

Today our forces are engaging the enemy in armed struggle, ~~however~~ it is well to remember that this was no sudden or spontaneous decision but was one that was arrived at only after years of non-military but militant struggle. ~~However~~ This is not the first time that the people of S.A. have engaged the enemy in armed struggle.

The inroads of the earlier settlers ~~was~~ met by stiff armed resistance and it was only after the defeat of the ~~the~~ Bambata rebellion in 1906 that the conquest of the indigenous population of S.A. was finally achieved. We learned valuable lessons from this period, viz., that we could not resist the invasion successfully because the resistance was conducted on tribal lines, moreover the enemy was equipped with far superior weapons and was better organised. We tried to remedy this in the next period. In the 1912 the ANC was formed with the express purpose of mobilising the people as a whole, at this time the Indian people led by Ghandi were involved in mass actions, however the most significant development for the struggle was the emergence of the S.A.C.P.

This was a period in which political understanding was being developed, in which the peoples organisations grew in maturity, but above all a period in which tribalism was slowly being replaced by national consciousness. In short it was a period of organisational growth. Various tactics from ~~civil~~ strikes to civil disobedience ^{Etc} were adopted which culminated in the 1961 decision to ~~embark~~ prepare for an armed struggle.

Let us for a moment reflect on our movements in this early period. Despite the repressive and harassing tactics of the Govt. all the organisations were functioning legally and above ground. It was only after the banning of the C.P. in 1950, that some form of underground structure was set up by the C.P. When one reflects on the past ~~now~~ it is easy to be critical of the fact that the other organisations, while foreseeing the trend of events, did not take contingency measures for the day when they too would be forced underground. One wonders what the 60s would have been like if such preparations were undertaken in the 50s.

After Sharpville some form of underground structure was evolved, which functioned quite effectively during the emergency. ^{But} From its very nature this whole machinery involved personnel who were well known to the police and who continued to work in the manner of the "old days". This structure was lapsed after the emergency, however because of the use of known personnel and the manner of work I doubt whether it would have withstood any big govt. offensive.

~~The decision to send many of our leaders underground was a correct one. Undoubtedly~~ The next phase was the sending of many of our leaders underground. It was a tremendous setback when the police arrested most of our leadership at Rivonia. From the information that is available it is apparent that far reaching plans had been evolved and that measures to put them into operation were in the process of being effected. Rivonia has raised many questions that must be analysed thoroughly if

thoroughly if we are to ~~pre~~ set up other underground structures. Was the proper assesment made as to whether the organisational structure than existing could sustain an ^{underground} organisational command?, Did we have a good enough intelligence network ?, what security measures were taken? One has the feeling that too many people knew about Rivonia, or if not about Rivonia itself at least about the whereabouts and activities of many of the personnel, moreover the communications line between the leaders underground and the "outside forces" was handled mostly if not fully by people well known to the police. All they did was round up hundreds of Congressites and with the help of the vicious 90 day law etc. they were able to obtain much information. One must admit that these laws and their effects was a new element in the situation and the organisation could not possibly have foreseen its ~~consequen~~ far reaching consequences.

~~Admittedly~~ in this transitional stage from the first phase to the second it is understandable that the necessary iron discipline was missing, that the need for utmost secrecy and security was not fully grasped. Yet one wonders whether so many leaders should have been gathered at one spot without the minimum of security. Here one is thinking of hidden tunnels, the mining of the grounds, some lookout system which could have given adequate warning.

Rivonia and the subsequent arrests of hundreds of activists was a hard blow from which we are only beginning to recover ~~now~~. Today the struggle is intensifying, armed confrontation has already taken place, our trained personnel and cadres are preparing and waiting to get back home, and there are thousands more at home who will rally to the organisations call. To ensure success it is essential that underground structures are set up within the country, not only taking into consideration lessons from our past experience, but also the wealth of information that is available from the experiences of other organisations.

The Morogoro conference was significant in many respects. Here for the first time "representatives" from the ANC's sister orgs. were invited and given full delegate status. Undoubtedly the presence of C.P. delegates " was the most important step for all revolutionaries. The Congress movements structure needed overhauling for various reasons; Many of our leaders who had played magnificent roles in the country could not cope with the new situation; democratic leadership was missing and discontentment was manifest on all levels of our org.

It is a credit to the political maturity of our forces that we were able to "ride the storm" and bring about changes not only in personnel, (which in isolation could only have a limited effect) but also in the structure of the org. which will enable us to march forward. The org.

can now accomodate non African rev. more effectively. Furthermore, conference accepted tht our work had been geared too much to international solidarity work, ~~which resulted in much overexertive~~ ^{and} ~~and~~ and all revolutionaries must welcome the decision to reverse this process and to set up the Revolutionary Council whose main task will be to deal with the armed forces and internal reconstruction. It is of utmost importance that the Party plays a vital role in the R.C.

All the changes and resolutions will be meaningless until and unless steps are taken to make these effective. It is no secret that the C.P. has played a fundamental role in influencing the N.L. Movement, that the militancy and activity was directly related to our role. We have been in the vanguard and must continue to be so, despite the fact that today's tasks are much greater and more ~~difficult~~ difficult.

TASKS.

What is necessary is an ^{overall} original strategic plan. Here I am not referring to a military plan but rather a political plan. We should proceed from scientific analysis to planning, from planning to organisation, and it is only after every step along the way has been tested finally to action first political and then a combination of political and military. This might necessitate a year or two of intense preparation. It should be obvious that we can't set up effective underground structures overnight.

Many National Liberation movements have found that during the first few years it was imperative that the preparation of the armed struggle was centred around political work amongst the masses. A revolutionary movement has no chance of success unless they have the support of the people for it is to them that the movement will turn for cadres and fighters, hiding places, concealment of equipment and men, liaison agents, food propaganda etc. This involvement is not something spontaneous, automatic or mechanical. True there is an identity of interests between the aims of a revolutionary and the aspirations of the people but this will remain a theoretical concept until contact is made and cemented. It is ^{also} true that we have had a record of political activity but we should not assume that because of that the people are all politicised and will immediately come to our side. There are various factors and elements that come to play, what about the role of counter-revolutionaries etc. Moreover for these people to get involved in this very dangerous stage of the struggle mere political consciousness is not enough, our cadres will have to be within them organising the and giving direction and meaning to their aspirations. From Che to Moa they all found many peasants unhelpful if not hostile, t

Before we ~~move~~^{start any activity} be it slogan writing, distributing of leaflets etc. ^{we} should ensure that ^{is} this is not limited to a few areas only as that will enable the enemy to concentrate its forces and ~~win the struggle~~. make things extremely difficult.

Various front organisations should be set up e.g., burial orgs., religious societies, sports and cultural bodies.

In our work we must ensure that the movement always maintains a sense of realism. We should not seek short term results by creating false optimism amongst the people. But while the difficulties and ~~needs~~ sacrifices must not be minimised we must always insist on the power of the people and the inevitability of final victory. We should make it clear that the enemy would undertake severe repressive measures and that the struggle will not be "smooth sailing", i.e., we will suffer setbacks some serious others not.

Initially we must work in total secrecy and in small groups. These cadres must be dispersed and they must completely identify themselves with the inhabitants in the areas in which they are working. They must adapt themselves to local conditions not only in language and behaviour but also in dress and appearance. Much of these problems will not arise if the cadre from the same area. For security and secrecy we should also consider sending cadres from area onto another, e.g. a cadre from Jhb. to be sent to Durban etc.

In our work we should place emphasis on the organisation of LIAISON, Intelligence, these are most essential for the successful working of an organisational structure. (If the enemy can infiltrate us, why can't we infiltrate their orgs.)

[As the question of leadership is of utmost importance the Party's role will be invaluable. It is only when the objective conditions are ripe that the first steps can be undertaken and only when the masses of the people think that the situation is ripe can bolder steps be taken.

We have seen that throughout our struggle, the Party's scientific analysis, militancy and ~~analysis of the situation~~, were reflected in the mood and activities of the Congress movements. Today our Party equipped with the tools of scientific-marxism-leninism must again play the vanguard role and lead our struggle to its inevitable victorious conclusion.

It is imperative that the Party immediately undertakes deep and analytical studies of various factors, e.g., the peasant question, the relations of classes ^{Our Party's experience} forces etc. These studies should be directed in a manner which will help us to determine organisational means etc. It is only on the basis of such studies that we will be able to give a clear guiding line.

To enable us to carry out our work effectively, the Party must give serious consideration to the training of personnel. This is most essential because our military men will not be able to survive let alone function, if the masses have not been organised or underground structures set up.

Party members must play a leading role both politically and militarily and must always set an example of dedication and loyalty.

We must ensure that there is democratic leadership and that full and frank discussions take place between the leaders and the men on various topics and levels. This of course does not mean that we should allow ourselves to function in a state of anarchy, e.g., in battle or during a vital moment individuals begin to question the commanders directives. Democracy under centralised guidance can be achieved by;

- 1) the leading bodies of the Party giving a correct line of guidance and finding solutions when problems arise in order to establish themselves as centres of leadership.
- 2) Higher bodies must be familiar with the situation in the lower bodies, and with the life of the masses.
- 3) Casual decisions should not be taken on any level, and once a decision is taken it must be carried out vigorously.

The Party should establish proper relations with its allies and develop and consolidate this alliance. (develop).

Lastly we must accept the fact that the opening of the Partys doors has not only swelled its numbers but by its very nature has effected security, discipline and education. It is inevitable that some bourgeois ideology might have permeated our ranks. To counter this it is essential that the Party organises either here or abroad intensive educational facilities.

If we are to play the vanguard role it is essential that we must all also look inwards. Much of our work has also been in the int. solidarity front. Our first priority should be the strengthening and consolidation of our Party inside S.A.

After the 60's we suffered some serious setbacks, many of our best cadres were arrested, many were killed and many were forced to leave the country. Bannings and other repressive legislations also took its toll. The consequence has been that our organisational structures on various levels have been totally destroyed. However despite all the difficulties etc. we have continued to live and work, to draw conclusions from the past and continue the struggle for the triumph of the national democratic revolution and socialism. A great defeat Lenin wrote, "gives the rev. parties and the rev. class a real and very useful lesson, a lesson in historical dialectics, a lesson in the understanding of the political struggle and the skill and art of waging it." It is a credit to our Party that despite the very repressive and dangerous conditions we have tried to work in this spirit, rather than becoming despondent and pessimistic.

"recognises the most varied forms of struggle;and it does not
~~narrowness~~
 but recognises all these forms of struggle as conciliatory"

^T us while our major task shpuld be the stenghtening of our armed forces

(which ~~itself ofcourse~~ depends on organisational work amongst the masses), we must flexibly combine illegal activity with legal activity eg., ~~cultural whenever the opportunity arises~~, sports orgs., etc. eg. cultural orgs., sport orgs., religious orgs., whenever the opportunity presents itself. Whenever spontaneous actions take place eg. doctors, dockers etc we must be prepared ~~organisationally~~ to inject organisation into this situation. This would be done by setting up of various associations and societies protecting their day to day interests.

For us to perform these tasks successfully it is essential that the Party devotes much of its resources and manpower to the internal reconstruction of our Party. Let us have no illusions! This is a very dangerous, difficult and painstaking task, however if we are to succeed, this task will have to be undertaken. I do not envisage this developing in a short period and feel that we should refrain from haste and impatience and should not leap over stages that have not yet been passed. If this task is not undertaken immediately we will be giving our obvious enemy as well as the pseudo rev. and counter rev. an opportunity to undermine our struggle. I have heard some information about the setting up of some form of cell system amongst the Indians. The leading personnel are from Durban and they have set up some structures in the TVL. They are taking a very anti-soviet, anti South African Communist Party and anti ANC stand. I suspect that these are probably trotskyites or Maoists. If these activities are not countered by us a very strong rev. potential will be misled, misdirected and endangered. From the limited information it appears that congressites have been attracted to these groups.

To fulfill our historical task it is important that the Party recruits (ofcourse the maximum security must be maintained) many cadres, some if not all must be brought out for training. Here I am envisaging courses at the Party High schools in socialist countries, as well as specific training in organisational methods, underground work,

propaganda etc. Undoubtedly this is a difficult task but it is essential. One of our tasks has been to get our personnel back home. A study has indicated that it is quite easy for Europeans to obtain passports as for Indians in 1968 about 8000 people applied for passports and of these 51 were refused a passport. I believe a similar position exists for the coloureds. Recruits from these groups can firstly be brought to "safe" areas ostensibly for study purposes etc and from here arrangements can be made to send them to socialist countries. Unfortunately this method is limited for Africans who must be recruited in increasing numbers and the Party must give most serious consideration to this aspect.

EXTERNALLY.

There are basically two categories i.e., those in the socialist countries and those in the capitalist countries. These can of course be further divided into students passport holders non passport holders and workers.

CAPITALIST COUNTRIES.

It appears that to date we are concentrating on the organisation of Party members in London only. However even in London the doors have to new recruits appear to have been opened only recently. The opening of the doors has naturally led to the drop in the "educational" standards and it is essential that immediate steps are taken to remedy this. For us to perform this and other tasks adequately it is imperative that the Party enforces its discipline and authority on all matters concerning its members, e.g., the Party must be involved in determining our members course and area of study. Far too many of us have or are in the process of studying courses which are academically stimulating but of no immediate use to the struggle. I feel that many of our personnel abroad should be sent either to Party high schools or should undergo studies in organisational methods, trade unionism, propaganda etc. The Party should also concern itself with the problem of party personnel that have completed their studies in capitalist countries, an education which I feel must be supplemented by studies of the type that I have

mentioned.

Party discipline must be instilled in our members and they must be made to realise that the Party is "supreme" and that in future it must be consulted on all matters of importance eq., taking up of employment, course of study, migration etc. This is a two way process and it is essential that the Party also takes the initiative in these matters.

As far as I know not much attention has been given to recruitment outside of London or outside our immediate circles even in London. I feel that this must be remedied. For example we have hundreds of South African students in ~~London~~ Ireland, and we should consider ways and means of influencing them in, left wing ideas and more important recruit some of them. Many of these qualify or fail to qualify but return to S.A. some time or other and I feel that this presents us with a good opportunity. It is not necessary to approach them ^{directly} through the Party, ^{i.e.} some form of Front Organisation can be used. There are also many students who are arriving in the United Kingdom for two-three year courses eq., the textile industry. These should also be considered as potential revolutionaries. Many a good personnel has gone back without having received adequate training or education which would enable him to carry out his functions effectively, if at all. Here the students in Cairo, India and Pakistan also come to mind. In this context we should also give some thought to people who come for a number of years but are not students. Recently there has been an increase in this type. I feel that these categories both the students and non-students are important for they are all passport holders, unknown to the police and ^{are able to} return home. The qualified personnel that return home tend to have tremendous respect and influence in the local communities.

I realise that this is no easy task and one has to consider the question of security etc., but I feel that on the basis of our experience as well as the experiences of various other Communist parties and

parties and movements these difficulties are not insurmountable and can be overcome.

SOCIALIST COUNTRIES.

We have many students in various Socialist countries. Unfortunately it appears that there is no clearly defined policy towards them. We have had very little if any influence in determining their courses nor has any systematic attempts been made to bring them into the fold of Party politics. I feel that recruitment and some form of grouping even if it is informal and not under the name of the Party should be initiated. by the Party. From reports it appears that our forces in the GDR have reduced themselves to petty quarrelling and slandering, there appears to be excessive drinking and no discipline whatsoever. The result has been that little or no work is being done. In a discussion with a leader of the FDJ we were informed that they were very keen to assist our struggle in many ways, in passing he mentioned publicity material support, training of cadres at the Youth schools, etc, but he indicated that the lack of any real contact had prevented this from materialising to its full potentials. We promised to raise this at various levels and discuss the possibilities of ensuring that some formal contact is maintained and consolidated. I fear that this lack of contact also exists in the other Socialist states. This must be remedied and this means that we must look into our personnel activities etc. in these countries. I feel that here we have opportunity to ensure that many of our people receive the correct training education etc which will be invaluable in the future and we should remember that many of these personnel are Africans. When considering any action here we must take into consideration the ANC youth and students sections role.

Children.

Many of the children of Party members as well as those of Congressites have not really experienced the situation at home. They are now growing up and being educated in a totally different environment and situation

and in this circumstances it is not surprising that many of them feel divorced from the struggle and are not as committed as kids that grow up at home. ¹/₄ feel that we should give serious consideration to this phenomenon. Here we the embryo of the future South African generation and we cant afford to lose them. Firstly we should consider means of bringing them into the stream of ANC Youth and Student politics but more important we should initiate some form of elementary marxist leninist classes. In our discussion with the FDJ I also raised the possibility of sending our kids to the vario s pioneer camps in the GDR. ¹/₄his could be extended to other socialist countries. Here atleast the problem of security is not such a difficult one, because the people we are dealing with can be considered "safe".