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IDEOLOGY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE IN 20TH CENTURY SOUTH AFRICA

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IDEOLOGY AND LEGISLATION OF THE POST-1948 SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT

"Segregation" remained, as I have suggested in my earlier papers, the overall framework of native policy during the 1930's. At the same time "liberal" criticism of this policy increased in strength. The most significant policy features of this critique were, perhaps (a) a hostility to "forced labour" practices (eg Masters and Servants Acts, restrictions on mobility) in farming and, though to a much lesser extent, in mining (b) calls for the modification or "abolition" of the pass laws, starting perhaps from Roberts and Lucas's minority recommendation in the 1930-2 Native Economic Commission Report and continuing in the 1935 Young-Barrett Interdepartmental Committee. It is sometimes not quite clear how far these suggestions were geared towards the "pinpricks" and "abuses" created by indiscriminate police arrests, and how far towards lifting influx control provisions themselves, but they certainly reflected some interest in lifting what were regarded as "archaic" restrictions on labour mobility (c) a rather lesser emphasis on the recognition of African trade unions (d) calls for improved housing, social amenities, "welfare benefits" etc for Africans in the urban areas, sometimes linked with a claim that African wages were far too low. Usually, though, raising wages remained linked to modernisation/productivity increases, and so on. In addition, concerns with the franchise and the job colour bar remained.

In the 1930's, there is little evidence that these pressures influenced policy. Indeed in 1934 "exemptions" from the pass laws were liberalised, permitting perhaps increased permanent urban residence by some Africans.¹ But both in 1930 and 1937 Parliament reaffirmed the principle for the mass of Africans that the towns were for employment only, and strengthened and controls over influx. As Smuts said to a conference of Municipal Representatives in Pretoria in September 1937:

there is no doubt, the proper way to deal with this influx is to cut it off at its source and to say that our towns are full, the requirements met, we cannot accomodate more Natives, and we are not going to accept any more except in limited numbers. (2)

With the advent of the Second World War, however, there seemed to be a change of direction. Smuts specifically called on the Natives Representatives in Parliament to suggest reforms in social welfare for urban Africans - measures which began to be legislated by Hofmeyr and others through to 1948. In February 1942 Smuts made his famous speech to the Institute of Race Relations in Cape Town that "isolation has gone and segregation has fallen on evil days too". In the wake of this there were strong indications that the Government intended to promote recognition of African trade unions. Denys Reitz announced the relaxation of the pass laws and the Smit Committee called for their abolition and condemned the system of migrant labour.³ The change, however, was short-lived. Whatever its reflection of the longer-term interests of some economic groups, the immediate stimulus would seem to have been the need to rally all sections of the South African community in the face of the nadir of Allied war fortunes: Smuts and others were also talking at this time of arming non-whites against the possibility of Japanese invasion.⁴ By 1943, in the face of an election, of African strikes, of white claims of an urban "crime wave", all reforms except those of a social welfare nature had been abandoned or postponed. And, as I hope to show in more detail later, the policy which the pre-1948 Smuts government began to develop showed greater continuity with both pre-1942 and post-1948 policy.

The election of the Nationalist Government in 1948, in other words, was not the "cataclysmic" event which liberal writing has maintained. Nor, in this light, can it be interpreted simply as the result of "racially prejudiced" ideas reimposing themselves on the integrative and levelling tendencies of capitalist development. Indeed it is impossible to deny that the Nationalists were able to win the support of the bulk of white workers, who demanded certain legislatively imposed "racial" measures to protect their situation - from their point of view to prevent it worsening as much as to secure privilege. But I have already suggested in my previous papers that the policy of "segregation" as a whole was framed in the interests of capital: that capitalism has no inherent non-racialising imperatives. Thus the fact that certain elements of capital adopted apparently different perspectives in the 1930's, gained a brief dominating influence on policy perhaps in the 1940's, and continued to advocate similar views at least through the 1950's, itself requires explanation. Such an explanation demands a deeper analysis of a number of points than I have time for here: (a) the different specific sectors of capital at the time, their interests and their power (b) the relationship between these interests and political party formation. One thing is certainly clear: the liberal vs segregationist debate in the 1930's represented a much sharper cleavage of interest than previously between farming and "urban" interests.⁵ But what were these "urban" interests? Where did mining stand, for example, particularly bearing in mind (a) that some mining houses were disengaging from South Africa while others were beginning to diversify into manufacturing in the expectation of a diminishing return from gold - until the new lease of life came from the Free State fields, particularly from 1946, and from the uranium extraction possibilities (b) that gold-mining depended most heavily on labour from within South Africa in the 1930's but from the 1940's began again to draw on extra-South African sources. And what was the nature of either urban capitalist interests? In contrast to the mining and farming sectors, secondary industry and of course commerce were dependent largely on the internal market. In particular light labour-intensive industry at the coasts, stimulated particularly by 1925 protectionist measures, would seem to have been dependent on the black market -

and hence on increased wages? However other industries, less protected, or protected for other reasons (white labour policy), or with other markets (white consumers or, more often, producers) might have less interest in such policies - without protection, competition with imports is a form of competition in "export" markets, demanding reduction of costs.⁶ What, for example, were the interests of the Rand-based engineering industry?⁷ Then, of course, there is the anomaly that Afrikaner industrialists, backed by their self-help financial institutions, though predominantly in light industry (Langeberg, Rembrandt) diverged in their policy from other coastal light industrialists.

I mention these points purely speculatively at this stage. My primary intention in this paper is to trace the specific chronological development of post-1948 "native policy" and the language in which it was phrased, and to stress its continuities with policy prior to that period. (In doing so, I am not at this stage entering into debate with Harold Wolpe's recent argument on the differences between segregation and apartheid. At least at the superstructural level there were continuities. The structural function of these continuities and their relation to South African economic development may in the process have undergone some alteration). I am particularly concerned to examine these policies in a light different from the predominant trend of liberal argument. Commenting in the Oxford History on arguments by Nationalist Ministers that apartheid did not prevent economic integration and that economic integration did not constitute apartheid David Welsh writes: "Critics argued that the policy [of apartheid] was a mere facade, designed to give an ethical embellishment to the continuation of an unequal society"⁸ Much earlier, Lee Kuper had said essentially the same thing:

Apartheid is a transient doctrine, since it is invalid in the sense that it is not consistent with the social structure and does not allow for the accommodation of action to the new and changed situation of industrial integration. Its promise of self-development in separate areas is illusory for the great mass of non-whites and ignores the effects of two centuries of culture-contact. (9)

Similar remarks could be reproduced almost indefinitely from the writings of liberal academics and liberally-inclined politicians over the past two and a half decades: let me give only one more:

It is essentially this conflict between economic development, greatly expedited during the war, with its increasing industrialisation and growing demands for Native labour in industries which are predominantly situated in the urban areas, and governmental policy, which is designed to hold the Natives on the land, that is responsible for the anomalies in urban Native administration. Despite the anxiety of the government to safeguard the labour supply for the European farming section, the pull of the towns has been irresistible and the unworkability of the urban areas legislation is becoming ever more manifest. The increasing population pressure in the reserves together with growing Native landlessness contributes markedly to the inherent contradictions between present policy and the pressure of reality. (10) (My emphasis)

Indeed such statements contain elements of truth. Apartheid, like all ruling ideologies, is in one sense an illusion and a facade giving an ethical embellishment to the continuation of inequality. The purpose of ideology is to present special interest as the universal interest, and where such ideology is promulgated by "partial" groups its claim to express the universal interest cannot fail to be imaginary. However liberal thought has erred in presenting its own ideology, of the inevitably integrative and levelling imperatives of capitalist development, as a "true" picture against which to contrast apartheid as invalid.¹¹ Moreover it has failed to recognise that all ruling ideologies must to some extent intersect with, drawing on and shaping, material reality. Rulers are not hypocrites or conspirators, considered in a structural sense (though there may be both among them). Rulers believe their ideologies and frame policies in terms of them. The success of their rule depends on the superiority of their "class consciousness" over that of those they rule - on their perception and promulgation in ideological terms of their special interests as much as on force. Hence an understanding of societies can never operate simply by dismissing ideology as "false" or "invalid" but only by decoding it, translating it, so as to understand the special interests which are cloaked by an appeal to the universal interest.

II

During the 1940's, as a series of government commissions gives evidence, the South African state began to pay more systematic attention to the planned development of the economy. Of course the state was already heavily involved in the shaping and maintenance of the South African system, and even, in terms of protection, wage regulation, and actual investment, in the field of secondary industry.¹² But it now intended to involve itself in a more coherent way: "The best economic system is one based on private enterprise but subject to such collective action as may be in the social interest."¹³ Particular stress was laid on the rationalisation of secondary industry, with the replacement of the artisan-unskilled division with semi-skilled operatives:

The extension of manufacturing industry can be stimulated through a reduction of the high cost structure through increased mechanisation so as to derive the full benefit of the large resources of comparatively low-paid non-European labour.

Indeed this particular commission specifically recommended the reduction of wages when whites were replaced by blacks.¹⁴ This policy of modernisation, which went along with a renewed drive to obtain foreign capital to provide the technical know-how, seems natural for the Smuts government. What is important to realise is that it was continued no less urgently by the Nationalists on their accession to power: from its inception Nationalist rule, far from being a return to "backwoodsmanship", was directed in the interests of capitalist rationalisation.¹⁵ "It is gratifying to note", said the Minister of Mines and Economic Affairs to the FCI in July 1948,

that there is a tendency in the direction of large production units rather than in the multiplication of the number of units....If this policy is continued....it will greatly improve the prospects of developing export markets - particularly our natural export markets on the African continent. (16)

The systematic pursuit of such a policy, however, introduced two related problems for the South African social system: (a) what was to be the status of the black workers whose cheapness produced the "comparative advantage" on which South African prosperity would be based (b) how could these need to employ blacks be reconciled with the existence of a white working class, entrenched in skilled jobs, heavily employed in public unskilled work, and with a measure of economic and political power. These were not new problems. Similar issues had had to be resolved before in the case of agricultural production and mining: but they were now extended over the totality of the economy.

The specific problem in the case of the white working class was how the newly-created semi-skilled roles were to be racially allocated. Pre-1948 commissions inclined to the view that this should be a matter for employers and employees to negotiate on a national basis without government intervention through a "continuous review of the classification of jobs and of manufacturing methods in the light of changing methods of production": the agreement already reached in the engineering industry was cited as a model. It was argued that, as in the United States and France, the influx of new less skilled (black) immigrants in an expanding economy would allow the existing (white) working class to be "raised to the

position of an aristocracy of labour". The retention of white privilege, they continued, would

ultimately depend on the development of the character, enterprise and industry of the European, and not on repression, the material and spiritual effects of which may prove to be the means of his own undoing. (17)

an attitude familiar from the much earlier writings of Merriman, Smuts, and others. Such a laissez-faire attitude could not assuage much of the organised white working class, let alone poorer whites whose guarantee of employment was marginal. The Nationalist Party was able to capitalise on this fact, and no doubt won electoral support on this basis. Within a year of election the Minister of Economic Affairs drew the attention of industrialists to

the recent increasing tendency in certain industries to replace European by non-European labour. Although there is no intention whatever of denying the non-European his rightful place in our industrial life, care will have to be taken to guard against a gradual replacement of European by non-European labour. This is an aspect of our industrial development which the Government will not lose sight of in the formulation and application of its industrial policy. (18)

Such a statement might appear to conflict with an emphasis on the comparative advantage of black labour. And indeed such statements guarding against the unrestricted use of cheaper labour are the basis of the liberal "conventional wisdom" which has seen job colour bar legislation (and even customary colour bars) as incompatible with economic growth. The liberals, with their insistence on "economic laws" receive soem support from Nationalist Ministers themselves:

The question, however, is this: what is our first consideration? Is it to maintain the economic laws or is it to ensure the continued existence of the European race in this country? (19)

Even though it might intrude upon certain economic laws, I would still rather see European civilisation in South Africa being maintained and not being swallowed up than to comply scrupulously and to the letter with the economic laws. (20)

Important as the growth rate may be, it is not the most important factor. It does not weight up against the position of the White worker. It can be said that an outlook is contrary to the economic laws but it should be understood that this is the policy of the Nationalist Party. (21)

However this appraisal, whether by liberals or Nationalists is, as several recent writers have pointed out, based on a rather unsophisticated and undynamic perception of the South African political economy. Advocates of the conventional wisdom should

take note of the remarks of an Afrikaner economist drawing attention to "the very complicated institutional framework within which the forces of Bantu labour supply and demand have to operate in South Africa as compared to those economic systems upon which the standard textbooks on the labour market are based. Broad deductive generalizations based on received economic theory are therefore hazardous."²² In particular, job reservation can only to be seen within the context of a constantly changing, modernising and rationalizing structure of production. Rather than acting as a restraint on growth, it should be seen as coming into operation when growth is restrained by other factors.²³ As Albert Hertzog said in 1967: "The trouble [of loss of white job security] starts once the economic upsurge has passed and the White man needs that place again. Then the injustice arises....that time will come again..."²⁴ Moreover a close examination of Nationalist Party policy to the job colour bar would I think verify that their actual policy has differed little from the United Party recommendations of the 1940's. Thus when introducing the 1956 legislation (significantly at a period when the economy was moving from boom towards recession) the Minister of Labour, while warning employers against replacement of employees on various pretexts when the real reason was cheaper labour, added:

This clause does not enable me to create new spheres of employment for any race...We shall be only too grateful if things can continue...on the basis of collective bargaining....I want to say clearly that employees in our country must not expect the protection of this clause if they do not carry their wight...If as a result of laxity or any reason within their control they are replaced, they must not apply to us for protection.
(25)

In practice the "job colour bar" legislation has been retained as a "watchdog" - proclamations under it have never covered more than 2% of the industrial workforce. As the Minister of Labour said to the right-wing Rapportryers in 1964, the job colour bar did not mean that no non-whites would be employed in jobs previously filled by whites:

Such an attitude would be totally unrealistic and nonsensical. Anyone who looks around him in the industrial field will see Non-Whites doing work today that was done by Whites 10 or 20 years ago. (26)

What has been insisted on is that the racial allocation or work-roles in the context of an altering structure of production should be determined by organised workers as well as employers, and in this the United Party has concurred.²⁷ No doubt the dynamics of this process are an important subject for research, from the 1920's and 1930's until the present. But as recent writers have insisted, the up-grading of work roles for some non-whites in no way represents a breakdown if apartheid: the institutions of apartheid were specifically designed not to prevent this trend but to encourage it in a regulated manner.

The more important question posed by the modernisation question was the status of Africans in industry. By the 1930's, as Harold Wolpe has recently reiterated, the basis of "segregation" was breaking down insofar as the "reserves" were no longer able to provide adequate labour-reproduction costs. At the same time the

increase in pass-law exemptions, the laxity of influx-control enforcement by municipalities, the growth of shanty-towns just outside municipal areas, were permitting the growth of a "permanently urbanised" African population. How far this African "urbanisation" resulted from the push of declining productivity in the reserves and how far from the pull of industrial and commercial labour requirements may be a meaningless question. But for certain sectors of industry and commerce, at least, it did pose a problem. The problem was essentially the incompatibility between the need for a permanently urbanised African workforce, securing the means of labour reproduction in the urban areas, and the undesirability of permitting a concentrated proletariat. On the one side, as a United Party Minister put it:

Can we develop our industries when we have the position that the native only works for a few months and then returns to the reserves for a couple of years? No, the native must be trained for his work in industry, and to become an efficient industrial worker he must be a permanent industrial worker. On that account he must live near his place of employment. (28)

Moreover, as I have mentioned, the United Party government had begun to provide social welfare benefits to replace those not forthcoming from the rural areas. On the other hand:

Racial and class differences will make a homogeneous Native proletariat which will eventually lose all contact with its former communal rural relations which has previously given their lives a content and meaning. The detribalisation of large numbers of Natives congregated in amorphous masses in large industrial centres is a matter which no government can view with equanimity. Unless handled with great foresight and skill these masses of detribalised Natives can very easily develop into a menace rather than a constructive factor in industry...the whole problem calls for vision and statesmanlike guidance. (29)

Less job turnover and less incentive to malingering or sabotage the productive process was in apparent contradiction with the threat posed by black urban concentration specifically to employers (as blacks increased their bargaining power) and to the overall sociopolitical structures of white domination which sustained the comparative cheapness of black labour. In a sense, the election of 1948 was fought around two solutions to this problem, a problem as much if not more for capital than white workers. Smuts endorsed the Report of the 1946-8 (Fagan) Native Laws Commission, and proposals for the reform of the Natives Representative Council; though one must question how far this "Hofmeyrian liberalism" was actually representative of all interests in the United Party.³⁰ The Nationalists fought on the basis of their own Sauer Commission.³¹

It is perhaps the areas of agreement between these two policies which require emphasis, as a corrective to prevailing views. After all, as Smuts said soon after the election:

Our policy has been European paramountcy....[it] has not been equal rights...We have said that we have a

position of guardianship, of trusteeship, over the non-European peoples in this country, and we must carry out that trust in the true spirit of guardianship...We have always stood and we stand for social and residential separation in this country, and for the avoidance of all racial mixture... There is a great deal about apartheid which is common to all parties in this country.
(32)

In the first place the Fagan Commission (in contrast perhaps to the Smit Report) was no less clear than the Nationalists that continued regulation of African movements was necessary; and they stressed that the new need was for centralised rather than local control.³³

The large-scale movement of Natives is attended by difficulties that have become a country-wide problem. We consider it essential, in the interests of the population as a whole but particularly in the interests of the Natives themselves, that the movement should be regulated; and where Native communities become settled in the vicinity of white ones, or Natives enter the service of Europeans (both in the rural areas and in the towns) a certain amount of regulation is necessary for the maintenance of the principle of residential separation, and, where there are contacts between races differing so greatly from one another, for the purpose of checking both exploitation from the one side and undesirable intrusion from the other....We believe, however, that the regulation can be carried out in a manner which will make it more effective than it is at present, and which at the same time will greatly tone down, and may in time entirely eliminate, those features of the pass system to which the Natives object. (34)

Amongst their more important recommendations in this connection were (a) the establishment of a national system of labour bureaux and (b) the replacement of the medley of passes of simplified identification system in which, however, most of the key features of the pass system apart from immediate arrest for non-production of a pass were to be retained. Both these aspects (though not the non-arrest provision, whose importance lies perhaps in the context of prison labour for farms) were introduced by the Nationalist Government.³⁵ There is not space here to enter in detail into the specific amendments on passes/urban areas legislation enacted by the Nationalists during their first decade in office. And anyone who has grappled with a year by year examination of laws, proclamations, administrative interpretations, implementation, court appeals etc will know how confusing the subject is. It is another important subject for more concentrated research, based on actuality rather than ideology. Undoubtedly, as we shall see, the long-term Government intention was to remove the vested rights (de facto or de jure) of Africans in the urban areas. But what is remarkable in retrospect is how slowly they

moved on this until the 1960's. Except with respect to non-Union Africans (which the Fagan Commission itself placed in a different category) and with respect to the Western Cape (which from 1955 with the establishment of the Eiselen line came to be seen as a field for white and coloured but not African labour) they appear to have operated as much through enforcement of the existing legislation, slightly strengthened, rather than through comprehensive new measures.^{35a} Comparative respect was paid to the vested interests of municipalities and even of urbanised Africans, in implementation if not of legislation. Centralisation of control, the withdrawal of powers from local authorities, took place quite slowly, and usually after attempts at negotiation and threat instead. From 1959 to 1969 Government estimates suggest that something like 1 million Africans, from towns or rural areas, have been resettled: what happened in the 1950's is by comparison minute in its effects.

However the proclaimed intentions in 1948 of the United Party and the Nationalist Party with respect to the use to be made of the pass laws certainly differed. This was not, as has so often been stated or implied, that the United Party/Fagan was willing to permit unrestricted African urbanisation and concomitant citizenship rights while the Nationalists were committed to total territorial segregation. In terms of ultimate goals, perhaps, the United Party was deliberately unclear while the Nationalists were committed to the maximum possible geographical separation. But from the time of their election Nationalist Ministers emphasised time and time again that they had no intention of withdrawing black labour from industry.³⁶ The difference between the two policies lay specifically in the attitude towards those Africans who must find employment in the existing industrial concentrations (particularly the Witwatersrand, Cape Town, PE-East London, and Durban-Pinetown). The Fagan Commission maintained that for such people permanent settlement in the towns was "a natural and inevitable economic phenomenon" and condemned the system of migrant labour.^{36a} The Nationalists in contrast intended to use the migrant system for secondary industry as well:

there should be a migratory labour policy, not only as it is on the mines, but in the country generally...This is exactly the policy which has been proposed by this side of the House in regard to Native labour required for secondary industries (Minister of Mines) (37)

The presence of tribal natives in urban areas must be regarded as temporary. They must be periodically returned to their homes to renew their tribal connections. (Minister of Native Affairs) (38)

While the presence of native labourers in the towns was essential, their status was that of foreigners who could have no political or equal social and other rights with European (Min Native Affairs) (39)

However even here the differences were in fact narrower than appeared. The Fagan Commission, for example, recognised that migrant labour would continue in the mining industry: and the mining industry, as a

result of the Free State finds and possibilities of uranium extraction, was do undergo expansion rather than contraction (it was overtaken in output by secondary industry only in the mid-60's). And it justified this not only by custom and the eventual decline of mining, but because the majority of gold-mining labour came from outside South Africa. Moreover, having perhaps a greater faith in the "natural conservatism of "tribal society" than the Nationalists, and perhaps believing that war-time economic growth rates were exceptional, the Fagan Commission argued (a) that some relaxations of influx control would not significantly increase the number of women in towns - which they regarded as a crucial index of urbanization (b) believed that:

Migratory labour, whether we encourage it or discourage it, will still continue for generations. In every generation, as far as we can look ahead, there will be migrants who pass into the class of stabilised labourers, there tribal ties; in every generation there will be new migrants, tribal Natives who in turn come out to see the world and look for work outside their tribal domain. (40)

Migratory labour, on both views, would therefore continue to some extent at the existing industrial growth points. But policy on this question cannot be separated from attitudes to future geographical location of industrial growth. If the Fagan Commission believed that the city worker must eventually settled at his place of employment, it was because its members did not believe that development in the "reserves", whether industrial or agricultural, could stem the urban influx (though they did point with favour to situations where "reserves" were situated near industries).⁴¹ Other pre-1948 commissions had been more optimistic about the possibilities of industrial decentralisation as a solution to the problems of a concentrated black proletariat:⁴²

It is possible that [this problem] will involve a policy of regional planning and development in order to bring about a greater measure of decentralization of industry, the transfer and development of some of the industries making cheap standardised wares for Native consumption to Reserves, as well as for a policy of separation and racial parting in factories and even for a large measure of territorial segregation. (43)

Another commission mentioned in this context meat canning, tanning, boot and shoe manufacture, textiles, a "cut, make and trim" industry, sawmilling and allied timber industries, dried and condensed milk and other dairy products, dehydrated and canned soups, fruit and vegetables.⁴⁴ The policy was initiated under the United Party by the Industrial Development Corporation, headed by H.J. van Eck, at least in terms of border industry if not of industry within the reserves themselves. Soon after the election Smuts reiterated his support for such a policy:

let us enlarge and develop these Native reserves and make them as attractive homes for the Native people who are there as possible. Let us have villages there, let us have amenities, let us have all the conditions which will make the reserves attractive and keep the Native people who are there and should be within their own areas. (45)

Van Eck continued with the implementation of this policy under the Nationalist Government: visiting the Pongola valley in 1949, he was impressed by its possibilities:

as a future rural-industrial area as it is close to the labour sources provided by Zululand and Swaziland and would help to stop the drift of natives to the towns. (46)

This policy was taken up and developed by the Nationalist government. In an important speech on native policy, published for domestic and overseas consumption, Jansen warned industrialists in 1950 that they should not establish labour-intensive industries in existing industrial complexes, but locate such industries near African reserves.⁴⁷ The following year the Minister of Native Affairs told an FCI deputation that:

although it was not contemplated that future development in existing industrial areas would be restricted by artificial means, it was necessary to control the influx of Africans to the towns, and, towards this end, to induce all surplus labour in the towns to migrate back to the Reserves.

And he stressed possibilities, not only for reserve agricultural development, but for establishing industries on the borders and within the reserves themselves.⁴⁸ SABRA and the Tomlinson Commission expanded on the advantages of such decentralisation for industrial enterprises that were not "location-bound". Besides the general feature of reducing the concentration of urban African labour,

The great advantage for the entrepreneur within the Bantu areas is the availability of Bantu labour and the absence of restrictions on making use of that labour...use can be made of the reserves of semi-employed people... and of large numbers of Bantu women to meet the shortage of unskilled labour, while the Bantu can also be trained to fill the vacancies in the skilled posts... [entrepreneurs can] pay skilled and semi-skilled Bantu lower wages than they would be compelled to pay them at the moment [on the basis of White standards]...It can also be pointed out that the Bantu is potentially a good machine operator and a classification of a large number of posts as semi-skilled might likewise lead to lower wage rates...

The "comparative advantage" of black labour, in other words, could be secured in decentralised areas - though Tomlinson Commission and Government came to differ on whether white capital could enter the reserves themselves, and therefore on how far "traditional" job reservation policies could be eroded.⁴⁹

In the Bantu areas industries may possibly come into being which under existing conditions (in the white areas) cannot be attempted because they would not be profitable, or which at this stage cannot compete on the overseas market.

Moreover, it was argued, such decentralisation would reduce the wastage of labour time and job turnover involved in the migrant labour system. Moreover if in the interwar period the dichotomy between cities and "reserves" had been expressed in terms of industrial versus agricultural development, it was not expressed in terms of labour-intensive versus capital-intensive development. In the decentralised areas emphasis:

by the very nature of things...[will] be laid on labour-intensive industries, and a degree of wage differentiation will make it unnecessary to provide the latest and most expensive machinery and alterations.

In the established areas in contrast, the comparative scarcity of labour should encourage employers to rationalize work and production methods (a manner, incidentally, in which the stricter influx control aspect of apartheid actually encourages economic growth)

When to this are added the possibilities of the substitution of capital for labour, it should be realised that the possibilities for countering the influence of higher wages on the cost structure are very great. (50)

Capital-intensive mechanisation was also being advocated for the "white" areas at the same time by Van Eck:

Automation and electronics will prove to be a great help in stimulating efficient and high quality production and this equipment will be no danger to labour as it will require better trained and better paid people. (51)

The decentralization policy was more easily proclaimed than implemented, however, for a variety of reasons. For a start, while mining and farming boomed into the early 1950's, the slow-down of the economy must be traced to decreased expansion in secondary industry in that period. Vested interests in existing plant and infrastructural facilities, combined with lack of new investment, inhibited such measures even for non location-bound industry. Indeed the bulk of South African labour-intensive industry, growing as it had out of urban commercial houses, was very much tied to the cities and resistant to decentralisation. Moreover the government did not seriously pursue it either by incentives or coercion until the late 1960's. The public investment of the 1950's which took up some of the slack in the remainder of the economy was concentrated (a) in transport and power-generating infrastructure, largely financed by World Bank and U.S. loans procured on the strength of the uranium production potential (b) in a number of state-owned or state-assisted and very capital-intensive enterprises such as SASOL, FOSKOR, SAPPI, SAICCOR. Undoubtedly during this period there was some alteration in the geography of economic growth. These new enterprises were situated for the most part in "decentralised" areas or, curiously enough, in Natal. The Frame textile group spurred a shift from the Eastern Cape to Natal to substitute "more docile" Indian labour for Coloureds (with unanticipated recent results!) The Cape's proportion of industrial investment declined. But the Rand remained the industrial focus, despite warnings about water shortage as well

as black concentration. An absolute distinction between labour-intensive and capital-intensive industry is perhaps impossible. Moreover in one sense it is labour-intensive industry which relies more on a structure of production differentiating artisans from unskilled workers, while capital-intensive industry uses operatives. So perhaps the distinction is best related to the cost of machines employed and the level of skill necessary to operate them. In this sense it would seem that the comparative failure of a policy of decentralised development relates to the fact that, while mechanisation at the start was of a more labour-intensive kind and opened scope for use of cheaper black labour, it has progressively become more capital-intensive, diminishing the need for large supplies of cheap labour in comparison with the need for skills. (This does not, however, take into account the use of labour in the more labour-intensive spheres of commerce and services, etc). I shall return briefly later to the implications of this for the social structure of South Africa. But these few remarks are chiefly intended to emphasise again the need for analysis of South Africa against a more detailed examination of the changing structure of production.

I turn now to two other spheres of policy of the 1948 period: political representation and social policy. In the political/administrative sphere the Fagan Commission argued that:

European and Native communities, scattered through the country as they are today, will permanently continue to exist side by side, economically intertwined, and should therefore be accepted as being permanent and as being parts of the same big machine, but that at the same time there are differences between them [Elsewhere, "races differing so radically from each other that there can be no question of assimilation"] to which legislation has to pay due regard and which in administrative affairs make necessary and inevitable a measure of separation, with machinery for consultation on matters of joint concern. (52)

"Blacks" and "whites" therefore, were to remain politically distinct; and Smuts's proposals to the NRC suggest that he will still operating within the "segregationist" framework of the 1920 Native Affairs Act. Separate local councils/boards, both rural and urban, would be encouraged, and linked more directly with the Parliamentary Natives Representatives and an NRC which would be granted increased powers over Africans "own" concerns, however these were defined.⁵³ The Fagan Commission was specifically at pains to refute the 1922 Stallard Commission argument that permanent African urbanisation (ie, presumably, residential rights) entailed franchise rights; and in so doing was in some senses less logically democratic than either that Commission or the Nationalists. Although both United Party and Nationalists, moreover, were united in denying Africans the right to strike, Smuts was moving just prior to 1948 towards incorporating Africans more integrally into the trade union system. Separated in terms of direct political institutions, in other words, urban Africans were to be socially controlled under the United Party proposals through "tame" trade unions, the nuclear family, and local representative institutions.⁵⁴

The Fagan Commission, therefore, justified its recommendations falling short of "European-type" liberal democracy for all members of the society in terms of the "radical differences" between "races". In this respect it fell somewhat short of the "liberal" argument which tended to justify discrimination on grounds of different levels of "civilisation" (however this code-word was interpreted), and which emerged more strongly in reports like those of van Eck and Smit. (However the Fagan Report did emphasise the social and cultural differentiation among Africans themselves, and tended to stress the desirability of formulating implicitly racially discriminatory provisions in "non-racial" economically discriminatory forms). The Fagan Commission, in other words was heir to the tradition of late nineteenth century liberalism at the Cape (Glen Grey) transmitted, as I have implied earlier, through such writings as Duncan (1912) to the revived modern liberalism. Against this the Nationalists reiterated the theme of "development along their own lines" which can be traced in party politics back at least to Hertzog in 1911.⁵⁵

If we yield in every sphere, in the political sphere and in the economic sphere, we shall be forced later on to yield in the social sphere. We would like to see the native develop in his own sphere and there attain a high standard of civilisation. We are not opposed to that but he must be separated from us. (J.H.Conradie) (56)

We have the choice of either giving the whites their own territory and the Bantu theirs, or of giving everybody one state and seeing the Bantu govern. (D.F.Malan) (57)

[Our policy is] separating the heterogeneous groups from the population of the country into separate socio-economic units, inhabiting separate parts of the country, each enjoying in his own area full citizenship rights, the greatest of which is the opportunity of developing such capabilities as its individual members may possess to their optimum capacity (W.W.M.Eiselen) (58)

In practical political terms this did not mean more than marginal differences in the short run from United Party policy. If the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 placed more emphasis than the UP would have done on the role of the chief in local African "government",⁵⁹ it nevertheless fostered local administration. It is true, however, that the Nationalists rejected any political or quasi-political institutions for Africans which would (a) create de facto "rights" for them in the "white" urban areas or (b) create a national institution which could focus Bantu grievances, hence one of the reasons for their failure to permit African trade unions (Native Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act 1953), and for the abolition of the Native Representative Council. For them social control was to be rooted or re-rooted in the rural "reserves" and extend from here to the towns.⁶⁰ (Of Africans on white farms Verwoerd said significantly that "these widely separated Natives constitute no danger.")⁶¹ One

might, therefore, legitimately accuse them of balkanisation, of divide et impera. The United Party appears not to have had fears to the same extent of a national African organisation because it possibly believed this would represent the aspirations of an African middle class rather than African as a whole.⁶² But it should be noted that the more prevalent accusation against the Nationalists on this score has been the classic liberal hostility to African "tribal" institutions as essentially primitive, archaic, conservative, and incapable of self-development - a hostility which can be traced back to Merriman and earlier to nineteenth-century missionaries. This became particularly evident after 1959, with the Nationalist introduction of the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act. Liberals had been so wedded to the idea that Nationalist policy was based on a belief in the inherent inferiority of the African that they had ignored all the messages about political "decolonisation" (whose seeds had in a sense been present since 1911 at least). Indeed it would not be impossible to give a series of quotations from Nationalists arguing in such biologically racist terms - but these could be found among the United Party also. Indeed Malan had tended to talk in terms of indefinite "trusteeship", and Strijdom as often as not in terms of domination and baasskap; and in this context even SABRA, de Wet Nel, Verwoerd etc had been equivocal about the extent to which African autonomy would reach. Indeed, as Verwoerd himself mentioned, outside events hastened the pace:

The Bantu will be able to develop into separate states. That is not what we would have liked to see. It is a form of fragmentation that we would not have liked if we were able to avoid it. In the light of the pressure being exerted on South Africa, there is however no doubt that eventually this will have to be done, thereby buying for the White man his freedom and the right to retain his domination in what is his country. (63)

But Verwoerd's defensiveness about devolution of authority is not unrelated to the fact that once the United Party and liberals had got over their shock, and considered the measures as something more than a "facade",⁶⁴ their main attack (Pace Merriman, Duncan, etc) was that autonomous Bantu areas would create a threat to White South Africa; and the more dangerous a threat for being based on "tribal" identification rather than controlled middle-class identification.

The notion of "cultural differences between whites and blacks in South Africa as the basis of differentiation (rather than biological differences) had been inherent in the ideology of "segregation" as I have suggested, since the 1908-1911 period. From 1959 they assumed the dominant role in Nationalist ideology. Though the analogy of blacks with "foreign workers" in Europe had been present since 1948 or so,⁶⁵ something of the flavour of early Nationalist justification of apartheid is conveyed in Dr. Malan's reply to a letter by the Rev. John H. Piersma of Grand Rapids, Michigan:

The deep-rooted colour consciousness of the White South Africans - a phenomenon quite beyond the comprehension of the unformed - arises from the fundamental difference between the two groups, White and Black. The

difference in colour is merely the physical manifestation of the contrast between two irreconcilable ways of life, between barbarism and civilization, between heathenism and Christianity, and finally between overwhelming numerical odds on the one hand and insignificant numbers on the other. Such it was in the early beginnings and such it largely remains....As Lord Balfour stated on a famous occasion, "In South Africa a White nation has established itself in a Black continent, which is something that has never before presented itself in the history of mankind." He might have added that there is no parallel for the South African racial record of non-extirpation, non-miscegenation, Non-assimilation, but of preaching and practising Christianity with the retention of racial identity and of mutual respect..... Essentially a positive and non-repressive policy as applied in our enlightened day, Apartheid is based on what the Afrikaner believes to be his divine calling and his privilege - to convert the heathen to Christianity without obliterating his national identity. Here a tremendous experiment is being tried; not that fraught with the bloodshed of annihilation, nor that coloured by assimilation, but that inspired by a belief in the logical differentiation, with the acceptance of the basic human rights and responsibilities..[which] can however only be exercised by human beings who are capable of appreciating their significance and it is here that my Government, dealing as it does with a still primitive non-White population, is faced with a major educational problem....

He then details government "progress" in non-white education, "reserve" rehabilitation, social welfare, housing, health, factory legislation etc.

The Bantu are given the opportunity to play an active part in the administration of their own affairs and, as they develop, more responsibilities and duties, as well as privileges, are granted them until they are proved to be competent to govern themselves... Theoretically the object of the policy of Apartheid could be fully achieved by dividing the country into two states, with all the Whites in one, all the Blacks in the other. For the foreseeable future, however this is simply not practical politics. Whether in time to come we shall reach a stage where some such division, say on a federal basis, will be possible, is a matter we must leave to the future....(66)

From 1959 the emphasis was much more positive:

There is something...which binds people, and that is their spiritual treasures, the cultural treasure of a people. It is those things which have united other nations in the world. That is why we say that the basis of our approach is that the Bantu, too, will be linked together by traditional and emotional bonds, by their own language, their own culture, their national possessions. (67)

Malan's just cited outline of the Nationalist programme of non-white "development" raises the question of post-1948 social policy. Harold Wolpe has recently maintained that:

the practice and policy of Separate Development must be seen as the attempt to retain, in a modified form, the structure of the 'traditional' societies, not, as in the past, for the purposes of ensuring an economic supplement to the wages of the migrant labour force, but for the purposes of reproducing and exercising control over a cheap African industrial labour force in or near the 'homelands', not by means of preserving the precapitalist mode of production but by the political, social, economic and ideological enforcement of low levels of subsistence. (68)

How seriously the state did attempt to preserve the precapitalist mode of production needs perhaps to be investigated. But certainly, as I have suggested, "liberals" came to realise that the agricultural potential for subsidising labour-reproduction was disappearing, and urged its supplement by urban social welfare measures. In the 1940's these began to be instituted, and though some initial cutbacks were made by the Nationalists, they continued to some extent: that is, under the post-1948 government the state continued to assume some responsibility for the reproduction of labour. Moreover it is important to realise that the Nationalists in fact implemented some "modernising" policies which had long been advocated by liberals, for example (a) the assumption of national responsibility for African education. Leaving aside the questions of its content, and of control by the NAD/BAD rather than Education Department, there is need for some less loaded investigation of post-1953 expenditure on this compared with pre-1940, and proportions coming from taxation of Africans; (b) urban housing. In the housing field the Government realised rapidly if not immediately that whatever the long-term situation, Africans would be resident as vested "permanent" inhabitants or migrants for some considerable time in the existing urban areas:

A long-term policy must exist for the development of completely suitable industrial areas, situated in such a way that Native labourers in the towns can live in their own areas [ie the border industry situation (69)]... There must be a transition period....[in which] there may however not be such unwise and excessive establishment of industrial areas that one will be bound by them for longer in the future than is necessary....(70)

One might conjecture that this was based on a realisation that the short-term industrial development of South Africa would be labour-intensive. In any case the Government did launch a massive urban housing campaign which, while intended to reduce African urban rights by removing freeholding of land or houses and (later) reducing provision for family accommodation, incorporated two elements of the liberal programme (a) permission for African artisans to engage in the construction of houses for Africans ⁷¹ (b) a levy on employers to provide some of the cost of such housing and later, of provision of transport services.⁷² At the same time

stringent blueprints were laid down for the social geography of such urban townships.⁷³

The eventual policy on wider social services seems clear. Ad Sadie wrote in 1956, in a single society Africans would use their political power to bring about high levels of taxation and social services but under separate development:

The Bantu will be put in the position where they themselves will have to accept responsibility for financing those services, and the extension of the services will be a function of the ability of the Bantu to pay...(74)

Or, as Verwoerd said in 1955:

I regard old-age pensions as a wrong system of dealing with the Native. We want to evolve a system whereby we can reinstate the natural obligations of Bantu authorities and Bantu children in regard to their old people, with the support of an equal amount of money to that which we now spend wrongly in caring for them. (75)

Or again, the Minister of Finance, speaking on the Native Taxation and Development Act of 1958 which raised African taxes:

We do not have one homogeneous community in which the prosperous people can be taxed to provide services for the less prosperous, but we have various communities which must be economically sound individually. The White guardian community must provide the funds for the essential developmental services...but thereafter the community concerned must itself see to the extension of those services in accordance with its capacity. (76)

But how was this to be done in the rural areas - seeing that agriculture could no longer achieve this? Of course, as Wolpe has pointed out, various mechanisms were to ensure that what Marx called the "socially necessary subsistence" for Africans remained lower than that for whites: but this had also been true prior to the 1940's, ie even taking into account the "subsidy" from the reserves, black wages were lower than white. (Though this needs calculation on the basis of skilled/unskilled differentials too; the "excessive difference" between the two levels was probably never compensated by the "reserves" subsidy). In part, as I have said, this was now supplemented by the state - greater, even if differential, provision of social welfare payments and social welfare infrastructure (which, from the late 1950's, began to be shifted to the reserves-hospitals and schools, for example). There are perhaps four other methods by which the government assumed that "Bantu self-development" could reabsorb the costs of labour reproduction - in all cases on the basis that the Bantutan political institutions could provide some redistribution of African surplus: (a) the development of full-time and taxable farmers in the reserves, advocated by Verwoerd and the Tomlinson Commission in the mid-50's, though in practical terms shelved at that time (b) the encouragement/coercion back to the reserves of African traders, petty businessmen etc (the long-term antagonism between the White petty-

bourgeoisie and non-white petty-bourgeoisie I have not been able to go into in these papers, significant as it is for racial ideology and policy with respect to Indians, Natalians and Afrikaners. But the inhibition of such people in the urban areas and white rural areas could now be complemented by a "positive" encouragement in the "reserves") (c) encouragement to whites to raise the wages of such Africans as were in the existing metropolitan areas.

^{published} I shall return later to the fourth aspect. Let me now comment briefly on the third. In the debate on the Native Taxation and Development Act of 1958 the Ministers of Finance and of Native Affairs both replied to arguments about Africans having too low wages to afford higher taxes by insisting on the responsibility of employers to pay wages to Africans "which their work and productivity justify."

As long as we allow employers to retain the habit of closing their eyes to the full cost of living needs of the Native; as long as employees are assured that the State will come along like Father Christmas and provide housing...transport....(perhaps) food cheaply... employers will then be inclined to employ too many Bantu, with all the resultant State expenditure. ...(77)

Indeed from about this time the Wage Board was employed to prod employers to raise African wages. What were the effects? Firstly, as one study has shown, "when Bantu real earnings were rising, increases in Bantu employment in manufacturing failed to keep place with the increase of non-Bantu employment in manufacturing... It seems plausible that some employers have substituted, within limited degrees, non-Bantu labour or capital for Bantu employees, or else they have reorganised their factors of production in order to eliminate marginal employees."⁷⁸ Raising the wages of Africans in employment, then, is at one and the same time an incentive towards "modernisation" (greater capital-intensity) and towards reducing the African labour force in the urban areas (towards, in other words, separate development). At the same time it may give such employees a greater disposable income to be redistributed towards "African welfare" by (a) the white State (b) the Bantustan (c) the extended family/home boy system. There are some connections here with the argument, made in the 1930's and repeated more recently, that influx control is of benefit not only to whites but to Africans already employed in the urban areas.⁷⁹ However it should be noted (and I return to this) that the same study concluded that "higher real Bantu earnings have been accompanied by higher rates of Bantu unemployment." ⁸⁰

The costs of labour-reproduction are intended to be borne, therefore, partly by the white State, partly by the Bantustans through income generated (a) by blacks in industrial employment (b) by reserve farmers (c) by African traders and businessmen within the reserves. These costs will be reduced from those of the "normal" industrial economy, or even from those of the society envisaged by liberals in the 1940's, through the decentralization of industry to areas where social costs are and can be maintained at a lower level than in the existing metropolitan areas:

It is my sincere conviction that the best way to increase this purchasing power [one of the

main factors in rapid industrial development] is to increase the productivity, and hence the purchasing power, of our large Bantu population. This can best be achieved by absorbing the surplus Bantu in secondary industries in areas near their own territories, where industrial development will be associated with far lower social costs and less disruption to the traditional society and family standards than has been the case with the industrialisation of our large urban centers. In effecting this development, there can be no question of bringing about the dismemberment of our economy. The Union will remain an economically integrated entity, but this unity will be associated with the increased activity and differentiation of its constituent parts. This is the way in which social development has always taken place. (81) (note the interesting quasi-biological metaphor)

These Border areas have the advantages of deriving all the external economies generated by the metropolitan centres of which they are the natural extensions, but, because the Bantu live in their own homelands, the concomitant diseconomies and social disadvantages are largely eliminated. (82)

III

Despite its proclaimed intentions the Nationalist Government, as I have said, moved slowly towards the implementation of its programme. Looked at in retrospect, what is remarkable is the comparative lack of large-scale social change, the comparative lack of authoritarianism, in the first ten years of Nationalist rule. If a considerable body of legislation was published, its enactment was delayed from year to year, presumably for reworking or further discussion with interested parties. Many matters were the subject of Commissions of Enquiry which took several years to report. Leaving aside black opposition, which would require a separate paper to examine, it would appear that the major white opposition of this period was not so much over the content of policy (extent over marginal issues and their apparently ideological and policy implications) but over the intention of the Nationalist Government to proceed by unprecedented constitutional means. (The major issue of substance may well have been the government decision, in a variety of Acts, to differentiate the Coloured population more rigorously from the whites, a policy controversial in Nationalist circles, and still not completely accepted. This has significant implications for my earlier arguments about the "colour line" which I cannot enter into here). In other words, the Government had to convince existing vested interests both about the viability of the content of its policy, and also about the measures of authoritarian planning needed to implement them. In the 1960's the practice of the government became much more authoritarian. Thus it appears ironical that, having aroused on its accession widespread fears and accusations of Fascism, it should have acted so delicately at first - and that, when it in fact turned to means which could more correctly be described as Fascist, the opposition among whites dwindled. One might perhaps attribute this to white exhaustion after the decade of opposition in the 1950's. But it may also be true that by the 1960's the government had convinced major white interests (specifically secondary industry and commerce) that its policy could succeed without threat to such interests. Or to put this in a slightly different way, it may be that by the 1960's the structure of production in industry (if not yet commerce) had altered sufficiently to make Nationalist policies appear viable: specifically in terms of the relative growth of capital-intensive over labour-intensive industry. (There is also the question of the relative importance of foreign and local capital, and what this signifies in terms of interests in situ in terms of production structure, markets, etc).

Whatever the causes and the effects, political and economic change slowed down in the mid-1950's. (Strijdom, an abrasive and archaic articulator of apartheid, seems to symbolise this period in contrast with the religious paternalism of Malan and the dynamic positive vision of Verwoerd). New impetus came both economically and politically from 1958. Foreign investment reinvigorated the economy; the Viljoen Commission laid down recommendations for the further direction of modernisation: the 1960's economic boom was getting under way. In the same year Verwoerd became Prime Minister, and from 1959 the political and economic restructuring of the "reserves" and border areas gathered momentum.⁸³ In 1963/4 there was the most serious major overhaul of urban areas/pass/influx control legislation since 1945 with the Bantu Laws Amendment Act and the White Paper on it: this firmly established the labour bureaux system rather than municipal officers/

native commissioners as the agency regulating the African labour supply and it vastly eroded the vested rights of an African workforce whose strength had been broken by the banning and crushing of African political organisations under Vorster at the Ministry of Justice from 1960/61. ⁸⁴ Ministers emphasised more confidently the migrant labour policy, and its links to mechanisation of industry. But with the accession of Vorster in September 1966 as Prime Minister the pace of change, and the rapprochement between government and industry, intensified as never before. Vorster gained acceptance in such circles as the Rand Club in a way no other Nationalist Prime Minister had: in the medium term the price that he paid was a resurgence of "right-wing" nationalism in the trade unions and rural areas symbolised politically in the verkrampte-verligte split. But, significantly, this took place while separate development was being implemented more seriously and, for the first time ever it did not appear to have gained overwhelming support in Afrikaner circles. Vorster's authoritarian modernisation policy held the firm centre position in white South African politics claimed by Botha and Smuts in 1910-24 and by Hertzog and Smuts in 1933-39. In concluding this paper I wish through quotations and some description of legislation to outline the main aspects of current policy, as a continuation of post-1948 trends; and I shall finish with a few comments on the current role envisaged for the "reserves".

I start with some quotations:

On the status of Africans in the "white" areas:

The Bantu are not being incorporated in our economy. They will only have become integrated when they have a joint say in regard to the way in which our economy must be run, but so long as the Bantu are only allowed to sell their labour in the White area, they are not integrated in our economy...All we are doing is to import labour into South Africa, and when those labourers have completed their work here, they return to their homelands, where they have their roots, where their future lies, where they can realize their ideals and where they can get their rights...They are only supplying a commodity, the commodity of labour....As soon as the opposition understands this principle, that it is labour we are importing and not labourers as individuals, the question of numbers will not worry them either. As far as principle is concerned, it makes no difference whether one or 5000 or 5 million Bantu come here to supply labour and then return to their homeland again...
(85) (G.F. Froneman)

The Bantu in the white areas are people within a national context, not labourers who only come here to work, but people...who are also citizens of their homeland, and who also have to develop their national feeling of solidarity with their own people, not with us as whites. Therefore we say...that the Bantu who are here in the white areas...are here... in a casual capacity.

They are not here in a permanent capacity, as we whites are... With our citizenship we are anchored here to the white area...with all our rights, to which we have prior and sole claim, whereas this is not the case with the Bantu...Section 10 of the Urban Areas Act does not confer rights of citizenship (86)... but only grants general exemption from influx control...The Bantu do not have here the comparable entrenched claims, rights and privileges which the whites have in the white area... The clearest and most fundamental right of all is the right of land ownership. In the second place, in the white area the Bantu do not have any political say...The third category...is that of the sphere of labour. As far as labour is concerned, all the opportunities for work in the white area of South Africa are the sole right of Whites. Insofar as the whites are not in a position to exercise that sole right at all times, we have the statutory machinery under which categories of labour are released for occupation by Bantu. This matter is regularised by a set of laws...Categories of labour are released...in cases where the whites themselves cannot do those jobs in their own homeland...There is a fourth category of rights I want to mention, that of residence. Residential equality does not exist in the sense that the Bantu may live anywhere in the white areas as the white may in fact do...Proper areas are designated... in which the Bantu may live... within the white area. These are controlled so that they may not expand indefinitely...(86) (Mr. Botha)

(The assertion of the whites "prior and sole claim" to rights in the "white" areas raises a question which I have dealt with insufficiently in these papers: the legitimation of the white areas. As I mentioned in my first, policy around 1900 was formulated on the basis of the right of conquest by whites - though soon after this there entered the theme of the "tradition of segregation since 1652." 87 At the same time Theal and others were arguing the prior settlement of much of South Africa by whites, a claim which has been progressively been intended so that, with the "conquest" ideology now outmoded, priority of occupation takes over. Another interwar theme, of course, was that whites, in terms of capital and entrepreneurship, had created towns/industries - but this does not seem to be used much any more).

On the status of Africans in the homelands

As a result of the process of emancipation in Africa, the concepts "Bantu" and "African" began to lose their significance. They were replaced by proper names, and individuals are now regarded as members of a certain nation and as citizens under a certain authority.... The decisive factor by which the nationality of a person is determined is not his birth-place, but rather his race descent [and language]...Membership of a nation is a sociological fact which, ultimately, will

have to be recognised formally and legally. Membership of a certain national community is acquired automatically, for every person is born within a certain national group and is loyal to it....(88) (M.C. Botha)

The Bantu are in fact divided by language, culture and tradition into several peoples or nations, history left them within the borders of the Republic large tracts of land which serve as their homelands.... the Governments policy is, therefore, not a policy of discrimination on the grounds of race or colour, but a policy of differentiation on the ground of nationhood of different nations, granting to each self-determination within the borders of their homelands....(89) (G.F. van L Froneman)

[We are aiming to give shape] "to every Bantu nation in accordance with its own national character...As regards all the various nations here...something to which we have given too little regard is the fact that numerically the White nation is superior to all other nations in South Africa...It has a very wide implication for us all. Firstly, it demonstrates our duty as guardians. It also demonstrates the utter folly of saying that a minority government is ruling others in South Africa. (90)

On "social welfare" policy

[Local authorities should not provide Africans with] bigger, better more attractive and more luxurious facilities...[which] have the effect not only of making the Bantu accustomed to a foreign taste but to enslave him to luxury which his homeland cannot afford, and thereby alienate him from what is his own... (Blaar Coetzee) (91)

[Development of the homelands should be] at such a rate that the development of the people will be able to keep pace with it and they will be able to absorb everything which is being introduced in terms of all the facets of development there. (M.C. Botha) (92)

What objection does the non member have to a pensioner draeing his pension in Sada? Why must he draw his pension in Cradock or Somerset East or in one of the white towns? Why must a house be built for him out of housing funds? Why must he be provided with health services etc in White areas when you can provide his health services and his housing etc for him in Bantu areas? (Mr. Vosloo) (93)

Removal of Africans from the white areas is not dependent on the development of the Bantu homelands, except that housing facilities should be made possible for them...the superfluous Africans, are actually aliens in the White homelands who only have to be repatriated....(94)

(G.F. van L.Froneman)

The state-controlled implementation of this policy took a substantial jump forward after 1967, with the passage of the Physical Planning and Utilisation of Resources Act 88 of that year. For the first time(?) the Government now intended to implement policy by legislation directed at employers rather than directly municipalities of Africans: the Minister of Planning could not control the use of all resources, including labour, and in particular restrict increased use of African labour in industry, on farms,⁹⁵ or in, for example, trade and commerce.⁹⁶ The Minister termed it "the most positive legislation in the entire industrial history of South Africa" and "supplementary to the direct and indirect means which the authorities have at present to direct and decentralise industrial development and to bring it into line with the socio-economic demands of separate development." The announced aim was to reduce the white-black ratio in industry in established areas from 1:2.2 to less than 1:1 by a 5% reduction in the black labour force per year, mandatory in the Western Cape.⁹⁷ In the same year it was announced that labour-bureaux were to be decentralised to the reserves, and that Africans would be registered "and allotted to specific labour categories according to prescribed norms so that all sectors would receive their rightful share of the available labour."⁹⁸ The state, in other words, was moving from negative controls to the positive supply of specific kinds of labour in specific places. At the end of the same year the famous General Circular No.25 (12/12/67) was issued, which formed the basis for the massive resettlement and dislocation described by Cosmas Desmond and others:

It is accepted Government policy that the Bantu are only temporarily resident in the European areas of the Republic, for as long as they offer their labour there. As soon as they become, for some reason or another, no longer fit for work or superfluous in the labour market, they are expected to return to their country of origin or the territory of their national unit where they fit in ethnically if they were not born or bred in the homeland... no stone is to be left unturned to achieve the settlement in the homelands of non-productive Bantu at present residing in the European areas. (99)

Numerous government statements reiterated this policy, stressing that it was non-productive Africans that were aimed at:¹⁰⁰ the state was creating an "industrial reserve army" situated in the areas from which it could be controlled and redirected as wished. The "non-productive" included:

The aged, unfit, widows, women with dependent children and also families who do not qualify under the provisions of the Bantu (Urban Areas) Act 25 of 1945 for family accommodation in the European urban areas.

Bantu on European farms who have become superfluous as a result of age, disability, or the application of Chapter 4 of the Bantu Trust and

Land Act No.18 of 1936, or Bantu squatters from mission stations or black spots which are being cleared up.

Professional Bantu such as doctors, attorneys, agents, traders, industrialists etc. Also such persons are not regarded as essential for the European labour market and as such they must be settled in the homelands insofar as they are not essential for serving their compatriots in the European areas....

At the same time (a) employers of all kinds (not only farmers and mineowners) were empowered to form recruitment organisations for migrant labour and (b) policy was changed to permit white investment on an "agency" basis in the "homelands" themselves (as well as border areas) while proclamations repealed the application of industrial legislation regulating wages and racial employment allocation in the homelands.¹⁰¹

Policy was further elaborated in consequence of the reports of the Geyser Commission, investigating the better utilisation of available labour, and the Riekert Commission, investigating the more effective implementation of decentralisation. Through these two new principles were established: (a) a distinction between "location-bound" industries which could not decentralise and others which could (b) that the government would determine racial employment ratios in the established industrial areas for non-location bound industries. In 1971 a guideline of 1:2.5 was established for the next two years, to be reduced to 1 white per two Africans after June 1973.¹⁰² If the government was showing some responsiveness to trade union pressure (for example, by reapplying job reservation for whites in the homelands at the request of white mineowners) it was also responsive to negotiation with industry: as Dr. Diederichs said in 1972 "the Government was always willing to consider adjustments of labour policy within the basic framework of society." ¹⁰³

These developments from 1967 cannot be viewed in the context of a static structure of production. As Verwoerd said in 1965, and as Ministers have continued to stress, the ability to circumscribe non-white employment in the existing industrial areas, and to establish racial employment ratios, depends on capital-intensive mechanisation and increasing labour productivity:

with mechanisation and automation, it was expected that by 1978 a decreasing number of Bantu would be required in industries situated in and around White urban areas. If the number of Bantu in white areas continued to increase in the meantime it was not in conflict with the Nationalist Party's ultimate goal of turning the flow back to the Bantu homelands. (104)

However what requires greater stress is that in consequence of the Riekert Commission the government appears to have formally bowed to the imperatives of modern growth and recognised that in the border areas/homelands as well one cannot rely on labour-intensive industry: what must be developed are "well balanced industrial complexes in [the] decentralised areas."¹⁰⁵ This is of the utmost significance. For what it indicates is a trend towards an eventual employment crisis, in which blacks of course will come off worst. Perhaps it is not evident as yet. Perhaps the rate of increase of African employment has as yet not showed signs of slackening: the figures are hard to interpret. But the signs of the trend are evident to

the far-sighted. Increasing attention is being paid to growth rates required, and capital per job estimated, to absorb the estimated non-white labour force. Some of these estimates are designed as propaganda against decentralization or job reservation policy - but even these can be revised to make estimates for the economy as a whole, while the absorption of some Africans in more skilled jobs, which is already taking place, does not deal with the problem as a whole. Other of the estimates were by those in general agreement with government policy.¹⁰⁶ As L.P. McCrystal writes rather ingenuously:

South Africa will need to grow at well over 7 per cent per annum just to maintain unemployment amongst Bantu at the levels prevailing in 1970 - a formidable task whilst the Bantu themselves make no meaningful contribution to the entrepreneurial class. (107)

Nor is Voster unaware of the issue:

in a country like South Africa, with its population structure as it is, there is one thing I am more afraid of than any other, and that is large-scale unemployment....

The greatest danger confronting South Africa is not so much the threat from outside the borders, serious though that may be, but mass unemployment and disturbed race relations. (108)

There can be little doubt that with increased capital-intensity in industry such unemployment will become the danger to the existing structure, a danger in part promoted by the pressure to reduce black numbers in the metropolitan areas (promoting mechanisation and economic growth), but in part solved by removing the problem to the rural areas:

I am afraid of something else and that is that our metropolitan areas will expand and develop in such a way that it will bring about South Africa's downfall...unfortunately there are in our metropolitan areas...industries which are so Bantu-intensive that, seen from all angles, it would have been much better not to have had those industries here. (109)

But in addition to removals, the new policy being advocated, inter alia by McCrystal and J. Sadie, is more intensified birth control among the black population: this is the fourth form of "social welfare" that I alluded to earlier, social welfare by elimination of the problem. Throughout the nineteenth century British humanitarian thought preserved the illusion that uncontrolled white settlers would engage in wars of extermination (sometimes meaning extrusion, sometimes extinction) against black populations. During much of the twentieth century white South Africans have believed that immigration from Europe could alter the South African demographic ratio. Now it appears that a rather refined form of extermination could be initiated - and black organisations in the United States have categorised discriminatory birth control as a form of attempted genocide - and initiated not by "backward" white settlers, but by a regime which wishes to maintain white supremacy and white prosperity under conditions of capital-intensive modernisation to which technology from the "advanced" Western countries has massively contributed. It is difficult to see, in describing the trend of policy since 1948, any fundamental conflict between economic growth and the social system shaped by apartheid.

Footnotes.

1. Proclamation 150 of 1934, issued in terms of the 1927 Native Administration Act, created "exemption certificates" from pass law provisions not only for specified categories of Africans but for any "native of good character and repute" certified by a Native Commissioner or Magistrate. By 1947 it appears there were 51, 134 such exemptions. I cannot fully clarify whether these certificates displaced or supplemented "letters of exemption", already in existence before Union and reaffirmed under the 1923 Native (Urban Areas) Act which applied to specified categories of Africans only: there may be some laws for which exemption applied under the letters but not the certificates. See inter alia Handbook of Race Relations (HRR) (1948), 284, 287; Survey of Race Relations (SRR) 1955-6, 80; 1957-8, 50.
2. See Report of NAC, 1937-8, 30. Amendments to the 1923 Native (Urban Areas) Act (a) in 1930 established (?) "proclaimed areas" at the request of local authorities, and strengthened powers of removal from urban areas, applying them for the first time to women (b) in 1934 required Transvaal and Free State Africans to carry travelling passes (c) in 1937 gave to the government rather than municipal areas the power to declare "proclaimed" areas into which any influx could be controlled. The 1937 amendment also (a) brought urban land ownership provisions into line with the 1913 Land Act (b) controlled the provision of social amenities for Africans in "whote parts" of urban areas (c) brought High Commission Territories and South West African Africans under identical provisions to Union Africans. Up to 1936 only 12 urban areas had been proclaimed: by 1938 there were 200 in existence. Cf HRR, 233, 284.
3. See J.C. Smuts, The Basis of Trusteeship in South African Native Policy, (New Africa pamphlet, 2, 1942); Report of Interdepartmental Committee on Social, Health and Economic Conditions of Urban Natives (1942). Also Report of the Committee appointed July 1942 to investigate the position of crime on the Witwatersrand and in Pretoria (1943); South African Outlook, 1940-1942; D. Reitz, Senate Debates, col 1583, 25/3/42 followed by Interdepartmental Circular of 12/5/42; Reitz, NRC Proceedings, December 1942; Smuts, Sunday Times, 30/8/42; Smit, Bantu World, 24/10/42; Ballinger etc to Smuts 5/1/43 [Ballinger Papers]; Xuma to Rand Daily Mail, 15/5/42 [Xuma Papers] J. Lewin, "The Recognition of African Trade Unions", Race Relations, 1942. See also Walshe, ANC; Hancock, Smuts, Vol II; Paton, Hofmeyr; M. Ballinger, From Union to Apartheid.
4. Reitz, Die Transvaler, 5/8/41; Smuts, Rand Daily Mail, 1a and 20/3/42; Smuts, House of Assembly Debates (HAD) 11/3/1942.
- 4a. Cf Walshe, ANC, 270-1, 279, 310; Hancock, Smuts, II, 488; HRR, 167-8, 288. David Welsh in the Oxford History Vol II tends to exaggerate the period of time of relaxation. For social welfare measures see inter alia, Outlines of Post-War Reconstruction (GPS 10154-1944/5); Report of SA National Conference on Post-War Planning of Social Welfare Work (GPS 4221-1944/5); Report of Social Security Committee (UG 14-1944). See also books by Paton, Hancock, Ballinger etc.
5. See for example Report NAC, 1937-8 (UG 54-1939), 7 which emphasized that passes assisted in preserving a proper labour supply in agriculture and mining. In addition to pass law amendments, the Native Service Contract Act (1932) was designed to impede the mobility of farm labour. Legislation in the 1920's cannot be so directly related to famers nees in opposition to those of urban interests.
6. It might be maintained that the "civilised labour" policy was antithetical to cost-reduction. However this needs investigation in terms of relations of production (in terms of skills and racial allocation) in different industries. The auto industry etc., which used white labour, being foreign-owned, was not in competition with (US) imported cars. Then ISCOR, using white labour, derived its cost benefits from South Africa's cheap (black-mined) coal: even so it got greater protection against "dumping" by the international cartel in the 1930's. In this analysis of interests, two problems are involved: (a) the creation of surplus value in the process of production (b) the realisation of surplus value through the sale of commodities produced.

7. At some point, in 1942-3 I think, engineering and metallurgical employers established a separate employers organisation (SAFEMA) which at the end of the war represented a greater capital investment and employment potential than any other sector except mining: South Africa's Metal Industries (UG Fact Paper 50, January 1958). This organization became the Steel and Engineering Fed of SA (Seifsa) in 1947.
8. Oxford History, II, 191.
9. L. Kuper, Passive Resistance in South Africa, 45.
10. Ellen Hellmann in HRR, 1948, 234. I hope to attach an appendix listing a series of writings in this vein, many of them under the auspices of the SA Institute of Race Relations.
11. On this question see the interesting article by A. Atmore and N. Westlake, "A Liberal Dilemma: A Critique of the Oxford History of South Africa", Race, XIV, 2 (1972), 107-136.
12. For interwar government publications on secondary industry see Dept of Mines and Industries and SARH, Industrial Development in South Africa (1924); BTI, Facilities for the Establishment of Factories in SA (1928); V. Bosman (ed) Industrial Development in SA and facilities for the establishment of factories (UG, 1936).
13. Third (Interim) Report of the Agricultural and Industrial Requirements Commission (UG 40-1941) (Van Eck Report), 6-7. H.J. van Eck was a chemical and metallurgical engineer who graduated at Stellenbosch in 1921, spent time in the United States(?), served in ESCOM, ISCOR and then private industry and industrial finance: his wartime and post-war role was rather equivalent to that of HJ van der Bijl in the earlier interwar period.
14. Board of Trade and Industries (BTI), Report 282, Investigation into Manufacturing Industries in the Union of South Africa (1945), 42-6. On the role of the state see ibid, 4.
15. See for example Minister of Economic Affairs 15/8/49 Commerce and Industry, VIII, 1, 15-16; Minister of Finance, ibid, IX, Oct 1950, 5; Minister of Economic Affairs, ibid, 51-2, 56; Eric Louw, ibid, XI, Dec 1952, 158; Eric Louw, ibid, XII, Dec 1953, 162. Because of the UK capital shortage, after the inflow and subsequent outflow of "hot money" in the 1947-9 period due to (a) the British Labour Government and (b) the Free State boom, the government found itself approaching US and Swiss/European capital sources.
16. Commerce and Industry, VI, August 1948, 593-4.
17. BTI, Report 282, 45-6.
18. Commerce and Industry, VIII, September 1949, 15-16. The "civilised labour" policy was reaffirmed in May 1949.
19. HAD, 1954, col 5854. (Minister of Labour).
20. Senate Debates, 21/3/57, IX cols 2423-5 (Minister of Labour).
21. Mr Viljoen, Dep Minister of Labour, Feb 1970 quoted by C. Desmond, The Discarded People, 20
22. P.J. van der Merwe, SA Journal of Economics, March 1969, 45.
23. See Minister of Labour to SEIFSA, Rand Daily Mail (RDM), 10/10/1957; 56-7, 133.
24. HAD 2/5/67.
25. HAD, 6/2/36 cols 1084-5.
26. Cape Argus, 28/11/64.
27. See e.g. HAD, 27/3/57, vol 10, col 3606; HAD, 24/7/70 (Graaff) (Marain Steyn) HAD 5/8/70; HAD 4/9/70; Stimes, 18/10/70.

28. HAD, 1947, cols 500915110 (Piet van der Bijl).

29. BTI, Report 282 (1945), 46.

30. Cf Smuts, Star, 23/10/47; UP Manifesto Star 24/4/48; Hancock, Smuts, II, 488-90, 501, 504.

31. See Die Burger, 29-30 March 1948. The Sauer Commission was headed by Paul Sauer and included E.G. Jansen, J.J. Serfontein, Dr. G.B.A. Gerdener, and M. de Wet Nel. See also, for it, Munger, American Field Service Reports.

32. HAD, 65, 21/9/48 col 2905, see also HAD 1947, col 2674, vol 60.

33. They used a rather illuminating metaphor of a stream of water and methods which farmers could use to control and utilise it: Report of Native Laws Commission (1946-8) (UG 28-1948), 5.

34. ibid, 19, 27, 49.

35. Labour bureaux appear to have been established by Native Laws Amendment Act 56 of 1949 though, as a result of opposition pressure, a clause was deleted compelling Africans to accept employment through the bureaux. However, the labour bureaux system seem to have been really started or at least hastened/strengthened by proclamations of 1/2/52 and 1/10/52 (in terms of the 1911 Native Labour Regulation Act) and perhaps by the 1952 Natives (Abolition of Passes and Coordination of Documents) Act which implemented the second aspect of the Fagan recommendations - simplification of documents without altering their purposes qualitatively. See Government Gazette CLXX, 4951, 31/10/52.

35a. A point of departure for a systematic study of pass law and legislation and implementation might be the United Party Native (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act 25 of 1945 which undoubtedly strengthened powers (and particularly central government powers) over interwar controls on influx. This should be compared (a) with the 1923 legislation and its successive amendments up to 1945 (b) amendments and implementation up to 1948 (c) amendments and implementation up to the next major overhaul in 1963/4. What is clear is that, even if the Nationalists stepped up the process, the UP was using this legislation to divert "surplus" Africans from the towns to other areas needing labour. Moreover as Francis Wilson implies in his Labour on the SA Gold Mines, by the late 1950's the implementation of influx control had secured a sufficiency of labour for the goldmines for perhaps the first time since the early 1930's. Any such study would have to take account of the nature of relaxations as well as restrictions: thus Nationalist legislation appears to have made it easier for Africans to return to the same job in the urban areas, thus trying to reduce job turnover in the interests of productivity.

36. See, for example, Verwoerd, Senate Debates, 1948 cols 233ff; Malan, HAD, 16/8/48 vol 64, cols 217-219; Malan, replying to the Dutch Reformed Church on total segregation, SRR, 48-49, 18-19 and HAD, 71, 12/4/50 cols 4141-4142; Verwoerd, Senate Debates, 1/5/51 cols 2893-4; Min Native Affairs to FCL Industrial Review, August 1951.

37a. In particular the Fagan Commission believed that urban requirements could not be assessed simply in terms of those adequately housed and those actually employed: "the fallacy of the popular notion that when we see a shanty town of Native squatters we have proof that there are 'redundant' Natives who have to be removed. In estimating labour requirements one has to remember that, where there is great industrial activity, it is also necessary that there should be a substantial reserve of labour - people who are ready to step in when others fall out or when there is increased activity in some industry; and there are many industries that are constantly contracting and expanding for seasonal and other reasons" op cit, 18.

37. HAD, 1948, vol 3, col 907.

38. HAD, 6/9/48, vol 64, col 1660.

39. HAD, 20/4/1950, col 4703. This speech was printed as Native Policy in the Union of South Africa (1950).

40. op cit, 44.
41. Cf generally ibid, 13-14, 16-19, 33-48. Also: "the migratory system can exist without detrimental social or moral consequences if... the place of work is so near to the worker's home that he remains in constant touch with his family, as is the case with workers in Durban whose families live in the Reserves on the boundaries of the town. This last class, however, cannot really be regarded as migrant labourers" ibid, 43. Also ibid, 46-7.
42. See also BTI, Report 219: Establishment of Industries in Native Territories, (1936/7).
43. BTI, Report 282, p. 46.
44. Social and Economic Planning Council, Report 9: The Native Reserves and Their Place in the Economy of South Africa (UG 32-1946).
45. HAD, 65, 21/9/48 cols 2903-4, 2906. Industries established by the IDC in such areas included Fine Wool Products and Goodyear Tyres (1945); The Good Hope Textile Corporation (1946); Masonite (1948).
46. Commerce and Industry VII, 12, August 1949, 690. See also H.J. van Eck, Some Aspects of the SA Industrial Revolution (1951 Hoernle Memorial Lecture) (SAIRR: 2nd edition, 1953), also advocating labour-intensive decentralisation, and indicating "liberal" support for such a policy. The other side of the coin (capital-intensive industry in white areas) is suggested by Ernest Oppenheimer's campaign for married housing facilities for Africans on the Free State mines: "The question of Native labour for the new mines will present a problem of its own. Science, however, may once again come to our aid. The ever-increasing extent to which mechanization has been introduced in several of the newer Rand mines, for example, has tended to make them less and less dependant upon Native labour... In this connection, I would like to see the Native mine labourers [in the Free State] housed in villages rather than in compounds with adequate provision made for married quarters" SAIRR, 17th Annual Report, 45-46, p.5. To a similar proposal in the 1950 Verwoerd replied (a) that permanent African urbanisation would exist when the mines stopped working and (b) that the children of permanent African miners would not want to work on the mines so that "those married quarters become a channel through which the rest of the non-European population in the cities becomes greater and greater" Quoted Herwitz, Polit Econ, 291-2.
47. HAD, 20/4/50, col 4703. See also Min of Finance, N.C. Havenga 9/6/48 Commerce and Industry, VII, Sept 1948, 3 and the activities of the National Resources Development Council under F.J. du Toit.
48. Industrial Review, August 1951. See also Verwoerd to last session of NRC, in 1951 Daily Despatch, 6/12/1951. Also Verwoerd, HAD, 18/2/54 cols 799ff; 2/6/54 cols 6143-5; Verwoerd to FCI Exec Council, The Manufacturer, August 1954.
49. These quotations are taken from J.L. Sadie, "The Native Reserves of the Union-Industrial Areas of the Future" Finance and Trade Review, (FTR) I, 5, July 1954, 12-24; J.L. Sadie to SABRE DRC-FAK Congress on Tomlinson Commission June 1956 (UG Fact Paper 17, August 1956). The Tomlinson Commission was released in March 1956, summarized in UG 61-1955 and debated in Parliament in May 1956 on the basis of Government White Paper F-56. See also J.A. Lombard in FTR, I, 7, July 1955, 4; and FTR, II, 1, 13-30; HJJ Reynders in FTR, II, 4, p. 219; Commission of Enquiry into Policy relating to the Protection of Industries (UG 36-1958) (Viljoen Commission) 55.
50. Sadie, op cit.
51. See H.J. van Eck, "Prospects for the next ten years" (Written for Golden Jubilee issue of SA Industry and Trade) (UG Fact Paper 36, June 1957). Also Professor J. Goudman, "Automation" FTR, II, 3, (1957), 182-4: "it seems to be practically certain that automation will reduce the demand for skilled labour and reduce the demand for unskilled labour": he cited ESCOM where a 13.3% increase in sales went with a 3.7% increase in white employees and 0.3% increase in blacks.

52. op cit, 14, 20-1, 26, 49-50.

53. see footnote 30. For the Fagan Commission on Stallard see op cit, 19-21.

54. The Industrial Conciliation (Natives) Bill of 1947, dropped by the Nationalists, provided for the compulsory registration of African trade unions with separate and mandatory arbitration procedures. Africans could no longer be members of racially-mixed unions, were prohibited from striking; and the Act specifically excluded farm and mine workers (in all minerals except oil, stone, gravel earth and water), domestic servants, and state employees. Cf SRR, 1946-7, 12-13.

55. Some examination is needed, however, of the different emphasis given this ideology during the 1930's by Hertzog etc., within the Fusion government, and on the other hand the Purified Nationalist Party and the Labour Party (which latter switched to a "liberal" policy during the 1940's).

56. HAD, 64, 7/9/48 col 1724. See also Diederichs, HAD 21/9/48 col 2990.

57. HAD, 1949, col 6513.

58. "Is Separation Practicable", Journal of Racial Affairs, Jan 1950. See also SABRE, Die Naturelle Vraagstuk (1950); Integration or Separate Development (1952); Jansen to SAIRR, January 1950 (Tatz, Shadow and Substance, 134); de Wet Nel, HAD, 1949, vol 66 col 150; vol 68, col 6084.

59. The Tomlinson Commission recommendations on encouraging a class of full-time farmers, though its actual implementation does not appear to have been a government priority, and the "re-ruralising" of professionals/traders etc suggest some recognition of a wider political/administrative base however.

60. Cf Verwoerd, HAD vol 76, 18/6/51 cols 9807-9814; Minister of Labour, HAD, 4/8/53 cols 870-3. An Urban Bantu Authorities Bill was published in 1952 but not implemented until 1961.

61. HAD, 18/2/54 vil 3, col 799ff.

62. Smuts statement (to Hofmeyr) on the August 1946 NRC adjournment can be read in the light of bafflement at the failure of the African middle class to adopt the required policy: "It means that the (hitherto) moderate intellectuals of the Professor Mathews type are now committed to an extreme line against colour discrimination, and have carried the Chiefs with them. We can't afford to allow them to be swept into the extremist camp, but I don't see what we can do to satisfy them, which would be tolerated by European public opinion. "Hancock, Smuts, II, 485-6. The Nationalist attempt was to provide this "satisfaction" by giving Africans political/administrative "opportunities" in the Bantustans.

63. HAD, 4/4/61.

64. See on this quotation in Roskam, Apartheid and Discrimination in SA, 121.

65. Cf Jansen HAD 20/4/1950 col 4703; Malan in Die Burger, 6/3/53 "Europe itself the matrix of Christian civilisation, is the outstanding example of apartheid. The map resembles a Joseph's coat of some twenty-five sections, each represented by its own nationality, and for the most part also its own race with its own tongue and its own culture...Apartheid is accepted in Europe as natural, self-explanatory, and right")

66. Letter of February 1954. Quoted in full in Kuper, Passive Resistance, 217ff.

67. De Wet Nel, HAD, 1959, col 6018. Also De Wet Nel as quoted in DW Kruger SA Parties and Policy, 441-452.

68. H. Welpé, "Capitalism and cheap labour-power in South Africa: from segregation to apartheid", Economy and Society, I, 4, 450.

69. See Min Native Affairs to FCI, The Manufacturer, August 1954; HAD, 18/2/54, vol 3, col 799ff.

70. Min N Affairs, State Info Newsletter 729, 18/12/53.
71. Native Building Workers Act of 1951 and amendments. A similar provision was recommended by the Fagan Commission.
72. Native Services Levy Act of 1952; Native Transport Services Act 53 of 1957.
73. Including adequate distance from white towns and from possible white urban expansion, "buffering" by intermediate industrial areas, within easy rail distance of the town, their own access roads, etc. Verwoerd said of such urban locations that they were not "native areas" but European-owned property "and the Natives who reside there reside just as Native farm labourers live on the farm of a European owner" HAD 1/4/54, vol 9, col 3204.
74. Sadie (1956) op cit.
75. HAD 13/6/55 col 7628.
76. HAD 16/9/58, vol X, cols 3875-80; 24/7/58 vol 3, col 858.
77. ibid. See also NAD to Institute of Race Relations: "Dependants of poorly paid workers in urban areas will be much better off financially if they remain in the reserves or take up residence in a rural village where they are at least in the position to grow their own mealies, vegetables etc. The bread winner can be accommodated either on his employers property or in a hostel...and remit as much of his monthly earnings as he is able to, through the Native Commissioner, to his dependants. In this manner he will at least save a pound or two pounds a month in rent." SRR, 56-7, 144-5. In 1949 the Nationalists had removed Unemployment Insurance from Africans earning below £182 p.a. and casual/seasonal labourers: in 1957 they raised the figure to £273, arguing that cost of living allowances were consolidated with ordinary wages in this figure. ibid., 216-7.
78. D. Purcell, SA Journal of Economics, June 1968, 94-5. The question of African wages/productivity/labour-reproduction costs needs to be taken up further on the basis of government/employer statements/actions - and a series of articles in the SAJE in 1960-62. Moreover in this piece I have not dealt with the relationship between government social policy and the powerful African movements (strikes, bus boycott etc) during the 1950's.
79. See the Native Economic Commission, the 1937-8 Report of the NAC, and W.J.P. Carr, Influx Centre, as seen by an Administrator of Non-European Affairs (SAIRR, 1961) for example.
80. Purcell, op cit.
81. De Wet Nel to FCI, 5/11/59 [42nd annual convention] quoted Houghton, SA Economy, 213, 216.
82. S.P. du Toit Viljoen (Chairman of BTI) to National Management and Development Foundations, October 1946 quoted Herwitz, Political Economy, 393.
83. Including (a) establishment of Bantu Investment Corporation (b) establishment of Permanent Commission for Location of Industry and Development of Border Areas in 1960, with the creation of incentives for industrialists (c) Bantu Homelands Development Corporation Act of 1965 (d) expansion - or diversion - of expenditure on education, housing etc for Africans to the "reserves"/Bantustans. Concessions have included tax holidays, interest-free or low interest loans, rail rebates, port rebates, price preferences on state tenders, a moratorium on capital charges for power installations, and as Verwoerd said in 1957 "a differential wage-regulation scheme will be undertaken by the Wage Board in connection with factories - in the big cities, those situated further away, and those near Native areas." HAD 23/5/57, vol 17, col 6623. Chief border areas have been Hammarisdale, Rosslyn, the Ciskei (KWE town), Pmburg/Central Natal, Phalaborwa, Pietersburg, Harrismith/Thaba Nchu.
84. See White Paper WP 9-63; Bantu Laws Amendment Act 76 of 1963, 42 (38?) of 1964; Bantu Labour Act 67 of 1964; Bantu Labour Regulations (Government Notice R1892 of 1965).

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revise archaic conditions of service...he would find that even though farm wages might still not be competitive compared with those in industry he would, nevertheless, still attract the Black farm labour". RDM 12/7/67. This could have been said in essence by any 1930's liberal. Of course farmers have been drawing (like the mines) an increasing proportion of non-South African labour.
96. Cf Mr Botha, Min BAD, RDM, 30/11/67.
97. HAD 26/5/67. Cf Botha in HAD, 6/2/67; Vosloo in Star 9/6/67; RDM 19/1/68; The first proclamation under this Act was on January 19th 1968, and other proclamations followed so that almost the whole country (except certain areas in Natal) was affected.
98. Vosloo in RDM 28/4/67; CTimes, 24/4/67; HAD 9/5/67. The Cape Times said this introduced "what appears to be full-scale direction of labour". Power to do this was strengthened by 1968 (Gazette 33, 2029 29/3/68) and regulations of 1969 and the Bantu Laws Amendment Acts of 1968 and 1970 (which also increased powers of job reservation).
99. The Circular is quoted extensively by Desmond, op cit.
100. Cf Koornhof in RDM, 23/8/68; HAD 4/2/69; HAD 16/6/69. Also Froneman, RDM 12/12/68 speaking to Free State farmers: "the removal of African labourers from the hite economy was not the most important aspect of the policy of seperate development. He said the removal of Africans who were not economically active was of greater importance." Government spokesmen talked increasingly of contract labour rather than migratory labour per se.
101. From at least 1967 there was official talk of white investment in the homelands, and it was introduced under the Promotion of Ec Dev of Bantu Homelands Act 46 of 1968, with the claim that concessions had already been made to white mining interests. Verwoerd in contrast had said: "I think it would be catastrophic for the present economic development of South Africa for the State to spend £30 million over the nextten years to establish subsidised White industries in Native areas in competition with existing White industries" HAD, 1957, vol 94, col 3749; and "South Africa helped the Transkei as a guardian. If industries were allowed to exploit the Bantu areas, the Bantu would resent it all the more when they realised what had been taken from them...Mr Oppenheimer mixes his Progressive Party policies with his financial policies and advocates what amounts to internal colonial capitalism when he said that White capitalists should be allowed to operate in the Bantu areas" SA Digest 11/9/64 (to Transvaal Congress HNP). For the repeal of labour legislation see Rand Daily Mail 9/10/69; Financial Mail 9/10/69 and 28/11/69; Proclamation R84/1970 20/3/70. But see Proclamation R124 21/5/71 restoring job res. to whites. Spokesmen had also said (with reference to border areas), "we will...not allow this [development] to be done in such a way that it prejudices the employment position of the white workers in any white area. That is our primary objective". HAD 4/6/68. This might be one motivation for allowing capital into the homelands.
102. See C. Diamond in SA Journal Economics, March 1972, S.L.Muller, Minister for Economic Affairs, HAD 2/6/71 cols 7954-6.
103. Guardian 30/9/72. See also the FCI report of 1970 kept secret because "the ECI believes the Government must back rack on the application, but not the theory, of decentralization" RDM, 12/8/70. Also Diederichs, HAD 3/3/71; Blaar Coetzee, Dep Min BAD: "I Have never spoken about tightening influx control but of streamlining it. We intend to do away with the pinpricks both to the employer and the employee" STimes; 1/10/67. The Bantu Affairs Administration Act 45 of 1971 has a main purpose the increase of mobility of Africans in urban areas "within the basic framework of society" by the establishment of larger administrative areas within which movement and re-employment is premissable: see HAD 2/3/71 cols 1962-70; 4/3/71 cols 2060-2069.
104. SA Digest 16/4/65. See also B. Coetzee STimes 1/10/67; RDM 21/6/66 (opening a conference on "Effective Bantu Employment" organised by the National Development and Management Foundation)

85. HAD, 1965, cols 5460-5461. On this question see also, inter alia, Verwoerd in Pelzer, Verwoerd aan die Woord; HAD, vol 17, 2/6/54 cols 6143-5; de Wet Nel in Patterson, Last Trek, 174; Prime Minister HAD, 17/1/56, vol 1, cols 41-3; Min N Affairs, HAD, 20/1/56 cols 187-90; 24/5/56, vol 15, cols 3867-70; Verwoerd, HAD, 1964, col 68, HAD, 1965, vol 13, col 625-6 Dep Min BAD, HAD, 1965, vol II, cols 4206-7; Dep Min BAD, HAD, 1965, vol 11, cols 4206-7; Dep Min BAD, HAD, 1965, vol 14, col 5571; Botha, HAD, 13/10/66 vol 11, cols 4131. Mr Botha, MIN BAD, HAD 6/2/67, col 7361ff. And Vorster, HAD 24/4/68: Africans remain in white areas "because they cannot provide employment for themselves...[but] Surely the fact that you work for a man does not give you the right to run his affairs? Surely no such political principle exists anywhere in the world...They [the Bantu] will continue to work for us for generations in spite of the ideal that we have to separate them completely. Surely we all know that?...We need them because they work for us, but, after all, we pay them for their work. What would have become of them if one had not created those employment opportunities for them? Surely they could not have survived? ... It makes no difference [with regard to political] whether they are here with any degree of permanency or not..."

86. Cf Times 6/11/70.

86a. HAD, 19/5/71 cols 7195-97.

87. See for example Beaumont Minute (UG25-1916); Gustav Prellert (editor of Die Volkstem) to F.W. Bell, 14/10/09 and 1/11/09: "having watched with considerable amusement the various attempts lately made to 'grapple' with South Africa's spinx-problems [sic] and also with some regret, that none of the writers or speakers have as yet had the courage to acknowledge, that every jot and tittle of whatever they had to say on the question, that was worth saying, amounted simply to a rehash of the policy the Dutch have evolved and consistently followed for half a century. The "policy of Drift" dates from 1902, when we were cut loose from the old one - and the one you now advocate with so much warmth and eloquence" - "What I meant in my article was, that the spirit, the principle of the policy you advocate, has also been from the very first, the principle of the Boer policy: segregation. And in all the history of the independent states of South Africa, you will find a rational and consistent striving after the realisation of that principle. But we hold that it is one which is going to prove as slow as evolution itself, and therefore it can never be very marked in the active politics of our country.

88. Speech at University of Potchefstroom, Bantu, July 1968.

89. to Institute of Citizenship, Cape Town 30/5/68 Desmond, op cit, 28.

90. HAD, vol 11, 13/10/66, cols 4131-7.

91. Rand Daily Mail 3/4/67.

92. HAD, 13/3/68.

93. HAD, 6/2/68.

94. Cf Rand Daily Mail 28/3/69; Cape Times 10/4/69. Also Froneman in HAD 6/2/68 "Do we first have to provide employment for them [the Bantu] before we remove them?"

95. In face of the labour shortage on the farms, the Deputy Minister of the BAD, Mr Vosloo, made a revealing statement to the Annual Congress of the East Coast Agriculture Union. Saying that workseekers in African areas would rather wait for industrial work than work in farms, he said that the government was taking steps to produce compulsory registration and direction of labour but "Perhaps their conditions of service are more attractive [elsewhere]. perhaps the food is better, or perhaps - and I cannot over-emphasize this factor - they receive better treatment there. Alas, it is a fact that there are still employers who seem to forget that the Bantu worker is a human being with his own likes and dislikes...we have been spoilt. We could pick and choose and make such ridiculous conditions of service that these farmhands would work virtually for charity and the right to plough and cultivate,...or...to graze [cattle]...If the farmers would

105. Diamond, op cit.

106. See reports of the IDC and the Permanent Commission on Decentralization Also the important article by J.L. Sadie, "Population and Economic Development in South Africa" SA Journal Economics, 1972, 205-222. This article also incidentally, implicitly refutes the conventional wisdom, eg. "measures have been introduced which, on the one hand, impeded the functioning of the market mechanism, such as those designed to shield White workers against direct competition from non-Whites and on the other hand reinforced the market forces conducive to economic growth, however inequitable some of them might appear to be...certain advantages inhere in the existence of the subsistence sector and, therefore, of economic dualism in South Africa" (ibid, 210).

107. SA Journal of Economics, December 1971, 400. See also Dr. Smit, Head of African Institute Dept of Geography, Star 12/7/69; and various statements in RDM 17/11/70; Evening Post 3/10/70; Financial Mail 4/9/70; Bantu, November 1970.

108. HAD 14/9/70 and a statement in May 1970 quoted from an unpublished paper by Barbara Rodgers.

109. Vorster, HAD, 7/2/69.

In a number of cases the citations/quotations from primary sources have been drawn from secondary works (eg by Tatz, Taskam, Horwitz, Walshe, etc) or from digest like Survey of Race Relations, Defence and Ais Information Service, etc. It would have lengthened the footnotes even more if I had included all these attributions as well as the primary source.
