A SOVIET plan to arm the MPLA to the hilt, and at the same time create chaos in Angola, are the main factors behind the MPLA'â\200\231s military superiority in that country today. = â\200\230 The whole exercise has peen a - classic straight from the Kremlinâ\200\231s book .giï¬\201,.a cedures for revoluon.) /

Moscow was perfectly aware that had general elections taken place in Angola earlier this year, as laid down in Article 40 of the illfated Alvor Agreement, the MPLA would have been decisively beaten by the FNLA and Unita.

Instead, the MPLA immediately gained control
- of finance and information
and drove its rivals â\200\224 the
FNLA and Unita â\200\224 from
Luanda with Soviet arms.

Russia $\hat{a}$ 200\231s decision to supply arms to the MPLA was taken in the early 1960s, when the Soviets first

rican instrument..

" Since then, the eyes of the Kremlin have been on Angolaâ\200\231s oil, copper and diamonds. But these, in the Russian mind, have always been secondary to the strategic assets of controlling Angolan - ports and, ultimately, the Cape route.:

k This is why Russia is

chose the MPPLA as-its Af-

. rts to

m MPL. rtunes,
ng in the best of
modern arms, doctrinal

backing, and a Moscow-

cpea'ted propaganda offensive urging unswerving support for the MPLA while = denigrating the FNLA and Unita as being allied to reactionary forces, namely ' the United

States and South Africa.

When, a few months ago,

Soviet arms began to pour

into Luanda at an increased rate, so were profes-

' sional communist agitators

moved into the city.

Two business men . who arrived in Lusaka from Angola in early October reported that one of these groups of agitators includ-

 $\hat{a}$ 200\230ed two East Germans, one

of whom was an intelligence officer, a Brazilian officer discharged from his countryâ\200\231s navy for subversion, and a\_Congolese intelligence officer who previously had been arrested in Zaire on espionage charges.

Also in the group was. a

 $\hat{a}\200\230$ Russian agent, a Czech, a to East Germany for train-

Rumanian and a Finn.

Angola: the Red connec can only get tighter

@ BOB HITCHCOCK, Military Correspondent amines aspects of a specia published by the authoritative

Conflict, London, and traces the V\Soviet-aligned MPLA. "  $\hat{A} \mbox{\ensuremath{@}}$ 

Anti-communist intelligence reports from Angola indicate that a group of 200 MPLA personnel left Congo - Brazzaville at the

- end of March this year in two Soviet' transport air-

craft

Most of these Africans were scheduled for an eight-month military training course in . Russia. Others were on their way

security work.

\_ ling \_in\_intelligence and lat ely

Another group
MPLA personnel had been
flown to Russia three
months previously for a
training course of indeterminate duration. /

The role of the Congo Republic as a terminus for a Soviet arms supply operation for the MPLA was confirmed without doubt in April this year when a Congolese Air Force Fokker transport plane openly flew Russian arms from the Maya-Maya air base, north of Brazza-ville, into Angola.

But these operations were only the tip of the iceberg as far as Soviet military assistance \_ pro-

\_ grammes to. the

were concerned this year.

For about 13 years the MPLA has been receiving Soviet arms, including rifles, machine-guns, mortars, anti-personnel mines, hand-grenades and 122 mm rockets. â\200\230

These Russian deliverjes were steeply accelerated in October last year,

of 200

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allowing a lead-time of six months following the Por- - tuguese  $\hat{a} \ge 00 \ge 30$  revolution.  $\hat{a} \ge 00 \ge 30$  The accelerated deliveries, besides rifles, machine-guns - aug¥ other infantry weapons\_on previous lines, have in addition included the following re-  $\hat{a} \ne N$ 

s O&XP essed by the two other nationalist movements in Angola.

manks, light field artillery, six-wheeled trucks, tracked armoured anti-aircraft vehicles, armoured personâ\200\230nel carriers, rocket ldunchers and anti-tank wireguided missiles.

The total effect is to give the M consider— able mobility as well as great firepower. In other words, the MPLA: outguns its rivals. E

\_ The Institute for the Study of Conflict report stresses that: Soviet official sources explicitly see.victorv of their cause in Angola as leading to further operations against Rhode—sia, South Africa and South West Africa.

\_For this reason, it is lik-

ely that Russia will continue to supply increasingly sophisticated arms â\200\230to the MPLA â\200\224 and military advisers and more Cuban soldiers to ensure that the arms are handled proficiently.

armoured vehicles,