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Joint local level IFP and ANC initiatives point a way towards peace

The sharply deteriorating relationship between the ANC and IFP that has set in over the past two months has still not been resolved at the level of their national leadership.

Not only has the ANC denied that its 5 April letter was an attack on the IFP, but it has expressed little interest in the national executives of the two organisations meeting again as they did on 29 January in order to sort out the mess. Escalating violence on the Reef has not helped matters either, leaving supporters more militant and less controllable than ever. And, though perhaps not an ideal venue to resolve its differences with the IFP, the ANC boycotted the State President's peace summit. So, the two executives are not yet talking.

Nonetheless, as IFP national chairperson Frank Mdlalose stressed in his 19 April letter to John Nkadimeng (his ANC equivalent in the 12-a-side peace committee), he believed it very important that local level peace initiatives be encouraged "to continue working against violence and for peace" while the leadership got on with the task of reconciliation.

Whatever the level of unpleasantness between the two organisations, attempts were made on the ground to achieve precisely what Mdlalose was hoping for, in places like Soweto, the Natal South Coast and Mpumalanga. In each of these, the purpose of the meetings, local dynamics and the outcomes were very different, but they all contributed in their unique own way to the peace process that must become the number one priority of all political organisations.

At a 19 May Soweto prayer service, representatives of the ANC Women's League and the IFP Women's Brigade made a joint appeal for peace. The significance of this lay less in its practical effectiveness (minimal), but in the fact that this was

the first occasion that the two women's organisations had come together to work for a common objective. There had been previous attempts at this in the past, but they were bedevilled by mutual suspicion.

For instance, a call last year by the Women's League that the Women's Brigade join it in a search for peace was rejected by the latter because the Women's League agenda was seen as highly suspect - it coincided with attempts by the ANC NEC to marginalise the IFP and Buthelezi and to create rifts between Buthelezi and the broader IFP constituency. Under the circumstances, Women's Brigade co-operation would have been perceived as tantamount to a betrayal of Inkatha and of peace.

This time things were seemingly different, there being a recognition of the fact that all women have a role to play in building peace and in doing more than they had in the past for peace.

A second example of local level ANC/IFP peace initiatives are the series of meetings in the Natal South Coast where, despite on-going violence, persistence could well end up in positive results. The major thrust towards resolving the violence in Ndwalane's tribal wards (around Port Shepstone) has been attempts at creating a broad community acceptance of political tolerance rather than a simple and probably irrelevant bi-lateral ANC/IFP accord.

South Coast violence has characteristically been youths against traditional communities, those coming into conflict with the former very often automatically being designated IFP supporters. It was for this reason Chief Khawula suggested that peace required a tripartite effort - the communities, the ANC and the IFP. An 18 April Port Shepstone meeting between the ANC and IFP thus broke new ground in recognising the role of traditional leaders in breaking the violence. But, with certain difficulties in mind, it was also requested that Mdlalose and Zuma participate in the 12 May meeting with Chief Mavundla.

It was important that this meeting was geared towards frank exchanges. Chief Mavundla, for instance was quite blunt: To explain the conflict between the ANC and IFP is like this. Young people started killing abathakathi ['witch-doctors'] and not listening to their parents about 3 years ago. I called a meeting and informed the people they should join IFP since we needed people to recruit in my area. The youths came and killed the people. Some are

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Traditional/cultural weapons the issue of the day as Zulus dig in their heels

IFP: look at the disease rather than its symptoms

On 5 April, the ANC issued the government an angry ultimatum threatening to withdraw from negotiations in toto (ie, regarding the proposed all-party congress as well as all bilateral exchanges on constitutional issues) unless seven demands were met by 9 May.

ANC's 5 April weapons demand

The first of the seven read as follows:

That the government takes legislative measures during the current session of parliament to outlaw the carrying of weapons, traditional or otherwise, at public assemblies, processions, rallies, etc.

The 5 April letter painted the ANC into a corner in that it was commonly and accurately perceived by almost everyone but the ANC that all seven demands would definitely not be met, and that the ANC would thus have to give way, at least partly on some of them (there was no way that De Klerk was going to fire Malan and Vlok, however desirable this might be). Thus the motivation in Mandela almost immediately signifying that the ANC was not as inflexible on the demands as it appeared to be. Yet despite this acknowledgement of reality, the ANC remained totally inflexible on the issue of traditional

weapons, confirming that its participation in negotiations was conditional upon the first of its seven demands of 5 April.

Indeed, as May progressed, this single issue dominated the political landscape, with neither the ANC nor the Zulus appearing willing to concede anything to the other.

Attempting to break this political impasse threatening the continuation of the government's pre-negotiation talks with the ANC, De Klerk flew to Ulundi on 25 April to seek the assistance of the Zulu king, the IFP and his cabinet, and the aMakhosi (chiefs) over the traditional weapons controversy.

Zulu concession

The result was that despite the aMakhosi on 10 April refusing to compromise on the matter whatsoever (see pages 6 & 7), and despite the IFP backing them up on 18 May (pages 8 & 9), in the interest of peace the Zulu leaders did agree to significant concessions, giving their blessing towards the government taking stricter measures to control traditional weapons. De Klerk and Buthelezi issued a brief joint statement which read:

The State President met King Zwelithini Goodwill kaBhekuzulu, the King of the Zulus, Dr MG Buthelezi,

What are traditional/cultural weapons?

The Natal Code dealt with the carrying of weapons in accordance with "traditional Zulu usages, customs or religions", and these customs remain very important to many Zulus.

GENUINE CULTURAL WEAPONS INCLUDE:

The shield:

This is made of dry animal skin and varies in sizes. The smallest of the shields is used by brides on wedding days. These shields are known as *Isihlangu*, *Umbhumbuluzu*, *Ihawu* or *Umdlalo*. The shaft in the middle of the shield, which keeps the shield rigid, is known as *Umgoba* and at times is sharpened at the bottom end. At the top it is adorned with a bit of skin.

The ubhoko stick:

The *Ubhoko* is sharpened at the bottom end and goes with the shield.

Straight sticks:

Amongst these are the *Umzaca*, which is a straight stick, and the *Isikhwili*, which is also a straight stick, but thick at the top.

The knobkierrie:

Or knobbed stick. The knob of the *Isagila* is often the root of the tree which has a natural knob on top of the stick. Another knobkierrie is the *Iwisa*, which is a carved knobbed stick distinct from the *Isagila* whose shape is natural.

The spear:

The *Imikhonto*, assegai or spear. These may have different shapes and the wood on which the blade is attached can be of different lengths. The *Ikhwa* is a long bladed spear, while with the *Inhlendla* the blade is fixed in an oblong fashion. The *Inhlendla* is carried only by the King and the Amakhosi, while others are used for slaughtering.

The axe:

The *Isizenza* battle axe was not normally carried by ordinary warriors in battle. Today, it is used for ceremonial occasions only, and is not carried in ordinary use.

Other weapons:

A number of other weapons, such as the swordstick known as the *Intshumentshu* and the *Isimolonthisi* are included in the old Code of Zulu law. Since it is regarded as illegal to carry those, carriers are and were regarded as having committed an offence. Indeed, these weapons are no longer considered traditional.

NON-TRADITIONAL WEAPONS INCLUDE:

Knives:

Knives of any kind, especially bushknives and kitchen knives.

Pangas:

These are not traditional weapons and in fact can be bought in many supermarkets throughout the country.

Axes:

Axes used for domestic purposes.

Spear look-alikes:

Or non-traditional spears. Though many weapons resembling spears are used in the violence, few are traditional weapons. An iron rod sharpened at one end, or a shaft with a blade attached to it, is not a traditional weapon.

That is why, in response to a query regarding the police intercepting a mass-produced consignment of "spears" en route to the Reef, an IFP spokesperson made a comment to the effect that the police were fully entitled to confiscate such weapons which the party considered anything but cultural or traditional.

members of his cabinet and amaXhosi in Ulundi today. They consulted on the question of the carrying of cultural weapons in unrest areas where a prohibition on the possession of certain dangerous instruments in a public place has been imposed. This followed previous consultations.

The Zulu leaders made a clear stand in favour of their cultural heritage, but were prepared to support the South African Government in efforts to improve control on dangerous weapons in unrest areas.

The Government is now drafting amending regulations along the lines agreed upon. These will be published soon.

The meeting took place in a friendly and constructive spirit but in realisation of the seriousness of the continuing violence in our country. There will be on-going contact in joint efforts to bring this to an end.

With this Zulu agreement, the government duly passed legislation outlawing the public carrying of spears in designated "unrest" areas, but did not ban them outright elsewhere.

issue goes far beyond use of weapons

Much appears to have been made of the supposed obvious merit in the ANC's demands that traditional weapons be outlawed. However, the issues at stake go far beyond what the ANC claims its motivation to be (peace), and it in regard to these considerations that the IFP and Zulus generally, have dug in their heels.

Following the ANC's 5 April 1991 ultimatum, there was heated debate on the ANC's brinkmanship approach to negotiations. But parallel with this, and despite earlier protestations

by Mandela and the rest of the ANC leadership that the ultimatum was not directed at the IFP and the Zulu people, the bulk of the 5 April demands were pushed into relative obscurity while prominence was placed almost exclusively upon the issue of traditional weapons.

IFP doubts the ANC's public motivation

According to both the ANC and its apologists, the debate is dominated by the idea that the violence emanates from those using traditional weapons, and that their removal from the public domain will thus automatically lead to peace. This in turn will satisfy the ANC, which is only being difficult on this issue because it is so committed to peace. The idea appears to be that once these dangerous weapons have been dealt with, the ANC will reaffirm its commitment to constitutional talks, so that the country is back where it was before 5 April, but now safer thanks to the ANC's concerns.

The IFP takes exception to the notion that the ANC is motivated by such noble sentiments. The ANC must be aware of the fact that genuine traditional weapons play a negligible role in the country's violence - the overwhelmingly greatest percentage of deaths are derived from gunshots, from hacking and from necklacing/bombing etc. Cultural or traditional weapons do not comprise sharpened steel bars, pangas, bushknives and the bulk of similar dangerous weapons used in the violence.

The ANC must also be aware of the fact that the IFP has condemned the carrying of non-traditional dangerous weapons in public. On 16 April, for instance, Buthelezi said he "had no problem whatsoever with the police confiscating axes, pangas and bushknives if they are carried in potential conflict situations." He naturally also referred to the reciprocal need to

Cultural significance of cultural weapons

One of the reasons for widespread Zulu opposition to the call for a ban on cultural weapons is found in Zulu customs and traditions. Zulus have carried traditional weapons for countless decades, especially in rural areas. The carrying of a stick for instance, was always far more significant than the practice of whites wearing hats - this was fashion, easily changeable, in contrast to very long-standing customary practice.

As Professor SJ Maphalala (History, University of Zululand) noted in his late-May response to ANC-aligned academics accusing the IFP of "using culture and tradition in a highly subjective way":

My understanding of Zulu history and tradition is that spears have always been part and parcel of Zulu culture, having been used at weddings, ceremonies and during wars.

Perhaps the most important feature of this aspect is the quasi-religious significance of such weapons. Zulu reluctance to give in to the demands to ban these weapons stems in part from the Zulu myth of origin in terms of which the first Zulus created carried weapons given to them by God.

These weapons form part of the overall package that comprises the Zulu notion of Ubuntu, which, in eurocentric terms, can possibly be viewed as African humanism. In terms of the Zulu concept of the African personality, weapons are regarded as an extension of the body.

Furthermore, the carrying of such weapons in many cases completes the process of dressing up. There is nothing negative about the weaponry and it are not carried for attack.

Forcefully removing these weapons therefore takes away from the whole concept of the complete human. Indeed,

it could even be said that this could lead to an identity crisis within the individual. These weapons, which many prefer to call artifacts, were part of the overall package that gave the Zulu nation its religious identity and helped it relate to the world around it.

The role of the King in all of this is also very important, for as much as Zulus believe in his tremendous powers, he is nevertheless controlled by this religion. Thus though he is considered the ultimate "priest", he is however not in a position to change these beliefs. By calling on him to allow the banning of the carrying of such weapons, a tremendous amount of pressure is thus put on him.

To the reasoning that such weapons are displayed at political rather than purely cultural meetings, Zulus note that Africans have been holding political meetings long before whites came to this country. At these meetings they meet with their ancestors and for them it would be wrong to appear before these ancestors and God without something as important as these artifacts. Zulus would not want to be disowned by their ancestors and would therefore be loathe to do anything to displease them. In a way the demand to prevent Zulus from carrying such weapons can be equated to banning Christians from having the bible.

Nonetheless, it is very important to distinguish between the correct use and understanding of traditional weapons and their misuse, because only certain weapons (see opposite) are considered traditional and their correct use is a very important aspect of Zulu culture and tradition. There is quite simply no cultural significance in the carrying of ordinary dangerous weapons over which the IFP seeks strict control.

confiscate "sophisticated weaponry" in the ANC's arsenal. Later, on national television, Buthelezi went further, encouraging the police to confiscate dangerous non-traditional weapons in the name of peace.

ANC is aware of the issues

It is because the ANC is aware of both of these issues, yet continues to call for a complete ban on the carrying of traditional weapons that Zulus are rallying around their king's refusal to accept this perceived assault on the Zulu nation. There is an increasing perception by IFP supporters and Zulus generally that the ANC's campaigns, supposedly serving the cause of peace, are in fact serving the cause of war - ie, they are perceived to be directed at the IFP, at Buthelezi, at Zulus.

Consumer boycotts, stayaways etc, are supposedly set in motion to pressurise the government into abandoning apartheid practices and to bring peace and democracy to South Africa, but through coercion and intimidation, are in fact also used as platforms to mobilise for the ANC and, equally important, to prevent the mobilisation of other parties.

The July 1990 Week of Action was ostensibly to highlight the need for peace, yet almost every other political organisation, including the IFP, the PAC and AZAPO, saw it as a bellicose act that would precipitate greater violence. Despite these dire warnings, the ANC went ahead, thus inspiring anti-Zulu reactions by many of its followers on the Rand.

To many, the anti-traditional weapons campaign falls into a similar category in that the ANC, under the guise of seeking peace, attacks a central institution in Zulu society, and does so in a way suggesting that it is Zulu hostel dwellers, instigated by the IFP, that are responsible for the Reef violence when in fact they initially entered the conflict simply to defend

themselves.

To the IFP, the ANC always appears to be trying to whitewash its role in the violence by blaming others - the state, the IFP, hostel dwellers, the third force, vigilantes, the security forces, etc, but never itself. The ANC never acknowledges that its hegemonistic politics, its coercion and intimidation, its refusal to see any other movement but itself representing "the people", is frequently the root cause of the violence.

To many in the IFP, the traditional weapons issue represents an attempt by the ANC to divert attention from the actions of their militant supporters who frequently trigger the violence. Because a ban on traditional weapons deals only with symptoms of a general political malaise rather than its causes, the ANC's motivation is suspected.

It also represents a convenient sabre-rattling exercise prior to the ANC's imminent national congress at which the new national leadership will be elected - the traditional weapons issue thus seems an ideal means of reasserting the incumbents' suitability for re-election by demonstrating the present leadership's ability to call the shots and to hammer the IFP.

The debate has thus unfortunately developed an irrational quality that has increasingly missed the point.

1: innocent ANC?

First, since the ANC presents itself as an innocent victim of violence of the IFP and of aggressive Zulus assisted by the government, it is therefore supposedly justified in its demands.

There is no mention of any reciprocal ANC concession however, though it is public knowledge that the ANC continues to have access to a very substantial armoury and that there are official arms caches all over the country. The ANC refuses to hand over its weapons because it has only suspended the armed

Traditional weapons are of negligible significance in the violence -

according to numerous sources, guns are by far the number one killer

The whole controversy surrounding Zulu traditional weapons frequently appears misguided. While it may appear obvious to many that any prohibition on the carrying of any weapons in public must be beneficial to the peace process, such an assumption misses two points.

One is that people will continue killing each other regardless of such prohibitions since political intolerance is the root problem rather than weaponry associated with this attitudinal problem.

Second is the fact that there will be such a negative reaction to such a prohibition that violence could in fact escalate rather than decrease.

The truth of the matter is that genuinely traditional or cultural weapons play a negligible role in political violence and always have done..

Statistics indicate quite conclusively that the vast majority of deaths that can be ascribed to political violence are caused through shooting, hacking, and stabbing.

It is important to note in this regard that traditional weapons can play no part in either shooting or hacking (since the appropriate weapons are not cultural), and that as far as stabbing is concerned, a number of weapons may be responsible.

For instance, stabbings can be caused by knives, forks, sharpened sticks, sharpened steel rods, etc, as well as spears.

The precise percentage of killings attributable to genuine cultural weapons as a percentage of those killed through hacking and stabbing is unknown, but given the preponderance of non-traditional weapons in the fighting, is clearly extremely low.

SOURCE 1:

In an address at Rhodes University on 18 May, Institute of Race Relations executive director John Kane-Berman noted that guns (especially AK-47s and shotguns) and explosives comprised 50% of the weapons used in political violence, while knives and pangas (neither of which are traditional weapons) comprised a modest 18%. Necklacing and burning were also particularly prominent causes of death (10% since 1984).

In the *Weekly Mail* (24 May) he added: "There is no reason to believe that spears are used in more than a relatively small proportion of violent incidents", noting that

research by the institute into political violence in the first four months of this year reveals that all sharp-edged weapons ... account for only 18 percent of weapons used in political conflict.

SOURCE 2:

Virtually any single month's statistics reveals that this is so. The Inkatha Institute analysed statistics for February 1991 for instance, for which the country's press and monitoring

struggle - officially they are being held in reserve in case they are needed in future (ie, if apartheid is not abolished), but the IFP believes it has far more to do with political positioning and maintaining an air of militancy. Umkhonto we Sizwe is still recruiting and training. The formation of so-called Defence Units, even in peaceful areas, is going ahead despite misgivings over their likely actions. ANC-aligned youths continue to harass anyone attending IFP meetings. Yet all this is given a highly insignificant status in the whole debate.

The IFP contends that the ANC is anything but the innocent organisation it suggests it is, and that a fair analysis of the violence would show that most violence is a reaction to ANC tactics and strategies, and always has been so.

even the BCMA pointed at the ANC first

For instance, in relation to the Reef violence that exploded from late-July 1990, even the (politically no friend of Inkatha) Black Consciousness Movement of Azania condemned the ANC for the violence. In a statement issued on 16 August, publicity and information secretary Vuisaw Qunta accused the ANC of attacking migrant workers from Natal. He said the killings on the East Rand and Soweto, leaving more than 150 dead (by then, later more like 1000), brought fears that the country could slide into an intolerable "orgy of violence unless the ANC changes its course." He added:

What justification exists in declaring peace with the regime and escalating war against Inkatha? Is it fair to attack all and every Zulu-speaking migrant worker in the hostels simply because Gatsha Buthelezi and the majority of Inkatha supporters are Zulu-speaking?

Qunta concluded that the killings would continue until the ANC stopped its drive for supremacy. Whatever the merit

or otherwise of Qunta's view, this is the type of issue that the IFP believes ought to be placed under the spotlight a lot more if peace is to be achieved. A major question being asked by many Zulus and the IFP is whether those limiting the peace debate to "Zulu disarmament" have peace as their main concern or whether they are more concerned with just keeping the ANC happy. The two are not necessarily identical.

2: negligible use of cultural weapons

Second, the facts of the matter show that genuine traditional weapons (as Zulus understand them to be), have played a relatively insignificant role in the actual killings in comparison to other weapons.

In fact, statistics available demonstrate that probably 2% - 5% of all fatalities (part of the approximately 18% attributed by various sources to hacking and stabbing) have been caused by traditional weapons, compared with 60%-75% fatalities being attributed to guns. These figures are available for anyone to see (refer below), including the ANC, yet they are convincingly ignored in the debate.

The real issue is not concerned with weapons as such, whether genuinely traditional or simply dangerous, but with political attitudes and a culture of intolerance and violence that results in weapons being used the way they have been. The ANC's demands of 5 April do not address these issues in the slightest, but concentrate exclusively upon areas which the ANC purports justifies its ultimatum to pull out of talks.

3: cultural weapons a Zulu issue, not IFP

Third, the ANC knew even before they wrote the open letter to the State President that the IFP does not have the final

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agencies reported 176 people killed in political violence. Of these, some 87 (49%) have the causes of death mentioned: 64 people were shot dead (74% of the 87); 16 were hacked to death (18%), and 7 were stabbed (8%). During the same month, 153 people were injured. Of the 81 to which causes were ascribed, 58 were shot (72% of the 81), 5 were injured by a hand grenade (6%), 2 by a petrol bomb (3%), 14 were hacked (17%), and 2 were stabbed (2%).

Clearly these figures are a little misleading in that there are sometimes multiple causes of death - people are shot, stabbed and hacked. Nevertheless, they do confirm the view that genuinely traditional weapons play a minimal role in the carnage.

SOURCE 3:

An independent university researcher in an as-yet unpublished paper on patterns of killings in Natal and the Transvaal, has established the following pattern for two periods. The first is September, October and November 1990, while the second covers February and April 1991.

Natal		Cause	Transvaal	
First period	Second period		First period	Second period
74%	70%	Shot	62%	55%
13%	8%	Stoned	12%	10%
14%	12%	Stabbed	11%	10%
5%	7%	Hacked	10%	14%
-	4%	Grenade	5%	7%
4%	9%	Unknown	5%	4%

Again, these figures confirm the low incidence of deaths attributable to genuine traditional or cultural weapons.

SOURCE 4:

Statistics taken from publicly issued South African Police reports for so-called unrest killings in Natal for the first four months of 1991 are broken down as follows:

	January No %	February No %	March No %	April No %	May No %
Shot	23 34	38 54	40 61	64 72	23 62
Knifed	8	2	4	9	11
Burned	5	12		9	
Stabbed	7	14	20		1
Hacked	6				
Spear	1				
Assault	1		1		
Grenade		1		5	
Other	18	2		2	2
Totals:	69	70	65	89	37

Other than confirming the typically high incidence of gunshot victims, the police reports make the distinction between being stabbed to death or being speared to death. Police pathology is able to determine with great accuracy which implements are the cause of death.

The weapons associated with stabbing in these Natal statistics are thus not traditional spears at all, but are objects such as knives, sharp sticks, sharpened steel, etc. Only once, among the 330 deaths, is mention made of a spear.

Zulu aMakhosi tell the government and De Klerk that "on this issue there can be no compromise whatsoever".

In response to the growing crisis over cultural weapons and the clamour that they be banned in toto, a gathering of the aMakhosi (chiefs) and iziPhhakanyiswa (leading dignitaries) of the Zulu people met in Ulundi on 10 May for a special day-long seminar.

Given the manner in which the ANC had conflated dangerous weapons with cultural weapons, as well as the fact that it was demanding a blanket ban on the carrying of the latter in public irrespective of the circumstances on the ground, their mood was not particularly conciliatory, though they did end by requesting that De Klerk visit them to talk through the issue. The following six resolutions were passed: "...

RESOLUTION 1

We the Amakhosi of KwaZulu gathered here today are appalled at the violence that is erupting in black townships. We are appalled at the extent to which internecine Black-on-Black strife takes place to shame every son of Africa. We are appalled at the human carnage that is deliberately instigated by some to gain political advantages over others.

WE RESOLVE:

- 1 To call on every Zulu to shame violence out of existence.
- 2 To express our deepest sorrow and to convey our deepest sympathy to every bereaved South African who has lost a son, a daughter, a husband or a wife, or any relative or loved one, in hideous Black-on-Black violence which is so marring the image of Black South Africa.
- 3 To stand tall and proud with our bowed heads as we express our solid support for His Majesty the King of the Zulus when he says that he is so shamed by the violence that is taking place, that he does not know which way to turn his face.

RESOLUTION 2

We the Amakhosi of KwaZulu have met this day to consider the present South African situation and in particular to consider the extent to which the flaring of violence is prohibitive of the negotiation process and is destructive of hopes for a speedy movement away from apartheid into a democracy.

Having carefully considered what is best for South Africa and best for the peace process, WE RESOLVE:

- 1 To say to the ANC that the confrontationism in their Open Letter to the State President must be condemned and that Black South Africa rejects their action in which they threaten to withdraw from negotiations if the State President does not respond positively to their demands which are impossible to meet.
- 2 To number amongst the demands which the State President will not be able to meet the demand for the banning of cultural weapons which Zulus carry.
- 3 To solidly support the right of His Majesty the King to hold a gathering of Zulus in Johannesburg to deliver a statement he wishes to make on the matter to us as his people.
- 4 To call on all the Amakhosi of KwaZulu to support His

Majesty the King of the Zulus who will be attired in his cultural dress and to urge all the Amakhosi of KwaZulu to support His Majesty also attired in their cultural dress, on the 21st of May, when the King will be addressing his people in Johannesburg.

- 5 To say to the ANC that it is AK 47's, it is petrol bombs, it is necklacing, it is hand grenades, it is land mines and it is pistols and other modern weaponry which must be banned and that the ANC must now once and for all drop their confrontation with the Zulus of South Africa by continuing to call for the banning of Zulu cultural weapons from public gatherings.

We wish to remind them that our people have carried these cultural artefacts as part of our customs and traditions for more than two hundred years. We wish to remind those on this Anti-Zulu Traditions campaign, that our people continued to carry these traditional weapons after their conquest by Afrikaners in Blood River in 1838, and after their defeat by the British in Ulundi in the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879.

- 6 To call on the South African Government not to follow lines of appeasement by leaving the ANC with their caches of arms, leaving the ANC with Umkhonto as their private army and leaving the ANC free to use Umkhonto commanders to train people in ANC Defence Units while they act against cultural weapons which Zulus carry which are not used for war, revolution or killing.
- 7 To praise the Prince of KwaPhindangene, the Chief Minister of KwaZulu, Dr. Mangosuthu G. Buthelezi, for clearly carrying to the State President the enormity of any action the Government would take to strip Zulus of their cultural weapons as accoutrements through which they express their historic identity.
- 8 And to finally state to the State President, the South African Government and the whole world that on this issue there can be no compromise whatsoever.

RESOLUTION 3

We the Amakhosi of KwaZulu here gathered together today state that we deplore the way the ANC is prone to humiliate KwaZulu, the Zulu people and by direct extension His Majesty the King of the Zulus. We felt deeply offended every time the ANC talked about KwaZulu as a creature of apartheid. We are deeply offended every time the ANC talks about KwaZulu as a product of apartheid which needs to be dismantled and knowing as we do know that KwaZulu existed before apartheid, before the Act of Union even, and before there was any White man's authority in our part of South Africa, we reject these ANC allegations with contempt.

We are particularly deeply angered that the ANC continues this attack on KwaZulu and Zulus now that they are in South Africa claiming to be working for a democratic future for our country.

WE THEREFORE RESOLVE:

- 1 To condemn the statements in the ANC's Open Letter to

the State President which points to KwaZulu and Zulus when they say "a group of individuals, drawn from a specific area of the country, sharing a common language and publicly identifying themselves with a specific political Party, have established control over a migrant labourers hostel through acts of intimidation."

- 2 To call upon Dr. Nelson Mandela to publicly apologise to the Zulu people and to His Majesty the King of the Zulus for claiming that Zulus do these things as Zulus.
- 3 To make our anger known to the ANC and the whole world by resolving further that the Amakhosi who will be in the company of His Majesty the King of the Zulus in Johannesburg when His Majesty goes to deliver the statement he wishes to make should all wear their traditional dress to emphasize their particular identity as people that history has created as Zulus, who value their cultural heritage, and who apologise to no one for being Zulu South Africans.

RESOLUTION 4

We the Amakhosi of KwaZulu gathered here today call on the ANC to publicly and consequentially withdraw from the confrontationist position they have adopted towards KwaZulu and the whole Zulu nation.

WE RESOLVE:

- 1 To say that there will be no peace in South Africa while the ANC makes war on the Zulu people.
- 2 To say that the ANC must go back to its origins when that great son of KwaZulu, Dr. Pixley ka Isaka Seme resolved to lead Black South Africans into establishing the African National Congress as an organisation which would fight for Black rights through non-violent tactics and strategies.
- 3 To say to the ANC that they did not have the backing of Black South Africa whom they did not consult, or even refer to, when in exiled isolation they made their unilateral decision to declare the armed struggle and to say to them that they must now disband their armed cadres and must now give up their caches of arms for the sake of the people of South Africa.

RESOLUTION 5

We the Amakhosi of KwaZulu gathered here today have always praised the Prince of KwaPhindangene, the Chief Minister of KwaZulu for his honest leadership and his refusal to lead the Black people of South Africa up the garden path.

We have learnt from the Chief Minister to deal with the realities around us and we know that he is right when he says that there can be no overnight solution to South Africa's problems and that it will take a great deal of effort by a united South Africa to finally make political victories that are going to come, meaningful in terms of increased standards of living for all.

WE RESOLVE:

- 1 To reject the ANC's demand for the immediate elimination of single quarter hostels on the Reef and say to them that more than half a million Black South Africans depend on those hostels to at least have somewhere to stay while they attempt to make South Africa a better place and to improve their economic circumstances.
- 2 To applaud the Chief Minister's campaign to have the hostels upgraded and converted into the kind of accommodation which we and all hostel dwellers would want.
- 3 To express our appreciation to the Chief Minister for campaigning for the improvement in hostel conditions in

the Transvaal townships in particular, and to thank him for the representations he made to the State President so effectively that the State President signed a press statement after a meeting he had with the Chief Minister of KwaZulu on Wednesday the 7th May in which the upgrading and conversion of hostels was listed as a point in an action programme to eliminate violence.

RESOLUTION 6

We the Amakhosi of KwaZulu have always been committed to support only non-violent tactics and strategies to bring about a fair and just land. KwaZulu has won many wars and done great deeds in numerous battlefields and we the Amakhosi of KwaZulu in part take our identity from Zulus as a warrior nation.

We are, however, aware that it was this KwaZulu warrior nation which turned from war to pursue non-violent tactics and strategies after the Bambatha Rebellion in 1906. We are aware that after the Bambatha Rebellion KwaZulu espoused the politics of negotiation in keeping with that great last reigning King, King Cetshwayo ka Mpande's historically significant commitment to deal with regional problems by treaty and negotiation rather than by war.

We who have clung to non-violent tactics and strategies and have supported every move that could be made to bring an end to internecine Black-on-Black violence in our country, now want to raise our voice in protest that the South African Government ignores who we are, ignores what we are and takes steps against what we are doing to bring about peace.

We need to direct our protest at the State President of South Africa, Mr. F.W. de Klerk and WE RESOLVE:

- 1 To say that we deplore the way the ANC has dramatised the carrying of cultural weapons while they and the South African Government have met and discussed and concur that the ANC can maintain Umkhonto we Sizwe as a private army, can keep caches of arms and ammunition hidden all over the country and can bring in Umkhonto commanders to retain their identity and to train so-called Defence Units.
- 2 To say that the enormity of the injustice in the contradiction of permitting the ANC to keep its AK 47's, its arms caches, its trained military personnel, and to continue to allow it even now to take our young sons and daughters out of the country for military training in foreign parts, and to simultaneously move against KwaZulu and the IFP by prohibiting the carrying of cultural weapons, defies description.
- 3 To say that this situation in which the ANC stockpiles the weapons that result in 80% of all Black-on-Black violent deaths and to move against the carrying of cultural weapons that are inconsequential in the violence that is taking place, needs to be discussed

AND

therefore we think it fit and proper for us as Amakhosi of KwaZulu to take our next step in dignity and in solemnity and to respectfully request the Honourable the State President of South Africa to respond positively to the appeal we make to him to come into our midst in a great gathering of the Amakhosi of KwaZulu, together with Members of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, in the presence of His Majesty the King and the Chief Minister of KwaZulu, and to talk to us and to reason with us on what we see as a situation thwart with danger for the politics of negotiation and for the whole of South Africa."

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say as far as the issue of the traditional weapons was concerned. The ANC was fully aware of the fact that it was an issue directly affecting Zulu people as Zulu people. The ANC was as equally aware of the emotional, historic, cultural (see page 3) and even political attachment people carrying these traditional weapons have on them.

The ANC knew that the carrying is seen as a symbol of Zulu resistance to repression. It was one of the main aspects during the Anglo Zulu war in 1879, after which the British also wanted to disarm the Zulus. After the war had all but finished, they embarked on a systematic policy of passifying the countryside and attempted to disarm the Zulus. These attempts failed, for as soon as they had left, Zulus would immediately make their cultural weapons again.

symbol of resistance

The issue of traditional weapons was also used in the 1950s and 1960s by police to harass blacks. Policemen stopped Zulus in the streets and told them to put the top of their knobkierries into their mouths - if it did not fit, they would be arrested for carrying a dangerous weapon. Again, Zulus then used these traditional weapons as a symbol of their resistance to such repressive measures and to many the ANC's present attempts to again ban the carrying of cultural weapons is equated with what the British did in 1879 and the 'boers' later. Following numerous supposed anti-Zulu statements by the ANC leadership, many Zulus perceive themselves to be under threat from the Xhosa-dominated ANC. Thus to give in to the demand to ban the carrying of traditional weapons would aggravate those fears.

To the IFP, this whole debate in which (invariably non-

Zulu) people fall over backwards try to define Zulu culture, and apply one-sided value-laden criteria in attempts to set a code of conduct for the Zulus, is a meaningless exercise and completely misses the real issues. There seems to be a view that all in South Africa owe something to the ANC, and that when the ANC demands, all must give freely in order to keep the ANC happy. The IFP does not believe that it owes the ANC anything, and believes it should only give when it is reasonable to do so - otherwise it will also share in the blame for spoiling the ANC which might prove very costly for South Africa.

4: ANC's hegemonic politics

Fourth, if a contribution to peace constitutes the major concern, then it will be asked what the ANC intends doing about its hegemonic politics, to the IFP, the major cause of violence. This is of course, not only the view of the IFP.

In an 18 May Rhodes University address, Institute of Race Relations executive director John Kane-Berman argued that peace required disarmament, correct police conduct, and the abandonment of strategies that lead to violence. Quoting a number of incidents reflecting enforcement of boycotts and stayaways, Kane-Berman said:

These are not isolated incidents. Our research suggests that they are the tip of an iceberg. That iceberg is a reign of terror. A survey recently commissioned by the Institute shows that fully a third of black adults in urban areas answered 'yes' to the question: "Have you in the past year been forced to take part in a consumer boycott or a stayaway?" At first sight, a third may not seem a large number, but it translates into hundreds of thousands of people and is indeed a high figure given the repeated claims that boycotts and stayaways are

IFP Central Committee pledges support for the Zulu amaXhosi

On 18 May, as pressure mounted for the government to ban the carrying of traditional weapons in public, the IFP's Central Committee met to back the Zulu dignitaries' 10 May stance which had rejected the proposed ban. The CC passed these resolutions:

RESOLUTION 1

We the members of the Central Committee of Inkatha Freedom Party having received the report of the proceedings of the meeting which our President Dr. Mangosuthu Buthelezi had with the Amakhosi of KwaZulu in the presence of His Majesty the King of the Zulus wish to enunciate the following principles:

- No constitutional development possible will avoid a substantial reliance on the Zulu Amakhosi and Chiefs of South Africa and unless the Amakhosi and Chiefs are consulted and concur with developments in the politics of negotiation, there will be problems ahead.

- Respect for individuals in a Bill of Rights will not be sufficient to ensure that South Africans end up being governed the way they are willing to be governed. We need the added respect which every culture deserves as part of the fabric of a richly woven South African society.

- The Party political attacks on any cultural group or on any collectivity of Amakhosi or Chiefs can only be destructive of

the ingredients of success in negotiations.

We therefore resolve as Inkatha Freedom Party to uphold the dignity of the Amakhosi of KwaZulu and the Chiefs of South Africa and in support of the Amakhosi's views expressed in their meeting with His Majesty the King and with the Chief Minister of KwaZulu and the President of Inkatha Freedom Party on the 10th WE RESOLVE:

- 1 To pledge our support for the right of the Zulu people to pay proper tribute to their Amakhosi to bear cultural weapons on every occasion at which an Inkosi or Amakhosi meet with their people.
- 2 To heed the collective wisdom of the Amakhosi of KwaZulu that it is proper cultural and ceremonial behaviour for Zulu men to bear cultural weapons on all occasions on which they formally gather together as Zulus under the authority of His Majesty the King of the Zulus and under the authority of the Prince of KwaPhindangene as the Zulu Prime Minister.
- 3 To respect the traditions of the people of KwaZulu by permitting the people of KwaZulu to carry cultural weapons at all political rallies and all collective meetings, as is the tradition of our people..

RESOLUTION 2

We the members of the Central Committee of Inkatha

voluntary. Two thirds of urban black people claiming to support Azapo or Inkatha or even the National Party say that threats have been used against them, their families or property, to stop them paying rent or service charges or for electricity. Four out of every five people who support Azapo or Inkatha claim to have been forced to take part in boycotts and stayaways.

He concluded that there was a direct link between the violence and this type of coercive politics:

I suspect that a large part of the explanation for the violence in many areas is that it is a backlash against this type of coercion. I suspect indeed that the so-called 'third force' widely blamed for township violence is this very backlash by ordinary people against the use of coercion to enforce consumer and rent boycotts or stayaways. The conclusion is straightforward: no end to the coercion, no end to the backlash, no end to the violence.

no coercion, no backlash, no violence

Buthelezi has been frequenting Soweto for almost two decades now, and each time he went there Zulu people in their traditional attire including spears have always been a prominent feature. The ANC has over the years been using pictures from such gatherings to support the theory that Inkatha was just a Zulu tribal association. By the late-1970s there developed a serious rift between Inkatha, the BCM and bodies such as the Soweto Committee of Ten. It all ended with the war of words without any use of spears at all.

Buthelezi and Inkatha meetings are not new to Soweto. Spears in political meetings are not new to Soweto. The conflict of ideologies are new to Soweto. Nor are hostels new to Soweto.

This is also not the first time that Buthelezi and Inkatha have been put under extreme political pressure by political developments (it will be remembered that in the post-1976 uprisings Buthelezi was pressurised to forego his positions in KwaZulu and join in with the then new political wave).

To the IFP, the only new phenomenon in Soweto is that of an increasing Charterist hegemonic tendency which all are expected to tolerate at all costs in order to keep the ANC happy.

5: hostel dwellers

Fifth, the ANC has attempted to link the achievement of peace with the material conditions of hostels and the behaviour of those residing within them, the main users of the traditional weapons at issue.

Single sex hostels in and around SA's cities are a living symbol of the migrant labour system that characterised the country's apartheid past. Over the past decades, the originally inhuman conditions of the hostels, geared to providing crude accommodation for their so-called "temporary sojourners", were allowed to deteriorate to an even worse state. Severe overcrowding, and the deterioration of ablution and sleeping facilities and of the buildings themselves went completely unchecked by the authorities.

Such a state of affairs is naturally one that all should be concerned with. But there has always been a dilemma in that the majority of hostel dwellers are people well established in the rural areas, in many cases with more than one wife and sometimes dozens of children. Realistically, they just could not afford to stay with their families in the cities, not that the cities could presently afford the influx of people that would go with the decision to bring all these families to them. Extra care thus

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Freedom Party have noted the ANC's strategy of attack against the IFP in the following steps which we have observed it taking:

- The writing of an Open Letter to the State President in which the IFP is bitterly attacked for using violence they say to achieve a political presence in Transvaal townships and to do so with the aid of the South African Police despite the ANC's sure knowledge that what they are doing is attacking the IFP on the Reef because the IFP has strong and growing grass root support there.

- The telephoning of our President by the Deputy President of the ANC conveying as truth rumours that the IFP is intent on attacking the ANC in specific places at specific times which the Deputy President of the ANC enumerated.

- Developing a media campaign pointing to the IFP and the cultural weapons some people carry being responsible for explosions of violence on the Reef, despite the fact that the ANC knows that it itself provoked the violence about which it complains is IFP violence.

- The holding of press conferences such as the one the ANC's Secretary-General, Mr. Alfred Nzo, held at which again fingers were pointed at the IFP for being responsible for violence and publicly accusing the IFP of having its Youth Brigade members trained by the SADF to give the IFP the capability of killing ANC leaders.

- The mounting of a public campaign culminating in a meeting with the State President demanding that the South African Government ban the carrying of cultural weapons on political occasions.

- The threat of withdrawing from negotiations if the South African Government does not comply with the ANC demands in the Open Letter to dismiss the Minister of Law and Order and the Minister of Defence and to bring violence under

control by the 9th May knowing full well that they were asking impossible demands and were going to compound the impossibility for Mr de Klerk by making him choose between disappointing the IFP by banning the carrying of cultural weapons, or disappointing the ANC knowing it would lead to the ANC's withdrawal from negotiations.

With great admiration we wish to convey our thanks to the President of Inkatha Freedom Party for not being intimidated by this ANC series of attacks against the IFP and KwaZulu and to RESOLVE:

- 1 To urge the South African Government to proceed with its business of bringing about reconciliation and establishing the politics of negotiation by ignoring the ANC's impossible demands.
- 2 To pledge our full support for the peace process which will be jeopardised by action which the ANC will in all probability undertake to undermine the process of reconciliation and attack moves to establish negotiation as the prime means of bringing about change.
- 3 To declare our willingness to attend the Summit Conference on Violence that the State President has called for in order to establish the supremacy of the politics of negotiation in the face of failed attempts by the ANC to have cultural weapons banned from public meetings.
- 4 To, as Black South Africans involved in the struggle for liberation and involved in opposition to apartheid to its final destruction, assure the State President that we, together with the whole of South Africa, will stand behind him in whatever he has to do to deal with the threat of using violence to undermine the politics of negotiation and to usurp the sovereign authority of South Africans to author a new constitution through the politics of negotiation.

King Goodwill Zwelithini ka Bhekuzulu's address to the Zulu nation

- * calls for peace
- * calls for killing talk to cease
- * commands his people to stop killing each other
- * calls for the ANC to stop attacking KwaZulu & himself

In his address to the Zulu nation (an Imbizo) at the First National Bank Stadium in Johannesburg, the Zulu King made an impassioned plea for peace.

In front of more than 60 000 followers, most of whom were defiantly bedecked in their traditional finery, the King said that peace demanded that a number of things come to an immediate end - war talk, necklacing, hacking, burning and the politics of intimidation. Instead, he called on Zulus to unite in a common commitment to the production of a democratic South Africa, to uphold "the supremacy of peace over violence and negotiation over revolution."

"Mr. Master of Ceremonies; the Prince of Kwa-Phindangene Chief Minister of KwaZulu and President Inkatha Freedom Party, Dr Mangosuthu Buthelezi; Members of the Royal family present; Amakhosi and all Zulus and other South Africans present.

There shall be a new South Africa. It shall be a democratic South Africa. Everyone shall be free in it. All shall be equal before the law and the constitution. It shall be a democracy in which there are many Parties which the people can choose between. The new democracy shall be a government which looks after the people and makes South Africa a better place for them.

it is good that we join different parties

It is this new South Africa that I as the King of the Zulus want for my people. We want to be Zulus in a South African democracy in which there are all these things and more. It is to these great ends that the Zulu people of South Africa want to direct politics.

As King of the Zulus I can say what others cannot say because I stand aloof from politics. I stand above Party politics. I am King of my father's people who will make their contribution to the emergence of a new South Africa. I preside over all of them as King of the Zulus and I prescribe to none which political Party they should belong to.

As King of the Zulus, I endorse anything that any Party does that will make my vision of a great, new, just South Africa become a reality. I know my people belong to different political Parties and I know that some of them belong to the ANC. It is good that this is so.

Having stated this without hesitation, I must say more. I must say more because while I stand above politics and while I pursue no Party political agenda myself, I find that I am attacked by some political Parties. KwaZulu is attacked and when KwaZulu is attacked, I am attacked.

commands people to work for peace

I have come to my father's people in this part of South Africa in order to command them to work for peace. I come to pronounce peace and I come to tell my father's people now to

desist in the use of violence for political purposes. I say this to every Zulu in every political Party.

I have also come to say some things quite clearly that the whole world may hear. In my call for peace I call for fair and just politics. I call for decency in politics. Let the atrocities now end.

Let there be no more necklacing.

Let the chopping up of people to pieces with pangas and axes, end.

Let the wanton destruction of life mostly caused by AK 47's and pistols and rifles and shot-guns and hand grenades and bombs end.

Let the burning and the destruction of property end.

Let the politics of intimidation which supports mass actions and strikes and stay-aways and boycotts, end. Let people be free from coercion. Let people be free to make their own choices.

And, my father's people, I command you, let war talk end. Let killing talk end. Stop now in this spreading of violence through filthy words.

ANC must stop attacking me & KwaZulu

I come thus to call for peace. I cannot do so in all honesty without addressing some words to the ANC. I say to the ANC that it must stop attacking me and KwaZulu. We are South Africans. We are products of history and we of all people in South Africa were there before history and we owe nothing to apartheid.

The ANC has been to the Transkei. The ANC has been to Bophuthatswana. The ANC has been to KaNgwane. The ANC has been to Ciskei. I ask why the ANC can go to these places and then turn to condemn KwaZulu for existing? Why can the ANC go to these places? Why can the ANC go to Umtata and Bisho and not to Ulundi?

When I held my November 1989 Imbizo in Durban, Mr. Walter Sisulu and some of his colleagues had just been released from Pollsmoor Prison. I then extended an invitation to Mr. Sisulu and his colleagues in my speech, to come to Ulundi to discuss the violence with me and the Chief Minister. I later wrote a formal letter to Mr. Sisulu, extending this invitation to him and his colleagues.

ANC snubs

Mr. Sisulu replied, accepting my invitation, but astounded me when he added a proviso that they would only see me in one of my Palaces in the Nongoma district - as they were not prepared to come to Ulundi. My official offices, as King of the Zulus, are in Ulundi and I have a Residence in Ulundi which I live in as often as I use my other Palaces and Residences in the Nongoma District. I therefore wrote to Mr. Sisulu and made it clear that I could only see them where I wanted to hold the discussion with them, and that was in Ulundi. I then never heard again from Mr. Sisulu.

On the 11th February 1990, the Deputy-President of the ANC, Mr. Mandela, was released from prison. On the 17th of February he phoned my uncle the Chief Minister. The Chief Minister later reported to me the contents of their conversation. Mr. Mandela wanted to visit my uncle at his KwaPhindangene Residence. He asked him for a date. He then asked him to seek an audience with me at the same time.

I responded by giving the following dates. Since he was given the 9th May 1990 by the Chief Minister for a visit to KwaPhindangene, I then wrote to the Deputy-President of the ANC and gave him the 10th May 1990 as the date on which he was to visit me at my Osuthu Residence. I gave him the 11th May 1990 as the date on which he and his colleagues were to visit me at my KwaKhangela Palace for a discussion. I gave him the 12th May 1990 as the date on which both the Chief Minister and I would accompany Dr. Mandela to Stanger, where he had requested an opportunity to lay a wreath at King Shaka's grave. I did not hear further from him.

Later, Dr. Mandela in talking to me over the telephone spent more than an hour trying to persuade me that I should meet with Mr. Sisulu in my Palace in Nongoma and not in Ulundi. I told Dr. Mandela that I could not change my mind. It was my invitation and Mr. Sisulu either accepted my invitation or he did not. He now made this a condition for his visit to me, that is that he (Dr. Mandela) would visit me only on condition that I just do as Mr. Sisulu suggested. I was adamant that I would only see Mr. Sisulu and other ANC leaders who were released with him in Ulundi.

Later, Dr. Mandela in a very short note informed me that he was too busy to come and was going overseas and would contact me later about alternative dates. That was the end of the matter. The Deputy President of ANC did not answer the Chief Minister's letter giving him the date on which to visit him.

As I say, I feel hurt and offended that the ANC goes everywhere but to Ulundi and will see anybody in their capitals, except myself and my uncle, the Chief Minister of KwaZulu. This really makes me feel like I am despised by the ANC.

Why, I ask the ANC, do you talk about disbanding KwaZulu as though KwaZulu was the product of apartheid? Why, I ask the ANC, do you mount these vendettas against KwaZulu?

KwaZulu has always been a friend to Black politics. It was KwaZulu which produced that great South African, Dr. Pixley ka Isaka Seme, who rose to be a leader of leaders and who was the founding father of the African National Congress. Zulu society has supported the struggle for liberation right from the very beginning. It was that great Zulu, Chief Albert Lutuli, who reinvigorated the ANC, brought life into the ANC and mounted a recovery of the ANC in the midst of Zulus to whom the ANC today owes so much.

We as a people have nursed the ANC and produced great leaders for it and empowered the ANC when it was weak. Why now does the ANC want to destroy the place of its origins?

Let the killing stop. Let the attacks against KwaZulu stop. Let the attacks against Zulu-speaking people stop. Let no ANC man, woman or leader now dare again say that Zulus are bussed into the Transvaal to kill in order to establish an Inkatha Freedom Party presence. Let that kind of killing talk, let that kind of slander, now end.

Indeed, let there now be apology for this kind of slanderous attack against the integrity of KwaZulu and against my very person. I personify the Zulu nation. I am the Zulu nation. He who attacks the Zulu nation attacks me. Let that statement be heard.

I say to the ANC that these things must stop. I say to the ANC that I am deeply hurt when they raise up the spectacle of

Zulus and their Zulu-ness being the cause of violence in South Africa. It is not the carrying of cultural weapons that leads to death and destruction. It is the AK 47 bullets which rip through life to kill that is responsible for death. It is the explosion of gun powder behind bullets, behind missiles and in bombs and hand grenades that kills.

I say to the ANC let this talk of Zulu cultural weapons being the instruments of death now cease. It is untrue. The call to ban the bearing of cultural weapons by Zulus is an insult to my manhood. It is an insult to the manhood of every Zulu man. We carry them for pride but not to kill.

Not only does the ANC attack the very existence of KwaZulu and insult the Chief Minister of KwaZulu and not only does it hurt me in these attacks, but the ANC want to hurt the Zulu-speaking people in the Transvaal as well. Hurting them is hurting me.

When the ANC called for the closing of hostels, they were actually saying that the poorest of the poor who have only the hostels to stay in, must rather go and find somewhere to sleep in one of the squatter camps. There is nowhere for the inmates of the hostels to go. We can talk about the need to improve hostel accommodation. We can talk about the need to upgrade them, but this is not what the ANC wants. The ANC wants the hostel dwellers scattered and removed from the hostels.

I say to the ANC: don't do this to my people. Don't penalise my people because they are Zulus. I say drop the hostel issue. Help us, if they will, I say to them. Upgrade hostels but do not take away the only roof that hundreds of thousands of black workers have over their heads.

I say to my father's people that they must put away their killing weapons and that they must not be drawn into violence. I command thus. I also command the people of my father to preserve their dignity and to remain locked in powerful unity. South Africa needs that unity which has always been there amongst Zulus. It needs the full might of the Zulu nation to work for peace. Let no one, I say to my father's people, come to divide you. Stand together against all onslaughts. Be with each other as the warriors of old went with each other and emerged invincible.

I say to my father's people be invincible in politics because the days of being invincible in war are gone

I say to my father's people be invincible in politics because the days of being invincible in war are gone. War is not the way of the Zulus. Unite, I tell my people, for the sake of peace. Unite as Zulus and be powerful for South Africa. Lead in the production of a democracy. Tolerate no evil. Today declare your intention to remain united as brothers born of warrior stock to use power and courage to uphold the supremacy of peace over violence and negotiations over revolution.

I command peace and I turn to the ANC and I say, do not destroy our peace-keeping capacity. I turn to the ANC and say, work for peace with us. I say to Dr. Nelson Mandela, bring your people to the discussion table. I say to him, stop slinging mud and stop your people slinging mud. Stop also, I say to Dr. Mandela, tolerating divisiveness. Stop this ugly vendetta against the Zulu people and their Zuluness.

Let no political Party and no political organisation and no liberation movement make victims out of any, and then blame the victims for the violence that destroyed them. Let there now be Black unity of purpose in the final destruction of apartheid and in the establishment of a new democracy. When that great deed is done, let the people decide who shall rule."

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needed to be exercised in any decision-making in this regard in order not to impact negatively on the families' lives.

The sixth of the ANC's seven demands of 5 April read:

Effective steps shall be taken to begin the process of phasing out the hostels and other labour compounds and transforming them into family units and single occupancy flats.

As far as many hostel dwellers are concerned however, the ANC's calls against the hostels are not calls for better conditions for those living in them, and neither are they calls for peace.

hostel dwellers not consulted

Were these calls simply and genuinely for better conditions, the dwellers' family problems would have been taken into account and the hostel people would have been involved in the debate from the beginning. Decisions in most communities however, were made behind their backs, rumours spread that they were going to be expelled, and indeed, they were physically attacked.

belief the ANC is punishing hostel dwellers

To many in the IFP, had the ANC's calls been calls for peace, equal attention would have been given to squatter communities inhabited mostly by Xhosa-speaking people and ANC supporters. Conditions are far worst in these squatter camps than they are in the hostels, and squatters have played a very active role in the violence. Yet, other than general calls for upgrading that applies equally in the rest of the country, the ANC has not singled out such squatter camp upgrading as a pre-condition for their supporters to cease attacking the hostels. There is therefore a perception that the ANC's calls regarding the hostels are nothing more and nothing less than political calls.

Many see the ANC attempting to punish hostel dwellers for not assimilating the kind of politics the ANC wants them to assimilate. Hostel residents are usually men, men who have demonstrated extreme contempt towards the prescriptive nature of ANC politics. Boycotts, stayaways, rent boycotts and all that go with it, where people are forced by ANC-aligned youth to comply willy nilly have not gone down well with hostel people.

And while there has long been uneasy relationship between hostel dwellers and township residents (since 1976 at least when youths first imposed themselves on hostel dwellers), they co-existed relatively peacefully until such time that hostel people started to be regarded as counter-revolutionaries by ANC-aligned youths. Where hostel people used to go freely into shebeens, shops, and other public amenities and where they were free to use public transport, they became victims of heavy abuse and attacks. They were made to feel increasingly unwelcome, not because of anything they were doing (unless going to work and shopping as they wished constituted problems), but because they refused to accept that they should or could be coerced into the kinds of political activity demanded by the ANC-aligned youth. The issue was not whether the boycotts were or were not justified, but whether people could be coerced into compliance.

There were other issues that brought the issue of hostel dwellers to the fore. The February 1990 Thokoza/Germiston taxi war, for instance, complicated the picture, when ANC-aligned bodies mistakenly highlighted the Xhosa/Zulu fight as Inkatha/ANC conflict, and Zulus and Inkatha were systematically labelled initiators of the violence. As in almost all violence outbreaks, the ANC's making political mileage out of the

incident led to further reactions. Because of the political images placed on what was simply a taxi owners' war, Zulus and Inkatha members in the townships and hostels were subjected to heavy abuse and indiscriminate attacks. Typically for instance, a road-block manned by ANC-aligned youths was set up to attack vehicles transporting Zulus between Natal and Transvaal, at times attacking vehicles simply on the basis of their Natal registration plates.

July 1990 anti-Inkatha campaign

The anti-KwaZulu and anti-Buthelezi campaign of the ANC alliance in July 1990 did not help to heal the situation. It is important to note that the ANC was mounting this campaign at the same time it was showering other homeland leaders (more so Major Holomisa of Transkei) with praise. What was referred to as The Week of Action Against KwaZulu at the beginning of July 1990 was marked by attacks on Inkatha members at Everton and Sebokeng, within the hostels and squatter communities. Indeed, Zulus who saw no sense in this campaign were attacked, and from 22 July 1990, war was in effect declared on the IFP on the Reef.

This is why there is a perception that the ANC, having failed to win the hostel dwellers into its political camp and having failed to force hostel dwellers into compliance, is using the issue of violence to get at them.

However, in so doing, the ANC is in fact polarising the situation even more. As the hostel dwellers become more and more antagonised and the township residents' stereotypical perspectives of hostel people get entrenched, the volatility of the situation will increase rather than decrease. That is why there is a view suggesting that in framing these issues - cultural weapons and hostels - it is extremely difficult to imagine that the ANC placed peace higher on the agenda than it did an attempt to drub Inkatha in the media to win more political mileage at its expense.

conclusion - look at the broad picture

At the end of the day, the question of traditional weapons has less to do with the vital yet narrow issue of reducing violence per se than it has to do with a far broader political picture. Stopping the violence thus goes far beyond questions regarding the cultural nature of select weapons, their availability and their use.

Stopping the violence requires (1) analysis as to its causes; (2) political organisations totally re-evaluating their approach to politics in the light of this; followed (3) by their deliberately changing those strategies and tactics engendering conflict rather than peace.

As far as the IFP is concerned, the ANC has a lot to answer for when it comes to the initiation and perpetuation of violence. The IFP believes that it is more committed to peace, and always has been, than the ANC is or is likely to be. To the IFP, the ANC's history right from the period it went into exile (or even earlier, with the 1959 breakaway of the PAC) until the present, is steeped in a political culture and in strategies that denied the right to exist or legitimacy of any liberation other than itself. The emergence of the BCM, and later Inkatha, was not simply very unwelcome to the ANC in Lusaka, but was characterised as a threat to be dealt with in a manner ensuring ANC hegemony. Strategies within the country, reinforcing the image of the ANC as the government-in-waiting and the only true representative of the masses, were thus key to the emergence of internecine conflict, intolerance and violence. This is the context within which the IFP views traditional weapons so totally differently than does the ANC.

KwaZulu Annual Prayer Day: Buthelezi says people are dying in fights to establish party political dominance

Speaking at the annual KwaZulu prayer day held in Ulundi on 12 May, Buthelezi said that although one day the annual prayer day would be used to give thanks for the advent of the long awaited new democratic era, and for success in reconciling black and white, "alas my brothers and sisters that day is not yet at hand." Quite the reverse was the case:

Indeed, as we gather to pray today one can perhaps say that nowhere in the history of South Africa have we seen such tragic circumstances as surround us today.

While there had undoubtedly been darker days or days with less hope or greater difficulty, never before had there been such well-founded hope on what could in reality be achieved mixed with real fears that it might not take place.

killings to establish political supremacy

Political strife and killings did not arise, said Buthelezi, from "irreconcilable ideological differences" and those killing each other not only often professed the same basic political values, but also purported to serve these values in similar strategies. The strife was thus over power:

So much strife today is determined by greed for power and the insistence on being the person, the leader, or the political party which wields the power to do what so many leaders and so many parties want done.

We are reaching the stage when South Africans are killing each other in fights about who shall lead and not about what policies should be introduced or what direction South Africa should take.

This we have never seen. This is evil and this must now end.

Buthelezi stated two things. First, he re-dedicated himself to the establishment of democracy and to putting the good of the country before the good of any political party:

It is for principles that I have struggled. It is not for personal power and it is not even for the power of the IFP or for any one party that I think we should be waging a struggle. We should be waging a struggle to create the circumstances in which all parties can be free to gather what strength there is for it to gather among a liberated population.

Buthelezi said, secondly, that there was no use in relying on the advocacy of principle or policy to avoid strife because people were dying not for those reasons, but "to establish political dominance" which was "utterly wrong". He thus committed himself:

to seek reconciliation through human contact and through love and care and understanding and not to rely on austere political principle to create common purpose.

The prayer day represented supplication to God for reconciliation, justice and peace to banish want, ignorance and disease.

We must bring humanism into our politics which reflects our Christian commitments to love our neighbours as ourselves and to love God. We must bring into politics tolerance and the recognition that

differences of opinion must be expressed if ever we are going to be governed wisely.

This required forgiveness and repentance - forgiveness of "our oppressors" and "white South Africa generally for the generations of suffering that white racism and greed has created", and "repentance on the part of whites and a real desire for black and white now to move into the future together."

But "repentance must of course be associated with restitution". Blacks whose land was grabbed from them must be able to get it back; blacks excluded from fully participating in the cash economy must be assisted to become full participants in it; those denied the opportunity to compete equally must get equality and assistance to make use of the equality to improve their lot in life. "There will be no genuine peace in South Africa if there is not this forgiveness, repentance and restitution."

But this restitution, said Buthelezi, "must be undertaken by a joint black/white endeavour to make it possible for the restitution to be practical and effective."

Restitution should therefore not be simply a question of taking from the rich and giving to the poor:

Restitution on the part of whites must take the form of working with blacks to produce the wealth and once the wealth is produced, to assist in the spreading of that wealth to lift black society up from destitution.

Restitution of the land does not involve merely taking it from whites and giving it to blacks, for:

this would result in crippling our country's agricultural productive capacity and destroying the whole process of capital formation and productivity of mining, commerce, banking and industry.

Restitution of economic opportunity likewise, will be empty if equality of opportunity is in reality equality in the lack of opportunity.

Whites, claimed Buthelezi, "could not rule alone in any kind of wisdom." For blacks, restitution required whites and blacks "putting South Africa first and generating opportunity and wealth and sharing concerns in which black and white can work together."

Restitution thus required more schools, more teachers, more teacher training colleges and better school equipment. It required whites and blacks working together to buckle their belts and tighten the economy so that black education gets what it needs.

restitution is no hand-out

Restitution was therefore not a hand-out from whites:

We do not want that superior benevolence. We have struggled all our lives, and indeed blacks have struggled for generations, for equality. We have not struggled to laud it over whites. We have not struggled to end up with the power to dominate whites.

We want only a fair and just society in which total equality before the law and the constitution can be made meaningful to all in terms of rising standards of living for all.

This, said Buthelezi, was what humanism could produce.

Buthelezi at SP's Peace Conference: violence must end and it must end now

Proposes secretariat to continue the peace initiative

With violence the major issue on the political agenda, and with the ANC having fully committed itself to a path of non-participation in negotiations until the government acceded to its seven 5 April demands, the government attempted to pre-empt the growing political impasse by convening a conference on violence intended to find sufficient common ground for the pre-negotiating process to continue.

The ANC rejected the idea virtually immediately it was announced, on the grounds that it was insufficient a reaction to the 5 April demands, because it had not been consulted, and because the ANC believed a more politically neutral body such as the churches should convene such a conference.

The IFP however, along with a wide range of other parties and organisations, welcomed the conference, and rejected the notion of the churches being politically impartial. On 18 May the party's Central Committee specifically declared its willingness to attend the Summit Conference on Violence that the State President has called for in order to establish the supremacy of the politics of negotiation in the face of failed attempts by the ANC to have cultural weapons banned from public meetings.

The IFP accordingly attended the 24/25 May summit, Buthelezi speaking on "Action for peace in South Africa: some observations and some specific proposals."

"Mr. Chairman, Mr. President and members of your Cabinet, His Majesty the King of the Zulus and members of his delegation, Members of the KwaZulu Cabinet present, members of my delegation, South African leaders present, Church leaders present, ladies and gentlemen.

I want right at the outset to make a personal statement. I have come here to assist in mounting a winning initiative against violence. Violence must end and it must end now.

I make the statement that on no single occasion have I ever, ever made any decision whatsoever to use violence for political purposes. I make that statement before all my friends here, before all South Africa, before the world and may God be my witness that it is true.

I have never presided over any meeting of Inkatha Freedom Party leaders where violence has been adopted as a strategy, nor have I ever heard of Inkatha Freedom Party leadership meeting to make any decision to employ violence for political purposes. I have not even heard rumour of it.

Whenever I have not co-operated with those who call me to meetings or try and involve me in initiatives to end violence, I have done so for good reason. I have tried and failed and tried and failed to end violence. August men of the Church such as Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Archbishop Denis Hurley, Bishop Stanley Magoba and others have tried and tried and failed. I have learnt not what to do to end violence. I have traced failure to end violence to some of its causes.

I will not be drawn into efforts to bring about peace which I know are going to fail, simply because I want to be there where the failure is going to take place, to gain an image of working for peace.

Mr. Chairman, I have always held out my hand of friendship to other political organisations and to organisations like the

South African Council of Churches.

Mr. Chairman, I pledge here today to work with anybody in any tactic which has any hope of bringing about an end to violence. In making this pledge, I call for the end of posturing and the end of making the peace process yet another form of the struggle to strengthen the pursuit of violence in politics.

Yes, that does happen. We have come together to mount initiatives against violence and we must start from a bedrock position which can take the weight of what we will have to do to become successful. In this Conference I am going to be appealing again and again for the facts of the matter to be looked at in the face. There are those in peace moves in times of national crisis who will always use the peace process as a means of blaming enemies and building up sectional power advantages.

I pledge, Mr. Chairman, in this Conference not to do this. I only ask that we look this phenomena in the face.

Before all my friends and my colleagues and before my country, I:

- pledge to dedicate myself to the achievement of peace;
- pledge myself to peace and pledge to pursue peace even if what I do in the end costs me politically;
- pledge to work for peace and to put the good of the State before the good of Inkatha Freedom Party in doing so;
- pledge to build in the IFP a leadership core for peace;
- pledge to continue to propagate the ideals of peace amongst IFP members;
- pledge to employ every leadership advantage I have and to employ the vastness of Inkatha Freedom Party's leadership at local level, at regional level and at national level, for peace;

Mr. Chairman, I repeat: violence must end, and it must end now.

"Violence begets violence and the revolutionary process invariably ends up dividing society and leaving society incapable of resolving conflict through peaceful means"

We as a nation must understand that violence is not only a violation of the sanctity of life of an individual. When violence kills, it does more than end one life, ten lives, or a hundred lives. When people in society die in violence, the very foundations of democracy are weakened.

There is a great truth in the saying that he who lives by the sword shall die by the sword. There is great truth in my observation that Governments which are taken over by force, or established by force, end up ruling by force.

The employment of violence for democracy is self-defeating. Violence begets violence and the revolutionary process invariably ends up dividing society and leaving society incapable of resolving conflict through peaceful means in its institutionalised life. Violence of the order of magnitude that takes over governments makes societies dysfunctional. I believe that real revolutionary violence plays with the prospects of

making society psychotic.

I believe that in this country we face the reality that we are now reaping the whirlwind that revolution, calls for revolution, attempts to make this country ungovernable and the idealisation of the use of war and bombs and violence for political purposes, have sown.

Mr. Chairman, I do not make these statements to put the ANC down. I have not come here to score points off the ANC or off any political Party. I have made these points because they have to be made and I make these points as preliminary remarks which have to be made before I go on to say what I am now going to say.

The full might of the State in South Africa, and it was considerable, could not stop the ANC's violence programmes. We really did see violence begetting violence, and apartheid begetting revolutionary violence and revolutionary violence begetting oppressive violence and oppressive violence begetting added revolutionary violence and added revolutionary violence begetting Draconian violence, and Draconian violence beginning to destroy the very fabric of society.

From the inception of Inkatha I have said that I can understand why some in South Africa resorted to violence. They were just pushed beyond the pale. The love for their country, the passion that love for their fellow human beings and the suffering they endured, their families endured and their communities endured was all just too much.

I understand that some could then say surely now there must be a just war.

In making my statements that I have made about violence, I am not even slamming the ANC for adopting the armed struggle. I can understand that that is all that they felt that they could do from their exiled position.

I am making the points I have made about violence, because I now go on to say:

- whatever else this Conference does, it must aim at keeping the ANC in the peace process.
- violence in our country will not be stemmed unless revolutionaries turned democrats work with those targeted by violence to bring about an end to violence;

I want to make a very particular statement that the peace process in our country will remain fatally flawed, or at best very greatly impaired, unless relationships between the IFP and the ANC are normalised.

It is now quite apparent that the January 29th agreements and accords reached between the IFP and the ANC were only first steps in the process of normalising relationships between the two organisations. The second step now needs to be taken.

The Central Committee of Inkatha Freedom Party adopted a Resolution at its meeting on the 14th April calling for a meeting between the IFP Central Committee and the ANC National Executive.

The ANC has now responded suggesting that the 12-a-side peace committee that was activated after the January 29th meeting of the two organisations, be convened to consider organising another Inkatha Freedom Party Central Committee and ANC National Executive Committee meeting.

I have made the statements I have made about violence because it must be recognised that war begins with a declaration of war, and before declarations of war, there is propaganda which prepares the way for those declarations.

If violence is ever to end in South Africa, killing talk must stop.

It is killing talk, and nothing but killing talk, for Dr Mandela to have said at a commemoration service in Kagiso for the victims of the Swanieville tragedy, that he warned the South

African Government that if it worked with what he referred to as an organisation which "wished to rise to power on the corpses of black people", Black people "... would arm themselves and take the violence into white areas."

In the same address, in ugly talk, Dr. Mandela slammed the Government for not banning cultural weapons and accused Mr. de Klerk of regarding the lives of black people as "cheap."

This tough talk is being backed up by the ANC's Chris Hani and his Umkhonto we Sizwe to establish Defence Units which we all know have nothing to do with defence and everything to do with possible future aggression. At the same venue in commemoration of the Swanieville dead, Mr. Hani said: "The Boers are using their small dogs to kill our people" and attacked the IFP by saying it was a counter-revolutionary organisation "established by the Boers to de-stabilise the black liberation movements."

It is killing talk by the ANC when in its Open Letter to the State President it said:

"1.2. In almost every instance of violence that has erupted on the Reef, for example, the following pattern has emerged. A group of individuals, drawn from a specific area of the country, sharing a common language and publicly identifying themselves with a specific political party have established control over a migrant labourers' hostel through acts of intimidation. Those who would not submit to such pressure are subsequently driven out of the hostel. These individuals constitute themselves into a group, with insignia for common identification (usually a red head-band). Supported by others of like purpose, bussed in from other areas, they then stage a provocative armed demonstration through the township, escorted by the police.

"1.3. Without exception, the townships that have suffered armed demonstrations did not previously have any visible presence of the Inkatha Freedom Party. In all the cases in question the majority of participants in such demonstrations have been bussed in from other localities. Instances when the police have averted attacks or deterred the perpetrators of such attacks are extremely rare. Even among cases where the assailants have been identified the number of them who have been arrested or charged is derisory."

Killing talk is nowhere near as dangerous when it is spread in the form of rumour. In intense fear-ridden communities, rumour is all you need to trigger off horrible reactions.

It is I believe utterly wrong to initiate rumour or give credibility to rumour in the way which was done by Mr. Alfred Nzo when at a press conference, amongst other things, he said that the Inkatha Freedom Party Youth Brigade was being trained by the SADF in Mkhuzi and in the Eastern Transvaal, to equip them with the killing skills they could use against ANC leaders.

Mr. Chairman, these things had to be said because without saying them, I could not proceed in this Conference.

Mr. Chairman, I state again very clearly that I am not talking as I have been talking to score points off the ANC. I am pointing to the imperatives at work saying that unless the IFP and the ANC normalise relationships between themselves, only further tribulation lies ahead.

Mr. Chairman, I turn to address the question of the IFP's culpability in violence. The IFP has paid an enormous price for the Party's commitment to establish a multi-Party democracy through non-violent means and its insistence on the ability of South Africans to put their own political house in order. We rejected the armed struggle; we rejected sanctions and we rejected the punitive isolation of South Africa.

What we stand for and the tactics and strategies we use in pursuit of our goals, have made us unpopular in revolution-

any circles which do all these things we say no to.

The IFP has been physically and violently attacked.

We number amongst our dead 153 office bearers at Branch, Regional and national level who have died violently.

They have not died on frontlines in offensives against political enemies. They have died where they slept, where they worked, where they walked and where they travelled. They have been hunted down and killed.

More than 1 000 members have lost their lives in internecine Black-on-Black violence in recent years. Again, these are not frontline casualties among troops sent to war. The majority of them have been hunted down and killed because they are IFP members.

Whole IFP neighbourhoods in townships and in rural wards have been smashed up by violence.

Of course the IFP was drawn into violence. No organisation of human beings could suffer that kind of attack without anger, without retaliation, without pre-emptive violence and without blood feud violence and without revenge violence taking place. IFP members are human and they have reacted as human beings. Of course they have been drawn into violence.

The ANC and the UDF and COSATU claim their own statistics of dead and wounded. Their members too of course have been drawn into violence. PAC claims its wounded and dead. AZAPO claims its wounded and dead. Various civic associations claim their wounded and dead. Of course the PAC, AZAPO members and members of civic associations have been drawn into violence.

I state, however, categorically that the IFP is not culpable in the sense of generating violence, taking steps to escalate violence and employing violence for political purposes.

"No one leader, no one organisation and even no combination of leaders and no combination of organisations, will put an end to violence in South Africa on their own. We need to mount a national campaign for peace."

If we could all just for a moment across all our differences and just for a moment if we could imagine ourselves before God and before His angels, and we were talking about killing in South Africa, I believe we would end up saying things like:

- apartheid which pushed people beyond their endurance can be blamed for those who left South Africa to seek to kill for political purposes;
- they were wrong but they were human in what they were doing;
- in escalating violence, which is contributed to by all sides, individuals are pushed beyond their endurance and they leave the principles of their Parties and their organisations behind and either kill on their own or kill in bands of like-minded people.
- before God and His angels we could not make a distinction that one kind of killing was more justified than another kind of killing. We would there before God and all His angels have to say this. However understandable it is that people when pushed beyond their endurance resort to violence, violence is wrong.
- violence is wrong in the ANC, violence is wrong in the IFP, violence is wrong in the PAC, violence is wrong in AZAPO, violence is wrong amongst groups of comrades, violence is wrong, period.

This brings me to my real message to this Conference and to South Africa. No one leader, no one organisation and even no combination of leaders and no combination of organisations, will put an end to violence in South Africa on their own.

We need to mount a national campaign for peace. We need to do what has to be done to develop a national will to shame violence out of existence. All the churches of South Africa are now there to assist in this matter. Every institution in South Africa is there to assist in this matter. The South African Government and the full might of the State is there to assist in this matter. The man in the street is there to assist in this matter.

Peace Secretariat

The vast majority of political Parties are there to assist in this matter of shaming violence out of existence by developing a national will to do so.

I repeat what I said earlier, that some things just have to be said. I turn now to say that it is utter rubbish that there is some sinister Third Force orchestrated beyond the ken of the Government or within the ken of the Government which is planning and carrying out massacres of people.

People are being gunned down in amazingly brutal, daring, full daylight, commando-type raids on trains and on mourners. That is the evidence that there is for a sinister Third Force.

I believe it is utter rubbish to say that Mr. F.W. de Klerk is employing violence for his own political ends. It is utter rubbish to say that Mr. de Klerk is fostering violence between the IFP and the ANC in order to cripple the ANC.

It is utter rubbish to say that there is a sinister South African Government plot to put an IFP face on the violence that they want to use to destroy the ANC.

Mr. Chairman, the ANC will perhaps have to realise that it is tough going in South Africa and has been all the years of their exile. We have had to face that toughness without inventing Third Force factors to account for it. It may simply be a case of South Africa not being the place of ANC dreams.

Mr. Chairman, I come back to my thought that we need to establish a national campaign to eradicate violence from South African politics roots and all for the political cancer that it is.

I believe, Mr. Chairman, that every participant in this Conference should recognise that we are just wasting our time if this Conference turns out to be another talk-shop. We want honesty and we want a genuine debate, and we want a proper delving into the causes and nature of violence and I believe that we should not rest in this Conference until we are quite sure that the conclusions of Conference and the action programme it must adopt, are regarded as binding on all the participants here present.

We should work at peace in this Conference knowing that no two-day Conference could possibly succeed in ending violence. A two-day Conference at the very best can only be a preparatory step towards action programmes which must be mounted against violence.

It is my plea that we do not allow this Conference to close tomorrow without ensuring that there is going to be continuing action which flows out of it to which we all remain party. I propose, Mr. Chairman, that we establish a Peace Secretariat which will be resourced and commissioned to co-ordinate and to assist Conference members in their ongoing action against violence, and which will be commissioned to draw in additional partners who are not present here today.

The Peace Secretariat, Mr. Chairman, should:

- be mandated to establish local and regional Peace Action

Groups wherever violence breaks out to bring a peace presence to troubled areas, provide immediate factual information to counter rumour;

- establish channels of communication between itself and these Peace Action Groups and between itself and security forces so that there is a constant working network of communication along which information can flow both ways in all troubled areas.
- be mandated to consult with local leadership at grass root level and with political Parties working at local and grass root level to facilitate peace moves.

I believe, Mr. Chairman, that the Peace Secretariat should be charged with reconvening Conference when necessary. We should cause a register to be drawn up of Conference delegates who commit themselves to lend their full support to an ongoing peace initiative which will flow from this Conference. It would, I believe, be advisable to lay this responsibility of reconvening Conference at doors other than the doors of the Government and political Parties.

Mr. Chairman, I make this suggestion aware that there is talk of mounting another Peace Conference on a national level. I say let there be many peace conferences. Let all who would work for peace work for peace under whatever framework they wish to do so. My suggestion is that we here today commit ourselves to go on working for peace in programmes that we here in this Conference determine to be appropriate to the crisis we face.

let there be many peace conferences, let
all who work for peace do so under
whatever framework they wish to

Mr. Chairman, if we do not give this Conference continuity and we do not provide the mechanisms for that continuity, we will - to say the least - be under-achieving. Let us aim at action that works and let us aim at continuing action until peace is established.

I make a point that this Conference, and the Peace Secretariat I am proposing, should take on the responsibility that the South African Government may not wish to carry on its own because politics could make it a disputing party in the peace process.

Nothing can be done without resources. The Peace Secretariat I propose we establish should be resourced to undertake its work. We exist in a national crisis and national resources should be made available by the South African Government to do whatever the Peace Secretariat does for peace.

Mr. Chairman, I go on now to make another appeal to this Conference. We cannot afford now to be bogged down and to become politically moribund because we deal in myths and fantasies and pursue tactics and strategies which can never win.

There will be no handing over of power by the South African Government to any Interim Government and there will be no Constituent Assembly as a precursor to any Interim Government. This is so because by far the majority of South Africans - Black and White - reject such notions.

Let the wrangling go on about what can and should be done in this direction but let us not ourselves do nothing while the wrangling goes on. We must get on with the business of making the transition in South Africa from apartheid to democracy.

Radical change is always dangerous to handle. I do not believe that it is wise for the sake of South Africa for us to leave all the handling of all the difficulties that are going to be encountered in making the transition we have to make, in the

hands of the South African government.

It is the Government. It has Statutory powers to run this country. It is ultimately responsible for law and order. But it does not have properly constituted parliamentary chambers in which all South Africans are represented and in which a total South African wisdom can be distilled out of debate.

Let there be a move to add to government the wisdom it must necessarily lack because it is a partisan government drawn from Whites only with Indians and Coloureds there in some measure to play some kind of watch-dog role.

I call, Mr. Chairman, for recognition by this Conference that the Government needs to share responsibility with us for the maintenance of law and order.

The whole question of shared responsibility for maintaining stability and order while negotiations take place, needs to come under focus. This Conference and leaders gathered here today should address the question of how the dominant leaders of political Parties, and how the major political Parties in the country, can be enabled to play a Statutory role in advising Government on the legislation requirements of the country in this interim phase.

I am not talking about apartheid's old-style advisory councils or committees. Mr. Chairman, I am talking about a Statutory body that has teeth, that has the Statutory right to delay legislation and to block it if necessary in defined circumstances.

I think it is politically cowardly to blame government as the law enforcement agency for not doing its job and to undermine so that it fails and can be further blamed. The South African Government is ultimately responsible for law and order. It is the Government. Let us have the guts and the courage and the South Africanism in our democratic commitment necessary to step up and say, we too are going to assist and be culpable or be applauded for what we do in failure or in success to bring about peace.

There are many ways in which this specific recommendation could be translated into a practical suggestion. I float only the idea because it is so important that I believe it would be wrong of me in any way to pre-empt anything anybody would want to say on the matter. I simply call for this Conference to recognise that the Government has failed to maintain law and order and that we must be South African man and woman enough to step up and say we will assist the Government.

We just have to recognise that Government has made mistakes. We just have to recognise that senior ranking officers in the police and the army have made mistakes. We must also recognise that beyond what are genuine mistakes, there has been misguided action, born of faulty analysis because some in the police and in the army are Party politically biased.

I know and Dr. Mandela knows, that members of the police force and the army have at times attacked members of our respective organisations. There has been this police partisanship in both directions. I can vouch for police against the IFP.

I have, however, never on one occasion turned this into a plot against me by Minister Vlok or General Malan. I have never accused the Government of plotting against me. I have simply looked the truth in the face. Policemen and some of their local and regional commanders are unfit to hold the positions they hold because they use authority for Party political gain.

The whole question of security force involvement in violence I believe should be located in the proposals I have made for a Statutory body which will share responsibility with the Government for making the right decisions in the whole process of ensuring that peaceful change takes place."

Development in Natal and KwaZulu's extensive experience

The KwaZulu government has very extensive experience in and appreciation of developmental issues, said Inkatha Institute director Gavin Woods during the 3-5 May CBM workshop focussing on development in Natal. And to a very significant extent, it is thus difficult to separate the IFP's approach to development in Natal from KwaZulu policy.

Inkatha, as the governing party in KwaZulu, began with ambitious development planning in 1976. But the resolution of the region's awesome problems was restricted not simply by normal financial constraints, but by the central government intentionally holding the KwaZulu government's R/per capita allocation to a level far below that of regions such as the Transkei, in order to punish Inkatha for refusing to take KwaZulu independence. As a result, development planning was forced to become more modest than it should have been.

In 1979, the KwaZulu government published its first development policy white paper, noted for its sober pragmatism and appreciation of dynamic planning.

In 1980, the KwaZulu government appointed the Buthelezi Commission to investigate political, social and economic

development in Natal/KwaZulu, producing what many still believe to be the most comprehensive study covering the region's development issues. Its recommendations were accepted by Inkatha and the KwaZulu government in 1982.

In 1986, the KwaZulu government produced its second white paper on development policy, upon which its current practice rests. Both the white paper and the Buthelezi Commission stress the central issues of economic growth, redistribution of wealth, job creation, deregulation and skills education - the very issues now being grappled with by many only today.

The IFP and KwaZulu, said Woods, thus have much to offer and to share with others. It could guard organisations against utopian thinking that comes from not being in touch with the dynamic complexities on the ground.

Given KwaZulu's limited resources, the IFP is encouraged by the pragmatism the Joint Executive Authority, as well as the recently mooted Joint Services Boards, the latter serving to ensure "a smoother transition to the coming non-racial order" and as "workable mechanisms for the improved distribution of wealth and resources."

Development impossible without peace, says IFP Central Committee member Senzo Mfayela

Addressing a Consultative Business Movement workshop on development in Natal on 4 May, Central Committee member Senzo Mfayela stressed that peace and development were opposite sides of the same coin:

"There is a visible input of political factors in the violence engulfing South Africa, and in particular Natal and the Transvaal.

In each township or shack area one visits, one is struck by the extent to which political intolerance dominates the inhabitants.

Even more visible in these areas though, is the chronic poverty and suffering.

violence linked to poverty and suffering

In areas around Pietermaritzburg and in the Durban Functional Region, violence has been on-going roughly as from 1985. A quick comparison would reveal that most of the more intense incidents tended to occur in the most poverty-stricken areas such as squatter communities, unimproved parts of the township, hostels, etc. So, in burning dwellings and belongings, burial fees, moving expenses, and even more importantly in the loss of jobs, violence had an effect of multiplying the already existing poverty and suffering for the affected people.

The poverty in my view, remains the main cause and sometimes even an important effect of violence. No peace initiative, no matter how politically wise, could make any difference without addressing poverty and related issues. There is, out there, the reality of people who have learned that through violence they can better themselves by stealing from others. Such people are not instructed by anyone to perpetuate violence, but mainly by circumstances surrounding their lives. No one can control them until there are at least prospects for change in their circumstances.

Development and peace are therefore opposite sides of the same coin - without one the other cannot flourish. Development is about people, not projects or programmes. The problem we have to confront however, is a catch-22 situation. On the one hand development should involve participation and direction from below, but on the other hand, this remains impossible while violence tears communities apart. There are areas today, for instance, where politically neutral health workers cannot go without having their cars hijacked. But in these very communities, disease remains rife and children die because the health worker cannot do his or her job.

Progress is therefore totally dependent upon this hopeless cycle being broken - without which there will be no peace and no development. This is the challenge facing each and every one of us. The IFP and ANC accord of 29 January is a good start towards this direction. This initiative though, needs to be nurtured by inputs from all directions - the state, business, the church, the media, and the parties themselves, because as experience has taught us, peace is a very fragile thing.

Despite the accord, or perhaps in addition to this accord, there is still a need for adequate and proper policing. There is still the urgent necessity of spreading the message of 29 January down to each and every person affected by or participating in violence. But, the lack of resources hampers this, particularly in the case of the IFP.

So, what needs to be done?

precondition

First is a precondition necessary for the developmental process to achieve its joint aims - progress and peace. There is little point in a top-down developmental approach, or a paternalistic one or even a benevolent one. These will all fail. The process must be one in which all interested parties form a

partnership to achieve their goals. This partnership would include the community itself, developers, business, the state and other organs of local and/or regional government, etc. A key to their successful interaction would be a willingness to accept others' ideas and others' perspectives of developmental priorities, as well as innovative thinking, and a preparedness to reach consensus on decisions instead of imposing one fixed view.

possible prioritisation

Without pre-empting what this process would lead to, it is likely that the prioritisation of development needs would reveal a bottoms-up hierarchy as follows:

- * Restoration of presently damaged buildings - houses, schools, businesses. For instance, damaged houses left as they are serve as easy reminders of the horrors of the past. Their occupants are unlikely to embrace their ex-enemies as friends while their homes remain as they are.

- * Creation of jobs. Many people lost their jobs through violence - moving from one area to another or becoming homeless refugees, they added to the already desperate levels of unemployment. The millions of unemployed are the single greatest threat to peace and to future stability. If we bear in mind the numbers of young people approaching adulthood and looking for jobs, the gravity of the situation appears almost hopeless.

- * Education and training. We realise that a modern economy rests upon foundations of well-educated and skilled workers. There is thus a need first to improve school education so that our children are better equipped to serve the economy, and second, a need for retraining, adult education, mass skills training for adults presently without a job or the prospects of one. Even those currently employed require a on-going in-house training.

- * Infrastructure. Land, water, electricity, telephones, roads, mains sewerage, stormwater, transport - without these, the shack dwellers urban environment will remain a living hell, particularly if there is no employment providing the funds by which such communities can develop even in a limited way. In addition to the act of providing this infrastructure providing jobs, the services provided can further stimulate employment - with electricity for instance, a man can start welding, can repair things.

- * Housing. Given the absolutely massive housing backlog, and acknowledging that people do need financial and other assistance in the provision of this housing, we nevertheless expect housing to be placed below the other priorities because in our view, people with jobs and serviced land will be able to do a lot for themselves towards building proper shelter.

must listen to the community

Notwithstanding our understanding of the manner in which communities are likely to prioritise their needs, we must emphasise that there is no substitute for the consultative and participative process that is the precondition to sound developmental practice. A community's priorities are what the community perceives the priority to be, not what we think it should be. Furthermore, we must remember that local conditions will vary from place to place, and that what is good for one community is not necessarily the case for another.

There is one huge caveat to all this however. There is simply no point whatsoever in pursuing these kinds of development unless the cycle of violence is broken. If sound development is premised upon community participation, then it stands to reason that a divided community, where people are at each

other's throats, will be a community which cannot participate in the consultative process as it should. Community participation as we envisage it is nothing less than a democratic process, and as we are all aware, the first thing to have suffered in the violence is democracy, which is almost invariably missing in divided communities.

can start work now in certain areas

Although the national picture is important (for international loan capital etc) we should think of development in a more local context. That is, we should avoid saying nothing can be done until there is total peace in South Africa, or until the new South Africa comes into being. Development cannot wait for this, but must go ahead now. Clearly development cannot take place without factors such as the availability of capital, skills, and political will. But most importantly, development can commence in those communities that have already started committing themselves to peace. For instance, Mpumalanga was one of the worst violence-torn communities from 1987 to mid-1990. Yet the community decided to stop the violence and did so without much outside assistance. Now, there is a promising developing partnership between the community and the Hammedale industrialists in terms of which the latter funds rehabilitation in return for which it receives relative industrial peace.

Mpumalanga

This has come about despite the fact that Mpumalanga is still far from being politically normal. What matters is that there is a irreversible momentum towards peace and the building of a true community again. When this occurs, development can start immediately. Such development serves two functions. First, it does what it is meant to do, ameliorating the negative socio-economic conditions with which people have to contend. But second, it greases the wheel as it were, reinforcing the peace process as, for the first time, ex-protagonists begin to find each other sharing a common purpose. But let us acknowledge the fragility of this process. It is irreversible, but on condition that all those involved in the partnership remain vigilant against factors that might destabilise the process.

One other lesson from Mpumalanga is the need for there to be a win-win situation. Everyone must benefit - the community, the industrialists, the employees, the transport companies, school pupils, etc. This binds people together into one community once more. In this regard, KwaZulu's experience is highly pertinent. Although violence has affected most rural areas in KwaZulu, hardly a single school has been burned down unlike the situation in the townships. The reason for this is that the community and the KwaZulu government have formed a partnership in terms of which as the community builds one classroom, KwaZulu funds another. As a result, people cherish the schools. They are part and parcel of the community rather than a foreign imposition without value. This suggests that the development process we are having to confront in Natal can be approached with a similar perspective, where applicable.

All I have said points to the need to avoid high-faluting theories, grand plans, abstract theorising. We need concrete action, on-the-ground participation. The people know what they want.

Our task should be to assist them in the achievement of the goals they set themselves, in a way that promotes the peace, development, self-worth and dignity that apartheid and poverty has stripped from them. In the final analysis, there will be no peace without development, but it must be the right kind of development."

not going to work because they are afraid.

Prior to the closed session, and in response to a question asking why the violence was continuing, Mdlalose was quite open in acknowledging that the answer was unknown, and had to be established. But, as a result of this kind of frankness, he was later able to state: "At least we are thankful that we now understand the gist of the violence in the Port Shepstone area."

Importantly, while this meeting saw its share of sweet rhetoric, such as agreement on the need of people "to be free to exercise the freedom of political association", the real stress was upon practicalities. Zuma spoke of the need to "preach the meaning and objective of the Peace Accord", and of everyone, the churches included, helping to "change the culture of violence to a culture of peace." Mdlalose spoke of the peace accord being spread "from the pulpit, at schools and at work", of the distribution of the joint IFP/ANC peace audiotape, and of the church facilitating peace. The basic agreement reached was on the need to convene joint ANC/IFP/community peace rallies. The first was planned to be held in Ndwalane, for which a meeting was scheduled for 17 May between the ANC, IFP and representatives of Chief Ndwalane.

That this meeting failed to achieve its immediate objective was possibly a good thing. Chief Ndwalane's representatives - indunas Gumede and Ndwalane - took a line that focussed upon what were to the Ndwalane community, the real burning issues. They were not enamoured with talk of peace, peace agreements and peace accords per se which elevated lofty sentiments above concrete grievances, and were also suspicious of talking to the ANC whose local leaders, they said, instigated violence. Rather, they wanted action on two specific issues: the razing of the tribal court and the chief's kraal by youths. What was the point, they argued, in agreeing to peace in abstract when nothing was to be done about these types of issues. The result was inconclusive, further discussion being agreed to.

But while it is tempting to dismiss the South Coast talks as so much hot air, their significance do not lie in the success or failure of any one meeting. What is important is that a process has been set in motion that is driven from below and which is geared towards real issues dividing communities and which avoids cheap party politics. From failures, success may grow.

This is evident in the culmination of a third peace initiative, one that really has succeeded - in Mpumalanga.

Mpumalanga was as strife-ridden a township as any in the country, perhaps one of the very worst, whose catalogue of misery included: a massive refugee problem, with up to 60% of the original inhabitants displaced by violence; empty schools which all closed down; non-existent social life, people hiding behind burned out walls, too scared to engage in a normal life; daily journeys to work that resembled crossing a firing line; and such levels of political violence that there were more burials each week than there were church services. Beriut was an appropriate approximation of life in Mpumalanga.

There had been attempts to bring peace to the area - in 1989, for instance, UDF and Inkatha representatives tried to do so, but their agreement lasted only a few months. On the very day of Mandela's release, attacks on Inkatha members resumed and war broke out again. Attempts by Inkatha and UDF/Cosatu leaders to resurrect the process got nowhere as the latter's delegation kept changing in response to internal

squabbling over leadership legitimacy.

This all changed with the election of responsible and forward-thinking local ANC leadership in September 1990 from which period the ineffectual UDF in effect faded away. Of fundamental significance to the following 8 months was the fact that ANC leader Micheek Hadebe was perceived by the IFP as honest, as constructive, and as someone prepared to acknowledge genuine grievances. He and IFP leader Sipho Mlaba were thus able to work together for the common good. The result was immediately visible, and list of positive achievements continues to grow. For instance, since September:

- * not one single person has been killed in ANC/IFP violence;
- * schools are operational and are no longer divided along sectarian lines - ie, there is a 50:50 IFP/ANC pupil ratio;
- * local Hammarsdale factories are beginning to employ IFP supporters to redress the imbalance (black personnel managers, ANC-aligned, only employed ANC supporters);
- * refugees are returning and are being deliberately and actively encouraged to return; and, quite amazingly,
- * IFP/ANC social interaction is growing, in parties and community tournaments (in one of which IFP and ANC teams competed against each other).

Importantly, peace was achieved because both sides worked together to solve problems or potential problems.

For instance, the comtsotsis problem, directed against IFP members in the main, was serious. The UDF was seen by Inkatha to have done nothing about this, had even encouraged it - as far as Inkatha was concerned, the UDF and comtsotsis were frequently synonymous. Mlaba and Hadebe however, identified the individuals and dealt with them in an appropriate fashion.

Another example: KwaZulu interior minister Stephen Sithebe wanted fresh community elections to reconstitute the defunct council. Both the ANC and the IFP objected strongly, the result being an agreement to hold elections next year - if warranted by circumstances. This leads to a critical point.

A most important contributor to the achievement of peace in Mpumalanga has been the virtual elimination of political competition. Until the council elections are held, the political structure of Mpumalanga rests firmly on the basis of power sharing - the township is run jointly by the IFP and the ANC. There is thus no "need" to kill opponents to gain control, there is no need to be politically intolerant, there is no political hegemony resulting in one side having to defend itself or its interests against another party seeking to destroy it.

In short, Mpumalanga has transformed itself. A township divided by deep conflict came together to resolve it, and in the process started recreating the old sense of community that had characterised the area before the violence started.

These examples of the peace process at work are important reminders of the need to sometimes look beyond national politics. As a reminder of the old adage "All politics is local politics", they suggest that peace is attainable if there is the will.

The women's movements of the ANC and IFP made a joint call for peace. This was a deeply symbolic act of women coming together for a common cause.

The South Coast peace talks demonstrate a process at work, of people in conflict making tentative attempts to restore peace. It demonstrates also how delicate the process is, and how the participants' perceptions are the ones that count and which must be dealt with. The South Coast remains very violent, but peace is there in embryonic form if nurtured correctly.

Mpumalanga is the jewel in the crown, proving perhaps conclusively that ANC/IFP peace is genuinely attainable if this is the real goal. It is a model whose principles and successes those engaged in peace talks can really learn from.

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