

Graham Spence

SOUTH Africa faces an â\200\234Ethio-
pia-typeâ\200\235 catastrophe with more
than 1% million people starving,
say welfare workers.

And hundreds of thousands of chil-
dren, stunted mentally and physical-
ly from acute protein deficiency and
unlikely to ever be economically
{ productive, would form a significant
section of the next generation.
~ These facts have been released by
the national crisis aid organisation,
-Operation Hunger.

And Mrs Ina Perlman, the execu-
tive director of the organisation,
painted a scary scenario of wide-
scale despair and starvation.

. Welfare organisations are often
t:jl,e only barriers left against mas-
sive starvation.

If they do collapse through rising
costs, entire peasant communities in
the most depressed areas of Kwa-
Zulu, KaNgwane and Lebowa could
starve to death.

-Despite widespread relief
schemes, in some rural clinics up to
24 malnutrition cases are being
treated every day.

Welfare workers say one hospital
in Lebowa near Pietersburg aver-
ages 60 hunger-related deaths a
month. And itâ\200\231s not only limited to
the rural districts â\200\224 or to blacks.

Emergency feeding schemes are
also now being extended to white
urban areas.

On the West Rand, Operation Hun-
ger is supporting 300 starving white
families.

But Operation Hunger â\200\224 the life-
SA faces own

THE DAILY NEWS, TUESDAY, AUGUST 19, 1986

e SRR B ACKGROUND BERR ST

â\200\230Ethiopiaâ\200\231 erisis

U THE face of South Africa 1986 as the recession bites deeper in unemployed communities.

line to almost a million people â\200\224 is extended to the hilt with barely enough funds for three more months.

Urgent appeals from starving communities are pouring daily, and officials believe the situation is going to worsen.

â\200\234One has to see the desperation in these areas to realise the stark horror of reality in this country,â\200\235 said Mrs Perlman. :

â\200\234In the â\200\230bestâ\200\231 areas which we are working, we are being asked for 50 percent increases in basic foodstuffs. In our worst, it is 100 percent. The situation is totally out of control.â\200\235

Operation Hunger had 957 000 desperate people on their books, and,

said Mrs Perlman, they should be providing for another 50 000.

Other community feeding schemes were providing for a further 600 000 people â\200\224 which meant that more than 1500000 South African and homeland residents were almost totally reliant on welfare.

Most of the victims were under the age of 10, and many schemes, such

- as the Red Cross which was particularly active in KwaZulu, concentrated only on children.

Mrs Perlman said that by the end of March next year they would need an extra R9,5 million to keep operating effectively.

But she said the situation might not be as bleak as it appeared.

They had several fund raising plans in the pipeline like a Gold Rush competition, expected to boost their coffers.

Also, the American Government agency US Aid had pledged relief on

a 3:1 basis. For every three rands Operation Hunger raised, US Aid would donate one, which hopefully would ease â\200\224 if only temporarily â\200\224 the current financial crisis.

Obviously sanctions would have a big effect on hungry communities â\200\224 and, ominously, also the welfare organisations assisting them.

Another problem, said Mrs Perlman, was the rapid mechanisation of agriculture which had massively cut back seasonal labour schemes â\200\224 the lifeblood of many black subsistence communities.

Operation Hunger was firstly a self-help organisation and not only a crisis feeding scheme.

Looking at famine problems elsewhere in Africa where food donations alone were at best a short-term

solution, much of their funds were

ploughed back into providing agricultural equipment and technical know-how. :

The emphasis was on self-sufficiency with Operation Hunger officials working both in advisory roles and side-by-side with needy communities. ;

However, the establishment of community self-help schemes was costing the organisation R100000 a month, and with funds drying up rapidly, officials said they needed a fur-

17

ther R2 million to complete their present projects.

Meals were budgeted at 6Â¢c a portion, served once a day, said Mrs Perlman. :

They consisted of a cup of high-protein soup and mealie-meal. Milk powder, once the staple subsistence diet, was now too expensive.

But the most alarming aspects of all were the long-term social and psychological effects. As most of the victims were young children in critical stages of development, the situa-

tion was particularly disconcerting.

â\200\234Children are a countryâ\200\231s wealth,â\200\235
said Mrs Perlman. â\200\234Yet we have
on our doorstep hundreds of thou-
sands that will be irreparably stunt-
ed through malnutrition. In an eco-
nomic sense, they will be misfits,
suitable only for menial tasks that
are now being rapidly mechanised.â\200\235

However, Operation Hunger had
been most heartened by the â\200\234touch-
ingâ\200\235 response they had had, said Mrs
Perlman.

â\200\234Weâ\200\231ve had donations from people
out of work, saying although they are

in dire straits, there are others worse
off than they are. South Africans are
realising what hardship is all about.â\200\235

But this was not true of the com- |
mercial and industrial sectors,
where donations had been dwindling
alarmingly.

â\200\234My biggest nightmare is if it ever
comes to the stage where we have to
say to these desperate people, we
canâ\200\231t help them anymore. '

â\200\234To have raised their hopes, and
then bring them crashing down is the
worst thing that can be done to
them.â\200\235

| Nats showing mbre signs of belfg sympathetic

Indaba: now for

the next questions

| DIPLOMATS and overseas poli-

ticians visiting South Africa
nearly all end up at the office of
the KwaZulu/Natal indaba â\200\224
and most of the them are
steered there by the Govern-
ment.

Although some Natal National
Party delegates viewed the in-
daba as a threat to white rights,
many of the visitors see it as the
one glimmer of light on an oth-
erwise depressed political land-
scape in South Africa.

This concerns the indaba
chairman, Professor Desmond
Clarence, who says he has a hor-
rible sinking feeling that the in-
daba is being elevated to a
higher level than it should.

Although he does not want to
make any predictions, he is ob-
viously happy with the way
things are going.

There is agreement on a Bill
of Rights which itself will dic-
tate the shape of the constitution
that the indaba hopes to decide
on within months.

The major point of agree-
ment, that Natal and Kwazulu
should be seen as a single eco-
nomic and political unit, was
reached soon after the first
meeting of the indaba in April.

Another is to try to get the
maximum powers for the region
â\200\224 at the very least the level of
powers held by KwaZulu which
are significantly more substan-
tial than those of the province.

But Professor Clarence
emphasises that there is no in-

BRUCE CAMERON

Political Correspondent

tention to have KwaZulu and Natal secede.

There is no doubt, Professor Clarence says, that the indaba will come up with a constitution although â\200\234I donâ\200\231t know if we will get complete consensusâ\200\235.

The problem is the same as that which is testing constitution-makers throughout the country, namely the protection of group rights as opposed to individual rights.

The Bill of Rights indirectly rules out apartheid laws such as the Group Areas Act by stating the everyone has the right to own and occupy property anywhere.

Professor Clarence points out that there are 6,5 million Zulus, a little under one million Indians, 800 000 whites and small number of coloureds.

There is no way, whether the region is divided up into regions or there is proportional representation, that blacks wonâ\200\231t have the majority.

This fact seems to have been accepted by most of the delegates, but the search is still on for protection of group interests.

Professor Clarence thinks the way will be found through special interest councils which would advise on all matters affecting their groups.

in the indaba to give the councils teeth by, for instance, creating a two-house legislature with representatives of the councils forming an upper house are not likely to meet approval.

Indaba delegates seem to be working through options more or less by elimination. The options are narrowing after every meeting and soon they expect final decisions to start being made.

Although there is real framework yet, it looks as if the plan could be influenced by the Swiss canton system.

Authors of the book South Africa â\200\224 The Solution, Leon Louw and Frances Kendall, are among the few people who have been asked to give evidence to the indaba.

The question now seems to be not whether the indaba will be able reach finality, but what will happen when it does.

The Government, despite the misgivings of some of its following in Natal, is showing far more signs of being sympathetic than originally expected but obviously the final form of the indaba recommendations will be vital.

Many Nationalists, including some of those who have sat in as official observers, do not see why the Government should not attempt to slot in a special arrangement for the region with | -

To next page B

Pressures from some quarters

4 From Page 8

the rest of the country.

One senior Nationalist said this week: â\200\234Natal is a good place to experiment. There is more peace here than anywhere else and it could set a pattern for the future.â\200\235

However, the Nationalists are nervous about what will come out of the indaba.

Their collective eye remains transfixed by the Conservative Party, even though | they are not a factor in | Natal.

Indaba: nervous

Nats sympathetic

says the indaba has not yet considered this issue, although there are special committees investigating financial viability and education.

These committees would present reports which could be used to support arguments in convincing the Government to accept the overall recommendations of the indaba.

The problems of the

indaba do not only lie in the direction of the National Party Government but also in the direction of black rights and customs.

For instance the land tenure system of KwaZulu could be a thorny question â\200\224 one with which KwaZulu has wrestled with for many years.

Early indications have been the public support is behind the indaba.

__Professor Clarence

Ghe; & allai- \202 FAorning Nelug

11 A

| & R\Ai- \201ug

et

Why the push for South African sanctmnsâ \200\231

. Thatcher and

England disa-
 . gree about im-
 i eco-

JERRY tions against
 BONNET the South Afri-
 can govern-
 ment? Why does Sen. Richard Lu-
 gar, Republican head of the Senate
 Foreign Relations Committee, disa-
 gree with President Reagan?
 The ordinarily reserved queen,
 almost without precedent for Eng-

| - lish royalty, has been making her

disagreement with the prime minis-
 ter over the sanctions issue known
 to the public, and ordinarily loyal
 Republican senators are reportedly
 anxious to organize an override of
 the presidentâ \200\231s expected veto of the
 sanctions bill.

If everyone is in agreement that
 South Africaâ \200\231s apartheid policies are
 repugnant and intolerable, why has
 the issue of economic sanctions be-
 come such a distinct point of depar-
 ture?

Lately, otherwise agreeable lead-
 ers of the free world have begun to

disagree about whether economic
 sanctions, such as cutting off trade
 and investment relations with
 South Africa, can work. And if sanc-
 tions would work, at what cost to
 the United States â \200\224 to black South
 Africa?

Economic sanctions are not new
 and untried tools of foreign policy.
 In fact, boycotts and embargos are
 recorded in history as having been
 in more or less continual use since

at least the time of ancient Greece; like in 432 B.C. when Pericles the Olympian outlawed trade with the Megarians in retaliation for the kidnapping of three Aspasian women.

Since that time, much has been learned about the effects and effectiveness of trade sanctions.

Will economic sanctions force the South African government to its knees and bring a quick end to generations of apartheid rule? The Institute for International Economics, a Washington-based think tank, recently released a study on the effectiveness of economic sanctions in the 20th century.

Researchers analyzed more than .

100 political confrontations where economic sanctions were imposed. The results of their work suggest

that in the case of South Africa, it is unlikely economic sanctions will bring about the desired major policy changes.

The study reveals that in 82 percent of the incidents examined where economic sanctions were imposed against foreign governments for the purpose of instigating major policy changes, nothing happened.

Nothing happened that is, except that the sanctioning nations and black marketeers enjoyed windfall profits, and sanctioned nations demonstrated not submissiveness, but rather a strengthening of resolve to defy sanctions and develop commercial alternatives.

Taken as a whole, the institute's empirical study presents a strong, unemotional case for abandonment of economic sanctions as instruments of foreign policy.

Yet when one looks behind the statistics, at the goals sought by governments through the use of sanctions, for example obtaining release of hostages, freeing African colonies, liberalizing Jewish immigration, improving treatment of political dissidents, limiting nuclear weapons development, deterring drug trafficking, encouraging rec-

ognition of labor unions and denouncing terrorism, then even a weak case for sanctions can be compelling.

But what price should the United States be willing to pay to promote human rights reform in South Africa? -

For the country as a whole, the cost in dollars of severing economic ties with South Africa would be trivial. Yet itâ\200\231s-clear the burden of broad economic sanctions will fall hardest on black South Africans. An already unstable situation will surely become more volatile. Is the United States considering the cost of a hastened civil war? Of more fervent repression compounded by economic strife?

Even though the motives are noble, itâ\200\231s hard to see how economic sanctions could improve the already abysmal - situation, particularly since sanctions likely will spell the end of diplomatic relations and cool-headed negotiation with the South African government.

Once broad sanctions are in place, the United States will lose its audience with the South African government and what ability it now has to influence the tide of future

events, short of supplying covert aid to anti-government forces. ,

Not only will the situation worsen before any hope of improvement, but the United States will: have placed itself voluntarily in the position of a powerless bystander.

Why then are our legislators so anxious to start down this path?â\200\231 Perhaps in calling for broad economic sanctions, Congress seeks to distance the United States from-South Africaâ\200\231s apartheid government and in doing so somehow wash our hands of past involvement with the regime. â\200\230

Whatever the reasoning, Congress seems bent on toppling South Africaâ\200\231s existing social structure, leaving a rubble of chaos, rather than joining in the process of interaction required to bring about reform. Imposing economic sanctions may be effective in the short run as a demonstration of our solidarity with black South Africa, but unfortunately, will not hasten the demise of apartheid. -

Jerry Bonnet is a Dallas lawyer and graduate student specializing

in foreign trade at the University of
Texas at Dallas.)

/0 b /%p / /76

N IWS DIGES'

GEIERAL

CA} ILLE Cosby, wife of TV
star Bill Cosby, hes gxiced
excl ustve rights to make &
filn about Wingie Mandels.

C by plans to co- rmm

the movie with Judi
erfc rd James, and maâ\200\230

"o uce @ lay based on
m ela b grapâ\200\231:w â\200\230Mothar

fa\â\200\230 onâ\200\235, an agent for the
Cog iys Said

Fï¬\202 would fm say N

"â\200\231Nâ\200\230 t hui satd' " Tk 07
ft.r would begin imn L.ed!Â»-
; ,

Qoo

i Hendrick?Ã©"

to quit
politics?

CAPE TOWN. â\200\224
South Africaâ\200\231s first
Coloured member of
the Cabinet, the Rev
Alan Hendrickse, has
hinted | that he
quit politics
year

Sources close to M
Hendrickse said he
may stand down fo

may
next

L84
personal reasons and d
return full-time to hi
congregational
church in Uitenhage

B

Â£

There 3 specuistion
hat he w uld, however,
cousider : ppoinfment to
some oth o body, such
as the pls aned Nationat
Councll, Â» the Council
of State

Should be make him-
self avai able for any
other pos ton, It would
be in his persopal ca
pacity an not as leader
of the Lai our Party,

Mr He ddrickse, onoe
detaload withowt triad
and a str mg opponeat
f aparti eld, led hix
pesty inte the new dis-
pesmation The party
Bolds 8] Â« f thee B5 seass

i the H wse of Repy-
fessntaliv 3.

He winx sppointad
chatrmen [the Minie-
tersâ\200\231 Coimcl of the
House of Represents
tives and st the same
tome fint Coloured
Calinet B Inister when
e State â\200\230resident, Mr
P W Both i, named the
â\200\234new Espengatiosâ\200\235
Cebdnet v 1984,

Fev ALAN
HENDRICKSE

quendy said he had
â\200\234made no decisionâ\200\235 s
this stage

His re-slection as pa
ty leader &t the last nat-
ional o â\200\230W was
unznimous,â\200\231 although
thers were 3 number of
pomisations for the
other ssuior party posts,
drickss decide w0 mdw
down a8 paty leader,
thers is now strong feel
img that Mr Julies would
soceed him

i

At the { gie Mr Hes- |
drickse 55 eed to take

bus parcy (10 the trica-
meral syst m, he said fts|
P&Itidpsu o would be
reviewsd s ey five yeary
i the ligh of what had
b:ca achi = ;

Cape conyress in Kei-
mocs last v eekead, par-
ty chalrm s, the Rev
Andrew J dies, who

Jmnt body Bill

LUSE (F ASSE MHEL Y Si&egients that the
.Wâ\200\230; 2% o fâ\200\231i~\202â\200\234y Â» :;â\200\230Dt, o o g 101t axecutiva
Buiteentty lo Kwaulu sig Was based on g
â\204çSieation o .,nu;-i~\202t't 3 A0 Songuitation with athay
rare E."â\200\230)'JÂ\$ â\200\234fe Ho "'Ssâ\200\230I"Vâ\200\234 M: â\200\230wâ\200\230_ '_.
';r".â\200\230 Ca,
!*u"â\200\230mm saad
("â\200\230Câ\200\234â\200\231iâ\200\230; in the Secong Pex,z 1Â\$ Debate on the
Joiat Bxee dve Authority for KevaZuly 20Âç Naipd
84 b sq svarybeddy realis " et kad 19 be o
Operation .u.har Aftics

The ques lon was an what basis such ooy fation
bad 10 lake place. The CP ".vum.rmofâ\200\230 that forcing
PEOGIE Oy -racial structores sich 8z the one
Provided fo in the Ril would not acb.t ve the de-
Kifed ."uâ\200\230lâ\200\230
Mr Uys si d it wag ,,.mx the Bij! Othing nocs
than o_ SRy ument in POver-sharing by the Nag-
Kakl Party Â£ overnment. Qne of the clauses made it
possibile & Âç iher the KwaZulu Gevern, nenr or Na-
al's Provin il Execurive 1 v uÂ«-â\200\230n ly cancel the
SOOPErAtiG | ystem at any time

The Srars | resident would have Â» rtio
Beede tosue g "â\200\234t. ("â\200\230-â\200\230 from tnfâ\200\230c party
â\200\234The viah 1Y of the pew /
pendent on .; 2 unilatera! !râ\200\224' S
the paries " 14y U vs gaue
The 'Pwa& hr-a!l; and irre o
wel! lo Sepird & developmen:
#e3 the fird o ap powy vh a mu
gvemimenr fo - the province

v,
5

The Âç Govern nent was UEINE MNUatsl 33 s .'â\200\234;vâ\200\231rl
Agg' or lc ans fo #xtend ull pawe ia z,g
ls

' Blacks lo hie whole of S ut b Africa vi Lows
tofberg (HNP -km'?â\200\234.â\200\230.rb. %410
Oppaoting the wecond Tt'n.uig A the Bil' he seid g
~as the most s mificant legisiztion to coms befure
the House this + asszon

.
Wi
St

The Bil! mad 1 posmbia for 4 B!&gÃ© 4â\200\230.; be-
COme the secon ar â\200\230ky.u\lâ\200\234i~\201 authe or aft of
Natal and fry 34 Jlack] language 10 become 11 thind
official Tangaage o/ Sou th Africs This wae | feat.
Hict with the oy Weation

â\200\234We wre on Âçk, TCad to 5 new dinpre v sutic
(NVCR\H ML 0 angang sheye o spEnsut;

the B!ax\ Tasis will be mVL"x;d A feud
sharing Y0 the |y ume, Erst odth the

Natal and ehen Â» satusiy full POver-shar

vl
it
s