

INDEX

Foreword	1
Strategic Planning Process	2
Strategic Issues	4
Rendering of service to the community	5
Vulnerability against the SAP 21\$ 21 result of instability (during the transition phase in political development)	6
(Internal Image)	7
Application of personnel	8
Training	9
(Tactical Mmmgvnm H)	
Administration	11
Change of Strategy	12
Responsibility for implementation	14
Strategic (Policies, Objectives) 21ml strategics	15
Monitoring of progress	16
Goal 1 : To improve the crime situation in the RSA	17
(Policies 2 : To improve the (Internal: ie image) of the SAP	19
Goal 3 : To ensure efficient employment of manpower in the SA Police	20
(Policy 1 : To ensure (Institutional) management in the SA Police	23
Goal 5 : To ensure a stable security situation in the RSA	26
Goal 6 : To ensure optimal safety/preparedness of members in the SAP	27

Voorwounl
1N1 l()l IDSOPGAWIC
Strutcgicsc Bcplzmningspmsus
Strategiusc chssics
Diunslcwcring 212m (110 Gcmccnskup
Gewcld Leon (iic SAP a.g.v. ())nstahilitcit, gcdurendc die SLaaLkundige uorgangsfusu
Korpuruticwc 1500111
Aanwcnding van Pcrsoncccl
Oplciding
Kostchcffckticwc Bestuur
Akkmnmodasic
Stratcgievcrandcring
Impl imcnt(:ringsvcrantwoordclikheid
Strategicse Doclstcllings, Doelwiue 0n Strategiee
Monitoring van Vordcring
Duclstclling 1 :
Duclslclling 2
Duclstclling 3
Doclstclling .1
Doulsclclling 5
J)(lclstclling 6
()m die misdumlsituusic in die RSA Le vcrbctcr
: ()m die Knrpuruticwc Bccld van die SAP u: vcrbctcr
: ()m die aanwcnding van Mannckrag in die SAP Le vcrbctcr
2 ()ln Kostc-cffckticwc B(xstuur in die SAP Le vcrhctcr
: ()m 'n Slubiclc Vciliglmidsluusic in die RSA u: vcrsckcr
: ()In optimalc vcilighcid/puraulhcid van lcdc in die SAP 1.0 vcrsckcr
N
(DmKIGMA
10
11
12
14
15
16
17
19
20
23
26
27

FOREWORD

The South-African Police has in the past, and is still, eager to form an active partnership with the community which it serves. The first two years of this decade have been characterised by dramatic and rapid change in many areas. These changes in the external environment in which the South African Police acts have made it necessary to consider anew the mission and strategy of the
Police. A strategic plan was therefore developed in order to direct the actions of the South African Police during the next few years.

VOORWOORD

Die Suid-Afrikaanse Polisie was in die verlede, en is steeds begerig om '11 aktiewe vennootskap te vorm met die gemeenskap wat hy dien. Die eerste twee jaar van hierdie dekade is gekenmerk deur dramatiese en snelle verandering op vele terreine. Hierdie veranderinge in die (strukture omgewin waarbinne die SAP 0) het dit nodig gemaak om te verander om te besin (in) die Polisie se missie, beleid en strategie. Derhalwe is '11 se voorgestelde plan ontwikkel om die SA Polisie se aksies 001' die volgende paar jaar te rig.

STRATEGIC PLANNING PROCESS

By the end of 1990 it had become clear that strategic management was the only way to bring about the repositioning and reorientation necessary to enable the SAP to strive effectively towards its mission in a politically changing South Africa. The reason for this is that strategic management is, in fact, aimed at taking fundamental decisions regarding the nature and direction of an organization. In normal circumstances it has a five-year horizon. As a result of internal, but especially external factors, it will be necessary for the SAP to revise its strategic plan annually.

-In 1991 we carefully gave form to strategic management, which has already led to a new orientation and approach. The SAP has a new mission, 3 new, much more streamlined and service orientated structures, a code of conduct, a police board, and a riot combating unit in a new form, to mention but a few of the changes.

STRA'L 1..) LESE BEPLANNINGSPROSES

Teen die cindc van 1990 Incl. diL duidclik guwurd duI. strutcgicsu lmsumr din (migrate wy su was um die hurposisinnccring (3n hernriemusic
tcwcc Y n: brin ' wut. nodi r is um (lit: SAP in swat. It: slcl 0m 5 missic in 'n slumkum
li r vcrmulcrcmlc SuidV-Afrika effuklief nu tc struuf.
& E, 5 Y

Die rude duarvunr is (I211 slrutugicsu hvsluur juis dunmp g(rmik is um fundmmmtclc h(rsl
uulu (mr (lit: aurd (2n rig! ing van die ()rgunisasic
u: nccm. l)il. hot Imrmzmlwug 'n vyf junr horisun. Vanwcc inturnc, Inuur vcrul ckstorm: f
ukloru, sul (lit vir die SAP nodig wees 0m sy
slratcgicsc plan jaurliks (c h(trsicc.

Die SA Polish: hut g(tdurcmic 19!)! surgvuhlig busing g(rgm: nun stralugicsc h(rsluur wul
. rvmlss mmluiding g(tgm: hut tut. 'n nuwc ()riftntusin
(3n hcnudccring. Div. SAP hot. 'n nuwu missiu, 'n nuwu, vvcl nicer vaurlhcllyndc (rn (lions
luwvrings; g(rdrcwc stukmur, 'n gmlmgskmlc, 'n
polisiuraud , (:n 'n (mluslwkmIpingst'cnhcid in 'n nuwu gmlaunlu gvkicu, um mzmrc ncl (-n
kultt vvrunduringc I(E nnum.

Briefly, the process which we followed in establishing strategic management took place as follows: A work group of officers conducted a broad reconnaissance of the internal and external environment of the SAP during November 1990. On the basis of these analyses a framework was drawn up of that which a strategic plan for the SAP should address over the next five years. The content of this strategy document (draft No 1) was accepted in principle and served as a basis for the working sessions conducted afterwards. The aim of these sessions was to introduce the process of strategic management to the broad management of the SA) and also to cultivate acceptance for the necessity of the process. During these sessions the validity or non-validity of the most important strong and weak points was confirmed, as well as opportunities and threats which exist in the SAP's internal and external environments. The information which came to the fore during these sessions was used to adapt the original draft strategy document. The adapted document (draft No 2) served as the basis of this plan, in which, amongst other things, certain strategic issues were identified.

Die prosce wat, met die vestiging van strategiese bestuur gevolg is het kortliks 500s vol
g verloop. 'n Werkgroep van offisiere het in
November 1990 'n besluitverklaring gemaak van die interne en eksterne omgewing van die SAP.
Op grond van hierdie ontleding is 'n
raamwerk (aangestel van dit wat 'n strategiese plan vir die SAP oor die volgende vyf jaa
r behoort aan te sê. Die inhoud van hierdie
strategiese dokument (konsep nr. 1) is in beginsel aanvaar en bet as basis gedien vir werks
sessies wat daarna gehou is. Die doel van hierdie
sessies was om die proses van strategiese bestuur aan die breë bestuur van die SAP bekend
te stel en ook aanvaarding te skep vir die
noodsaaklikheid van die prosce. Tydens hierdie sessies is die geldigheid al dan nie bevat
tig van die belangrikste sterk- en swakpunte,
sowel as geleenthede en bedreigings wat daar in die SAP se interne en eksterne omgewings b
estaan. Die inligting wat tydens die sessies
na vore gekom het, is gebruik om die oorspronklike konsep as 'n raamwerk-dokument aan te
pas. Die aangepaste dokument (konsep nr. 2) het
as basis gedien vir hierdie plan waarin onder andere bepaalde strategiese kwessies giden
tifieer is.

STRATEGIC ISSUES

After the information compiled during the different sessions had been analyzed, consensus was reached regarding the strategic issues or flash-points facing the SAP. These issues came strongly to the fore at various deliberations on strategy, not only at Head Office level but also at regional and district level, to such a degree that no longer can there be any doubt about their validity. The issues are briefly illustrated here:

STRATEGIESE KWESSIES

Na ontleding van die inligting wat tydens die verskillende sessies ingewin is, is konsensus bereik oor die strategiese kwessies of brandpunte wat die SAP in die gesig staar. Hierdie kwessies, het op verskeie strategie-behandelings, nie net op hoofkantoorvlak nie, maar ook op ereks- en distrikvlak, sterk na vore getree, tot so 'n mate dat daar geen twyfel meer kan bestaan oor die geldigheid daarvan nie. Vervolgens word die kwessies kortliks toelig:

RENDERING OF SERVICE TO THE COMMUNITY

Crime has been escalating at a rapid rate since 1988, while the solving of crime is not as (me would wish it to be. This situation, along with other obvious shortcomings in the rendering of service, such as a slow reaction time to complaints and the injudieious location of police stations and service points in rompnrison with demographic trends, means that service is probably the SAP's single most important strategic problem.

1n

DIENSLEWERING AAN DIE GEMEENSKAP

Misdaad is sedert 1988 blyk om teen '11 snelle tempo toe te neem, terwyl misdadoplossing nie na wense is nie. Hierdie toestand, tesame met ander oenskynlike diensleweringse gebreke, soos stadige reaksietyd op klagtes en onoordeelkundige plasing van polisieostasies en bedieningspunte in vergelyking met demografiese tendense, beteken dat dienslewering waarskynlik die SAP se enkele belangrikste strategiese kwessies is.

U

VIOLENCE AGAINST THE SAP AS A RESULT OF INSTABILITY DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PHASE IN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

The escalation of violent crimes, the actions of gangs of murderers and mhhvrs, as well as political power-plays between conflirting groups, forces agnnjern olehulvioknuxrlunnlsocinty and hnwns part(H a nhlknlin Wdhch vhnence b heconng such a parttthaHy hfethatrespectforluunan hfeislxxxnnnnngIessandlnss. hldeahnngnh Unashuatknu Uu380utthhica n Pohcei5(xnmtanthlcaught in the "cross-fire", in which it is accused on the one hand of contributing to the violhncc, Or unwillingness to am decisively, and on the other hand the SAP itself has become a target for violence (the increasing numhvr of attacks on SAP mmnhcrs is proof of this). The ever-present danger to hfc hdllbring ahouttlu1Ltlu%staLc wdH cvuntuaHy he hi1 hl21"crhu)hx11nhntknf'regardhu;the hwtrunlont8()f safety.

U

GE'WELD TEEN DIE SAP AS GEVOLG VAN ONSTABILITEIT GEDURENDE DIE STAATKUNDIGE
OORGANGSFASE

Die eskalasie van geweldsmisdade, die Optredes van moordbendes en rowers, asook politieke magtspiele tussen strydende groepe, druk 'n patroon van blindelinge geweld op die samelewing af en maak deel uit van 'n milieu waarin geweld so deel begin word van die daaglikse bestaan dat. reaksie vir die menslike lewe minder en minder geag word. In die huidige omring van die situasie staan die Suid-Afrikaanse Polisie voortdurend in die "spervuur" waarin hy aan die eenkant beskuldig word van of aandoening by geweld, of onwilligheid tot besliste optrede en aan die ander kant self leide van geweld geword het (500\$ die toename in aanvalle op veral SAP-lede getuig). Die alomteenwoordige lewensgevaar bring mee (dat die swart; wit imlelik in 'n "verlamme posisie" met betrekking tot veiligheidsinstrumente gelaat kan word.

CORPORATE IMAGE

The corporate image of the SAP amongst a large part of the population is not as desired. The most important causes are the application of unpopular laws, visible involvement in combating riots and the discrediting of the SAP as a suppressive "instrument" of the Government. The classic policing task of crime prevention and investigation has been neglected as a result of this and a further result has been that visible policing has almost vanished. In addition to problems concerning the external image, there are also indications in the organization of certain internal image problems. Reference is made here to the insecurity amongst a high percentage of the members and the age-old problem of faulty internal communication. Problems such as these influence our members' attitude negatively and that it is eventually reflected in the external corporate image.

KORPORATIEWE BEEN)

Die korporatiewe beeld van die SAP is onder 'n groot gedrukte van die bevolking is nie na wense nie. Die vernaamste oorsaak is die toepassing van ongewilde wetgewing, sigbare betrokkenheid by onlusbekamping en diskreditering van die SAP as onderdrukkende "instrument." van die Regering. Die klassieke politiseringstaak van misdaadvoorkoming en ondersoek is hierdeur afgeskeep en 'n verdere gevolg was dat sigbare politisering bykans verdwyn het. Benewens eksterne beeldprobleme is daar ook in die organisasie aanduidings van bepaalde interne beeldprobleme. Hier word verwys na onsekerheid by '11 tot) persentasie lede en dan die eeu-oue probleem van gebrekkige interne kommunikasie. Sulke probleme beïnvloed lede se houding negatief en dit reflekteer uiteindelik in die eksterne korporatiewe beeld.

er

JV

APPLICATION OF PERSONNEL

This is a critical question when it is taken into consideration that nearly 80% of the SAP'S budget consists of personnel expenses. The ways in which personnel are obtained, employed and retained are crucial factors in ensuring effective policing. Yet research shows that not every member in the SAP is being effectively employed. The frequent use of trained police officials for administrative work is an indication of the injudicious employment of manpower. Another upsetting fact is that a high percentage of police officials, as much as 45%, are employed outside the classic policing terrain for functions such as administrative, guard and extra-departmental duties. Exceptional pressure is exercised on the SAP to relinquish large numbers of personnel for the execution of these duties.

AANWENDING VAN PERSONEEL

Hierdie is 'n kritieke kwessie as in ag geneem word dat bykans 80% van die SAP se begroting uit personeeluitgawes bestaan. Die wyse waarop personeel verkry, aangewend en in stand gehou word is deurslaggewende faktore om 'n effektiewe polisie-organisasie in Suid-Afrika te verskaf. Tog blyk die uit navorsing dat nie alle lede in die SAP effektief aangewend word nie. Die hoe gebruikmaking van opgeleide polisiebeamptes vir administratiewe werk is 'n aanduiding van onoordeelkundige aanwending van mannekrag. 'n Ander onstellige feit is dat 'n 1106 persentasie polisiebeamptes, soveel as 45%, buite die klassieke polisiefunksies aangewend word vir funksies 500 administratiewe-, wag- en buite- departementele dienste. Buitengewone hoe druk word op die SAP geplaas om groot getalle personeel vir die uitvoering van hierdie (liens) af te staan.

TRAINING

Training has always, and, in future will hint) to do vvvv iiiorv to fulfil an important r
 olo iii I)I'Pl)21riilg iiiviiihvrs so as to PSHH' a poliring
 S(WViFO of high quality. Although thv SAP has 21 woll-iorniiilzitml training polity, anti
 thmivi'orv ulso makvs u(hiptzitions on a Pontinual
 hzisis, (Especially in basic training (iiiiiiiviilzi, thoro 2m: indications that constable
 s who have just CUIHIHPIPd their training are still not,
 capable of effectively (:zirrying out the hnsiv (przutt irnl) poliring tasks. It has hero
 ine IltftTSSilliy to follow 21 training policy which gives
 priority to training ainiod zit i'zipnhility, iii ot hvr words, individuals are trained i
 n thYDellFP with tlw rvqiiirmnvnts of a part icular type
 of activity or post in the SAP. 'lhis is (loop to make our training input, the rvquironiv
 nts of iiiodvrii poliriiig. 'liht- fraigiiivntod and
 uncovortlinatcd nature of training has :ih't-ziiiy nwoivmi attention and has hvon t(irtif
 ivd. 'lihv vxistiiiig hzivklog in training, especially
 regarding the blink nizmzigmiwiit (iziih'v, hzis zilso itwvivml :ittviition 21ml ftirthvr
 stops zirv hoiig tukvn to (1021! with tho hzivklog. The
 urgent nature of this training is rvzilism:imi vvviythiiig possihlv is hviiig done to o
 btain thv iiH't-ssziry funds to iiit-vt this llPOd.

OPLEIDING

(Opleiding) het huidige (aan sul sovccl 1v mcur in die lockoms, 'n belangrike ml vervul 0 m lulu V(mr u: berei ton cinde hoe kwaliteit polisieringsdins te versker. Hoewel die SAP oor '11 goed geklarmulccrde (Opleidingsbclci d beskik en daam 00k voortdurend aanpassings in veral basiese Opleidingskurrikulum maak, is daar aanduidings dat die pas opgeleide kundel stelsel steeds nie opgewasse is om die basiese (praktiese) polisieringsmke effektief te verrig nie. Dit het nodig geword dat 'n Opleidingsbclci gevolg word wat bevoegdheidsgerigte opleiding voorsien, met ander woorde, individue word opgelei in ooreenstemming met die vereistes van 'n besondere soort werksaamheid of pos in die SAP. Dit word gedoen om Opleiding aan moderne polisieringsveristies te laat voldoen. Die gefragmenteerde en (on)gekoördineerde aard van opleiding het reeds die nodige aandag ontvang en is reggeel. Die (Opleidings)toestand wat bestaan, veral ten opsigte van die swart bestuurskader, het 00k aandag geniet en verdere stappe word gedoen om die toestand uit te skakel. Die dringendheid van hierdie (Opleiding) word besef en alles moontlik word gedoen om die nodige fondse te bekom om hieraan te voldoen.

11)

COST-EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT

The limited availability of funds in the public sector hampers the effective management of all the FPSUHTPS at the disposal of the SAP. Yet it has been found that the SAP, as an organization, is not orientated towards (30)st--(2)fl(tttt,ivmtess in every respect. Deficiencies still exist in the area of financial management, as for example a lack of autonomy in financial management. It has become a matter of urgency for the SAP not only to aim at staying within the available funds, but rather to use funds efficiently. In this respect much is already being done to reorganize the SAP but, on the other hand, it is also clear that an innovative task of great proportions still lies ahead. Another aspect, of this issue has to do with computerization. Because of a lack of funds, several systems in the SAP are outdated and clumsy. This matter can only be rectified if funds are acquired (70)111thvrisation is set-up.

KOSTE-EFFEKTIEWE BESTUUR

Die beperkte beskikbaarheid van fundm. in die openbare sektor noodsaak dat alle hulpbronne tot beskikking van die SAP effektief bestuur moet word. Tog is bevind dat die SAP as ()rganisasie nie in 21110 opsigte op kosh-effektiwiteit. gerig is nie. Daar is nog leemtes op die gebied van finansiële bestuur, 5005 byvoorbeeld 'n gebrek aan finansiële bestuursoutonomie. Dit het dringend nodig geword dat die SAP hom daarop instel om nie net binne beskikbare fondse te bly nie, maar om eerder fondse doeltreffend en effektief aan te wend. In hierdie opsig word reeds veel gedoen om die SAP te herorkinteer, maar aan die ander kant is dit ook duidelik dat 'n groot opvoedingstaak nog voorle. 'n Ander aspek van hierdie kwessie het te doen met rekenarisering. Weens 'n tekort aan fondse is verskeie chsels in die SAP vcroudcnl en lump. Illicrdic saak kan selgs rcggestcl word as fondse: vcrkry en rekenarisering bespoedig word.

1 1

ACCOMMODATION

em, so much so that it is affecting the ability of the SAP to render an effective
Particularly office accommodation, is a serious pmb
and other accommodation has obviously not kept abreast of the rapid expansion of the
211 works

service. The granting of funds for (:apit

autonomously in the acquisition and maintenance

SAP. The situation is further aggravated by the fact that the SAP does not function
totally dependant on the Department of Public Works to deal with these matters.

of accommodation. The Department is, as a whole,

AKKOMMODASIE

Dit is veral kantoorakkommodasie wat 'n ernstige probleem is, soveel so dat dit besig is om die vermoë van die SAP aan te tas om effektief diens te lewer. Die bewilliging van fondse vir kapitaalwerk en ander akkommodasie, het duidelik nie tred gehou met die snelle uitbreiding van die SAP nie. Die situasie word verder vererger deur die feit dat die SAP nie oornoo funksioneer ten opsigte van die verkryging en instandhouding van akkommodasie nie. Die departement is in sy geheel totaal afhanklik van die Departement van Opknoping vir die hantering van hierdie betrokke sake.

CHANGE OF STRATEGY

The existence of the above issues and the Stim'vssiiui Iiizinagemt'nt thereof (hiring the next five years will have a considerable influence and impact on the effective functioning mid surverss (if the SAP. For this reason it. is of exit iCill importance that. effevtive strategies are followed to manage these issues. antlly speaking, the strategy of the SAP must shift. from the clinical enforcement of laws to a high quality, pro-active approach in rendering it service which is aimed at the community. This change in strategy is necessary to effectively obviate these various issues, some direct and others indirect. To give this a visible form, the mission of the SAP has been reformulated to read as follows:

" WE UNDERTAKE, IMPARTIALLY AND WITH RESPECT
FOR THE NORMS OF THE LAW AND OF SOCIETY,
TO PROTECT THE INTERESTS OF THE COUNTRY AND EVERYONE THEREIN
AGAINST ANY CRIMINAL VIOLATION,
THROUGH EFFICIENT SERVICE RENDERED IN AN ACCOUNTABLE MANNER."

STRATEGIEVERANDERING

Die bcslaan van bogcnomnde kwcssics en die suksesvolle bcsunr daarvan oor die volgcnde vyf jaar 581 'n beduidende invloed en impak op die docltrcffeende funksionering en sukses van die SAP he. Om hierdie rede is (lit van kritieke belang dat effektiewe strategie gevolg word om die kwcssics te bestuur. In die brce gcsien mucl die strategie van die SAP van 'n kliniese Loepassing van wette, na 'n hoe") kwaliteit, pro-aktiewe, gcmcenskapsgerig e di(:nslcwcringsbenadering verskuif. Hierdie strategieverandering is nodig om die verskillende kwcssics, sommige (lirek on under indirck, cffektief t0 ()ndervang. Om daaraan sigbaur gestaluz LC gee is die missie van die SAP gewysig

0111 as volg Le lees:

ONS ONDERNEEM OM DIE BELANGE VAN DIE LAND EN ALLE MENSE
ONPARTYDIG EN MET DIE EERBIEDIGING VAN REG- EN GEMEENSKAPSNORME
DEUR DOELTREFFENDE DIENSLEWERING
OP 'N VERANTWOORDBARE WYSE
TEEN ENIGE STRAFKEGTELIKE SKENDING TE BESKERM."

In addition (0 thv adapt ion of llw misaiun nt' tlw South Afrivzm Polivv, the change in f orms whirl) had hvvn (1m idmi (m, was also brought into being by formulating a visinn mul hmml stmtvgy for (hp SAP whirh mm svrvn 218 21 fmn H-wnrk fur ()rrhvstrming the (xssuntial changes that haw to take plurv in lhw mgzmizntion (luring tlw next few yt-ars. Those slru lvgivs 21w:

Depoliticisation and the increase of (:nmunity accountability

Visible policing

Stabilising

l'stablising 0f (:03L-1:ff(:(:tiv0 management practices

Computerisation

Raeructuring and rcwwalmHion of training

Acquiring greater independence in management

Restructuring

A number of members of tho munngvwnl board of the SAP have lwn tasked with the rvsponsi hilily 0f rurl'ying (mt lhw above

strategies. That, however, in itself is not 311! f'icivnt. By moans of informing and 21 p rocvs 0f ussnviul inn rurv has lwn taken to ensure

that (:vcry manager in tht: SN), ()1) whntvvvr lvvv1, would ('xvvp1 ()wnvrsllip ())f lhw p lan.

Benoem die aanpassing van die Suid-Afrikaanse Politiek SC missie, is deur 00k busing geg
 ce aan die fiksieverandering waarop besluit
 is deur 'n visie (3n bred strategie vir die SAP (0 formulêr Will. as raamwerk kan (lio
 n vir die orkestrering van die noodsaaklike
 verandering Will in die ()rganisasie om die volgende aanuul jurc moot. plzsvind. Hierd
 ie strategie is:

depolitiserings en die verhoging van gemoeds- en raansprekbaarheid

sigbare politisering

stabilisering

vestiging van koch-effektiewe bestuurspraktyke

rekenarisering

herstrukturing en herbeoordeling van opleiding

verhoging van grater bestuurskwaliteit

herreorganisering

Versterking van die SAP se bestuursraad is getuik met die verduideliking: Om iilv
 m:ring nan die genoemde strategie u: gee.

niel alleen is hier nie voldoende nie. By wys van V(moedlikheid an 'n proses van verandering
 is sorg gedra dat elke bestuursraad in die SAP,

(1) waiter vlak ()ukzil, (EiCIHmrSkill) van die plzm aanvaar.

iii

RESPONSIBILITY FOR IMPLEMENTATION

The top management of our organization (hence, the General Staff and the commanding officers of Head Office components) is chiefly involved in the determination of strategy and policy, while the top and senior management of regions, apart from the strategic reconnaissance of the particular situation in that region, have to especially see to the operationalization of over-all policy and strategies. The emphasis at regional level is on operational objectives which have to be achieved within a particular financial year. Especially on regional, district, station and unit, level action planning must be formulated in order to ensure that the objectives agreed upon are indeed achieved. Action planning takes place at district and station level so that, as mentioned earlier, everyone in the SAP, from the highest to the lowest level, is involved in the process of Strategic Commitment. For this reason it is essential that members at every level master the process of strategic management so that continued success in the long term can be ensured in this way.

IMPLEMENTERINGSVERANTWOORDELIKHEID

Die tophcsluur van die Polish: (hrcodwgc diu g(tncrult: sluf (3n hcvdvuurendc uffisiurv v
zm lumfkmnuur kumpnnumc) is hoofsaaklik
bctmkkc by die lwpuling vzm strategic (:n lwluid, lorwyl (lit: top- on seniorlwstum' van
slnrkv, lwnuwons strutvgicsu verkenning van die
bcsnmlerc siluasiu in dammit: struck, vurul nuwl uilmtring gm: nun (lie ())pcrasionalisur
ing van nnrhnofsc hcluid (2n strutvgicc. Din klc
Op slrcokvlak is up ())pcmsimwlc dnulwitlc wul, hinm: 'n lwpzmldu finunsielu junr buhaul I
IHHEI, wurd. Dit, is verul Op struck, distrik-
stusim cn (:cnhcidsvlak wut uksiclwplmming gufurmulccr moot. word (on ())in0 (c vursvkvr (1211
nurcvngckmnu duclwilur wcl bercik word.
0;) distrik-- (:n stasicvlak word die aksiclwplunning uilgcvoccr, sodul almul in die SAP,
sons rumls gunman, van die hoogste mt die luugstc
vlak, hy (lie moes van slmlcgiusc lwsluur lmslmkkc is. ())m hicrdic rule is (lit nnndsuum
lik (int lulu vzm die, Polisiu ())p 21110 vluukk die
pmses van strutgcicsc hvstuur sul hmnucstur sudut vnurlgesctlc sukscs (mr (h(t lunglvnnyn
up hivrdic wysc vursvkr kzm word.

STRATEGIC GOALS, OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGIES

In order to structure the process of strategic management for the financial year 1992/93, the attached plan was developed for the implementation of the six long-term strategic goals of the SAP. These goals are to -

- to improve the crime situation in the RSA
- to ensure a stable internal security situation
- to ensure the optimal safety/preparedness of members in the SAP
- to improve the corporate image of the SAP, especially with regard to the operational level
- to ensure the efficient employment and maintenance of manpower in the SAP: and
- to establish an effective management at every level in the SAP.

The above goals are the specific objectives and strategies in the plan.

STRATEGIESE DOELSTELLINGS, DOELWITTE EN STRATEGIEii

()m die prosce van strategie se bcsLuur vir die finansiële bukkjaar 1992/93 Le struktumcr, is uungeheggtc plan omwikkel Om uitvoering

Le gee aan die sce langlcrmy n strachiesc doelstcllings van die SAP. Hierdie doelstclling s is:

9 Om die misdaadsituasie in die RSA u: verbeter

9 Om 'n stabiele binnelandse veiligheidsituasie Le versker

9 Om optimale veiligheid/paraathheid van lode in die SAP Le versker

9 um die korporatiewe beel d van die SAP, veral ten opsigte van die ()pkrasionele vlak, te verbeter

9 um die doeltmatige aanwending (tn instandhouding van mannekrag in die SAP Le versker

9 Om koch-effektiewe bestuur Op alle vlukke in die SAP te vestig

Bognoemde doelstcllings word in die plan in spesifieke doelwitte, On strumgiue umgcskakc l.

MONITORING OF PROGRESS

During (tvvry sermni mowing of (hp (?mwrzil Stuff, time is allocated for f(rodhzutk rvgar ding progress made wilh the objectives concerned. As far as thv latter is ronrvmmi, it is mnphzisismi that the invnsuring ()f av hiuvvnwnt forms an important part. of the total process. Planning without. (:rilvria, or standards of achicvmmmt, serves no purpose and f or this reason, progress measured against spusific standards of achiovmncnt, is rvportmi. With this plan the establishment of 2m ou tpuL-(lrivcn culture in the SAP, instead of one that concentrates on amivitics, is realized. hi this manner a culture is established in w high performiamtc, the retaining and adapting of Objectives, results and output. zirv PSS0IIIilllI (: (mipmivnls.

J.V. VAN DER MERWE \$1333

..... GI'ZNI'ZRAI.

COMMISSIONER: SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE

JV VAN DER MERWI",

1(3

MONITERING VAN VORDERING

Daar word Lydcns Clkc Lwccdc gencrale st.af-byeenk0ms, tyd ingeruim 0m terugvoering te kr
y oor vordering wat met die betrokke
duclwittc gemaak is. Wat luasgcnnncmde bctrcf word hcklemtoon dat prestasicmcting 'n hclan
grikc Underdecl van die totale proses
uitmaak. Beplunning sander krilcria of dam prestasiestandaarde is nuttcloos en duarom wor
d vordering teen spesifieke

)rcstasicstandaardc Tera))ortcer. Met hierdic plan is bcsla e ee aan die vesti in van '
n uitset- edrewe kultuur in die SAP in stede

I E, I I 8 g g 8 g g

van ccn wat 0p aktiwitcitic konsenlvrcer. Op hierdie wyse word 'n kultuur gevctstig waarin
prestasië, doelwitbereiking, -hersiëning en -
aanpassing, rcsultate 0n uitscuc die kcrnbcstandclc is.

J.V. VAN DER MEHWE WEE

..... HiNliRAAI,

KOMMISSARIS: SlJll)val"RlKAANSlc POI .ISIIC

JV VAN DER MERWE

GOAL 1 2

TO IMPROVE THE CRIME SITUATION IN THE RSA

I

OBJECTIVE

1.1. To decrease the incidence of 2111 crime, but especially serious crime, by 93413-31 taking into consideration prevailing demographic factors.

I

STRATEGY

1.1.1. Broadening of visible policing.

1.1.2. Increasing community involvement and support.

1.1.3. Strengthening of relations with sown 11v and mhvr luw muforvvnwnt nrgnniyntinns su rh us (110 Dvpm tnwnt) of justice and local authorities.

1.1./1. 1'ist211)lishnwm nf ('rinw mwvntitm :15.)r'imurv mlivitm (usk.

. 1 .

17

1)()1il.S'11i1.1.1N(i 1 :

OM DIE MISDAADSITUASIE IN DIE RSA TE VERBETER

%

DOELWI T

1.1. Om die voorkoms van 8119 misduad, maar veral ernstige misdaad teen 93-03-31 1e vcrmi
nder met inagneming van
hecrsendc demografiese fakmre.

m

STRATEGIEg

1.1.1. Verhroding vam sigharc polisiecring.

1.1.2. Uitlmuing van guillvtmksnpnlzlmkknllcid cu ()ndcrstcuning.

1.1.3. Vcrslcwiging vzm vcrlmudingc met scckuriwiLsa on under wctst()(lpassingsinslunsius
501151111:1)vp1.vanjustisic en plaaslikc owat-
hedc.

1.1.11. Vusligmg vzm mimizmd- V(mrkmning as pl'inlCrt: polisiecringstzmk.

OBJ E C TI VE

1.2. To improve the solving of crime (under code 500) by 5% per region by 93-03-31.

STRATEGY

1.2.1. Establishmnt, 21nd vxlvnsimx 01' the infumtion nvlwmk.

1.2.2. Improving the level of (:xpm'tisv 01 (Time investigators.

1.2.3. More general availability ()1 fmvnsiv ivahnnhmy.

1.2.4. Rostnutnrling of (111110 invvxtignl inn H'IViVPS.

18

u

DOELWI T

1.2. ()m die ()plussing vun misduud (kodic under 500) teen 93-0331 met 5% per struck u: vc
rhoog.

%

STRATEGIEEE

.2.1. Vcsliging (-n uitlm-iding van inligLingsnmwcrk.

\$2.2. thnging v/d kllmiighuidsvluk van misdnmh)ndursnckcrs.

2.3. M(HEI' ulgmnvm- lwslixikhuurstvlling van forensicsu tugnologiu.

\$3.11. Iicrstmklmvring vzm n1istlumiondursnokdivnst(a

19
(1()AI.2:
TY) .IIiEU?C)V1? f171lf (:CHQEMJEUQI7? .IFLA(2E7 (IF' 1731? fill)

CuiJEKTZIIDUZ

2.1. 11)rawe Unzacceptabihty,88(knnrn1hnx1by ophnon p0H,ofthefvx130HCCznnongsttho, gencral
publktby aLleastl(Y%
by 93-03-31.

W

1;112111??(;l'

2.1.1 Creating a positive image amongst thv, public.

2.1.2 Cultivation of 21 positive zltlitmh' amongst memlwrs 01 the SA Police.

2.1.3 1)(%p())lit.i(tismion

IS)

I)()ICIAS'TICI.I,IN(1 2 :

OM DIE KORPORATIEWE BEELD VAN DIE SAP TE VERBETER

DOEL WI T

2.1. ()m din aanvumbaarheid van die SA Polisie under die algemene publiek (ecu 9303431 ma
t. minstens 10% te verhoog sons

dour 'n nwingingspeling bepaal.

STRATEGIEQ

2.1.1 Pensioen huukskopping by die publiek

2.1.2 Kweek van positiewe geding (telling) deur Impl van die SA Polisie.

2.1.3 Dvplanning.

20

10A1. 3 :

TO ENSURE EFFICIENT EMPLOYMENT OF MANPOWER IN THE SA POLICE

OBJECTIVE

3.1. To reduce employment, of police for nnwclassic policing from 45% (.0 30% by 93-03-31

.

STRATEGY

3.1.1. Reduction of all HQ (tompwms.

3.1.2. Phasing ()uL Lrainml members; from admin posts.

20

DORISHSLHNG 3 :

OM DOELMATIG'E AANWENDING VAN MANNEIGZAG IN DIE SA POLISIE TE VERSEIUKR

DOELWI T

SJ. 0111 die aanwending van polsiebeamptes vir nie-klassieke polisie'iring van 45% Lot 30
% KC vcrminder teen 93,013-31.

u

STRA TEGIE'E-i

_.1.1.1. Vcrmimim'ing mm (1110 II/K knmpom-nlc.

_.1.1.3. Uilfnxm'ing mu npguluidc IL'dC nit admin. posl.c.

OBJECTIVE

3.2 To raise the productivity of the SA l'ulicc to its maximum by 93_03_31.

STRATEGY

3.2.1. The establishnumt of profvssional human Ivsmn'Uvs mmmgoman praclivvs in the SA Pol
ivc.

3.2.2. Establishnwm. ()f svionLifiv nmngmnmn prm'lirvs.

3.2.3. Implenmtmion of (imtmnrnlism ion of human rvsnurvvs mmmgmnom to regional lvvol.

W

DOELWIT

3.2 ()m die produktiwiteit in die 8 A Polisie teen 93-03-31, maksimaal te verhoog.

STRATEGIE

3.2.1. Vestiging van professionele menslike hulpbronbestuurspraktyke in (die 8 A Polisie).

3.2.2. Vvinging van wettenskaplike stuurspanne.

3.2.3. Oorname van (bestuurlike) van menslike hulpbronbestuur tot op struktuurvlak.

OBJECTIVE

3.3 To provide training aimed at. competence on every level, which meets every need of the community, by 930331.

W**STRATEGY**

3.3.1. Restructuring of training pmgrmmnos.

_____. _____

DOEL WI T

3.3 Om bcvogdheidsgerigte opleiding teen 93-03-31, 0p alle vlakke (e voorsien wat aan alle gemeenskapsbehoeftes voldoen.

%_&

S TRA TEGI E

3.3.1. Hurstmktlu'vring vzm opioidingspmgrzunmc.

'23

GOAL 4 :

TO ENSURE COST-EFFICIENT MANAGEMENT IN THE SA POLICE

OBJECTIVE

4.1. To establish financial management expertise, which meets requirements, formulated by the department, in the SA

Police by 9303-31.

STRATEGY

4.1.1. Expansion of financial management expertise.

IQ

1)()li1,S'l1lCl.1.lNG 4 :

OM KOSTE EFFEKTIEWE BESTUUR IN DIE SA POLISIE TE VERSEKER

u

DOELWI T

4.1. Om finansi'olc hestuurskundighcid wat nan deparlementeel neergelegdc Vercistcs voldocn. Icc1193v03-31. in die SA Polisie te vestig.

w

STRA TEGIE

11.1.1. llillmuing van 191112111511:chlwsluurskundighoid.

12-1

"

OBJECTIVE

4.2. To establish responsibility cost management systems to a district level in at least one region by 93-03-31.

W

STRATEGY

4.2.1. Decentralisation.

4.2.2. Restructuring.

4.2.3. Establishment of (winnputcrism1 mmmgvnwnt inhn'mmion systems).

4,1

-----_.

DOELWI T

1.2. ()111vrnlnlwmu(lt-lilqu-idslmmvlwnlInn'slvvlwr; inH'IIminsle'vvnslxm-k lm-n SH (H 1H,
ml up diallikwlnk tr, vmlm.

STRA TE'GI'FIE

.3. 1 Ih'm'n1 1 JIlifJ'l Hm.

.Lf... llmxluluu'l inn.

WHIS, Huzurulrllim; um)(rH'luPl1l1l1 iam'n1r lwnlmnuinliulHugulrlwlm

W

OBJECTIVE

4.3. To Obtain more mmmgvnwm imlvpundzuutc for the SA Police as a (lcpartnwm by 91103431.

STRATEGY

1.3.1. 'ln ()hluin mmv mulmgvnn'm nutmwm 1m (111' SA Imlirv 21;; u (h'pmlm'nl.

4.3.2. '10 Uhlain nrrmmmlnlinn.

4.

_ & _____ &

DOELWI T

1.3. ()m gmlvr lwstuursolfstmnliglwid vir the SA Polisie 218 (ivpurlmnvnt won 93-70373! t
c lwkum.

N__ __

STRA 1FGIE5

1;. 1. (

imlvr lwstquwmtmmmitvil Vir div SIX Imlisiv us (it'partmncnl lo lwknm.

- .12. Akkmmlmdzwivvm kl'yging.

'31;

()All 5:

TO ENSURE A STABLE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE RSA

W

OBJECTIVE

5.1. To reduce the inrhlm: of 501111in and rim-rvlutml crimes by at 102131, 111% by 9110 3731.

m

STRATEGY

5.1.1. Stabilisation21mlImim'litm(Jt'm'rlnilx'2111111101 11111211111 illvhlvmrs.

L'U

1)()1z1.S11'1,I INU 5:

OM 'N STABIELE VEILIGHEIDSITUASIE IN DIE RSA TE VERSEKER

W

DOELWI T

()m div wmrkmns vzm vuiliglwitlsr/nnlus:clcvzmlc misdrywe muL Illinslcns HM; (P(TH 199370
3431 10 vcnnindcr.

W

S TRA TEGI E

5.1.1. Smhiliwrinu M) vmmimh'ling VHH VViliglwhls /nnlllss vt'rwzmln Vumx'ullv.

(LUAI, (i:
10 ENSURE OPTIMAL SAFETY/PREPAREDNESS OF MEMBERS IN THE SAP
NW
(?ELIER311IPQE
6.1. 'To NIH)FOV(EIIHEI)rPIH1FC(hICSS Hf th(:1n(nln)urs Io SU(ilzin 0
xtcxn.lhaL atleasL 500) h3u11 n1cn1bers(Hc and/or are hxhlrod
by 934831.
N
:?11?11123(;)'
6.1.1. liff'iviunt Huining Hf Hwy Im-mhm.

1)()1'1 SH'I HNG (5:

()M ()PTIMALE VEILIGHEI'U/PARAATHEID VAN LEDE' 1N DIE SAP TE VERSEKER

W

DOELWI T

(H. ()m div pmuuthuid van 1min tmrn 1993703731 smizmig (v, vmhuurr (lat. minstvns S(% mi
mivr Imic stt'rf vn/uf bcsecr word.

Mk

5 TRA TEGIE

(5.1.L lhwllH-valv nplritling VRHI lev lmiv.

L? 8

W

OBJECTIVE

6.2. To improve the safety of the nmhvrs in such an extent that at least 50% less nmhms (HP zmd/nr are injured by
930331.

M

S TRA TEG Y

(5.2.1. Inmmvvlm'nt of plnsimxl nuh-ly nf ull IHPHHH'IA.

28

W

DOELWIT

(\$.12. ()m div. vcili Ihuid vzm 1min (mm 19930301 suduni r (c vcrbctcr dziL mimtvns 5(%
mimicr lmlv slm f (rn/of bcseer word.

L, 2:

W

STRA TEGIE

(5.2.1. lewlt-I'ing vzm finivw vvilighviti vzm allv lmlv.

