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APARTHEID AFTER APARTHEID

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INTRODUCTION

The actions taken by South African President F.W. de Klerk since his 2 February speech are, within his own society, remarkable: unbanning the ANC, PAC and other anti-apartheid organizations including the Communist party, partially lifting the State of Emergency, releasing Nelson Mandela and holding preliminary talks with an ANC delegation. De Klerk's speech, and Mandela's release, ignited a mood of euphoria - as if, with one statement to parliament, apartheid was no more.

Yet apartheid, unfortunately, is very much alive. It was not eradicated, or even altered, by that speech, or by the release of a man who emerged, after 27 years behind bars, into a society much like the one he left, that he has dedicated his life to changing.

Just as it is important to explore every possibility of negotiating an end to apartheid, so too is it vital that the international community be aware of the changes that have, or have not, taken place - and that it await, albeit impatiently, the moment when change is irreversible before easing the pressure on apartheid and ending its isolation.

The very pressures that brought the National Party nearer to the negotiating table are the same pressures that will keep it there until a democratic system replaces that of institutionalized discrimination on the basis of race.

The Commonwealth has played a leading role in exposing past duplicity by seizing the opportunity to investigate solutions through the Eminent Persons Group, and in pricking the international conscience through its carefully chosen range of sanctions, which others followed.

The European Community increased the pressure for change by implementing a limited range of agreed sanctions, and individual member countries imposed additional measures.

This pressure for change was aimed at eradicating apartheid, not just unbanning of the ANC and release of political prisoners, as Mandela has noted so eloquently in his public statements, such as that delivered to the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa (CFMSA) in Abuja, Nigeria, on 16 May:

"Whilst we regard the Groote Schuur Minute as significant, the most important thing about it is its implementation. We have not reached that point yet. However ... we are amazed and shocked because even before the mutually established working group has

completed its work, and even before the agreement aimed at removing obstacles to negotiation has been implemented, certain governments are working and calling impatiently for the lifting of sanctions!

All we are working on at this point is removing the obstacles to negotiating the eradication of apartheid. Apartheid, the central problem that all of us are trying to put to an end remains untouched, in place and intact."

He noted that all United Nations member states, without exception, committed themselves just five months ago to maintain international pressure until the goal of irreversible change in South Africa is achieved.

It is therefore appropriate that this paper be directed to parliamentarians and non-governmental organizations in Europe to provide input into their deliberations leading up to the summit of European Community leaders in Dublin later this month.

This paper, prepared by the SARDC Information Unit, lays out examples of South Africa's racial laws still in place which prevent the ANC and other unbanned movements and individuals from functioning within any democratic norm.

Nelson Mandela, in reality, is not a free person. He was released from one small prison into a larger national prison to join some 30 million other non-white inmates, as prisoners of apartheid. He has made the point that he could not vote when he went into prison in 1964, he still could not vote when he came out in 1990, and he is subjected to the same legislation which decrees where he must live, where his grandchildren can attend school, where he can seek medical attention, and so on.

Yet there are those in the international community, notably the British government, who argue that Mandela's release is in itself enough to facilitate the lifting of sanctions and the ending of South Africa's international isolation. This view gained some credence during de Klerk's public relations exercise in Europe in May. He, too, returned to a South Africa where no legal aspect of apartheid has changed, despite his promises.

De Klerk's agenda, and endgame, remain, in the public domain at least, a matter of speculation. However, indicators can be found in the work document prepared by the Afrikaner Broederbond, "Basic Political Values for the Survival of the Afrikaner", which is considered in the Preface following this Introduction.

Apartheid, as the liberation and mass democratic movements rightly insist, cannot be reformed. There is no morally acceptable means of reforming legalized, institutionalized racial discrimination. It must be abolished, not redefined, and the laws which hold it in place must be scrapped.

Is President de Klerk's policy that of abolition or reform? Is it

another ploy to gain economic time and international acceptance, orchestrated by a tactician more practiced and charismatic than his predecessor who signed the Accord of Nkomati with Mozambique under similar economic and international pressures in 1984 - and whose duplicity was exposed soon after the ink was dry?

If it is reform that he intends, rather than abolition, then the pronouncements to date are merely cosmetic, and the process will be dragged out and delayed to wring every possible concession and international financial guarantee before exposure. If the intent is abolition, then a basis for genuine negotiation exists, but the international community must act as a watchdog to see that the pace of events and commitment to change are proceeding faster than the concessions received by Pretoria, which is certainly not the case in June 1990.

Pretoria must not be allowed to break out of its isolation into international acceptability until there is - as stated in the United Nations declaration - "clear evidence of profound and irreversible changes".

That, then, is the intent of this preliminary paper: to provide the basis for ongoing monitoring of what is and what is not changing in South Africa. This document will be expanded and updated as necessary to monitor change and context.

The purpose of this initial draft is to present in an accessible format an indication of the extent of just how much must be dismantled and abolished. Its contents are not intended to be exhaustive in defining the tentacles of apartheid, at this preliminary stage, but rather to offer an insight into some fundamental aspects which are a barometer of change. The Apartheid Index section provides a statistical insight, drawing on information provided by the Human Rights Commission and other sources in South Africa.

There is a need to analyse the economic backdrop against which de Klerk made his dramatic 2 February speech, and the pressures that resulted in Mandela's release. This is integral to the Commmonwealth's important decision to monitor South Africa's international financial links.

Traditional apartheid had become a victim of its own system, and of the cost of maintaining it, under the growing burden of international economic pressure. Sanctions and divestment had raised the cost of maintaining this overt form of apartheid above the acceptable limit. So much so that keeping the majority of the population out of the political system, once seen as essential to the survival of Afrikaner culture and white economic privilege, is now seen by the Broederbond as a threat to that privilege and that survival.

South Africa has maintained a cost-effective war of attrition against its neighbours, but the political price has been rising as international outcry over the morality of this policy

increased. Some countries in the region have been driven to the brink of survival by these covert destabilization policies, under which South Africa's domination of the region has been maintained through direct or indirect military and economic means. The cost to the region in damage and lost development, and destruction of education and health facilities, is estimated at US$ 45-60 billion and loss of lives at over 1.5 million, mostly children.

Militarily, because the human and financial cost of victory had increased dramatically, South Africa was defeated at Cuito Cuanavale in southern Angola. The wars in Angola and Namibia, and support for surrogate movements against other Frontline states, had become too costly for South Africa's ailing economy, and the international arms embargo was curtailing the ability of the military to replace aging equipment.

This point is underscored by the recent drastic reductions in military expenditure and by attempts to tame the "securocrats" and bring them back under executive direction. The battle is now on the political and diplomatic field - and it promises to be as decisive as the military battle at Cuito Cuanavale.

Namibia's successful transition to independence and reconciliation can be seen as a victory for all interested parties - the liberation movement, the people of the country, the United Nations, the southern African region and, not least, South Africa itself. On the success of that transition rested de Klerk's ability to win time for his manoeuvres at home.

Namibia was also, in a very real sense, a victory for the international community and its sanctions policy, because those sanctions raised the cost of the war in Namibia to an unacceptably high level, until it was cheaper to negotiate peace, and until South Africa's survival depended on peace.

Even so, Pretoria managed to delay Namibia's independence by a decade after Resolution 435 was passed in 1978, until the effects of real and concerted international pressure began to bite. Sanctions as applied to Namibia were not lifted after Andimba Toivo ya Toivo was released from prison in 1984; they were lifted six years later, after acceptance in 1990 of a constitution that guaranteed an irreversible change to an egalitarian society.

International sanctions against Rhodesia were not lifted when nationalist leaders were released from prison in late 1974, but almost six years later after a constitutional agreement at Lancaster House and a successful transition to independent Zimbabwe following internationally monitored elections.

South Africa is in serious trouble economically, due to what Pretoria calls "deteriorating financial conditions". Debts have had to be rescheduled, divestment is biting, the gold price has fallen to under US$400, unemployment - including among whites - is growing and business confidence has been collapsing. Former opponents of sanctions, such as the U.S. administration, now

admit that these pressures have contributed to concessions.

White emigration is escalating, mostly in skilled professional groups. Of South African passengers boarding connecting regional flights to Australia every week, 42 percent are top professionals who, despite Australia's strict immigration regulations, are going for good. Others are departing for other countries willing to accept them.

Internally, despite the harsh repression, the voice of the majority could not be muted any longer. Internal democratic movements grew, were banned and re-formed under different names. The voice of protest was ever more vocal. Resistance mounted, uncurtailed by the vast security apparatus.

By pulling the plug on Western television viewers, South Africa has silenced that increasingly vocal group, but it could not silence its own people no matter how many troops and police poured into the townships.

Internationally, the anti-apartheid movement persisted in its work of informing and mobilizing a broader community, of making apartheid South Africa an international pariah. Isolation, for a country which depends upon the largesse of the industrialized nations for survival, is a reality which can be ignored only at extreme peril and risk of survival.

Having seen the positive gains of internal and international pressures for Namibia, for the release of Mandela and unbanning of political organizations, it would be a grave betrayal of the South African people to in any way diminish this pressure. Rather, all forms of international pressure must be maintained, monitored and strengthened until the acceptance of democratic constitutional principles signals irreversible change.

1 June 1990

APARTHEID INDEX
1 June 1990

Percentage of political prisoners convicted of armed action against apartheid still in prison since release of Mandela: 80%

Total number of political prisoners in April 1990: 347
Number of trials going on: 184 involving 1142 accused

Number of state executions in SA since 1910: 4,523
Number of state executions in SA in the past 5 years: 775
Number of people on death row in February 1990: 279
Number of people on death row in April: 310
Number of political prisoners on death row in April: 73

Percentage of world-wide 'legal' executions since 1984 which took place in South Africa: 47%

Number of known assassinations by government hit squads: 117

Number of people killed in political violence
1 January - 31 March 1990: 574 (SAIRR 996)

Country with highest per capita prison population in the world:
South Africa
Number of inmates: 110,000 (425 per 100,000 people)

Number of people detained without trial since 1960: 75,000
Number detained without trial in the past four years: 50,000
Number of children under 18 detained since June 1986: 10,000

Average months in detention before coming to judicial system: 32
Percentage of detainees released without charge: 75-80
Percentage convicted: less than 5

Number of whippings suffered by detainees in one year between mid-1987 and mid-1988: 40,933

Total number of people in detention on 30 April 1990: 396
Under State of Emergency: 320
Under Internal Security Act: 48
In "independent" homelands: 28

Number of 'independent' homelands: 4
Number under military rule after successful coups: 3

Rands allocated in 1990 budget for defence: 10,000,000,000
Rands allocated for health: 7,000,000,000
Percentage budgeted for defence: 15
Percentage budgeted for health: 9.8

Rands allocated in special programme for 'disadvantaged' South Africans - for black education, housing, land: 3,000,000,000

Number of discriminatory laws governing education, housing or land rescinded: 0

Percentage of land allocated to 26 million non-whites: 13
Percentage of land allocated to less than 5 million whites: 87

Categories under which people can be forcibly removed: 11
Removal laws (excluding amending and consolidating acts): 16
Number of homeless in South Africa (excluding homelands): over 5 million

White hospitals average percentage occupancy: 50-60
Black hospitals average percentage occupancy: 130-150

Average per capita spending on health care for patients who are: white, R597; Indian, R356; coloured, R340; urban black, R138; rural black, R88

Percentage of white population covered by medical schemes: 80
Percentage of black population covered by medical schemes: 4

Number of patients per medical doctor in South Africa for: whites, 330; for blacks, 12,000;

Infant mortality per 1,000 live births for: white babies, 9; black babies, 94-124

Most common diseases treated at white hospitals: those of affluence (heart disease, cancer, geriatric)
Most common diseases treated at black hospitals: those of poverty (malnutrition, infectious diseases, diarrhoea, tuberculosis)

Number of black South African lives claimed by TB every day: 12
Number of new cases of tuberculosis estimated each year: 60,000

Location of one of the world's largest importers of toxic waste: Pietermaritzburg, Natal
Number of drums of toxic mercury waste imported from the U.S. each year since 1986: 120
Tons of toxic waste imported through Durban each year by Thor Chemicals, Pietermaritzburg: 20
Number of times the legal limit of mercury in a litre of water in the Umgeni river, near Thor Chemicals: 2 1/2
Mercury pollution level relative to rest of world: highest

Education spending per student: white, R3,082; black, R765
Teacher-student ratio: whites 1:16; blacks 1:50
Percentage literacy: whites, 97 ; blacks, 45

Number of vacancies in white schools: 300,000
Number of blacks without school places: 2,000,000

Managerial, technical or professional vacancies: 40,000
Number of blacks in these positions: 2,860
Whites: 180,000

Number of black mine managers in 77 years: 1
Year the first black mine manager was allowed to qualify: 1989

Black mineworkers killed since discovery of gold in 1886: 65,000
Average per year: 800 deaths, 10,000 injuries

Racial wages gap, 1979: R 600
Racial wages gap, 1989: R 1,700

Percentage living below poverty line: blacks, 53; whites, 1.6

Percentage income distribution:
whites (one-sixth of population), 66
blacks (three quarters of population) 25

Monthly earning of black labourer in public sector: R 447
Minimum requirement for family of six: R 526

Average public service salaries, excluding labourers:
blacks, per month, R 670
whites, per month, R 2,070

Number of statutes in place for control of mass media, excluding the state of emergency: over 100
Estimated number of publications banned since censorship introduced in 1974: 40,000

Government spending on sports:
for 26 million blacks: R 8 million
for less than 5 million whites: R 8 million

Number of soccer fields for 212,000 whites in Durban city: 146
Number for 330,000 blacks in adjacent townships: 6

Number of swimming pools for whites in Durban: 15
For township blacks: 2

Percentage of all sports facilities at white schools: 72

Percentage of exclusive white access to:
athletics tracks, 73
swimming pools, 83
rugby fields, 82
golf courses, 92
cricket pitches, 84

APARTHEID
AFTER
APARTHEID

PREFACE

Now that "talks about talks" have begun between the South African government and the African National Congress it is more necessary than ever to understand the vast chasm that separates them so false expectations are not raised and ill-judged decisions made.

In trying to understand this gap three fundamental documents serve as the blueprints or guidelines encapsulating the divergent positions of the two sides.

The first is a leaked -- and classified as "strictly confidential" -- working document of the secret Afrikaner Broederbond (Afrikaner Union of Brothers), once again the guiding ideological hand behind ruling National Party politics.

It is entitled: BASIC POLITICAL VALUES FOR THE SURVIVAL OF THE AFRIKANER.

The second, based on the analysis contained in the first, was circulated to Broeders in June 1989 and it lays down the "guidelines" for South Africa's future constitution.

The third is the UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION of 14 December 1989 which calls for the maintenance of "existing measures aimed at encourging the South African regime to eradicate apartheid, until there is clear evidence of profound and irreversible changes."

This document was drafted by the ANC and Frontline States, and adopted by the Organisation of African Unity as the HARARE DECLARATION on 20 August 1989. It was subsequently endorsed by the Non-Aligned Movement without variation and with minimal change by all member states of the UN. As such it represents the international community's blueprint or guidelines, the terms and conditions to be met by Pretoria before sanctions can be lifted.

At the outset it is necessary to understand the basic history and philosophy of the Broederbond and its importance in South African society today.

It was founded in June 1918, four years after the creation of the National Party and 30 years before the NP came to power.

The foundation of both came in the wake of the Anglo-Boer war in which thousands of Boer homesteads were burned and some 26,000 Afrikaner women and children died in British concentration camps.

The humiliated Afrikaners were an impoverished second class citizenry in South Africa with their language derided by English speakers who totally dominated the civil service, commerce and industry.

In 1935 the Broederbond blueprint for apartheid, including the creation of "bantustans", was drawn up. This stated that: "Total mass segregation should not only be stated as the ideal, but should also be the immediate practical policy of the State". Therein lies the definition of the apartheid policy.

One further insight into the Afrikaner mentality, given in a rare interview in 1944 by then Broeders chairman, Dr.J.C.van Rooy, is necessary to understand their perception of themselves:

"The Afrikaner Broederbond was born out of the deep conviction that the Afrikaner volk (people) has been planted in this country by the Hand of God, destined to survive as a separate volk with its own calling".

Now that "talks about talks" have begun the two fundamental questions to be addressed are -- how influential is the Broederbond today and how much has its basic thinking really changed?

During the tenure of P.W.Botha the influence of the Broederbond waned as he depended upon the "securocrat" establishment to batter the Frontline states and quell internal dissent.

F.W.de Klerk has begun to change that scenario. The "securocrats" have been stripped of much of their power and the Broederbond restored to its former pre-eminence. Once again it is the firm guiding ideological hand behind the National Party.

De Klerk is a long standing member of the Broederbond. His key negotiator, Dr Gerrit Viljoen, Minister of Constitutional Development, is a former Broederbond chairman and all other senior members of the negotiating team are Broeders.

Thus the Broederbond document, BASIC POLITICAL VALUES FOR THE SURVIVAL OF THE AFRIKANER, is their document, their blueprint for negotiations with the ANC.

The title itself provides an insight into Afrikaner mentality. The foremost priority is the survival of the Afrikaner - not the creation of a democratic non-racial South Africa.

The ANC deputy president, Nelson Mandela, in testimony to the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa (CFMSA) at Abuja, Nigeria on 16 May provided a further insight into this mentality and the Broeders' negotiating strategy.

The composition of the ANC delegation at the Cape Town meeting which began the "talks about talks" phase on 2-4 May and agreed on the Groote Schuur Minute was non-racial and non-ethnic - composed of men and women. That, in itself, is an enduring comment on the ANC's commitment to a majority-ruled democratic South Africa which would not countenance a society in which ethnicity, colour, creed or sex would dictate who should rule.

In stark contrast, the leaders of the team they faced across the table were all Afrikaners and Broeders, a succinct comment that the survival of Afrikaner interests precedes all others in the thinking of the Broeders. Their unity was as a minority white Afrikaner tribe bound together by their religion, and excluding English, Portuguese and other white groups -- and the womenvolk.

It is undoubtedly true that de Klerk has come some way towards meeting the criteria contained in the UN and HARARE declarations to create the climate for negotiations.

Mandela and some other political detainees have been freed, anti-apartheid movements unbanned, the State of Emergency partially lifted.

But it is equally important to note that not all of the five demands to create that climate have been met. Not all political prisoners and detainees have been freed, troops remain in the townships, major sections of the State of Emergency remain in place and, as the following paper illustrates, even if it were to be lifted a vast amount of repressive legislation remains intact.

Nevertheless, largely because there was little choice, the ANC decided to test how genuine and serious de Klerk is. The stage is now set to move beyond the point of creating a climate for negotiations to addressing the principles contained in the UN DECLARATION. It is upon three of these principles that the real test lies:

"South Africa shall become a united, democratic and non-racial state;

"All its people shall enjoy common and equal citizenship and nationality, regardless of race, colour, sex or creed;

"All its people shall have the right to participate in the Government and administration of the country on the basis of universal, equal suffrage, under a non-racial voters' roll, and by secret ballot, in a united and non-fragmented South Africa."

It is upon these basic fundamental principles that the success or failure of the negotiations rests. And it is upon these fundamentals where the chasm is most starkly illustrated.

The Broederbond document specifically rejects as unacceptable to the Afrikaner:

"Concealed majority domination, e.g. one man one vote in a unitary system, or 'winner takes all'."

The guidelines take this a step further, throughout using the phrase "participating entities". Among the political objectives it states:

"Basic conditions for Afrikaner survival. We hereby accept that the following political aim is the basis for further constitutional development:

"The achievement of a special democratic political dispensation by which every SA citizen's individual rights are protected enabling full and effective participation and joint control within a participatory system (groups or regions) of all government decisions without domination by any one of the participating entities".

The guidelines define "participating entities" as geographical or ethnic groups, in other words homelands or racial groups.

"Participating entities which choose maximum autonomy for themselves must be assured of obtaining it through the constitution. This includes the ability of the participating entities, within the accepted broad principles of the constitution, to chose autonomously how their governing institutions will be constituted. The autonomy of the participating entity must include all matters which influence the survival of its special character".

Later the guidelines add that it must be ensured that the size of any "participating entity", no matter whether it represents the majority or minority view, must not be decisive in resolving any "general affairs" issue and that constitutional change cannot occur without the acceptance of "every participating entity".

In stark contrast, the UN DECLARATION demands a non-racial unitary state with the government elected by universal franchise on a common voters role. That is not on the Broeders' agenda for discussion.

One is tempted to ask that if this principle is rejected in advance what is the point in talking at all and what are the dangers of doing so until the principle is accepted?

In the first place, given recent changes in South Africa, it is impossible, and would be irresponsible, not to test de Klerk's genuineness and seriousness. He is, as the Broeders document makes clear, willing to make substantial concessions. But beyond these his hands are tied.

One concluding paragraph in the SURVIVAL OF THE AFRIKANER document provides an insight into present Broederbond thinking:

"A test which should be set for the acceptability of a system must always be: What will be in our interests in the event that we end up in the opposition seat? Furthermore, we must also realise that humanly speaking there simply are no guarantees. We must think in terms of probabilities, of calculated risks. The greatest risk that we are taking today is not taking any risks. The will to survive as Afrikaner and our faith and energy will serve as our greatest guarantee".

So, as the Broeders acknowledge, an accumulation of circumstances has forced them into the risk-game -- to the negotiating table. And, as in all negotiations, there are top and bottom lines, initially perceived principles upon which there can be compromise and others where there cannot.

Viljoen and Mandela starkly illustrated the gap between the two parties in statements in mid-May.

On 13 May, Viljoen - and it is important to note he was speaking as acting State President during de Klerk's absence in Europe - told the South African Parliament that the National Party would seek to protect South Africa from one-party rule which could result from "an unsophisticated majority vote".

Pretoria opposed black majority rule, he said, and would seek a constitutional system which protected white (shorthand for Afrikaner) minority rights. The continued segregation of community dwellings and schools were among the 12 "protection of minority rights" guidelines he enunciated.

"These minorities, because of their particular values and aspirations, should have a special voice in the new constitutional dispensation" Viljoen insisted.

His point was clear and totally in line with the Broeders perceived strategy for survival: a blocking vote which would forever protect the interests of the Afrikaner minority against those of the South African majority.

This presentation failed to meet approval with the minority Democratic Party. It was "plainly ridiculous" for the National Party to demand a special veto over the majority and, added the DP leader Wynand Malan, who was to determine sophistication. "They have never applied sophistication to white elections".

Four days later, in Abuja, Mandela pursued a quite different line. He strenuously criticised Western governments, and in particular Britain, for partially lifting sanctions following his release and the unbanning of the ANC.

Despite the Groote Schuur Minute, he stressed, apartheid remains the central problem, "untouched, in place and intact". Those who were lifting, or planning to lift sanctions, were undermining efforts to terminate apartheid, he said.

He appealed to the Commonwealth Foreign Ministers to maintain sanctions and South Africa's economic and cultural isolation. That, he added, is "our humble request and plea".

Such differing messages have led to confusion in the international community; whether to offer de Klerk a carrot or to continue to use the stick until the process of ending apartheid is irrevocable.

A fourth document, categorised as unofficial in this case, comes from Willem de Klerk, Professor of Communication at the Rand Afrikaans University, the Afrikaner academic think-tank. He is the brother of President de Klerk.

Willem de Klerk, whose article in South Africa International in January 1990 is overtly racist, argues for a ten-year transition to the Broeders version of a majority-ruled South Africa.

He categorises this in four phases. A year or so to get serious negotiations underway, the "talks about talks" phase. Thereafter he perceives the process to secure negotiations and establish an agenda as taking three years. After that the phase of negotiation and compromise in respect of a constitution can commence and will take a further three years. The final phase is a further three years, ridding South Africa of apartheid while ensuring the preservation of Afrikaner power and privilege under a new form of apartheid.

His scenario advances us to an unacceptable situation in the year 2000 at the very earliest.

In the 1990s decade, as made explicitly clear in the initial Broederbond document and subsequent "guidelines", President de Klerk and the Broeders have charted substantial cosmetic concessions, timed and seductive in their own way to buy time and reduce international pressure.

But the polarity between the South African government and the ANC, acknowledged by Willem de Klerk as the main "black actor", remain fundamentally divergent and, as a result, the early prospects for a negotiated settlement, remote.

In the coming months and years major changes will occur in the structure of apartheid society. Pillars and edifices may be shattered, and the removal of petty apartheid give way to more fundamental change.

But, as we begin to grapple with our responses to this phase, two final questions must be addressed.

The first is the matter of conflicting principles. On the one hand there is the Afrikaner perceived principle of survival. On the other the democratic - and internationally accepted - principles enunciated in the UN DECLARATION.

Secondly, and this is a critical issue, why has the Broederbond come as far as it obviously has?

It is not because it has had a radical "Christian" change of heart. It is because of pressure from within and without, the resistance of the people of South Africa, international opprobrium, sanctions, divestment, arms embargoes, sports boycotts, and the like.

All these pressures have driven the Broeders to the negotiating table. To relax them now, particularly when fundamental principles are still in dispute, would be to negate all past efforts. On the contrary, efforts should be made to exert additional pressure to bridge the yawning chasm which exists as the principal parties approach the real negotiating table.

Mandela's appeal to the international community at Abuja is the appeal of someone who knows and has long tried to negotiate with the Afrikaner. His knowledge, and the knowledge of the South African people, is based on their personal experience and, as such, deserves the first hearing.

"All those countries who are lifting, or intend to lift, sanctions are undermining the efforts of the international community.

"There are no grounds whatsoever for lifting sanctions against the racist regime of South Africa or in ending its diplomatic and cultural isolation".

Such action, Mandela told Commonwealth Ministers in Abuja, represented a "dangerous trend", one if not arrested would reverse all the gains to date in ending rather than reforming apartheid.

"Negotiations on the dismantling of apartheid will have to address the overwhelming demands of our people for a democratic, non-racial and unitary South Africa. There must be an end to white monopoly on political power and a fundamental restructuring of our political and economic system to ensure that the inequalities of apartheid are addressed and our society thoroughly democratised.....

We call on the international community to continue the campaign to isolate the apartheid regime. To lift sanctions now would be to run the risk of aborting the process towards the complete eradication of apartheid."

Nelson Mandela, Cape Town, 11 February 1990

"We assert here and now that apartheid remains in place and intact.

We call upon you, in your capacities as representatives of conscientious governments and peoples; as representatives of concerned and sovereign states to impress upon your governments, and those other governments you could influence to halt and reverse the effort to untimely and wrongly lift sanctions against the South African government. If this trend is not stopped all our gains will be reversed."

Nelson Mandela to CFMSA, Abuja, 16 May 1990

Since coming to power in South Africa in 1948, the National Party has created a tangled web of laws, emergency rules and regulations to protect white privilege and power, the consequences of which will take decades to unravel.

In 1960 a stubborn minority refused to listen to the demands of the majority -- moderate and reasonable by any standards -- and the result has been 30 years of violence and oppression of the country's black population.

South Africa became a Republic on 31 May 1961 after being forced to leave the Commonwealth over this very issue of entrenched racism. Black leaders, meeting at Pietermaritzburg just before the Republic was formed, had called for a new non-racial democratic constitution. Their words were ignored by then Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd and South Africa has been in crisis ever since.

Thirty years later a successor to Verwoerd, President F.W. de Klerk, has freed Nelson Mandela, unbanned his organization, the African National Congress (ANC), sought to create a climate for negotiations and allowed for the first time in 40 years legal opposition to apartheid. Included in the unbanning were the South African Communist Party (SACP), the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) and 30 other organisations.

De Klerk says the talks are aimed at bringing about "a new democratic constitution; universal franchise, no domination; equality before an independent judiciary; protection of minorities as well as of individual rights; freedom of religion; better education, health services, housing and social conditions for all."

Aside from the fact that "protection of minorities" is a National Party codeword for retention of white power and privilege, the ANC and other anti-apartheid groups could be pardoned for asking why it took 30 years to reach such a conclusion. Thirty years of bitter, wasted time and opportunity.

And still, de Klerk talks of guaranteed "group" rights while ANC and others talk of non-racial democratic majority rule and one-person, one vote.

In Zimbabwe, which celebrated 10 years of independence in 1990 after a bloody war with white supremacists, and in newly independent Namibia, whites were given sincere offers of reconciliation. In both countries, whites occupy senior government positions at ministerial level on the basis of equality with their colleagues. Yet South Africa continues to demand permanent protection for the existing power and privilege of its white minority.

The basics are clear. The ANC, the Organization of African Unity, the United Nations and the Frontline States have their five-point declaration as a minimum for negotiations in a bid to bring peace to South Africa and stability to the region:

1 Release all political prisoners and detainees unconditionally and refrain from imposing any restrictions on them;

2 Lift all bans and restrictions on all proscribed and restricted organisations and people;

3 Remove all troops from the townships;

4 End the state of emergency and repeal all legislation, such as, and including, the Internal Security Act, designed to circumscribe political activity; and,

5 Cease all political trials and executions.

By unbanning the political organisations, suspending executions and releasing political prisoners, the South African president has only partially met these minimum demands to create a climate for talks. But, even should de Klerk lift the state of emergency, and meet the other conditions toward creating a climate for negotiations, nothing will have changed in terms of apartheid legislation. The pillars of apartheid will remain the law of the land. Literally thousands of laws, rules and regulations will continue to enslave the black majority and present a virtually unbridgeable gulf between the two sides.

A close examination of these "pillars", as they have been known in South Africa for decades, shows that apartheid remains firmly in place. The Group Areas Act, the Population Registration Act and the Land Act, each with its myriad sections and sub-sections, proscribe any possibility of real freedom for the 26 million South African blacks.

There have been some reforms. The Mixed Marriages and Immorality Acts have been abolished, the pass laws are gone and de Klerk has promised that the Separate Amenities Act will be revoked by mid-October, 1990. But the pillars remain:

- **The Group Areas Act (1948)** still bars Africans from living in "white" neighbourhoods or attending "white" government schools. It specifies where whites, blacks, Indians and coloureds can live and it forbids members of one racial group from living in another group's area. It was under this act that millions of Africans were forcibly removed from their homes and forced out of areas where they had lived in order to eradicate "black spots". The de Klerk proposals will now recognise "grey areas" where the Group Areas Act does not work, even under apartheid, but the National Party will not repeal the act until "an alternative arrangement to protect community life" is agreed upon.

- **The Population Registration Act (1950)** classifies all South Africans according to ethnic groups and, in the case of Blacks, by tribe. Blacks, whites, Indians, coloureds must all carry identity cards containing this information. Even after the hated pass laws were abolished, classification continues. The minister in charge of constitutional affairs, Gerrit Viljoen has agreed that a racially defined description of peoples is no longer acceptable. However, in order to guarantee minority rights his party suggests that the test for membership in a group would be "personal choice" or "acceptance".

- **The Land Act** dates back to 1913 and was one of the first of the discriminatory laws in South Africa pre-dating even constitutional apartheid. Under this act, 87 percent of all South Africa's land is reserved for whites who today make up just 14 percent of the population. This act is the legal foundation on which grand apartheid -- the division of South Africa into black "homelands" and a white "fatherland" - is based. Residence in these homelands, supposedly independent, has stolen citizenship from 14 million blacks by making them part of tribal homelands. The future of these "states" -- Venda, Transkei, Ciskei and Bophuthatswana -- is uncertain. It is the least productive land, it is without industrial centres, it is grossly overcrowded, almost entirely poor, a dumping ground for toxic and chemical waste, environmentally degraded. Its main purpose is to force blacks to live there once they have been removed from white areas and to provide a pool of cheap labour for the cities.

These "pillars of the system" cannot be reformed, although de Klerk says they can all be laid on the negotiating table. Their place on the statute books of the land keeps enormous powers in the hands of the government and its pervasive security apparatus. The ideology of the pillars is supported by the practice of apartheid and the military and security forces. Some ANC spokes-persons equate de Klerk's insistence on "group rights" as a more sophisticated way of maintaining the pillars of apartheid, albeit under another name.

The United Democratic Front (UDF) says that until these pillars are dashed, until the state of emergency is lifted, until the Internal Securities Act (whereby detention without trial is legal) is repealed and until all political prisoners, including those convicted of "terrorism" are released, white political control is still guaranteed in an atmosphere hardly conducive to negotiation.

Rather than simply negotiating reform of these pillars, legal experts suggest a constituent assembly is required, similar to that elected late last year in Namibia, which would hammer out the terms of a non-racial democracy.

De Klerk says there is no way that a multi-racial interim government will share power during the constitution-drafting process. He has said that his "lawfully" elected government, chosen by the country's white minority numbering just 14 percent of the population, will not be suspended to allow an interim government to come about. But he is a man under pressure. Under the current constitution de Klerk must hold a whites-only election in 1994 or he must respond to a formula of constitutional change. The question is will it be real change or cosmetic?

The only way to guarantee real change is for the international community to adhere to the commitment made by all member states of the United Nations not to relax existing measures aimed at eradication of apartheid "until there is clear evidence of profound and irreversible change".

REFORM

While de Klerk clearly wants to reform apartheid before his current mandate expires and thereby gain international approval, the very word "reform" is unacceptable to the majority of South Africans. For them total abolition and dismantling of apartheid is the basic goal for negotiations. As we shall see below, there are hundreds of laws, even if which reformed, would perpetuate apartheid in another guise.

There have been "reforms" since the latter years of de Klerk's predecessor, P.W. Botha, largely designed for international consumption and to give the appearance of movement.

When Walter Sisulu, former general secretary of ANC and a long-time colleague of Mandela, was released, the government knew there would be spontaneous rallies. It therefore allowed early demonstrations partly to condition security forces from taking reckless actions that would result in a blood-bath, and tarnish the reformist image the National Party was trying to cultivate.

Often touted as reform is the opening of public beaches and other recreational facilities to all races such as in the conservative East Rand town of Boksburg after a major boycott of white businesses by black shoppers. It was only after de Klerk declared his intention to abolish the Separate Amenities Act that the crippling strike ended and recreational facilities were opened to all races. The "reform" was in fact recognition of black purchasing power and the "negative image of Boksburg, both locally and abroad."

While the Separate Amenities Act may be repealed, de Klerk has made it clear that there are "sensitive areas" where facilities will remain reserved for "members of certain communities". This raises concerns that "amenities apartheid" will be reintroduced through the back door using new terminology while the essentials of apartheid remain.

The National Party makes a distinction between "differentiation" and "discrimination" saying the "vested rights" of communities must be protected. Under this new terminology words like "communities" and "cultures" are code names for "race" while "sensitive areas" is the term for segregated areas.

On the same day that Nelson Mandela was speaking to the Commonwealth Foreign Ministers in Nigeria, the South African government announced that all public provincial hospital and ambulance services were officially "open" to all races. Dr. Rina Venter, minister of national health and population development, said these 240 hospitals could begin treating all patients immediately and that no legislation was required to change a long-standing rule of segregated health.

What Dr. Venter did not explain was that people now sleeping on floors and benches in grossly overcrowded Black hospitals could be transferred to vacant wards in underutilized white hospitals. The wards will remain segregated, as will hospital administration.

The administration of health and all its laws remain segregated although the government is under pressure from the opposition for a single department of health to replace the present racially fragmented system under "own affairs" administrations.

By releasing high-profile political prisoners selectively, beginning with Govan Mbeki and culminating with Mandela, the South Africans have been able to gain maximum impact internationally as well as conditioning their own electorate to recognise the reality of things to come. But the release is not universal. (For example at the end of April at least 25 more anti-apartheid activists were arrested.)

South Africa has made much of its reductions in spending on security forces. In fact the withdrawal from Angola and the Namibian settlement reduced substantially the South African Defence Force (SADF) costs. In addition,the excessive expenditures on maintaining security in homelands and destabilising neighbouring countries have placed heavy strains on an economy struggling against sanctions, reduced investment and heavy debt. Cuts in security spending do not make the South African regime any less repressive, they simply make it possible for police and defence forces to direct funds to the same areas more effectively and with reduced strain on the economy.

The National Security Management System (NSMS) and Joint Management Committees (JMCs) were created in 1984 and 1985 as a government response to the majority's "ungovernability campaign." They were heavy-handed police and army-dominated structures designed to control local administration with WHAM (Win Hearts And Minds) campaigns. This misdirected plan put funds at the disposal of the JMCs ostensibly to improve local infrastructure and culture. At times WHAM placed soldiers in classrooms as

teachers and provided the security forces with funds for community development and economic projects. To turn soldiers into planners and developers overnight, the same forces which had displayed their hostility to the people through beatings and arrests, was a major miscalculation. There was such friction and resistance from the community towards WHAM that the government decision to scrap these programmes was more an admission of failure than any fundamental change.

The scandal sweeping through the security establishment over revelations that death squad activity in South Africa was directed from the highest levels prompted de Klerk to establish a judicial inquiry. (See SECURITY below) His decision to do so was a reversal of an earlier announcement that such an inquiry was unnecessary. Government, with its reformist image at stake, wanted to distance itself from the scandal.

While the cabinet has announced that all activities by the Civilian Co-operation Bureau (CCB), accused of being the defence department's hit squad, were suspended until the judicial inquiry had reported, it is significant to note that it has not been disbanded. So the CCB and its activities can be reactivated at any time.

One of the examples of reform was de Klerk's speech to 500 police in which he exhorted them to ignore political questions and confine themselves to police work. He failed to tell them, however, how they would enforce such politically motivated laws as the Internal Security Act, the Group Areas Act, the Public Safety Act, the Riotous Assemblies Act and all the various emergency regulations.

Little noted outside South Africa were moves by the government in mid-March to spend billions of rands on "disadvantaged" South Africans. Three billion rands was announced in the budget to be spent on black education, housing and land. What de Klerk did not announce in the 1990 budget was an end to discriminatory education, housing or land laws, rather "an end to high priority backlogs."

One-third of the budgeted allocation will be used to build new black schools; another large amount will be used to buy land for black urbanization and the rest will establish a housing trust for homeless blacks and those living in "shack-housing." And the manager of the trust wants the ANC and UDF to help administer the fund.

This poses a dilemma. No one can be opposed to improved living conditions, especially when exiles begin returning home to enormous overcrowding and a crisis shortage of accommodation. On the other hand, this reform of education, housing and land may also help to perpetuate the legal discrimination that exists in these sectors.

The ANC and other democratic opposition organizations are adamant that apartheid cannot be reformed but must be dismantled. In order for that to happen the legal infrastructure of apartheid must also go. Following is an outline of South Africa's every day racial policies and how they affect the lives of all South Africans.

STATE VIOLENCE

From 1910 when the Union of South Africa was formed - until 1989 - 4,523 person were executed by the state, 775 of these in the last five years.

South Africa has the dubious distinction of being second only to Iran for the highest execution rate in the world. It is responsible for 47 percent of all legal executions world-wide with eight distinct capital crimes, among them judicial murder of freedom fighters and people resisting apartheid.

When de Klerk announced the suspension of capital punishment in his February speech there were 279 people still on death row, including several ANC guerrillas. In May there were 310, of whom 73 are political prisoners. Their fate is in balance, they have not been reprieved, for the time-being their executions are simply delayed until the State decides what to do with them.

Evelyn De Bruin is one of these people. She is 64. In May last year, she, her husband and 13 others were convicted of killing a municipal policeman on evidence that lawyers stress was, at best, questionable.

She is the only woman on death row at Pretoria's Central Prison. She suffers from severe depression, habitual crying, insomnia and poor appetite. She is also illiterate, unaware of her rights. Recently her lawyers applied for permission for her to see her youngest children, aged 12 and 14 who, because of their ages, were unable to come to prison to see her. The judge dismissed her application saying there was insufficient evidence to make her request exceptional.

There is nowhere in the world where political deaths occur on the scale they do now in South Africa. According to the South African Institute of Race relations (SAIRR), the violence in the first half of 1990 is incurring more deaths than in 1985/86 when the State of Emergency quelled an insurrectionary situation.

The SAIRR says that if the current situation continues for the remainder of the year, an estimated 4,000 people will die. The official figure for deaths in political violence is 574 during the first three months of 1990. However the SAIRR says 996 people died in this period from events related to political violence. (In all of last year, 1,403 died in political violence.)

Since de Klerk's speech of 2 February, 139 people have been killed in police actions in situations of political unrest, and 1,429 injured.

The Human Rights Lawyers of South Africa said at the end of April 1990 that there were 347 people held as political prisoners. There are some 184 political trials still going on, involving 1,142 accused.

The Internal Security Act (1982)is permanently in force even when there is no State of Emergency. It confers on security forces wide powers of detention without trial, banning of persons, organizations, gatherings and publications. It has been fully operational at one time or another, in various guises, since 1963.

According to the Human Rights Commission more than 75,000 people have been detained without trial since 1960, more than 50,000 of these in the past four years.

People detained without charge are so numerous that many are held for an average of 32 months before coming before the judicial system. Many of these have been children and young people and 10 percent of them women. Usually between 75 and 80 percent of these people are eventually released without charge and fewer than five percent are convicted of anything despite having to spend almost three years in prison.

A number die in prison because there is no law that guarantees their safety. Some are whipped and tortured, others die of "natural causes" or "suicide". There have been 98 deaths in detention during the 27 years Mandela has been incarcerated.

Detention without trial takes place in South Africa under security legislation and emergency legislation. The former -- the 1982 Internal Security Act -- provides for long-term (12-month) "preventive" detention. Indefinite interrogatory detention, six months "witness" detention and short-term (14 days) preventive detention. The 1953 Public Safety Act also provides for detention without trial.

The Human Rights Commission has recorded a total of 396 people held in detention in South Africa at the end of April 1990. These include 320 people held under the Emergency regulations, 48 under the Internal Security Act and 28 in the "independent homelands".

In de Klerk's February reform speech, the ANC and other organisations were unbanned in terms of the Unlawful Organisations Act and the Suppression of Communism Act, which remain on the statute books and in terms of which these organisations can still be rebanned. The same laws apply to unbanned individuals and publications.

Despite Mandela's release, 80 percent of political prisoners convicted of armed actions against apartheid are still in prisons. Despite offers of indemnity to certain people who have committed ordinary crimes in pursuit of political aims, those apartheid laws under which they were convicted remain in place. According to international law and the UN, the black majority has the right to self-determination which the fundamental tenets of apartheid deny. For this reason, the liberation movements have the right under international law to wage an armed struggle, yet South Africa has criminalized political opposition.

South Africa is in a permanent state of emergency whether officially declared or not. Such basic freedoms as association, movement, speech are not available, neither is freedom from torture and physical abuse by authorities.

A year ago Sipho Mbatha, 16, was savagely beaten by two white policemen for distributing union pamphlets. Dr. Aubrey Mokoape, who treated the youth, said: "This is the most brutal and barbaric assault I have ever treated. The youth suffered a hairline fracture to his jaw, and the welts and bruises on his body attested to continuous assault with sjamboks [rhinoceros-hide whips]."

Sipho said he was taken off a train on his way home and driven to a garage behind a Durban police station with his hands tied by a piece of wire. "They beat me and whenever I fell down I was kicked in the face and ribs and told to get up. They would then pour cold water over me to clean away the blood and start beating me again.

He recalls the police arguing about releasing him. `"We have to release him. We can't keep him here in this condition, we will cause a lot of problems for ourselves." At 3 a.m. he was literally chased from the police station and stumbled and crawled to a hospital where he collapsed, remembering nothing more.

When the doctor, who has treated hundreds of victims of unrest-related violence, saw Sipho, he said it was the most "gruesome" attack he'd ever seen. Police at the station said they were "unaware of the incident."

On 16 May 1990, a sample of extremist violence occurred in the Orange Free State mining town of Welkom. Four hundred black mineworkers held a peaceful demonstration to protest against the dismissal of 30 of their colleagues for wearing the unbanned ANC's colours.

According to a shop steward of the National Union of Mineworkers "we were singing and chanting on our way to the administration block when suddenly mine security guards opened fire on us without warning."

In the resulting melee, two whites were killed, four injured and 15 blacks severely hurt. Several groups of white extremists were so angered they called for "blood and revenge" and began patrolling the streets in place of the police. One of their leaders said "the time has come for the white man to live under the protection of the gun."

And they did. In Thabong, the black township at Welkom, members of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB), an extremist organization, killed eight blacks in what was characterized by police as a revenge killing for the deaths of the two white security guards.

The AWB vowed to keep Welkom a whites-only area and police seem powerless to prevent them patrolling the streets armed with batons and pistols. While Law and Order Minister Adrian Vlok has deplored the violence he has done little else to stop the activities of the AWB.

While some would argue that South Africa is one gigantic human rights violation, specific allegations of brutal abuses places it near the top of the list of international pariahs. And these are continuing.

SECURITY

Long before de Klerk's dramatic 2 February speech to the South African parliament there were clear signs that the civilian rulers did not have control of the country's security apparatus; and there is evidence it still does not.

Police death squads responsible for the murders of anti-apartheid activists, the existence of special forces, covert links between officers and fascist political forces, and the whole elaborate military network reaching into every aspect of civilian life that had been built up during the Botha "securocrat" regime has resurrected fears of a revolt among South Africa's security forces.

One of de Klerk's early moves after his election last year was to abolish the National Security Management System (NSMS) and replace it with a co-ordinating system under civilian control.

For 11 years, the military and security elites had built a network of more than 500 management committees, headed by the State Security Council which dominated every level of government from the cabinet to local affairs. These powerful people, more than any other, had the ear of P.W. Botha, in effect an inner cabinet.

In abolishing the NSMS, de Klerk admitted that the security forces had taken over and he wished to return power to the cabinet as "the highest policy-making and co-ordinating authority." The State Security Council would become an advisory body to a cabinet committee responsible for national security.

Analysts say the decision was devastating to the military who had built careers and a massive industry based on the management of security. It was their belief in the "total onslaught" that gave senior military and police officers control over every aspect of life and turned the 1980s into the decade of the "securocrats."

"The instruments of coercion available to the South African state are among the most varied and diffuse in the world," says Mark Phillips of the Centre for Policy Studies in Johannesburg.

The securocrat decade was characterized by an internal and external counter-insurgency strategy which ignored and openly flouted the constitution and the laws.

According to Phillips the security establishment includes the Defence Department, various intelligence services (military intelligence and counter-intelligence, the National Intelligence Service, and Security Police) and the Directorate of Security Legislation.

Other components are the security arms of the police including riot squads, reaction units, a special guard unit, and a special task force. Included as well are municipal police, mine police, military police, traffic police and private security companies.

Most analysts and anti-apartheid activists doubt there will be a full-scale revolt by South Africa's security forces but do expect a low-level war of attrition which will make de Klerk's reform policies much more difficult to implement. Far right groups have infiltrated the security units. One estimate says that at least three out of four white policemen in the Transvaal belong to the right-wing Conservative Party, utterly opposed to de Klerk's unbanning of the ANC.

It was fear of a police revolt that led de Klerk to address some 500 officers to persuade them they should not be involved in political policies. But his powers of persuasion failed. Police acted with brutality towards crowds of marchers and demonstrators when the ANC's unbanning was announced and again when Mandela was released in Cape Town.

When cabinet ministers said it was safe for ANC exiled leaders to return home, they were contradicted by Police Commissioner Jan van der Merwe who had been present during de Klerk's "loyalty speech."

He said that from a police point-of-view "people against whom we can bring cases of terrorism, subversion and sabotage will face prosecution". These are the measured words of a senior security officer clearly indicating that detention, torture and beatings will continue at a lower level. The rank and file of the police and SADF could, either by maverick individual actions or in a coordinated way, oppose the changes proposed by the government.

From 1978, when white mercenaries installed a pro-South African despot in the Comoros, to the SADF setbacks in Angola in 1988 there have been few military events in southern Africa in which South Africa did not have a hand. Such events as the coup d'etat in Lesotho, a decade of vicious bandit wars in Mozambique with cross-border attacks into Zimbabwe and Zambia, the 25-year liberation war in Namibia, killings of civilians in all neighbouring countries, and economic destabilization, are all part of the "securocrat" policies of preventing the so-called "total onslaught".

Within South Africa itself this security control of policy prompted the declaration of the state of emergency more than four years ago which resulted in over 50,000 people being detained without trial, curtailment of already limited media freedom and banning of more than 30 organizations.

Well-armed vigilante groups, police death squads and inter-black violence are all part of the security policies. Dr. Jacques Cilliers, a South African security systems consultant, says the counter-insurgency policies have not worked although their failure has not convinced the security structures.

Internal unrest and international pressures in the form of sanctions and isolation due to apartheid policies have forced the government to backtrack.

"F.W. de Klerk defines the problem differently to the military people," Cilliers says. "He's saying you can't simply have a counter-insurgency approach because it may be that the enemy is the majority of the population."

One of the architects of the "total onslaught" theory, Defence Minister Magnus Malan remained in de Klerk's cabinet but was forced to watch with horror the cuts in the SADF, reduction to one year of compulsory military service and the demilitarization of NSMS. Malan's knowledge and involvement brought the hit squad scandal into the highest levels of government and the defence establishment took another beating.

A five-person hit squad team was responsible for the assassinations of SWAPO (South West Africa Peoples' Organization) politburo member Anton Lubowski in Windhoek and civil rights activist David Webster in Johannesburg, amongst others. Webster was gunned down in May 1989 and Lubowski in September. Both were shot outside their homes.

The assassins are members of the SADF's Civil Co-operation Bureau, linked to death squad activities. The chain of command in the defence establishment went directly to Malan although he has denied giving any orders to commit the murders of Lubowski, Webster or other politically-motivated assassinations.

A judicial inquiry, the Harms Commission, is investigating all political murders and CCB activities inside South Africa -- but

its mandate specifically prohibits it from examining actions in the region -- and its findings may well give de Klerk the evidence to get rid of the last vestiges of overt military control of his government. With responsibility for such illegal activities going right into his cabinet, confidence in de Klerk's control of events has been shaken.

Earlier the security police were also revealed to have hit squads. Captain Dirk Coetzee, who headed one of them, admitted to involvement in assassinations which killed lawyer Griffiths Mxenge, activist Ruth First, ANC member Patrick Makau and other unnamed opponents of the regime.

Coetzee, who left the security forces in 1985, eventually fled South Africa and joined the ANC.

His revelations shook the police, especially when he implicated another cabinet minister, former police minister Louis le Grange who, according to Coetzee, backed the operations of the 12-person squad. Also implicated was Coetzee's successor as head of the security police death squad, Major Eugene de Kock, who has been named as responsible for activities resulting in nine political deaths.

Much publicity has been given to the cuts made in January 1990 to the SADF totalling about 10 percent of the defence budget. Most of the cuts came from what some analysts describe as frills or as a result of ending the war in Namibia.

The SADF insists that the cuts have not affected "in any way" the defence force's capability. Indeed security analysts in the country say that many of the reductions were "extravagant extras grafted onto the defence budget over the last decade."

The main cuts were in the retirement of 2,000 naval personnel, and closing five naval bases; cancelling or delaying 60 weapons projects; reducing by 10 percent the workforce of the parastatal armaments manufacturer, Armscor; disbanding six airforce squadrons; and withdrawing five types of aging aircraft and a number of minor frills like the closing of a horse-breeding farm.

The director of the South African Institute of International Affairs, John Barratt, says the cuts indicate a shift in policy from a military solution to diplomatic, economic and political solutions. But, he said, this shift should not be interpreted as a weakening of the SADF.

"We are so strong relative to our neighbours that this cutback still leaves the SADF in an overwhelming position."

The cuts in the defence budget, however, do not present a true picture of the total amount spent on security. For example, defence and police expenditures in the "bantustans" are financed through the foreign affairs vote and the amount spent on defence buildings and property is paid for by the Department of Public

Works. Thus, total spending on defence and security in South Africa is in the neighbourhood of R20 billion.

The Committee on South African War Resistance which has been waging a campaign against compulsory military service, militarism and the apartheid war, says the cuts do not indicate a change in policy but rather a change in tactics.

"The objectives of de Klerk are the same as [P.W.] Botha's: to stabilize the situation, and restore some legitimacy to the system without radically affecting white power and privilege. He is simply using different methods but he has the same old aims."

The steps taken to halt the seemingly inexorable process of militarization which was such a feature of the eighties are very partial, the committee says.

Conscription, introduced in 1967 and applicable only to white males, has been cut to one year but any decline in the SADF is being replaced by a doubling of the police forces who have largely taken over from troops in securing the townships.

Armscor, one of South Africa's dynamic economic success stories, will continue to spend with the SADF more than R5 billion in 1990 on such projects as submarines, new fighter aircraft,and a ballistic missile which is nuclear capable, developed jointly with Israel.

Controversy still surrounds this latter development which has been confirmed by the U.S. State Department. Tests were conducted last year of a Jericho II intermediate missile at a base near Cape Town. Israeli technical expertise is being given in return for uranium from South Africa to build nuclear warheads. Israel and South Africa have had a close military relationship since the 1960s.

South Africa has, until recently, had no rocket of its own but is believed to have a stockpile of nuclear warheads and a testing site within its borders in the Kalahari Desert. The fighter aircraft were also developed with Israeli technical assistance, and the submarine plans came from West Germany, in breech of the mandatory international arms embargo.

The role of the SADF and the security police, while no longer under the direct control of the securocrats, remains firmly in the hands of the de Klerk government and they are, in no way, undermined. The Internal Security Act is in place. Intelligence gathering, surveillance and the presence of security forces throughout the country will continue.

Having brought the security forces back under the control of cabinet, one of the questions facing de Klerk in the next months is whether he can prevent them from blunting the impact of his reforms.

HOMELANDS

An entire section of the grand plan of apartheid is crumbling with the virtual collapse of South Africa's "bantustans" since de Klerk's reforms were announced.

Ten tribal regions sliced out of the country -- four of them with the trappings of "sovereignty" -- are demanding a return to South Africa by their 14 million or so residents who are determined not to be left out of a truly free state.

Their breakdown has been dramatic and violent. Massive and sustained resistance has occurred almost simultaneously across the country bringing the entire system to a state of disaster. It is a massive failure of the ideological underpinnings of South Africa's race policies. These homelands can no longer be used as the dumping ground for black people under the guise of "constitutional independence."

Within six days Ciskei (800,000 population) in the Eastern Cape, Bophuthatswana (1.5 million) scattered in seven pieces of land across the country and Venda (500,000) near South Africa's border with Zimbabwe have been wracked with violence as people demanded reincorporation into South Africa. Many lives have been lost. Ciskei and Venda have had military coups. Soldiers, civil servants and administrators turned their backs on their political masters and sided with the masses of the people.

Homeland residents have demanded to reincorporate and end the legal balkanization of South Africa. On 4 March, Lennox Sebe, "president-for-life" of Ciskei, was overthrown by General Oupa Joshua Gqoso of the Ciskei Defence Force. Speaking before crowds of cheering supporters, he told them his aim was reintegration into South Africa. Standing on a platform before ANC and SACP flags, he said Ciskei, as a product of apartheid ideology, was doomed to oblivion.

When spontaneous rioting broke out with the news that Sebe had been toppled, Ciskei armed forces refrained from acting and South Africa Defence Force troops did nothing to aid the deposed president, withdrawing its troops as soon as the violence died down.

Three days later more than 100 000 people marched through the streets of Garankuwa in Bophuthatswana demanding President Lucas Mangope resign. His troops responded by killing at least seven people and wounding dozens more. Mangope was defiant -- "Bophuthatswana will be an independent state 100 years from now."

In Venda, the least urban of the four "independent" homelands, conflict over ritual killings along with a revolt by civil servants and euphoria over Mandela's release caused an estimated 30 deaths and the overthrow of President Frank Ravele on April 5. He had already agreed to many of the demands for reincorporation.

The fourth "independent" homeland, Transkei, two years ago staged a military coup that brought Major General Bantu Holomisa to power, toppling two Transkei prime ministers in a row in 1987. He promised a referendum on whether or not Transkei should be reincorporated. In addition, he unbanned the ANC and PAC well ahead of de Klerk's move on 2 February.

The self-governing homelands which are still part of South Africa have also begun to seek reintegration. Kangwane's chief minister Enos Mabuza was the first of the homeland leaders to openly align himself when he went to Lusaka, Zambia three years ago to meet with ANC. His stated role is now to stay in power only until a democratic and unified South Africa is under way.

It appears that Lebowa and Qwaqwa also support ANC and the idea of a united non-racial South Africa. There have been sporadic protests in both and neither seems anxious to offend its pro-unification populous.

Gazankula in Transvaal has had to face civil service strikes, cancellation of the legislative assembly, school and business boycotts demanding the resignation of Chief Minister Hudson Ntsanwisi. Reports indicate at least 28 people have been killed and more than 1 200 detained. Ntsanwisi has not encouraged reunification although he supports the concept of a united non-racial South Africa.

Violence continued to explode in the KwaZulu bantustan in the Natal region. Its chief minister, Mangosutho Gatsha Buthelezi, also heads the controversial Inkatha movement of Zulu nationalism. Since the mid 1980s more than 3 000 people have died in an undeclared war between Inkatha and organizations of the ANC/UDF. Security forces are responsible for many deaths as violence in both urban and rural communities has become well established.

Both Buthelezi and Mandela have appealed for members to stop the violence and there have been numerous attempts at a cease fire. However, Buthelezi is determined to blame the ANC/UDF while calling on Africans to end the current violence.

De Klerk has now indicated he will consider the possible return of the homelands to South Africa.

LAND

The Land Act of 1913, one of the "pillars" of apartheid, allocates 87 per cent of land to less than 5 million whites and 13 per cent of land to 26 million non-whites. Through the Population Registration Act which distinguishes races and the Group Areas Act which dictates where races shall be settled, residential and agricultural land is occupied according to these racial laws.

Of these proportions, the white percentage contains the best agricultural and mineral producing land and most of the urban and industrial areas. The 13 per cent allocated to blacks comprises the most arid and overpopulated sections in which the bantustans are to be found.

Consequently, in terms of the Group Areas Act, there is a perpetual shortage of housing caused by bringing black labour to the white industrial areas. At present there is a shortage of about 800,000 black housing units in South Africa while in the homelands it is estimated that more than a million housing units are required to meet the most urgent demands.

Related to the mal-distribution of land has been the forced removal of the majority urban population into segregated conglomerate townships adjacent to white cities; and the resettlement of blacks to make room for industrial expansion, commercial agriculture or white housing.

There is no exact total known for removals. But, the Surplus People Project (SPP), a research group, has estimated that between 1960 and 1983 more than 3.5 million removals took place and another two million were under threat of removal.

There are 11 different categories cited by the SPP under which the government can remove people using no less than 16 different laws, some dating back to 1913, as well as numerous amending and consolidating acts.

The 11 categories of removals give an indication of the lengths legal apartheid has gone to preserve white power and privilege. They are:

- Farm removals: eviction of tenants from white farms and of redundant workers;

- Black spots and consolidation: clearing black-owned property outside homelands, and fragments of reserves surrounded by white land;

- Urban relocation: moving townships from white areas to bantustans;

- Informal settlements: removal from unauthorized urban settlements;

- Influx control: ejection from white urban areas;

- Group areas: intra-city removals due to racial re-zoning;

- Strategic: relocation due to development schemes and clearing "sensitive" areas;

- Political: imposed moves such as banishment and flight from oppression;

- Moving resettlement areas.

The SPP says that information about removals is usually refused in parliament and the official Year Book gives no figures for removals.

The amount of property lost during removals is incalculable. The state sends in troops and police, along with huge bulldozers which smash homes and destroy possessions. Usually very little notice is given, although the government says they are carried out "with compassion and respect for human dignity."

But, for example, the removal of the people at Kenton-on-Sea location, where they had lived for 25 years, to Glenmore in Ciskei was done on 11 days notice.

"We are being dumped here very much against our will -- only to die. `People are starving. Only last week a young boy died in his initiation school. It was found he had not eaten for days. When we had to bury him, only five people came to the service because they were too hungry and did not have enough energy to go to the church."

As well as wrecking peoples' homes, the government does little to replace them in the new areas with usually the most rudimentary services. Tents or temporary huts on loan, pit latrines or buckets, bore holes for water and dirt roads are what is usually offered. Although the government says clinics, schools, shops, transport facilities and jobs will be provided, the victims say this is not the case.

One location of 100,000 reported to the SPP that it had one clinic, one police station, one supermarket and 19 schools operating double shifts for 20,000 pupils. There was no hospital, no electricity, no sewage system and almost no jobs.

The process of forced removals has adopted a number of disguises, designed to minimise international political damage. One technique is "voluntary removals" designed to persuade people to leave their place of residence; another is forced incorporation which administratively removes whole communities to specified homelands.

For example, the state can use its powers in the sphere of public health to clear slums, thereby requiring the relocation of whole communities. Another is "township upgrading" to remove people from urban areas.

Related to the land problems of South Africa's apartheid system is squatting, which is illegal under a variety of acts and amendments to prevent people from living on land which they neither rent nor own. Anti-squatter legislation is often used to clear "black spots" in rural areas or as "influx control" in urban areas.

In 1989, the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Bill was passed and immediately exacerbated the homeless situation in South Africa -- more than 5 million people are without homes -- for blacks. Under this act anyone other than a landlord can be removed from his or her house at the discretion of a junior official.

Under this act anyone is a squatter unless they can prove otherwise. This renders millions of people vulnerable to unchallengeable eviction as squatters and increases the government's powers of forced removal.

The total number of squatters is not known but is estimated in the hundreds of thousands. The best known of these camps is Crossroads outside Cape Town which was the object of numerous demolition raids against its 50,000 residents. These people were removed finally by arson following attacks by vigilantes who burned peoples' homes while security forces stood by passively. The government justified these actions by calling Crossroads a "symbol of defiance and anarchy."

HEALTH

Irene Mzizi had worked for 40 years in Soweto hospitals, serving as a nurse for people of all races. But, when she needed help after being injured in a car accident last year, she was left to die on the side of road, slowly, a victim of apartheid health.

She was in a car accident. Soon after the crash, an ambulance aircraft lifted two injured whites to hospital, leaving four blacks at the scene of the accident. Mzizi and her husband were left trapped in the car.

Members of the family pleaded in vain with the white helicopter crew, who left the black victims unattended for five hours. When they were finally freed, Mzizi was dead, although her children said that for at least three of the five hours she was breathing and screaming for help.

Ambulance services in South Africa, like all health services, are segregated and remain legally segregated despite recent high-profile claims that the system had changed. Floor beds in black hospitals have been exchanged for beds in empty wards in white hospitals but the wards remain segregated.

Dr. Rina Venter, the minister responsible for hospitals, admitted that the overcrowding would be difficult enough to deal with and that the situation would only change when there is legislation to ensure accessibility to all people and when there was money to reopen underutilized beds in white hospitals. She admitted during debate in Parliament that public hospitals would eventually be required to accept patients from all race groups but that wards would remain segregated until the laws are changed to include a single health department for the country. Private and academic

hospitals will be asked to co-operate but are not required to accept racial groups equally.

Statistics of inequality: while black hospitals have 130 to 150 percent occupancy, necessitating floor beds between and under regular hospital beds, white hospitals run at 50 to 60 percent occupancy.

More than 80 percent of the white population of South Africa is covered by medical schemes of some sort, contrasted with four percent of the black population. These statistics are at a time when South Africa is also moving to privatize health care.

King Edward VIII hospital in Durban is the second largest black hospital in South Africa (after Baragwanath in Soweto). It has 2,000 beds, sees 500,000 outpatients a year and delivers 17,000 babies. It is horribly overcrowded, running an average bed occupancy of 130 percent. Patients sleep on the floor, under beds and now on benches. Nursing care is extremely difficult.

Eight kilometres away is Addington Hospital for whites. It has 60 percent occupancy and recently closed its children's hospital for lack of use. Such is the cruel logic of legal apartheid, dictated by such legislation as the Group Areas Act and its subsidiary, the Separate Amenities Act.

Under the new regulations announced in mid-May patients under beds or on benches may be moved to wards in Addington, but the wards remain segregated.

Per capita spending on health care continues the shocking statistical comparisons: health care spending for whites is R597; Indians, R356; coloureds, R340; urban blacks, R138 and homelands blacks, R88.

Some of the main indicators of the health of a nation are life expectancy and infant mortality. For blacks life expectancy at birth is an average of 58.9 years, for whites, 72. Life expectancy in the rural areas and homelands is considerably lower than in urban areas. There are nine white infant deaths per thousand live births in South Africa but among blacks it is a 94-124.

Even though white hospitals are located in white areas and black hospitals in black areas, it would be better if the health care systems were equal. They are not. Some of the most sophisticated and advanced medical procedures (including organ transplant centres) are available in white hospitals. Doctors and nurses work in spacious, airy conditions, their workload far less than their black counterparts. For example, there is one doctor for every 330 whites and one for every 12,000 blacks. The situation is even worse in the homelands -- there is one doctor for every 19,000 people in Gazankulu.

White nurses and doctors are trained separately, paid more and

usually end up in supervisory positions, despite the fact that both blacks and whites must meet the same examination standards. Black nurses have not been allowed to attend white patients until recently due to a shortage of white nurses.

White hospitals generally admit patients suffering from "diseases of affluence" (coronary heart disease, cancers, geriatric problems) while diseases affecting blacks are those of poverty (tuberculosis, malnutrition, infectious disease, scabies, heart failure, diarrhoea and chronic lung disease) being the most common.

The dual system of health care has been challenged recently by the Mass Democratic Movement as part of its struggle for political freedom forcing white hospitals to treat black patients: in fact, forcing white hospitals to treat even their own black employees.

South Africa is a violent society under apartheid. The health system is forced, under the unequal system outlined above, to cope with this violence. A recent study by the National Medical Dental Association of 600 persons who had been released from detention and of whom 40 percent were children, revealed:

"Twenty-five percent had spent more than 140 days in solitary confinement, 72 percent had evidence of physical abuse, 25 percent had been suffocated, 14 percent had been electrically shocked and 21.7 percent had lost consciousness. About 75 percent of those who had been physically assaulted also complained of mental abuse such as deliberate humiliation, forcible and continuous threats, forced interrogation and being stripped naked. One-third of the children had post-traumatic stress syndrome."

These are medical and psychological conditions which the white medical system rarely has to deal with, nor does it have the stabbing and gunshot wounds and beatings caused from violent breakup of demonstrations that strain the already inadequate black system.

Another is tuberculosis where 60,000 new cases are reported annually in South Africa, claiming the lives of 12 people daily. It's almost entirely a disease of blacks resulting from overcrowding, poor housing, inadequate nutrition, susceptibility to infection.

Frequent and prolonged cuts in water supply in Soweto, for example, result in the increase of serious diseases like typhoid, dysenteries, skin infection, even polio. Pipes are blocked, sewage overflows, contaminating yards and streets. Water is in short supply for washing hands, bodies, clothes, food and cooking utensils. Refuse is uncollected for long periods, producing rat- and fly-transmitted diseases. Sanitation in some areas uses a bucket-latrine system to collect and dispose of excreta because there is no running water.

Barry Martin is a black American dancer whose arms and legs were paralysed because he was refused hospital treatment under the apartheid system. He ultimately sued the South African authorities for US$130 million. He'd been involved in a car accident and was left on the roadside because of his colour, while his white companion was taken to hospital. A black passer-by, he said, took him to the local white hospital but he was refused treatment and left for several hours before being transferred to the black section of another hospital 65 miles away. He said he was not treated for another 24 hours before being transferred to the white section as "an honorary white" because of his American citizenship.

For blacks this is an everyday occurrence. As in every other aspect of legalised apartheid, black life is considered immeasurably cheaper than white.

"The enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of every human being without distinction of race, religion, political belief, economic or social condition." This is the position of the World Health Organisation but not the law of apartheid South Africa.

ENVIRONMENT

South Africa has some of the weakest environmental legislation in the world. It took seven years to get the existing law, the Environmental Affairs Act, passed just this year.

Air pollution, lack of clean water, dumping toxic wastes, deforestation, land degradation, herbicide and pesticide poisoning and a host of other problems affect the health and well-being of all South Africans.

As this report has already illustrated, the extreme shortage of land, overcrowded conditions and the abject poverty of the millions of Blacks living in homelands have resulted in some of the worst health statistics in Africa.

Now these people, already victims of poverty-related environmental destruction, must face the effects of legislation which has been so delayed and diluted that even segments of the white community, usually protected from such degradation, is up in arms. Tens of thousands of people have signed petitions denouncing industrial threats.

Recently a plan to mine titanium, a highly toxic metal, near the scenic Lake St. Lucia dunes on the Natal Coast resulted in a 200,000-signature petition, forcing the government to demand that Richards Bay Minerals, a British-owned company, delay work until an environmental assessment can be made.

A recent chemical spill into the Crocodile River from a nearby

paper mill at Nelspruit killed tens of thousands of fish and rendered the water supply of 200,000 people unsafe. The politically conservative area near Kruger National Park demanded the government tighten up "lax safety measures".

One of the most serious environmental hazards facing South Africa is the disposal of toxic waste. Yet recently the government and a geologist from the Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC) put forth a serious proposal that South Africa import a "significant portion of the world's toxic waste" to pay for the processing of its own poisons.

Dennis Toens, former chief geologist with AEC, said South Africa could safely import and process toxic wastes like arsenic and cyanide and other carcinogenic chemicals and "make a mint". Toens' argument, which the government appears to be considering, is that in the absence of legislation and financial incentives to industry the wastes will "lie around or we can import enough to make the local operation viable."

The proposed waste disposal site of Alexander Bay is on the northwest coast just at the edge of the Namibia border. Opponents fear the long transport problems from the industrial heartland could pollute the coastal areas and fish stocks of both countries, as well as posing a danger to people along the route.

Industry, opponents of the scheme say, should be forced to clean up its own mess. Environmentalists in South Africa estimate that 90 percent of municipalities could not meet even minimal legislation governing the disposal of solid toxic waste.

Workers at Thor Chemicals, a multinational near Pietermaritzburg in Natal province which imports highly toxic mercury waste, are suffering from severe nervous disorders associated with mercury poisoning. Thor and its associate company in New Jersey, American Cyanimid, has been allowed by the South African government to import through the port of Durban two shipments a year of 10 tons each of mercury waste from the U.S.

Tests indicate that Thor has polluted the Umgeni River which contains 50 micrograms of mercury per litre of water, two-and-a-half-times the already generous legal limit for South Africa. The environmental organization, Earthlife Africa, says the mercury pollution level is the highest in the world.

Labourers in the factory have symptoms -- nervous shaking, severe mood swings and loss of touch with reality -- which the Workplace Information Group says are consistent with those of mercury poisoning.

Greenpeace, the international environmental agency, has released the contents of a world-wide study of toxic waste disposal. It indicates that Thor Chemicals is one of the Third World's largest importers of toxic waste which is dumped or recycled in South Africa.

"In a deal between Thor Chemicals of Natal, South Africa and American Cyanimid of New Jersey, 120 drums of mercury contaminated wastes have been exported from the U.S. to South Africa each year since 1986," says the Greenpeace report.

A range of environmental groups, unions and political organizations is gearing up to fight the importation of toxic wastes into South Africa.

A year ago, Alfred Gumede, 17, fell into an effluent canal at Saiccor and was severely burned by acid over most of his body. The youth also suffered respiratory problems from inhaling the effluent. Gumede had to undergo skin grafts and his doctor says he is lucky to have survived. Slabs covering the canal had been removed to do repair work.

Alarm about the toxicity and final destination of effluent prompted the company to suggest it was heat rather than toxicity that burned the youth but doctors say the effluent burns were not from heat but from acidic chemicals.

South Africa has also carefully evaded the 1986 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which would require it to dismantle its nuclear weapons and allow inspection of its nuclear facilities. The Pretoria regime has no stringent controls over the dumping of nuclear waste and glosses over the long-term dangers.

The ANC has already begun developing a policy on the environment in the absence of South African legislation. It will respect the Basel Declaration on the international disposal of toxic waste in which South Africa will not now participate.

The Freedom Charter affirms that land will be returned to those who work it, but the land is now dangerously wasted and polluted. The ANC identifies six areas where the hideous consequences of apartheid environment are evident: land exploitation, use of dangerous chemicals, uncontrolled air pollution, water pollution, nuclear energy and wildlife conservation. These affect the health of people, the quality of their lives and the productivity of their land.

EDUCATION

It was in 1953 that then Minister of Bantu Affairs, Hendrick Verwoerd, set out to reform black education -- backwards. He stated that education was "to teach the natives from childhood to realise that equality with Europeans is not for them. They must be taught to serve the white man. What is the purpose of teaching black students mathematics when his job is to draw water and wood?"

The Bantu Education Act of 1953 has precipitated a massive crisis in black education which shows no sign of diminishing. In the

matriculation examinations last December six out of every 10 of the 195,000 black scholars who took the state examinations failed outright. Only 17,000 qualified for university entrance.

By comparison 95 percent of white scholars who finished school last November (1989) passed their examination, half of them well enough to enter university.

Only at private non-governmental schools did Africans do as well as their white counterparts, disproving once again the cherished white racist notion that says the problem is lack of intelligence. Instead, say educationists, the failures are a result of years of official neglect of black education run by a separate government department from that which runs white schools and universities.

The government has increased spending since the first explosion of black student protests in 1976 when it spent 13 times as much on each white student as on each black one. However, the government still spends four times as much annually on whites (R3,082) as on blacks (R765).

And, says, Education Minister Stoeffel van der Merwe, the South African government has no intention of scrapping apartheid in education. Almost immediately after de Klerk's reform announcements in February, he said that "cultural differences" between blacks and whites made separate schools essential. "Integration would not be very acceptable at the moment in South Africa."

Yet there are more than two million black children in South Africa who have no schooling. This is the pool of cheap labour, restless and unemployed in South Africa's townships and homelands.

Fully half of the 155,000 black teachers have not themselves passed matriculation, while less than a quarter are university-trained. The student-teacher ratio for Africans is one to 50; in white schools, one to 16.

Last year Patwell Hlabangane, a Soweto student, was one of the six out of 10 who failed. His story graphically illustrates the problem.

In English, he wrote one essay and one letter throughout the year. The teacher who marked them didn't notice or correct the many grammatical errors.

Patwell wrote only four literature tests and entered the exam totally unprepared by his teacher. "At the start of each literature period, the teacher would hand out 30 copies of MacBeth, and take them back at the end. We had no chance to read them at home or make notes."

Of only 11 English language exercises, fewer than half were

marked, often incorrectly. Maths was worse because the university-educated teacher left in mid-term to go to a private school. Patwell failed completely in three courses.

"We fared so badly," Patwell shakes his head sadly, "because of the acute shortage of teachers."

Teachers argue that they are grossly overworked and suffer from stress. The Department of Education and Training (DET), responsible for African education, requires teachers to take 42 periods per week. In a recent independent survey (Education Project Unit), 65 percent of teachers complained about mental fatigue and insufficient time to mark student papers.

When South Africa's schools open at the start of a new year, the viciousness of apartheid towards the young is obvious. Black students queue up for admission to overcrowded, often derelict buildings. Many are turned away.

There are not enough whites to fill their well-maintained schools. Last year there were 300,000 empty places which could not be used, however, by blacks who usually go to schools in the "platoon" system where two complete schools use one building at different times and thousands of students attend classes under trees.

Most educationists believe that promises by the government that black education would be on a par with white education within 10 years is impossible because the white educational system would have to stand still and wait for the black system to catch up.

The syllabus for African schools is drawn up by whites, and ignores African educationists. It is blatantly biased and, says T.W. Kambule, headmaster at Pace Community College in Soweto, is usually "blatant apartheid propaganda, an historical farce. ... historically, grammatically and factually incorrect." He says there is a flood of textbooks proffered specifically for black schools produced by white writers who become authors overnight. African schools who try to order textbooks of their own choice are ignored by DET.

The syllabus also over-emphasises academic education in a country which claims desperate shortages of skilled labour. According to one study in 1988, there were 38,000 unemployed matriculants in that year. There are more than double the number of students in universities than in technical colleges. Ninety-five percent of black graduates are training in non-technical fields and only one percent is studying technical subjects.

Educated Africans are encouraged by the system to become professionals -- mainly lawyers and clergy -- while whites insist that the majority should exist primarily to be manual labourers. When Verwoerd justified downgrading African education by saying that mathematics was unusable, there are now not enough teachers who can educate students in it, denying many black graduates

opportunities to enter medicine, sciences and engineering. His sneering words have come back to haunt education and employment.

Education cannot be normalised until the political situation, and with it, the education system, changes. The Department of Education and Training must disappear and one unitary educational system replace it for all races. This will not happen until apartheid is dismantled.

LABOUR

On 21 December, 1989 Haile Mphushu became the first black in South African history to qualify as a mine manager. For 77 years South African laws barred the majority from supervisory positions in mines, South Africa's biggest industry.

But it was not just laws that stopped Mphushu and other blacks from advancement, it was the entire system which legally prevents whites from being supervised by blacks under the Job Reservation Act (1956).

The white Mineworkers' Union, too, has fought for years to confine African miners to less skilled tasks, reserving the more responsible jobs in the coal and gold mines for its own workers.

Typically, trade union solidarity is divided racially in South Africa. The powerful National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) has long called for the repeal of legislation which, until recently, would not even allow black miners to handle explosives.

Inequality in the labour sector of South Africa is entrenched in legislation. By definition of the Job Reservation Act, certain categories of work are reserved by racial classification -- skilled jobs for whites, semi-skilled jobs for coloureds and Indians and unskilled for the majority despite the fact that South Africa has a severe shortage of skilled labour and at least three million unemployed, the vast majority of whom are black.

The only exception to this rule is when no white person is available. But even then the black person is to be supervised by a white even if the latter is semi-skilled or unskilled; and at a much lower wage-scale.

In any racially "mixed" job situation the supervisor is always a white, irrespective of skills.

Wages are also determined by race. An unskilled black worker earns a third of the salary of a white counterpart and about two-thirds of a coloured person.

Even though there are well over 40,000 vacancies in South Africa in managerial, technical and professional occupations the number of Africans who have been allowed to advance is negligible. The South African Institute of Race Relations has found that there

are only 2,860 blacks in these positions, which includes executives and administrators. At the same time there are more than 180,000 whites.

Dr. Hennie Reynders is chairperson of the National Manpower Commission. He blames the lack of managerial progress squarely on legislation and white attitudes which, although they pay lip-service to majority advancement, displays a "notable unwillingness or inability to do this in practice."

If current trends prevail there will be a shortage of 230,000 skilled managerial workers in South Africa while 90 percent of the population, almost entirely non-white, will remain semi-skilled or unskilled.

Wage gaps continue to widen between blacks and whites in almost every sector despite claims by the public and private sectors that racial discrimination in the work place is being reduced. In 1979 when trade union rights were first extended to African workers the racial wage gap was about R600. It now stands at R1,700.

The width of the wage gap is clearly illustrated by the number of black people living below the poverty line -- nearly 53 percent compared with 1.6 percent of whites.

One of the most telling sets of figures is within the government's own public service sector where black labourers averaged R447/month, some going as low as R300. Minimum requirements for a black family of six are R526. The racial gap in the Public Service salaries, set by law for 1,670,000 people is even more shocking in a "reform" government. Blacks, excluding labourers mentioned above, earned on average R670/month, whites received more than three times that, an average of R2,070.

Although the trade union movement is racially divided, the black unions are much more militant and political, despite a racist and prohibitive Labour Relations Act which the one-million-member COSATU (Congress of South African Trade Unions) is campaigning against.

The amassed workers' grievances against the apartheid system are legion. In addition to inequality in wages and promotion, the creation of "independent" homelands as pools of cheap labour, the importation of migrant workers from other countries to fill the mines with underpaid workers, lack of protection for farm workers and domestics and a strongly pro-business slant to the Labour Relations Act means that strikes are increasingly common.

Some industrial relations experts estimate it costs the South African economy more than what fair legislation would have required. With union membership at about 2.5 million, ferocious strikes in the railway and brewing sectors cost the economy more than three million work-days last year. Industrial sabotage in the rail strike alone has been estimated at R40 million.

COSATU's campaign against the Labour Relations Act resulted last year in the loss of another three million work-days from political "stay-aways".

These strikes have resulted in at least 24 deaths, beatings, arrests, attacks by dogs, tear-gassing as authorities cracked down hard in support of business.

Among the clauses of the labour relations legislation is the recognition of "minority" unions and the right to sue unions for loss of production.

Opposition to the legislation brought together, on this issue at least, the two big union congresses, COSATU and NACTU (National Council of Trade Unions) with "progressive" elements of employers' associations, chambers of commerce, industry, mining, banking and corporations. It was a recognition by corporate interests that unions are one of the major expressions of black aspirations.

This is a major change in approach. For years employers, and especially government, argued that unions should confine themselves to bread and butter issues such as wages and working conditions.

The unions maintain that as long as the majority of people are denied political rights then they grab whatever chance they are given to express their political demands. In South Africa that means unions. Industrial Relations consultants, normally on the side of business and government employers, agree that unions which do not address themselves to political issues are not adequately fulfilling their duty to the membership.

Says one consultant: "Many large employers (including government) indulge to a greater extent in politics. Surely the same right cannot be denied to organised labour."

While labour legislation remains racialist and repressive of blacks, the newly formed Consultative Business Movement (CBM) of business and trade unions issued a statement a year ago saying they "accepted the inevitability of structural changes in the socio-political and economic fields." And they agreed on the need for "transformation to a post-apartheid society in which the current polarization can be overcome."

MEDIA

As journalists -- both foreign and domestic -- were celebrating the lifting, in February 1990, of many of the State of Emergency regulations which had hampered their coverage, two English journalists were being expelled for their reporting of this year's rebel English cricket tour and an Afrikaner reporter was beaten by riot police at a university celebration.

South Africa, which likes to characterize its media as "the freest in Africa", actually has more than 100 statutes, apart from the Emergency regulations, which control the mass media.

It was under these rules that Charles Leonard, a journalist with Vrye Weekblad, was brutally beaten by police and a day later journalists were ordered away from a scene of "unrest" in Tembisa.

British radio reporter Gary Furby, covering the rebel cricket tour, was sent home accused of "writing distorted reports which could be to the detriment of South Africa." These events happened less than two weeks after de Klerk announced he was partially lifting the State of Emergency rules which had hemmed in journalists for the last four years.

Media lawyers say the repeal of the emergency legislation will, for the time being, have a significant relaxing effect on what can and cannot be reported. But, they caution, police can, and will, use other regulations to order journalists away from scenes of unrest.

It is now legal to publish written accounts or sound recordings of police action but the publication or airing of visual material is still banned.

As it remains, television, which has the strongest mass international impact, has achieved the desired effect of lulling viewers into believing that all is quiet.

Media people are deeply concerned, however, that police can still find easy ways to prohibit coverage. While the media regulations under the state of emergency are eased, officials still have the power to order people away from a scene of unrest under the security sections of the emergency laws.

The Anti Censorship Action Group (ACAG) which lobbies for a free press, says: "The repeal of the (emergency) media regulations is of little significance if police are able to invoke the security emergency regulations to justify ordering journalists to leave a particular area."

The whole relaxation exercise is a bit of newsspeak, along with South Africa's alleged free press.

Before June 1986 (when the State of Emergency was imposed) the media was already heavily controlled by laws governing their activities. The Defence Act, the Police Act, the Prisons Act, the Internal Security Act and the Publications Act are the most commonly used to inhibit press freedom but the complexities of the law are so enormous that most publishers require full-time lawyers to examine stories before they are printed or aired.

Self-censorship is common. Many publications carry a page one disclaimer saying they are publishing under government restrictions. This makes for uncertain and curtailed information for media to protect themselves from existing legislation.

The various acts and regulations often use the catch-all phrase saying that information "calculated to prejudice or embarrass the government...or alarm or depress members of the public" is illegal if published. That, in theory, could prevent publication of South Africa's economic woes.

The Police Act says no one can publish "anything untrue" about the police unless they can prove they had "reasonable grounds to believe it was true". Journalists trying to function under such a sweeping regulation would be hard-pressed to publish anything.

The Prisons Act makes it a crime to publish information about the experiences of prisoners or ex-prisoners. That means that technically information about Mandela's 27 years in the South African prison system is illegal.

Under the Internal Security Act, the minister responsible can ban a publication simply by publishing the fact in The Government Gazette. Many publications have been closed down since this act was passed in 1977. This act can define publishing of certain kinds of information as terrorism, subversion, promoting communism or promoting banned organizations.

Intimidation is regularly imposed on journalists, their sources or people who might report repression to the media. To protect themselves or their sources, journalists often practice censorship on themselves.

A police liaison officer, Captain Eugene Opperman of Witwatersrand, said journalists "incite" crowds "because they are well-known to the people, they actually shake hands when they get together, that's how well they know each other."

Opperman said attitudes of demonstrators and crowds "change as soon as journalists with notebooks, tape recorders and photographic equipment arrive. This cannot be tolerated. Police have their authority to see to it that the laws of this country are being upheld. We will uphold the law -- it's our job."

The Campaign for Open Media has launched a drive to have all censorship laws repealed, existing convictions and prosecutions dropped, lifting of the entire state of emergency, removal of government control of radio and television and the opening of official, commercial and political sources of information.

On 19 October 1977 the first newspapers were banned under censorship laws -- *The World*, *The Weekend World* and a church publication *Pro Veritate*. Since then hundreds of journalists have been arrested and banned, their publications closed and their assets confiscated.

As recently as last fall the Johannesburg newspaper, *New Nation*, owned by the Southern African Catholic Bishops' Conference, was threatened with suspension of publication by Minister of Home Affairs Eugene Louw. It was alleged to have published "subversive statements".

In its three-year existence, "New Nation" was suspended for two months, its editor, Zwelakhe Sisulu (son of recently released ANC leader Walter Sisulu), was held for two years and then severely restricted, and its acting editor was before the courts for contravening the emergency regulations.

The ACAG claims that well over 100 journalists were arrested in 1989 and "at least" 31 incidents of official censorship occurred.

For foreign journalists, the censorship and emergency laws governing the media have proved a minefield. But they were effective for the last four years in limiting reports of apartheid violence and shaping news coverage attitudes and ignorance in the West.

The first restrictions stripped overseas television screens of images of violence and curtailed reports of unrest in newspapers and magazines. Coverage became more and more muted.

Newspapers began carrying fewer stories on their front pages. A survey of the three most influential dailies in the U.S.,"The New York Times", the "Washington Post" and the "Los Angeles Times", indicated that their coverage had been reduced to less than half after 1986.

For television it was even worse -- or better if you were a white South African politician -- most major networks virtually shut down their coverage.

The "New York Times" bureau chief in Johannesburg was expelled for his coverage and his successor refused a visa. Other correspondents have also been expelled or threatened. "The fact is that the regulations invoke a lot of self-censorship," says Michael Getler, assistant managing editor for foreign news of the "Washington Post".

According to human rights groups around the world, the media restrictions resulted in cooling a mounting tide of outrage at the violent scenes of police clubbing and tear-gassing unarmed civilians and children.

The principal reason for the ban on taking pictures or making sound recordings of the violence was to keep anti-apartheid violence off Western television screens. South African officials and news executives say the restrictions were almost totally effective.

Journalists are cautiously hopeful of de Klerk's partial lifting of the emergency laws but, as an editorial in the daily pro-government paper *The Citizen* pointed out, it's still publishing on the old adage of "when in doubt [about laws], leave it out."

CULTURE and SPORT

Culture in South Africa cannot be separated from the reality of apartheid which is organically linked to the concept of superior and inferior races. Thus, apartheid culture is a culture of division which ultimately stunts the cultural development of all races. It bankrupts rather than enriches.

Apartheid true believers create a culture of inferiority because the Afrikaner believed that the purity of the white race - a concept not unlike that of the Nazis - could only be preserved by isolation from the majority race and repression is needed to preserve that isolation.

This isolation, preserved as it is by hundreds, if not thousands of laws, not only isolates the minority race from others within South Africa, but also isolates the white race from other cultures throughout the world, except perhaps those tiny minorities of ideologues.

For example, Conservative Party leader Andries Treurnicht advocates the complete separation of Afrikaners from all other ethnic groups, including English-speaking South Africans. It is impossible for culture, by even the broadest definitions, to thrive in this kind of atmosphere.

The Group Areas Act has segregated cultural activities since 1965 and Blacks are barred from "any place of entertainment" in areas designated as white.

In reality, however, since African culture is regarded as both inferior and temporary, there are almost no cultural or recreational facilities provided in black areas. Despite this, or perhaps because of it, a vibrant and challenging alternative culture expressing the aspirations of the majority has sprung up in music, theatre, the visual arts, literature and dance.

Because apartheid has segregated culture, forcing the majority to develop its own expressions, it has become an important weapon in the struggle for national liberation. Culture, as a weapon of struggle, has been used in two ways -- punitive and developmental.

Organizations such as the ANC have been calling for the cultural isolation of the apartheid regime. This has resulted in the listing of persons who participate in any cultural activity with South Africa. These boycotts are supported by the Organization of African Unity, the Non-Aligned Movement, the United Nations and anti-apartheid groups and governments around the world.

At the developmental level, the majority have created organizations and encouraged individuals to reflect their history and hopes. Alternative publications, drama, film, books, art express this alternative -- some would argue mainstream -- culture.

The government over the years has reacted in two basic ways: one, is to spend enormous amounts of money to lure Western "stars", particularly in film and music -- as well as sports (see below) -- to South Africa; and secondly by enforcing one of the most stringent censorship codes in the world aimed at suppressing the culture of resistance. Anything which the government perceives as opposition to its policies is banned.

Book-banning under the Publications Act has been rampant but censors can ban any "publication or object, film, public entertainment or intended entertainment" without hearing evidence or giving reasons.

The all-powerful arbiter of everything South Africans see, hear or read is the Directorate of Publications. It has banned such books as *Black Beauty* and writers like John Steinbeck, Ernest Hemingway, and Nadine Gordimer. Most black writers and artists have had their work banned. Even T-shirts and posters have been removed from circulation.

Hundreds of films have been banned under a system of ad hoc committees established by the Directorate who must see "all films intended to be exhibited in public" and approve them. Grounds for rejection are dealing too explicitly with sex, violence and politics. A play can be banned long before it is staged simply on the basis of its script.

There are estimated to be at least 1,000 ad hoc committees, any of which can ban any cultural expression, either domestic or imported. The decisions cannot be appealed but a review can be considered after two years. Banning can be requested by any member of the public, a customs officer or the directorate itself. It is generally estimated that customs officials submit more than 80 percent of "objectionable" materials.

Political books and cultural material are especially suspect. Books written by or about such noted African leaders as Samora Machel, Julius Nyerere and Kenneth Kaunda have all been banned.

Since de Klerk announced the unbanning of the ANC and other political organizations the Directorate, which usually bases its decisions on the prevailing political climate -- despite protestations that its actions are independent -- has been inundated with queries from artists, writers and filmmakers to know if their material is going to be unbanned.

The Directorate, following de Klerk's lead, has lifted the ban on such ANC publications as *Sechaba* and the SACP's *The African*

Communist could soon be on the newsstands. On the other hand lawyers say a review of every banned piece of cultural material may have to grind through the whole process again.

What censorship analysts say is that the faceless, nameless people who set the moral and political tone of the Directorate's secret censorship committees must be changed before any real benefit for the cultural community can be assured.

Contradictions abound. Nelson Mandela's book, *No Easy Walk to Freedom* has been unbanned but the film *No Easy Road to Freedom*about Namibian independence is banned. The film *Cry Freedom* was approved, seized by the police and then released back to its distributors. Now it can be seen in South African cinemas.

But, so long as the State of Emergency exists and the Internal Security Act is unamended there can be little hope of dramatic changes in the Directorate or its archaic and conservative censorship committees.

A recent tour of South Africa by a "rebel" British cricket team led by Mike Gatting cost hundreds of injuries inflicted by police on demonstrators, R4 million and placed the South Africa Cricket Union (SACU) firmly within the apartheid institution along with about 90 percent of organised sport.

The controversial tour lasted for eight weeks. It played tests and regular games against the wishes of the majority and the anti-apartheid movement in Britain. Violence broke out time and again as police smashed demonstrators protesting what one newspaper called "this immoral mercenary cricket tour."

Krish Naidoo, general secretary of the National Sports Congress (NSC), which is affiliated with the Mass Democratic Movement, says the tour represents a "microcosm of their broad struggle in South Africa."

He wrote that no amount of justification would enable the SACU to evade the point that the rebel tour was an act of racism, "immoral and intended to serve a predominantly white constituency at a very high financial and political premium to the country."

Naidoo accuses the SACU of being prepared to "squander millions of rand from state coffers for their rebel tour while a vast chasm exists between sports facilities for the different population groups and billions of rand will be required to equalise opportunities for the oppressed people and to improve their living standards.

There are probably few countries which are as sports-conscious as South Africa, particularly among the privileged white population.

Technically sport is multi-racial but under the Group Areas Act while the races may play on the same team or against one another,

permits are required, facilities like clubhouses are segregated and blacks can be refused admission.

Teams from racially segregated schools do sometimes play against each other though this often requires the prior permission of every parent of every child due to compete. Essentially as long as schools are segregated - and as noted above education is not about to be integrated - sports will remain segregated.

But under the various laws and distribution of public funding, the inequalities soon become evident.

For example 330,000 people live in the Natal townships of Umlazi and Lamontville. They share six soccer fields, seven tennis courts and two swimming pools. The 212,000 whites who live in Durban municipality share 146 soccer venues and 15 swimming pools.

A government survey found that white schools nationally had 72 percent of all school sports facilities. Whites have exclusive access to 73 percent of all athletic tracks, 83 percent of swimming pools and 82 percent of rugby fields. Whites also control 92 percent of golf courses and 84 percent of cricket fields.

While sports are integrated in theory and, under the law, sports participants of all colours have equal access to teams at club, provincial and national levels -- even the Springbok colours are awarded on merit in theory -- other apartheid legislation virtually guarantees little black participation.

Naidoo says 90 percent of sponsorship money goes to white sport. Government spending on sport, according to the South Africa Institute of Race Relations, is roughly R8 million each for whites and blacks, despite the fact there are over five times as many blacks. This is an improvement over 1983 when spending on school sport was R9.84 for white children and less than half-a-cent for African children.

South Africa has also gone to extreme lengths to circumvent international campaigns to isolate it from the rest of the sports world such as setting aside millions of rands for tours like the Gatting cricket tour and the infamous 1981 New Zealand tour.

But rebel tours not only place the country and sports outside international competition (it cannot participate in the Olympics for example), it portrays to young black and white youth the image of sport not as a matter of high ideals and competition but of another degrading aspect of apartheid which wants to become respectable without changing its essentials.

Indeed, a microcosm of the broad issues facing South Africa today.