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Pretoria Seeks U.S., Soviet Mediation To Settle Civil War in Mozambique

By William Claiborne
Washington Post Foreign Service

CAPE TOWN, South Africa, Feb. 7—South Africa is trying to initiate a U.S.-brokered settlement of the civil war in Mozambique similar to last year's negotiated breakthrough in Angola, Foreign Minister Roelof F. (Pik) Botha said today.

While acknowledging that there are major differences between the conflicts in Angola and Mozambique, Botha said that a peace agreement in southeastern Africa might be achieved if the Soviet Union is brought into the process, as it was in Angola.

"The idea is, if we could do it in the west, why can't we do it in the east," Botha said.

He said that he raised the subject in a meeting with then-Secretary of State George P. Shultz after the signing of the Namibian-Angolan peace agreement on Dec. 22 in New York, and that he asked Shultz to pass along the proposal to his successor, James A. Baker III.

There has been no response yet from the Bush administration, Botha said, but one of his aides said later that the foreign minister planned to actively pursue the idea. Botha said he had not yet approached the Soviets with the proposal.

The Angolan agreement, brokered by former U.S. assistant secretary of state Chester A. Crocker, is seen as the United States' biggest diplomatic achievement in Africa.

For 13 years, anticommunist Mozambique National Resistance

(Renamo) movement guerrillas have waged a grinding war against the Soviet-supported Mozambique government. For most of that time, the guerrillas have had South African backing.

Pretoria insists that it has stopped assisting the rebels and has begun providing nonlethal military equipment to the Mozambican Army to help it prevent the guerrillas from destroying hydroelectric power pylons running from the Cahora Bassa Dam in north-central Mozambique to South Africa.

In December, South Africa delivered to Mozambique two shiploads of military trucks, radios, uniforms and other equipment for security forces deployed to guard the powerlines against Renamo rebels.

South Africa's Military Intelligence Department, in an effort to destabilize Mozambique, took over control of Renamo in 1979 from the Rhodesian government, which created the rebel group as a fifth column force in its war against black nationalist guerrillas.

Renamo sabotage has kept the Cahora Bassa power project out of operation since 1983. Last September, Botha and President Pieter W. Botha met in Cahora Bassa with Mozambican President Joachim Chissano to discuss restoration of the project with an initial South African injection of \$18 million.

At the time, about 600 of the 4,000 power pylons in Mozambique had been destroyed by Renamo guerrillas, but since then the number has risen to about 1,400, according to South African officials.

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THE NEW YORK TIMES

FEBRUARY 10, 1989

Angola Accuses Pretoria of Breaking Peace Pact

By ROBERT PEAR

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 9 — Angola asserted today that South Africa had violated the recently signed peace accords by sending troops back into southern Angola. South Africa denied the accusation.

Angola's Defense Minister, Col. Pedro Maria Tonha, said South African Army forces entered southern Angola on Wednesday and fired on Angolan Army units, according to a report on Angolan national radio monitored by Reuters.

At the end of August, Angolan and South African officials said all South African troops had left Angola. Pretoria and Washington have been supporting the Angolan guerrillas in their war against the Luanda Government, which is backed by the Soviet Union.

Tonight, a State Department spokesman said, "We have no evidence of any South African military incursion in southern Angola." But, he said, "our information does indicate" that there has been renewed fighting between the Angolan Government and the guerrillas near the town of Caiundo in southern Angola. The guerrillas have taken responsibility for starting the clashes, and South Africa has denied that it was involved, he said.

The dispute between Luanda and Pretoria came as a leader of the Angolan guerrilla forces asked the United States for antiaircraft guns, artillery and other weapons to sustain an offensive begun this week against the Angolan Government.

The guerrilla leader, Tony da Costa Fernandes, who is visiting Washington, said, "We need material help very urgently so we can defeat what we see coming in the next few months" — a series of assaults by the Angolan Government and its Cuban allies.

Mr. Fernandes, who is chairman of the foreign affairs committee of the guerrilla group, the National Union for

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In S. Africa, De Klerk Likely to Stay the Course

Tough New Party Chief Has Backed Botha

By William Claiborne
Washington Post Foreign Service

CAPE TOWN, South Africa, Feb. 4—When Frederik W. de Klerk, who in all likelihood will become the next president of South Africa before the year is out, was named minister of white education five years ago, it was an appointment not lightly taken.

The ruling National Party, whose leadership de Klerk inherited Thursday from ailing President Pieter W. Botha, traditionally dispenses the education portfolio only to a man who, in Afrikaner idiom, has the "steel teeth" required to keep white South African schools white.

De Klerk's credentials for that task and for protecting the other foundations of apartheid that his party built are formidable, notwithstanding his acquiescence to the reforms that have been made in that system of racial separation in the past 10 years.

Through deed and word, de Klerk in his 17 years in Parliament has remained uncompromisingly committed to the principle the government euphemistically calls the maintenance of "own affairs," which to the 23 million-strong black majority translates as racial segregation.

It is a concept based on a deep faith in the "group pillar" philosophy upon which apartheid is predicated, the belief that each ethnic group in South Africa—white, black, Indian and mixed-race "Colored"—is a separate pillar of the society and should govern its own affairs.

During a debate in Parliament last year, de Klerk made himself clear on the subject. "The National Party demands, as a basic pattern," he said, "that own residential areas be maintained, that own state schools are not threatened . . . and this is also done by the maintenance of own facilities."

It is a sentiment shared by most National Party members in Parliament, even the reformists, but one not always expressed so bluntly.

Most Afrikaners have a deep respect for what they call *kragdadigheid*—iron-like strength and inflexibility—and they don't associate such strength with vagueness of principle or leniency with adversaries.

Botha's friends and enemies alike

respectfully call the president "the crocodile" for his toughness of judgment against those who he feels have wronged him or failed in their duty to support his principles.

De Klerk, despite his urbane and personable manner, is said by his associates to have the same quality, although he has sought to soften his image and has benefited from having his views compared with those of his opponents in the extreme right-wing Conservative Party.

It was this toughness, National Party insiders said, that made de Klerk, 52, Botha's choice as party leader and heir apparent when the president decided to ease himself out of politics at the age of 73.

When Foreign Minister Roelof F. Botha dared suggest publicly in 1986 that South Africa could someday have a black president, it was de Klerk, according to informed party sources, who advised the president to force the foreign minister to make a humiliating public retraction.

Although he has held six Cabinet posts, de Klerk has not initiated a single piece of legislation dealing with racial reform. But being as a self-described "team man," he has not publicly opposed reform moves.

In the next parliamentary election, which is expected this year and cannot be held later than March 1990, de Klerk will face a tough battle for reelection in the town of Vereeniging, south of Johannesburg, where voters have continued to move closer to the Conservative Party. Party strategists say it is unlikely that he will be able to modify his hard-line image further in such a contest.

De Klerk, who is a lawyer, was born into politics. His father, Jan, was a National Party Cabinet minister and president of the disbanded Senate. The younger de Klerk was a member of the party's youth wing, the Jeugbond, and was active in politics at Potchefstroom University in the Orange Free State.

He rose through party ranks, becoming in 1972 a member of Parliament and information officer of the Transvaal Province National Party, upon which he built a political base to become provincial party chairman. Cabinet portfolios he has held include posts and telecommunications, social welfare, sport and recreation, mining and home affairs.

A New Face for Old Policies in South Africa

By JOHN D. BATTERSBY

Special to The New York Times

CAPE TOWN, Feb. 3 — Frederik W. de Klerk, the newly elected leader of the governing National Party, is seen as a man likely to reflect, rather than drastically alter, the prevailing attitudes of South Africa's minority Government.

"I am basically a team man, and my style will be that of a team man," Mr. de Klerk said at a news conference after his election as the party leader on Thursday. "I like to be surrounded by strong people because strong people give good advice."

Mr. de Klerk, 52 years old, was chosen after President P. W. Botha, who is recuperating from a stroke suffered last month, resigned Thursday as leader of the party. Mr. Botha, 73, is staying on as President, although an Acting President has been named.

Unlike any of his predecessors, Mr. de Klerk, who is little known outside South Africa, will lead the ruling party without acquiring the executive powers of head of government.

But his election as party leader has established him as the heir apparent to the powerful state presidency, once Mr. Botha decides to step down.

In choosing Mr. de Klerk, the National Party is seen as having selected a safe party man rather than the more popular and charismatic Foreign Minister, Roelof F. Botha, or the younger and more liberal Finance Minister, Barend J. du Plessis.

Mr. de Klerk's political foes to the left regard him as an able, affable politician but a man incapable of the vision and innovation needed to extricate the country from its racial impasse and international isolation.

A Political Family

His foes on the far right of South African politics see him as a dangerous pragmatist, prepared to adopt the political language of change to further his political ambition.

Mr. de Klerk is a member of a political family. His father, Senator Jan de Klerk, was a Cabinet Minister in two former National Party Governments.

His elder brother, Willem A. de Klerk, is a key figure in attempts to unite liberals to the left of Government, having lost his editorship of a leading Afrikaans-language newspaper because of his advocacy of change.

As Minister of National Education, Frederik de Klerk is the custodian of apartheid at state-controlled schools, which he believes should remain rigidly segregated.

He was elected as a National Party legislator in 1972 and was appointed a Cabinet Minister in 1978.

In 1982 he handled the crisis of his political career when he took over as leader of the National Party in Trans-

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Botha: Fewer Titles, More Control?

By Lynda Schuster

Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

CAPE TOWN

DESPITE President Pieter Botha's recent resignation as head of South Africa's ruling National Party, government insiders say he isn't about to relinquish control of the country.

On the contrary, they see Mr. Botha hunkering down to some serious state business. His strategy: By divorcing himself from party politics, Botha effectively is free to take the relatively radical steps needed to bring disenfranchised blacks into national government. It's a plan colleagues believe the President long has been itching to implement.

"Botha wants to go down in history as the man who unified South Africa," explains a ranking government official close to Botha. "I think he'll stick around for at least another year to try to

get this thing off the ground."

The move to distance himself from his party, say political analysts, is highly significant. For starters, many view it as the culmination of Botha's steady accumulation of power during his decade-long presidency. Officials concede that now — at least technically — the President isn't accountable to anyone.

Perhaps more important is the substance of what he apparently wants to attempt. For despite the boldness of Botha's potential moves, many analysts contend, he still won't be willing to negotiate an end to white political control. And the bottom line for most blacks, analysts say, is apartheid's total abolition.

No matter how far removed he is from the Nationals, "Botha still is a prisoner of his own history," says Mark Swilling of the Centre for Policy Studies. "Unless he's willing to sacrifice his and his party's history of white domination, there is no way he can be the

great statesman who forges a new social compact."

Botha's resignation took most here by surprise. This, despite the fact that his five-year term as President is up in September and, under the Constitution, he then is required to call an election within six months. Many analysts had expected him to run again and so opt for an early ballot — mainly to preempt fallout from right-wingers opposed to South Africa granting Namibia independence on April 1.

But Botha suffered a stroke in January and suddenly all political planning was up in the air. That is, until last Friday, when Botha submitted his resignation to a National Party caucus some 10 minutes before it was set to meet. After three hasty ballots, Frederik de Klerk — the conservative-minded leader of Transvaal Province — replaced Botha as party leader.

Party members and analysts alike think it a stunning strategic

move. Catching the caucus off guard probably prevented a long and messy succession struggle, they say. That could have played into the hands of the opposition ultraright Conservative Party.

Moreover, Mr. de Klerk's election apparently just about clinches the matter of a prime minister. Botha has talked for some time about reestablishing that post and intends to push the legislation through this sitting of Parliament. The government official says the President wants to cut a deal whereby De Klerk will be named prime minister to take over the daily burden of running the country — thus freeing Botha to concentrate on reform issues.

Part of the deal, the official says, would include an agreement for an early election in which the Nationals would put up Botha as the presidential candidate — an unprecedented move, since the party leader has always been nominated. And, as he would not

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FEBRUARY 4, 1989

S. Africa eases stand on housing issue

New penalties barred in residential mixing

By Peter Honey

Sun Staff Correspondent

CAPE TOWN, South Africa — South Africa's white-dominated government has abandoned plans to impose harsh new penalties on blacks who move into so-called white areas in violation of residential apartheid, acting President Chris Heunis said yesterday.

He also said legislation to open some residential areas reserved for whites to all racial groups would go ahead. A government spokesman said he expected this to begin within the next few months.

But the government would not summarily scrap the Group Areas Act and similar apartheid laws that for more than 36 years have prohibited black, Indian and mixed-race people from settling in areas reserved for whites, the spokesman said.

The excluded groups account for more than 85 percent of the population, while whites, who make up the remaining 15 percent, occupy more than 80 percent of the land.

Delivering the opening address to this year's session of Parliament yesterday, Mr. Heunis said the government would seek to reduce the drift toward residential integration more by social management than by legislation.

"The key to the solution of the problem lies mainly in the availability of housing," he said.

Mr. Heunis touched on several other issues but offered no new policy or trends.

The government has come under increasing pressure from the left and right in recent months over the Group Areas Act. Liberal groups and anti-apartheid activists want the discriminatory laws abolished, while conservative and militant rightist groups want the legislation toughened to keep their communities "white."

Many so-called white areas have become racially mixed despite the law. For example, more than 80,000 blacks are said to be living illegally in the densely populated suburb of Hillbrow in the Johannesburg area.

The issue became particularly acute this week after a small group of white militants picketed a house in the Johannesburg white suburb of Mayfair West and prevented the new owner, an Indian man and his family, from moving in.

While the Group Areas Act technically prohibited the family from living in the area, they had evaded the restrictions by buying the house through a white nominee — a method that thousands of non-whites have used to buy into white suburbs around the country.

In a similar incident in the small town of Kraaifontein near Cape Town this week, the white Town Council evicted a mixed-race family who had moved into a rented property in the white part of town.

Right-wingers in other towns have threatened similar actions to force blacks out of their neighborhoods. Some town councils dominated by the right-wing Conservative Party have provoked a public outcry by restoring "whites-only" signs in public amenities such as parks, swimming pools and community halls.

The rightists claim they are merely acting within the laws introduced and administered by the National Party government.

Information Minister Stoffel van der Merwe conceded yesterday that this was true, but he said the government was moving away from discrimination in a gradual way so as to reduce the likelihood of social friction in suburbs that were becoming racially mixed.

"The government has to take cognizance of what is happening in the communities. We can't simply repeal the Group Areas Act and let

people act as they wish. That leads to incidents like we have had in Mayfair West and Kraaifontein," Mr. Van der Merwe said.

He said that although the government was responsible for the discriminatory laws, it was not hypocritical for it to criticize whites who wanted to reinforce apartheid.

"We are not trying to force or rush people into anything, but rather we want to influence them and persuade them to accept integration," he said.

"That is why we are extremely critical of people who want to reverse the trend away from discrimination."

Government officials estimated last year that there was a shortage of 500,000 houses for blacks, while there was a surplus of 40,000 units for whites.

Mr. van der Merwe said this was the unavoidable reason why blacks were moving into white areas.

He said the government finally had accepted the principle of mixed areas, adding that he expected the number of integrated areas to increase as (white) society accepted the idea.

The High Risk of Campaigning Against Apartheid

By Marjorie Hyer
Washington Post Staff Writer

For almost a month now, the Rev. Frank Chikane of Johannesburg has been on a mission that forces him to break his nation's laws almost every time he opens his mouth.

Chikane, 38, a minister of the Apostolic Faith Mission and general secretary of the South African Council of Churches, is a member of an international church group on a mission to Europe, Japan and the United States seeking help in eliminating South Africa's system of apartheid. The evil of that system is so pervasive that Chikane is willing to risk repercussions when he returns home later this month.

The black churchman is one of eight "eminent church persons" visiting government leaders of South Africa's major trading partner nations. Under the mandate of an international ecumenical church gathering that met in Lusaka last year, the group is urging government leaders to join in tough economic sanctions against South Africa to force an end to apartheid and a more equitable role for the country's black majority.

Chikane said in an interview here that increasingly strict press censorship keeps the outside world—and South Africans themselves—from knowing about the increasingly grim conditions there.

"It's very difficult to communicate details of what happens on a day-to-day basis" he said. "Almost every second person you talk to has been in prison at one stage or another. We are becoming a generation of prisoners and detainees." He recalled attending a church meeting recently where "we discovered everyone had been in prison at one stage or another."

More insidiously, the terror has now reached the children, he said. With the army a permanent fixture in the townships where blacks live, he said, "we are no more shocked when [army vehicles] drive amongst us when we go to work."

When parents go to work, "You leave the children, mostly, and old people in the townships and the army comes in, deals with the children during the day and leaves when you come back." He said it is not uncommon for parents to find their children missing when they return from work.

"They look for them in the hospitals, in the police stations, the mortuaries. And if you don't find them in those three places, then you think of them maybe in hiding or left the country or dead . . . or they are in detention and [authorities] don't tell you they are in

detention."

The perennial argument against economic sanctions—that it will deprive Africans of jobs—becomes increasingly irrelevant in such circumstances, he pointed out. "It's come to a level where losing a job doesn't mean much—the pain you go through from sanctions is not an important issue."

Chikane is the only South African in the delegation, except in Washington, where Archbishop Desmond Tutu, in this country on other business, flew in for the group's visit Tuesday with Secretary of State James Baker. Tutu, who has been sharply critical of the South Africa policy of the Reagan administration, was cautiously optimistic after the visit.

"I don't want to be euphoric, but we certainly have been impressed," he said, adding that the new secretary seemed "not dogmatic" and open to new ideas as the new administration develops its policy.

"He did not dismiss us, he listened to us with very considerable interest," Tutu said after the half-hour visit.

Chikane said that the South African regime has grown increasingly repressive and reluctant to change. From February to November last year, he said, 34 organizations—"those who are using peaceful means of change"—have been banned and 55 persons have been "restricted," a process he described as "almost house arrest."

"Our entire leadership [of the Council of Churches] is in prison or is restricted or in hiding or underground or they've gone into exile," he said.

"Restrictions on the press intensified during that period" last year, he said. "Basically the restrictions are such that the government is able to control what the world knows and what it shouldn't know . . . what South Africans could know and what they shouldn't know."

"You can only say positive things about the government and its leaders. If you make a critical statement, then it becomes illegal to publish that."

"The law says I cannot say that children are brutalized by the army, even if I've seen it and I've got evidence, because that's a subversive statement . . . you are discrediting their security forces. You're lowering the morale of the security forces by actually talking about what they are doing. That's what the regulations say."

Chikane believes that by cracking down on groups that advocate nonviolent change, the government is forcing a crisis that can only be "a blood bath."

Last February, when church members tried a peaceful march from the cathedral in

Cape Town to the nearby parliament building, they were halted and arrested as they prayed.

What the government contends, he said, is that "if you oppose the apartheid system actively, you are opting for violence . . . They say you are forcing the police to act violently and therefore you are causing the violence. It is a very strange logic."

"The world is evil, it's immoral," Chikane said. While others may deplore what is going on in South Africa, "They want to act [only] when we are killed in one place in big numbers. Then they begin to make noises."

"If the system continues brutalizing us for many many years . . . it is not a problem. It is only when the police have shot 20 people in one place at the same time, then it makes a difference."

"If one dies per day over 19 or 20 days . . . it doesn't matter."

Some who are battling apartheid are beginning to say, according to Chikane, that "it does look like, if you don't go to the streets, which means you get killed in great numbers, the world is not going to take it seriously . . . It is tragic, but it looks like the world is waiting for that to happen."

"The possibility of a blood bath is real for us and we feel it is important" for people of good will elsewhere "to do something now and not later, to change the concrete conditions in the country to force [the white minority regime] to the negotiation table."

THE SUN FEBRUARY 5, 1989

SOUTH AFRICA

3 white parties unite to combat apartheid

Three of South Africa's white anti-apartheid parties agreed yesterday to end their fragmentation and form a unified multiracial political party to challenge the governing National Party.

The decision was made after months of negotiations and amid growing speculation that a general election could be held by September.

The new grouping, to be known as the Democratic Party, will bring together the liberal-to-moderate Progressive Federal Party, the more liberal National Democratic Movement and the Independent Party, a group that is more establishment-oriented.

The three parties hold a total of 20 seats in the 178-seat white house of Parliament. There are no blacks among the new group's leaders.

Bush should concentrate on South Africa and Poland

By Andrew Nagorski
and Pauline H. Baker

If a new era in international relations is at hand, economic growth and moral authority rather than military power are now the key weapons in the global competition between communism and democratic capitalism. Instead of simply reacting to Mikhail S. Gorbachev's skillfully presented proposals, George Bush should be devising creative initiatives of his own. One fresh approach would be to focus simultaneously on Poland and South Africa.

For all their vast differences, those two countries present foreign policy challenges that are strikingly similar. They exemplify much more than geopolitical or regional trouble spots; their internal crises are historic struggles aimed at achieving fundamental human rights and a stable transition to representative government.

Mr. Bush should signal his understanding of the moral significance that underlies these struggles by declaring U.S. support for the legalization of political opposition

Mr. Nagorski and Ms. Baker are senior associates at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. This article is appearing simultaneously in the Arizona Republic.

For all their vast differences, those two countries present foreign policy challenges that are strikingly similar.

groups in both countries.

By doing so, Mr. Bush would accomplish several objectives. He would be demonstrating a commitment to human rights that transcends partisan politics or narrow ideological crusades that selectively target regimes of only the left or the right. He would be laying the foundation for a bipartisan foreign policy that would win congressional support. And he would be providing a pointed reminder that global tensions today often result not from territorial conquest or military conflict, but from internal repression.

In both Poland and South Africa, the government refuses to acknowledge the right of a vast majority of the citizenry to legitimate social and political representation. For Poland, the rationale is ideological; for South Africa, it is racial. But in each case, an embattled minority — Polish

Communists and South African whites — is desperately clinging to the levers of power, convinced that its own survival depends on fighting off all attempts by the majority to attain full political rights.

The results are increasingly polarized societies, with frustration and anger simmering in Poland and intermittently exploding in South Africa. Repression has neither eliminated the opposition nor dissolved political grievances. While each government has periodically resorted to liberal gestures, both have balked at anything that smacks of genuine power-sharing.

The major stumbling block in Poland is the government's fear of Solidarity, the banned independent trade union that still commands widespread support. Earlier this month, Prime Minister Mieczyslaw F. Rakowski proposed the legalization of the union but attached numerous conditions that would cripple the opposition movement. Solidarity, which has agreed to talk to the government but has not agreed to its terms, would have to accept a strike moratorium until 1991 and proclaim its allegiance to the Communist system, assuring its subservience to the regime.

A few months ago, the government appeared to be ready to enter into unconditional "round table" talks with the opposition, but then it began backpedaling. Now the talks

have finally started, there is renewed hope — but the odds against success still appear long. Unless the government is willing to accept Solidarity as both a potential partner and rival with rights of its own, the union will be forced to reject its terms. If the stalemate continues into the spring, Poland is likely to experience a new round of strikes and confrontations, which could easily spin out of control.

The South African government has signed a peace agreement for southwestern Africa, but it continues to muzzle the press, detain anti-apartheid leaders and restrict popular opposition groups at home. The African National Congress, the oldest and most popular nationalist movement that adhered to non-violent protest for 50 years, has been banned since 1960, after which it turned to violent tactics. The United Democratic Front, a relatively new umbrella organization of anti-apartheid groups committed to non-violence, has been severely restricted under a state of emergency decree, and four of its top leaders were recently convicted of treason.

By lumping together violent and non-violent groups and criminalizing legitimate political dissent, Pretoria is deepening black rage and raising the potential for a revival of

revolutionary activism that swept the country in 1984-1986.

Economic pressures are also mounting in both countries. The Polish economy is saddled with \$39 billion in hard currency debts, an inflation rate of more than 60 percent and declining real wages. The government is hoping to appease the public with the promise of economic reforms, including an expansion of the private sector. But past failures indicate that Poles will not support economic reforms unless they are accompanied by significant political concessions.

South Africa is likewise facing severe financial constraints. U.S. sanctions enacted by Congress in 1986 have begun to bite. Debt, disinvestment, scarcity of foreign loans and a depressed gold price are also taking a toll. South Africa is desperately short of hard currency. The economy has grown at an annual average rate of 1 percent throughout the 1980s. By 1990, the bunching of foreign debt will bring South Africa to a new financial precipice, from which it is unlikely to pull back without international cooperation. Increasingly, world leaders are in agreement that the South African government should not be bailed out unless it addresses basic political issues.

The efforts by both governments to grapple with their economic problems, attain international legitimacy and relieve domestic political pressures provide the West with a window of opportunity to exert some leverage.

In Poland's case, it has already done so. After the imposition of martial law in 1981, the United States applied economic sanctions, including the lifting of most-favored-nation trade status and a ban on government credits, which helped force the government to ease its hard-line policies. In recognition of such steps as the lifting of martial law and freeing of political prisoners, the United States eliminated all sanctions by 1987.

Although the impact of sanctions varies, the Polish experience demonstrates that Western pressures can influence societies dependent on external capital at crucial junctures. That lesson should be applied to South Africa, now at the point of having to make hard political choices. The time is ripe for the international community not to retreat, as it may do with the Angola-Namibia disputes nearing resolution, but to press forward with the larger agenda within South Africa itself.

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THE NEW YORK TIMES,

Pretoria Banker Discounts Sanctions

By CHRISTOPHER WREN

Special to The New York Times

CAPE TOWN, Feb. 6 — The head of South Africa's central bank said today that the nation was surviving the damage of Western economic sanctions despite a reduced annual growth rate and a heavy outflow of capital.

The banker, Gerrit de Kock, president of the the South African Reserve

Bank, said sanctions had contributed to a net outflow of 25 billion rand, or more than \$10 billion, from South Africa over the last four years. Half of that, Mr. de Kock said, went to pay off debts that became due as foreign banks began calling in loans.

"But we have made the adjustment, we have repaid the debt and we have run huge current accounts surpluses," Mr. de Kock said. He added that South Africa reduced its foreign

debt to about \$21.5 billion in 1988 from \$27.5 billion in 1985.

The banker made his remarks at a briefing today for foreign journalists on South Africa's financial outlook.

New Sanctions Studied

New financial sanctions aimed at isolating South Africa in the international money market are being discussed this week by eight nations in the Commonwealth. The foreign

ministers of those nations — Australia, Canada, Guyana, India, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe — are attending a three-day meeting in Harare, Zimbabwe.

Previous economic sanctions, which have included making Western companies pull out of South Africa or cut their trade links, have tried to force the country to change its apartheid policies.

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THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

Namibian Independence — Hard Work Ahead

By Robert I. Rotberg

PEACEKEEPING in Namibia will not be easy. The South African-dominated territory on the southwestern shores of the continent is vast, its peoples and languages diverse, and its communications system underdeveloped.

In accord with an agreement painfully negotiated late last year by South Africa, Angola, Cuba, and the United States, South Africa has withdrawn its troops from southern Angola and promised to scale back its occupying force in Namibia. A United Nations Security Council plan, devised in 1978, stipulates that the South African army units will be replaced by 7,500 UN-sponsored, armed, keepers of the peace.

The UN force is needed to keep the peace internally and to prevent any outsiders (including South Africa) from influencing or interfering in Namibia's elections. The territory's 1.2 million people will vote in November for a constituent assembly. The assembly will write the future nation's constitution. All of its decisions will have to be taken by a two-thirds majority. South Africa hopes to prevent its popular black opponents from winning a two-thirds majority of the seats in the assembly.

The big powers in the UN Security Council want a force smaller than 7,500 in order to reduce its estimated \$650 million cost. The South West African People's Organization (SWAPO), which has been fighting to oust South Africa from Namibia since 1966, naturally prefers as much military protection as possible.

SWAPO distrusts South Africa's intentions. So did the US and the other Western big powers, who in 1978 framed Security Council Resolution 435 and specified the size of the peacekeeping force. They argued that 7,000 men were needed to ensure an honest election.

Those fears are still real. After all,

South Africa has controlled Namibia since 1915, first as the conqueror of what was the German colony of South West Africa, then as an agent of what became a League of Nations mandate, and, finally, after 1946, in defiance of UN orders that it place Namibia under the control of the United Nations Trusteeship Council.

Only in 1977, after President Carter threatened to impose unspecified sanctions, did South Africa end its near-incorporation of Namibia and begin to negotiate with the US and other Western powers. Many false promises and stalling maneuvers later, South Africa finally appears to be surrendering control.

But Namibia is nearly twice the size of California, and seven-eighths desert and semi-desert. South Africa knows the people and the terrain. Even 7,500 UN troops may understand Namibia only slowly.

Nearly two-thirds of all Namibians, especially the dominant Ovambo (700,000) and their Kavango (90,000) and Caprivi (50,000) neighbors live in the northern, well-watered eighth of the country along the Angolan border. This is SWAPO country and also the area of greatest South African military penetration. Consequently, most of the UN troops will have to be stationed (and provisioned) in a region that is at least 300 miles from Windhoek,

rica's presence in and around Windhoek will remain, for South African Airways and South African trains will continue to connect Namibia to the rest of the world. Walvis Bay, Namibia's only real port, is a South African-owned enclave; trains will continue to carry imports from that port to Windhoek and take exports of uranium oxide and copper there.

Central Namibia is also the home of 90,000 Damara, 85,000 Herero, 40,000 mixed-background coloreds (recent immigrants from South Africa), 9,000 Tswana, and 35,000 San (Bushmen). South of Windhoek to the Orange River, a dry grazing area, live 45,000 brown-skinned Baster farmers and a few thousand whites. Windhoek, with 150,000 people, is the only sizable city.

South Africa has been subsidizing Namibia and spending \$1 billion a year on its army. So it wants out. But for at least 10 years it has called SWAPO (supported by the Soviet Union) a terrorist menace.

Although South Africa has reconciled itself to the likelihood of a SWAPO electoral victory, it still seeks to prevent a two-thirds sweep. South Africa will back financially and in other ways a coalition of anti-SWAPO non-Ovambo parties.

The task of the UN peacekeeping force, and of the much smaller UN elections supervisory team, will be to watch out for and frustrate undue South African influence between April and November.

Modern electronic surveillance techniques will not be sufficient. A large and savvy contingent of blue berets will certainly be required. Even then, the peacekeepers and the supervisors will need to be wary, lest South Africa continues to influence the Namibians it has governed, coerced, and befriended for so long.

The task of the UN peacekeeping force and elections supervisory team will be to frustrate undue South African influence.

Namibia's capital.

UN troops will also have to monitor activity in the central belt of the country, where 65,000 white farmers, civil servants, and businessmen are dominant. South Af-

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A frail new infant in Africa

ON ALL Fools' Day, April 1st, a new African state begins its transition to independence, the first to win freedom since Zimbabwe shook off white minority rule ten years ago. South Africa arrived in Namibia during the first world war and has held onto it since 1946 in defiance of the United Nations. Last December it agreed to pull its soldiers out, in return for a promise that Cuba will pull its soldiers out of Angola.

The Namibia timetable is set by the UN. By late June South Africa is supposed to withdraw all but 1,500 of its own troops. Its departing army is alleged to be hiding guns and ammunition, and training bands of Namibians to use them against a future independent government. By the same date the South Africans are supposed to disband their locally recruited army, the South-West Africa Territorial Force. But South Africa plans to keep paying all these soldiers even after they are disbanded and, before it leaves, to give the men of its toughest anti-terrorist unit new jobs in the Namibian police. The former "terrorists" who hope to form Namibia's new government are not happy about this.

On November 1st the Namibians will elect a constituent assembly. A free vote would probably give the South-West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO), the Namibian independence movement recognised by the UN, a majority, but probably not the two-thirds it needs to design the constitution by itself. The South Africans would like to prevent a two-thirds majority. They put up anti-SWAPO posters in health clinics, and are said to have handed out Namibian identity cards to enfranchise some of the Angolan UNITA rebels based under their protection in northern Namibia. SWAPO, for its part, is accused of trying to smuggle its own Angolan allies on to the election register.

Given these uncertainties, many Africans complain that the UN is not being motherly enough. Ten years ago it laid plans for a "Transition Assistance Group" of 7,500 soldiers to oversee the independence process. The big countries that would have to pay most of the bills say this is more than is needed. The peacekeeping force may be cut to 4,650 men, for a saving of some \$284m. In partial compensation the UN has proposed raising the number of policemen in its force from 360 to 500. It has asked the South Africans to dismiss some of their 8,000 Namibian policemen, and says it will stop South Africa re-employing its anti-terrorist men in the new nation's police force.

However big the UN force, the South Africans could disrupt Namibia if they wanted. For years they kept Mozambique and Angola intimidated, and they know the Namibian terrain even better. Even after independence, South African soldiers will be on hand in Walvis Bay, a Namibian port which is and will remain a part of South Africa.

A SWAPO government might inspire the

sort of domestic opposition that South Africa could exploit. The South Africans encouraged the Namibians to organise themselves on tribal lines, and each tribe has its party. For the November election these opposition splinters will probably form into two bundles: one, to be called the United Democratic Front, for those in the current South African-sponsored government; the other, the Namibia National Front, for those who stayed out. Between them they may get two-fifths of the vote.

SWAPO is largely a tribal movement too, although it is more than that. It is based on the Ovambo people who make up just over half of Namibia's population. (The next-largest tribe, the Herero, were the majority until the Germans tried a genocide campaign in the 1890s.) SWAPO's toughness might push its opponents towards accepting South African arms. Like most guerrilla movements, it can sometimes treat its dissidents arbitrarily: about 100 of its members and ex-members are now locked up, allegedly for spying for South Africa.

On the other hand, South Africa may desist from promoting its tribalist ways. Its government seems to have stopped meddling in Mozambique, as well as in Angola. The promise to leave Namibia—another sign of South Africa's change of heart—won President Pieter Botha invitations to visit four African states last year. Mr F.W. de Klerk, anointed on February 2nd as his apparent successor (see page 41), will be no more likely to risk antagonising these new foreign friends by blocking Namibian independence.

Even if its birth is peaceful, Namibia's new government will have economic problems. Its rich mines and fisheries are controlled by, and may have been over-exploited by, foreign firms, most of them South African. Starting from May, about 80,000 Namibian exiles (nobody knows the exact number) will return to their country. They will not easily find work.

The 78,000 whites in Namibia control the economy. At independence, many will choose South African citizenship. SWAPO claims that white Namibians are, on average, 25 times richer than blacks. Walvis Bay, which will remain South African, is the long coastline's only good natural port. Almost all overland trade goes through South Africa. South African and other foreign-owned mines produce at least a third of the country's wealth. The minerals go to South Africa and other countries for processing, and foreigners bag the profits.

Elsewhere in Africa, newly independent governments have expropriated foreign firms, deprived themselves of white skills and capital, and ruined their countries. SWAPO's civilian leaders say they will avoid that trap: their policy document, published last November, declares the "moral superiority of social ownership", but goes on to

Baker calls on Sudan and rebels to allow relief to famine victims

Cox News Service

Secretary of State James A. Baker III, distancing himself from the policy of his immediate predecessor, has called on the government of Sudan and Sudanese rebels to stop obstructing relief to starving people caught in southern Sudan's famine.

Mr. Baker's comments Wednesday marked the first time a high administration official has spoken out publicly on the famine, which is estimated to have killed as many as 500,000 people in the past year.

The Reagan administration had taken a low-key approach to the famine and had said little about the government's involvement in worsening the starvation.

Despite the criticism, Sudan's ambassador to the United States, Hassan el Anin el Bashir, said he was happy with Mr. Baker's remarks, partly because he interpreted them to mean the United States will not support a military coup in Sudan.

Bordering on Egypt and six other nations, Sudan is the largest country in Africa and is strategically important. Until a few years ago, it received more U.S. military and economic aid than any other country in sub-Saharan Africa.

Mr. Baker called for a cease-fire in the war and said, "We call on authorities at all levels on both sides to remove remaining obstacles and do everything possible to provide emergency relief to victims caught in the war zone."

Congressional and other critics who have urged the State Department for months to speak out on the famine praised Mr. Baker's statement as the strongest indication yet that the new administration will give Sudan's troubles high priority.

say that redistribution of wealth will be limited and tactful. Land reform will proceed by dispossessing absentee landlords first, then owners of more than one farm.

Nobody knows whether the civilians, rather than the unsophisticated fighters, will decide a future SWAPO government's policies. The movement's president, Mr Sam Nujoma, tells foreign businessmen his country needs them. On January 30th another senior SWAPO figure, Mr Andimba Toivo ja Toivo, went so far as to say that Namibia would co-operate with South Africa. Namibia will need more such realism if it is to follow Botswana's road to political pluralism and mineral-based prosperity.

Food for Sudan

FEBRUARY 6, 1989

The U.S. government finally is moving in the direction of getting food to people who are starving in the Sudan while their government blocks relief supplies from reaching areas controlled by rebels. Hundreds of thousands have died of hunger already, according to the United Nations, from the combined effects of drought, war and the deliberate withholding of food shipments from parts of southern Sudan, where rebels have waged war against the government for five years.

Until now, the United States has been reluctant even to criticize the Sudanese government, which is friendly and strategic, for fear of damaging the fragile coalition of Prime Minister Sadiq al Mahdi. The U.S. also was concerned that pressure on the Sadiq government would push it closer to Libya, Sudan's neighbor. But the Sadiq government has taken actions in recent weeks that have led to frustration and criticism in this country.

Not only has the government made it difficult for supplies to get to rebel-held areas, it has expelled four Western relief organizations. The Sadiq government also has grown closer to Libya and

has spurned recent calls for a cease fire in the south, where Christian and animist forces of the Sudan People's Liberation Army are battling the Islamic government and its effort to impose Islamic law throughout the country. While the civil war rages, the government is openly hostile to relief efforts to aid the people of the south. The government is not the only culprit. The rebels apparently use food as a weapon, too. But that does not make the government's action more acceptable.

Yet, the United States said nothing of government atrocities, and continued to funnel aid into the country solely through a government that would not help people in its southern regions. But frustration with the Sadiq government has reached the point where the United States has decided to explore the possibility of moving food from Kenya directly into the war-torn south.

The decision is a good one. It took long, loud criticism from Congress and the press before the State Department would act. But it has taken action at last that will benefit the people of southern Sudan, who desperately need our help.

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

February 9, 1989

Hunger Prompts US to Tread Risky Path on Sudan Policy

Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

WASHINGTON

By Robert M. Press

THE United States response to massive, war-caused starvation in southern Sudan has entered a new and politically risky phase. Although US officials deny there has been a shift in policy toward Sudan, a recent decision to send food to starving civilians in rebel-held regions, without the Sudanese government's permission, marks a significant change of tactics.

Officials in Washington point to two reasons for putting humanitarian needs above diplomacy:

- The immensity of civilian suffering.
- Failure by Sudan's leaders to end the five-year civil war in the south.

This has been a decision long in coming. For three years, since Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi's election, the US government dealt exclusively with him on the issue of food relief in the south. And for three years the human toll due to starvation mounted.

Prime Minister Mahdi refused to allow food to be delivered to rebel areas, arguing that it would be used by rebel soldiers and not civilians. Most of the south, except for the main towns and cities, is in rebel hands.

Last fall, the rebel Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and a major political party in Sudan's coalition government agreed on a plan to halt the fighting. Part of the deal called for a "freeze" on government proposals to impose Islamic law (*sharia*) on Sudan. Most of the south is not Muslim, and rebel leaders oppose the *sharia* plans.

But, under Mahdi's direction, the peace plan was only partially adopted by parliament in December. The agreement to freeze *sharia* proposals was dropped, effectively killing the deal.

"He [Mahdi] missed a chance; that's what everyone is saying," says a US official involved in policy toward Sudan. "The opportunity [for peace] has been lost for the moment."

An estimated 250,000 to 500,000 civilians have died in the war, which began in 1983, US relief sources say. At least another 1.5 million have fled to the capital, Khartoum, where they live in squalid conditions. World Vision, a US-based relief agency says several hundred civilians may be starving each day in the south.

The suffering in Sudan "is one of the

worst disasters of the century," says World Vision's Tom Getman.

US congressional impatience is growing.

"The feeling in Congress is: Let's get a cease-fire and pump in all [the relief] we can," says US Rep. Frank Wolf, (R) of Virginia. Mr. Wolf traveled to Sudan, including a rebel-held area, last month and is convinced that relief must be sent to civilians wherever they are.

That has been US policy all along, US officials say. US Agency for International Development (AID) officials have been pushing for more than a year to send food to civilians in rebel-held areas.

But until now, the US bowed to Mahdi's wishes. He has allowed the International Committee of the Red Cross to deliver some food, but deliveries are interrupted by frequent fighting. Now, the priority to not anger Mahdi appears to have been nudged aside.

"We're putting the stress on meeting the human needs and getting peace," one US official said in an interview.

"It's important that that part of Africa be stable. [Sudan is] a democracy — one of the few in Africa," he said.

FEBRUARY 9, 1989

Sudan urged to end war

By Thomas J. Breen
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Secretary of State James A. Baker III yesterday urged the government and rebels in Sudan to agree to a cease-fire to allow U.S. and worldwide relief groups to funnel food to tens of thousands of starving civilians there.

Sudan has been wracked by civil war for five years. At least 300,000 refugees fled to Ethiopia after the Sudanese government began cutting off Western food shipments to areas in the rebel-held south in 1988. The African nation has about 25 million people.

The State Department estimated that the cutting off of food shipments to the south had claimed at least 150,000 deaths by starvation in 1988.

"The sad reality . . . is that starvation will almost certainly not end until the fighting ends," Mr. Baker said in a three-paragraph statement issued at a State Department briefing.

"We call on all authorities at all levels on both sides to remove remaining obstacles and do everything to provide emergency relief to victims caught in garrison towns and other areas of the war zone," the secretary added.

In recent weeks, the United States has grown increasingly frustrated with the government in Khartoum, which is fighting the Sudan People's Liberation Army in the south and has continued to block efforts by U.S. and Western relief agencies to provide food to rebel-held areas.

But the West has persisted in shipping food into those areas, with yesterday's statement by Mr. Baker viewed as a clear sign that the Bush administration aims to become increasingly involved in Sudan relief efforts.

Meanwhile, Western relief agencies yesterday were hailing the Baker statement.

Said a spokesman for the U.S. Committee for Refugees, "This [the Baker statement] is a very positive sign."

One of the chief causes of the Sudanese strife is the government's attempt to make Shariah, the Islamic

Treasure for Pleasure

Liberia's American money managers gave up

The 17 American accountants, bank examiners and economists seemed well suited to their mission: straightening out the chaotic finances of the West African nation of Liberia. They began to realize what a job they faced when shipments of \$60,000 Mercedeses earmarked for government ministers turned up on the docks. When they learned that the country's president had impulsively given \$1 million to the national soccer team to mark its victory over Ghana, they began to suspect the task was impossible. When they left in frustration late last year, practically all they had to show for nearly a year's effort was a case study in how not to manage public money.

Founded by freed American slaves in 1847, Liberia has been stumbling through the 1980s. M/Sgt. Samuel K. Doe, then 28, took power in a bloody 1980 coup, and began reigning over economic decay: the country's gross domestic product actually shrank, by 1.3 percent, between 1980 and 1986. Doe's pro-American policies won him the embrace of Ronald Reagan—literally, at a 1982 White House photo session—and with that came \$500 million in aid over five years. But Congress lost patience with the Doe regime's mismanagement, corruption and human-rights violations, and began cutting the donations. Finally, as a step toward getting aid renewed, Doe invited Washington to help him run his country's finances. He vowed close cooperation with American experts and gave them cosigning authority over government spending.

Attacked by domestic critics for ceding the budget to foreign control, the president had second thoughts even before the American team arrived in January of 1988. Once in Liberia, the overseers couldn't get in to see the president. The U.S. program direc-



LOUISE GUBB—JB PICTURES
Mercurial: Doe

tor did see Doe by chance: the mercurial president appeared at the Finance Ministry, accused the minister of being tardy—and on the spot fired him, his deputy and 150 staff members. Other Liberian officials politely made it clear that their commitment to austerity measures stopped short of depriving themselves of perks. Asked if he couldn't make do with a nice, inexpensive Japa-

nese car, a Mercedes-borne minister replied: "I wouldn't be seen dead in one."

Loopholes in the agreement turned out to be big enough to fly through in a helicopter—one of the presidential purchases that took the Americans by surprise. Liberia actually runs on two budgets, wholly separate. Gasoline taxes and logging taxes go straight to the president's discretionary budget. This was off limits to the U.S. auditors. In all, Doe personally controls some 40 percent of government revenue, spending much of that on his military power base.

Bad form? Some critics suggest it was bad form for the Americans to quibble over such ploys—sometimes referred to as "the African way"—when they enjoyed real control over 60 percent of national revenues. Liberian Finance Minister David M. Farhat says they lacked sensitivity to cultural differences. In any case, the mission's failure to reopen the aid pipeline could prove costly not only to Liberia but also to the United States. Liberia permits American military planes to land and refuel at Monrovia's Roberts Field, and plays host to a CIA regional headquarters and a Voice of America transmitter. There are hints that an almost-broke Liberia may emulate the Philippines government and seek much higher rent for those facilities.

BRADLEY MARTIN with JANE WHITMORE
in Washington

code, the law of the land. Sudan, like several other sub-Saharan states, is divided into a largely Islamic north and a predominantly Christian and animist south.

The United States has long supported Sudan, Africa's biggest state, and regards a friendly government there as crucial to the security of Egypt on the north.

During the previous government, the United States and Sudan viewed

radical Libya as a common enemy but the current leader, Prime Minister Sadeq Mahdi, has softened that stand.

The United States, partly to avoid pushing Sudan closer to Libya, had been hesitant to take aggressive action to aid famine victims.

But "the worsening situation there [Sudan] has forced the U.S. to become more aggressive," one analyst said.

AIDS IN AFRICA:

FEBRUARY 5, 1989

A TROUBLED HISTORY
OF DIAGNOSIS VS. DENIAL

By Sanford J. Ungar

The visitor to a major African capital had a startling experience when he was taken out to dinner by his host, a physician at the local university hospital, in mid-1987. Nearly everyone in the city's best restaurant seemed to know the man and greeted him enthusiastically, not just the other patrons — businessmen, lawyers, and government officials — but also the entire staff. Waiters tripped over each other to make him welcome. Finally, as his guest looked at him in puzzlement about the obsequious display, he leaned over and explained in a confidential tone: "They're all my patients. They all have AIDS."

Such an experience was not uncommon in the late 1980s in many of the major cities of Central and East Africa, where between 8 and 10 percent of the urban population is believed to be infected with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) that causes acquired immune deficiency syndrome. The pattern of AIDS in Africa has immobilized health systems and panicked those in charge of managing the economies. Because the disease appears to be transmitted primarily through heterosexual practices and blood transfusions, women and men are affected in almost equal numbers, as are virtually all socio-economic groups in the urban areas. The consequences for social order are profound.

The short history of AIDS in Africa, and of knowledge and research about it, is very troubled. Statistics are unreliable; a good deal of the scientific study is suspect; and in some countries, diagnosis has taken a back seat to denial. Once the problem was recognized, Africa did not have the resources to deal with it, and outsiders looking in have often seemed eager to blame the victims for their misery.

The first reports that the continent might have a serious problem with AIDS appeared in the Western scientific literature only in late 1983 and early 1984, well after alarm had begun to spread in the United States and other developed countries about a syndrome that appeared to infect primarily homosexual men, hemophiliacs, intravenous drug abusers, and Haitian immigrants.

In fact, the first known African cases of AIDS were identified two years earlier among well-to-do Africans visiting or living in Europe. Investigation soon revealed substantial numbers of people with AIDS or seemingly related afflictions and symptoms in such cities as Kinshasa and Kigali, the capitals of Zaire and Rwanda respectively. And once more information was available for comparison, it became clear that "slim disease," a wasting, life-threatening illness that had begun to sweep through Uganda, and to a lesser extent Tanzania, during the early 1980s was probably AIDS. Eventually, more than 80 percent of prostitutes in Nairobi tested positive for HIV; indeed, the rapid spread of the virus among that high-risk group in Kenya's booming capital has been compared to the earlier situation among homosexual men in San Francisco. In Zambia, after the revelation that President Kenneth Kaunda's

son had died of AIDS, any remaining complacency about the disease quickly disappeared.

Yet at first, the attempts to analyze and understand AIDS in Africa came across to some people (especially to sensitive African political leaders) as an effort to assign responsibility for an international problem to the poorest continent, and later, to stigmatize Africans for their social behavior. Indeed, some researchers hypothesized at one stage that HIV had actually originated in Africa, having mutated from a virus commonly found among African green monkeys, also known as vervets. How it was thought to spread to humans was never clear, although one theory implicated bites from pet

monkeys and the exposure to blood and internal secretions that might occur during the preparation of monkeys for smoking or other forms of cooking in some societies. Beneath the science lurked the implication of some bizarre and improper form of contact between humans and animals in Africa.

The argument that AIDS had come from Africa was buttressed for a time by the discovery that blood serum specimens frozen and banked years (or even decades) earlier in several African countries showed a high prevalence of weakly positive results in HIV tests. (It later turned out that similar results could also be produced with specimens banked in the United States as early as the late 1950s.)

Although there was no reason to believe that such speculation about Africa as the birthplace of this modern-day scourge was explicitly motivated by racism, Africans often interpreted it that way. As they saw it, AIDS had first come to light as a symptom of decadent Western behavior, particularly in the United States, and this was just an effort to use scientific verbiage to pass the buck and blame the victims.

African physicians and clinical investigators were rarely included in the early scientific meetings or written symposiums examining the nature of the disease on their own continent. (It was not until last September that such a meeting was actually held in Africa.) As outside scientists struggled to understand and explain the spread of AIDS in Africa, they produced other, questionable theories. For a time, it was fashionable to suggest that HIV was spread by insects common in tropical areas. Another focus was on certain African cultural practices, such as female circumcision, ritual scarification, and the therapeutic blood-letting and enemas administered by traditional doctors among some tribal groups. Because of the unhygienic circumstances associated with these practices, it was argued, Africans would likely be at unusual risk to AIDS. However, the data actually demonstrated little direct correlation between these practices and the disease — largely because such customs are now more prevalent in rural areas and AIDS, with a few exceptions, is more common in African cities.

Another sensitive issue in the study of AIDS in Africa involved accusations of greater sexual promiscuity on the part of Africans than other people. Understandably, given the pattern of the disease's spread in the West, researchers at first looked for evidence of homosexual or bisexual practices in the countries most seriously affected. But although homosexuality is thought to be common in the all-male compounds of migrant labor camps and in situations such as the

Continued on page 11

South African mines (where workers are separated from their families for long periods of time), it is still illegal in many African countries and there seems to be less of the overt, sequential homosexual activity found in other parts of the world. Africans are, in any event, reluctant to talk about the subject.

What does appear to be true among heterosexuals, as among homosexuals — in Africa as elsewhere — is that people who have a large number of sexual partners are more likely than monogamous individuals to contract AIDS. It is no secret that in many of the affected African countries, prosperous upper- and middle-class men, among others, tend to have many sexual liaisons at the same time, whether or not they are married.

It would be difficult to prove conclusively that all of this amounts to greater promiscuity than exists in, say, Paris, Rome, Bangkok, Manila, Rio, or even New York. What can be said, however, is that other sexually transmitted diseases, such as genital ulcers and chlamydia, are rampant in African cities, and the medical disruptions associated with those diseases may cause increased susceptibility to the transmission of AIDS.

Despite the widespread suffering from AIDS in Africa and the obvious need for outside help, for several years many countries were reluctant to cooperate with international study of the disease. Furious over being made scapegoats, they reacted by denying there was a problem. In late 1986, only seven African nations were willing to submit official figures on AIDS cases to the World Health Organization (WHO); a year later, 36 countries on the continent were cooperating with WHO, but it was not clear how many governments were truly prepared to take the political risks associated with an aggressive AIDS reporting and prevention program.

Some regimes were apparently worried about the effects on tourism. In a few instances, they accused Western scientists of obtaining and publishing information about the epidemiology of the disease in Africa without permission, creating a "scientific black market."

It is almost certainly true that some outsiders have exaggerated the place of AIDS on the list of serious public health problems in Africa. As to morbidity and mortality, malaria, diarrheal diseases, and malnutrition still stand as greater threats on the continent, as in other parts of the Third World, at this time. But it would be foolish to underestimate the scope or the urgency of the AIDS issue in Africa.

The exact number of cases in Africa is not known. WHO officially counted 14,000 people with AIDS in Africa as of July 1988, but the agency itself admitted that the true figure might be 10 times that; and some researchers believe that upwards of 5 million Africans may now be infected with HIV. (By contrast, the number of people in the United States thought to be infected with the virus stood between 1.5 million and 2 million in 1988, and there were about 70,000 actual AIDS cases.) In Uganda, which has been more open to discussion of the issue than most countries, the number of acknowledged cases went from 17 in 1983 and 29 in 1984 to 1,138 in 1987; according to some speculation, half of all Ugandan adults may have AIDS by the year 2000.

Perhaps most worrisome of all is the dra-

AIDS IN AFRICA: A TROUBLED HISTORY (Continued)

matic growth in the rate of AIDS infection among children, many of whom are infected before or at birth. Between 2 percent and 15 percent of pregnant women test positive for HIV in some areas of Central and East Africa, and a Nairobi study showed that more than half of the infants born to virus-infected mothers had HIV antibodies at birth.

One of the most compelling explanations for at least part of the spread of AIDS in Africa is also one of the simplest — that the disease has followed the path of the heavy trucks that haul food and other material from the Indian Ocean ports of Mombasa, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, into the interior of the continent. Along the way, there are plenty of bars and prostitutes catering specifically to the drivers; at least 30 percent of the drivers tested, according to some reports, are infected with HIV. To the extent that this urban disease has reached

small towns and rural areas, they invariably lie along or near the truck routes.

One particularly poignant and pathetic example is the Rakai district in southeastern Uganda, where AIDS has affected entire villages and people desperately turn to itinerant prophets for a miracle cure.

Another, less systematic means of spread into remote regions relates to the tradition in some countries that the widow of a dead man must return to the village of her birth. Since many such widows today are young and may carry the AIDS virus themselves, they are quite likely to pass it along further after they return home.

The facilities for diagnosis and treatment are, of course, less adequate in rural areas than in the cities, and so the reporting of cases is bound to be less reliable. It is when the disease is widely disseminated through an entire country that genuine devastation will result.

But nowhere in Africa — in urban or rural areas, in large countries or small — has anyone been equipped so far to handle the magnitude of the AIDS problem. Some nations still have only one doctor for every 25,000 people and ordinarily spend an average of \$10 per person per year on all health care costs. Just the test to confirm a single suspected case of HIV infection now costs about \$20, and the price of caring for 10 AIDS patients in the United States (some \$450,000) is more than the entire annual budget of a large hospital in Zaire.

The cost of the tests most frequently used to screen for HIV — and the time they take to perform — are major barriers to dealing with one of the most common sources of the disease, AIDS-infected blood donors and contaminated blood. Transfusions are used very widely (almost recklessly) in Africa, sometimes as a substitute for expensive medications that cannot be obtained; since blood banks may be limited or nonexistent, relatives of people who are seriously ill or about to have surgery will often turn up at the hospital to make their blood available on the spot. Yet if the blood being transfused is not to be trusted, it may create more problems than it solves.

WHO, as part of its ambitious program for dealing with AIDS in Africa, has provided money to some countries for the screening of

blood donors, but what is really needed is the development of a reliable new, cheap, rapid HIV test. (One test that has been developed in the United States and employed experimentally in Zaire takes only five or 10 minutes to perform; its cost is less than half that of the ELISA or Western Blot tests commonly used around the world, but, unfortunately, it also seems to be considerably less accurate.)

For the time being, the main hope for dealing with AIDS in Africa lies with public education about the disease and how it is spread. In several countries, graphic posters and simply written pamphlets warning about AIDS have been widely disseminated, with some success. In Uganda, the slogan that seems to have caught on is "Love Carefully." The Family Life Movement of Zambia, with the cooperation of that country's Ministry of Health, distributes a four-page flier entitled "AIDS and You." To confront the disease, the Movement says, requires "a return to the sexual morality proposed by our best Zambian traditions as well as Christianity, Islam, and Hinduism." In Rwanda, the national radio has been particularly active in the education and prevention effort.

Meanwhile, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has launched an ambitious effort to distribute condoms in Africa. Although they are regarded with suspicion in some societies where birth control has been slow to take hold and it is sometimes difficult to store condoms effectively in hot and humid tropical climates, there are indications that they have begun to catch on in certain afflicted countries. USAID and other national and international assistance agencies are also encouraging the use of disposable or sterile needles and syringes in Africa, so that the growing immunization programs against other diseases do not have the accidental effect of transmitting HIV.

There is, however, far to go. The appearance of a second virus, dubbed HIV-2, in Africa has raised many new questions. Initial epidemiological studies show that it is widespread in West Africa, particularly in Senegal, Ivory Coast, and Guinea-Bissau, where there have been relatively few cases of AIDS thus far.

Indeed, there are many debates and problems yet to come. If AIDS compromises recent improvements in infant mortality rates and thus comes to be perceived by the African public as a major killer of children, it may also set back many African countries' halting, but urgently necessary, programs to reduce the rate of population growth. And AIDS has an explosive potential in South Africa, where most of the cases reported so far have been among whites and have followed the patterns of the disease in the developed world. If blacks and whites there find cause to blame each other for the disease, it could open up new areas of conflict between them. Afrikaner extremists now accuse the African National Congress of sending HIV-infected guerrilla fighters across the borders on a subversive mission to spread AIDS among their brethren. And black miners in South Africa who test positive for HIV, according to some reports, have been quietly deported to neighboring countries. Yet wise policy and courageous political leadership, supported by culturally sensitive help from the outside, could actually make African countries the leaders in this fight against a serious international problem.

Shining Faith on Rusty Chairs

By Neil Henry

The 60 parishioners at Kabulonga Church sat in a cluster on rusty metal chairs: schoolteachers, bus drivers, cooks, janitors and other middle-class Zambians. It was discussion time on a rainy Sabbath morning, and the topic was AIDS.

First an algebra teacher from the west side of town stood up to insist that AIDS was nothing more than "a consequence of sin" and its victims little more than sinners.

This brought an indignant reply from a mine worker who declared that all people were sinners in one form or another, and that it wasn't right or Christian to judge people with AIDS.


For half an hour the talk went on, touching on subjects as disparate as Leviticus and extramarital relations, until a slender, soft-spoken music teacher named John Mwesa said something that everyone seemed to agree on.

"It's a bit like leprosy was in biblical times," Mwesa said, before leading the church choir in song. "It doesn't matter how or why a person gets sick. What's important is that we learn to do right and not treat people as outcasts."

These are very hard times for the 238,000 citizens of Lusaka, the capital of a southern African nation whose economic and social woes seem so complex and intractable.

At one time this copper-rich country enjoyed one of the highest standards of living on the continent. Twenty-five years later, burdened by a foreign debt of more than \$5 billion and stung by falling international copper prices that last year dipped as low as one-third the 1975 level, Zambia has become little more than another symbol of black Africa's travail.

Diesel fumes and dust choke the humid air of this city. The streets and sidewalks are in disrepair and downtown stores are bereft of consumer goods such as



BY LARRY FOGEL—THE WASHINGTON POST

shoes and auto repair parts.

In the city's health clinics, an estimated one out of every nine women giving birth tests positive for the AIDS virus, as does one out of every 12 pints of donated blood.

Recently, the Times of Zambia and the Zambia Daily Mail presented Lusaka readers with harrowing tales of unrest, of armed bandits terrorizing villagers and travelers and of teen-agers rioting over a government system of food rationing.

This is a city where shattered windshields of buses and taxis go unrepaired because of shortages of glass and where housewives must rise early each day just to claim a good spot in line on Cairo Road and Haile Selassie Avenue for subsidized allotments of cooking oil and corn meal.

Hope, in short, is a precious commodity in Lusaka. In the face of suffering and want, it remains

a quality almost essential for survival. And few places seem to have as generous a supply of it as the church in Kabulonga—a simple, unpretentious place where human faith and a reasoned consideration of contemporary issues go hand in hand.

"Most of the people who come here have decent jobs, but we aren't rich. We scrape to get along just like everyone else," said Jameson Namomba, an elder of the Seventh Day Adventist church who works as a salesman for an oil company here. "The church is a place to express religious belief, but it's also a link to a wider community."

The place doesn't look like much—a few score chairs set before a wooden table that serves as an altar in the gymnasium of a girls' school on the city's east side. There's no organ and rarely enough Bibles to go around.

But what's lacking in material is more than made up in soul. When the congregation isn't discussing matters such as AIDS or South Africa or public education, it's engaged in the business of worship and making music that would thrill even the most cynical of listeners.

Nearly three-quarters of Zambia's 7.7 million population are nominally Christian, but the figure doesn't reflect this country's extraordinary tribal diversity. This is the home of four major tribes and 73 subtribes, each speaking a different native dialect. Some carry a history of mutual hostility and conflict that stretches back for centuries.

Peculiarly carved from a plateau of grassland and forest in the vague shape of a butterfly by its British colonial rulers, Zambia has been independent for only 24 years. Although English is the official language, for many Zambians it is a second or even third tongue.

The task of forging a nation from so many parts, in fact, is still so new and daunting here

Continued on page 13

that Kenneth Kaunda, Zambia's president since independence, begins every public appearance with the declaration, "One Zambia!"—to which his listeners customarily reply, "One nation!"

At Kabulonga Church, that challenge takes on human form. "We have all the major tribes represented here. I'm a Tonga, for instance," said Namomba, a reserved man in his fifties, referring to a southern tribe.

"But my wife is a Lozi from the west. Long ago there was a truce made by our ancestors. One of the terms of peace was that whenever a Tonga or Lozi died, it was the sacred duty of the other tribe to attend the burial and make the loved ones smile again."

As several parishioners nodded in agreement, Namomba said many such tribal beliefs and practices survive to this day and are finely suited to Christianity, which was introduced here by

missionaries in the 19th century.

"There are some concepts that are universal," added Mwesa, the choir director. "Love your neighbor. Treat a man as you would have him treat you. Then there's the music. That's the greatest bond."

Mwesa, 51, who works for the Lusaka school system, started the 30-member Kabulonga Church choir 10 years ago as a way to preserve Zambia's musical tradition while blending it with western religious styles.

The result is a rich and eclectic repertoire that may include, during any given service, songs as diverse as the American hymn, "Amazing Grace," the black spiritual, "This Little Light of Mine," and traditional Zambian folk songs.

Last month, Lusaka hosted a conference on African-American relations that attracted more than 200 political officials, academicians and other experts from both sides of the Atlantic. For five days, the analysts examined the myriad crises confronting

this continent and discussed the singular ties of culture and history that Africa and America share. Those ties, they agreed, should be sustained and nurtured.

It was fitting, then, that one of the week's highlights came during a memorial service for an American leader of African descent, the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr., that was hosted by the U.S. Embassy—here. Packed tightly into a small library, the Africans and Americans heard speeches for an hour that night, then watched as Mwesa and his Heritage Singers performed, the men in maroon jackets, the women in white dresses.

With his back to the audience, Mwesa held up his index finger to make sure his singers were attentive. He blew into a harmonica to find the exact pitch. Then, with a sweeping gesture of his right hand, the choir erupted in song.

"We shall overcome. . .," the Zambians sang, and the crowd began to sway.

February 7, 1989

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

DAMAGE-CONTROL MISSION

Somali Leader Makes His Case in US

By Linda Feldmann

Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

WASHINGTON

SOMALI Prime Minister Mohamed Ali Samater's damage-control mission to the United States was a win, lose, and draw venture.

The 10-day visit was a success, a ranking State Department official says, because it exposed Somalia's No. 2 leader and other officials to a variety of players in Washington's policy toward Somalia—from top administration policymakers to congressmen to human rights activists.

"All this contact is helping them," the US official says. "They're beginning to realize what an awful image they have. And they're beginning to realize they won't get what they want just by saying the right words."

In a sense the mission also backfired, because it refocused news media attention on the very

issue the Somalis are trying to counteract—allegations of gross human rights violations. The visit also reinvigorated Somali dissidents in the US, many of whom dogged Prime Minister Samater with shouts of "stop the killing."

Congressional meetings with Samater, Capitol Hill aides say, produced a draw: They neither helped nor hurt impoverished Somalia's chances of getting at least some of the \$55 million in economic aid frozen by Congress and the Bush administration. The US, which has access to Somali military facilities, has also withheld military aid since June.

In an interview last week, Samater said his aim in visiting was not to unfreeze US aid, but to "correct all the false information" about his country, which has been locked in civil war in the north since May. Samater also came bearing promises of freedom for "all political prisoners," economic liberalization, national reconciliation, and an April 25 visit by Amnesty International

that will have "no restrictions."

Samater says his government has released more than 100 political prisoners, leaving about 100 more who will soon be freed. But Human Rights Watch says the figure is closer to 1,000.

The plan for "national reconciliation" also met with some skepticism on Capitol Hill, when Samater declared that his government will not negotiate with the rebel Somali National Movement.

"The so-called SNM's object is to divide the country," Samater said. "The people we are going to talk to are the people who have sympathy for them and who are still in the north. We will talk to the leaders of those people."

THE SNM has said it will not negotiate with the Somali government until President Mohamed Siad Barre leaves the scene.

Samater says only "small pockets" of conflict remain in the mountains of northern Somalia, and that refugees are returning.

Of the 200,000 Somalis who fled to Ethiopia—he calls the UN's figure of 400,000 an exaggeration—some 100,000 have returned, he says.

Somalia is fighting another funding battle—with the UN high commissioner for refugees. His office recently said it will stop aiding Ethiopian refugees in northern Somalia. It cited reports that Somali government forces have been arming the refugees and using UN supplies for military purposes. Samater says it was the SNM that took the UN supplies, and attacked the camps.

"We provided them [the refugees] with Army" protection, he says, adding that some refugees had brought small arms from Ethiopia. The UN refugee office and Somali government are negotiating to maintain the program.

Samater denies charges that Somalia has received chemical weapons from Libya, but he says "it's possible we have received light arms, like rifles." President Siad visited Libya in December.

ANGOLA ACCUSES PRETORIA OF BREAKING PEACE PACT (Continued)

the total independence of Angola, or Unita, said the rebels would "increase the fight" against the Luanda Government because it had rejected their proposal for a cease-fire.

In agreements signed in New York on Dec. 22, South Africa promised to give independence to Namibia, which it rules in disregard of United Nations resolutions. The agreements also require Cuba to withdraw all its forces from Angola by July 1, 1991.

The Angolan guerrillas did not sign the agreements, and Mr. Fernandes said today that the accords had serious flaws. For example, he said, they set no penalties for violations and establish no effective means of verifying the withdrawal of Cuban troops.

Washington sponsored the negotiations that produced the agreements. When the accords were signed, American officials said they believed there were 50,000 Cuban soldiers in Angola.

But a Cuban official said last month that some of the Cuban soldiers leaving Angola would be replaced by others, so that 72,000 Cuban troops would "go into and be withdrawn from Angola."

The comments were made in an interview on Cuban television by Gen. Ulises Rosales del Toro, a member of the Cuban delegation to the talks on Angola and

PRETORIA SEEKS U.S. SOVIET MEDIATION TO SETTLE CIVIL WAR IN MOZAMBIQUE (Continued)

In an interview at his bush headquarters near Gorongosa Mountain last July, Renamo President Alfonso Dhlakama said he would continue blowing up the pylons as long as they carried electricity to Maputo, the Mozambican capital.

While the ruling Frelimo government controls virtually all of Mozambique's cities and principal towns, the country's vast rural areas, where 85 percent of the 14.7 million population lives, have been trapped in chaotic violence that has collapsed the country's economy and caused widespread suffering.

Botha, talking to foreign correspondents today, called the continuation of the war a "tragedy," saying that the attacks on the pylons alone would double the cost of restoring the sorely needed hydroelectric project. Other South African officials said it would now cost \$80 million to replace the sabotaged pylons.

"The war will have to stop. It simply will have to stop. . . I have no illusion. I don't say it's going to be that easy, but I say it can be done," the foreign minister said.

be running for a parliamentary seat, Botha would be freed of taxing campaign matters.

In exchange — assuming he were elected — Botha would stay on only for a year or so, then pass the presidency to De Klerk, the official says. "To do what Botha wants to do," the official says, "he

needs time and needs to throw off responsibility for the party."

That's because, faced with a white backlash to limited reforms already introduced, many party members would be reluctant to go any further. Political scientist Swilling calls Botha's circumventing of the party "the logical conclusion" of a trend to create an

all-powerful presidency.

Swilling contends that "by riding himself of the party, [Botha] has thrown off the last vestige of democratic consensus."

But the government official insists that Botha will carry the party along with him on the force of his initiatives. "It's the right political climate," he says, "and

Botha is the right man."

Prof. Sampie Terreblanche, a former National Party member, isn't so sanguine. "Botha is a product of the National Party which built apartheid. To dismantle apartheid means dismantling not only the Nationals' ideology but its privilege. No party man could do that."

Namibia.

'Clemency Is for Criminals'

Mr. Fernandes, who has been meeting here with Bush Administration officials, said "nobody knows" exactly how many Cubans are in Angola.

The President of Angola, José Eduardo dos Santos, has offered clemency to guerrillas who lay down their arms. But Mr. Fernandes rejected the offer, saying: "We did not fight the Portuguese for eight years and the Soviets and Cubans for the past 14 years only to throw our hands in the air and surrender. Clemency is for criminals."

He said the offer of clemency was based on the premise that Angola would remain a one-party state. President dos Santos and his colleagues "want us as individuals but not as an organized group," he said.

Mr. Fernandes said he also doubted that the United Nations could verify the departure of Cuban troops from Angola. Mr. Fernandes said the 90-member team was much too small to detect cheating.

American officials said today that they had not decided whether to grant the guerrillas' request for more weapons at this time.

Referring to the agreement last year under which 50,000 Cuban troops will be withdrawn from Angola in exchange for South Africa permitting Namibia to become independent, Botha said, "I am hoping the same kind of process would be possible in the case of Mozambique, assuming the Soviet Union will also play a positive role."

The United States, Botha said, would have to play a role as mediator in the negotiations as it did in Angola. He added, "We stand ready to have discussions on the possibility of putting together a similar process of negotiations."

"The two situations differ, however."

The main combatants in the Angolan war were largely controllable by their superpower patrons—the Angolan government and the Cubans by the Soviet Union and Jonas Savimbi's anticommunist rebels of the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) by the United States.

Although UNITA was not a party

NEW YORK TIMES, FEBRUARY 5, 1989

9 Rebels Walk Out of Prison As Angola's Amnesty Begins

LUANDA, Angola, Feb. 4 (Reuters) — Nine Angolan rebels captured in combat walked out of a Luanda prison today as a Government amnesty that has been rejected by the guerrilla group went into effect.

Angolan officials said other captured rebels were being freed around the country under the amnesty plan, but would not give a total. Under the 12-month amnesty offer, all opponents of the Government who renounce violence and accept its authority will be pardoned.

The guerrillas, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, led by Jonas Savimbi, have rejected the amnesty and said they will begin a military push next week.

The Government of President José Eduardo dos Santos is resisting pressure from the United States and some African governments to negotiate with the rebels.

Washington has said it will continue military aid to them, and American officials are skeptical about the amnesty.

to the Angolan negotiations and its role in further national reconciliation is still undefined, Washington, by promising to continue its military aid, can exert considerable influence over Savimbi.

In contrast, none of the potential negotiating partners in a Mozambique peace process could guarantee to "deliver" Renamo, which is funded mostly by business interests in Portugal and Latin America and by right-wing businessmen and evangelical Christians in the United States.

Dhlakama, in lengthy conversations over a period of three days in July, repeatedly said that he felt betrayed by the United States because it had begun to establish close economic ties with the Marxist Mozambican government.

However, he admitted that he could not win the war militarily—just as the Mozambican Army also could not—but that his strategy was to force Frelimo to accept negotiations for a democratically elected government.

BOTHA: FEWER TITLES, MORE CONTROL? (Continued)

PRETORIA BANKER DIS- COUNTS SANCTIONS (Continued)

Proponents argue that such punitive measures are needed to show disapproval and convince South Africa it must dismantle laws perpetuating racial discrimination. The United States Congress enacted a package of sanctions in 1986 and there is pressure among Democratic Congressmen to do so again over the objections of the Bush Administration.

Critics of sanctions, among them some white South Africans opposed to apartheid, have said that blacks are the first to suffer because jobs and social programs are lost.

Growth Rate Cited

Mr. de Kock supported his Government's argument that Western sanctions do not work, but based his contention purely on economic statistics.

The banker said the burden of debt repayment had slowed South Africa's rate of growth and caused living standards to decline in 1985 and 1986. But he added that the real growth rate, adjusted for inflation, had climbed to about 3 percent last year, compared with 2.5 percent in 1987 and only 1 percent in 1986.

Without sanctions and disinvestment, he estimated, the nation's growth rate would have reached 4 or 5 percent a year. He anticipated a 2 percent rise in 1989.

He also said the annual inflation rate had been reduced last year to 12.9 percent from 18.6 percent in 1986 and 16.1 percent in 1987. He conceded that the rate might climb back to 15 percent this year, and was still "unacceptably high" compared with the more modest inflation rates in the United States and Britain.

Currency Depreciates

One consequence has been a steady decline in the value of the South African rand, currently worth about 42 cents. In allowing the rand to depreciate and interest rates to rise, Mr. de Kock said, the Government improved its balance of payments by encouraging both exports and domestic substitutes for imports.

As a result, he said, South Africa's balance of payments in 1988 showed a surplus of 2.5 billion rand, or more

THE SUN

FEBRUARY 7, 1989

U.S. AID TO SOMALIA

Lethal shipments halted over rights violations

The United States secretly cut off shipments of ammunition and other lethal equipment to Somalia last summer in response to widespread human-rights violations during a counterinsurgency campaign, according to U.S. officials.

The officials said that some shipments of military aid to Somalia continued but that all deliveries of lethal aid had been suspended.

From Wire Reports

than \$1 billion.

South Africa, the world's leading gold producer, has also been hurt by the decline in gold prices, to less than \$400 an ounce, from \$500 in 1987.

South Africa faces the prospect of having to pay back up to \$1.7 billion in loans in 1989, \$1.9 billion in 1990 and \$1.5 billion in 1991. But Mr. de Kock said he anticipated no difficulty in covering such debts in a "worst case" scenario, in which no loan could be rolled over or converted to a longer term.

"This situation can continue indefinitely," he said. "That's what many of the proponents of sanctions fail to appreciate. By sending what they call a stronger message to the South African authorities on the need to dismantle apartheid and so on, they thought that they would accelerate the process of reform."

"Though their objectives might have been sincere and understandable, the methods have certainly not accelerated reform in this country, and the figures I have just presented show conclusively that the South African economy is not only surviving, it is actually growing and meeting all its commitments and putting up a quite reasonable performance."

A NEW FACE FOR OLD POLICIES (Continued)

vaal Province when Andries P. Treurnicht, the former Transvaal leader, broke away with 15 other legislators to form the far-right Conservative Party.

Mr. de Klerk barely retained his own parliamentary seat of Vereeniging, an industrial satellite of Johannesburg, in a Conservative challenge in a whites-only general election in May 1987.

A lawyer by training, Mr. de Klerk has won respect from political friends and foes for his skills as a parliamentary debater and a political operator.

Parliament Opens

But he has never shown any enthusiasm for reversing racial segregation and discriminatory laws, which have helped the white minority maintain its position of dominance.

That position was reinforced today

as the 1989 session of Parliament opened here, with the Government indicating that it had no plans to repeal two key legal elements of the apartheid system that have become increasingly hard to enforce.

The laws are the Group Areas Act, which mandates residential segregation, and the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act, which sets aside public sites for whites only.

The Acting President, J. Christiaan Heunis, told Parliament that the Government, while aiming "to realize full civil rights for all South Africans," also needed "to leave room for those who wish to exercise their individual rights in a community context."

This was an allusion to continuing legal preservation of segregated neighborhoods, schools and other sites for whites who wanted them.

BUSH SHOULD (Continued)

If the new administration adopts a position of blanket opposition to sanctions — as the Reagan administration did — then Pretoria will conclude that it has gained four years of breathing space, blacks will surmise that Washington's human rights concerns evaporated with the removal of Cuban troops from Angola and U.S. policy will be deprived of a base of bipartisan support that Mr. Bush rightly stresses is necessary for effective influence.

The administration should press for an end to restrictions on anti-apartheid organizations to provide legal space for legitimate political dissent. That move should set the stage for negotiations with the ANC and other significant groups aimed at suspending violence and achieving a true non-racial democracy.

The United States should take the lead in coordinating its response with Western European allies and the private sector, indicating that a positive response could result in a sanctions moratorium or even a selective relaxation of punitive measures. On the other hand, a negative response would inevitably launch a new wave of comprehensive sanctions from Congress, which the White House should support if South Africa fails to act.

In dealing with Poland, the Bush administration should likewise spell out the benefits that could be derived from positive steps; most notably the abandonment by the government of its conditions for the legalization of Solidarity — conditions that threaten to torpedo any chance for national reconciliation. Until the Jaruzelski government moves in that direction, U.S. policy will remain in its current limbo — neither imposing sanctions nor offering a sympathetic hearing for requests for new credits. By coordinating an alternative scenario with its Western European partners, the Bush administration could seek to break the current deadlock.

Economic pressures or incentives alone will not produce democracy in Poland or South Africa. A realistic foreign policy must be based on the recognition that there are limits to what Western pressure can do.

But both the Polish and South African governments are hardly immune to outside influence or unconcerned about what direction Mr. Bush will take. Will he expend valuable political capital fighting Congress on the issue of South African sanctions? Or, if there is another round of unrest in Poland, will he resist pressures to apply new punitive measures? Not likely, unless both governments begin the process of legalizing legitimate political opposition.

The moment is right for action, clearly stated and flexibly applied. Tactically, the mix of negative and positive incentives must be adjusted to the changing situations in both countries as circumstances warrant. But in broad policy terms, U.S. goals should be unambiguous, reflecting the moral and political values of our society.

If the Bush administration contributes to the peaceful transformation of these repressive societies, the United States will demonstrate that it can effectively put its natural strengths to use in the new international order. And it would offer a rare opportunity for the United States to apply a balanced strategy at the intersection of East-West and North-South issues, one that could advance human rights and democratization in societies poised at the brink.

Angolan Rebels Ask U.S. To Make Up Lost Arms Aid

By David B. Ottaway
Washington Post Staff Writer

A spokesman for U.S.-backed Angolan rebels yesterday appealed here for an increase in American covert military aid to his group to compensate for the loss of \$80 million annually in assistance from South Africa.

Brig. Gen. Tony da Costa Fernandes, a top official of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), said he has asked the Bush administration to increase "very urgently" American material help to his group because of an expected new Angolan government offensive.

He said UNITA needed more anti-aircraft weapons, long-range artillery and antitank weapons to offset Soviet-made MiG25s and upgraded Hind helicopter gunships arriving from Cuba and the Soviet Union for the Angolan army. "We need more sophisticated, up-to-date equipment," he said.

The United States already has supplied UNITA with Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, TOW antitank missiles, communication and other military equipment as part of the \$15 million annual covert aid program administered by the Central Intelligence Agency since 1986. U.S. intelligence officials have begun studying UNITA's additional needs as a result of the South African cutoff of assistance.

Fernandes said South African aid has "completely stopped" since the

signing Dec. 22 of the U.S.-brokered tripartite accord among Angola, Cuba and South Africa providing for the withdrawal of 50,000 Cuban troops from Angola and independence elections for South African-administered Namibia.

As part of the agreement, South Africa pledged to end its support for UNITA. Fernandes said the rebels had been informed of this only Dec. 18. He said South Africa had provided UNITA with "lethal and nonlethal" aid, but no South African-made arms, and had allowed UNITA to bring in its supplies through the Namibian port at Walvis Bay and purchase fuel in Namibia.

Breaking with his anti-Marxist guerrilla group's reluctance to discuss the importance of its South African connection, Fernandes said UNITA received \$80 million "annually" from South Africa. Informed sources here said there was little likelihood of U.S. aid rising to that amount.

Fernandes, who has seen a number of senior administration officials, said he was "satisfied" with the reaction so far to UNITA's request for additional aid. "I think there is understanding," he said.

Asked how a larger volume of U.S. aid could reach UNITA now that South Africa is withdrawing from Namibia, Fernandes said UNITA has built a new airfield at the rebels' Jamba headquarters in southeastern Angola capable of receiving "all types of long-range aircraft."

"If there is aid, aid will reach us," he said.

HEUNIS URGES REFORM

CAPE TOWN, South Africa (Reuters) — Acting President Chris Heunis said yesterday that South Africa's apartheid laws were a stumbling block to racial harmony and called for their reform.

In a speech that echoed the conciliatory tone of new National Party leader F. W. de Klerk, he vowed to take the lead in redefining legislation but stopped short of saying race classification was wrong.

Restating a major policy change introduced last year, he said everyone should have the right to live with others of his own race but no one should be forced to do so.

Mr. Heunis told Parliament he would invite people of all races to redefine the groups that form the basis of the political system.

"It is not in itself wrong or discriminatory to define members of existing groups along ethnic lines [but] to use such a definition to advance or disadvantage one group is racist and discriminatory," Mr. Heunis told Parliament.

"I believe we can find a definition of groups that would make differentiation possible but eliminate discrimination; that would ensure group protection but recognize individual rights," he said.

He identified three laws, the remaining pillars of the National Party's 41-year-old apartheid system, as the main barriers to racial reconciliation.

He named the Group Areas Act, which enforces separate residential areas; the Population Registration Act, which defines everyone as either white, colored (mixed-race), Indian or black; and the Separate Amenities Act, which reserves facilities such as beaches for the exclusive use of one race.

He did not say they would be scrapped, but he said they should be amended and redefined to eliminate discrimination.

Mr. Heunis echoed the moderate message of Mr. de Klerk, who said Wednesday: "White domination, insofar as it still exists, must go."

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