TRANSKEI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

Standing Orders and Operational Procedures Manual

AMENDMENT LIST

NGCOFE W.M.Z.

NO.	AMENDED BY :	DATE

TRANSKEI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

'G

STANDING ORDERS AND OPERATIONAL
PROCEDURES MANUAL

- I N D E X -

A P P E N D I C E S

APPENDIX "A"   STRUCTURE TRANSKEI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

APPENDIX "B"   DETAILE DUTIES OF HEADS OF DESKS AND REGIONAL
REPRESENTATIVES

APPENDIX "C"   PROCEDURE WHEN PREPARING ESTIMATES

APPENDIX "D"   CONTROL OF EXPENDITURE

APPENDIX "E"   MAILING LIST

APPENDIX "F"   TRANSMISSION OF MAIL

APPENDIX "G"   CARDING AND INDEXING

1.   Authority and scope of standing orders

1.1   These standing orders are issued on the authority of the
        Director of the Transkei Intelligence.

1.2   They are designed to assist members in the performance of
        their duties and as a statement of policy for compliance
        by all officers.

1.3   These standing orders must be read in conjuction with :-

        PUBLIC SERVICE ACT 1978 TRANSKEI PUBLIC

        SERVICE REGULATIONS TRANSKEI FINANCIAL
        HANDBOOK

1.4   The procedures and policy laid down will be kept under
        constant review; should an officer consider that they
        should be reviewed because of changing conditions -
        representations should be made to the Director.

AIMS OF THE TRANSKEI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

The Intelligence Service and State Security Act lays down
the function and duty of the Intelligence Service as :

(1) To collect, evaluate, correlate and interpret National
    Security Intelligence for the purpose of :

    (i) detecting and identifying any threat or potential
         threat to the security of the State.

    (ii) advising the Prime Minister of any such threat.

(2) To perform such other functions and duties in relation
    to National Security Intelligence as the Prime Minister
    may from time to time assign to the Intelligence
    Service.

The objectives as defined in 1 (1) above must be clearly
borne in mind in any problem solving, decision making or
other activity in which staff may be engaged in.

CHAPTER 1

ORGANISATION OF THE TRANSKEI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

1.   ORGANISATION

1.1   The organisation of the Transkei Intelligence Service showing
      the chain of responsibility to the Director is set out in
      Appendix "A" to these standing orders.

2.   The Director and Deputy Director

2.1   The Director is responsible to the Prime Minister for the
      following functions and duties.
      (a)   To collect, evaluate, correlate and interpret national
            security intelligence for the purpose of :

            (i)   detecting and identifying any threat or potential
                   threat to the security of the Transkei.

            (ii)   advising the Prime Minister of any such threat

2.2   In addition to these primary responsibilities, the Director
      is responsible for :

      (a)   The efficiency and interior economy of the Service,
            and the training, discipline, efficiency and welfare
            of all members.

      (b)   The efficient operation and management of all Regional
            offices bureaux, and the proper maintenance of all
            records.

(c)   Ensuring the closest co-operation between members of
      the Service and Security Police, Military Intelligence
      and other Government Departments and agencies.

2.3   The duties of Heads of desks and Regional Representatives
      shall be the same as the Director's duties in relation to
      the whole country.

2.4   It is the responsibility of the respective Heads of
      Departments and Regional Representatives to keep the Direc-
      tor informed of all matters relating to national security.

2.5   Detailed duties of all Heads of desks, the officers under
      them, and Regional Representatives are contained in
      Appendix "B".

2.6   The Deputy Director is responsible to the Director for the
      following :-

         (i)   production
         (ii) evaluation
         (iii) technical services

      And through the Head of Administration and the Head of
      Finance for the efficient administration and supervision
      of the Transkei Intelligence Service.

2.7   Head of Production

2.8   The Head of Production is responsible for the collection and
      correlation of all national security intelligence for the
      purpose of detecting and identifying any threat or

potential threat to the security of Transkei.

2.9 Head of Evaluation

2.10 The Head of Evaluation is responsible for the evaluation and correlation of information from all agencies and the preparation of evaluated memorandum.

2.11 Head of Administration

2.12 The Head of Administration is responsible for all such matters relating to the administration of the Service as may be assigned to him by the Director, including the interior economy, efficiency and the correct maintenance of all records and bureaux, estimates and long term planning.

2.13 Head of Finance

2.14 The Head of Finance is responsible for the management of all funds allocated to the Service, budgetary control, estimates long term planning and such other functions as may be assigned to him by the Director.

CHAPTER 2

DISCIPLINE

1.   GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES : ALL MEMBERS

1.1   Every officer shall make himself thoroughly conversant with
      the Public Service Act 1978, Transkeian Government
      Service Regulations, Standing Orders, and all other
      instructions or orders, however published, that may be in
      force at the time of publication of these Standing Orders,
      or that subsequently be issued.

1.2   Every member is responsible to his immediate superior for
      his own conduct and efficiency and for the discipline of
      those members placed under his command, and shall ensure that
      the law, instructions and orders referred to in subsection
      (1.1) are complied with.

1.3   Every member shall :-

      (i)   by his own personal conduct, be a good example to
             his subordinates;

      (ii)   avoid undue familiarity with his subordinates but
             shall adopt an attitude which is compatible with
             civility and kindness;

      (iii) not place himself in a position of fear of accu-
             sation in the event of having to report his sub-
             ordinates for breaches of discipline or for
             misconduct;

(iv)   avoid reproving any subordinate officer in the presence of any member of the public; or other member of a junior rank to that of the officer reproved;

(v)   be impartial in the distribution of duties among his subordinates;

(vi)   perform his own duties efficiently, energetically and in accordance with law, orders and instructions;

(vii)   not issue any advise which are vague, ambiguous or unlawful, but shall exact a ready obedience to his lawful order;

(viii)   always be ready to advise and instruct his sub - ordinates in any matter connected with their duties;

(ix)   not publish any official document or information, nor use the same for personal controversy or private purpose, without the authority of the Director;

(x)   avoid the use of intemperate or irritating language and shall maintain a good temper and treat all persons with courtesy and consideration;

(xi)   practise truthfulness and sobriety at all times;

(xii)   maintain the fullest co-operation with all other officers.

2. OBEDIENCE TO ORDERS

2.1 Every member shall receive the lawful commands of his superior with deference and respect, and shall execute them with alacrity.

2.2 Every superior shall give his orders in temperate language and with due regard to the feelings of those under his command.

2.3 While no member is compelled to obey an order which is obviously unlawful or improper, he shall not refuse or neglect to obey any lawful order from personal motives or considerations.

2.4 Should any member consider that an otherwise lawful order is unfair or unjust to him, he must first obey the order, but may thereafter make representations.

3. ADVERSE REPORTS ON MEMBERS

3.1 Members shall at all times advise their subordinates of any shortcomings which, if not corrected, might lead to an adverse report on them being submitted. Such advise will not be held over until a report is due to be submitted.

3.2 Should any member consider it necessary to submit in writing an adverse report on any subordinate member, the member reported on will be shown the report and will sign it as having read it, unless the report concerns matters of security.

MINOR MISCONDUCT

Any officer who is alleged to have committed any minor irregularity or breach of discipline which does not justify trial. Proceedings may be dealt with summarily by the Deputy Director, Head of Operations, Evaluation or Administration.

Where any minor irregularity is committed by an officer he shall be reprimanded verbally and he will also acknowledge such warning in writing.

If any officer objects to being dealt with summarily for his alleged misconduct he shall state his objections to the Deputy Director who may then direct that the misconduct be the subject of a disciplinary trial.

CRIMINAL CHARGES AGAINST OFFICERS

For the purposes of this section criminal offence means any offence under the common law or statutory enactment.

Where any officer is charged with a criminal offence a concise summary of the facts with supporting statements and a recommendation will be forwarded to the Director.

DRUNKENESS

Any officer who consistently renders himself unfit for duty through the excessive use of alcohol will be the subject of an official enquiry in terms of the Public Service Act.

CHAPTER 2

1.   PAY AND SALARIES GENERAL

1.1   All matters relative to pay and salary are governed by
      the Public Service Act 1978.

1.2   Compensation for loss or damage.

1.3   Compensation may be paid when the personal property of
      officers is lost or damaged when being used during the per-
      formance of an official duty.

ESTIMATES

1.   GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

1.1   The correct planning in the production of estimates must
      take cognisance of such factors as :-

           (i)   establishment or approved posts

           (ii)   growth or expansion of the establishment

           (iii) cost inflation

           (iv)   extension of the services activities

1.2   When considering growth or the extension of activities
      cognisance must be taken of the additional facilities
      required if, for instance, two additional officers are asked
      for then, the following will be required :-

           (i)   Office accommodation

           (ii)   Housing (Single or married accommodation)

           (iii) Transport

           (iv)   Desks and chairs

           (v)   Telephone

           (vi)   Typewriter

2.   PROCEDURE WHEN PREPARING ESTIMATES

2.1   The procedures to be used when preparing estimates are
      contained in Department of Finance minute 6/82. See
      Annexure "C".

3. CONTROL OF EXPENDITURE BY THE TREASURY

3.1 In preparing estimates cognisance must be taken on Depart-
     ment of Finance minute 82/84. See Annexure "D".

CHAPTER 4

INTERNAL SECURITY INSTRUCTIONS

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 The purpose of these instructions are to establish minimum requirements to ensure that matters relating to the activities of the Transkei Intelligence Service are protected and secured.

2. Classifications

All official matters requiring the application of security measures are accordingly divided into the following security classifications :-

2.1 Top Secret

This classification is limited to matters requiring the highest grade of protection of which unauthorised disclosure may, inter alia, lead to :-

   (i) War

  (ii) Severing of diplomatic relations

 (iii) Severing of commercial, military or other important treaties.

  (iv) Compromising of military or intelligence operations or plans.

   (v) Compromising of technological and scientific information of particular importance to security.

(vi) Causing severe embarrassment to the country and the Government in particular

2.2 Secret

This classification is limited to matters of which unauthorised disclosure there of may lead to serious harm to the image of the Republic of Transkei.

2.3 Confidential

This classification is limited to matters of which unauthorised disclosure thereof may be prejudicial to the interests of the Republic of Transkei, or embarass the administration of the state or relations with another state, or may injure the prestige of this Service or a member of this Service.

3. ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED MATTERS

As a general rule only members with a classification of Top Secret shall have access to such matters. Notwithstanding the classification of members, access to classified matters will be restricted to those matters or parts thereof which are necessary for the execution of his duties, i.e. on a "need to know" basis.

4. CLASSIFICATION OF DOCUMENTS

4.1 Each document is classified according to its contents and origin of the contents and not according to its reference to other documents.

4.2 Documents may only be re-classified with the approval of a
Divisional Head or Regional Representative.

5. <u>MARKING OF CLASSIFICATION ON DOCUMENTS AND CLASSIFIED
MATERIAL</u>.

5.1 <u>Bundles</u>

Books, publications, pamphlets and other bound documents must
be marked with a rubber stamp on the top and bottom of both
the front and back covers.

5.2 <u>Loose Documents</u>

The security classification is typed or stamped on the top
and bottom of each page.

5.3 <u>Drawings, Photographs, Blueprints, etc</u>.

The security classification is placed where it will be
noticeable, but care must be taken that essential details
are not obliterated.

5.4 <u>Tape Recordings and other material that cannot be marked</u>.

If it is physically impossible to mark a classified piece,
the piece must be placed in a suitable cover or envelope
which is then sealed. The security classification is then
placed on the cover of envelope.

6.   COPIES OF CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS

6.1   All Secret and Top Secret documents must receive copy
      numbers. Annexures must be numbered likewise.

6.2   No copy or extract of a classified document may be made
      without the approval of a Divisional Head or Regional
      Representative.

6.3   Copies and extracts receive the same security classification
      as the original document.

6.4   Copies of classified documents may only be made if the entire
      document is required, otherwise extracts must be made.

7.   RECEIPT OF INCOMING CLASSIFIED POSTAL ARTICLES.

7.1   An authorised member of the central registry is responsible
      for the receipt, opening, recording and distribution of in -
      coming post. Top Secret documentation are recorded in a
      separate register.

7.2   When opening classified postal articles, documents must be
      carefully checked against the mailing list. Any missing
      or incomplete documents must immediately be reported to
      the Head of Administration or Regional Representative.

7.3   The mailing list recepit must be returned to the sender
      immediately.

7.4 Envelopes and other covers must be carefully inspected before they are opened and any signs that such envelope or other cover have been tampered with must immediately be reported to the Head of Administration or Regional Representative. The envelope or cover will then be opened under his supervision and the contents inspected. It must be decided if a prima facie case of irregularity exists and steps must be taken that the necessary investigation is instituted.

7.5 Envelopes continuing wax and/or paper seals must be destroyed immediately.

8. PREPARATION OF CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS FOR DISPATCH

8.1 A mailing list (example per Appendix E) is prepared and attached to the documents for signature and return by the addressee.

8.2 The documents are placed in a intrasparent envelope (named the inner invelcpe). This inner envelope is prepared as follows :-

8.2.1 On the front in the centre of the envelope, the official address in the usual position, e.g.

The Regional Representative

Transkei Intelligence Service

Butterworth

8.2.2   On the top left hand corner the security classification of
         the contents.

8.2.3   On the top right hand corner, the name/address stamp of the
         sender.

8.2.4   If the envelope contains Top Secret document, the envelope
         may be endorsed below the address as follows, "To be opened
         personally by ...."

         NOTE : Top Secret documents are delivered by courier only.

8.3   The envelope is sealed with passport glue or other suitable
         glue that cannot be steamed open.

8.4   The rear of the envelope is prepared as follows :-

8.4.1   Paper seal are glued with passport glue over both flaps of
         the envelope.

         Date stamps are placed over the seals, covering both the
         seal and the envelope. Large envelopes will require more
         seals. (See example Appendix "F")

8.5   Another intrasparent envelope, named the outer envelope, is
         addressed to the Regional Representative or Head of Administration in person in the normal fashion, e.g.

                    Mr ....
                    P.O. Box .....
                    BUTTERWORTH

8.6   The outer envelope must give no indication as to the nature and classification of the contents of the inner envelope.

8.7   For classified material to large for conventional envelopes, other suitable intrasparent material may be used as inner and outer cover. Knots of string or tape must be suitably sealed.

9. SAFE-KEEPING OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL

9.1   When classified documents are not in use, they must be stored in a safe or strongroom. In the absence of a safe or strongroom, they may be stored in a steel cabinet. The latter must be provided with a suitable lock and be located in a restricted area.

9.2   Classified documents must be placed under lock and key before any member leaves his office.

9.3   No information relating to the subject or the security classification of the contents of any cabinet, safe or strongroom may be displayed on the outside thereof.

9.4   When visitors, messengers, cleaners, etc., enter any classified area, all classified documents must be put away or covered.

9.5   Any cleaning, repairs or other work in classified areas may only be done under the strict supervision of a responsible member of the Service.

10.   DESTRUCTION OF CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS

10.1   Classified documents must be destroyed by means of shredding
       or burning under the direct supervision of a responsible
       member of the Service.

10.2   Concept manuscripts, notes, carbon paper, stencils, blotting
       paper, typewriter ribbons, photographic negatives, etc.
       must be destroyed by burning.

10.3   Tape recordings must be erased as soon as the transcriptions
       have been completed. Old recording tape must be destroyed
       by burning.

REGISTRY - OPERATIONS

1.   OBJECTIVES

      (i)   The storage of information in files

      (ii) The maintenance of an index

      (iii) The retrieval of information from files.

2.   FILES

2.1   Three types of files will be maintained :

      (i)   Personal   -   TIS 76 P/

      (ii) Subject   -   TIS 76 S/

      (iii) Organisation -   TIS 76 O/

3.   NUMBERING OF FILES

3.1   Files will be maintained on a numerical basis.

3.2   The Registry will compile a numerical or master list of files

3.3   An alphabetical index will be established and maintained on
cards, of all personal, subject and organisation files -

3.4   All persons who come to notice will be carded and indexed in
the form of the specimen card - See Appendix "G".

4. OPENING OF FILE

4.1 No new file will be opened without the authority of the Head
     of Registry in liaison with the Deputy Director.

5. BREAKDOWN OF FILES

5.1 It may be necessary to break a file into sub groups in the
     case of subjects and organisations. The following is an
     example of the breakdown of the file of a political
     organisation :-

     TIS 76 O/271/1.   General
                   2.   Organisation
                   3.   Branches
                   4.   Finance
                   5.   Youth League
                   6.   Womens League
                   7.   Meetings
                   8.   Terrorism and sabotage
                   9.   External
                  10.   Recruiting.

5.2 The following is a breakdown of a file relative to a subject
     - "Interest in or by a named state" - South Africa.

     TIS 76 S/255/1/.   General
                   /2.   Political
                   /3.   Economic
                   /4.   Military

5. Psychological

6. Scientific

INSTRUCTIONS FOR CARDING : INDEXING AND FILING OF DOCUMENTS

1. RESPONSIBILITIES "VIS AVIS" PROCESSING REPORTS

1.1 The Head of the Registry or his Deputy will be responsible for processing all incoming reports by checking :-

    (i) that the correct reference numbers appear on the report

    (ii) that sufficient copies of a report have been produced for the relevant files, or that extracts for other files have been prepared.

    (iii) that each report has an ACTION SLIP attached and that instructions to the Registry have been compiles with

    (iv) that reports have been circulated to other Departments or Regional Offices.

3. OPENING OF NEW FILES

3.1 A new file will be opened only on the authority of the Head of Registry in liaison with the Deputy Director.

4. ACTION SLIPS

4.1 All instructions will be entered on the action slip and these must be perused by staff to ensure that the correct indexing and filing procedure is implemented.

    (i) The symbol (1) means that the report is to be passed to the DMI or the Security Police

(ii)   The symbol (2) requires that the report is to be
copied to the DMI or the Security Police

(iii) The symbol (3) means that the report is to be
filed away - no further action geing required by
the Registry staff.

(iv)   The symbol (4) means that previous papers (the
file) is required by the person dealing with the
report.

(v)   The symbol (5) means that the Registry must
card and index all names appearing in the report.

(vi)   The symbol (6) will be used when the Intelli -
gence Officer dealing with the report requires
that a section or part is to be extracted to
another subject, organisation or personal file.

(vii) The symbol (7) is self explanatory and should be
used by Operational and Evaluation staff when
passing on instructions to the Registry.

5.   <u>RESPONSIBILITIES</u> - <u>REGISTRY CLERKS</u>

5.1   Registry clerks will have the following responsibilities :-

(i)   The processing of all reports by carding and
indexing, persons, subjects and organisations as
instructed on the action slip.

(ii)   The copying and filing of all reports after ensu-
ring that carding and indexing has been carried
out.

(iii)   The opening of new files

(iv)   Maintaining a master register of all files

(v)   The maintenance of Administration Policy and
        Finance files.

(vi)   The upkeep of the Departments library and standing
        operational procedures for both the Administra -
        tion, Finance and Operational sections.

6.   EXTRACTS

6.1   Paragraph 4 (vi) relates to extracts. The Registry will be
        instructed when to copy part of a report to another subject,
        personal or organisation file in the format shown in
        Appendix "H".

CHAPTER 7

STRONG ROOM

1. The strong room will be divided into two compartments each
    containing the following :-

    (i) Restricted, confidential, secret, administration
        and finance files.

    (ii) Top secret files.

2. KEYS TO THE STRONG ROOM

2.1 Keys of the strong room will be held by two members of the
    Registry staff.

3. ACCESS

3.1 Registry and Operational staff will have access to that
    compartment of the strong room which contains files
    classified up to Secret.

3.2 "C" desk staff and Divisional Heads only will have access
    to Top Secret files.

CHAPTER 8

INSPECTIONS

1. ### GENERAL

1.1 Two types of inspections will be held :-

    (i) Monthly

    (ii) Annual

1.2 All Regional Offices will be visited and inspected by the Director or the Deputy Director at least once a month.

1.3 An annual inspection of Head Office will take place during the last month of the financial year i.e. 1st - 31st March.

2. ### INSPECTION FORMAT

2.1 Inspections will cover three factors :-

    (i) Administrations

    (ii) Financial records

    (iii) Production, collection, and evaluation

    (iv) Future requirements

2.2 ### ADMINISTRATION

2.3 The following will be inspected :-

    (i) Buildings

    (ii) Staff housing

    (iii) Files, filing system, carding and indexing.

    (iv) Letter register

    (v) Enquiries register

(vi)   Transport

                    (vii) Transport records (i.e. Logs)

2.4   FINANCIAL RECORDS

2.5   (i)   Cash and ancillary books

                (ii) Budgetary control records

2.6   PRODUCTION AND COLLECTION

                (i)   File evaluation

                (ii)   Source files

                (iii) Production files

                (iv)   Targets

                (v)   Patrol targets and patrol areas

                (vi)   Running diary

2.7   FUTURE REQUIREMENTS

2.8   Annual inspections will evaluate all future requirements.

       Thus inspection will cover needs in the following areas :-

                (i)   Staffing

                (ii)   Transport

                (iii) Housing

                (iv)   Office accommodation

                (v)   Office furniture

                (vi)   Office equipment.

PRODUCTION OF GRASSROOTS INTELLIGENCE

1.   THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS.

1.1   In a rural environment the task of an intelligence
       gathering organisation to obtain information is difficult.
       This results from the following :-

            (i)   Communication problems

            (ii) Security of intelligence gathering operations

            (iii) Delay in receiving information

            (iv) Delay in reacting

            (v)   Dominant influence of subversive elements

            (vi) Distrust of alien influences particularly Govern -
                  ment agencies

            (vii) Distance

2.   TARGETS

2.1   These are in the intelligence world always.

                  Persons
                  Subjects
                  Organisations

       Talent spotting for contacts, informers, sources, and agents
       is the bread and butter of an Intelligence Service.
       Positive thinking is the key and the comments in this
       chapter   are relevant.

2.2   TRIBAL AUTHORITIES

2.3   Basic information from a rural area must relate to establi-
shing links with the following persons and organisations :

    (i)   Paramount Chiefs

    (ii)   Minor Chiefs

   (iii)   Administrative Headmen

    (iv)   Tribal Authorities

    (v)   Regional Authorities

Having defined these, intelligence gathering operations
based on patrol targets for the purpose of efficiency and
economy of reporting can be set. Patrol areas must be
allocated to specific intelligence officers.

GENERAL

There are numerous other contacts who can provide intelli -
gence ranging from bus drivers and conductors to Magistrates,
rangers, store owners, hotel keepers, etc. In each case
the question to be asked is :-

How can they help the Service in meeting its
objectives/aims?

2.4   BRIEFING

2.5   For any intelligence gathering operation to be successful
adequate briefing must take place. The basic briefing will
cover all those items listed from paragraph   onwards

2.6   REPORTS

All patrols must be the subject of a concise report on all
persons, subjects and organisations encountered during a
patrol. Where a specific report needs to be drawn up then
a brief reference to this only will be made in the patrol
report and the comment added see TIS 76 O/523 dated 1.2.83

2.7   POLITICAL ORGANISATION

The activities of all Political Parties must be the subject
of reports - Grass roots intelligence will relate to the
existence of branches at all levels and the persons who
sit on local, district or National Committees. In targetti-
ng such organisations for penetration access by a source
is the key word.

2.8   Full details of the persons filling the above positions
must be obtained and listed in area intelligence files.
Information from them would be related to the following :-

       (i)   Areas of conflict relative to relationship between
             a Paramount Chief, Government and the people.

       (ii) The activities of persons who are members of politi -
             cal organisation. List of all office bearers from
             the branch level upwards will be obtained.

       (iii) The activities of persons who are overtly or covertl'
             involved in or would support action against Govern -
             ment by violent or non violent mean.

(iv) Tribal influences which could be used as a
catalyst against Authority.

2.9   SCHOOLING AND EDUCATIONAL MATTERS

2.10 Schools in a rural environment are often a barometer of
local feelings; teachers have a high standing in a commu-
nity and they are close to the people through the youth
particularly at Secondary school level. Information on
attitudes to current national local affairs should be
obtained by examining:

(i)   The atmosphere at a specific educational institu-
tion which may be affected by a number of facto.
i.e. Location, histroy of political awareness.

(ii) Incident of ill discipline i.e. boycotts and ac
of violence against persons and property.

(iii) Scholars particularly those in the matric class
who have left school midway through a term.

2.11 RELIGIOUS ORGANISATION

2.12 The church plays an important role in the life of a rura
community and the attitude of churchmen to current natio
and local affairs should be researched.

2.13 ACTIVITIES OF SOCIAL CLUBS etc

2.14 The identification of these organisations and their memb
provides, information on the activities of front organisa
tions for banned political parties.

2.15   LAND AGRICULTURE AND HOUSING

2.16   Conflicts arise where Government for   development purpo-
       ses is forced to take a hand in the above matters.

2.17   MIGRATION AND UNUSUAL MOVEMENTS OF PERSONS

2.18   Refugees from adjacent states can provide information on
       matters of interest such as

                        Political
                        Economic
                        Military

2.19   EXPATRIATES

2.20   Can be defined as a person who has left the Transkei and
       proceeded to a foreign country with the express purpose of
       undergoing military training to overthrow the government of
       Transkei. The whereabouts of such a person, family and
       friends is to be established.

3.   THE ROLE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER AT GRASS ROOTS LEVEL

3.1   INTELLIGENCE

3.2   The acquisition of reliable intelligence is the major
       factor in countering subversion of any form. It enables us
       to secure a better knowledge of the current threat and
       hereby to decide upon the most effective method of defeating
       enemies of the state.

See Appendix A re
sectors & agencies
NB ✓ al Not levels
reproduced at begin
× 9 ?
Internal security with SIS
of ch ⊕

3.3   Intelligence will not produce itself; it must be worked fo

3.4   It may be secured in many ways as, for example, from
informers documents arrested insurgents and intelligence
agents, defectors, public records, etc. These may be
divided into two classes, viz :

    (i) Overt, meaning readily and freely available.

    (ii) Covert, meaning concealed and restricted.

3.5   Good intelligence yields success, which in turn produces
public confidence in the police and government, leading to
even better intelligence. Effective grass roots intelligen
nce work will ensure that this is a continuous process.

3.6   The most valuable information usually stems from covert
reports submitted by informers.

3.7   Sources and contacts are also used and these can be define
as :-

    (i) Source, sometimes called agents. Recruited speci
fically, after examination of his background, for
the purpose of gaining access to a designated
target.

    (ii) CONTACTS, is not specifically recruited. He has
fortuitous access to a target and does not operat
in response to positive direction. He works on a
non-continuous basis and is prepared to pass occa
sional intelligence. His value is considered on
current basis.

He may be developed into informer in due course.

3.8 Anyone may become an Informer, and for any one of several
reasons, the intelligence officer should not consider that
their efforts to develop Informers must be restricted to
persons of any particular social level and should not, for
example, consider that leading members of the community
such as teachers, senior clerks, large landowners, tribal
heads, etc. are beyong approach. This applies equally to
known subversive group.

3.9 Some of the factors to be considered by the intelligence
officer when using Informers are listed below :-

    (i) Examine the existing distribution of Informers,
          bearing in mind each one's potential limit in
          any specific field to decide where additional
          coverage is needed.

    (ii) Consider potential Informers in the area where
           existing coverage is weak. Decide upon an
           approach, over a protracted period, to a sele -
           cted number. The approach must be gradual and
           there must not be a direct invitation to provide
           information at this stage.

    (iii) In due course certain person will be indicated
           as a warranting further development. Concentrate
           on these. It is a common mistake for the
           intelligence officers to endeavour to recruit
           too many Informers simultaneously. Two reliable
           informers, whose respective reports may be

compared, are infinitely more valuable than a large
number of dubious worth.

(iv) Develop is a long-term process. An informer's confide-
nce is paramount and hasty development will destroy it.
On no account will an informer be approached for infor-
mation by anyone other than his "runner" unless prior
agreement has been received from him. Similarly, arra-
ngements must be made well in advance to ensure that an
informant's aid is not lost in the event of casualties
occasioned by the transfer or illness of the intelli-
gence officer.

(v) In such instances, should an informer refuse to accept
another operator, his existing "runner" should make
suitable arrangements to ensure continued future
contact. This is to avoid permanent loss of the
informant's value.

(vi) Do not expose informers to unnecessary risk. For
example, the operator should not insist on the produ-
ction of actual documents when an oral report would
suffice.

(vii) Meetings with informers must be carefully planned.
Ensure that there is agreements as to time and place,
and that safety is assured. Do not consider that all
meetings are essentially covert. Circumstances may
indicate that meetings arranged to coincide with
normal behaviour are best, as, for example, an open
visit to a co-operative storekeeper during business
hours.

(viii) Ensure that sufficient time has been allowed for briefing of the informer.

(ix) Briefing must be specific and fully understood. Avoid vague directions such "Keep an eye open for anything of interest." During slack periods create work for an informer, even if it is petty. This will enable him to grow accustomed to this work and to his operator. It will afford valuable experience for him, as well as build his confidence.

(x) During briefing, be careful not to say too much. There is a danger of revealing the extent of our knowledge and, also, of having an informer repeat the briefing almost exactly during debriefings thereby giving a false impression of efficiency.

(xi) Exercise forethought. If a suspect group is becoming established, encourage the informer to associate himself with it in order that he might be in a position to provide information should the group commence subsequent subversive activity.

4. GENERAL

4.1 Public support is essential to the success of a anti-Government campaign whether violent or non violent. It is equally important to successful counter-insurgency.

4.2 Each intelligence officer must familiarise himself with local community.

He cannot know everyone but, with diligence, can secure
sufficient knowledge to enable an accurate assessment to
area to be made by him.

4.3 The intelligence officer must understand current affairs,
and be able to act as government's spokesman in assisting
members of the public in understanding the reasons upon
which contentious and unpopular decisions might have been
based, and counteract any subversive propaganda that is
being disseminated.

4.4 If such problems are beyond his ability, it might require a
visit to the area by Senior Government or Local Authority
officials. In any event, he must be able to submit prompt
and accurate reaction reports in such circumstances.

4.5 The intelligence officer has a particularly important task
in allaying fear and doubt among the rural community with
regard to the infiltration of armed insurgents; and in
encouraging close co-operation with Government agencies.
The following points can always be made in discussions with
the public :

(i) Co-operation with insurgents present danger from
two sources; firstly from the insurgents themselves
as their intentions and temperament are unknown
factors; secondly from the Security Forces, in that
co-operation with insurgents could result in the
death of terrorist collaborators or, alternatively,
lengthy imprisonment and detention.

(ii) In all other instanecs, known or suspected insur -
gent activity within an area must be reported to
the Police without delay.   Persons resident in
remote areas must be advised that any inconvenience
thereby incurred will be fully compensated.

4.6 Note books must be in constant use throughout each day, and
entries made at the earliest opportunity to avoid matters
being forgotten or overlooked. The note book is not a log
or essay book, nor a means of merely checking a detail's
movements on patrol. Notes should be brief; a note book is
an aid to memory and the intelligence officer must employ it
as such.

4.7 Matters of obvious importance should be reported without
delay, even if the patrol is broken. Details must cover an
area by visiting specific targets if informers have been
correctly distributed and a sound knowledge of the local
community has been acquired, members will be alive to pre-
vailing conditions and any new developments.

4.8 The intelligence officer is engaged on security work. Other
than in exceptional circumstances he must not involve him -
self in matters of a criminal nature when engaged on intelli-
gence gathering.

(i) The payment of substantial rewards for informa-
tion received must be stressed.

(ii) Tribal Authorities, such as Chiefs, Headmen,
kraalheads and messengers, have a responsibility
in this regard.

It is the safety of their own people that is endangered
by insurgents.

(iii) Lawful Government represents Legality + Construction
+ Results. The insurgents represent Illegality +
Destruction + Promises.

4.9 The intelligence officer must visit the families of expatria-
tes as defined in paragraph   (2.20) whenever possible.

4.10 The intelligence officer must acquire a thorough topographi-
cal knowledge on their area. Once established, this knowledge
will be an invaluable aid.

4.11. This knowledge will also assist where the presence in the
area of subversive elements is suspected but unconfirmed.
The following indications are examples :-

(i) Disaffection and hostility amongst the public,
where such was previously absent. Changes in
general attitude must always be reported.

(ii) A marked absence of young men in the area, which
cannot be satisfactorily explained.

(iii) Signs of increased traffic on paths or roads not
usually busy.

(iv) Increased poaching, stock theft, store breakings,
etc.

(v) Reports of undetected explosions and gun shots.

  (vi) Increased return of expatriates to the area, especially
     where they travel frequently either within the area
     or beyond, or ask numerous questions.

  (vii) The presence of strangers, especially if they are
     making numerous enquiries, idling in the vicinity
     of stores, Government offices, etc.

 (viii) Large, uncommon, purchases of food from local stores.

  (ix) Increased movement within the area or beyond of known
     suspects normally resident there.

4.12 Attention must be paid to local tribal habits and customs.
Senior tribal authorities must be visited at every opportu -
nity and accorded all due respect but avoid any suggestion
of subservience.

CHAPTER 10

INTELLIGENCE GATHERING

1.   THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS

1.1   Meaning of INTELLIGENCE

- Information which is -

- relevant to the defined aims and objectives
  of the Service

- reliable (there are varying levels of
  reliability)

2.   TRANSKEI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE'S TASK

2.1   To protect the nation against the threat of -

Espionage

Subversion

sabotage

terrorism

3.   The Intelligence Process

(i) Assess the THREAT

(ii) Gather INTELLIGENCE

(iii) Assess its RELIABILITY

(iv) RECORD it

(v) DISSEMINATE it

(iv) Take ACTION

4.   The THREAT

4.1   Which PERSON

           ORGANISATION

           COUNTRY

poses an espionage or subversive threat?
These are the TARGETS of the Service.

5.   INTELLIGENCE GATHERING

5.1   There are two basic methods :-

(i) Open (or overt) sources;

(ii) Secret (or covert) sources.

5.2   The Service deals in FACTS

6.   RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT

6.1   Evaluate the source

6.2   Collate the information (i.e. compare it with other
INTELLIGENCE, or COLLATERAL information)

6.3   THROW OUT THE RUBBISH !!!!!

7.   <u>RECORD IT</u>

7.1   Make sure only RELIABLE intelligence goes into T.I.S.
        records.

7.2   The records are the Services' "<u>MEMORY</u>".

7.3   <u>PROTECT YOUR RECORDS</u>

8.   <u>DISSEMINATE INTELLIGENCE</u>

8.1   Pass the intelligence to those who "<u>Need to know</u>".
        <u>Note</u> : <u>Report writing</u>: passing on relevant and reliable
                    intelligence accurately.

9.   <u>TAKE ACTION</u>

9.1   Armed with good intelligence, those whose duty it is to
        prevent acts of Espionage, Subversion, Sabotage or
        Terrorism can <u>ACT</u> swiflty to prevent the threats
        becoming a reality.

<u>COUNTER - ESPIONAGE</u>

1. <u>INTRODUCTION</u>

1.1 How do we counter or protect ourselves against the
activities of a hostile Intelligence Service?

1.2 The threat must be clearly defined thus -

(i) The Internal Threat; and the

(ii) External Threat.

1.3 What are the specific targets within the country of the
hostile Intelligence Service?

- Always remember that <u>PREVENTION</u> is better than <u>CURE</u>.

2. <u>TARGETS OF A HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE</u>

2.1 Be aware of the weight of the current espionage attack;

2.2 Recognise that any public servant, whether he has access
to classified information or not, is a potential target
for recruitment; and

2.3 All contact by public servants (or others) with
individuals from hostile countries should be monitored
and reported to the Service immediately.

3. General Defences

3.1 Ensure that the protective security system is adequate, i.e. buildings, documents and personnel;

3.2 Movement through all ports of entry, i.e. airports and border posts will be strictly controlled. The names of all persons of security interest or potential security interest, whether they are entering or exiting the country will be recorded;

3.3 Interviewing people of security interest provides a wealth of Intelligence;

3.4 Close links must be maintained with the Visa Section;

3.5 Liaison with Intelligence Services of friendly countries for an exchange of Intelligence of mutual interest.

4. Speicific Defences (i.e. Missions etc.)

4.1 Any official building can be used as a legal residency. An Intelligence Service may be found in any of the following - Embassy, Consulate, Trade Mission, Press Office Information Office, Cultural Office, National Tourist Office, National Airline Office, National Bank, etc.

4.2 Official building will always have diplomatic immunity.

7.   <u>Patterns Which Assist In Identifying Intelligence Officers</u>

7.1   Use of counter-surveillance techniques;

7.2   Those with a wide range of contacts;

7.3   Those apparently ignorant in their ostensible job;

7.4   Those with more freedom in relation to their colleagues
and as to where they live.

7.5   A mental capacity that would appear to warrant a better
job.

7.6   Those holding a low rank, speaking several languages,
exceptionally broad interests,

7.7   Those working overtime or at irregular hours.

7.8   Those with ostensible jobs that do not keep them fully
occupied.

7.9   Holding a lower rank to what they have been known to hold
elsewhere.

7.10   Unusual freedom to entertain particularly in lavish or
exotic places;

7.11   Those in touch with other known Intelligence Officers
especially on arrival where the association cannot be
readily explained.

8.   <u>General Hints</u>

8.1   A complete picture should be drawn up of individuals and
      also of the Mission as a whole.

8.2   The investigation of Intelligence Officers or suspected
      Intelligence Officers will provide an indication as to
      where the hostile Intelligence Service is directing its
      efforts, and the possible identification of agents.

8.3   The employment of counter espionage techniques can be
      introduced once the field work has been completed.

OVERT AND OFFICIAL SOURCES OF INTELLIGENCE

1.   Overt sources have certain advantages over Covert Sources:

        (i)   Simpler

        (ii)   Cheaper

        (iii) Reliable

        (iv)   Often Quicker

        (v)   Less risk of compromise

        (iv)   Can be used with greater freedom.

      But Remember :- THE OPPOSITION KNOWS YOU KNOW

2.   Overt Sources

2.1   Library of authoritative publications

2.2   Press, magazines, etc.

        (i)   Published by Target Organisationa

        (ii)   The National Press

2.3   Interviews and field enquiries

        (i)   Granted

        (ii)   Imposed

2.4   Interrogation

2.5   Searches

        (i)   Body

        (ii)   House

        (iii) Road Checks

3.   <u>Official Sources</u>

3.1   Official Records including :-

      (i)   Establishment

      (ii)   Personnel

      (iii)   Departmental, etc.

3.2   Official Contacts :-

      (i)   Ministeries and Departments

      (ii)   Armed Forces

      (iii)   Police

      (iv)   Industry, etc.

EVALUATION

1. ASSESSMENT OF A REPORT

1.1 It must be remembered that an accurate assessment is a two part exercise and separate cognisance must be taken of :-

(i)   THE RELIABILITY OF THE SOURCE
(ii) THE ACCURACY OF THE INFORMATION

1.2 Both these aspects must be carefully considered before making an assessment.

2. THE RELIABILITY OF THE SOURCE

2.1 The source himself must be examined when assessing his reliability and both his access to information and past history must be considered.

2.2 There are a number of reasons which motivate a source to provide information and the reasons in respect of each source should be carefully studied and identified. The most common are :-

(i)   A sense of patriotism or duty to the State;

(ii) A desire to provide information for monetary reward;

(iii) A desire for revenge or to settle an old score;

(iv) The source is under some form of co-ercion or compulsion by his runner.

2.3   The author of the report is being asked in effect to look

at the source carefully, judge him correctly and give

him a grade or mark in respect of his reliability.

2.4   The following letters are used to denote the source's

degree of reliability :-

                 A - Completely reliable

                 B - Usually reliable

                 C - Fairly reliable

                 D - Not usually reliable

                 E - Unreliable

                 F - Reliability unknown

2.5   Each of these classifications or gradings will be

examined in some detail.

2.6   <u>COMPLETELY RELIABLE</u>

2.6.1   Few sources are completely reliable and the classifica -

tion "A" should be seldom used for a number of reasons :-

       (i)   Even when a source is reporting what he has seen

and heard, he will place an interpretation on

events, which will be coloured by his own precon -

ceived ideas and experiences. He will in all

probability do so quite subconsciously and may not

even realise that he is doing it. The author of

any report, which is produced as a result of that

information, must keep that factor in mind when making his assessment.

(ii) The classic and well proven example of personal interpretation is in the case of a road accident. It is a known fact that if for example five people witness a road accident, each one of them will remember something slightly different, and each version will differ accordingly;

(iii) This same human trait is equally apparent when questioning a number of people, for example who have heard a political speech, each one will remember what is said slightly differently and put more importance on one aspect than another;

(iv) It can be seen, perhaps, more clearly why a source acting in good faith might well subconsci - ously misinterpret events he has witnessed, and why the classification "A" - Completely Reliable - should be used with caution;

(v) The classification "A" should be used mainly in respect of documentary evidence obtained in circumstances, which leave no doubt as to its authenticity;

2.6.2 USUALLY RELIABLE "B"

2.6.3 The classification "B" is generally the highest grading
given to human source for the reasons outlined in the
previous paragraph. The classification is usually rese-
rved for sources who have been on the books for a consi-
derable time and have a record or history of consistent
reliability.

2.6.4 FAIRLY RELIABLE "C"

2.6.5 The classification "C" is normally given to good quality
contacts and sources who are in the process of establi-
shing their reliability, and are developing a record of
trustworthiness. A "C" rated source or contact may well
in the fullness of time be upgraded to "B".

2.6.6 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE "D"

2.6.7 A "D" rated source is a source or contact who has a
history of passing on reliable information, but on
occasions has produced accurate information. This type
of source has tendency to exaggerate and embellish his
information to make it more acceptable. Great care must
be taken with a source or contact like this not to
upgrade him prematurely. and such a course of action
should be undertaken only after his reportage has
become consistently more reliable.

2.6.8   UNRELIABLE "E"

2.6.9   The classification "E" is given to a contact, who has
         proven record of unreliability. But such a contact will
         sometimes provide information of such nature that it
         cannot be disregarded and it is reported in case it is
         substatiated from a more reliable quarter. This type
         of source or contact is usually a grass root type, who
         is always making approached in the hope of monetary
         reward, but as previously stated he will sometimes
         provide information which because of its seriousness
         cannot be overlooked.

3.   THE ACCURACY OF THE INFORMATION

3.1   The accuracy of the information forms the second part of
         the assessment and refers only to the INFORMATION and not
         to the source. When assessing accuracy, the nature of
         the information, and whether it has been substantiated
         either directly or indirectly from any other source must
         be taken into account. The probability of the informa -
         tion, being true based on the author of the report's
         knowledge of the subject must also be considered.

3.2   The rating or gradings for accuracy are as follows :-

              1. - Confirmed by independent sources

2. - Probably true

3. - Possibly true

4. - Doubtful

5. - Improbable

6. - Impossible to say.

3.2.1   CONFIRMED BY INDEPENDENT SOURCES 1

3.2.2   The majority of information obtained at station level
        may well only originate from one source and in some
        instances may be confirmed by another. It is clear at
        this level the use of grading 1, should not used, and
        it would probably be only at Provincial or Headquarters
        level that a grading of one could be allocated providing
        the information could be

3.2.3   PROBABLY TRUE 2

3.2.4   It is, perhaps necessary to refer to the dictionary
        definition of "probable" and fully appreciate the
        meaning of the word before deciding whether an item of
        information warrants a 2 or 3 classification.

        The Collins Dictionary defines probable as meaning :-

"likely; to be expected; having more evidence for
than against". The third definition "having more
evidence for than against" is most suited to
our purpose, when assessing information.

3.2.5   POSSIBLY TRUE 3

3.2.6   Again reference has been made to the dictionary for the
definition of "possible" which is defined as :-

> "capable of being; or of coming into being;
> liable to happen; worthy of consideration.

3.2.7   DOUBTFUL 4

3.2.8   The dictionary definition of doubtful has been referred
to again, and the most relevant definition for our
purposes would be :-

> "uncertain or questionable , dubious or Obscure."
> Thus where the truth or accuracy of the informa -
> tion is questionable a grading of 4 should be
> applied.

3.2.9 IMPROBABLE 5

3.2.10 Improbable is defined as "unlikely", and remembering we are imposing the test on the truth of the information, we may define the information as "unlikely to be true"; and if the information fits that test than a 5 should be the grade.

3.2.11 IMPOSSIBLE TO SAY 6

3.2.12 The accuracy grade of 6 should be applied when dealing with information which the author at the time of writing is unable to confirm or refute from any other source available to him. However, the nature of the information is such that it cannot be disregarded as either doubtful or improbable on the other hand, or probable or possible on the other. The author is in essence keeping an open mind.

There is no objection to reporting information with an assessed accuracy grade of 6, because when it is examined at Provincial or Headquarters level, it may well be corroborated by information already received from another source.

4. CONCLUSION

4.1 It must be stressed that the grading of a report involves two separate and distinct processes - RELIABILITY AND ACCURACY.

This should be noted that a B graded source does not automatically report information which is rated 2. This is a common mistake in linking B and 2.

4.2 It is not in any way detrimental to a B source for him to produce information which is rated 6, i.e. usually reliable source has passed on information which may be second or third hand because of the circumstances in which it was obtained and it is "impossible to say" whether it is accurate. Similarly a source rated F - Reliability unknown does not always pass on 6 information - "impossible to tell". When classifying a report remember the two sets -

(1)   THE RELIABILITY OF THE SOURCE

(2)   THE ACCURACY OF THE INFORMATION.

CHAPTER 14

AGENT RUNNING

1.   DEFINITIONS:

1.1   Agent : A person under the regular direction and control
             of an agent runner who gathers intelligence
             secretly.

1.2   Informant : A person who provides information but is
                  not under regular direction and control.

1.3   Clean Agent : A person, chosen for his or her personal
                    qualities and characteristics, who is
                    recruited and then seeks access to a
                    target.

1.4   Turned Agent : A person already in or alongside a target
                     organisation who is recruited to provide
                     intelligence on that target.

2.   Advantages of an Agent over other Sources

2.1   He is human and flexible

2.2   He can interpret what he sees and hears;

2.3   He may be able to obtain documentary intelligence;

2.4   He can provide character sketches;

2.5   He can go underground with the target organisation if it
      is prescribed;

AGENT RUNNING

1.   DEFINITIONS:

1.1   Agent : A person under the regular direction and control
             of an agent runner who gathers intelligence
             secretly.

1.2   Informant : A person who provides information but is
             not under regular direction and control.

1.3   Clean Agent : A person, chosen for his or her personal
             qualities and characteristics, who is
             recruited and then seeks access to a
             target.

1.4   Turned Agent : A person already in or alongside a target
             organisation who is recruited to provide
             intelligence on that target.

2.   Advantages of an Agent over other Sources

2.1   He is human and flexible

2.2   He can interpret what he sees and hears;

2.3   He may be able to obtain documentary intelligence;

2.4   He can provide character sketches;

2.5   He can go underground with the target organisation if it
       is prescribed;

2.6   He may be able to foresee risks to the operation;

2.7   He may be able to assist in technical operations.

3.   Disadvantages of an Agent

3.1   He will have human weaknesses and failings (may drink too
       much, be extravagant, indiscreet, etc.);

3.2   He may develop personal problems,

3.3   He may be time-consuming if he is to be run properly.

4.   There are seven main phases in any agent operation :-

4.1   Establishing the requirement i.e. relate it to aims and
       objectives.

4.2   Finding the agent;

4.3   Assessing his suitability

5.   The Work

5.1   By its nature, agent running demands maturity, sensitivity
       and self discipline. An agent runner works largely on
       his own, the agent's life and his may be at risk or there
       may be risk of severe political embarrassment - if the
       operation is compromised. It should always be remembered
       that agents are run to gather intelligence, to meet
       specific requirements. The agent runner must be able to
       assess his operation(s) objectively and judge whether
       they are producing a worthwhile intelligence dividend.

AGENT ACQUISITION

1. THE REQUIREMENT, FINDING THE AGENT, SELECTION AND
ASSESSMENT

1.1 The Requirement :

1.1.1 Because agent operations are expensive in officer time,
they should only ever be mounted in response to specific
requirements.

1.1.2 The requirements will be laid by management (not by indi -
vidual agent runners) and will depend upon the threat
stemming from espionage, sabotage, subversion and terrorism.

.1.1.3 The list of targets for agent operations should be up-dated
on a regular basis (say - 6 monthly). Agent operations
may take a long time to mount and develop - it is no good
saying, "Right, lets have an agent in such-and-such an
organisation to cover next Saturday's meeting".

2. Finding the Agent

2.1 Having established the requirement, we have to find the
agents. There are many sources of potential agents, e.g. :

    (i) The uniformed police

    (ii) CID.

    (iii) Desk officers in CID;

   (iv) Talent spotters;

   (v) Existing agents;

   (vi) Colleagues and friends;

  (vii) The agent runner himself

 (viii) A resources index

2.2 None of these will be able to suggest possible agents unless they are fully briefed on the requirements of the Service.

3. <u>Selection and Assessment</u> :

3.1 Having found a potential agent, identify him fully, assess his suitability, taking into account :

   (i) likely motivation (ideological, mercenary, dislike of violence or the aims and methods of the targets, personal grudge, patriotism, personal respect/liking for the agent runner, etc.)

   (ii) personal characteristics (sobriety, honesty, acceptabilityto the target, robustness, discretion etc.)

  (iii) family circumstances - what effect might an agent role have on his family?

  (iv) career/job prospects - what effect might an agent role have on his promotion or job prospects?

(v)   the security of the operation - e.g. is he already
       known to be friendly with the police or authorities?

3.2   If the answers to these questions are satisfactory, he can
be considered for recruitment.

AGENT RUNNING

1. APPROACH AND RECRUITMENT, OPERATIONAL SECURITY, TRADECRAFT
    AND MEETINGS

1.1 Approach and recruitment

1.1.1 The time and place for a recruitment approach must be
carefully chosen by the agent runner. The aim is to create
circumstances in which the potential agent is likely to
accept the agent runner's proposition while, at the same
time, leaving the agent runner free to withdraw with the
least possible embarrassment to himself or his service.
The keys to successful recruitment are :-

> (i) thorough background research and preparation;
>
> (ii) the establishment of trust between the potential
> agent and the agent runner.

1.1.2 The agent runner must decide :-

> (a) whether the approach is to be made on official or
> non-official premises;
>
> (b) how the question of an agent role is to be introduced
> into the interview/conversation;
>
> (c) what cover story can be used to account for the
> meeting.

2. OPERATIONAL SECURITY

2.1 Operational security is the responsibility of the agent
    runner. It includes :-

        (i)   the agent's own security

        (ii) the agent runner's security;

        (iii) control of knowledge of the operation

        (iv) consideration of the effect of compromise on other
              associates operations

3. Tradecraft

3.1 Tradecraft is the technique used by agent runners and agents
    to conceal the clandestine nature of their relationship.
    It is considered under four headings :-

        (i)   Personal contacts;

        (ii) Impersonal contacts;

        (iii) Anti- and Counter-surveillance;

        (iv) Agent training.

3.2 Personal contacts include meetins at fixed points and on the
    move - in vehicle, hotels, bars, safe premises, etc.

3.3 Impersonal contacts include the use of the telephone, the
    post, dead letter boxes, signals, live letter boxes,
    couriers, etc.

3.4 The following thought process is helpful in deciding how
    to communicate with an agent :-

```
┌──────────────────┐                    ┌──────────────────┐
│ Can we safely be │                    │ Yes, if we have a│
│                  │                    │                  │
│ seen together    │                    │ cover story.     │
└──────────────────┘                    └──────────────────┘


         NO              YES                Cover Story


    IMPERSONAL                          PERSONAL

    CONTACT                             CONTACT
```

3.5   Anti-surveillance is a set of procedures used by an
       individual to establish whether he is under surveillance,
       to identify the people who are watching him and, if
       necessary, to loose them.

3.6   Counter-surveillance is the deployment of colleagues to
       establish whether an individual (either the agent runner
       of the agent) is under surveillance.

3.7   Agent training may include :-

       (i)   Improving the agent's powers of observation,
              access and reporting
       (ii)   tradecraft
       (iii) technical resources - e.g. the use of cameras
              or tape recorders
       (iv)   specialist training for particular operations.

4. BRIEFING, DEBRIEFING, PRODUCING THE REPORT, AND AGENT
   RECORDS

4.1 Briefing and debriefing

4.1.1 At any meeting with an agent, the following sequence of
events must be rigidly adhered to :-

    (a) confirm the cover story

    (b) arrange the next meeting

    (c) briefing

    (d) debriefing

    (e) administration and welfare

4.1.2 Debriefing - the agent should be allowed to pass over
the information he has gathered in his
own time. Supplementary question are
best left until the end unless there is a
lot of material on a variety of subjects.
Agents should be trained to report
accurately, succinctly and in a logical
sequence, and to differentiate clearly
between fact and comment.

4.1.3 Briefing - Briefings for future tasks should be given
clearly and simply, and must take into
account the agent's capabilities and
limitations.

4.1.4 Producing the report

4.1.5 After each meeting, the agent runner should produce :-

(i) a "contact note"; this gives the date, time,
     place and duration of the meeting, payments made,
     equipment issued or withdrawn, arrangements for the
     next meeting, comments on the agent's morale and
     welfare problems, a very brief note of the infor -
     mation passed over at a meeting (in heading form
     only) and any briefing given.

(ii) a series of "source reports" each one dealing with
     a specific subject covered by the agent.

4.1.6 Agent Records

4.1.7 Each agent should have (at least) two files :-

(i) an administration file (usually his original PF).
     This should contain his personal particulars,
     enquiries made before recruitment, financial
     arrangements, target organisations and the agent's
     positions within them, communication arrangements,
     Intelligence Officers known to the agent (e.g. -
     case officers, desk officers etc,) training given,
     equipment issued, welfare and personal problems,
     security notes and a record of each meeting.

(ii) an intelligence record file. This contains only a
note of the requirement the agent was recruited to
meet, documents produced by the agent, a copy of
each source report and consumer comments on the
source reports.

4.1.8 Agent's files should be kept seperately from other PFs
and access to them should be controlled on a strict
need-to-know basis.

5. PAYMENT AND REWARD

5.1 General principles

5.1.1 Two basic principles should be applied :-

(i) the agent is an employee of the T.I.S. and, as such,
is entitled to reasonable remuneration for his
work.

(ii) an agent should never be "out of pocket". All
reasonable expenses incurred through his activities
as an agent must be reimbursed in full.

Methods of payment

5.1.2 There are three baisc methods of payment :-

(i) regular salary - this has the advantages of making
the agent feel part of the Service,

discouraging fabrication or the holding back of
information and gives the agent pay rises to work for
and look forward to :-

(ii) bonuses - can usefully be combined with a regular
salary but they must be used judiciously

(iii) payment by results - is dangerous because it encou -
rages fabrication and the holding back of information
"for next time."

5.1.3   Payments may be made :-

(i)   in cash

(ii)   into a bank/savings account

5.1.4   It is essential that an agent should never be seen by
members of the target organisation to have more money than
he can account for.

5.1.5   Some agents feel it their duty to work for the Service and
may feel insulted by an offer of payment. They can be
generous birthday and/or Christmas presents, but these
must be carefully chosen.

6.   RELATIONSHIPS, TERMINATION AND RESETTLEMENT

6.1   Relationships

6.1.1 The relationship between an agent runner and his agent may
       become very close. The agent runner is often the only
       person who knows everything about the agent's life and
       to whom the agent can turn for guidance on personal
       problems and so on.

6.1.2 While encouraging trust and confidence, the agent runner
       must always be able to look at an operation objectively
       and judge whether it is producing a worthwhile intellige -
       nce dividend. If it is not - and if there is no prospect
       of its doing so in the future - the operation should be
       terminated.

6.1.3 Agent runners are always likely to be posted to other
       stations or departments and must therefore be able to
       hand their agents over to other runners. This will be
       most easily achieved if the agent has been told at the begi-
       nning of the operation that it is likely to happen, and
       if the agent runner makes it clear that his replacement
       is as professional, secure and well trained as he is.

7.   Termination

7.1   The termination of agent operation is almost always a
       difficult and delicate business.

The agent is likely to have come to value his relationship with the agent runner - and the Service - and to rely on the money he receives from them.

7.2   The chief risk in terminating a case is that the agent will go away feeling anoyed, frustrated and dissatisfied, and that he may express these feelings through indiscretion - e.g. going to the press or even to the target organisation.

7.3   Every termination will be different but, in general, the reasons for it must be clearly explained to the agent and discussed with him - in carefully chosen circumstances - he should be reminded that it is an offence to disclose classified information to those not authorised to receive it, and a generous terminal grant gratuity may help.

PREPARATION FOR AN INTERVIEW

1.   DEFINITION

1.1   An interview is a conversation between two people on a
      subject with a specific objective in view.

1.2   A security interview is either:

      (a) for gathering information, or
      (b) for assessing an individual
      Sometimes both aspects are involved.

2.   RESPONDENT PERSONALITY PROFILE

2.1   Respondents charater and personality, intelligence,
      temperament, special aptitudes, fundamental drives and
      attitudes, prejudices. Information from personal files,
      Service and staff records, Police, transcribers, agents.

3.   STUDY SUBJECT MATTER

3.1   Full knowledge is essential. If points are missed or
      misinterpreted, wrong assessments may result.

4.   PRELIMINARY PLAN

4.1   Main objective, information gathering or assessment.
      Detailed objective : define precisely what the interview
      is meant to achieve.

4.2 <u>Key Areas</u> : pinpoint key areas of the case where facts
vital to the achievement of your objective will be found.

4.3 <u>Questions</u> : consider wording of important questions.

4.4 <u>Administration</u>

   (i)   Where - alternatives and timing

  (ii) How to call respondent

 (iii) Special arrangements

  (iv) Maps

   (v) Photographs

  (vi) Surveillance

 (vii) Recording

4.5 <u>APPLY LOGIC</u> to all aspects of preparation.

4.6 <u>PROBE</u> anything which does not satisfy you.

4.7 <u>ENSURE</u> everything in the file is understood.

THE CONDUCT OF AN INTERVIEW

1.   KNOW YOURSELF

1.2   An interviewer must know himself; and recognise and control
       his bias, prejudices, weakness and strengths.

1.3   Do not allow yourself to be embarrassed by topics which are
       distasteful to you.

2.   BODY OF INTERVIEW

2.1   Contructive approach - always make it easy for respondent
       to give you the information you want.

2.2   Assess everything you are told logically. Could it have
       happened this way? Does it tie in with your existing
       knowledge?

2.3   Is it probable?

2.4   Probe everything thoroughly and ensure relevant aspects are
       satisfactorily explained.

2.5   Preliminary assessment of the respondent require revision
       as the interview progresses. If necessary revise it.

2.7   An interview is normally intended to produce information,
       therefore the respondent should do most of the talking.

3.   TECHNIQUES

3.1   There are no gimmicks which will solve a problem inter -
       view. There are certain situations which arise in most
       interviews. The interviewer should use these to help not
       hinder the achievement of his objective.

3.2   Beginning : decide how to begin and do so confidently.

3.4   Questions : be sure you and respondent know what you
                   mean.

3.5   Silence   : silence can help or hinder.

3.6   Reflecting : summarizing a respondent's statements can
                    encourage or annoy.

3.7   Stress   : deliberate creation of stress situations is
                   dangerous and can produce unexpected
                   reactions. Never create stress by a threat
                   which cannot be carried out.

3.8   Probing   : do not hesitate to probe deeply any statement.

3.9   Encouragement : this is simple and often produces very
                       favourable results.

3.10   Notetaking : a difficult problem : notes are necessary
                    but can break rapport and continuity and
                    recording is very consuming.

3.11   Ending   : decide how and when the interview is to end
                   and do so firmly.

3.12   These are aids not substitutes for preparation and the
       application of logical thought.

INTELLIGENCE REPORTING

1. PURPOSE OF REPORTS

1.1 Reports contain the raw material on which all decisions
are based. Reports reveal by implication the steps taken
to achieve a specific result and affords evaluation of each
facet of action taken during the execution of the task.
Intelligent and well composed reports provide the informa -
tion that is required to complete the intelligence "jig-
saw puzzle", and enables case officers to plan action, to
co-ordinate and control operations, to formulate policy
and to generally increase efficiency.

1.2 Reports can be verbal or in writing. Althought the contents
of reports differ, the basic requirements remain the same.

  (i) PRECISENESS : Not only facts but also phrasing
      must be correct. Opinions and deductions must be
      distinguished from facts. Accuracy is most importa-
      nt.

  (ii) CONCISENESS AND COMPLETENESS : This signifies the
      detailed interpretation of facts in as few words as
      possible without forsaking completeness and style.

  (iii) CLEARNESS : Reports must be understandable,
      logically and unmistakably clear and must be
      worded and arranged so that they are understandable
      at the first reading.

All persons mentioned in the report must be clearly
identified so that at a later reference, there will be
no question of the identity of the person.

(iv) CONTEXT : This means the exclusion of all non-relevant
words, clauses and ideas from the report. The test
should be :"Will the argument be influenced should a
certain word or clause not be included?"

(v) LOGIC : Deductions must be logical and related to the
argument.

(vi) NEATNESS : When a report is untidy and gramatically incor-
rect, it creates the impression of carelessness.
This is not beneficial to the interest of the organisa -
tion.

(vii) TIMELY ACTION : The time factor is very important.
It frequently happens that the most important and urgent
information is retained for days. This is an unforgivable
evasion of responsibility.

1.3   Proper reporting is very essential for the recovery and
evaluation of information. Incomplete reports lead to
unnecessary queries which only not create delays, but
also hampers the making of decision. Each report must
be submitted with the greatest care and/consciousness
and must be submitted without delay.

1.4 STYLE : To afford the analyst thetrue value of the report
it is necessary that the arguments, based on facts, are
presented in a logical sequence. The purpose of this is
simplicity. Short words, sentences and paragraphs must
preferrably be used throughout the report. It is important
to realise that an attractive style captivates the atten-
tion of the reader. Style depends on the following :-

(i) WORDS : A precise knowldge of the meaning of each
word eliminate ambiguity, vagueness and misunder-
standing. Short words are preferred to long words,
but most important is the use of the correct word
in the correct context.

(ii) SENTENCES AND PARAGRAPHS : Arguments can only be
properly elucidated by the logical sequence of
sentences and divided into sub-paragraphs. Short
sentences are essential, provided continuity is
not lost.

1.5 It frequently occurs that field workers receive information
that is immediately dismissed as to be unimportant to
submit. It must however, be stressed that the summarily
rejection of doubtful or improbable information is not the
accepted policy of the Service. The reason for this is
that individual field-workers are not in the position to
decide if the specific information fits into the overall
picture.

1.6 No information, however, absurd must summarily be rejected until all possible implications have been considered.

2. REQUIREMENTS FOR GOOD REPORTING

2.1 EXACT COMPREHENSION OF THE INSTRUCTION

A report is a reflection of an instruction. In the absence of a specific instruction there can be no specific report. Vague, general, indifferent, obscure and unintelligible instructions result in vague, general, indifferent, obscure and intelligible reports. Instructions and requests must consequently be positive and as detailed as possible.

2.2 ABILITY TO REACH THE PLACE WHERE THE INFORMATION ORIGINATES

2.3 The scene where the action took place is obviously where the most detailed accurate information can bee obtained from. A report about activities in Maluti submitted by sources from Maluti is obviously more detailed than a report on the same subject submitted in Umtata by sources from Umtata.

Accordingly, the agents personal enquiries and real furnished the best results that can only be obtained by the agent personal attention and presence at the scene of the action.

2.4   THE AGENT MUST BE AN HONEST OBSERVER, OBJECTIVITY IS THE
        BASIS OF HONESTY

        If an agent expresses a strong opinion on a subject, his
        report may be influenced by his personal expectations and
        thus influence the objectivity of his report.

        Any attempt to further a case or to over-emphasise an
        incident by placing it out of context is detrimental to the
        report and could mislead the analyst.

2.5   ABILITY TO REPORT INFORMATION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE

        All information must be submitted as soon as possible
        subject to the available means of communication. As a
        rule, reports are written the same day that the informa -
        tion was obtained. There are several reasons for this :-

        (a) In time details are not remembered clearly.

        (b) Tape recordings can accidentally be erased before
             the reports are written.

        (c) Delayed reports result in delayed action - the
             possibility of success in an operation diminishes.

        (d) Information looses value in time, because the
             situation changes.

2.5 REPORTING AND DEDUCTIONS

It is every agent's primary function to submitt objective
and factual reports. Agents are also encouraged to furnish
comment on the contents of the information. He must, however,
separate deductions and facts and for this reason it is
necessary for agents to understand the basic differences.

(i) Objective and factual reporting is an attempt to
report incidents the way such incidents actually
happened.

(ii) Subjective and speculative reporting presumes
uncertainty and presents information that is
apparently correct.
Example : A person is dressed in a Khaki
uniform with golden maple leaf insignia on the
shoulders; he speaks English with an accent. The
objective observer gives a full description of the
the uniform and the manner of speech while the
subjective observer summarily reports that the
man is an American Armed Forces Major.

(iii) In order to submit a good report it is not nece -
ssary for the honest and competent agent to con -
cern himself with deductions. In some instances,
it is preferred that he makes no deductions. He
may know nothing about shipping, but can observe
and describe a ship so precisely that an expect
can easily identify the ship and even determine
its tonnage.

In such cases the facts are presented to the ~~~~~~
without deductions.

3.   THE REPORT

3.1 The Intelligence report consists mainly of :-

    (i)   Source and Content Evaluation

   (ii)   The Heading

  (iii) The Body

   (iv) The Identification and Index

    (v) The Comment

(a)   SOURCE AND CONTENT EVALUATION (SEE CHAPTER 5)

The source is not known to the evaluator nor did the
latter conduct the debriefing of the source. The
source and content evaluation by the agent submitting
the report thus provides a valuable guide to evaluator
The source is evaluated as follows :-

1. Very reliable

2. Probably reliable

3. Possibly reliable

4. Probably unreliable

5. Cannot be evaluated.

3.2   The contents of the report are evaluated as follows :-

1. Confirmed by other reliable and dependent sources
2. Probably true
3. Possible true
4. Doubtful
5. Probably False
6. Cannot be evaluated.

3.3   THE HEADING

The heading must reflect briefly the contents of the report
e.g. , "Labour Unrest : United Milling Company, Umtata,
12-15/1/1977. Suspected Trade Union Council Involvement."

OR

"African Youth League (A.Y.L.) Executive Committee
Meeting : Unity Hall, Umtata : 8/8/1977. Discussions on
future policy of the organisation."

3.4   THE BODY

3.5   As previously stated, the body of the report must contain
only facts. If there is any matter that must be brought
to the attention of the Head Office, or if a matter must
be clarified, the report may be preceeded by a paragraph
titled "Relevant Information" or "Preamble". If a source
attended a meeting or conference, comment on his capabili -
ty and reliability as well as the Method by which he
obtained the information, e.g. tape recording, notes
memory, etc.

A typical preamble to a report would be as follows :-

"Source attended a committee meeting of the African National
Alliance on the evening of 8.8.77 at the Unity Hall, Umtata
Source memorised the relevant facts of the meeting and
compiled his report the same evening. Source is intellige -
nt and is capable of giving a true objective version of what
was said at the meeting.

     OR

"Source attended the meeting of the opposition National
Liberation Front (N.L.F.) at the Jubilee Hall, Umtata on
morning of 8.8.77. Source compiled the following report
from notes he made at the meeting. Source's objectability
in this report is questioned as he is staunch supporter of
the Ruling Party and he is known to be very biased towards
the N.L.F." If the credibility or objectability of the sou-
rce is questioned - as in the latter example - then this
must be brought to the attention of the evaluator. Also if
the source is semi-educated or not technically inclined and
he attends highly technical conference, he is obviously not
capable of giving a detailed and accurate account of the
conference. For proper analysis of the information these
facts must be brought to the attention of the evaluator.

Avoid abbreviations - "A.N.C." could stand for African
National Congress (South Africa), African National Council
(Rhodesia). or the Armee' National Conglaise (Congo).

Reflect figures also in words, e.g. "200 (Two Hundred) terrorists are about to enter the country from Lesotho." A typing error could change the figure "2,000".

3.6 IDENTIFICATION

All persons and organisations mentioned in a report must be fully identified so as to facilitate the task of the administrative sections. All persons mentioned in a report are indexed by the latter section and a person who is not fully identified cannot be indexed. Should full particulars of a person not be immediately available, state as much, and follow up with a detailed identification. A typical identification will be as follows :-

(X1) John Davis Elliot, Engineer at Morris Engineering, Industrial Main Street, Butterworth. Residing 3 Mountain Road, Butterworth.

(X2) David Peter Goodwin, (N.I.N. 013 3464), Clerk at Monza Spares, Main Street, Umtata. Residing 232 Park Road, Umtata.

(X3) J. Magasi, Residing Mqanduli. Full particulars not yet available.

(X4) Joe Andrew Madasa   -   TIS 76 P/123

(X5) Transkei Students Association (T.S.A.)   -   TIS 76 O/321

(X6) Department of Education - TIS 76 S/456

3.7   With regard to the above identification, the administra -
        tive section would proceed as follows :-

        (i)   Goodwin and Madasa will be placed on index, i.e.
              the name of the subject, the reference of the
              report and the date of the report will be placed
              on the card and filed, or, if the subject is
              already on index, the reference and date of the
              report will be added to his card. Magasi will be
              indexed when his full particulars are known.

        (ii) Copies of the report will be cross-filed in the
              personal file of Madasa and the organisation file
              of the T.S.A. as well as the file on Department
              of Education.

        COMMENT

        This aspect of the report has already been discussed in
        detail in previous pages.

4.   CONCLUSION

        Head Office is guided by the reports submitted by its
        agents in the field and must make objective decisions,
        based on facts supplied by these agents.

SUBVERSION -   THE THREAT

1.   Definition

1.1   An attempt by a person or group of persons, who are
       prepared to use illegal or uncostitutional means, to change,
       undermine or overthrow the constitution of a country.

       NOTE:

       Not all methods used by the subversive organisation will be
       illegal. A clear distinction must be made between subver -
       sion and constitutional opposition.

2.   Tactics and Methods

2.1   Their tactics will be to strike at those parts of the
       country where power presently resides i.e. -

       (i)   The Government Machine

             Parliament and the Cabinet
             The Ministries
             The Police and Armed Forces
             The Civil Service.

       (ii) Influential Sectors of Society

             Political Parties
             Trade Unions
             Schools and Universities
             The Press and Broadcasting

Sports Bodies

2.2   Methods of Attack

        (i)   Penetration

               By controlling the institutions under attack they
               can be used to increase the influence of the
               subversive organisation.

        (ii)   Propaganda

               To spread the views and policies of the subversive
               organisation.

        (iii) Economic Pressure

               By penetrating Trade Unions the group can use them
               to bring pressure on the Government or the economy
               by fermenting industrial unrest for the group's
               own purposes.

        (iv)   Disinformation and de-composition

               The publication of deliberate falsehood to
               undermine the organs of Government and the fabric
               of Society.

        (v)   Espionage

               By stealing secrets and publishing them they
               embarrass and damage the Government.

        (vi)   Protest and Demonstration

               This may lead to violence such activities bring
               valuable publicity for the group and causing an

over-reaction by the security authorities or the Government, help to discredit them.

(vii) Violence

This includes Terrorism, Sabotage and Armed Insurrection.

Terrorism is violence against persons for political purposes, and includes such activities as aeroplane hijacking.

Sabotage is the damaging or destruction of buildings or installations which are on importance to the nation, for a political purpose.

2.3 Such act may be carried out by agents of foreign powers, or by subversive groups.

STRUCTURE TRANSKEI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE   APPENDIX "A"

DIRECTOR

INTERNAL
COLLECTION
PRODUCTION

ADMINISTRATION

"A" DESK ——— DEPUTY DIRECTOR —— F DESK

EXTERNAL
COLLECTION
&
PRODUCTION   "B" DESK

REGISTRY

REGIONAL OFFICES

SURVEILLANCE
OPERATIONS

FINANCE

LIAISON

PERSONNEL
&
SELECTION

TECHNICAL
OPERATIONS   "C" DESK

SPECIAL
OPERATIONS

PERSONNEL
TRAINING
&
DEVELOPMENT

G DESK

EVALUATION —— D DESK

ECONOMIC —— E DESK

VETTINGS

JOURNALISM

BORDER POSTS

DETAILED DUTIES OF HEADS OF DESKS AND REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES -

PARAGRAPH (2.5)   CHAPTER 1

1.   STRATEGIC RESPONSIBILITIES

1.1   Political, economic and military intelligence - related to National
Security and threats thereto.

2.   TACTICAL OPERATIONS

2.1   These can be divided into overt and covert operations. All activity must
be based on a systems approach to the collection and production of
intelligence. It is counter productive to attempt to operate in
fragmented segments.

2.2   The development of our objectives into a situation whereby quality
strategic intelligence is being produced is our ultimate goal. Tactical
considerations are :-

(1) Collection and production of strategic intelligence

(2) Collection and production of grass roots intelligence

(3) Counter intelligence

(4) Counter subversion

(5) Counter espionage

(6) Targetting of suspects, organisations and subjects.

(7)   Talent spotting

(8)   Source running

(9)   Evaluation

(10) Liaison

PROCEDURE WHEN PREPARING ESTIMATES

1. Upon receipt of the annual estimates circular, the Accounting
    Officer and his Accountant or responsible officer should make a
    thorough study of the contents thereof in order to be fully
    acquainted with the basis on which the estimates have to be
    drawn up. The Accountant or responsible officer then issues
    a circular to the heads of the various divisions or sections
    of the department, in which they are requested to inform him,
    before a particular date, what provision has to be included in
    the department's draft Vote in respect of the services for
    which they are responsible. He also requests them to fully
    motivate their requirements and indicates what policy should
    be applied in determining the required amount in accordance
    with the instructions contained in the estimates circular.

2. The latter, however, also refers to matters concerning the
    estimates for the current financial year and instructions
    regarding the revision of the current year's estimates are
    also contained in the estimates circular.

3. Meanwhile the Accountant or responsible officer instructs
    his staff to calculate the amount which will be required
    in respect of salaries, wages and allowances during the forth=
    coming financial year, on a realistic basis, that is,

on the basis of the approved posts which are occupied at that stage.
The establishment must, however, agree with the records of the Public
Service Commission. A schedule is drawn up in which every post
appearing on the department's approved establishment is reflected,
irrespective of whether or not a post is occupied. Vacant posts are
indicated as such. Against each post is reflected by whom occupied,
incremental date, salary scale, present notch and notch on 1st April
of the ensuing financial year, what portion of the salary increment
will fall within the period covered by the ensuing financial year, and
finally, the total of the salary notch on the coming 1st April plus
the portion of the salary increment falling within the scope of the
following financial year. The last three columns are added up indivi=
dually. The combined totals of the two columns preceding the last
must equal the total of the last column. To the total of the last
column, representing amount required for occupied posts should be added
an estimated amount for vacant posts, which, with a reasonable measure
of certainty will be filled. Vacancies are normally calculated at
minimum notch of the relevant scale. From the total of the last
column plus the provision for vacant posts must be subtracted the
estimated amount which will be saved as a result of staff changes.

The latter usually result in savings, as posts fall vacant are normally
filled only after the lapse of several months, and, meanwhile the salary
attached to these posts is saved.

Similarly, savings frequently arise when officials are promoted after having reached the maximum notch of their scales and they are substituted by officers who have not yet reached the same notches.

4. When subsistence and transport expenses are calculated due regard should be taken of the actual expenditure of the preceding year, the current year's revised estimates as well as the trend of expenditure as reflected in the trial balance figures for the current year. If these figures are taken into consideration in determining the amount required it is adapted in accordance with other factors which might have an effect on the expenditure, such as a rise in the cost of transport, extension of existing services, introduction of new services or the increase of staff who have to undertake many journeys on official duty.

5. When expenditure under the main divisions:- Postal, Telegraph and Telephone Services and Printing, Stationery, Advertisements and Publications is calculated the actual expenditure of the previous year as well as the revised estimates and trial balance figures for the current year are used for determining a basis. Due regard must be taken of any anticipated extension or decrease in the department's activities. Heads of divisions or sections should indicate whether they perhaps envisage any special printing or whether more advertisements will be placed or more books, journals or other publications purchased.

It should be borne in mind, however, that if any printing of extraordinary nature is envisaged or publications purchased, the Treasury's authority must be obtained prior to the inclusion of any provision thereof in the draft estimates.

6. Miscellaneous expenses include those items of expenditure which are not relevant to any of the other main divisions and which, individually, are not important enough to form separate main divisions of their own. Expenditure is calculated on the same basis as for Postal and Telephone services, Stationery, Publications, etc.; due regard being taken of the requirements of the department for the year under review.

7. The administrative main divisions of the Vote (A to E) relate to the administration of the department as a whole as they are incurred in order to maintain the functions of the department. The other main divisions relate to the various services peculiar to a department and which are therefore rendered by the specific department. The funds required in respect of these main divisions are furnished by various heads of divisions or sections and incorporated in the estimates by the Accountant or responsible officer, who will then immediately compile a schedule of all the particulars. Against each main and sub-division he should indicate:-

    (i)   actual expenditure for previous year;

    (ii)   revised expenditure for the current year, and

    (iii) estimated expenditure for the coming year.

The schedule is then submitted to the Accounting officer. Discussions
with the heads of divisions now take place in order to ensure that the
envisaged expenditure is actually essential and cannot be financed
in more economical ways than those suggested by the divisional heads.
The Accounting officer may then accept, decrease or even increase
the provision in accordance with the policy which the department
intends to follow. Should there be any new services or abnormal
extension of existing services, that is, in excess of the increase
specified in the estimates circular for the specific financial year,
which have not as yet been approved by the Treasury, the requisite
authority should be obtained before any provision in respect thereof
is included in the draft estimates.
Treasury authority should also be obtained in the event of it being
necessary to effect any changes to the form of the Vote. The form
is essential for the purpose of control to preserve uniformity of
the different votes and maintain continuity of one year's particulars
with those of other years. In terms of the estimates circular the
draft estimates should be prepared in consultation with the Accountant-
General who should be afforded the opportunity to scrutinise the
drafts.

8.   When in possession of all the required details and authorities the
Accountant or responsible officer prepares a rough copy of his Vote
and compares it very carefully with the current year's printed Vote
in order to ensure that the wording of main and sub-divisions are
reflected correctly or that it has been altered where amendments
have been authorised by Treasury.

Thereafter one of the printed copies of the preceding year's vote, which accompanied the estimates circular, is taken and all particulars not applicable to the ensuing financial year, are cut out. The open spaces resulting from this, are closed up by pasting clear paper neatly over them and the relevant particulars are either written thereon by hand or neatly typed in. From each of these documents as many photostat copies are made as may be required. Four clear copies together with an explanatory memorandum (in quadruple) should be submitted to the Treasury so as to reach the latter on or before the date specified in the estimates circular.

9. The explanatory memorandum is a very important document as it also serves to draw a parallel between expenditure proposed for the ensuing financial year and the provision, and also revised position, for the current financial year. Departments should fully motivate all excesses and explain savings quoting the number and date of each Treasury authority in respect of every new service, abnormal increase and extension of existing service. Motivations should be specific and concise, substantiated by figures where necessary.

TRANSKEI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

MAILING LIST NO: _____   DATE: _____

TO: _____   _____

_____   _____

_____   _____

REFERENCE	SUBJECT	

....

MAILING LIST NO: _____

TO: _____   FROM: _____

_____   _____

_____   _____

DATE STAMP

....

SIGNATURE

The Regional Representative
Transkei Intelligence Service
BUTTERWORTH.

TIS 76 9/123 dt. 1982-11-23

TIS 76 P/456 dt. 1982-11-23

APPENDIX "P".

Mr. M. Gcingca
P.O. Box 324
BUTTERWORTH.

GWEBINKUMBI

TIS 76 P/406   dd   10.12.82
TIS 76 O/271   dd   15.01.83
TIS 76 S/389   dd   14.03.83
TIS 76 O/271   dd . 16.07.83

GWEBINKUMBI

MALINDI

See under MALINDI Gwebinkumbi