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The enemy therefore has a duty for his own sake to defend all parts of the country. Through the Bantustan system the apartheid regime is of course trying to cut off certain areas of the country, to make them irrelevant to the functioning of the economy. He seeks to use these areas as dumping ground for the "surplus" population, knowing also that these areas supply nothing to the economy in the form of raw materials, processed goods, power or anything else. Consequently, the enemy would dearly like that if we fight at all, then we must fight in these Bantustan enclaves.

The level of development of our country gives the apartheid regime the material basis to maintain the forces of repression that it has at its disposal. However by dispersing our active forces throughout this developed country, we would be able to turn the fact of this level of development into a disadvantage for the enemy and an advantage for us.

Having thus broken up the opposing army into smaller units we would, for the first time, be in a position realistically to set ourselves military objectives, such as the destruction of enemy personnel and his garrisons. It is also only in this situation that the condition would exist for the initiative to pass decisively into our hands.

Consequently, Comrade Chair, if we want to win, we must seriously set about the business of having MK present and dispersed throughout our country. That must be our perspective, to build up our armed forces inside the country and at as many points as possible. The distance we still have to travel should be clear from the fact that the number and deployment of our units inside the country is still too limited in relation to the demands of the situation.

The question how do we achieve this objective and how many combatants we shall have inside the country, twelve months hence, is a practical one. It hinges on how much progress we make in establishing an underground organisation rooted among the people. It should also be clear that we can never solve the problem of the presence of MK inside the country by relying on comrades to cope on their own or "to survive in the terrain"

Comrade Chairman, I have made these comments about our military perspectives so that these perspectives or any other that the NEC believes are correct, should also form part of the basic understanding that we impart to our membership inside so that it knows where we are going and how to get there.

The third component part of the leadership process that I have referred to is planning, plan implementation and plan verification. As a political organisation, we cannot progress without setting ourselves targets to achieve. It was out of this realisation that the last session of the NEC decided that at RC Headquarters there should be a Planning Committee. That resolution went on to describe what structures would be responsible for the implementation of approved plans and make the working Committee ultimately responsible for the verification of the plans, that is, assessing whether the plans had been carried out, how far they had been, and so on.

That very resolution was itself a plan. Accordingly the Planning Committee was constituted and has been working. The RC Headquarters did also submit to the Working Committee some plans for work inside the country. Senior Organs were established in the forward areas.

But has all this produced the results inside the country that we desired? The lack of common direction to which the comrade inside draws our attention would suggest that whatever plans we have had have so far failed to reach sufficient members of the activists inside the country. And to come to a crucial point, Comrade Chair, throughout this period plan verification, certainly on the part of the Working Committee, has been missing. Therefore we have been in no position to determine whether we were making progress or not, whether our perspectives were reaching our people inside, how many people we were reaching and what these patriots were doing with our plans or even what they thought of them. In the absence of all this we were of course unable to lead.

What in fact are the major plans that have come before the Working Committee? Let me list these Comrade Chair without commenting on their quality.

(a) Proposals for the constitution of the Senior Organs.

- (b) A plan for the organisation of the Indian Community
- (c) A plan for the organisation of the Coloured Community.
- (d) A plan of our military perspectives.
- (e) A plan for our involvement in the Free Mandela Campaign.
- (f) A plan for the reorganisation of the units we have inside the country.
- (g) Proposals for work among white war resisters.

In the addition there have been two other plans which have not originated from the RC but from the Working Committee itself.

These are:

- (a) A plan for the observance of the Year of the Charter.
- (b) A plan for the organisation of the Christian Community.

As the comrades know, we have also had proposals for the observance of the Year of the Worker drawn up by a joint committee constituted by SACTU, the SACP and the ANC.

All this represents an improvement at the planning level and as compared to the previous twelve months. But it is clear that we have not as yet succeeded to produce a comprehensive programme of work designed to realise our strategic and tactical pursuits.

To mention just a few facts: we do not in fact have a plan for the organisation of the workers and the peasants into legal organisations as well as the ANC. Neither do we have one covering the youth and the women. We have no plan for the establishing of MK within the country. Nothing exists to guide us in practical terms as to what we want to do with already existing legal organisations such as the trade union centres like FOSATU, SAAWU, the WPGWU, CUSA and TUCSA, and other groupings such as COSAS, AZASO, AZAPO, INKATHA, the Labour Party, the civic organisations and so on.

Let me make it clear once more, Comrade Chair, that the kind of planning I am talking about involves the elaboration of a concrete programme of work, based on objective reality, a programme designed to be carried out by specific and identifiable individuals and groups.

Even with regard to specific dates, we suffer from the same malaise. December 16th is already upon us. We know that the broad masses of our people recognise this as one of our national days. It is also the day of our armed forces. But as far as I know, the Working Committee has no plan for its observance. Other days are coming - January 8, March 21st, June 16 and 26, August 9th - will they also pass without our having properly planned to mark them inside the country?

<sup>1981</sup>  
1981 is the 20th anniversary of MK and the 5th anniversary of the Soweto uprising. It is also the 60th anniversary of the South African Communist Party. What concrete plans exist for us to utilise these important anniversaries for the advancement of our struggle, plans that involve the masses as well as our membership inside the country! As far as the ANC is concerned, I think I would be correct to say none exist.

I have spoken at this length, Comrade Chair, on this question of planning of designing a concrete and realistic programme of work in order to give justification to the position I believe to be correct, that this kind of planning is a necessary component part of the leadership question we are supposed to discuss. Therefore it will serve us well if we do indeed discuss this question of planning in its three interlinked stages - plan elaboration, plan implementation and plan verification - to establish exactly what is wrong that we have not done what we should have and to find solutions.

To pass on to another element in the totality of issues that comprise the capacity to lead, let me now deal with what I have referred to as the ability of our whole machinery, from the basic cell unit to the National Executive Committee, to function as it is meant to function. Quite clearly we are nowhere near achieving this objective. Let me illustrate this with some examples.

The Working Committee has had in its possession for at least two months now, the plan of the RC to reorganise the units inside the country. Up to now the Working Committee has not completed its discussions on such a vital document and therefore has given no directions to the RC. This is not the first time, Comrade Chair, that this is happening with documents from the RC. The result is of course obvious. Work is brought to a stand-still. No lead comes from the Working Committee to the RC HQ. consequently no lead can come from the RC HQ to the Senior Organs and from there into the country. Frustration develops at all levels and the function of leadership, which means taking initiatives, cannot be exercised.

It is now over six months since the Working Committee passed detailed instructions to the RC HQ covering the Freedom Charter and Free Mandela campaigns. Since then, to the best of my knowledge, no report has come from the RC HQ on what is in fact being done with regard to these campaigns. I do not believe either that the Working Committee made a follow up on its instruction. It was only when we were preparing for this meeting that the Working Committee finally asked the RC HQ for reports. In the meantime October 5, the date we had set for a national conference inside the country which should have reaffirmed the demands contained in the Freedom Charter, has passed without even a single leaflet being distributed. The Sunday Post wound up the Free Mandela campaign for the specific reason that our membership inside the country failed to keep the campaign alive and growing. This situation is quite clearly most unsatisfactory.

In addition to whatever other problems they may have, COSAS and AZASO have an additional one in that they are receiving contradictory directives from our various Senior Organs. This naturally results in conflicts within these organisations and sets them pulling in different directions all because of instructions coming or purporting to come from the ANC. The RCHQ will no doubt resolve this problem.

These are just a few examples comrade Chair, of some of our functional weaknesses. We will not be able to provide leadership to anybody as long as this situation persists. Indeed if we are ourselves disorganised, how can we organise anybody else!

This session of the NEC should examine the question - why is our organisational machinery not functioning with the efficiency that it should? The structures cannot be faulted. If they do not function properly, then it probably means that we have named them wrongly.

Let me now turn to the last item among the ones I have mentioned as constituting, in my view, component parts of the function of leadership. This last item is the role of the NEC itself.

Comrades, since the independence of Zimbabwe, the eyes of the world have focussed on South Africa more than ever before. The masses of our people have also sensed the proximity of victory and are looking to the equivalent in our country of the Zimbabwe Patriotic Front alliance to bring about the results that have been achieved across the Limpopo. All this means that as never before, this body, the National Executive Committee of the ANC, has to prove itself to the satisfaction of our people to be equal to the task of leading our people in their entirety to victory. If we are unable to carry out this task, history will judge us accordingly and will certainly not accept any excuses from us however much we ourselves might consider such excuses as sound reasons.

If the ANC is failing to provide strategy, organisation and a common direction inside the country, then blame must fall squarely on the NEC. We cannot escape our responsibility, by apportioning blame to subordinate organs. Is the NEC providing the leadership expected of it?

Without proposing a vote of no confidence in this NEC, I would say Comrade Chair, that our performance leaves a great deal to be desired. I will attempt comrades to pinpoint some of the most serious weaknesses. I may of course be wrong but it will be for this

meeting to say so and to isolate the weaknesses and seek to correct them.

At the beginning of my report, I pointed out that, in my view we need to meet at least twice a year to review our work and the situation generally, solve any problems that may have arisen and chart the direction forward. The fact that we are not meeting with this regularity is one of the weaknesses that we need to correct as a matter of extreme urgency. It is a matter of committee meets at least once a week, and get it takes no decision to convene an NEC meeting.

The second weakness is that as yet, the Working Committee has not succeeded to organise its work so that it can <sup>el</sup>evote the bulk of its time to fundamental or major questions. Much time is spent discussing questions which should not come to the Working Committee except as reports on work done. The result of this is that there is no senior organ in the movement which is continuously paying attention to the issue of the main directions of our attack, determining these directions and ensuring that we do in fact follow these directions.

This must in part mean Comrade Chair, that the various departments that we have are not functioning according to expectations. It also means that heads of departments from the President downwards, are not performing their task of supervising, guiding and assisting their respective departments. If we improved our performance in this regard we would probably thus create the possibility for the Working Committee to use its considerable talent to attend to national rather than departmental questions. But obviously we can no longer continue with the situation where the most senior committee of the movement is handling fundamental questions of our revolution either in a haphazard, half-hearted and sporadic manner, or when there is nothing else to do.

Over the years, we have evolved the position that as many members of the NEC as possible would be detailed to work in committees and areas dealing with the home front. I believe this position remains valid. The intention in deploying NEC members in this way was to ensure that the leadership of the organisation was directly involved in work



on the home front, so that the NEC would through these comrades, in fact lead our whole effort on this front. In the normal course of things, and not as a result of any extraordinary consideration, we should have constantly reviewed the performance of our comrades to establish whether in fact the intentions of the NEC were being realised. Unfortunately we have never done this. However, the Working Committee is due to discuss the role of members of the NEC in the RC. This is because of the many problems these members seem to be experiencing.

At our last session Comrade Chair, I remember making an appeal that the Working Committee must demand reports from all our organs, including the RC. As you may well guess from what I have already said, my view is that the Working Committee by and large remains the uninformed about what is happening inside the country except for information that is contained in that very useful publication, the Weekly News Briefing. But, let us add, the fault sits with the Working Committee itself.

There is great need that the voice of the NEC be heard within the country much louder than has been the case up to now. It is necessary that our people should feel our presence among them. If for no other reason, they need to feel that those who lead them, those whom they recognise as their national leaders are prepared to sacrifice side by side with them. Many of the people we want to see cannot come out of the country. We need to get to them not merely by means of couriers but in person.

Comrades I am not suggesting that we engage in some wild adventure to prove how brave we are. But it ought to be our aim that the leadership should in fact transfer from outside to within the country as part of an all-round effort to strengthen our leadership capacity. I am sure that we are at one in the recognition that the best place from where to lead our people is among these people, at home.

Comrade Chair, I have dwelt on this question of our capacity to lead both because the question has been on our agenda for a long time but also, and more important, because at this stage it would seem to me to be the decisive question on which hang the prospects of our revolution. I have also dealt with this question in so far as



it affects the home front because it is here that our leadership is most needed. But it is also here that our leadership is most wanting.

If this meeting discussed only this question, come up with concrete and realistic solutions and charted a practicable path for us to follow over the next twelve months, I for one would be very happy. I should however make the observation once more, comrades, that in looking for a way of exercising leadership over the masses of our people, we must not look just for one miraculous cure. Such a cure does not exist. What we have to do is to adopt a whole combination of measures which, in their totality will bring us and our people the results that our revolution demands. It is my sincere hope that these lengthy remarks have laid a basis for a fruitful, constructive and business like discussion.

If I may, Comrade Chair, I would now like to make some remarks around the question being repeatedly raised by some of our supporters. Is a peaceful resolution of the South African problem possible?

Over the last five years, the balance of forces in Southern Africa has changed radically in our favour. The Pretoria regime has been compelled to accept the principle and inevitability of the independence of Namibia. However long the road may be that our comrades-in-arms of SWAPO still have to travel, the fact is that the liberation of Namibia is in sight. Botha was therefore correct when he said that the independence of Zimbabwe and the victory of the Patriotic Front alliance has changed South Africa's strategic position.

From this we should have expected that Botha would try to evolve new schemes for the perpetuation of apartheid but in the new conditions of this changed strategic balance. It is in this context that I would like to reflect on the question of the possibility of a peaceful resolution of the South African problem.

There is first of all the question of urging that we are getting for us to enter into dialogue with the Botha regime to find a peaceful solution. As the comrades will remember, the first of these propositions was made by Gatsha Buthelexi towards the end of last year. Briefly his position was that

of last year. Briefly his position was that he thought that it was time that this ANC met the Botha regime to find a peaceful solution. He asked what our condition would be and offered to act as go-between. As it happens, we never replied to Buthelezi.

Subsequent to this we were asked by a group of MRA people who were visiting Zimbabwe to take the initial steps of finding a basis for negotiation. This group claimed that it was expressing the desire of some highly placed personalities within the ruling group in South Africa, including at least one cabinet Minister.

Our office in London has also been approached by a section of the ruling British Conservative Party who also asked that we should enter into discussions with the Pretoria regime.

Through somebody connected with the Prime Minister's Office in Zimbabwe we got a further report earlier this year that the then acting Foreign Minister of Australia had once more raised this question with Zimbabwe government, pointing out that Australia felt that the Namibia and South African problems ought to be solve as part of one process though not necessarily simultaneously. The Austratians felt that we too ought to start talking to Botha.

Finally, Comrade Chair, the message that Comrade Victor Matlou brought back from his five-month detention in Bloemfontein was that the Botha regime was interested to talk to us.

I should add Comrade Chair, that according to our information that as early as March 1979, Buthelezi had been approached by the U.S. state Department to put to him the proposal that the ANC, Inkatha and possibly some other groups should enter into discussions with the Pretoria regime. As we understand it, U.S. hoped that King Sobhuza would convene the conference. We understand also that the U.S. promised to use anything short of military means to compel Botha to come to the conference table.

So far the position that the Working Committee has taken with regard to this issue is that if the apartheid regime is seriously interested in discussing with us any question, such questions must be put to the leadership of the ANC as a whole. It is that whole collective which would then decide what to do. This means that this leadership on Robben Island must be released and all other political prisoners. In other words, Comrade Chari, what the Working Committee is saying is :

- (a) We are not prepared to enter into any talks with apartheid regime;
- (b) the question whether we should enter into talks should be decided by our whole leadership meeting freely inside South Africa;
- (c) the release of our leaders would not in itself mean that we have accepted to talk to the Botha regime, because we are not competent to accept in the absence of the rest of the leadership;
- (d) while refusing to enter into any talks we should not give the impression that we have a preference for armed struggle out of love of violence.

Certain consequences must follow from this. One of them is that we should, by virtue of these positions, say that it is premature to call for a national convention. This would be consistent with our position that the very issue of whether there should be talks or not must be decided by the entire national leadership of our people.

By its nature a national convention would be composed of representatives of all contending parties, they having agreed that a solution acceptable to all the parties involved, should be found. Secondly, a national convention has to be convened by somebody.

With regard to this second issue, the question has to be posed, who would convene this national convention. In the case of Zimbabwe, Britain convened, chaired and otherwise directed the Lancaster House talks. In the case of Namibia, the United Nations will play this role. There is no equivalent power or body that can play this role in South Africa.

When we first made the call for a national convention in 1961, we demanded that the apartheid regime should summon the convention. As the comrades know, over recent years the people at home have once more taken up the call for a national convention and are demanding that the Botha regime should summon this convention. Do we, as the ANC, support this position?

My own view, comrade chair, is that we cannot, at this stage support such a position. We do not accept the apartheid regime as the legitimate authority in our country. We consider it a colonial minority which has usurped power and maintains itself in authority by force of arms, against the express wishes of the vast majority of the people of South Africa. It is this which lends legitimacy to our armed struggle.

Therefore if anybody has the right to call a national convention, it cannot be the one who represents a minority. It has to be those forces which represent the majority. Of course our rejection of the legitimacy of the Pretoria regime does not mean that we deny that the Nationalist Party represents an opinion inside the country. It does and would, in a proper convention, have the right to represent that opinion but as a minority opinion.

If our position is that whether there should or should not be a national convention is a matter to be decided by our collective leadership and that in any case it would not be the apartheid regime that would call such a convention, then the question is, do we come out publicly against the demand for a national convention,

If we did this and with the best of intentions on our part, I believe we would be playing into the hands of the enemy. The fact of the matter is that this demand is popular among the democratic forces of our country. It is also specific in that to all intents and purposes these democratic forces are calling on Botha to talk to the ANC on its leadership. It would be incorrect to ~~xxx~~ regard and deal with their position as negative or counter-revolutionary.

Technically and indeed strategically it puts the Botha regime in a difficult position in that, through this call, our people are simultaneously challenging Botha's attempt to impose Bantustan leaders on us. Furthermore, they are putting forward the concept that the conflict in South Africa is not between black and white, that our struggle is not a racial one, but that the conflict is between the forces of democracy and anti-racism on the one hand and those of fascism and racism on the other. There are powerful and correct positions which we should not do anything to weaken. Certainly we should not find ourselves in the position in which the enemy can turn round to our people to say - there you are, your ANC is against your national convention as even, in Pretoria, are! Obviously such a position is untenable.

So what do we do to introduce lime among our people that is consistent with our own outlook which we believe to be correct? The principal slogan that we put out to our people for the Year of the Charter was Forward to a People's Government! It had been our hope that by the time the national conference around October 5th was held, sufficient ground work would have been done to get this representative conference to reiterate this slogan and thereby put forward also the thesis that the Pretoria regime is unacceptable to the people of South Africa.

At the level of legal struggle, our people cannot of course at this stage put forward the demand for the overthrow of the apartheid regime. That would immediately invite a crack-down on the grounds of sedition or treason. Yet we must get the point through to the broad democratic forces inside the country that the strategic position we should all take is non-recognition of the legitimacy of the apartheid regime.

The ongoing debate inside the country about whether to have confrontation or dialogue with this regime in fact contains the nation whether we should recognise the racists as legitimate rulers or not. The Buthelezi line in favour of dialogue means recognition of this legitimacy. The refusal of important sections of the democratic movement to enter into negotiations with the Botha regime means on the other hand that these sections do not accept the legitimacy of the regime.

I believe that we have to build on this latter position to get our people into the position where they demand the dissolution of the present "government" and the formation of a provisional government, truly representative of the people of South Africa, one of whose tasks would then be the summoning of a national convention.

The advantage of this position would be that it would explicitly state the unacceptability of the present regime to our people and thus help focus mass democratic political activity on the task of removing the apartheid regime rather than pressurising it to amend the apartheid system. Secondly it would present the liberation movement as the alternative government of our country, once more explicitly. And thirdly it would put the demand for a national convention in its proper context, replacing an appeal to the oppressors to see reason with a battle-cry whose realisation is dependent on the overthrow of the fascist regime.

Such a position must of course mean that we must stick very firmly to our stand of refusing to enter into negotiations with Botha and Malan. In any case, in terms of our organised strength on the ground, both politically and militarily we are not in a position to win very much by even entertaining the idea of talks. What we would gain from such talks directly proportional to our strength. Our task must therefore remain that of increasing our strength while reducing that of the enemy.

Having said all that Comrade Chair, given that the enemy has begun to show the flag of peace, however deceitful this manoeuvre, we must also find ways of utilising this manoeuvre further to sow confusion among our opponents's ranks to weaken him.

We must take the position that whenever the enemy retreats, however tactical that more, we must attack. Take for instance the recent press reports that Pretoria is planning to amend or abolish 800 apartheid laws. We should not be satisfied merely to denounce this as cosmetic posturing. We have to go beyond this to turn such posturing into a weapon against the enemy. If there are individuals within the ranks of the enemy forces who are beginning to see that the path that Botha

is pursuing is suicidal, we must find ways of attracting such individuals to our way of thinking, of increasing their lack of confidence in the racist regime.

For example, a few days ago, while on a visit to London, the Professor of Political Science at the University of Stellenbosch made the interesting observation that young whites are no longer interested in maintaining their so-called national identity if such an objective threatens their security. The professor went on to say that the important thing about Botha's President's Council was that it had conceded the principle that South Africa could no longer be ruled by the whites alone. What he thought was necessary was that a structure should be found to ensure real "power-sharing" among all the people of South Africa. He thought that this was the only way in which the security of the whites could be guaranteed.

I have given this example comrade Chair to make the point that we need to find these white sections that Professor Esterhuyse was talking about exactly to make the point to them that only a democratic South Africa can guarantee their security and to begin to organise them to fight for that democratic South Africa.

Hopefully, comrades, the remarks I have made will help us to discuss seriously this question of a peaceful solution of the South African problem. It seems clear to me that once Namibia is out of the way, even some of those we count as among our best friends today will turn round and urge us to cooperate in the search for such a solution.

The pledging conference called by the nine independence states of Southern Africa took place in Maputo last week. This served as confirmation of the commitment of our friends in this region to pay somewhat more and concentrated attention to the economic development of their countries



Naturally we too support this initiative. But it also means that they will increasingly begin to weigh the objective of the total liberation of the continent against the need to satisfy the material aspirations of their own peoples. Already the Botswana Finance Minister has come out publicly against the imposition of sanctions against apartheid South Africa on the grounds that this would hurt the nine.

We have to bear it in mind that our allies in this region, the governments and the ruling parties, have a responsibility to lead, clothe, house and educate their peoples. If they do not do that they lose the authority to govern. Already we can see the problems in some of these countries with our own eyes and do wish that they will be solved.

Our common enemy is also studying the situation with even greater thoroughness than we are doing. He has many weapons in his hands to influence events in the independent states of this region in his favour, including terrorism and sabotage. He is preaching the doctrine that it pays to have peaceful coexistence with apartheid South Africa. In this situation we should expect that some of our friends will begin to say that it is necessary and inevitable that we have "decolonisation without radicalisation". Already that concept is contained within the notion of "dismantling apartheid"

Since we are forewarned, we should seek to be fore-armed. Part of that process of fore-arming must consist in preparing our offensive and defensive positions to that when the pressure for a peaceful solution comes we are at least prepared for it.

With your permission comrade Chair, I would like to pass on to a different but related question, that of our attitude to the national minorities in our country. This question has come up repeatedly as a suggestion that we should open membership of the ANC to all the people of South Africa. In my own public statement on January 8th last year, I expressed the hope that by the 70th anniversary of the ANC we should perhaps have opened our doors.

Naturally, this is not a simple question of membership. My own view is that central to it are two issues. One: whom does the ANC represent? And two: What is the nature of our struggle? I believe that we must answer the so-called question of ANC membership of the minority nationalities with reference to these rather fundamental issues.

We characterise our struggle as national democratic. Therefore all section of our population that stand to benefit from national liberation and democratic rule constitute the forces that we should be organising into active struggle. What I am stating is of course old policy of our movement.

The real point we should therefore be discussing is how best to mobilise these forces, with particular reference, for the purpose of discussion, to the national minorities, if the ANC is the leader and the personification of the national democratic revolution in our country, it would seem reasonable that its membership should reflect this fact.

In a country such as ours where racism and national antagonisms have occupied and continue to occupy an important position in national politics and in social psychology, it is natural that people should think in terms of national identity and for the minorities to entertain fears about their long-term future.