Africa received a license to produce the Aermacchi Aerfer AM-3Cs, a fully-equipped, general purpose aircraft.

(88) In 1974, 40 of these planes were delivered in component parts, including the engine, and assembled by the Atlas Company; the following year Atlas went into full production of the plane, known in South Africa as the Atlas AM-3C Bosbok. (89) In 1973, Italy accepted a sales order for helicopters known in South Africa as the Silvercraft SH-4. (90)

South Africa is producing and assembling a number of other militarily useful planes under license from Italy. For example, the Aermacchi MB-326K, a jet-powered, light strike trainer aircraft, with a speed of 890 km. per hour, was licensed in 1973 and went into production that year; nevertheless in 1974 four such

trainers were supplied complete from Italy. (91) The engine is imported from Britain, under license, and 100 of them are on order. (92)

Since last year, South Africa has been producing the C4M Kudu, a substantially improved version of the Aermacchi AM-3C. What is significant about this development is its American connection, for this plane uses an American engine originally built in Italy under U.S. license -- and only subsequently re-licensed to South Africa. (93)

Belgium

Available information about the Belgian supply of arms to South Africa reveals four relevant items -- one arms sale and three weapons produced under license.

Under license are (a) the EN 7.62 automatic rifle; (b) an improved version of the Mark R1 automatic rifle; and (c) ammunition for both weapons. (94)

In 1975, the Belgian Air Force sold an unspecified number of Swearingen Merlin light transport planes to South Africa. The plane is of American design and was built in Belgium under license. The United States had the legal right to prevent its subsequent sale but failed to do. (95)

United States

American involvement in the transfer of military-related equipment to South Africa has been cited in this report almost in passing, yet it is substantial: the failure of the U.S. to interpose a veto in the sub-licensing of U.S.-designed military equipment by Belgium and Italy; the American participation in the construction of the Advokaat system; the direct sale by American firms of machine

tools and other equipment to the Atlas Aircraft company; the sale of Cessna trainer planes; Westinghouse's 15 per cent interest in one of the French companies constructing the billion-dollar nuclear reactor; and the U.S.-South African uranium enrichment project.

Important information is available from a major Congressional source on the U.S.-South African aircraft deals in the period 1963-1973. (96)

While U.S. aircraft manufacturers have made no known sales of new equipment to the South African military since 1963, there have been substantial engine replacement, repair and other services provided for seven C-130s sold before 1963. The average annual value of these services from 1963-1968 was \$1.8 million, from 1968 to 1972 about \$3 million. (97)

The dollar value of sales of U.S. aircraft to South African commercial companies rose from \$23 million in 1967 to \$80 million in 1972. In many instances, these commercial planes can be adapted to military use. (98)

Since 1972, six large L-100 transports (the new version of the C-130) have been licensed for sale to SAF Air, a private commercial South African manufacturer. State Department sources have admitted that they know of the military use of U.S. aircraft previously sold to the same company. (99)

In the first three months of 1973, "non-military" helicopters accounted for \$11 million out of the \$21 million in U.S. aircraft sales to South Africa. (100)

Nor, finally, should we forget the estimate by the U.S. Arms Control Agency that in the decade 1965-1974 South Africa received

\$24 million worth of military equipment from this country. (101)

Jordan

In May 1974, the Kingdom of Jordan concluded a military sales deal with South Africa in the amount of \$17.4 million covering the delivery in that month of 41 Centurion battle tanks and the Short Tigercat surface-to-air missile system. Deliveries included 717 missiles, (162 practice missiles, 555 combat missiles) as well as jeeps, launchers, radar and other support and maintenance equipment. (102)

Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia

At least two members of the Soviet bloc, the USSR and Czechoslovakia, deal with South Africa, although documentation is difficult. A recent article in the reliable South African daily, the Johannesburg Star, provides a tantalizing revelation. (103)

The Star points out that ever since the 1963 arms embargo, local gun dealers have been forced into a variety of subterfuges in order to obtain handguns, rifles and shotguns. Some of the stratagems include arms shipments changing hands on the high seas, consignments passing through two and even three foreign export houses to disguise their final destination, and dispatching guns to points in neighboring African countries for ultimate delivery to South Africa.

Ironically, the Star notes, "it is often easier to get weapons from Communist countries than from some of their Western rivals. Shipments of Czech handguns and shotguns, some of them closely modelled on Western makes, are snapped up. Even the Russians are not above selling shotguns here. The Communist-made weapons are

low-priced, in a bid to attract sorely needed foreign exchange." According to the Star, it is generally known in the trade that a large proportion of American and European arms destined for South Africa passes through West Germany, even though the German government is the toughest of all on sales of its own manufacture to South Africa. Many such arms are sold to South African dealers on the understanding that they are first shipped to West Germany.

In this context, the Star makes a relevant point: "Germans are the middlemen in the sale of the Communist-made weapons to South Africa. The Czech arms industry employs mainly German and Austrian agents to market its wares in the West, and does not concern itself with the final destination of the guns "

* * *

Israel

By contrast with the huge, multi-billion-dollar arms traffic detailed in this far from complete report, Israel's military relationship with South Africa pales into insignificance. The sum total of Israel's arms deals with South Africa as reported in the 1976 Yearbook of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute consists of two items: (104)

a. Israel is building six Ramta-class patrol boats, essentially corvettes, for South Africa.

b. Israel is supplying a quantity of Gabriel II surface-to-surface missiles, to arm the six corvettes.

And that is the whole of it.

* * *

Why Is Israel Singled Out?

In the face of the evidence documenting the overwhelming disproportion between the extent of Western and Soviet-bloc arms traffic with South Africa and what Israel sells to South Africa, the question inevitably arises as to why Israel has been singled out for attack by the UN General Assembly's "Special Committee Against Apartheid."

The answer is to be found in the composition of the Committee itself. Three of its members (Algeria, Sudan and Syria) belong to the Arab League; three are Soviet-controlled (East Germany, Hungary, the Ukraine). Only five recognize Israel.

India is a case in point. Here is a state that secretly and deviously fashioned and exploded atomic bombs out of nuclear materials and know-how given to it exclusively for peaceful uses; that has suspended the civil liberties provisions of its constitution; and that practices its own version of apartheid in the treatment of its 50 million untouchables. Who is India to judge Israel?

The hypocrisy practiced by some of Israel's harshest critics is further underscored by a highly authoritative document on international commerce -- a volume called Direction of Trade, published by the International Monetary Fund. (105) The volume's detailed section on South Africa provides a breakdown of statistics on the apartheid regime's exports and imports to various parts of the world for the year 1974. It reveals that South Africa has trade relations, running into millions of dollars annually, with three members of the UN Special Committee Against Apartheid -- East Germany,

Hungary and Peru. According to the IMF Statistics, East Germany sold \$3.44 million worth of goods to South Africa in 1974; Hungary's exports to Pretoria ran to \$2.4 million; Peru imported \$3.80 million and exported \$4 million worth of goods in its trade with South Africa during 1974.

For the Soviet Union and its East European satellites as a whole, the IMF figures reveal nearly \$5 million worth of imports from South Africa and nearly \$25 million worth of exports to South Africa. Poland is cited as the largest of South Africa's East European trading partners for 1974, with nearly \$10 million worth of exports and imports in 1974. Czechoslovakia's exports to South Africa during the same period amounted to \$7.37 million. Other East European countries listed by the IMF as trading partners with South Africa are Bulgaria, Romania and the Soviet Union itself.

Indeed, though this is not noted by the IMF, it is well established that the USSR is a substantial purchaser of chrome -- useful for both civilian and military purposes -- from both South Africa and Rhodesia. This is, for obvious reasons, no simple matter to document. Nevertheless, a recent issue of the authoritative London newsletter Soviet Analyst (edited by Robert Conquest, an internationally renowned Soviet Affairs scholar) reports just such a purchase earlier this year.

According to Soviet Analyst, at least \$75 million worth of Rhodesian products have been bought this year by the Soviet Union. The deal was completed after Mozambique President Machel had closed his country's border with Rhodesia on March 3 and the Mozambique

ports of Maputo and Beira were heavily stocked with Rhodesian goods awaiting sale and shipment. The newsletter reported that all of these goods were shipped to the USSR -- shipments that included a high proportion of chrome ore, which ranks as a strategically important material. (106)

Not less significant is the final category listed by the IMF study -- "Other Area Totals of Interest." One of the three categories under that rubric is "Oil Exporting Countries," to whom South Africa exported in 1974 goods valued at \$44 million. Who are the oil-exporting countries with whom South Africa does business? The IMF does not say. But they could only be those African and Arab states where South African products are traditionally and readily available -- Nigeria (also a member of the UN special Committee Against Apartheid), Saudia Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait.

The question remains: Why does the UN General Assembly "Special Committee" single out Israel?

Three reasons come to mind: First, many of the Committee's members do business with the Western states and the USSR. Out of their own interest, it would not do to criticize or condemn these countries for maintaining a massive arms traffic and other commerce with South Africa. It is far easier and more convenient to find a suitable scapegoat.

Second, focusing the world's attention on Israel's trade with South Africa helps to distract attention from their own culpability.

Finally, anti-Semitism continues to operate as an irrational combination of unreasoning ignorance and wild prejudice.

Whatever the reasons, the Third World in combination with the Soviet bloc is engaged in a massive worldwide campaign to brand Israel as a military partner of the South African apartheid regime -- and therefore guilty of racism.

The facts prove otherwise. The guilt lies elsewhere.

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