

Cape Democrats
Kaapse Demokrate

The ANC and the new South Africa



What are the issues?

What are the facts?

A collection of ANC documents and speeches

1912-1990

INTRODUCTION

South Africa appears to have completed a full circle in the last three decades. Thirty years of spiralling violence and fruitless attempts to destroy resistance to apartheid have gained the government nothing. In 1960, the ANC was banned, and now in 1990 the ANC is again a legal organisation.

The history of the National Party is one which takes up large sections of any textbook prescribed for South African school students, and is well-known by rote. But the ANC is often only deserving of a small and insignificant paragraph.

Why is it that the ANC plays such a major role in South Africa's future? Who do they represent and where do they come from?

ANC HISTORY

The ANC was formed in 1912 as the symbol of a new African nationalism which united the resistance of disparate "tribal" groupings into a single political force. After more than 30 years of moderation - petitioning the authorities and sending deputations - the organisation began to take a militant turn.

A new generation of ANC leadership emerged from the ANC Youth League - Mandela, Sisulu, Tambo and others - and began promoting civil disobedience and mass struggle in the face of an intransigent regime.

At the same time, they consolidated a non-racial vision within the ANC by promoting alliances with other sections of

the oppressed as well as with white democrats. The Congress Alliance formed in 1954 between the ANC, the Indian Congress, the Coloured People's Congress and the Congress of Democrats gave organisational expression to the ANC's non-racial vision.

The Defiance Campaign of 1952 saw the ANC develop into a mass movement. Together with its future Congress allies, the ANC had launched a campaign of civil disobedience against six apartheid laws. Volunteers came forward to break apartheid laws and present themselves for arrest, the strategy being to fill-up apartheid jails and make the system unworkable.

Although the violent responses of the state to these peaceful protests finally broke the campaign, the ANC's membership had grown by more than 100 000. Non-violent mass struggle by the Congress Alliance continued throughout the 1950s in the form of school boycotts, bus boycotts, consumer boycotts, marches and stayaways; but the response of the authorities became more violent.

THE FREEDOM CHARTER

In the midst of growing violence and repression designed to curb peaceful opposition, the Congress Alliance launched a campaign for a Congress of the People which would draw up a Freedom Charter to reflect the democratic demands of all South Africans for a new society. Volunteers were dispatched across South Africa to gather the demands of the people and to organise them to elect delegates who would bring their demands to the Congress. More than 1 million demands were gathered.

The Congress of the People was attended by more than 3 000 elected delegates from all over South Africa.

Although the Congress Alliance had initiated the campaign, the COP was far broader than a Congress conference - it was a representative gathering of the people. The Congress of the People adopted the Freedom Charter on June 26, 1955. The ANC adopted the Charter as its programme at its conference in December that year.

The Congress of the People campaign more than any other popularised the ANC all over the country. Hundreds of thousands of South Africans came to identify with its programme of non-violent mass action. Unable to win the support of black South Africans, the government relied increasingly on violence to suppress the challenge to minority rule presented by the ANC.

After an anti-pass campaign called by the breakaway PAC led to the Sharpeville killing of 69 unarmed people, the government declared a state of emergency and banned the ANC and PAC in April 1960. The Congress of Democrats was also banned in 1962.

Effectively then, the government's response to non-violent black resistance was to outlaw it. This left the ANC with the choice of either giving up the struggle, or turning to arms. Rank and file membership and supporters of the ANC, who had contended with state violence during peaceful campaigns, argued that non-violence in the face of repression was no longer viable.

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THE TURN TO ARMS

The turn to arms did not follow immediately after the banning. For more than a year, the ANC campaigned for the right to exist legally. At the All in African Convention of 1961, held on the eve of the declaration of the white republic, Mandela called for a national convention to determine South Africa's future. The government remained unresponsive. In December 1961, former ANC president Chief Albert Luthuli received the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo. He spoke of the "legitimacy of armed force provoked by the adamancy of white rule". On December 16 1961 Umkhonto we Sizwe was formed, with Mandela as commander in chief. Umkhonto consisted of members of all the Congress Alliance affiliates.

MOROGORO

In 1969 the ANC, by now mostly in exile, held a major consultative conference at Morogoro in Tanzania. This conference thoroughly assessed the previous period and developed new strategies.

The conference proposed that the ANC prepare itself for a "protracted people's war" by rebuilding its political structures inside South Africa and creating a broad popular base for the armed struggle. To this end, a "Revolutionary Council" was established to supervise the ANC's military and political work.

The conference took a decision for the first time to allow non-Africans to be members of the external ANC as well as of the Revolutionary Council (although the ANC executive remained purely African). The Morogoro Conference established the basis for the ANC's role throughout the 1970s and it played a major role in unifying the organisation.

The late 1960s and early-1970s marked a period of consolidation for the ANC. The presence of the ANC and the Congress Alliance was fairly low-key. Events of the mid-70s, however, considerably enhanced the ANC's position.

CHILDREN'S REVOLT

The 1976 uprising saw thousands of students around the country engaged in

peaceful protest actions which police shootings transformed into street battles. An insurrectional climate developed in the townships all over South Africa with battles raging for days on end, and thousands of workers observing stayaway calls. In Soweto, the uprising carried over into a rent boycott throughout 1977.

According to official statistics, 575 people died and more than 6 000 were wounded. The uprising left South Africa's townships once again highly politicised, and a new generation of youth whose militancy had been equalled by their courage in facing the security forces.

The time comes in the life of any nation when there remains only two choices - submit or fight. That time has come to the people of South Africa

Umkhonto manifesto 1961

More than 7 000 youths fled into exile as the uprising subsided. Although the ANC had not been responsible for the events of 1976, they had clearly established a presence to the extent that the bulk of the recent emigres flocked to join the movement. This provided a massive new recruitment for Umkhonto we Sizwe, which together with the changed face of Southern Africa, presented new possibilities. A hand-grenade attack on a police van at Komati-poort (later the site of the Nkomati Accord) late in 1977, heralded the beginning of a new wave of guerrilla actions.

AFTER 1976

During the period of 1977 to 1982, the ANC set itself as principal tasks the re-organisation of its internal structures and the reassertion of its profile through action. At the same time, the re-emergence of legal political organisation saw the tradition of the Congress Alliance once again boldly acclaimed.

The ANC set up an Internal Development and Reconstruction Department in Lusaka to supervise the building of in-

ternal networks. Trials in the early-80s reveal that long-time ANC members who had been active in the fifties and sixties, such as Elmon Malele and Joe Gqabi, played an important role in this respect.


The trial of Barbara Hogan in 1982 revealed attempts to establish ANC cells to co-ordinate work in the legal political sphere. A number of other cases in the period show the ANC rebuilding its political background, as well as support structures and intelligence networks for its guerrilla actions. (For example, Renfrew Christie and Rob Adam were both found guilty of assembling and transmitting information on possible targets for sabotage to the ANC, while national serviceman, Roland Hunter, was found guilty of transmitting SADF secrets.)

It is impossible to assess the success of the rebuilding of underground networks by the ANC because the only evidence of this process comes through trials of those who have been caught. By 1977, however, Minister of Justice, Jimmy Kruger, noted with alarm that "the ANC is everywhere!"

RE-EMERGENCE OF THE ANC

At the legal political level, the ANC's profile also began to increase. In the late-70s, the traditions of the Freedom Charter began to reassert themselves in the organisations which emerged in the wake of the October 1977 bannings of Black Consciousness (BC) organisations. Even Buthelezi's Inkatha looked for co-operation with the ANC, sending a delegation to meet the organisation in London in 1979. After Buthelezi's repressive actions against boycotting students in Natal, however, the ANC broke off all relations with Inkatha in June 1980.

Within the sphere of legal politics, popular organisations began to assert the legitimacy of the ANC. Repeated calls were issued for the release of Mandela and other ANC prisoners and for the organisation's exiled leadership to be allowed to return to South Africa. Memorial services were held in South Africa for ANC exiles killed in SADF raids. And during 1983, the Azanian Stu-



ANC TIME CHART

1912:
ANC formed

1919:
Anti-Pass Campaign

1943:
ANC Women's League formed

1944:
ANC Youth League formed (Mandela, Tambo, Sisulu, etc)

1952:
Launch of Defiance Campaign
Congress Alliance established (ANC, Congress of Democrats, Natal Indian Congress, Coloured People's Organisation)

1955:
Congress of the People draws up Freedom Charter

1960:
Sharpeville Massacre (21 March)
ANC banned (30 March)

1961:
Umkhonto we Sizwe launched

1964:
Rivonia Trial - ANC leadership jailed

1969:
Morogoro Conference - first ANC Conference in exile

1976:
Soweto Schols Protest (June 16). Thousands leave SA to join ANC following heavy police action.

1985:
National Executive Committee membership opened to all

1987:
Van Zyl Slabbert leads first Afrikaner delegation to visit ANC in Dakar. Followed later by many others.

1989:
Sisulu, Kathrada and other Rivonia trialists released from prison

1990:
ANC unbanned (2 February). Some exiles return. Many others still excluded from fear of arrest. Mandela released. Other ANC members remain imprisoned.

ments Organisation (AZASO) held a "Save the Six" campaign calling for clemency for six ANC guerillas due to be executed. AZASO argued that given the ANC's signing of the Geneva Convention on guerilla warfare in 1980, and the character of the armed conflict in South Africa, captured Umkhonto guerillas should be treated as prisoners of war.

ANC's Department of Publicity and Information has been inundated with requests from South Africans of all walks of life for meetings. This reflects the recognition by whites in South Africa that the ANC is central for any settlement of South Africa's conflict.

CONCLUSION

The last five years of the ANC's history have perhaps been some of the most difficult. Four successive states of emergency have been part of a last ditch attempt to crush resistance to apartheid. In spite of this, however, the mass rallies and marches that followed the unbanning of the ANC on February 2nd have shown that it continues to gain support.

International esteem of the ANC has also grown. Mandela's reception (both in Africa and Europe) following his release, was equal to that of the leader of any nation. The ANC has also established international diplomatic relations with an increasing number of countries.

Many would argue, however, that the most interesting period of all for the ANC is the future, and the challenges that lie ahead.

THE ANC IN THE 1980s

Since this time, support for the ANC has grown enormously. The formation of the United Democratic Front in 1983 and its adoption of the Freedom Charter is an indication of the number of people who support the ANC's vision.

This support is graphically illustrated by the display of the ANC's colours at rallies, funerals and marches. The recent adoption of the ANC's document on negotiations by both the Organisation of African Unity and the United Nations indicates the extremely high esteem in which the ANC is held in the international community.

Since the trip to Dakar in 1987 by a group of Afrikaans businesspersons and professionals to see the ANC, the

Application for Membership

Name..... Title

Address

..... Code

Phone (W) (H)

Occupation

Preferred language

Type of member - Active: Projects subcommittee ☐
Media subcommittee ☐
Membership subcommittee ☐
Education & Information ☐
Culture subcommittee ☐

Supporter: Attend house meetings ☐
Host house meetings ☐
Receive mail ☐
Attend general meetings ☐

I enclose R..... in payment of membership fees.
R..... as donation.

Fees are R10 per annum for students and pensioners.
R40 per annum for all other members.

Signature Date

Cheques to be made payable to Cape Democrats,
P.O Box 21, Salt River 7925.

Cape Democrats
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If ever there was a time to stress the urgency of preparing
for our future and the process that will lead us to it - now is
that time.....

LET'S PREPARE FOR THE FUTURE



River, 7925.

WHO ARE WE?

Cape Democrats was formed as part of the process of building the broadest possible front of resistance to apartheid. We aim to provide a home for the many concerned whites who oppose the current unjust and undemocratic system, who are not catered for by existing democratic organisations. The apartheid system has divided the people of South Africa: Our aim is to re-forge the bonds that have been broken during the apartheid years.

We have a structure that allows members to take an active or a supportive role. For those interested in taking a more active role, here are details of some of our subcommittees:

Media produce our newsletter, as well as pamphlets, stickers, postcards, topical T-shirts and calendars. Information packages, including documents such as the Harare declaration, the ANC's Constitutional guidelines, and Mandela's speeches, are being produced.

Contact Anine on 557-6971 to find out more.

Creative Action is a good name for this subcommittee, which is buzzing with new ideas. To name but a few : forums to debate the crucial economic issues facing South Africa; encounters between business and representatives of the MDM; a jazz evening; and a public lecture series - starting with Jack Simons, a long time member of the SACP. Watch the press for details.

Contact Renee on 47-0219 for further details.

Education organise talks and workshops for Cape Democrats members and the public. An educational programme aimed at deepening our understanding of local and international events is being planned, taking the form of a series of workshops. We will be looking at the history of the ANC, but focus on the movement today and the issues facing it. If you would like to help plan this series contact Sue on 419-2825.

Membership look after our members by keeping in touch through various events, but draws in new members as well. We organise housemeetings and tables in shopping centres, the aim of which is to reflect the views of the MDM on current events. By this means we hope to encourage informed dialog and debate about our common future. Get involved by contacting Jill on 24-2573.

Community Contact aims to build non-racialism in practice through work in three areas: Labour issues, political Imprisonment and civic/squatter issues. We explore ways of bringing South Africans of all races together in non-racial action. Recently we have made contact with the South African Domestic Workers Union to explore avenues for joint action. Contact Sheila at 47-7479.

: River, 7925.

Special interest groups are formed from time to time, such as the Namibia Information Group. They produced fact-sheet updates with current information, as well as videos and public events.

Membership Forums (also known as General Councils or GC's) are held every second week. The forums are the place where issues of the day are discussed, the work of the subcommittees is co-ordinated and activities are initiated.

Contact Debra on 47-0219 for more information.

YOU CAN DO IT TOO!

Membership is open to all who subscribe to the aims and objectives of the Cape Democrats, irrespective of race, class, sex, religion or nationality. All members can participate in any or all of the events, meetings or campaigns.

Viva ANC!
Viva MANDELA
Viva Cape Democrats!
FORWARD TO A NON RACIAL
DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA

Issued by Cape Democrats, P.O. Box 21, Salt River, 7925.

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FOREWARD

After the ANC was banned on the 8 April 1960, it became illegal to propagate its policies. For thirty years, it was an offense to possess the documents you now hold in your hands.

Legally, all we were allowed to know about the ANC came from the South African government. Through statements in parliament, press releases by the Minister concerned, SABC broadcasts and the glossy publications of the Department of Information, the government gave us their interpretation of ANC policy.

Some of us learnt of the ANC at university or from a lucky encounter with some ANC oldtimer - veterans from the times when the ANC campaigned openly. But for most, it was only the all too frequent political trials which showed that the government's ban did not bring an end to the movement.

As we all know the ANC did not disappear or wither away. Instead it has become the most popular political movement in South Africa today. The government itself now accepts that it cannot go to the negotiating table without the ANC being present.

And so, quite miraculously it seems, the government has restored the ANC's public voice. On the 2 February 1990, the ANC came in from the cold. We can see and hear about ANC policies from its representatives - even on SABC. The documents collected in this folder will give you a clear picture of ANC policy as the movement enters the era of negotiations.

To understand the ANC's position on negotiations, we need to know both their proposals about the process they envisage taking place, and the policies they are likely to bring to the table. The process has been elaborated with ever increasing clarity and detail in the Harare Declaration, the Constitutional Guidelines, the ANC's National Executive Committee's reply to De Klerk, and the speeches of released leaders. But these statements do not stand in isolation from the ANC's past policies such as the Freedom Charter, Mandela's speech from the Dock in 1964, and the 1969 Strategy and Tactics.

Read together, we can see how the ANC's commitment to peace and negotiations and armed struggle, or to a mixed economy and nationalization are not inconsistent. Together these statements about process and policy describe a complex but coherent vision for a future united non-racial and democratic South Africa.

The documents in this folder will enable you to participate more fully in the political dialogue that is now opening up to define the new South Africa.

The Freedom Charter

Preamble

We, the people of South Africa, declare for all our country and the world to know:—
That South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white, and that no government can justly claim authority unless it is based on the will of the people;
That our people have been robbed of their birthright to land, liberty and peace by a form of government founded on injustice and inequality;
That our country will never be prosperous or free until all our people live in brotherhood, enjoying equal rights and opportunities;
That only a democratic state, based on the will of the people, can secure to all their birthright without distinction of colour, race, sex or belief;
And therefore, we, the people of South Africa, black and white, together — equals, countrymen and brothers — adopt this Freedom Charter. And we pledge ourselves to strive together, sparing nothing of our strength and courage, until the democratic changes here set out have been won.

The people shall govern

Every man and woman shall have the right to vote for and stand as a candidate for all bodies which make laws.
All the people shall be entitled to take part in the administration of the country.
The rights of the people shall be the same regardless of race, colour or sex.
All bodies of minority rule, advisory boards, councils and authorities shall be replaced by democratic organs of self-government.

All national groups shall have equal rights

There shall be equal status in the bodies of state, in the courts and in the schools for all national groups and races;
All national groups shall be protected by law against insults to their race and national pride;
All people shall have equal rights to use their own language and to develop their own folk-culture and customs;
All apartheid laws and practices shall be set aside.

The people shall share in the country's wealth

The national wealth of our country, the heritage of all South Africans, shall be restored to the people;
The mineral wealth beneath the soil, the banks and monopoly industry shall be transferred to the ownership of the people as a whole;
All other industries and trade shall be controlled to assist the well-being of the people;
All people shall have equal rights to trade where they choose, to manufacture and to enter all trades, crafts and professions.

The land shall be shared amongst those who work it
Restriction of land ownership on a racial basis shall be ended, and all the land redivided amongst those who work it, to banish famine and land hunger.
The state shall help the peasants with implements, seed, tractors and dams to save the soil and assist the tillers.
Freedom of movement shall be guaranteed to all who work on the land.
All shall have the right to occupy land wherever they choose.
People shall not be robbed of their cattle; forced labour and farm prisons shall be abolished.

All people shall be equal before the law
No one shall be imprisoned, deported or restricted without a fair trial;
No one shall be condemned by the order of any Government official;
The courts shall be representative of all the people;
Imprisonment shall be only for serious crimes against the people, and shall aim at re-education, not vengeance;
The police force and army shall be open to all on an equal basis and shall be the helpers and protectors of the people;
All laws which discriminate on grounds of race, colour or belief shall be repealed.
The preaching and practice of national, race or colour discrimination and contempt shall be a punishable crime;

All shall enjoy equal human rights
The law shall guarantee to all their right to speak, to organise, to meet together, to publish, to preach, to worship and to educate their children;
The privacy of the house from police raids shall be protected by law;
All shall be free to travel without restriction from countryside to town, from province to province, and from South Africa abroad;
Pass laws, permits and all other laws restricting these freedoms shall be abolished.

There shall be work and security
All who work shall be free to form trade unions, to elect their officers and to make wage agreements with their employers;
The state shall recognise the right and duty of all to work, and to draw full unemployment benefits;
Men and women of all races shall receive equal pay for equal work;
There shall be a forty-hour working week, a national minimum wage, paid annual leave, and sick leave for all workers, and maternity leave on full pay for all working mothers;
Miners, domestic workers, farm workers and civil servants shall have the same rights as all others who work;
Child labour, compound labour, the tot system and contract labour shall be abolished.

The doors of learning and of culture shall be opened
The government shall discover, develop and encourage national talent for the enhancement of

our cultural life;

All the cultural treasures of mankind shall be open to all, by free exchange of books, ideas and contacts with other lands;

The aim of education shall be to teach the youth to love their people and their culture, to honour human brotherhood, liberty and peace;

Education shall be free, compulsory, universal and equal for all children;

Higher education and technical training shall be opened to all by means of state allowances and scholarships awarded on the basis of merit;

Adult illiteracy shall be ended by a mass state education plan;

Teachers shall have all the rights of other citizens;

The colour bar in cultural life, in sport and in education shall be abolished.

There shall be houses, security and comfort

All people shall have the right to live where they choose, to be decently housed, and to bring up their families in comfort and security;

Unused housing space shall be made available to the people;

Rent and prices shall be lowered, food plentiful and no one shall go hungry;

A preventive health scheme shall be run by the state;

Free medical care and hospitalisation shall be provided for all, with special care for mothers and young children;

Slums shall be demolished and new suburbs built where all have transport, roads, lighting, playing fields, creches and social centres;

The aged, the orphans, the disabled and the sick shall be cared for by the state;

Rest, leisure and recreation shall be the right of all;

Fenced locations and ghettos shall be abolished, and laws which break up families shall be repealed.

There shall be peace and friendship

South Africa shall be a fully independent state, which respects the rights and sovereignty of all nations;

South Africa shall strive to maintain world peace and the settlement of all international disputes by negotiation — not war;

Peace and friendship amongst all our people shall be secured by upholding the equal rights, opportunities and status of all;

The people of the protectorates — Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland — shall be free to decide for themselves their own future;

The right of all the peoples of Africa to independence and self-government shall be recognised, and shall be the basis of close co-operation.

Let all who love their people and their country now say, as we say here:

"These freedoms we will fight for, side by side, throughout our lives, until we have won our liberty."



Chief Albert Lutuli, Dr Yusuf Dadoo and Father Trevor Huddleston were awarded Isiwalandwe/Seaparankoe at the Congress of the People in Klip-town in 1955. Since then outstanding leaders have also been honoured, notably Govan Mbeki, Lilian Ngoyi, Helen Joseph and the 'Rivonia Trialists' — Nelson Mandela, Elias Motsoaledi, Raymond Mhlaba, Ahmed Kathrada, Andrew Mlangeni and Walter Sisulu.

Isiwalandwe/Seaparankoe:

This is the highest honour awarded by the people of South Africa, through the ANC, to those who have made an outstanding contribution and sacrifice to the liberation struggle.

The Spear and the Shield:

The spear and the shield symbolise the early wars of resistance. This tradition is continued today by the ANC and especially its military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe, the Spear of the Nation, which was formed in 1961, 49 years after the formation of the ANC.



Document 75. Statement during the Rivonia trial, by Nelson R. Mandela, April 20, 1964

I am the First Accused.

I hold a Bachelor's Degree in Arts and practised as an attorney in Johannesburg for a number of years in partnership with Oliver Tambo. I am a convicted prisoner serving five years for leaving the country without a permit and for inciting people to go on strike at the end of May, 1961.

At the outset, I want to say that the suggestion made by the State in its opening that the struggle in South Africa is under the influence of foreigners or communists is wholly incorrect. I have done whatever I did, both as an individual and as a leader of my people, because of my experience in South Africa and my own proudly-felt African background, and not because of what any outsider might have said.

In my youth in the Transkei I listened to the elders of my tribe telling stories of the old days. Amongst the tales they related to me were those of wars fought by our ancestors in defence of the fatherland. The names of Dingane and Bambata, Hintsa and Makana, Squngthi and Dalasile, Moshoeshoe and Sekhukhuni, were praised as the glory of the entire African nation. I hoped then that life might offer me the opportunity to serve my people and make my own humble contribution to their freedom struggle. This is what has motivated me in all that I have done in relation to the charges made against me in this case.

Having said this, I must deal immediately and at some length, with the question of violence. Some of the things so far told to the Court are true and some are untrue. I do not, however, deny that I planned sabotage. I did not plan it in a spirit of recklessness, nor because I have any love of violence. I



The Wheel:

The wheel dates from the 1955 Campaign for the Congress of the People which drew up and adopted the Freedom Charter. The four spokes represent the main national groups which were represented by their organisations in the Congress Alliance. The wheel rolling to freedom symbolises our goal of a united people developing in struggle, and forging a new South African nationhood.



The Fist:

The fist of our fighting people represents a unified determination born in the fight for national liberation. When people sing our national anthem, they raise their fists and then the battle-cry is echoed: Amandla Ngawethu! Matla ke a Rona! Power to the People! Mayibuye iAfrika! Africa Must Come Back!



The Flag:

The colours of the ANC flag are black, green and gold. Black symbolises the people, green the fertility of the land, and gold the mineral wealth beneath the soil. These colours were adopted by the ANC in 1925.

planned it as a result of a calm and sober assessment of the political situation that had arisen after many years of tyranny, exploitation and oppression of my people by the Whites.

I admit immediately that I was one of the persons who helped to form Umkonto We Sizwe, and that I played a prominent role in its affairs until I was arrested in August, 1962.

In the statement which I am about to make I shall correct certain false impressions which have been created by State witnesses. Amongst other things, I will demonstrate that certain of the acts referred to in the evidence were not and could not have been committed by Umkonto. I will also deal with the relationship between the African National Congress and Umkonto, and with the part which I personally have played in the affairs of both organizations. I shall deal also with the part played by the Communist Party. In order to explain these matters properly I will have to explain what Umkonto set out to achieve; what methods it prescribed for the achievement of these objects, and why these methods were chosen. I will also have to explain how I became involved in the activities of these organizations.

I deny that Umkonto was responsible for a number of acts which clearly fell outside the policy of the organization, and which have been charged in the Indictment against us. I do not know what justification there was for these acts, but to demonstrate that they could not have been authorised by Umkonto, I want to refer briefly to the roots and policy of the organization.

I have already mentioned that I was one of the persons who helped to form Umkonto. I, and the others who started the organization, did so for two reasons. Firstly, we believed that as a result of Government policy, violence by the African people had become inevitable, and that unless responsible leadership was given to canalise and control the feelings of our people, there would be outbreaks of terrorism which would produce an intensity of bitterness and hostility between the various races of this country which is not produced even by war. Secondly, we felt that without violence there would be no way open to the African people to succeed in their struggle against the principle of White supremacy. All lawful modes of expressing opposition to this principle had been closed by legislation, and we were placed in a position in which we had either to accept a permanent state of inferiority, or to defy the Government. We chose to defy the law. We first broke the law in a way which avoided any recourse to violence; when this form was legislated against, and when the Government resorted to a show of force to crush opposition to its policies, only then did we decide to answer violence with violence.

But the violence which we chose to adopt was not terrorism. We who formed Umkonto were all members of the African National Congress, and had behind us the A.N.C. tradition of non-violence and negotiation as a means of solving political disputes. We believe that South Africa belonged

to all the people who lived in it, and not to one group, be it Black or White. We did not want an inter-racial war, and tried to avoid it to the last minute. If the Court is in doubt about this, it will be seen that the whole history of our organization bears out what I have said, and what I will subsequently say, when I describe the tactics which Umkonto decided to adopt. I want, therefore, to say something about the African National Congress.

The African National Congress was formed in 1912 to defend the rights of the African people which had been seriously curtailed by the South Africa Act, and which were then being threatened by the Native Land Act. For thirty-seven years—that is until 1949—it adhered strictly to a constitutional struggle. It put forward demands and resolutions; it sent delegations to the Government in the belief that African grievances could be settled through peaceful discussion and that Africans could advance gradually to full political rights. But White Governments remained unmoved, and the rights of Africans became less instead of becoming greater. In the words of my leader, Chief Luthuli, who became President of the A.N.C. in 1952, and who was later awarded the Nobel Peace Prize:

“who will deny that thirty years of my life have been spent knocking in vain, patiently, moderately and modestly at a closed and barred door? What have been the fruits of moderation? The past thirty years have seen the greatest number of laws restricting our rights and progress, until today we have reached a stage where we have almost no rights at all”.

Even after 1949, the A.N.C. remained determined to avoid violence. At this time, however, there was a change from the strictly constitutional means of protest which had been employed in the past. The change was embodied in a decision which was taken to protest against apartheid legislation by peaceful, but unlawful, demonstrations against certain laws. Pursuant to this policy the A.N.C. launched the Defiance Campaign, in which I was placed in charge of volunteers. This campaign was based on the principles of passive resistance. More than 8,500 people defied apartheid laws and went to gaol. Yet there was not a single instance of violence in the course of this campaign on the part of any defier. I, and nineteen colleagues were convicted for the role which we played in organizing the campaign, but our sentences were suspended mainly because the Judge found that discipline and nonviolence had been stressed throughout. This was the time when the volunteer section of the A.N.C. was established, and when the word ‘Amadelakula’ was first used: this was the time when the volunteers were asked to take a pledge to uphold certain principles. Evidence dealing with volunteers and their pledges has been introduced into this case, but completely out of context. The volunteers were not, and are not, the soldiers of a Black Army pledged to fight a civil war against the Whites. They were, and are, the dedicated workers who are

gaol, and a Gaol Committee, set up to deal with complaints, was called the High Command. After the Emergency this phrase stuck and was used to describe certain of the A.N.C. Committees in that area. Thus we have had witnesses talking about the West Bank High Command and the Port Elizabeth High Command. These so-called "High Commands" came into existence before Umkonto was formed and were not concerned in any way with sabotage. In fact, as I will subsequently explain, Umkonto as an organization was, as far as possible, kept separate from the A.N.C. This explains why persons like Bennet Mashiyane and Reginald Ndube heard nothing about sabotage at the meetings they attended. But, as has been mentioned by Zizi Njikelane, the use of the phrase "High Command" caused some dissension in A.N.C. circles in the Eastern Province. I travelled there in 1961, because it was alleged that some of these so-called High Commands were using duress in order to enforce the new Plan. I did not find evidence of this, but nevertheless forbade it, and also insisted that the term "High Command" should not be used to describe any A.N.C. Committee. My visit and the discussions which took place have been described by Zizi Njikelane, and I admit his evidence in so far as it relates to me. Although it does not seem to have much relevance, I deny that I was taken to the meeting by the taxi driver John Tshingane, and I also deny that I went to the sea with him.

In 1960 the Government held a Referendum which led to the establishment of the Republic. Africans, who constituted approximately 70% of the population of South Africa, were not entitled to vote, and were not even consulted about the proposed constitutional change. All of us were apprehensive of our future under the proposed White Republic, and a resolution was taken to hold an All-In African Conference to call for a National Convention, and to organize mass demonstrations on the eve of the unwanted Republic, if the Government failed to call the Convention. The Conference was attended by Africans of various political persuasions. I was the Secretary of the Conference and undertook to be responsible for organizing the national stay-at-home which was subsequently called to coincide with the declaration of the Republic. As all strikes by Africans are illegal, the person organizing such a strike must avoid arrest. I was chosen to be this person, and consequently I had to leave my home and family and my practice and go into hiding to avoid arrest.

The stay-at-home, in accordance with A.N.C. policy, was to be a peaceful demonstration. Careful instructions were given to organizers and members to avoid any recourse to violence. The Government's answer was to introduce new and harsher laws, to mobilise its armed forces, and to send saracens, armed vehicles and soldiers into the townships in a massive show of force designed to intimidate the people. This was an indication that the Government had decided to rule by force alone, and this decision was a milestone on the road to Umkonto.

prepared to lead campaigns initiated by the A.N.C. to distribute leaflets: to organize strikes, or do whatever the particular campaign required. They are called volunteers because they volunteer to face the penalties of imprisonment and whipping which are now prescribed by the legislature for such acts.

During the Defiance Campaign, the Public Safety Act and the Criminal Law Amendment Act were passed. These Statutes provided harsher penalties for offences committed by way of protests against laws. Despite this, the protests continued and the A.N.C. adhered to its policy of non-violence. In 1956, one hundred and fifty-six leading members of the Congress Alliance, including myself, were arrested on a charge of High Treason and charged under the Suppression of Communism Act. The non-violent policy of the A.N.C. was put in issue by the State, but when the Court gave judgment some five years later, it found that the A.N.C. did not have a policy of violence. We were acquitted on all counts, which included a count that the A.N.C. sought to set up a Communist State in place of the existing regime. The Government has always sought to label all its opponents as communists. This allegation has been repeated in the present case, but as I will show, the A.N.C. is not, and never has been, a communist organization.

In 1960, there was the shooting at Sharpeville, which resulted in the proclamation of a State of Emergency and the declaration of the A.N.C. as an unlawful organization. My colleagues and I, after careful consideration, decided that we would not obey this decree. The African people were not part of the Government and did not make the laws by which they were governed. We believed in the words of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, that "the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of the Government", and for us to accept the banning was equivalent to accepting the silencing of the Africans for all time. The A.N.C. refused to dissolve, but instead went underground. We believed it was our duty to preserve this organization which had been built up with almost fifty years of unremitting toil. I have no doubt that no self-respecting White political organization would disband itself if declared illegal by a Government in which it had no say.

In some of the evidence the M. Plan has been completely misrepresented. It was nothing more than a method of organizing, planned in 1953, and put into operation with varying degrees of success thereafter. After April, 1960, new methods had to be devised, for instance, by relying on smaller Committees. The M. Plan was referred to in evidence at the Treason Trial, but it had nothing whatsoever to do with sabotage or Umkonto We Sizwe, and was never adopted by Umkonto. The confusion, particularly by certain witnesses from the Eastern Province, is, I think, due to the use of the phrase "High Command". This term was coined in Port Elizabeth during the Emergency, when most of the A.N.C. leaders were

Some of this may appear irrelevant to this trial. In fact, I believe none of it is irrelevant because it will, I hope, enable the Court to appreciate the attitude eventually adopted by the various persons and bodies concerned in the National Liberation Movement. When I went to gaol in 1962, the dominant idea was that loss of life should be avoided. I now know that this was still so in 1963.

I must return to June, 1961. What were we, the leaders of our people to do? Were we to give in to the show of force and the implied threat against future action, or were we to fight it, and if so, how?

We had no doubt that we had to continue the fight. Anything else would have been abject surrender. Our problem was not whether to fight, but was how to continue the fight. We of the A.N.C. had always stood for a non-racial democracy, and we shrank from any action which might drive the races further apart than they already were. But the hard facts were that fifty years of non-violence had brought the African people nothing but more and more repressive legislation, and fewer and fewer rights. It may not be easy for this Court to understand, but it is a fact that for a long time the people had been talking of violence—of the day when they would fight the White man and win back their country, and we, the leaders of the A.N.C., had nevertheless always prevailed upon them to avoid violence and to pursue peaceful methods. When some of us discussed this in May and June of 1961, it could not be denied that our policy to achieve a non-racial state by non-violence had achieved nothing, and that our followers were beginning to lose confidence in this policy and were developing disturbing ideas of terrorism.

It must not be forgotten that by this time violence had, in fact, become a feature of the South African political scene. There had been violence in 1957 when the women of Zeerust were ordered to carry passes; there was violence in 1958 with the enforcement of cattle culling in Sekhukuniland; there was violence in 1959 when the people of Cato Manor protested against Pass raids; there was violence in 1960 when the Government attempted to impose Bantu Authorities in Pondoland. Thirty-nine Africans died in these disturbances. In 1961 there had been riots in Warmbaths, and all this time the Transkei had been a seething mass of unrest. Each disturbance pointed clearly to the inevitable growth among Africans of the belief that violence was the only way out—it showed that a Government which uses force to maintain its rule teaches the oppressed to use force to oppose it. Already small groups had arisen in the urban areas and were spontaneously making plans for violent forms of political struggle. There now arose a danger that these groups would adopt terrorism against Africans, as well as Whites, if not properly directed. Particularly disturbing was the type of violence engendered in places such as Zeerust, Sekhukuniland and Pondoland amongst Africans. It was increasingly taking the form, not of struggle against the Government—though this is

what prompted it—but of civil strife amongst themselves, conducted in such a way that it could not hope to achieve anything other than a loss of life and bitterness.

At the beginning of June, 1961, after a long and anxious assessment of the South African situation, I, and some colleagues, came to the conclusion that as violence in this country was inevitable, it would be unrealistic and wrong for African leaders to continue preaching peace and non-violence at a time when the Government met our peaceful demands with force.

This conclusion was not easily arrived at. It was only when all else had failed, when all channels of peaceful protest had been barred to us, that the decision was made to embark on violent forms of political struggle, and to form Umkonto We Sizwe. We did so not because we desired such a course, but solely because the Government had left us with no other choice. In the Manifesto of Umkonto published on the 16th December, 1961, which is Exhibit 'AD' [Document 66], we said:—

“The time comes in the life of any nation when there remain only two choices—submit or fight. That time has now come to South Africa. We shall not submit and we have no choice but to hit back by all means in our power in defence of our people, our future and our freedom”.

This was our feeling in June of 1961 when we decided to press for a change in the policy of the National Liberation Movement. I can only say that I felt morally obliged to do what I did.

We who had taken this decision started to consult leaders of various organizations, including the A.N.C. I will not say whom we spoke to, or what they said, but I wish to deal with the role of the African National Congress in this phase of the struggle, and with the policy and objectives of Umkonto We Sizwe.

As far as the A.N.C. was concerned, it formed a clear view which can be summarized as follows:—

- (a) It was a mass political organization with a political function to fulfil. Its members had joined on the express policy of non-violence.
- (b) Because of all this, it could not and would not undertake violence. This must be stressed. One cannot turn such a body into the small closely-knit organization required for sabotage. Nor would this be politically correct, because it would result in members ceasing to carry out this essential activity: political propaganda and organization. Nor was it permissible to change the whole nature of the organization.
- (c) On the other hand, in view of this situation I have described, the A.N.C. was prepared to depart from its 50-year-old policy of non-violence to this extent that it would no longer disapprove of properly controlled violence. Hence members who undertook such

activity would not be subject to disciplinary action by the A.N.C.

I say "properly controlled violence" because I made it clear that if I formed the organization I would at all times subject it to the political guidance of the A.N.C. and would not undertake any different form of activity from that contemplated without the consent of the A.N.C. And I shall now tell the Court how that form of violence came to be determined.

As a result of this decision, Umkonto was formed in November, 1961. When we took this decision, and subsequently formulated our plans, the A.N.C. heritage of non-violence and racial harmony was very much with us. We felt that the country was drifting towards a civil war in which Blacks and Whites would fight each other. We viewed the situation with alarm. Civil war could mean the destruction of what the A.N.C. stood for; with civil war racial peace would be more difficult than ever to achieve. We already have examples in South African history of the results of war. It has taken more than fifty years for the scars of the South African War to disappear. How much longer would it take to eradicate the scars of inter-racial civil war, which could not be fought without a great loss of life on both sides?

The avoidance of civil war had dominated our thinking for many years, but when we decided to adopt violence as part of our policy, we realised that we might one day have to face the prospect of such a war. This had to be taken into account in formulating our plans. We required a plan which was flexible and which permitted us to act in accordance with the needs of the times; above all, the plan had to be one which recognised civil war as the last resort, and left the decision on this question to the future. We did not want to be committed to civil war, but we wanted to be ready if it became inevitable.

Four forms of violence are possible. There is sabotage, there is guerrilla warfare, there is terrorism and there is open revolution. We chose to adopt the first method and to exhaust it before taking any other decision.

In the light of our political background the choice was a logical one. Sabotage did not involve loss of life, and it offered the best hope for future race relations. Bitterness would be kept to a minimum and, if the policy bore fruit, democratic government could become a reality. This is what we felt at the time, and this is what we said in our Manifesto (Exhibit AD):—

"We of Umkonto We Sizwe have always sought to achieve liberation without bloodshed and civil clash. We hope, even at this late hour, that our first actions will awaken everyone to a realisation of the disastrous situation to which the Nationalist policy is leading. We hope that we will bring the Government and its supporters to their senses before it is too late, so that both the Government and its policies can be changed before matters reach the desperate stage of civil war".

The initial plan was based on a careful analysis of the political and economic situation of our country. We believed that South Africa depended to a large extent on foreign capital and foreign trade. We felt that planned destruction of power plants, and interference with rail and telephone communications would tend to scare away capital from the country, make it more difficult for goods from the industrial areas to reach the seaports on schedule, and would in the long run be a heavy drain on the economic life of the country, thus compelling the voters of the country to reconsider their position.

Attacks on the economic life lines of the country were to be linked with sabotage on Government buildings and other symbols of apartheid. These attacks would serve as a source of inspiration to our people. In addition, they would provide an outlet for those people who were urging the adoption of violent methods and would enable us to give concrete proof to our followers that we had adopted a stronger line and were fighting back against Government violence.

In addition, if mass action were successfully organized, and mass reprisals taken, we felt that sympathy for our cause would be roused in other countries, and that greater pressure would be brought to bear on the South African Government.

This then was the plan. Umkonto was to perform sabotage, and strict instructions were given to its members right from the start, that on no account were they to injure or kill people in planning or carrying out operations. These instructions have been referred to in the evidence of Mr. "X" and Mr. "Z".

The affairs of the Umkonto were controlled and directed by a National High Command, which had powers of co-option and which could, and did, appoint Regional Commands. The High Command was the body which determined tactics and targets and was in charge of training and finance. Under the High Command there were Regional Commands which were responsible for the direction of the local sabotage groups. Within the framework of the policy laid down by the National High Command, the Regional Commands had authority to select the targets to be attacked. They had no authority to go beyond the prescribed framework and thus had no authority to embark upon acts which endangered life, or which did not fit into the overall plan of sabotage. For instance, MK members were forbidden ever to go armed into operation. Incidentally, the terms High Command and Regional Command were an importation from the Jewish National underground organization Irgun Zvai Leumi, which operated in Israel between 1944 and 1948.

Umkonto had its first operation on the 16th December, 1961, when Government buildings in Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth and Durban were attacked. The selection of targets is proof of the policy to which I have referred. Had we intended to attack life we would have selected targets

where people congregated and not empty buildings and power stations. The sabotage which was committed before the 16th December, 1961, was the work of isolated groups and had no connection whatever with Umkonto. In fact, some of these and a number of later acts were claimed by other organizations. (Put in newspaper cuttings.)

The Manifesto of Umkonto was issued on the day that operations commenced. The response to our actions and Manifesto among the White population was characteristically violent. The Government threatened to take strong action, and called upon its supporters to stand firm and to ignore the demands of the Africans. The Whites failed to respond by suggesting change; they responded to our call by suggesting the laager.

In contrast, the response of the Africans was one of encouragement. Suddenly there was hope again. Things were happening. People in the townships became eager for political news. A great deal of enthusiasm was generated by the initial successes, and people began to speculate on how soon freedom would be obtained.

But we in Umkonto weighed up the White response with anxiety. The lines were being drawn. The Whites and Blacks were moving into separate camps, and the prospects of avoiding a civil war were made less. The White newspapers carried reports that sabotage would be punished by death. If this was so how could we continue to keep Africans away from terrorism?

Already scores of Africans had died as a result of racial friction. In 1920 when the famous leader, Masabala, was held in Port Elizabeth gaol, twenty-four of a group of Africans who had gathered to demand his release, were killed by the police and White civilians. In 1921, more than one hundred Africans died in the Bulhoek affair. In 1924 over two hundred Africans were killed when the Administrator of South West Africa led a force against a group which had rebelled against the imposition of dog tax. On the 1st May, 1950, eighteen Africans died as a result of police shootings during the strike. On the 21st March, 1960, sixty-nine unarmed Africans died at Sharpeville.

How many more Sharpevilles would there be in the history of our country? And how many more Sharpevilles could the country stand without violence and terror becoming the order of the day? And what would happen to our people when that stage was reached? In the long run we felt certain we must succeed, but at what cost to ourselves and the rest of the country? And if this happened, how could Black and White ever live together again in peace and harmony? These were the problems that faced us, and these were our decisions.

Experience convinced us that rebellion would offer the Government limitless opportunities for the indiscriminate slaughter of our people. But it was precisely because the soil of South Africa is already drenched with the blood of innocent Africans that we felt it our duty to make preparations as a long-term undertaking to use force in order to defend ourselves against

force. If war were inevitable, we wanted the fight to be conducted on terms most favourable to our people. The fight which held out prospects best for us and the least risk of life to both sides was guerrilla warfare. We decided, therefore, in our preparations for the future, to make provision for the possibility of guerrilla warfare.

All Whites undergo compulsory military training, but no such training was given to Africans. It was in our view essential to build up a nucleus of trained men who would be able to provide the leadership which would be required if guerrilla warfare started. We had to prepare for such a situation before it became too late to make proper preparations. It was also necessary to build up a nucleus of men trained in civil administration and other professions, so that Africans would be equipped to participate in the Government of this country as soon as they were allowed to do so.

At this stage it was decided that I should attend the Conference of the Pan-African Freedom Movement for Central, East and Southern Africa, which was to be held early in 1962 in Addis Ababa and, because of our need for preparation, it was also decided that, after the Conference, I would undertake a tour of the African States with a view to obtaining facilities for the training of soldiers, and that I would also solicit scholarships for the higher education of matriculated Africans. Training in both fields would be necessary, even if changes came about by peaceful means. Administrators would be necessary who would be willing and able to administer a non-racial State and so would men be necessary to control the army and police force of such a State.

It was on this note that I left South Africa to proceed to Addis Ababa as a delegate of the A.N.C. My tour was a success. Wherever I went I met sympathy for our cause and promises of help. All Africa was united against the stand of White South Africa, and even in London, I was received with great sympathy by political leaders, such as Mr. Gaitskell and Mr. Grimond. In Africa I was promised support by such men as Julius Nyerere, now President of Tanganyika; Mr. Kawawa, then Prime Minister of Tanganyika; Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia; General Aboud, President of the Sudan; Habib Bourguiba, President of Tunisia; Ben Bella, now President of Algeria; Modiko Keita, President of Mali; Leopold Senghor, President of Senegal; Sekou Toure, President of Guinea; President Tubman of Liberia and Milton Obote, Prime Minister of Uganda. It was Ben Bella who invited me to visit Oujda, the Headquarters of the Algerian Army of National Liberation, the visit which is described in my diary, one of the Exhibits.

I started to make a study of the art of war and revolution and, whilst abroad, underwent a course in military training. If there was to be guerrilla warfare, I wanted to be able to stand and fight with my people and to share the hazards of war with them. Notes of lectures which I received in Algeria are contained in Exhibit 16, produced in evidence. Summaries of books on

guerrilla warfare and military strategy have also been produced. I have already admitted that these documents are in my writing, and I acknowledge that I made these studies to equip myself for the role which I might have to play if the struggle drifted into guerrilla warfare. I approached this question as every African Nationalist should do. I was completely objective. The Court will see that I attempted to examine all types of authority on the subject—from the East and from the West, going back to the classic work of Clausewitz, and covering such a variety as Mao Tse Tung and Che Guevara on the one hand, and the writings on the Anglo-Boer War on the other. Of course, these notes are merely summaries of the books I read and do not contain my personal views.

I also made arrangements for our recruits to undergo military training. But here it was impossible to organise any scheme without the co-operation of the A.N.C. offices in Africa. I consequently obtained the permission of the A.N.C. in South Africa to do this. To this extent then there was a departure from the original decision of the A.N.C., but it applied outside South Africa only. The first batch of recruits actually arrived in Tanganyika when I was passing through that country on my way back to South Africa.

I returned to South Africa and reported to my colleagues on the results of my trip. On my return I found that there had been little alteration in the political scene save that the threat of a death penalty for sabotage had now become a fact. The attitude of my colleagues in Umkonto was much the same as it had been before I left. They were feeling their way cautiously and felt that it would be a long time before the possibilities of sabotage were exhausted. In fact, the view was expressed by some that the training of recruits was premature. This is recorded by me in the document, which is Exhibit R. 14. After a full discussion, however, it was decided to go ahead with the plans for military training because of the fact that it would take many years to build up a sufficient nucleus of trained soldiers to start a guerrilla campaign, and whatever happened the training would be of value.

I want to deal now with some of the evidence of "X" [Bruno Mtolo].

Immediately before my arrest in August, 1962, I met members of the Regional Command in Durban. This meeting has been referred to in "X"'s evidence. Much of his account is substantially correct, but much of it is slanted and is distorted and in some important respects it is untruthful. I want to deal with the evidence as briefly as possible:

(a) I did say that I had left the country early in the year to attend the Pafmeca Conference, that the Conference was opened by the Emperor Haile Selassie, who attacked the racial policies of the South African Government and who pledged support to the African people in this country. I also informed them of the unanimous resolution condemning ill-treatment of the African people here, and promising support. I did tell them that the Emperor sent his warmest felicitations to Chief Luthuli.

- (b) But I never told them of any comparison made between Ghanians and South African recruits, and could not have done so for very simple reasons. By the time I left Ethiopia the first South African recruits had not yet reached that country and Ghanian soldiers, as far as I am aware, receive training in the United Kingdom. This being the fact and my understanding, I could not possibly have thought of telling the Regional Command that the Emperor of Ethiopia thought our trainees after *two months* were better than the Ghanians after two years!
- (c) These statements, therefore, are sheer invention, unless they were suggested to Mr. "X" by someone wishing to create a false picture.
- (d) I did tell of financial support received in Ethiopia, and in other parts of Africa. I certainly did not tell him that certain African States had promised us 1% of their budgets. This suggestion of donating 1% never arose during my visit. It arose for the first time, as far as I am aware, at the Conference in May, 1963, by which time I had been in gaol for 10 months.
- (e) Despite "X"'s alleged failure to remember this, I did speak of scholarships promised in Ethiopia. Such general education of persons who will one day be willing to take part in the efficient administration of a non-racial State has always, as I have pointed out, been an important aspect of our plans.
- (f) I did tell them I had travelled through Africa and had been received by a number of heads of States, mentioning them all by name. I also told them of President Ben Bella's invitation to me to go to Oujda, where I met officers of the Algerian Army, including their Commander-in-Chief, Colonel Bommediene. I also said that the Algerians had promised assistance with training and arms. But I certainly did not say they must hide the fact that they were Communists, because I did not know whether they were Communists or not. What I did say was that no Communist should use his position in M.K. for communist propaganda, neither in South Africa nor beyond the borders, because unity of purpose was essential for achieving freedom. At this stage, I said that the exact form of a future society was unimportant. What we aimed at was the vote for all, and on this basis we could appeal to all social groups in South Africa and expect the maximum support from the African States. Mr. "X" denies this, but I could not have suggested any other than the true objective, nor could there have been any possible reason for hiding it.
- (g) It was in this context that I discussed "New Age" and its criticisms of the Egyptian Government. In speaking of my visit to Egypt, I said that my visit coincided with that of Marshall Tito, and that I had not been able to wait until General Nasser was free to interview me. I said that the officials whom I had seen had expressed criticism of articles

appearing in "New Age" which had dealt with General Nasser's attacks on communism, but that I had told them that "New Age" did not necessarily express the policy of our Movement, and that I would take up this complaint with "New Age", and try and use my influence to change their line, because it was not our duty to say in what manner any State should achieve its freedom.

(h) I told the Regional Committee that I had not visited Cuba, but that country's ambassadors in Egypt, Morocco and Ghana. I spoke of the warm affection with which I was received at these embassies and that we were offered all forms of assistance, including scholarships for our youth. In dealing with the question of White and Asian recruits, I did say that as Cuba was a multi-racial country, it would be logical to send such persons to this country as these recruits would fit in more easily there than with Black soldiers in African states.

(i) But I never discussed Eric Mtshali at the meeting, for the simple reason that I did not know him until I heard his name mentioned by [Bruno] Mtolo in this case.

On my return to Tanganyika, after touring the African Continent, I met about 30 South African young men, who were on their way to Ethiopia for training. I addressed them on discipline and good behaviour while abroad. Eric Mtshali may have been amongst these young men. But in any event, even if he was, this must have been before he visited any African State other than Tanganyika, and in Tanganyika, he would not have starved or been in difficulties since our office there would have looked after him. It would be absurd to suggest that the South African office in Dar-Es-Salaam would discriminate against him on the ground that he was a communist.

(j) Of course, I referred to Umkonto We Sizwe, but it cannot be true to say that they heard from me for the first time that this was the name or that it was "the military wing" of the A.N.C.—a phrase much used by the State in this trial. A proclamation had been issued by M.K. on the 16th December, 1961, announcing the existence of the body and its name had been known for seven months before the time of this meeting. And I had certainly never referred to it as a military wing of the A.N.C. I always regarded it as a separate organization, and endeavored to keep it as such.

(k) I did tell them that the activities of MK would go through two phases, namely, acts of sabotage and, possibly, guerrilla warfare, if that became necessary. I dealt with the problems relating to each phase. I stressed, just as he said, that the most important thing was to study our own history and our own situation. We must, of course, study the experiences of other countries also, and, in doing so, we must study, not only the cases where revolutions were victorious, but also cases where revolutions were defeated.

But I did not discuss the training of people in East Germany as testified to by Mtolo—nor do I have any recollection that anyone expressed any suspicions of M. P. Naicker.

(l) I did not produce any photograph in "Spark" or "New Age" as testified to by Mtolo—these photos were only published on the 21st February, 1963, after I was in gaol.

Whilst referring to Mr. "X"'s evidence, there is one other fact that I want to mention. Mr. "X" said that the sabotage which was committed on the 15th October, 1962, was in protest against my conviction, and that the decision to commit such sabotage had been taken between the date of conviction and the date of sentence. He also said that the sabotage was held over for a few days because it was thought that the police would be on their watch on the day that I was sentenced. All this must be untrue. I was convicted during November, 1962, and was sentenced on the same day to five years' imprisonment with hard labour. The sabotage in October, 1962, could, therefore, not have had anything to do with my conviction and sentence.

I wish to turn now to certain general allegations made in this case by the State. But before doing so, I wish to revert to certain occurrences said by witnesses to have happened in Port Elizabeth and East London. I am referring to the bombing of private houses of pro-Government persons during September, October and November, 1962. I do not know what justification there was for these acts, nor what provocation had been given. But if what I have said already is accepted, then it is clear that these acts had nothing to do with the carrying out of the policy of Umkonto.

One of the chief allegations in the Indictment is that the A.N.C. was a party to a general conspiracy to commit sabotage. I have already explained why this is incorrect but how, externally, there was a departure from the original principle laid down by the A.N.C. There has, of course, been overlapping of functions internally as well, because there is a difference between a resolution adopted in the atmosphere of a committee room and the concrete difficulties that arise in the field of practical activity. At a later stage the position was further affected by bannings and house arrests, and by persons leaving the country to take up political work abroad. This led to individuals having to do work in different capacities. But though this may have blurred the distinction between Umkonto and the A.N.C., it by no means abolished that distinction. Great care was taken to keep the activities of the two organizations in South Africa distinct. The A.N.C. remained a mass political body of Africans only carrying on the type of political work they had conducted prior to 1961. Umkonto remained a small organization recruiting its members from different races and organizations and trying to achieve its own particular object. The fact that members of Umkonto were recruited from the A.N.C., and the fact that persons served both organizations, like Solomon Mbanjwa, did not, in our view, change

the nature of the A.N.C. or give it a policy of violence. This overlapping of officers, however, was more the exception than the rule. This is why persons such as Mr. "X" and Mr. "Z", who were on the Regional Command of their respective areas, did not participate in any of the A.N.C. Committees or activities, and why people such as Mr. Bennett Mashiyana and Mr. Reginald Ndubi did not hear of sabotage at their A.N.C. meetings.

Another of the allegations in the indictment is that Rivonia was the headquarters of Umkonto. This is not true of the time when I was there. I was told, of course, and knew that certain of the activities of the Communist Party were carried on there. But this is no reason (as I shall presently explain) why I should not use the place.

I came there in the following manner:—

(a) As already indicated, early in April, 1961, I went underground to organize the May general strike. My work entailed travelling throughout the country, living now in African townships, then in country villages and again in cities.

During the second half of the year I started visiting the Parktown home of Arthur Goldreich, where I used to meet my family privately. Although I had no direct political association with him, I had known Arthur Goldreich socially since 1958.

(b) In October, Arthur Goldreich informed me that he was moving out of town and offered me a hiding place there. A few days thereafter, he arranged for Michael Harmel to take me to Rivonia. I naturally found Rivonia an ideal place for the man who lived the life of an outlaw. Up to that time I had been compelled to live indoors during the day time and could only venture out under cover of darkness. But at Liliesleaf I could live differently and work far more efficiently.

(c) For obvious reasons, I had to disguise myself and I assumed the fictitious name of David. In December Arthur Goldreich and his family also moved in. I stayed there until I went abroad on the 11th January, 1962. As already indicated, I returned in July, 1962, and was arrested in Natal on the 5th August.

(d) Up to the time of my arrest, Liliesleaf farm was the headquarters of neither the African National Congress nor the M.K. With the exception of myself, none of the officials or members of these bodies lived there, no meetings of the governing bodies were ever held there and no activities connected with them were either organized or directed from there. On numerous occasions during my stay at Liliesleaf farm I met both the Executive Committee of the A.N.C., as well as the N.H.C., but such meetings were held elsewhere and not on the farm.

(e) Whilst staying at Liliesleaf Farm, I frequently visited Arthur Goldreich in the main house and he also paid me visits in my room. We had numerous political discussions covering a variety of subjects. We discussed ideological and practical questions, the Congress Alliance, Umkonto and its activities generally and his experiences as a soldier in the Palmach, the military wing of the Haganah. Haganah was the political authority of the Jewish National Movement in Palestine.

(f) Because of what I had got to know of Goldreich, I recommended on my return to South Africa that he should be recruited to Umkonto. I do not know of my personal knowledge whether this was done.

Another of the allegations made by the State is that the aims and objects of the A.N.C. and the Communist Party are the same. I wish to deal with this and with my own political position, because I must assume that the State may try to argue from certain Exhibits that I tried to introduce Marxism into the A.N.C. The allegation as to the A.N.C. is false. This is an old allegation which was disproved at the Treason Trial and which has again reared its head. But since the allegation has been made again, I shall deal with it as well as with the relationship between the A.N.C. and the Communist Party and Umkonto and that Party.

The ideological creed of the A.N.C. is, and always has been, the creed of African Nationalism. It is not the concept of African Nationalism expressed in the cry, "Drive the White man into the sea". The African Nationalism for which the A.N.C. stands, is the concept of freedom and fulfilment for the African people in their own land. The most important political document ever adopted by the A.N.C. is the "Freedom Charter". It is by no means a blueprint for a socialist State. It calls for redistribution, but not nationalisation, of land; it provides for nationalisation of mines, Banks and monopoly industry, because big monopolies are owned by one race only, and without such nationalisation racial domination would be perpetuated despite the spread of political power. It would be a hollow gesture to repeal the Gold Law prohibitions against Africans when all gold mines are owned by European companies. In this respect the A.N.C.'s policy corresponds with the old policy of the present Nationalist Party which, for many years, had as part of its programme the nationalisation of the Gold Mines which, at that time, were controlled by foreign capital. Under the Freedom Charter nationalisation would take place in an economy based on private enterprise. The realisation of the Freedom Charter would open up fresh fields for a prosperous African population of all classes, including the middle class. The A.N.C. has never at any period of its history advocated a revolutionary change in the economic structure of the country, nor has it, to the best of my recollection, ever condemned capitalist society.

As far as the Communist Party is concerned, and if I understand its

policy correctly, it stands for the establishment of a State based on the principles of Marxism. Although it is prepared to work for the Freedom Charter, as a short-term solution to the problems created by White supremacy, it regards the Freedom Charter as the beginning, and not the end of, its programme.

The A.N.C., unlike the Communist Party, admitted Africans only as members. Its chief goal was, and is, for the African people to win unity and full political rights. The Communist Party's main aim, on the other hand, was to remove the capitalists and to replace them with a working-class Government. The Communist Party sought to emphasize class distinction whilst the A.N.C. seeks to harmonise them. This is a vital distinction. It is true that there has often been close co-operation between the A.N.C. and the Communist Party. But co-operation is merely proof of a common goal—in this case the removal of White supremacy—and is not proof of a complete community of interests.

The history of the world is full of similar examples. Perhaps the most striking illustration is to be found in the co-operation between Great Britain, the United States of America and the Soviet Union in the fight against Hitler. Nobody but Hitler would have dared to suggest that such co-operation turned Churchill or Roosevelt into communists or communist tools, or that Britain and America were working to bring about a communist world.

Another instance of such co-operation is to be found precisely in Umkonto. Shortly after MK was constituted, I was informed by some of its members that the Communist Party would support Umkonto, and this then occurred. At a later stage the support was made openly.

I believe that Communists have always played an active role in the fight by colonial countries for their freedom, because the short-term objects of Communism would always correspond with the long-term objects of freedom movements. Thus Communists have played an important role in the freedom struggles fought in countries such as Malaya, Algeria and Indonesia, yet none of these States today are Communist countries. Similarly in the underground resistance movements which sprung up in Europe during the last World War, Communists played an important role. Even General Chiang Kai Chek, today one of the bitterest enemies of Communism, fought together with the Communists against the ruling class in the struggle which led to his assumption of power in China in the 1930's.

This pattern of co-operation between Communists and non-Communists has been repeated in the National Liberation Movement of South Africa. Prior to the banning of the Communist Party, joint campaigns involving the Communist Party and the Congress Movements were accepted practice. African Communists could, and did, become members of the A.N.C., and some served on the National, Provincial and local committees. Amongst those who served on the National Executive are Albert Nzula, a former

Secretary of the Communist Party, Moses Kotane, another former Secretary and J. B. Marks, a former member of the Central Committee.

I joined the A.N.C. in 1944, and in my younger days I held the view that the policy of admitting Communists to the A.N.C., and the close co-operation which existed at times on specific issues between the A.N.C. and the Communist Party, would lead to a watering down of the concept of African nationalism. At that stage I was a member of the African National Congress Youth League, and was one of a group which moved for the expulsion of Communists from the A.N.C. This proposal was heavily defeated. Amongst those who voted against the proposal were some of the most conservative sections of African political opinion. They defended the policy on the ground that from its inception the A.N.C. was formed and built up, not as a political party with one school of political thought, but as a Parliament of the African people, accommodating people of various political convictions, all united by the common goal of national liberation. I was eventually won over to this point of view and have upheld it ever since.

It is perhaps difficult for White South Africans, with an ingrained prejudice against Communism, to understand why experienced African politicians so readily accept Communists as their friends. But to us the reason is obvious. Theoretical differences amongst those fighting against oppression is a luxury we cannot afford at this stage. What is more, for many decades Communists were the only political group in South Africa who were prepared to treat Africans as human beings and their equals; who were prepared to eat with us; talk with us, live with us and work with us. They were the only political group which was prepared to work with the Africans for the attainment of political rights and a stake in society. Because of this, there are many Africans who, today, tend to equate freedom with Communism. They are supported in this belief by a legislature which brands all exponents of democratic government and African freedom as Communists and bans many of them (who are not Communists) under the Suppression of Communism Act. Although I have never been a member of the Communist Party, I myself have been named under that pernicious Act because of the role I played in the Defiance Campaign. I have also been banned and imprisoned under that Act.

It is not only in internal politics that we count Communists as amongst those who support our cause. In the international field, Communist countries have always come to our aid. In the United Nations and other Councils of the world the Communist block has supported the Afro-Asian struggle against colonialism and often seems to be more sympathetic to our plight than some of the Western powers. Although there is a universal condemnation of apartheid, the Communist block speaks out against it with a louder voice than most of the White world. In these circumstances, it would take a brash young politician, such as I was in 1949, to proclaim that the Communists are our enemies.

I turn now to my own position. I have denied that I am a Communist, and I think that in the circumstances I am obliged to state exactly what my political beliefs are.

I have always regarded myself, in the first place, as an African patriot. After all, I was born in Umtata, forty-six years ago. My guardian was my cousin, who was the acting paramount chief of Tembuland, and I am related both to the present paramount chief of Tembuland, Sabata Dalinyebo, and to Kaizer Matanzima, the Chief Minister of the Transkei.

Today I am attracted by the idea of a classless society, an attraction which springs in part from Marxist reading and, in part, from my admiration of the structure and organization of early African societies in this country. The land, then the main means of production, belonged to the tribe. There were no rich or poor and there was no exploitation.

It is true, as I have already stated, that I have been influenced by Marxist thought. But this is also true of many of the leaders of the new independent States. Such widely different persons as Gandhi, Nehru, Nkrumah and Nasser all acknowledge this fact. We all accept the need for some form of Socialism to enable our people to catch up with the advanced countries of this world and to overcome their legacy of extreme poverty. But this does not mean we are Marxists.

Indeed, for my own part, I believe that it is open to debate whether the Communist Party has any specific role to play at this particular stage of our political struggle. The basic task at the present moment is the removal of race discrimination and the attainment of democratic rights on the basis of the Freedom Charter. Insofar as that Party furthers this task, I welcome its assistance. I realize that it is one of the means by which people of all races can be drawn into our struggle.

From my reading of Marxist literature and from conversations with Marxists, I have gained the impression that Communists regard the parliamentary system of the West as undemocratic and reactionary. But, on the contrary, I am an admirer of such a system.

The Magna Charta, the Petition of Rights and the Bill of Rights, are documents which are held in veneration by democrats throughout the world.

I have great respect for British political institutions, and for the country's system of justice. I regard the British Parliament as the most democratic institution in the world, and the independence and impartiality of its judiciary never fail to arouse my admiration.

The American Congress, that country's doctrine of separation of powers, as well as the independence of its judiciary, arouse in me similar sentiments.

I have been influenced in my thinking by both West and East. All this has led me to feel that in my search for a political formula, I should be absolutely impartial and objective. I should tie myself to no particular

system of society other than of socialism. I must leave myself free to borrow the best from the West and from the East.

I wish now to deal with some of the Exhibits. Many of the Exhibits are in my handwriting. It has always been my custom to reduce to writing the material which I have been studying.

R-20, 21 and 22 are lectures drafted in my own hand but they are not my original work. They came to be written in the following circumstances:

(a) For several years an old friend with whom I worked very closely on A.N.C. matters and who occupied senior positions both in the A.N.C. and the Communist Party, had been trying to get me to join the Communist Party. I had had many debates with him on the role which the Communist Party can play at this stage of our struggle, and I advanced to him the same views in regard to my political beliefs which I have described earlier in my statement.

In order to convince me that I should join the Communist Party he, from time to time gave me Marxist literature to read, though I did not always find time to do this.

Each of us always stuck to our guns in our argument as to whether I should join the Communist Party. He maintained that on achieving freedom we would be unable to solve our problems of poverty and inequality without establishing a Communist State, and we would require trained Marxists to do this. I maintained my attitude that no ideological differences should be introduced until freedom had been achieved.

(b) I saw him on several occasions at Liliesleaf Farm, and on one of the last of these occasions he was busy writing with books around him. When I asked him what he was doing, he told me that he was busy writing lectures for use in the Communist Party, and suggested that I should read them. There were several lectures in draft form.

(c) After I had done so, I told him that they seemed far too complicated for the ordinary reader in that the language was obtuse and they were full of the usual Communistic clichés and jargon. If the Court will look at some of the standard works of Marxism, my point will be demonstrated. He said it was impossible to simplify the language without losing the effect of what the author was trying to stress. I disagreed with him and he then asked me to see whether I could redraft the lectures in the simplified form suggested by me.

(d) I agreed to help him and set to work in an endeavor to do this, but I never finished the task as I later became occupied with other practical work which was more important than trying to prove my point that Marxism could be expressed in more simplified terms than those habitually employed by Party members. I never again saw the unfinished manuscript until it was produced at the Trial.

(e) I wish to state that it is not my handwriting which appears on Exhibit R.23 which was obviously drafted by the person who prepared the lectures.

There are certain Exhibits which suggest that we received financial support from abroad, and I wish to deal with this question.

Our political struggle has always been financed from internal sources—from funds raised by our own people and by our own supporters. Whenever we had a special campaign or an important political case—for example the Treason Trial—we received financial assistance from sympathetic individuals and organizations in the Western countries. We had never felt it necessary to go beyond these sources.

But when in 1961 the M.K. was formed, and a new phase of struggle introduced, we realized that these events would make a heavy call on our slender resources, and that the scale of our activities would be hampered by the lack of funds. One of my instructions, as I went abroad in January, 1962, was to raise funds from the African States.

I must add that, whilst abroad, I had discussions with leaders of political movements in Africa and discovered that almost every single one of them, in areas which had still not attained independence, had received all forms of assistance from the socialist countries, as well as from the West, including that of financial support. I also discovered that some well-known African states, all of them non-Communists, and even anti-Communists, had received similar assistance.

On my return to the Republic, I made a strong recommendation to the A.N.C. that we should not confine ourselves to Africa and the Western countries, but that we should also send a mission to the socialist countries to raise the funds which we so urgently needed.

I have been told that after I was convicted such a mission was sent, but I am not prepared to name any countries to which it went, nor am I at liberty to disclose the names of the organizations and countries which gave us support or promised to do so.

As I understand the State case, and in particular the evicence of Mr. "X", the suggestion is that Umkonto was the inspiration of the Communist Party which sought by playing upon imaginary grievances to enrol the African people into an army which ostensibly was to fight for African freedom, but in reality was fighting for a Communist State. Nothing could be further from the truth. In fact the suggestion is preposterous. Umkonto was formed by Africans to further their struggle for freedom in their own land. Communists and others supported the movement, and we only wish that more sections of the community would join us.

Our fight is against real, and not imaginary, hardships, or to use the language of the State Prosecutor, "so-called hardships". Basically, we fight against two features which are the hallmarks of African life in South Africa and which are entrenched by legislation which we seek to have

repealed. These features are poverty and lack of human dignity, and we do not need Communists or so-called "agitators" to teach us about these things.

South Africa is the richest country in Africa, and could be one of the richest countries in the world. But it is a land of extremes and remarkable contrasts. The Whites enjoy what may well be the highest standard of living in the world, whilst Africans live in poverty and misery. Forty per cent of the Africans live in hopelessly over-crowded and, in some cases, drought-stricken reserves, where soil erosion and the overworking of the soil, make it impossible for them to live properly off the land. Thirty per cent are labourers, labour tenants and squatters on White farms and work and live under conditions similar to those of the serfs of the Middle Ages. The other thirty per cent live in towns where they have developed economic and social habits which bring them closer in many respects to White standards. Yet most Africans, even in this group, are impoverished by low incomes and high cost of living.

The highest-paid and the most prosperous section of urban African life is in Johannesburg. Yet their actual position is desperate. The latest figures were given on the 25th March, 1964, by Mr. Carr, Manager of the Johannesburg Non-European Affairs Department. The poverty datum line for the average African family in Johannesburg (according to Mr. Carr's department) is R42.84 per month. He showed that the average monthly wage is R32.24 and that 46% of all African families in Johannesburg do not earn enough to keep them going.

Poverty goes hand in hand with malnutrition and disease. The incidence of malnutrition and deficiency diseases is very high amongst Africans. Tuberculosis, pellagra, kwashiorkor, gastro-enteritis and scurvy bring death and destruction of health. The incidence of infant mortality is one of the highest in the world. According to the Medical Officer of Health for Pretoria, tuberculosis kills forty people a day (almost all Africans), and in 1961 there were 58,491 new cases reported. These diseases not only destroy the vital organs of the body, but they result in retarded mental conditions and lack of initiative, and reduce powers of concentration. The secondary results of such conditions affect the whole community and the standard of work performed by African labourers.

The complaint of Africans, however, is not only that they are poor and the Whites are rich, but that the laws which are made by the Whites are designed to preserve this situation. There are two ways to break out of poverty. The first is by formal education, and the second is by the worker acquiring a greater skill at his work and thus higher wages. As far as Africans are concerned, both these avenues of advancement are deliberately curtailed by legislation.

The present Government has always sought to hamper Africans in their search for education. One of their early acts, after coming into power, was

to stop subsidies for African school feeding. Many African children, who attended schools, depended on this supplement to their diet. This was a cruel act.

There is compulsory education for all White children at virtually no cost to their parents, be they rich or poor. Similar facilities are not provided for the African children, though there are some who receive such assistance. African children, however, generally have to pay more for their schooling than Whites. According to figures quoted by the South African Institute of Race Relations in its 1963 journal, approximately 40% of African children in the age group between 7 to 14, do not attend school. For those who do attend school, the standards are vastly different from those afforded to White children. In 1960/61 the per capita Government spending on African students at State-aided schools was estimated at R12.46. In the same years, the per capita spending on White children in the Cape Province (which are the only figures available to me) was R144.57. Although there are no figures available to me, it can be stated, without doubt, that the White children on whom R144.57 per head was being spent all came from wealthier homes than African children on whom R12.46 per head was being spent.

The quality of education is also different. According to the Bantu Education Journal, only 5,660 African children in the whole of South Africa passed their J.C. in 1962, and in that year only 362 passed matric. This is presumably consistent with the policy of Bantu education about which the present Prime Minister said, during the debate on the Bantu Education Bill in 1953:—

“When I have control of Native education I will reform it so that Natives will be taught from childhood to realise that equality with Europeans is not for them . . . People who believe in equality are not desirable teachers for Natives. When my Department controls Native education it will know for what class of higher education a Native is fitted, and whether he will have a chance in life to use his knowledge”.

The other main obstacle to the economic advancement of the African is the industrial colour bar under which all the better jobs of industry are reserved for Whites only. Moreover, Africans who do obtain employment in the unskilled and semi-skilled occupations which are open to them, are not allowed to form Trade Unions which have recognition under the Industrial Conciliation Act. This means that strikes of African workers are illegal, and that they are denied the right of collective bargaining which is permitted to the better-paid White workers. The discrimination in the policy of successive South African Governments towards African workers is demonstrated by the so-called “civilised labour policy” under which sheltered unskilled Government jobs are found for those White workers who cannot make the grade in industry, at wages which far exceeded the earnings of the average African employee in industry.

The Government often answers its critics by saying that Africans in South Africa are economically better off than the inhabitants of the other countries in Africa. I do not know whether this statement is true and doubt whether any comparison can be made without having regard to the cost of living index in such countries. But even if it is true, as far as the African people are concerned it is irrelevant. Our complaint is not that we are poor by comparison with people in other countries, but that we are poor by comparison with the White people in our own country, and that we are prevented by legislation from altering this imbalance.

The lack of human dignity experienced by Africans is the direct result of the policy of White supremacy. White supremacy implies Black inferiority. Legislation designed to preserve White supremacy entrenches this notion. Menial tasks in South Africa are invariably performed by Africans. When anything has to be carried or cleaned the White man will look around for an African to do it for him, whether the African is employed by him or not. Because of this sort of attitude, Whites tend to regard Africans as a separate breed. They do not look upon them as people with families of their own; they do not realise that they have emotions—that they fall in love like White people do; that they want to be with their wives and children like White people want to be with theirs; that they want to earn enough money to support their families properly, to feed and clothe them and send them to school. And what “house-boy” or “garden-boy” or labourer can ever hope to do this?

Pass Laws, which to the Africans are among the most hated bits of legislation in South Africa, render any African liable to police surveillance at any time. I doubt whether there is a single African male in South Africa who has not at some stage had a brush with the police over his pass. Hundreds and thousands of Africans are thrown into gaol each year under pass laws. Even worse than this is the fact that pass laws keep husband and wife apart and lead to the breakdown of family life.

Poverty and the breakdown of family life have secondary effects. Children wander about the streets of the Townships because they have no schools to go to, or no money to enable them to go to school, or no parents at home to see that they go to school, because both parents (if there be two) have to work to keep the family alive. This leads to a breakdown in moral standards, to an alarming rise in illegitimacy and to growing violence which erupts, not only politically, but everywhere. Life in the townships is dangerous. There is not a day that goes by without somebody being stabbed or assaulted. And violence is carried out of the townships in the White living areas. People are afraid to walk alone in the streets after dark. Housebreakings and robberies are increasing, despite the fact that the death sentence can now be imposed for such offences. Death sentences cannot cure the festering sore.

Africans want to be paid a living wage. Africans want to perform work


which they are capable of doing, and not work which the Government declares them to be capable of. Africans want to be allowed to live where they obtain work, and not be endorsed out of an area because they were not born there. Africans want to be allowed to own land in places where they work, and not to be obliged to live in rented houses which they can never call their own. Africans want to be part of the general population, and not confined to living in their own ghettos. African men want to have their wives and children to live with them where they work, and not be forced into an unnatural existence in men's hostels. African women want to be with their men folk and not be left permanently widowed in the reserves. Africans want to be allowed out after 11 o'clock at night and not to be confined to their rooms like little children. Africans want to be allowed to travel in their own country and to seek work where they want to and not where the Labour Bureau tells them to. Africans want a just share in the whole of South Africa: they want security and a stake in society.

Above all, we want equal political rights, because without them our disabilities will be permanent. I know this sounds revolutionary to the Whites in this country, because the majority of voters will be Africans. This makes the White man fear democracy.

But this fear cannot be allowed to stand in the way of the only solution which will guarantee racial harmony and freedom for all. It is not true that the enfranchisement of all will result in racial domination. Political division, based on colour, is entirely artificial and, when it disappears, so will the domination of one colour group by another. The A.N.C. has spent half a century fighting against racialism. When it triumphs it will not change that policy.

This then is what the A.N.C. is fighting. Their struggle is a truly national one. It is a struggle of the African people, inspired by their own suffering and their own experience. It is a struggle for the right to live.

During my lifetime I have dedicated myself to this struggle of the African people. I have fought against White domination, and I have fought against Black domination. I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to live for and to achieve. But if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die.



Note: This text, in mimeographed form, was made available to the editors by the Rivonia trial defense team. The Special Committee on Apartheid of the United Nations General Assembly reproduced the text on May 6, 1964 (A/AC.115/L.67) from a copy made available by Mary Benson.

The struggle of the oppressed people of South Africa is taking place within an international context of transition to the Socialist system, of the breakdown of the colonial system as a result of national liberation and socialist revolutions, and the fight for social and economic progress by the people of the whole world.

We in South Africa are part of the zone in which national liberation is the chief content of the struggle. On our continent sweeping advances have been registered which have resulted in the emergence to independent statehood of forty-one states. Thus the first formal step of independence has been largely won in Africa and this fact exercises a big influence on the developments in our country.

The countries of Southern Africa have not as yet broken the chains of colonialism and racism which hold them in oppression. In Mozambique, Angola, South West Africa, Zimbabwe and South Africa White racist and fascist regimes maintain systems which go against the current trend of the African revolution and world development.

This has been made possible by the tremendous economic and military power at the disposal of these regimes built with the help of imperialism.

The main pillar of the unholy alliance of Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa is the Republic of South Africa. The strategy and tactics of our revolution require for their formulation and understanding a full appreciation of the interlocking and interweaving of international, African and Southern African developments which play on our situation.

South Africa was conquered by force and is today ruled by force. At moments when White autocracy feels itself threatened, it does not hesitate to use the gun. When the gun is not in use, legal and administrative terror, fear, social and economic pressures, complacency and confusion generated by propaganda and "education", are the devices brought into play in an attempt to harness the people's opposition. Behind these devices hovers force. Whether in reserve or in actual employment, force is ever present and this has been so since the White man came to Africa.

From the time alien rule was imposed there has been, historically, unbroken resistance to this domination. It has taken different forms at different times but it has never been abandoned. For the first 250 years there were regular armed clashes, battles and wars. The superior material resources of the enemy, the divided and often fragmented nature of the resistance, the unchallenged ascendancy of imperialism, as a world system up to the

STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN REVOLUTION

A Political Report adopted by the Consultative Conference of the A.N.C. at the Morogoro Conference, Tanzania, May 1969.

beginning of the twentieth century, the historically understandable absence of political cohesion and leadership in the people's camp; these and other factors combined to end the first phase of resistance unequalled anywhere else in Africa are underlined by the fact that the armed subjugation of the indigenous people was only really accomplished at the beginning of this century.

The defeat of the Bambata Rebellion in 1906 marked the end of this first phase and set the stage for the handing over of the administration of the country to local Whites in 1910. The fifty years which followed was not a period of resignation or of acceptance. It was a period of development and of regrouping under new conditions; a period in which newly created political formations of the people continued to struggle with the enemy and grew into maturity; a period in which, above all, national consciousness began to assert itself against tribal sectionalism. This period witnessed the emergence and development of the primary organisation of the liberation movement – the African National Congress. It also saw the involvement of national organisations reflecting the aspirations of other oppressed non-White groups – the Coloureds and Indians – and the creation of economic and political organisations – the South African Communist Party, Trade Unions which reflected the special aims and aspirations of the newly developed and doubly exploited working class. This was a period of organisational growth. It was punctuated by struggles involving techniques ranging from orthodox mass campaigning to general strikes, to mass acts of defiance. It culminated in the decision taken in 1961 to prepare for armed confrontation. The year 1961 saw the opening stages of this campaign in the simultaneous acts of sabotage which occurred in most of the main urban centres on 16 December.

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of forty-one states. Thus the first formal step of independence has been largely won in Africa and this fact exercises a big influence on the developments in our country.

The countries of Southern Africa have not as yet broken the chains of colonialism and racism which hold them in oppression. In Mozambique, Angola, South West Africa, Zimbabwe and South Africa White racist and fascist regimes maintain systems which go against the current trend of the African revolution and world development.

This has been made possible by the tremendous economic and military power at the disposal of these regimes built with the help of imperialism.

The main pillar of the unholy alliance of Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa is the Republic of South Africa. The strategy and tactics of our revolution require for their formulation and understanding a full appreciation of the interlocking and interweaving of international, African and Southern African developments which play on our situation.

South Africa was conquered by force and is today ruled by force. At moments when White autocracy feels itself threatened, it does not hesitate to use the gun. When the gun is not in use, legal and administrative terror, fear, social and economic pressures, complacency and confusion generated by propaganda and "education", are the devices brought into play in an attempt to harness the people's opposition. Behind these devices hovers force. Whether in reserve or in actual employment, force is ever present and this has been so since the White man came to Africa.

From the time alien rule was imposed there has been, historically, unbroken resistance to this domination. It has taken different forms at different times but it has never been abandoned. For the first 250 years there were regular armed clashes, battles and wars. The superior material resources of the enemy, the divided and often fragmented nature of the resistance, the unchallenged ascendancy of imperialism, as a world system up to the

beginning of the twentieth century, the historically understandable absence of political cohesion and leadership in the people's camp; these and other factors combined to end the first phase of resistance unequalled anywhere else in Africa are underlined by the fact that the armed subjugation of the indigenous people was only really accomplished at the beginning of this century.

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armed struggle become the only alternative? Not at all. There has never been a moment in the history of South Africa since 1652 in which the White ruling class would have given privileges without a physical battle. Why then did organisations like the African National Congress not call for armed struggle? Was it perhaps that they were not really revolutionary or that it was only in the early 'sixties that they began to appreciate the correct strategy? Is there perhaps substance in the accusations by some of our detractors that until the early 'sixties the liberation movement was lacking in military fervour and the desire for radical change? In other words was its policy not a revolutionary one? What is our measuring rod for revolutionary policy? A look at this concept will help towards a more profound understanding not only of the past but of the future. It is therefore not out of place to devote a word to it.

In essence, a revolutionary policy is one which holds out the quickest and most fundamental transformation and transfer of power from one class to another. In real life such radical changes are brought about not by imaginary forces but by those whose outlook and readiness to act is very much influenced by historically determined factors.

To ignore the real situation and to play about with imaginary forces, concepts and ideals is to invite failure. The art of revolutionary leadership consists in providing leadership to the masses and not just to its most advanced elements; it consists of setting a pace which accords with objective conditions and the real possibilities at hand. The revolutionary sounding phrase does not always reflect revolutionary policy, and revolutionary sounding policy is not always the springboard for revolutionary advance.

Indeed, what appears to be "militant" and "revolutionary" can often be counter-revolutionary. It is surely a question of whether, in the given concrete situation, the course or policy advocated will aid or impede the prospects of the conquest of power. In this – the only test – the

advocacy of armed struggle can, in some situations, be as counter-revolutionary as the advocacy of its opposite in other situations. Untimely, ill-planned or premature manifestations of violence impede and do not advance the prospect for revolutionary change and are clearly counter-revolutionary. It is obvious therefore that policy and organisational structures must grow out of the real situation if they are not to become meaningless clichés.

Future historians may well be able to pause at some moments during the evolution of our struggle and examine critically both its pace and emphasis. But, in general, without the so-called reformist activities of the previous half century, the prospect of advancing into the new phase would have been extremely small. This is so because even in the typical colonial-type situation armed struggle becomes feasible only if:

There is disillusionment with the prospect of achieving liberation by traditional peaceful processes because the objective conditions blatantly bar the way to change;

There is readiness to respond to the strategy of armed struggle with all the enormous sacrifices which this involves;

There is in existence a political leadership capable of gaining the organised allegiance of the people for armed struggle and which has both the experience and the ability to carry out the painstaking process of planning, preparation and overall conduct of the operations; There exist favourable objective conditions in the international and local plans.

In one sense conditions are connected and interdependent. They are not created by subjective and ideological activity only and many are the mistakes committed by heroic revolutionaries who give a monopoly to the subjective factor and who confuse their own readiness with the readiness of others.

These conditions are brought about not only by devel-

oping political, economic and social conditions but also by the long, hard grind of revolutionary work. They depend on such factors as the response of the enemy, the extent to which he unmasks himself and the experience gained by the people themselves not in academic seminars but in actual political struggle.

We reject the approach which sees as the catalyst for revolutionary transformation only the short cut of isolated confrontations and the creation of armed resistance centres. Does this mean that before an actual beginning can be made to the armed challenge we have to wait for the involvement of some sort of deep crisis in the enemy camp which is serious enough to hold out the possibility of an immediate all-round insurrection? Certainly not! We believe that given certain basic factors, both international and local, the actual beginning of armed struggle or guerrilla warfare can be made and having begun can steadily develop conditions for the future all-out war which will eventually lead to the conquest of power. Under the modern highly sophisticated police state (which South Africa is) it is questionable whether a movement can succeed in a programme of mass political organisation beyond a certain point without starting a new type of action. Also, it is not easy to determine the point at which sufficient concrete political and organisational preparations have been carried out to give our armed detachments the maximum chances of survival and growth within any given area. There is no instrument for measuring this. But we must not overdo the importance of the subjective factor and before embarking upon a path which is in one sense tragic, although historically inevitable and necessary, certain of the 'basic minimum' conditions already mentioned must be present and certain minimum preparations must have been made.

In the light of those considerations, it is clear that it was only after the victory of the anti-imperialist forces in the Second World War and the tide of independence in

Africa, Asia and Latin America, combined with the zig-zags of struggle inside South Africa in the last fifty years which by the beginning of the 'sixties demanded a move in the direction of armed struggle. The 'fifties were among the most stirring and struggle-filled decades in the history of the liberation movement. Thousands upon thousands of militant cadres were tempered during this period and masses of our people both in town and countryside participated in a variety of forms of struggle. The moulding of mass political consciousness reached a new intensity. The response of the authorities was such that the overwhelming majority of the people learnt, through their own participation in the struggle and confrontation with the state, that in the long run the privileges of the minority will only be wrenched from it by a reversion to armed combat. Indeed, during this "peaceful" stage in our struggle hardly a year passed without massacres of our people by the army and police.

Each phase in the unfolding of the struggle of the 'fifties played a part in setting the stage of our new approach. A rebirth of the spirit of deliberate defiance of the White man's law was stimulated by the great Defiance Campaign of 1952. The response of the state towards the Congress of the People Campaign and the adoption of the Freedom Charter demonstrated its intention to crush what had previously been accepted as legitimate expressions for equality. The numbers of highly successful national general strikes motivated in the main by political and not economic demands proved the growing maturity of the urban non-White working class. The magnificent resistance by the peasants in Pondoland, Sekhukhuni and Natal in the late 'fifties pointed also to the new spirit of militancy and struggle in the countryside.

The general strike as a method of political mobilisation was suppressed with the utmost vigour and by the end of the 'fifties could no longer be effectively employed as an instrument of mass struggle. Other protests were increas-

ingly broken by police brutality and the use of orthodox mass demonstration as an effective weapon was demonstrably no longer feasible. Legal opposition was rendered ineffective by bannings, exiles and the imprisonment of activists and leaders to long terms for the most trivial infringements. Finally by such laws as the Terrorism and Sabotage Acts all opposition by the legal or peaceful means was rendered impossible.

In the field of representation, any reformist illusion that may still have existed of a slow advance towards democracy was shattered by the removal of the historic remains of non-White representation including even undemocratic and powerless bodies such as the Native Representative Council. Thus the enemy unmasked himself completely not only to a group of advanced thinkers but to the mass of the people as a whole. The liberation surge towards independence of the African continent which marked the late 'fifties and early 'sixties had an important bearing on our own situation. Not only were friendly borders creeping closer but in a very real way these events stimulated and excited people in the unliberated territories in the direction of self-rule. The basic drive for this in our country had never been suppressed. But the events in South Africa in the previous decade and what was happening on the continent confirmed that conquest of power by the people was a realisable goal in our lifetime. The enormous material power of the enemy and by contrast the material weakness of the people was to them no more than a temporary impediment. The memory of Cuba and – on our continent – of Algeria, was fresh, both had proved that in the long run material resources alone are not a determining factor.

The heightened political ferment both here and on our continent reflected itself in the growth and further maturing of all sections of the liberation front. Those leaders who were unable to adjust to the new revolutionary mood (even before the policy of the preparations for organised

armed resistance) fell by the wayside. The cohesion and unity of action between the various national and social groupings comprising the liberation front reached new heights. All this constituted not only moral justification for a move towards armed struggle, but, what is more important, conditions had been created – they were not always there – making a departure in this direction correct, necessary and, in the true sense, revolutionary.

In a way the decision taken in 1961 was, historically speaking, in the tradition of the earlier armed resistance to the entrenchment of the foreigner. But it is now occurring in a new situation. Not only had this situation to be understood but the art and science – both politically and military – of armed liberation struggles in the modern epoch had to be grasped and applied. The head-on mobile warfare of the traditional African armies of the past could not meet the challenge. The riot, the street fight, the outbursts of unorganised violence, individual terrorism; these were symptoms of the militant spirit but not pointers to revolutionary technique. The winning of our freedom by armed struggle – the only method left open to us – demands more than passion. It demands an understanding and an implementation of revolutionary theory and techniques in the actual conditions facing us. It demands a sober assessment of the obstacles in our way and an appreciation that such a struggle is bitter and protracted. It demands too the dominance in our thinking of achievement over drama. We believe our movement acted in accordance with these guidelines when it embarked upon the detailed preparation for the launching of guerrilla struggle.

We understood that the main physical environment of such a struggle in the initial period is outside the enemy strongholds in the cities, in the vast stretches of our countryside. The opening steps in 1961 – organised sabotage mainly in the urban areas – served a special purpose and was never advanced as a technique which would, on its

own, either lead to the destruction of the state or even do it great material damage (although guerrilla activity in the urban areas of a special type is always important as an auxiliary). At the same time there was a threefold need to be met in order to lay the foundations for more developed and meaningful armed activity of the guerrilla type.

The first was the need to create a military apparatus and, more particularly to recruit large numbers of professional cadres who were to be trained and who would form the core of future guerrilla bands.

The second was the need to demonstrate effectively that we were making a sharp and open break with the processes of the previous period which had correctly given emphasis to militant struggle short of armed confrontation.

The third was the need to present an effective method for the overthrow of White supremacy through planned rather than spontaneous activity. The sabotage campaign was an earnest indication of our seriousness in the pursuit of this new strategy. All three needs were served by this convincing evidence that our liberation movement had correctly adjusted itself to the new situation and was creating an apparatus actually capable of clandestinely hitting the enemy and making preparation for a more advanced phase. The situation was such that without activity of this nature our whole political leadership may have been at stake both inside and outside the country and the steps which were simultaneously taken for the recruitment and preparation of military cadres would have met with less response.

When we talk of revolutionary armed struggle, we are talking of political struggle by means which include the use of military force even though once force as a tactic is introduced it has the most far-reaching consequences on every aspect of our activities. It is important to emphasise this because our movement must reject all manifestations of militarism which separates armed people's struggle from its political context.

Reference has already been made to the danger of the thesis which regards the creation of military areas as the generator of mass resistance. But even more is involved in this concept. One of the vital problems connected with this bears on the important question of the relationship between the political and military. From the very beginning our movement has brooked no ambiguity concerning this. The primacy of the political leadership is unhalleged and supreme and all revolutionary formations and levels (whether armed or not) are subordinate to this leadership. To say this is not just to invoke tradition. This approach is rooted in the very nature of this type of revolutionary struggle and is borne out by the experience of the overwhelming majority of revolutionary movements which have engaged in such struggles. Except in very rare instances, the people's armed challenge against a foe with formidable material strength does not achieve dramatic and swift success. The path is filled with obstacles and we harbour no illusions on this score in the case of South Africa. In the long run it can only succeed if it attracts the active support of the mass of the people. Without this lifeblood it is doomed. Even in our country with the historical background and traditions of armed resistance still within the memory of many people and the special developments of the immediate past, the involvement of the masses is unlikely to be the result of a sudden, natural and automatic consequence of military clashes.

It has to be won in all-round political mobilisation which must accompany the military activities. This includes educational and agitational work throughout the country to cope with the sophisticated torrent of misleading propaganda and "information" of the enemy which will become more intense as the struggle sharpens. When armed clashes begin they seldom involve more than a comparative handful of combatants whose very conditions of fighting existence make them incapable of exercising the functions of all-round political leadership. The masses of

the peasants, workers and youth, beleaguered for a long time by the enemy's military occupation, have to be activated in a multitude of ways not only to ensure a growing stream of recruits for the fighting units but to harass the enemy politically so that his forces are dispersed and therefore weakened. This calls for the exercise of all-round political leadership.

Guerrilla warfare, the special, and in our case the only form in which the armed liberation struggle can be launched, is neither static nor does it take place in a vacuum. The tempo, the overall strategy to be employed, the opening of new fronts, the progression from lower to higher forms, thence to mobile warfare; these and other vital questions cannot be solved by the military leadership alone, they require overall political judgments intimately involved with the people both inside and outside the actual areas of armed combat. If mere awareness of oppression combined with heroic examples by armed bands were enough, the struggle would indeed be simple. There would be no collaborators and it would be hard to find neutrals. But to believe this is to believe that the course of struggle is determined solely by what we do in the fighting units and further involves the fallacious assumption that the masses are rock-like and incorruptible. The enemy is as aware as we are that the side that wins the allegiance of the people wins the struggle. It is naive to believe that oppressed and beleaguered people cannot temporarily, even in large numbers, be won over by fears, terror, lies, indoctrination, and provocation to treat liberators as enemies. In fact history proves that without the most intensive all-round political activity this is the more likely result. It is therefore all the more vital that the revolutionary leadership is nation-wide and has its roots both inside and outside the actual areas of combat. Above all, when victory comes, it must not be a hollow one. To ensure this we must also ensure that what is brought to power is not an army but the masses as a whole at the head of which stands its or-

ganised political leadership. This is the perspective which is rooted at all levels of our liberation movement whether within or outside the army. Our confidence in final victory rests not on the wish or the dream but on our understanding of our own conditions and the historical processes. This understanding must be deepened and must spread to every level of our movement. We must have a clear grasp not only of ourselves and of our own forces but also of the enemy – of his power and vulnerability. Guerrilla struggle is certainly no exception to the rule that depth of understanding, and knowledge of realities, both favourable and unfavourable, make for more lasting commitment and more illuminating leadership. How then do we view the enemy we face – his strength and his weakness? What sort of structure do we face and how dogged will the enemy resistance be?

On the face of it the enemy is in stable command of a rich and varied economy which, even at this stage when it is not required to extend itself, can afford an enormous military budget. He has a relatively well trained and efficient army and police force. He can draw on fairly large man power resources. In addition the major imperialist powers such as Britain, West Germany, France, the United States and Japan who have an enormous stake in the economy of our country constitute a formidable support for the apartheid regime. Even now before the crisis deepens the imperialist partners of South Africa have done much to develop the economy and armament programme of South Africa. In a situation of crisis they may pass over from support to active intervention to save the racist regime.

If there is one lesson that the history of guerrilla struggle has taught it is that the material strength and resources of the enemy is by no means a decisive factor. Guerrilla warfare almost by definition presents a situation in which there is a vast imbalance of material and military resources between the opposing sides. It is designed to cope

with the situation in which the enemy is infinitely superior in relation to every conventional factor of warfare. It is *par excellence* the weapon of the materially weak against the materially strong. Given its popular character and given a population which increasingly sides with and shields the guerrilla whilst at the same time opposing and exposing the enemy, the survival and growth of a people's army is assured by the skilful exercise of tactics. Surprise, mobility and tactical retreat should make it difficult for the enemy to bring into play its superior fire power in any decisive battles. No individual battle is fought in circumstances favourable to the enemy. Superior forces can thus be harassed, weakened and, in the end, destroyed. The absence of an orthodox front, of fighting lines; the need of the enemy to attenuate his resources and lines of communication over vast areas; the need to protect the widely scattered installations on which his economy is dependent; these are among the factors which serve in the long run to compensate in favour of the guerrilla for the disparity in the starting strength of the adversaries. The words "in the long run" must be stressed because it would be idle to dispute the considerable military advantages to the enemy of his high level industrialisation, his ready-to-hand reserves of White man power and his excellent roads, railways and air transport which facilitate swift manoeuvres and speedy concentration of personnel. But we must not overlook the fact that over a period of time many of these unfavourable factors will begin to operate in favour of the liberation forces:

The ready-to-hand resources including food production depend overwhelmingly on non-White labour which, with the growing intensity of the struggle, will not remain docile and co-operative; The White man power resources may seem adequate initially but must become dangerously stretched as guerrilla warfare develops. Already extremely

short of skilled labour – the monopoly of the Whites – the mobilisation of a large force for a protracted struggle will place a further burden on the workings of the economy;

In contrast to many other major guerrilla struggles, the enemy's economic and man power resources are all situated within the theatre of war and there is no secure external pool (other than direct intervention by a foreign state) safe from sabotage, mass action and guerrilla action on which the enemy can draw; The very sophistication of the economy with its well developed system of communications makes it a much more vulnerable target. In an undeveloped country the interruption of supplies to any given region may be no more than a local setback. In a highly sensitive modern structure of the South African type, the successful harassment of transport to any major industrial complex inevitably inflicts immense damage to the economy as a whole and to the morale of the enemy.

One of the more popular misconceptions concerning guerrilla warfare is that a physical environment which conforms to a special pattern is indispensable – thick jungle, inaccessible mountain areas, swamps, a friendly border and so on. The availability of this sort of terrain is, of course, of tremendous advantage to the guerrillas especially in the early non-operational phase when training and other preparatory steps are undertaken and no external bases are available for this purpose. When operations commence, the guerrilla cannot survive, let alone flourish, unless he moves to areas where people live and work and where the enemy can be engaged in combat. If he is fortunate enough to have behind him a friendly border or areas of difficult access which can provide temporary refuge it is, of course, advantageous. But guerrilla warfare can be, and has been, waged in every conceivable

type of terrain, in deserts, swamps, in farm fields, in built-up areas, in plains, in the bush and in countries without friendly borders or islands surrounded by the sea. This whole question is one of adjusting survival tactics to the sort of terrain in which operations have to be carried out.

In any case, in the vast expanse that is South Africa, a people's force will find a multitude of variations in topography, deserts, mountains, forests, veld and swamps. There might not appear to be a single impenetrable mountain or impenetrable jungle but the country abounds in terrain which in general is certainly no less favourable for guerrilla operations than some of the terrain in which other guerrilla movements operated successfully. Also the issue must be looked at in the context of guerrillas, who are armed and operate in the terrain. The combination makes an area impenetrable for the guerrilla. South Africa's tremendous size will make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the White regime to keep the whole of it under armed surveillance in strength and in depth. Hence, an early development of a relatively safe (though shifting) rear is not beyond the realm of practicality.

The above are only some of the important factors which have not always been studied and understood. It is necessary to stress these factors not only because they give balance to our efforts but because – properly assessed – they help destroy the myth of the enemy's invincibility.

But above all a scientific revolutionary strategy demands a correct appreciation of the political character of the forces which are ranged against one another in the South African struggle for liberation. Is the enemy a monolith and will he remain so until his final defeat? What is the main content of the struggle for liberation and, flowing from this, which is the main revolutionary force and who are its potential allies and supporters? These are questions of capital importance. They play a vital part in determining the tactics of the revolutionary struggle, the broad alliances for which we must strive, the organisation-

al structures we create and many other fundamental approaches. They must be considered within the framework of the special feature of the objective situation which faces us. South Africa's social and economic structure and the relationships which it generates are perhaps unique. It is not a colony, yet it has, in regard to the overwhelming majority of its people, most of the features of the classical colonial structures.

Conquest and domination by an alien people, a system of discrimination and exploitation based on race, technique of indirect rule; these and more are the traditional trappings of the classical colonial framework. Whilst at the one level it is an "independent" national state, at another level it is a country subjugated by a minority race. What makes the structure unique and adds to its complexity is that the exploiting nation is not, as in the classical imperialist relationships, situated in a geographically distinct mother country, but is settled within the borders. What is more, the roots of the dominant nation have been embedded in our country by more than three centuries of presence. It is thus an alien body only in the historical sense.

The material well-being of the White group and its political, social and economic privileges are, we know, rooted in its racial domination of the indigenous majority. It has resisted and will resist doggedly and passionately any attempt to shift it from this position. Its theorists and leaders ceaselessly play upon the theme of "We have nowhere else to go". They dishonestly ignore and even twist the fact that the uncertainty about the future of the oppressor in our land is an uncertainty born not of our racialism but of his. The spectre is falsely raised of a threat to the White men's language and culture to "justify" a policy of cultural discrimination and domination. By economic bribes and legal artifices which preserve for him the top layers of skills and wage income, the White worker is successfully mobilised as one of racialism's most

reliable contingents. In every walk of life White autocracy creates privilege by operation of the law and, where necessary, the gun and with a primitive and twisted "proof" of its own superiority.

Nevertheless, the defence of all-round economic, social and cultural privileges combined with centuries of indoctrination and deeply felt theoretical rationalisation which centre on survival, will make the enemy we face a ferocious and formidable foe. So long as the threat from the liberation movement was not powerful enough to endanger the very existence of White *Baaskap* there was room for division – sometimes quite sharp in the White political camp.

Its motivation amongst the ruling class was competition for the lion's share of the spoils from the exploitation of the non-White people. It always centred around the problem of the most effective way of "keeping the native in his place". In such an atmosphere there were even moments when White workers adopted militant class postures against the small group which owns South Africa's wealth. But the changed world mood and internal situation inhibited these confrontations. The larger-minded White group as a whole moves more and more in the direction of a common defence of what is considered a common fate.

These monolithic tendencies are reinforced by a Hitler-like feeling of confidence that the fortress is impregnable and unassailable for all time. This process of all White solidarity will only be arrested by the achievements of the liberation movement. For the moment the reality is that apart from a small group of revolutionary Whites who have an honoured place as comrades in the struggle, we face what is by and large a united and confident enemy which is in alliance with, and is strengthened by world imperialism. All significant sections of the White political movement are in broad agreement on the question of defeating our liberation struggle.

This confrontation on the lines of colour – at least in the early stages of the conflict – is not of our choosing; it is of the enemy's making. It will not be easy to eliminate some of its more tragic consequences. But it does not follow that this will be so for all time. It is not altogether impossible that in a different situation the White working class or a substantial section of it, may come to see that their true long-term interest coincides with that of the non-White workers. We must miss no opportunity either now or in the future to try and make them aware of this truth and to win over those who are ready to break with the policy of racial domination. Nor must we ever be slow to take advantage of differences and divisions which our successes will inevitably spark off to isolate the most vociferous, the most uncompromising and the most reactionary elements amongst the Whites. Our policy must continually stress in the future (as it has in the past) that there is room in South Africa for all who live in it but only on the basis of absolute democracy.

So much for the enemy. What of the liberation forces? Here too we are called upon to examine the most fundamental features of our situation which serve to mould our revolutionary strategy and tactics. The main content of the present stage of the South African revolution is the national liberation of the largest and most oppressed group – the African people.

This strategic aim must govern every aspect of the conduct of our struggle whether it be the formulation of policy or the creation of structures. Amongst other things, it demands in the first place the maximum mobilisation of the African people as a dispossessed and racially oppressed nation. This is the mainspring and it must not be weakened. It involves a stimulation and a deepening of national confidence, national pride and national assertiveness. Properly channelled and properly led, these qualities do not stand in conflict with the principles of internationalism. Indeed, they become

the basis for more lasting and more meaningful co-operation.

The national character of the struggle must therefore dominate our approach. But it is a national struggle which is taking place in a different era and in a different context from those which characterised the early struggles against colonialism. It is happening in a new kind of world – a world which is no longer monopolised by the imperialist world system; a world in which the existence of the powerful socialist system and a significant sector of newly liberated areas has altered the balance of forces; a world in which the horizons liberated from foreign oppression extend beyond mere formal political control and encompass the element which makes such control meaningful – economic emancipation. It is also happening in a new kind of South Africa; a South Africa in which there is a large and well developed working class whose class consciousness and independent expressions of the working people – their political organs and trade unions – are very much part of the liberation front. Thus, our nationalism must not be confused with chauvinism or narrow nationalism of a previous epoch. It must not be confused with the classical drive by an elitist group among the oppressed people to gain ascendancy so that they can replace the oppressor in the exploitation of the mass.

But none of this detracts from the basically national context of our liberation drive. In the last resort it is only the success of the national democratic revolution which – by destroying the existing social and economic relationships – will bring with it a correction of the historical injustices perpetrated against the indigenous majority and thus lay the basis for a new and deeper internationalist approach. Until then, the national sense of grievance is the most potent revolutionary force which must be harnessed. To blunt it in the interests of abstract concepts of internationalism is, in the long run, doing neither a service to revolution nor to internationalism.

The African although subjected to the most intense racial oppression and exploitation, is not the only oppressed national group in South Africa. The two million strong Coloured Community and three-quarter million Indians suffer varying forms of national humiliation, discrimination and oppression. They are part of the non-White base upon which rests White privilege. As such they constitute an integral part of the social forces ranged against White supremacy. Despite deceptive and often meaningless concessions they share a common fate with their African brothers and their own liberation is inextricably bound up with the liberation of the African people.

A unity in action between all the oppressed groups is fundamental to the advance of our liberation struggle. Without such a unity the enemy's strength multiplies and the attainment of a people's victory is delayed. Historically both communities have played a most important part in the stimulation and intensification of the struggle for freedom. It is a matter of proud record that amongst the first and most gallant martyrs in the armed combat against the enemy was a Coloured Comrade, Basil February. The jails in South Africa are a witness to the large-scale participation by Indian and Coloured comrades at every level of our revolutionary struggle. From the very inception of Umkhonto they were more than well represented in the first contingents who took life in hand to help lay the basis for this new phase in our struggle.

This mood was not only reflected in the deeds of its more advanced representatives. As communities too the Coloured and Indian people have often in the past, by their actions, shown that they form part of the broad sweep towards liberation. The first series of mass acts of deliberate defiance of the conqueror's law after the crushing of the Bambata rebellion, was the campaign led by that outstanding son of the Indian people – Mahatma Gandhi. Thereafter the Indian community and its leaders – particularly those who came to the fore in the 'forties – played

no small part in the injection of a more radical and more militant mood into the liberation movement as a whole. The stirring demonstrations of the 'fifties from the Defence Campaign to the Congress of the People, to the general strike, and the peasant revolts and mass demonstrations, saw many examples of united action by all the oppressed people. Indian workers responded in large numbers to almost every call for a general strike. Indian shopkeepers could always be relied upon to declare a day of hartal in solidarity with any protest which was being organised. Memory is still fresh of the outstanding response by the Coloured workers of the Western Cape to the 1961 call by the A.N.C. for a national general political strike.

The Alliance between the Congress organisations was a spur to the solidarity and reflected it. But events both before and after Rivonia put paid to the structures which had been created to express the Alliance.

How can we strengthen and make effective the co-operation between the communities and how can we integrate committed revolutionaries irrespective of their racial background?

Whatever instruments are created to give expression to the unity of the liberation drive, they must accommodate two fundamental propositions: Firstly, they must not be ambiguous on the question of the primary role of the most oppressed African mass and, secondly, those belonging to the other oppressed groups and those few White revolutionaries who show themselves ready to make common cause with our aspirations, must be fully integrated on the basis of individual equality. Approached in the right spirit these two propositions do not stand in conflict but reinforce one another. Equality of participation in our national front does not mean a mechanical parity between the various national groups. Not only would this in practice amount to inequality (again at the expense of the majority), but it would lend flavour to the slander which our

enemies are ever ready to spread of a multi-racial alliance dominated by minority groups. This has never been so and will never be so. But the sluggish way in which the movement inside the country responded to the new situation after 1960 in which co-operation continued between some organisations which were legal (e.g. S.A.I.C., C.P.O., C.O.D.) and those that were illegal (e.g. A.N.C.) sometimes led to the superficial impression that the legal organisations – because they could speak and operate more publicly and thus more noticeably – may have had more than their deserved place in the leadership of the Alliance.

Therefore, not only the substance but the form of our structural creations must – in a way which the people can see – give expression to the main emphasis of the present stage of our struggle. This approach is not a pandering to chauvinism, to racialism or other such backward attitudes. We are revolutionaries, not narrow nationalists. Committed revolutionaries are our brothers to whatever group they belong. There can be no second class participants in our movement. It is for the enemy we reserve our assertiveness and our justified sense of grievance.

The important task of mobilising and gaining the support of other oppressed non-White groups has already been referred to. Like every other oppressed group (including the Africans) we must not naively assume that mere awareness of oppression will, by itself, push the Indian and Coloured people in the direction of opposing the enemy and aligning themselves with the liberation movement. The potential is there, because in a very real sense the future of the Indian and Coloured people and their liberation as oppressed groups is intimately bound up with the liberation of the Africans. But active support and participation have to be fought for and won. Otherwise the enemy will succeed in its never-ending attempt to create a gap between these groups and the Africans and even recruit substantial numbers of them to actively collaborate with it. The bottom of the barrel will be scraped in the

attempt to create confusion about the objectives of the liberation movement. More particularly, the enemy will feed on the insecurity and dependency which is often part of the thinking of minority oppressed groups. He will try to raise a doubt in their minds about whether there is a place for them in a future liberated South Africa. The enemy has already spread the slander that at best for the Coloureds and Indians White domination will be replaced by Black domination.

It is therefore all the more important, consistent with our first principle, that the Coloured and Indian people should see themselves as an integral part of the liberation movement and not as mere auxiliaries.

Is there a special role for the working class in our national struggle? We have already referred to the special character of the South African social and economic structure. In our country – more than in any other part of the oppressed world – it is inconceivable for liberation to have meaning without a return of the wealth of the land to the people as a whole. It is therefore a fundamental feature of our strategy that victory must embrace more than formal political democracy. To allow the existing economic forces to retain their interests intact is to feed the root of racial supremacy and does not represent even the shadow of liberation.

Our drive towards national emancipation is therefore in a very real way bound up with economic emancipation. We have suffered more than just national humiliation. Our people are deprived of their due in the country's wealth; their skills have been suppressed and poverty and starvation have been their life experience. The correction of these centuries-old economic injustices lies at the very core of our national aspirations. We do not underestimate the complexities which will face a people's government during the transformation period nor the enormity of the problems of meeting economic needs of the mass of the oppressed people. But one thing is certain – in our land

this cannot be effectively tackled unless the basic wealth and the basic resources are at the disposal of the people as a whole and are not manipulated by sections or individuals be they White or Black.

This perspective of a speedy progression from formal liberation to genuine and lasting emancipation is made more real by the existence in our country of a large and growing working class whose class consciousness complements national consciousness. Its political organisations – and the trade unions have played a fundamental role in shaping and advancing our revolutionary cause. It is historically understandable that the doubly oppressed and doubly exploited working class constitutes a distinct and reinforcing layer of our liberation and socialism and does not stand in conflict with the national interest. Its militancy and political consciousness as a revolutionary class will play no small part in our victory and in the construction of a real people's South Africa.

Beyond our borders in Zimbabwe, Angola, Mozambique, Namibia are our brothers and sisters who similarly are engaged in a fierce struggle against colonialist and racist regimes. We fight an Unholy Alliance of Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa with the latter as the main economic and military support. The historic ZAPU/A.N.C. Alliance is a unique form of co-operation between two liberation movements which unites the huge potential of the oppressed people in both South Africa and Zimbabwe. The extension of co-operation and co-ordination of all the people of Southern Africa as led by FRELIMO, ZAPU, SWAPO, M.P.L.A. and the A.N.C. is a vital part of our strategy.

What then is the broad purpose of our military struggle? Simply put, in the first phase, it is the complete political and economic emancipation of all our people and the constitution of a society which accords with the basic provisions of our programme – the Freedom Charter. This, together with our general understanding of our rev-

olutionary theory, provides us with the strategic framework for the concrete elaboration and implementation of policy in a continuously changing situation. It must be combined with a more intensive programme of research, examination and analysis of the conditions of the different strata of our people, in particular those on the land, their local grievances, hopes and aspirations.

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF SOUTH AFRICA

"... as I became more and more deeply involved with the Congress movement of those years, that is, the movement for freedom and equal human rights for all... it was always members of the Communist Party who seemed prepared regardless of cost to sacrifice most; to give of their best, to face the greatest dangers, in the struggle against poverty and discrimination."

ABRAM FISCHER (Statement from the Dock:
28 March 1966)

Constitutional guidelines for a democratic South Africa

The Freedom Charter, adopted in 1955 by the Congress of the People at Kliptown near Johannesburg, was the first systematic statement in the history of our country of the political and constitutional vision of a free, democratic and non-racial South Africa.

The Freedom Charter remains today unique as the only South African document of its kind that adheres firmly to democratic principles as accepted throughout the world. Among South Africans it has become by far the most widely accepted programme for a post-apartheid country. The stage is now approaching where the Freedom Charter must be converted from a vision for the future into a constitutional reality.

We in the African National Congress submit to the people of South Africa, and to all those throughout the world who wish to see an end to apartheid, our basic guidelines for the foundations of government in a post-apartheid South Africa. Extensive and democratic debate on these guidelines will mobilise the widest sections of the population to achieve agreement on how to put an end to the tyranny and oppression under which our people live, thus enabling them to lead normal and decent lives as free citizens in a free country.

The immediate aim is to create a just and democratic society that will sweep away the centuries-old legacy of colonial conquest and white domination, and abolish all laws imposing racial oppression and discrimination. The removal of discriminatory laws and eradication of all vestiges of the illegitimate regime are, however, not enough; the structures and the institutions of apartheid must be dismantled and be replaced by democratic ones. Steps must be taken to ensure that apartheid ideas and practices are not permitted to appear in old forms or new.

In addition, the effects of centuries of racial domination and inequality must be overcome by constitutional provisions for corrective action which guarantees a rapid and irreversible redistribution of wealth and opening up of facilities to all. The Constitution must also be such as to promote the habits of non-racial and non-sexist thinking, the practice of anti-racist behaviour and the acquisition of genuinely shared patriotic consciousness.

The Constitution must give firm protection to the fundamental human rights of all citizens. There shall be equal rights for all individuals, irrespective of race, colour, sex or creed. In addition, it requires the entrenching of equal cultural, linguistic and religious rights for all.

Under the conditions of contemporary South Africa 87% of land and 95% of the instruments of production of the country are in the hands of the ruling class, which is solely drawn from the white community. It follows, therefore, that constitutional protection for group rights would perpetuate the status quo and would mean that the mass of the people would continue to be constitutionally trapped in poverty and remain as outsiders in the land of their birth.

Finally, success of the constitution will be, to a large extent, determined by the degree to which it promotes conditions for the active involvement of all sectors of the population at all levels in government and in the economic and cultural life. Bearing these fundamental objectives in mind, we declare that the elimination of apartheid and the creation of a truly just and democratic South Africa requires a constitution based on the following principles:

The State

- a* South Africa shall be an independent, unitary, democratic and non-racial state.
- b* Sovereignty shall belong to the people as a whole and shall be exercised through one central legislature, executive, judiciary and administration. Provision shall be made for the delegation of the powers of the central authority to subordinate administrative units for purposes of more efficient administration and democratic participation.
- c* The institution of hereditary rulers and chiefs shall be transformed to serve the interests of the people as a whole in conformity with the democratic principles embodied in the constitution.
- d* All organs of government, including justice, security and armed forces, shall be representative of the people as a whole, democratic in the structure and functioning, and dedicated to defending the principles of the constitution.

Franchise

- e* In the exercise of their sovereignty, the people shall have the right to vote under a system of universal suffrage based on the principle of one person/one vote.
- f* Every voter shall have the right to stand for election and be elected to all legislative bodies.

National identity

- g* It shall be state policy to promote the growth of a single national identity and loyalty binding on all South Africans. At the same time, the state shall recognise the linguistic and cultural diversity of the people and provide facilities for free linguistic and cultural development.

Bill of Rights and Affirmative Action

- h* The constitution shall include a Bill of Rights based on the Freedom Charter. Such a Bill of Rights shall guarantee the fundamental human rights of all citizens, irrespective of race, colour, sex or creed, and shall provide appropriate mechanisms for their protection and enforcement.
- i* The state and all social institutions shall be under a constitutional duty to eradicate race discrimination in all its forms.
- j* The state and all social institutions shall be under a constitutional duty to take active steps to eradicate, speedily, the economic and social inequalities produced by racial discrimination.
- k* The advocacy or practice of racism, fascism, nazism or the incitement of ethnic or regional exclusiveness shall be outlawed.
- l* Subject to clauses (i) and (k) above, the democratic state shall guarantee the basic rights and freedoms, such as freedom of association, thought, worship and the press. Furthermore, the state shall have the duty to protect the right to work and guarantee the right to education and social security.
- m* All parties which conform to the provision of (i) to (k) above shall have the legal right to exist and to take part in the political life of the country.

Economy

- n* The state shall ensure that the entire economy serves the interests and well-being of the entire population.

- o* The state shall have the right to determine the general context in which economic life takes place and define the limit to the rights and obligations attaching to the ownership and use of productive capacity.
- p* The private sector of the economy shall be obliged to cooperate with the state in realising the objectives of the Freedom Charter in promoting social well-being.
- q* The economy shall be a mixed one, with a public sector, a private sector, a co-operative sector and a small-scale family sector.
- r* Co-operative forms of economic enterprise, village industries and small scale family activities shall be supported by the state.
- s* The state shall promote the acquisition of management, technical and scientific skills among all sections of the population, especially the blacks.
- t* Property for personal use and consumption shall be constitutionally protected.

Land

- u* The state shall devise and implement a land reform programme that will include and address the following issues: Abolition of all racial restrictions on ownership and use of land; Implementation of land reform in conformity with the principle of affirmative action, taking into account the status of victims of forced removals.

Workers

- v* A charter protecting workers' trade union rights, especially the right to strike and collective bargaining, shall be incorporated into the constitution.

Women

- w* Women shall have equal rights in all spheres of public and private life and the state shall take affirmative action to eliminate inequalities and discrimination between the sexes.

The family

- x* The family, parenthood and children's rights shall be protected.

International

- y* South Africa shall be a non-aligned state committed to the principles of the Charter of the OAU and the Charter of the UN and to the achievement of national liberation, liberation, world peace and disarmament.

V. PROGRAMME OF ACTION

23.0 In pursuance of the objectives stated in this document, the Organisation of African Unity hereby commits itself to:

23.1 Inform governments and inter-governmental organisations throughout the world, including the Non-Aligned Movement, the United Nations, General Assembly, the Security Council, the Commonwealth and others of these perspectives, and solicit their support.

23.2 Mandate the OAU ad-hoc committee on Southern Africa, acting as the representative of the OAU, assisted by the Frontline States, to remain seized of the issue of a political resolution of the South Africa question;

23.3 Step up all-around support for the South African liberation movement and campaign in the rest of the world in pursuance of this objective;

23.4 Intensify the campaign for mandatory and comprehensive sanctions against apartheid South Africa; in their regard, immediately mobilise against the re-scheduling of Pretoria's foreign debts; work for the imposition of a mandatory oil embargo and the full observance by all countries of the arms embargo;

23.5 Ensure that the African continent does not relax existing measures for the total isolation of apartheid South Africa;

23.6 Continue to monitor the situation in Namibia and extend all necessary support to SWAPO in its struggle for a genuinely independent Namibia;

23.7 Extend such assistance as the Governments of Angola and Mozambique may request in order to secure peace for their people; and

23.8 Render all possible assistance to the Frontline States to enable them to withstand Pretoria's campaign of aggression and destabilisation and enable them to continue to give their all-around support to the people of Namibia and South Africa.

24.0 We appeal to all people of goodwill throughout the world to support this Programme of Action as a necessary measure to secure the earliest liquidation of the apartheid system and the transformation of South Africa into a united, democratic and non-racial country.

DECLARATION OF THE OAU AD-HOC COMMITTEE ON SOUTHERN AFRICA ON THE QUESTION OF SOUTH AFRICA

Harare, Zimbabwe : August 21 1989

1. PREAMBLE.

1.0. The people of Africa, singly, collectively and acting through the OAU, are engaged in serious efforts to establish peace throughout the continent by ending all conflicts through negotiations based on the principle of justice and peace for all.

2.0. We reaffirm our conviction, which history confirms, that where colonial, racial and apartheid domination exists, there can neither be peace nor justice.

3.0. Accordingly, we reiterate that while the apartheid system in South Africa persists, the peoples of our continent as a whole cannot achieve the fundamental objectives of justice, human dignity and peace which are both crucial in themselves and fundamental to the stability and development of Africa.

4.0. With regard to the region of Southern Africa, the entire continent is vitally interested that the processes, in which it is involved, leading to the complete and genuine independence on Namibia, as well as peace in Angola and Mozambique, should succeed in the shortest possible time. Equally, Africa is deeply concerned that the destabilisation by South Africa of all the countries of the region, whether through direct aggression, sponsorship of surrogates, economic subversion and other means, should end immediately.

5.0. We recognise the reality that permanent peace and stability in Southern Africa can only be achieved when the system of

apartheid in South Africa has been liquidated and South Africa transformed into a united, democratic and non-racial country. We therefore reiterate that all the necessary measures should be adopted now, to bring a speedy end to the apartheid system, in the interest of all the people of Southern Africa, our continent and the world at large.

6.0. We believe that, as a result of the liberation struggle and international pressure against apartheid, as well as global efforts to liquidate regional conflicts, possibilities exist for further movement towards the resolution of the problems facing the people of South Africa. For these possibilities to lead to fundamental change in South Africa, the Pretoria regime must abandon its abhorrent concepts and practices of racial domination and its record of failure to honour agreements, all of which have already resulted in the loss of so many lives and the destruction of much property in the countries of Southern Africa.

7.0. We reaffirm our recognition of the right of all peoples, including those of South Africa, to determine their own destiny, and to work out for themselves the institutions and the system of government under which they will, by general consent, live and work together to build a harmonious society. The Organisation of African Unity remains committed to do everything possible and necessary, to assist the people of South Africa, in such ways as the representatives of the oppressed may determine, to achieve this objective. We are certain that, arising from its duty to help end the criminal

apartheid system, the rest of the world community is ready to extend similar assistance to the people of South Africa.

8.0 We make these commitments because we believe that all people are equal and have equal rights to human dignity and respect, regardless of colour, race, sex or creed. We believe that all men and women have the right and duty to participate in their own right and duty to participate in their own government, as equal members of society. No individual or group of individuals has any rights to govern others without their consent. The apartheid system violates all these fundamental and universal principles. Correctly characterised as a crime against humanity, it is responsible for the death of countless numbers of people in South Africa, resulting in untold loss of life, destruction of property and massive displacement of innocent men, women and children. This scourge and affront to humanity must be fought and eradicated in its totality.

9.0 We have therefore supported and continue to support all those in South Africa who pursue this noble objective through political, armed and other forms of struggle. We believe this to be our duty, carried out in the interest of all humanity.

10.0 While extending this support to those who strive for a non-racial and democratic society in South Africa, a point on which no compromise is possible, we have repeatedly expressed our preference for a solution arrived at by peaceful means. We know that the majority of the people of South Africa and their liberation movement, who have been compelled to take up arms, have also upheld this position for many decades and continue to do so.

11.0 The positions contained in this Declaration are consistent with and are a continuation of those elaborated in the Lusaka Manifesto, two decades ago. They take into account the changes that have taken place in Southern Africa since that Manifesto was adopted by the OAU and the rest of the international community. They constitute a new challenge to the Pretoria regime to join in the noble effort to end the apartheid system, an objective to which the OAU has been committed from its birth.

12.0 Consequently, we shall continue to do everything in our power to help intensify the

liberation struggle and international pressure against the system of apartheid until this system is ended and South Africa is transformed into a united democratic and non-racial country, with justice and security for all its citizens.

13.0. In keeping with this solemn resolve, and responding directly to the wishes of the representatives of the majority of the people of South Africa, we publicly pledge ourselves to the positions contained hereunder. We are convinced that their implementation will lead to a speedy end of the apartheid system and therefore the opening of a new dawn of peace for all the peoples of Africa, in which racism, colonial domination and white minority rule on our continent would be abolished for ever.

11. STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES

14.0. We believe that a conjuncture of circumstances exists which, if there is a demonstrable readiness on the part of the Pretoria regime to engage in negotiations genuinely and seriously, could create the possibility to end apartheid through negotiations. Such an eventuality would be an expression of the long-standing preference of the people of South Africa to arrive at a political settlement.

15.0. We would therefore encourage the people of South Africa, as part of their overall struggle, to get together to negotiate an end to the apartheid system and agree on all the measures that are necessary to transform their country into a non-racial democracy. We support the position held by the majority of the people of South Africa that these objectives and not the amandment or reform of the apartheid system, should be the aims of the negotiations.

16.0. We are at one with them that the outcome of such a process should be a new constitutional order based on the following principles, among others:-

16.1. South Africa shall become a united, democratic and non-racial state.
16.2. All its people shall enjoy common and equal citizenship and nationality, regardless of race, colour, sex or creed.
16.3. All its people shall have the right to participate in the government and

administration of the country on the basis of a universal suffrage, exercised through one person one vote, under a common voters' roll.
16.4. All people have the right to form and join any political party to their choice, provided that this is not in furtherance of racism.

16.5. All shall enjoy universally recognised human rights, freedoms and civil liberties, protected under an entrenched Bill of Rights.
16.6. South Africa shall have a new legal system which shall guarantee equality of all before the law.

16.7. South Africa shall have an independent and non-racial judiciary.

16.8. There shall be created an economic order which shall promote and advance the well-being of all South Africans.

16.9. A democratic South Africa shall respect the rights and sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries and pursue a policy of peace, friendship and mutually beneficial co-operation with all peoples.

17.0. We believe that the agreement on the principles shall continue the foundation for an internationally acceptable solution which shall enable South Africa to take its rightful place as an equal partner among the African and world community of nations

III. CLIMATE FOR NEGOTIATIONS

18.0. Together with the rest of the world, we believe that it is essential, before any negotiations take place, that the necessary climate for negotiations be created. The apartheid regime has the urgent responsibility to respond positively to this universally acclaimed demand and thus create this climate.

19.0. Accordingly, the present regime should, at the very least:

19.1. Release all political prisoners and detainees unconditionally and refrain from imposing any restrictions on them;

19.2. Lift all bans and restrictions on all proscribed and restricted organisations and people;

19.3. Remove all troops from the townships;
19.4. End the state of emergency and repeal all legislation, such as, and including, the Internal Security Act, designed to

circumscribe political activity; and,
19.5. Cease all political trials and political executions.

20.0. These measures are necessary to produce the conditions in which free discussion can take place - an essential condition to ensure that the people themselves participate in the process of remaking their country. The measures listed above should therefore precede negotiations

IV. GUIDELINES TO THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION

21.0. We support the view of the South African liberation movement that upon the creation of this climate, the process of negotiations should commence along the following lines:

21.1. Discussions should take place between the liberation movement and the South African regime to achieve the suspension of hostilities on both sides by agreeing to a mutually binding ceasefire.

21.2. Negotiations should then proceed to establish the basis for the adoption of a new Constitution by agreeing on, among others, the Principles enunciated above.

21.3. Having agreed on these principles, the parties should then negotiate the necessary mechanism for drawing up the new Constitution.

21.4. The parties shall define and agree on the role to be played by the international community in ensuring a successful transition to a democratic order.

21.5. The parties shall agree on the formation of an interim government to supervise the process of the drawing up and adoption of a new constitution; govern and administer the country, as well as effect the transition to a democratic order including the holding the elections.

21.6. After the adoption of the new Constitution, all armed hostilities will be deemed to have formally terminated.

21.7. For its part, the international community would lift the sanctions that have been imposed against apartheid South Africa.

21.8. The new South Africa shall qualify for membership of the Organisations of African Unity.



STATEMENT OF THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS LUSAKA, ZAMBIA - FEBRUARY 16TH, 1990

The National Executive Committee of the African National Congress met in Lusaka, Zambia, from February 14-16, 1990 to consider the situation arising from the decisions announced on February 2nd and 10th, 1990, by Pretoria's State President, FW de Klerk, affecting the system of repression against the democratic movement which the white National Party regime had instituted during the 42 years of its illegitimate rule of South Africa.

As is known, De Klerk also spelt out policy positions of his party and government, which he presented as being intended to address the issue of ending the system of apartheid.

During its deliberations, the NEC benefited from proposals submitted to its meeting by the President of the ANC, Oliver Tambo, and other leaders of the ANC based within South Africa.

It reaffirmed the continuing and urgent responsibility of the ANC and all other democratic and anti-apartheid forces, both South African and international, to continue the struggle to end the apartheid system as quickly as possible.

The NEC recognised the unbanning of the ANC and other organisations as an important factor which contributes to the creation of a climate conducive to negotiations. It also viewed in a positive light other measures such as the partial lifting of the press restrictions and the rescinding of banning orders affecting various persons.

It welcomed the suspension of the death penalty as an important first step which must, without delay, lead to the unconditional release of all political activists sentenced to death and an end to the barbaric practice of capital punishment.

The NEC, however, also concluded that the Pretoria regime has not yet created a climate conducive to negotiations, as has been called for by the overwhelming majority of the people of South Africa and the international community.

It therefore calls on this regime specifically to release all political prisoners and detainees, end the State of Emergency, repeal all repressive legislation, halt all political trials and remove all troops from the townships.

To help achieve these objectives in the shortest possible time, it resolved to meet Mr De Klerk as soon as possible to discuss with him the need to address these issues so that a climate conducive to negotiations is created. Its delegation will be composed of the leaders of the ANC based within the country as well as members of the NEC based outside the country.

The NEC also considers it of vital importance that it should meet the leaders of the ANC who are inside South Africa, as well as those of the Mass Democratic Movement and other anti-apartheid forces. It therefore resolved to send a delegation into South Africa as soon as the necessary arrangements have been made.

It further resolved that it is important immediately to begin the work of re-establishing the ANC within the country. It has therefore constituted the leaders within the country into an organ under the NEC charged with the task of carrying out this work, working under the chairmanship of Comrade Walter Sisulu.

The NEC calls on all members of the ANC, as well as those of our compatriots who had already taken steps to constitute themselves into ANC units, to work directly with and under this leadership collective.

The NEC resolved to take immediate steps to prepare for the organised return to South Africa of the leadership and membership of the ANC.

It also recognised that over the years a serious brain drain had occurred with the emigration from South Africa of many people who were opposed to the apartheid system. It therefore resolved to take steps to encourage the return of these exiles as well, so that they can contribute to the democratic transformation of our country and make an effective contribution to the reconstruction and development of a post-apartheid South Africa.

In the light of the new developments, the NEC resolved that the next National Conference of the ANC will be held inside South Africa from the 16th of December, 1990. The planned National Consultative Conference originally scheduled for June this year will therefore no longer take place. Conference preparations will however continue, both inside and outside the country.

The NEC welcomed the unbanning of the SACP. It reaffirmed the importance of the alliance of the ANC, the SACP and the organised workers of our country. It resolved that this historic alliance will continue to function with the necessary restructuring having taken place to meet the new situation.

It also reviewed the relations of the ANC with other democratic and anti-apartheid formations within South Africa. As already indicated, it resolved to enter into discussions with these to assess the recent developments. It reiterated its view that, at this stage, the UDF and its affiliates should continue to function and mobilise their respective constituencies.

The NEC is gravely concerned at the continuing violence, especially in Natal and Uitenhage. It reaffirmed the necessity to take urgent steps to stop this destructive conflict. It therefore confirmed earlier decisions that the leadership within the country should intervene immediately to end this fratricidal carnage. It calls on all those who have previously blocked attempts to find a solution to co-operate with these leaders in the interests of life itself.

The NEC reiterated the fact that the masses of our people continue to suffer under the apartheid system. It restated that even when a climate for negotiations is created, this will not mean that this system will have been abolished. Therefore the struggle for a united, democratic and non-racial South Africa must and will continue.

In this regard, it considered with all due seriousness, suggestions that it should unilaterally suspend the armed struggle. While appreciating the sincerity of purpose underlying these suggestions, it however confirmed that the only just and correct way to approach this question is to adhere to the positions contained in the Harare and UN Declarations. It therefore reiterates that upon the creation of a climate conducive to negotiations, the ANC will seek to negotiate with the Pretoria regime a suspension of hostilities by both sides.

The NEC views with grave concern and strongly condemns the continuing campaign of repression carried out by the South African and bantustan police and armies. The State of Emergency and repressive legislation, such as the Internal Security Act, which have been maintained, legalise and encourage this campaign of terror against the people.

The ANC and Umkhonto we Sizwe have a responsibility to defend the people against this terror. There can therefore be no question of a unilateral moratorium or a suspension of the armed struggle in a situation in which the violence of the apartheid system continues unabated. The Pretoria regime has an urgent responsibility to take all the necessary measures to end this violence and thus create the situation when the present obligation on our part to act in defence of the people, arms in hand, will fall away.

The NEC reaffirms the need for the continuation of mass political action to achieve the objectives contained in the resolutions of the Conference for a Democratic Future and the January 8th statement of the NEC, to realise the intention of this Year of People's Action for a Democratic South Africa.

The international community imposed sanctions against South Africa with the express purpose of ending the apartheid system. There can therefore be no justification for lifting these sanctions at this stage. The NEC strongly condemns the position taken by the British government on this issue.

These positions not only hinder the process leading to the speedy liquidation of the apartheid system, but are a betrayal of decisions of the European Community and the UN General Assembly, to which the British government is party, that sanctions would not be lifted until profound and irreversible changes had taken place in keeping with the objectives contained in the UN Declaration on South Africa, adopted unanimously last December.

The National Executive Committee therefore calls on the forthcoming ministerial meeting of the European Community to reject the call of the Thatcher government to lift sanctions and thus repulse its efforts to

weaken the international struggle to end the apartheid system.

The NEC reaffirmed that our country's problems can only be solved when South Africa has been transformed into a non-racial democracy, in which the fundamental rights of all our people, both black and white, would be guaranteed. It therefore calls on all forces committed to this perspective further to consolidate their unity and continue to act together to advance towards the common goal.

The Struggle Continues!

The People's Victory over the Apartheid System is Assured!

ISSUED BY ANC, PO BOX 31791, LUSAKA, ZAMBIA

PREPARING FOR POWER

"The immediate interests of the overwhelming majority of SA people lie in the carrying out of fundamental change."

FROM PROTEST TO CHALLENGE

An historic meeting, Tambo meets with President Mikhail Gorbachev in Moscow, 1986

FOR more than seventy years, the SA communist party (SACP) and the ANC have waged militant battles against racism.

Given the formidable threat they posed to the government, both these organisations were banned - the Communist Party in 1950 and the ANC just over a decade later. But their alliance, forged through their struggles on the ground, remained unaffected.

Today, with the unbanning of the organisations, that alliance is in fact stronger than it ever was, despite it being the focus of a sustained campaign to smash and discredit it.

The alliance, to a large extent, has been decisive in the progress that the struggle waged by the two organisations, has made.

Before the alliance actually took form, the Communist Party of SA, as it was then known, was very much a party of white activists and intellectuals without any mass base.

Formed on July 30, 1921, it was the first Communist Party in Africa and its formation was directly inspired by the Bolshevik Party of the Soviet Union.

Its involvement at a mass level first found expression in the association of Party members with the Industrial and Commercial Union (ICU) in the 1920's. This was decisive in laying the foundation of its association with the ANC.

As far as the SACP was concerned, the ICU through its actions, "awakened revolutionary national and class consciousness" of African working people in the towns and rural areas.

The ICU also mobilised the cadres of the Communist Party and the ANC for the struggle ahead.

And when the ICU disintegrated, it was these cadres who set to work to organise industrial unions along militant lines and towards building the national liberation movement.

It was during this period that the Communist Party's relationship with the ANC improved significantly. In line with its emphasis on the mobilisation of the African masses, the Party re-assessed its policy towards the ANC, which from the SACP's point of view, had not until then reflected any clear revolutionary potential.



In fact the shift in the party's emphasis brought with it a very substantial increase in African membership. From a minority in 1924, African Communists came to represent the great majority in the party, by 1928 - 1 600 of the 1 750 members. In addition, three executive members were black.

There was also a considerable degree of cross membership between the two organisations. By 1945, three leading African Communists, Moses Kotane, JB Marks and Dan Thloome, who is current SACP chairperson, had been elected onto the ANC executive. Their presence in both the Party and the ANC leadership added an organic character to the alliance.

Dr Yusuf Dadoo, former general secretary of the SACP and Moses Mabhida played equally important roles in strengthening the alliance.

It was in the post-1945 period, through the influence of these leaders, that the Party saw itself being involved in campaigns that went beyond simply working class issues. The Party, for example, involved itself in the anti-pass campaigns and the denial of the right of Africans to vote.

The shift in ANC strategy in 1927 to a more radical approach, also helped forge a closer relationship with the party. Josiah Gumede's election to presidency of the ANC was followed by an announcement by the organisation of its intention to embark on a course of mass action.



But the move by the Communist Party, which laid the foundation for an alliance with the ANC, was the adoption of a slogan which defined its goal - namely to work towards "an independent native republic as a stage towards a workers' and peasant's republic".

Herein lay a basic premise which informed the SACP's "colonialism of a special type" thesis.

It argued that a specific variant of "bourgeois domination and capitalist relations of production" which were characteristic of colonialism, had developed in SA.

The variation, it pointed out, was that in SA, the colonial ruling class and the oppressed colonised majority, were both in the same country.

In explaining this position, the SACP said in its programme of action adopted at the party's 1989 congress, titled the Path to Power: "...the effect of colonialism of a special type, is that all white classes benefit, albeit unequally and in different ways, from the internal colonial structure. Conversely all black classes suffer national oppression, in varying degrees and in different ways."

It was on the basis of this understanding of the nature of exploitation and oppression in SA, that the recognition by Communists, that the principal element of the struggle in SA was national liberation, followed.

The party says in its programme: "The immediate interests of the overwhelming majority of SA people lie in the carrying out of fundamental change: a national democratic revolution, which will overthrow the colonial state and establish a united, democratic and non-racial SA."

"The main content of this revolution is the national liberation of the African people in particular, and the black people in general."

This position opened up a range of other possibilities for the SACP in respect of strategies and tactics. This, for example found expression in the Party's acceptance that the achievement of the aims of the (Freedom) Charter would answer the pressing and immediate needs of the people and lay the indispensable basis for the advance to socialism".

It was against this understanding that the SACP saw no contradiction between its role as the vanguard of the working class and the leading role of the ANC.

But the reasons why the alliance has endured for nearly seven decades are not limited to the Party's recognition of the task of "national liberation" being primary.

Perhaps the more important factor contributing to the endurance of the alliance was the fact that the SACP never saw itself as a caucus group that sought to impose the Party's position on the ANC and the alliance.

Party general secretary, Joe Slovo, says in a recent paper on socialist practices: "We do not regard the trade union or the national movement as mere conduits for our policies. Nor do we attempt to advance our policy positions through intrigue and manipulation. Our relationship with these organisations is based on complete respect for their integrity and inner-democracy". This, the communists says, has never been a rhetorical slogan but a reflection of the reality.

Nelson Mandela confirms this view in his paper on negotiations addressed to the government, in which he says: "The SACP has throughout the years accepted the leading role of the ANC, a position which is respected by SACP members who join the ANC."

The SACP, through its principled stand against the exploitation and oppression, earned itself the respect of the ANC leadership as early as in the latter half of the 1920's. The ANC's president at the time, Josiah Gumede, told the International Congress of the League Against Imperialism, that he was happy that there were Communists in SA. "...it is my experience that the Communist Party is the only party that stands behind us and from which we can expect something."

On his return from the congress, he told the ANC annual conference that same year: "Of all political parties, the Communist Party is the only one that honestly and sincerely fights for the oppressed people."

Despite the alliance finding substantial support in the ranks of the liberation movement, it has come under attack at various points in the history of the ANC and the SACP - not only from the government and its allies internationally, but also from within the ANC itself.

Gumede himself was ousted from the leadership by conservative elements in the organisation.

But even these tendencies were defeated in the course of struggle. Mandela says of the attacks on the alliance from within the ANC: "Even within the ranks of the ANC, there have been at one time or another, people - and some of them were highly respected and influential individuals - who were against this co-operation and who wanted SACP members expelled from the organisation."


"Those who persisted in these activities, were themselves expelled, or they broke away in despair."

While the alliance has endured and been strengthened over the years, the question that will have to be confronted is: what happens after the national democratic revolution?

While this will certainly be a subject for intense discussion and debate with the ranks of the Party, the ANC and the MDM, little is expected to change in the immediate long term.

It will in likelihood be argued that the alliance must in fact be strengthened and the unity of the liberation movement deepened in a post apartheid society.

This unity will be crucial in addressing the historical injustices that have characterised the "colonialism of a special type".



FORWARD TO FREEDOM!

**ANC
LIVES!**



**ANC
LEADS!**