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MEMORANDUM FOR DISCUSSION WITH MR B WALLETT, MR H BEIER, MR J POHL
MS R GREALEY AND MR J BRYCE <igh
FROM THE NATAL CHAMBER OF INDUSTRIES
BY MANGOSUTHU G. BUTHELEZI, CHIEF MINISTER OF KWAZULU
AND PRESIDENT OF INKATHA
ULUNDI. 18TH OCTOBER 1989

I welcome every one of you to Ulundi. I am always so pleased when
people come to see me here because it is here that I *most. can
ensure the hospitality which makes for relaxed discussion even on
difficult issues. I have always seen the free enterprise system
for South Africa's future and I have always seen the
stry making a positive contribution not only to the
development of the eÃ©conomy but when acting as opinion makers who
read the writing on the wall, the wider socio political
development of the country.

I have often noted that in our fear-laden South African atmosphere
it lis when people act out of concerns for their vested interests
that they are most predictable. A political Party does not really
have a change of heart. but bt sis very
difficulti at i i i i will
short-llived, i i i

Whether or
not the of industry have changes of heart becomes
immaterial to me when directors, managers and shareholders shift
direction. South Africa is now passing through a MeEY: oyl tryeail
phase of its history and the shifts that have taken place in
mining, commerce, banking and industry will not only endure but
will have to be s trengthened because they are shifts for survival.

I preface my remarks on violence in the bhroad Kwazulu/Natal region
thus because I â\200\230want you all to understand that I greatly value the
support that I have always received from organised mining, commerce
and industry and I have always greatly valued the natural
Partnership llinks - albeit at times latent - which exist be tween
business and Inkatha because Inkatha's aims and objectives have
always been aims and objectives which organised wining, commerce
and industry have upheld and indeed striven fors

We are not on different sides of a problem. We are both on the
same side of the problem. There is a problem of violence in the
KwaZulu/Natal region: - ltiis hurting you and you can believe me, it
is hurting me far more i I more than
black leader i i m i to

bring about changes that even vyou, Madam,
Gentlemen, want through non-violent tactics and strategies.

We entered a new period of South African history in the mid-1970's. The disillusionment with politicians in exile led to an internal political ferment. Business was not as politically aware in the 1970's as it now is and was not aware of the extent to which Black South Africa was taking up positions on both sides of the violence issue. There were militant developments in the then dominant organisations - the Black People's Convention and SASO, and there was the development of the Black Consciousness philosophy on the one hand. On the other hand there was the emergence and development of Inkatha and a, to the outsider, imperceptible clustering around of any local leadership which sought to move away from the kind of political confrontations leading to the violence that would add to the upward spiralling of political violence.

Then there was June 16th 1976 and its aftermath. Inkatha came out with its flag nailed to the mast of non-violent tactics and

strategies and we were battered because of it. At that time there was the whole fan-fare politics of media-created unrealistic expectations. BPC leaders and Black Consciousness spokesmen were

predicting the collapse of the South African Government within 18 months and my complete political demise in the process that would ensure this collapse. Mr. Steve Biko made a public statement that I should abandon what I was doing and step into a black leadership position on this new front of billowing confrontation, and he and the rest of South Africa would follow me. I knew then that I could indeed do this.

During the same period there were discussions between Inkatha, BPC and ANC and ANC was putting immense pressure on me to take up a prominent national position of leadership in developing the unrest situation into a situation in which there was a full revolutionary potential. This but in the context of their planning and their decision-making. It would have been possible for me to emerge applauded as a national leader and fully supported by the whole exile movement. I mention this beginning period of Inkatha because I said no to Steve Biko and his offer, and I said no to ANC and I did not say no to them because I was divisive. I said no to them because I envisaged the hideous long run of violence which their tactics and strategies was committing South Africa to and I said no because I knew in the end violent attacks on the South African

Government would only make the Government stronger where it was attacked most.

After the abortive last-ditch attempt to reason with the ANC in London in October 1979 an orchestrated and co-ordinated attack on Inkatha commenced and I was given no hope whatsoever of surviving the black political opposition to my commitment to non-violence and my commitment to change through negotiations and my commitment to a free enterprise system in a multi-party democracy.

Ever since 1979 I have been burying my dead in Inkatha. People have died defending their right to belong to Inkatha and they have died at the hands of those who are publicly committed, privately committed, nationally committed, internationally committed and committed in political principle and philosophy, to bring about change in South Africa through killing. The ANC had made the armed struggle the means of bringing about change in South Africa.

The ANC in its efforts to escalate violence weekly exhorted Black South Africans, and particularly our youth, to kill, kill and kill again for political purposes. You Madam, Gentlemen really should read, say, the 1980-1984 weekly broadcasts of Radio Freedom in which the ANC voice - beamed to South Africa - exhorted people in South Africa to do exactly what has been happening in Natal during the last two years.

During this period of ANC heightened propaganda for violence, the UDF was launched and at its very opening ceremony, Inkatha was singled out as an organisation in their enemy camp. It was in this period that COSATU was launched and again, at its opening ceremony, there was a declaration of war on Inkatha by Mr. Elijah Barayi.

The public sometimes has a very short-lived memory of what were important political announcements. The UDF began gathering its support in the left political spectrum under the banner of a commitment to make South Africa ungovernable. The ANC during this period exhorted civilians to band themselves together and then turned to promoting the concept of a "people's war." There was common purpose when you read both together. The ungovernability of South Africa commences with making black townships ungovernable and attempts to do so were deliberately planned so that there would be a basis for the spread of violence into white areas and into mining, commerce and industry.

The ANC, the UDF and COSATU consulted and planned with each other to annihilate me and Inkatha politically because I insisted on non-violent tactics and strategies, I insisted on a multi-party democracy and refused to have anything to do with tactics and strategies which would deepen the alienation of man to man in this country in such a way there finally would only be scorched earth policy meeting scorched earth policy.

The bitterness of attacks against me and Inkatha increased as every prediction of my political enemies made about Inkatha proved wrong. In 1976 I was not even given six months before I would be totally isolated, and as violence spread and spread ever further afield from Soweto and as more and more violent band-wagons got under way, there were more and more predictions of my political demise. Yet in 1976, 77, 78 and 79 Inkatha grew and continued to grow, and doubled and continued to re-double its membership.

It is a fact that Inkatha is the largest political constituency ever to have emerged in the history of South Africa. I am of course talking about an organisation which has been put together by the hard, back-breaking grind of membership recruitment. I am not talking about affiliate organisations in which three out of five members of a committee say yes and their organisation of some thousands of members are suddenly claimed to be new members of the UDF or COSATU.

I am also talking about Inkatha as an integrated whole in which members actually do themselves determine policy, vet leadership which they themselves appoint and hold accountable to Inkatha's Annual General Conferences. I took seriously Mr. Oliver Tambo's message to me during the first years of Inkatha's existence that I must not make the mistake that ANC made of stinting on hard work on the ground to put together a leadership-heavy organisation which had no real organisational base amongst the people.

Inkatha is attacked because I have shown ordinary Blacks rallying around symbols and flags which stand for the things that can unite not only Blacks but can unite Blacks, Whites, Indians and Coloureds. There will be the politics of negotiation and if there is going to be a future worth having in South Africa, it will be achieved through negotiations. Inkatha will be there at the negotiating table, negotiating positions which it first adopted as far back as 1976. We are an unshakeable reality and this is what so galls so many leaders who speak about themselves as "true" leaders and have grandiose dreams of returning from exile as part of a government come home in a one-Party State.

There has been a battle for minds around very fundamental issues in Black politics ever since 1976. It is a battle that has raged and in which there has been hideous extravagances of violence and counter-violence.

I have never claimed that no member of Inkatha has not been an aggressor. All I say is that no decision Inkatha has made as Inkatha that I know of has ever been a decision to adopt violence as a political weapon. I want to pause here and point something out that I would like you, Madam, Gentlemen to think about very seriously.

In black townships and in the normally adjoining huge squatter areas and informal settlements, there simply has to be at least that level of normality in the free flow of people in and out of townships and the transportation of goods into townships otherwise people cannot go to work, food cannot be transported into shops and people starve just because they have no money and there is no food to' by The closer positions come to this minimal level, the more

the backlash potential of a black community arises. You cannot stop buses, transport, stop people from going to work and deny people the right to find the cash to buy the food needed for life itself and hope that you are doing something that can last very long.

Every time comrade action has produced a threat to this minimal normality I am talking about, there have been backlashes by ordinary people. These ordinary people will include people who normally support the UDF, COSATU and Inkatha. It is a people's backlash. Yet every time there is this backlash, I am blamed for orchestrating vigilantes who are seen as opposed to the UDF, COSATU and the ANC. Every time violence between Black and Black flares because people are desperate, the UDF and COSATU blame me. Every time there is a collapse of ill-conceived tactics and strategies which can only finally be defeated by this backlash, I am blamed for siding with the oppressor.

I make the point that only the politically gullible can really believe that Inkatha's growth rests on its ability to coerce people to become members. This is the politics of intimidation which is normally found among those committed most to violence. If it was possible to gain the kind of membership that Inkatha has by using the tactics and strategies that are attributed to me, you can be quite sure that revolutionary organisations and those who support them for whom violence is justified, would long since have used these methods as their own and would have long since developed membership-based organisations much larger than Inkatha. They do not employ them because they cannot work. I do not employ them because they cannot work and yet even normally intelligent people, and sometimes even well-meaning people, believe that Inkatha rests on intimidatory violence.

Sure, Inkatha will not be driven out of political business by violence whether it be the violence of the State or the violence of any black opposition group. Sure, Inkatha's members have defended themselves. What would you do if a band of 30 odd people broke into your house in the small hours of the morning carrying a tyre to put around your wife's neck?

When violence sweeps through a township it is not only the political activist who become embroiled in it and it is not only political violence that we need to talk about. There is revenge violence and there is blood-feud violence which is personalised and has nothing to do with organisation decision-making. And in our situation of mass poverty, criminal violence rides on the back of political violence. Once you put a match to the violent tinder it becomes ever more all-consuming.

To curb violence now in the KwaZulu/Natal region we will have to do a lot more than sit down as an Inkatha, UDF/COSATU committee and say nice things. I have declared a moratorium on continuing talks in which we say nice things and do not deal with real issues. I have not abandoned peace initiatives. I have simply said there are some issues which are prior issues which we need to deal with. I have said, Madam, Gentlemen, let us stop and deal with them because if we do not deal with them, there will be no peace.

I want to move sure-footedly from one firm position to another in a genuine attempt to bring about an end to violence. I, wmore than anybody else, want violence to be eliminated in this KwaZulu/Natal region. I really do believe that Mr. F.W. de Klerk is beginning to move in the right direction towards weaningful negotiations. The less violence there is in the KwaZulu/Natal region, the better it will be for negotiations.

I wost of all want black politics normalised. It now really Iis only a matter of time before Dr. Nelson Mandela is released from jail. A whole new ball-game is starting in which internal politics is going to jump by octaves into high-pitched urgency. The more we normalise black politics, the more productive the release of political prisoners will become.

Madam, Gentlemen, I am actually not very good at planning and perpetuating violence. I aloathes ity I have deep Christian commi tments against the use of violence for political purposes. I am far better dealing in the nuances of the politics of negotiation than I would be in the technical business of planting bombs and killing people. I am far better at building up a negotiating time and developing a spirit of comradeship based on intellectual understanding and emotional commitments to peace, Jjustice and prosperity, than I would be in welding killer comrades into some kind of spear for what ultimately would become a one-Party, socialist State.

Madam, Gentlemen, I really have reached the point where I do not junp to it every time somebody tells me that somebody else has smashed my name. There is a sense in which the Buthelezi battering which excites some and agitates others just makes wme very, very bored. You will have sensed irritation in my response to your request for a meeting today. I just get so irritated with having to answer strings of questions because people put on their gullible garb when they listen to ANC/UDF/COSATU propaganda.

Having listened to propaganda, people come to me with minds already made up and ask me to explain myselfto them. T amyguEssnot prepared to do so any more. People must form their judgements and if they want to applaud when I am tried and hanged by a media which is both prosecutor and defence, Jjudge and jury rolled into one, then they must feel free to do so. The time has come to attend to

priorities and all this politicking around on the Buthelezi-bashing stage only detracts from real issues.

I had a sober reminder of the extent to which there is in fact bigotry among leading personalities in commerce and industry even in this region where people ought to know me better than they apparently do, when I dealt with the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce last year. The Chamber had become involved in attempting to act as mediator between Inkatha and the UDF/COSATU and I had to take strong exception to the Chamber's Manager, Mr. Paul van Uytrecht whom the New York Times quoted as saying: "Inkatha warlords had tried to enforce loyalty to the Zulu group at schools, hospitals and work places, even insisting that disaster relief after floods in October be channelled exclusively through its hands." He also said: "Over a period of time communities that were not politicised have begun turning spontaneously against Inkatha. Now things have swung in a way that is very unsatisfactory to Inkatha, and they may in fact be left with very little."

I subsequently had discussions with people from the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce, accompanied by Mr. A. Rogoff, the President of Associated Chamber of Commerce. Mr. Rogoff later put in writing to me: "We, in ASSOCOM, were most distressed to read of the quotes from Mr. van Uytrecht in the New York Times and I have discussed the matter with ASSOCOM's Board of Management. Let me state quite categorically that we in ASSOCOM disassociate ourselves completely from the remarks attributed to Mr. van Uytrecht. We feel that they were totally uncalled for and were a serious breach of the 'honest broker' role being played by the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce." Mr. Rogoff went on to say: "ASSOCOM recognises the vital role that you [meaning me] are playing in upholding the free enterprise system and in seeking a solution to South Africa's problems through peaceful negotiation and dialogue and has a positive attitude towards the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba."

I simply go through exercises to reach such endings to beginnings in which I am expected to defend myself against views imbibed by businessmen when they become all things to all people to buy insurance policies against UDF/COSATU problems at factory floor level.

The peace talks which I say I wisely put on hold while we attend to the things that would scuttle them, must go on. I am therefore appalled that UDF/COSATU have now come out in a press statement to again make me the villain of the peace. They are now contending publicly that I have kept raising obstacles in order to scuttle peace talks. The facts of the matter are that I am attempting only to remove the things that will make a happy ending to peace negotiations totally impossible. If they take time to deal with, then we must take the time that is necessary. For me peace talks are not a public relations exercise.

I will do what I am doing because people are dying around me and I will continue doing what is best for those who have not yet died, even if I incur the political penalties -of global media condemnation. What the UDF/COSATU does not tell the world in its press statement accusing me of scuttling the peace initiatives, is that even before Archbishop Hurley first approached me in March this year about the need for a peace initiative, I knew that the ANC/UDF/COSATU were going to attempt to mount a peace initiative to trap me politically.

I have now disclosed this knowledge to the media. I have disclosed that on the 27th February 1989 a meeting was held in Lusaka which included ANC National Executive members. At this meeting Mr. Oliver Tambo, Mr. Thabo Mbeki, Mr. Joshua Jele, Mr. Steve Stuart, Mr. Joe Slovo, Mr. Alfred Nzo, Mr. John Nkandimeng and Aziz Pahad and Chris Ndwalane met with UDF/COSATU representatives. A peace initiative was discussed as a means of consolidating the UDF/COSATU as organisations. The initiative would be pursued knowing that I could not resist their call for peace because if I did so, I would be rejected by my international friends. The peace initiative that was discussed was outlined as one in which there would be convenors of a peace initiative and facilitators would be selected.

The whole approach discussed in Lusaka is seen in the proposal which Archbishop Hurley wrote to me about seeking my support for a peace conference. He too talked about convenors / facilitators and the outline of his proposal clearly came from the Lusaka meeting. COSATU later did admit having discussions with the ANC about a peace initiative,

I must therefore be excused for being somewhat jaundiced when the peace initiative was presented to me as an all innocent thing welling up in the hearts of concerned citizens. Madam, Gentlemen, this is the real world of politics in which there is a raging battle for minds. From the outset the peace initiatives had been mounted in a highly party political context by the UDF/COSATU.

I am handing you today the transcript of a press conference given by Mr. Thabo Mbeki in Copenhagen on the 27th June this year. This was quite some time after peace initiatives had been promoted and after the first press statement had been issued following the joint Inkatha, UDF/COSATU discussions on the 19th June. It was also made long before there was any halt in the progress that we began making in the Inkatha and UDF/COSATU discussions. You will see from the transcript that Mr. Mbeki says: "The daily task he [meaning me] carries out is to administer the section of the South African apartheid system as the head of KwaZulu Bantustan." He says: "Buthelezi has never been leader of the six, seven, eight million. The Zulu people have got a King. If you look at the traditional structures of the Zulu people, as a Zulu King, who could say in traditional terms, 'I am the leader of so many Zulus.' Gatsha Buthelezi is a minor chief. In the traditional structure there is

no way in which he can claim that he is the leader of the six million:Â®

Mr. Mbeki also said: "Buthelezi has never been elected by anybody to be Chief Minister of the KwaZulu Bantustan. He was appointed by Pretoria." And adds: "Now Buthelezi cannot claim to be a representative of the Zulu people." Mr. Mbeki said: "But as I say, his place and his activities would define him as part of the de Klerk administration unless he acts in a way which defines him."

There is now a South African Congress of Trade Union tract which oozes vitriol against me in which it is said I have "become Vlok's surrogate in killing our people in Natal." The tract says: "The onus is on us to neutralise Gatsha once and for all, the snake that is poisoning the people of South Africa needs to be hit on the head." For the sake of updating this record, I will give you a copy of this BACTU tract as well, :

When the UDF/COSATU press statement issued last week therefore holds me to be responsible for the breakdown in the talks between Inkatha and the UDF/COSATU on peace, they are doing a political hatchet job. Right at the outset of all discussions following Archbishop Hurley's first approach to me, I have stressed that

killing talk must stop. Songs swearing at me and denigrating me are still being sung at UDF/COSATU rallies and meetings.

At the re-internment of Paramount-Chief Sabata Dalindyebo's mortal remains in Transkei on the 11st of this month, in the presence of the ' President of the UDF - Mr. Archie Gumede, @ their Publicity Secretary - Mr. Murphy Morobe, Mr. Elijah Barayi - the President of COSATU and Mr. Jay Naidoo - the General Secretary of COSATU, I was publicly denigrated through these kind of filthy songs. No one amongst this top-brass of the UDF/COSATU alliance even as much as batted one eyelid on hearing my name being denigrated in their presence. The words of the song that was sung are: "When Umkhonto returns and Mandela comes out of prison Gatsha will be forced to cross the seas into exile."

I challenge anyone to quote one song that is sung by Inkatha members which denigrates any leader of whatever organisation. One of course can see that these people do not know Zulu history and forget that the warrior blood of Kings and Zulu war generals courses in my veins. If they dream that any of the events that they quote can force me into going into exile, then they better go and re-read their Zulu history. It is known that I have been top on hit lists of some political organisations for some years now. Let them know that I will die here on South African soil and that I have never been a yes-man of the Heads of State of this country, who in military terms are more powerful than any other Head of State on the continent of Africa.

I will not now in the twilight of my years be a yes-man to any other 'kaffir' - whoever he may be, and whatever happens. I respect other leaders and it does not matter who they are, but I will be no political bag carrier to any one of them. All these things amount to war talk as you can see for yourselves. You must understand my disgust when people ignore all these facts and come here after swallowing the propaganda of my political enemies to - regurgitate the pack of lies that my political enemies spout and ignore a history which has happened in front of their eyes and the role I have played fearlessly in the interests of peace and reconciliation in South Africa.

I am not imagining that there are black leaders and organisations who wish me dead like the hundreds of Inkatha members that they have killed. At Robert Sobukwe's funeral in 1978, in Graaff-Reinet an attempt on my life was made in broad daylight. Some Transkei leaders publicly applauded the effort to kill me. We are talking about very serious matters here - we are talking about life and death which are the very guts of black politics in this country, and which no one who is not Black can ever even begin to understand.

It is no use the UDF/COSATU pretending that there are no real obstacles which would make any further blythe continuation of our peace discussions futile,. I have written to Mr. Oliver Tambo declaring the need for us to meet. He must have received this letter before he became ill and did not reply to it. e 318, however, on his desk and Mr. Alfred Nzo as acting President should have acted on it or at least acknowledged it. ANC is party to the violence and must therefore be party to the peace initiative. I cannot go ahead without an indication from them in one or another direct communication.

I find having to say all these things very painful. I no longer want to have to sit down and explain myself and defend myself. There is a problem with violence; there is a problem in bringing violence to an end. We should be talking about that problem.

Madam, Gentlemen, in your letter suggesting this meeting you say: "Our official sources insist that we must speak to you urgently because the UDF are certainly painting a picture of Inkatha being responsible for the breakdown of the peace talks." I was going to commence this meeting asking what your response to this information from the UDF was when it was given to you. I was going to ask you whether you expressed total indignation or whether you have come here because you are persuaded the UDF is correct. On further thought, however, I decided that I must present you with some facts and impressions before I ask these questions. I now ask. In conclusion: Did you actually come here believing that the UDF is correct and that I am the villain of the peace? ;

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PRESS CONFERENCE ON THE 27 JUNE 1989: THABO MBEKI FROM THE ANC

This press conference with Mr. Thabo Mbeki, director of international affairs and chief representative in Denmark of the ANC/Mr. Aron Mnisi. Before the questions, HI. Thabo Mbeki has a word.

THABO MBEKI

Let me start by saying why we are in Denmark. We thought we should come to try and familiarize ourselves with the position of the Danish government on issues of South Africa and Southern Africa and of course to discuss with the Danish government the current situation as it affects the region of Southern Africa as well of course as to meet non-governmental organizations dealing with Southern African questions as well as this anti-apartheid movement. So I hope I am going to get the names right. So we had a meeting with Mr. Otto Møller: permanent under-secretary of Foreign Affairs: and some other people at Foreign Affairs: had a meeting with Mr. Bent Baakonsen: under secretary of State of International Development Cooperation: and some people there: as I was saying: as well as other representatives of non-governmental organizations dealing with South Africa including DanChurch Aid:, the Danish Association for International Co-operation: the World University Service: International Department of the Labour Movement: the Anti-apartheid Movement etc.

I think, the first thing I would like to say is: we were very pleased with the positions that the government of Denmark is taking on the issue of the isolation of the apartheid issue.

On the issues of isolation of the apartheid regime, we think that the measures that have been adopted by Denmark to impose sanctions are very good, and require emulation by other countries. It's clear of course that we're committed at the time to monitor the implementation of the law: to ensure that the purpose of the sanctions is achieved. I think the other point which was important was the effect of the commitment of the Danish government to continue to extend humanitarian assistance to the ANC, generally to the people of South Africa. We are very pleased with the commitment to continue that assistance and to the extent that it's possible to meet the increasing need for that humanitarian assistance. I think it's a very pleasing task yesterday to participate in the more or less opening of our new office. We're shifting from one set of rooms to another set of rooms to a much larger office and of course that has been made possible by assistance extended by the Danish government. to the ANC to maintain and run that

office. That was a very good thing that we had this assistance now from the Danish government to run our office in Copenhagen.

I mentioned a few things with regard to the current situation as I said, . I thought was necessary that we need to discuss some elements of the current situation of Southern Africa. And the first then is Namibia.

We are very concerned, very concerned that the Namibia process

should go through, as was visualized by the international community acting through the United Nations. I think people here know that the ANC undertook to move its military personnel out of Angola in order to ensure that the South African regime did not have any excuses not to enter into that agreement - that's an indication of our level of commitment to see to the success of this process leading to the independence of Namibia. We are very concerned that the South African regime would want to destabilize that process . in the first instance to ensure that SWAPO does not get its two-thirds majority that is required in order to approve the constitution - draw up the constitution and then approve it. And also the South African regime. will be interested in destabilizing that situation precisely in order to ensure that majority rule, one person one vote, doesn't work. It leads to chaos. And that way they would be interested to produce that chaos and so that we were very keen to discuss that matter with the Danish government, so that we can contribute whatever it can particularly since it has contributed to the UNTAG forces to make its best contribution to ensure that the process goes with a smoothness and a stability which obviously both SWAPO and the international community would like to see. I think our own sense that the Danish government is itself committed to play its role within the context of those UN decisions, it will assist Namibia's transition to independence as quickly as possible.

Of course the other question is the visit of Frederik de Klerk

to Western Europe - to England, West Germany and Portugal.

It's clear, that what de Klerk is doing he's going around Europe carrying a bag full of promises. He's promising to change things: he's promising that he wants to move away from apartheid . In part clearly he's trying to raise his prestige within his own constituency in the period leading up to the white elections in September, the tricameral elections in September. And in part: of course: he's worried about the distinct possibility of new sanctions against apartheid South Africa and that he wants to go around to promise change. But of course there is a reality about the South African situation whatever de Klerk might be saying in terms of promising that things are going to change. The reality is that: instead, the state of emergency was renewed this year and this is a demand that's been made by everybody that the state of emergency must be lifted.,

whatever promises de Klerk is making about the future.

The defence budget this year was increased by about 25% so again: despite these promises de Klerk is making, the fact of

the matter is that they are continuing to try to increase their military strength or the southern African GLM, of the RuURpcses of peace for the purposes of war and for the purpose of oppression at home and for the purpose of aggression in the region.

" In the last seven days, I think., you have at least three bombs going off in Lusaka our headquarters in Zambia a Zambian has been killed by a bomb which was placed in the middle of town: in a place that had absolutely nothing to do with the ARC. Clearly it was just an open act of terror to intimidate the zambian population, to say why do you allow the ARC to stay in your town. Chuck them out. If you don't, they are going to place these bombs. It's just an open and straight act of terror. Two of our places in Lusaka were attacked: one of our people was seriously injured in one case and one of our offices was seriously damaged so I'm saying is that whatever de Klerk is promising as he goes around Europe: the reality in South Africa is increasing and continuing oppression. It's preparations for more aggression: for more repressions its attacks will continue for the destabilisation of Southern Africa. And therefore: we wanted to make the point to the Danish government that it's very important that the international community should not allow

itself to be used by de Klerk to try to break out of international isolations because in the substance nothing is happening in South Africa that indicates change. Mandela is still in prison and other of his people.

With regard to the September elections of course that's one of the issues that de Klerk gives: as a reason that they're going to have elections on September sixth, and that it's only after those elections that it will be possible for him to move. But of course, the point about that, those elections too: that you are removing an apartheid parliament. The South Africa tricameral parliament excludes 75% of the population of our country. And they are having elections on the sixth of September to perpetuate apartheid institution. It cannot therefore be that we look to that institution as an agent of change - it's part of the problem.

It's one of the things that would need to be removed in terms of changing South Africa. One of the issues of course that is bothering de Klerk a great deal, is a problem of the rescheduling of the South African debt. This tax has to be changed next year: and a lot of discussion has started already about this matter. And the South African economy is in a very desperate state; there are very serious problems. And they are very interested that the banks should reschedule these debts with the most favourable terms and possibly extend new loans to South Africa. So that's part of the reason why de Klerk isn't promising change to give an assurance to the international banking committee that changes

may come: and that they 'should be reassured' that their money in South Africa will be safe, because we are going away from apartheid.

They did the same thing in 1986 when they made a debt reschedule and floated very strongly that Nelson Mandela was going to be

released and so on -~ and in order to create a climate where the banks could reschedule under the most favourable terms for pretoria; and yet there is the same thing now. In 1986 Mandela was supposed to be released and now Mandela is still in prison. They're doing the same now Bay itira point which the anti-apartheid movement, particularly within the European Community

is taking with a great deal of vigour.

One other point of course was of interest to us was that the European Community had a meeting on the 12th of June with a frontline foreign ministers were asking for new sanctions against apartheid within the context of the EC., and therefore as I think you know the EC ministers said: "Let's give de Klerk a chance; let's not impose any new matters now; let's wait until after the end of the year. Give him a chance to go through the elections: to take over as 2 president and then sort it out." OF course that's a matter of concern to us we would have thought-like the frontline states: that it was necessary to continue the pressure, because they see nothing has changed in terms of the continuation of the apartheid system; that it was important to adopt additional matters: but anyway that position was not accepted by the EC; and they did say give de Klerk a chance. SO it's of interest to us that the EC ought to be discussing

now that if de Klerk does not do these things which they expect him to do the release of political prisoners: the end of the state of emergency and so on. If de Klerk doesn't do those things = we think that the EC ought to stand ready and to impose further measures. And hence during these six months with Inance as president of the EC. We think that it would be important that some consensus does develop within the EC; so that when time comes to act: they are able to act and don't have to waste more time in the future debating what they ought to do given that de Klerk would not fulfil whatever their demands are.

It's a question obviously I could discuss with the Danish government obviously I could not discuss it with other members of the EC, but having said give de Klerk a chance. If he doesn't use that chance to produce his results that everybody else demands: what is the EC then going to do? We think that's an important point.-

And the last point HMr. chairman: I want to make is of course being here in Denmark: being part of the Nordic countries We took advantage of that to have a bit of a consultation with the ANC diplomatic corps in the region: SO we had a meeting

with the representatives of the ANC in Stockholm: in Oslo: in Helsinki and of course in Denmark Just to have a look at the

regionr and how~it's going. Sor that's all, I said this afternoon.

I thank your MC. Mbeki. â\200\224 &And now questionS....-. shall ve debate? :

Question 1

Yes: on May 15, Mr Adrian Vlok: minister of law and order made a proposal hnd offered all members of the ARC to come back safely to South Africar if they were not involved in terrorism. How was this considered by the ANC?

Answer

First of all, the ANC is banned in South africa. Ik's an illegal organization. 500v what is the ANC supposed to do returning to spa? I don't know, because immediately they land. they are subject to arrest. There are people who are serving long sentences in South Africar who were charged with membership of the ANC, not activity;; not that you set off a .bomb somewhere Or distributed a document. That's mere membership. Charged with treason and sentenced. So for Vlok to say the ANC nust come backr F-gonâ\200\231t . know. They must remove the ban on the ARC. Very important persons in the leadership of the ANC are in prison: pandela, Sisulu and others. Aand everybodyr everybody: including Reaganr when he was there, and the Pope and everybodyr they said that these people must be released. If Vlok wants to address the issue of the ANC people coming back, why don't they release those ones who are there? (garbled) They live with them and each other you ought to release those people. No, it was 2 dishonest offer. It had no seriousness to it at all. Everybody has demanded as I said the release of political prisoners &as one of the things that could create a better climate for a political solution cf the South African question. And all that is happening in South Africa is, instead of prisoners being released, the population of political prisoners is increasing. If Vlok really wanted +o address the issues, 1 8aY those are the things, we have to a4 Yaft the 'bfu-on the ANC and other banned organisations: There is nobody in the ANC who suddenly is going to stand up and say, I abandon the armed struggle. We can abandon the armed struggle when the conditions which necessitated that armed struggle remain unchanged. ..ses- Thank you. More questions?

Duestion.2:

Bave you any plans of Jaunching some kind of a oratorical campaign up to the September election, or are Yyou just going Yo ignoreait? ~

Answer:

Well, no we'll see that the struggle has to continue not directed specifically at the elections. Political struggle must continue the armed struggle must continue. They are not specifically directed at the elections. But, of course we're more settled in the political campaign for the boycott of those elections. It is part - of this political process that will take place. Well we're quite certain that there will be as in the past: an overwhelming boycott of the elections, both to the Coloured House of Representatives and to the Indian House of Delegates. There will whoever gets elected from the coloured and the Indians, will obviously get elected, and then there is a small minority through the participation of a very small minority of the population. Within the coloured population, because the boycott so it means will certainly want to encourage that campaign to ensure non-participation in those two Houses. We understand that the Democratic Party wants to participate in the elections to the white House of Assembly. Of course as I was saying: this is an apartheid institution. There is no way the ANC can approve and encourage and support the new African apartheid institution, whether it's the House of Assembly or the House of Delegates or the House of Representatives. So I'm saying: 'there's no way the ANC would want to encourage that. But do you recognise the fact that the Democratic Party might want to use this period of elections to project this democratic alternative. It is an election campaign after all; (garbled) That the Democratic Party would want to use this occasion to project this perspective of a non-racial and democratic South Africa. And it's a good thing. If they can win as many whites as is possible towards that respect for non-racial democracy. This will be a good thing. But otherwise the struggle continues. We're not conducting a struggle for the determination of the tricameral Parliament. We're conducting a struggle for the termination of apartheid. So the struggle must continue but we shall respond to the election campaign by encouraging non-participation in this apartheid institution.

Therefore no they won't, as the regime is trying to suggest: we are not looking to carry out any action specifically directed: like military actions, specifically directed at the elections.

The conduct of the armed struggle has to be directed to the removal of apartheid

More questions?

Question 3:

The Herald Tribune had an article about the situation in South Africa and it was commented that the South African government was planning to overthrow physically - some most active representatives of the ANC abroad. Could you comment on this statement?

Answer:

Yes, certainly. It seems to us that part of the response of the South African regime to its continuing crisis, has to be to stick to weakening the ANC. And so one of the things they are doing - they have been doing for some months now., It's to PGt oUE werysstrongly - & message that their divisions within the external ANC, that there is competition: and division about matters of strategy and divisions built on personal ambitions. This one wants to become a president:, another one wants to become something else - a very strong competition. It's clear to us that, in the end, the intention is then to take action: to agsase sinate members of the ANC, of the leadership of the ANC, and then to say that everybody knows that there's no conflict in the ANC, whether it's in the press or whatever: that there was conflict between this one and the other one. Just before I left Lusaka last week, there was an anonymous letter. addressed to our Commander, Joc Modise and this letter said:

Dear commanders I cannot disclose my name. But I know that Steve Tshwete who is also a member of our National Liaison Committee:, is planning to kill you on about the 16th of June. I would therefore suggest to you that maybe you should get out of Lusaka during this period. otherwise something terrible might happen to you. Of course this is a lot of nonsense, but (garbled) somebody would have said, yes we knew that action was planned by him: or (unclear) But it is clear that the regime is very keen to act against the leadership of the ANC in order to weaken the ANC. As I say: it comes from the crisis because, everything the regime has tried, the state of emergency detaining thousands of people: those bombs I was talking about in Lusaka, all of these things. They have failed to achieve this purpose of reducing the influence of the ANC, of immobilizing the people through fear or destroying democratic organizations, so that people are unable to organize themselves. All of those things, I said. So clearly: they have to do something else and it is our view that if you weaken the ANC, then you'll be able to weaken the rest of the democratic movement inside the country.

More questions?

Question 4:

In case after the elections that step forward to more democracy

in South Africa ~ release of Nelson Mandela, and if there is a chance in the actual policy of the government - are you prepared to participate to the conference in South Africa or outside South Africa with all the parties involved, including UDFs including

Chief Buthelezi and so on. &re you prepared to participate in negotiations? 0 e

ANSWER:

always been the policy of the ANC that the best solution to this conflict is a political resolution of the conflict. Over decades we've been saying this. There's in fact no prime minister of the South African regimes who has not received a letter from the ANC: why don't you sit down to negotiate to solve this problem? And consistently it's the other side that has refused. So that's the first point. So there's no problem from the point of view of the ANC of entering into general negotiations to solve this problem. No problem. But we have said that it's necessary for any negotiations to take place - that a necessary climate needs to be created; it can be created by us it could be created by the other side as you are saying we're so-called prisoners. It's going to take place. The end of the state of emergency has got to take place. The abandoning of the ANC or other organizations follow these things that have got to take place then you have a climate, where it becomes possible for all the leaders of the ANC: because some of them have come out of prison: to be able to make contact with the people because the ANC is no longer an illegal organization and so on. So what we have said it's necessary that those conditions should be made. And, that once that climate conducive to negotiations is created the ANC is more than willing to sit down and say all right, what else can we do now than to find a political solution to the South African problem? Our future is that the ANC, important that it is - in terms of liberation struggle. The ANC is not the only force in South Africa that is engaged in this struggle for a democratic SA. Organizations I would like to mention which are part of the history of the UDF and COSATU: the Council of Bishops: the Council of Churches and all these people. There are many forces that are involved in this struggle for the transformation of South Africa into non-racial democracy; and it is our view that they would have to be part of the process of these negotiations. So my point is that.

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Like the other Bantustan chiefs: Gatsha Buthelezi is a bantustan chief. At the end of the month: he receives a salary from Pretoria. The daily task he carries out is to administer the section of the South African apartheid system as the head of the KwaZulu Bantustan's Chief Minister. So unless by his actions: he defines himself as belonging not to the other side but to this side. Sure he would want to be around such a negotiating table and would take part, okay as I said: but (unclear) apartheid structures: made about Gatsha Buthelezi which are very false: like - to disformalize! the used, leader of the six million, seven million: eight million Zulus. Buthelezi has never been leader of the six: seven or eight million. The Zulu people have got a king. If you look at the traditional structures of the Zulu people as a Zulu king: who could say in traditional terms: "I am the leader of so many Zulus." Gatsha

Buthelezi is a minor chief. In the traditional structure there's no way in which he can claim that he's the leader of the six

million

But he has made a claim. Buthelezi has never been elected
by anybody to be chief minister of the KwaZulu Bantustan.

He was appointed by Pretoria. So I'm saying that if you look
at traditional structures of government: Buthelezi cannot claim
to be a representative of the Zulu people. If you look at
modern things in terms of elections: he can't claim he was elected
either. He was appointed and placed there and called
chief minister. At the end of the month, he supplied
with a Mercedes Benz to drive around and all that. and so he
lets him come and sit to negotiate. But as I say his place and
his activities would define him as part of the de Klerk adminis-
tration unless he acts in a way which defines him. But SULE
the ANC would have no problems in that climate was created/
because the creation of that climate by the use of political
prisoners and banned organizations and so on. Apart from crea-
ting a climate of course it would also indicate the seriousness
and the bona-fides of the regime that it is now ready to act
{it's now ready to move. And certainly the ANC would have no
problems indeed, Of saying: It's right to let us then sit down:

and see what we can do to find a political resolution of this
problem. :

Thank You.

More questions? :

Question 5. you mentioned several times said several times
- 4 ' ' . . - 0

at the struggle will continue: but according to the Guardian
some days ago: the armed struggle will catalyze . midweek BHNC

has been launched a campaign for mass defiance., Maybe You could elaborate
on that?

Reply: Well, the Guardian was a bit wrong when it says the
ANC has launched a campaign for mass defiance. But the Guardian
was wrong. What the situation is, is that there is clearly a
general mood of defiance in the country. We saw this last year
when local government elections took place in October, It was
prohibited by law for anybody to call for a boycott of those
elections. But people like Archbishop Tutu did not act on the
instructions of the ANC. put on his own. he said = well we're going
= 0. defy this prohibition. So when Bishop Tutu and others stood
up and said: , boycott the election - that mood of defying something
general was reflected = that continues. I think people are
determined to say: we're no longer going to be intimidated by
the state of emergency. The state of emergency detainees who
went on hunger strikes were saying "i we're no longer going
to allow ourselves just to be detained by this situation: and
it's with people who have been released and new restrictions
have been imposed: like you must report to the police once &

and you must be home between 6 p.m. and 6 a.m. A lot of
 people are defying those things. So there is that general
 country. The trade union movement is grappling with
 this -labour relations amendment act which is very
 much anti-union legislation. The unions are discussing action
 against that legislation so certainly I think that what we're
 going to see in South Africa is that general spirit of defiance
 to break all these restrictions to say we refuse to be bound
 by these restrictions that the regime is placing on their activ-
 ities. So it's not only the ANC as long as it's defiance campaign
 but I'm saying it's coming out of the people. It's coming out
 of impatience: 2 resolutions a resolve to act against this

kind of oppression regulation. Yes: indeed, I mean it's a kind
 of permanent responsibility of the ANC to continue the armed
 struggle, to escalate it: and I think one of the things we would
 have seen. which Vlok was talking about is that it seems clear
 to him: that the ANC is now training more people inside the
 country than outside; and it's worrying him. That must happen. It
 has to happen to go to try and strengthen our military capacity
 within the country. and that has to be part of this process
 of ensuring the escalation of this' armed struggle.

more questions?

Question 6:

Yes: last month a leaflet in Lusaka issued by some member of
 the ANC: showing their unhappiness to be transferred from Lusaka
 to some other camps in Uganda in Nigeria. Do you intend to move
 your forces from the front line to the north? And what is the
 reaction of the matter of the ANC?

Reply: No.. well - yes there was this thing that was distributed;

I don't know if it came from a member of the ANC. It came from
 somebody who didn't put his name - who said: I'm a member of
 the ANC. I think it came from any member of the ANC. I
 think it came from agents of the South African regime, for instance.
 I mean; one of the things it said was: can you please identify
 points at the border where we can come in come back to South
 Africa; not a single person from Lusaka has gone to take advantage:
 to express in practice that he has a desire to go to South Africa
 if there were such people: they could have gone quite easily. It's
 no problem., And it hasn't happened. Nor I think it was something
 coming from the agents of the South African regime to destabilize
 the ANC inside., We're moving: I was saying: and we're moving
 some personnel out of Angola. As I said earlier, we
 thought it was necessary in order not to give any excuses to
 the Pretoria regime, not to go to the negotiations concerning
 Namibia because we knew we're going to raise this matter and
 if necessary to say: we cannot agree while the ANC is there
 so we say no problem, and the membership of the ANC understands:
 because we understand the importance to the Namibian people:

and they are quite important to our armed struggle of the independence of Namibia. If, in return for more people to wherever Alce welrâ\202- going. bOAMOVE Ehem Yo dnhbricar ifiin return we'll get independence of Namibia - that's a very big price. The people who are moving SOME of our people from Zambia where this leaflet was: distributed or moving some of our people from Zambia because we've got a very important settlement: 2 development centre in Tanzania.] to us by the Tanzanian government
]] It seems to us:
 who at the moment reside
 Zambia and are in anything constructive
 terms of the work of the movement; that it would be better
 3Â that development centre in Tanzania because they have the
 possibility to engage in vocational training and do all sorts
 of things. Therefore to uplift yourself non-individually and
 to participate in the maintenance of the community. SO now that
 process has started of moving such people to Pakawa in Tanzania.
 There is no problem. It is a good thing - for if there
 was anybody who wanted to leave the ANC from Lusaka and go back
 to South Africa it's not terribly difficult. We've got a few
 people in Lusaka who moved to quarter themselves to the U.T. head
 commissioner - the refugee who wanted to go somewhere at a school;
 and the U.N. head commissioner for refugees is taking care of
 them. And it's no problem if there were people who wanted to
 go back to South Africa and surely they were Horn of Africa just
 walking down the road to the ANC office and saying: please: I'm
 tired of Lusaka or the ANC, and I now want to go back to South
 Africa. Because there were never such people who got disillusioned
 and wanted to go back to South Africa.

Thank you. More questions?

Question 7.

when you talked about the E.C. ministers and the whole question
 of giving de Klerk a chance and all that I think that

Thatcher could be persuaded to change her attitude to sanc-
 tions? :

Answer: I don't know. I don't know whether she can be persuaded;
 but I think there needs to be a point at which the rest of the
 5.0 must surely say Margaret Thatcher doesn't have the power
 of veto. If the rest of them want action against apartheid:
 there must be a point as I'm saying: where they say: Look here

are eleven of us saying we can't be paralysed since you have
 not moved.

Question: wouldn't that mean that they would have to change
 the Treaty of Rome or something - I mean constitutional basis
 for making decisions?

Answer: Yes: I know. But I'm not talking about changing of consti-

E 5,

gkution, but I'm saying: surely there must be politically: some ways in which pressure is put on Margaret Thatcher to act. I saying that whatever de Klerk will say there is a certain reality about South African racism. And, really it's a reality of death of imprisonment: all of these things. They just take (garble) The tremendous destruction that is taking place in Mozambique: which continues up to now, and the South Africans continue to support the MNR. If the regime says: No, no it's not us, it's some other people. But they admit at least that assistance continues to come from South Africa. This has tremendous disastrous consequences: and the South Africa is perfectly capable if it gets the support it is coming from within South Africa. It is perfectly possible

to stop that. But they're not

you know the situation in Mozambique Very tragic; getting worse. Now: why do we allow Margaret Thatcher to be in position of sanctions against a regime which is responsible for that kind of destruction. Why is it allowed? I think that the E.C., has a responsibility to do what it can to oblige them to move. Margaret Thatcher is very busy talking to these ministers from South Africa. It started with P. Botha she talked to President de Klerk. The Minister of Finance. She's now spoken to de Klerk: she's going to speak to some others. And she's saying: Now is the time to change. Release Mandela and the other prisoners. The reason she thinks the moment is right is because it

own reading of the situation - in sanctions have had an impact

came sanctions of which she's opposed. put she herself

that nows like the financial sanctions

foreign debt, the absence of an influx of foreign

S.A. She knows it has had a very important impact - Was a important element in forcing the Pretoria regime to enter negotiations.

she knows all these things. And because they are weakened because of sanctions, she says now/ why don't we sit down and talk. THs: a-very dishonest position because she's the same person who opposes sanctions. but then takes advantage of the results from the sanctions to now pose herself as a person who is going to lead the political solution of the South African question. But also I'm saying I think that the EC really ought not to place itself in a position where it gets paralysed because Margaret Thatcher..... (fades)

More questions?

Question 8: Exactly how far should de Klerk go after the September elections before you could recommend a set of EC sanctions- Go you demand the release of the political prisoners? A or is that enough or do you demand a total constitutional change before you could recommend some sort of legislation?

Answer: Yes: 1 means we called for sanctions: and we conduct
L =

struggle is ' 3. Sanctions:
 Rave called for sanctions in - order to negoti-
 Who said sanctions would end apartheid
 that would be our position at the moment where

Africa would create: okay & new concentration and so on. Then
 this international pressure can be lifted, This is precisely
 what has happened to the government of Zimbabwe: for instance. The
 decision to end sanctions against Rhodesia came at a point when
 at Lancaster House they created a new constitution. They then
 said, okay we can now end sanctions; we can now sign a cease-fire.
 The fighting was going on while they were sitting there at Lancaster
 House negotiating. Because it means the struggle was not: &
 struggle for negotiations: it was a struggle to end colonialism
 this way. sanctions in South Africa are almost the same. They
 have to be for the termination of apartheid. And I would think:
 it's at a point where the international community is satisfied. That
 now they have arrived at the point where they can say: okay &
 Yetla aggression & Bay constitution, because Zgadi as. you
 can see & if there were specific sanctions against South Africa
 on the issue of Namibia, it was quite possible to have said
 in 1978, when Resolution 435 was adopted: which the South Africans
 accepted., It might have been possible in 1978 to say, Okay:
 1; & our pressures. When in fact, the point to lift those pressures
 came 10 years later. So it has to be that sanctions are targeted
 at ending apartheid. and therefore I think they have to be lifted
 at a point where such a level has been reached to end apartheid.

I haven't got more questions.

Yes, one more.

Question 9:

In connection with the previous question. I would like to hear
 your personal evaluation on the possible effectiveness of the
 newly created so-called Nordic bureau of sanctions against apartheid.

Answer: Well, you see we think it's important that the Nordic

countries somewhat must monitor the implementation of the Nordic
 sanctions to ensure that they are implemented. And since the
 Nordic countries work as a Nordic group: it would therefore
 be fighting for the illegitimacy of having this Nordic bureau
 for implementation of sanctions. NO: it would be good because
 it also becomes a point of coordination: apart from monitoring

and ensuring the implementation. It becomes a point of coordination
 to continue the process of that & concerted action.

More questions?

Now; I want to thank Mr . Thabo Mbeki. - Thank you!