


MC 91-22-4-3



NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

DOCUMENTS

8 - 10 JUNE 1992

AFRICAN NATIUNAL CONGRESS

NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

<u>CONTENTS</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
1. Draft Agenda	3 - 4
2. Minutes of Previous NEC Meeting	5 - 15
3. Analysis of Current Political Situation	19 - 28
4. Balance of Forces and the Challenges of Transition	29 - 40
5. Decisions of Policy Conference	41 - 52
6. Programme of Action	53 - 74
7. Negotiations Commission - CODESA	75 - 80
8. Code of Conduct for NEC Members	81 - 85

Feb. Jan M. APC Mtg.
3 dots. Bqpt. London
MHQ Completing report -
A row - ADC in hand

AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS

NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

DATE: 8 - 10 June, 1992

Venue: Kempton Park Conference Centre

Time: 10:00 a.m.

FINAL DRAFT AGENDA

- 1. Opening**
- 2. Adoption of Agenda**
- 3. Apologies**
- 4. Adoption of Minutes of Previous NEC Meeting**
- 5. Analysis of Current Political Situation**
- 6. NWC Report**
- 7. State of Organisation**
 - Regions**
 - Departments**
 - Women's League**
 - Youth League**
 - Elections (Strategy and Structure)**
- 8. Implementation of Decisions of Policy Conference**

9. Programme of Action adopted at Policy Conference

10. Negotiations Commission - CODESA

11. Code of Conduct for NEC Members

12. Statements by NEC Members on Matters

affecting the ANC

13. General

Shani Zulu-

14. Closure

MINUTES

AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS

NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Minutes of the meeting held on 6 January 1992 and
adjourned to 23 and 24 January 1992.

1. Present

As per register.

2. Apologies

Apologies were accepted from the following comrades:
Popo Molefe (in Bloemfontein); C. Hani (Ugunda); Sis Bernard
(Nigeria); C. Caroulus (Bloemfontein).

3. Opening

Cde President welcomed all NEC members and wished everyone a successful year. He especially welcomed new NEC members Cdes: Ngoako Ramatloadi (N.Tvl. Chairperson); Sifiso Nkabinde (Midlands Secretary); Aaron Ndlovu (N. Natal Chair). The President also extended a special word of welcome to Cde. Joe Nkuna who had survived a brutal attack by vigilantes.

4. Confirmation of Minutes of Previous Meeting

The minutes of the previous meeting were confirmed as a correct record of the proceedings.

5 Matters Arising from the Minutes

5.1. Self Defence Units

Cde. Ronnie Kasrils wanted to know what progress had been made with regard to the organisation of SDUs. It was decided that the report on SDUs should be handled by the NWC.

5.2. Cde C. Hani's Position on NWC

Cde. T. Manuel enquired about Cde. Hani's position on the NWC now that he had been elected as full time General Secretary of the SACP. Cde. J. Slovo stated that Cde. Hani had indicated that he intended to submit his resignation from the NWC.

5.3. Sports Policy

Cde. T. Manuel pointed out that the question of the sports policy had not yet been discussed properly. It was agreed that the matter be placed on the agenda.

5.4. Commission for the Emancipation of Women

Cde. V. Moosa wanted to know what progress had been made with regard to the setting up of the Commission. It was reported that progress had been made towards the setting up of the Commission; all that remained was the employment of staff.

5.5. Code Of Conduct for NEC

Cde. R. Sutner wanted to know when the Code of Conduct would be discussed by the NEC. It was agreed that this matter should be on the agenda of the next NEC.

5.6. Financial Resources

Cde. M. Phosa raised the question of the Treasury increasing regional monthly allocations. The TG said that the main problem was that regions were not contributing their one third to HQ. The TG would be touring the regions to deal with the problems.

5.7. Transport

Cde R. Kasrils raised the question of the allocation of cars. A number of other comrades raised the problem of shortage of cars in the regions. It was agreed that the problem of allocating cars would be resolved once there was a committee that would draft policy and

also attend to the allocation of cars.

5.8. Administration

Cde. S. Ndebele proposed that the ANC should invest in administration by training our administrators. He also proposed that we should set up an Administration Commission at HQ. The matter would be considered.

5.9. Regional Officials: Full Time work for ANC

Cde M. Msimang raised the matter of having regional secretaries as full time officials. It was agreed that where there were difficulties we should at least have two members of the REC working full time in the regional office.

5.10. Media Leakages

Cde M. Sparg wanted to know whether the report was available. The President reported that he was still studying the report and would report to the NEC in due course.

6. **Analysis of Current Political Situation**

6.1 Introductory Remarks by President

Analysis of the current political situation must be attempted against the objectives set out in the January 8 Statement of last year. To ignore that statement would indicate that we are not conducting our struggle in accordance with our own plans and programmes. If we don't do that we will have no yardstick to measure any progress we might have made.

The cornerstone of that statement was that 1991 was to be the year of mass action for the transfer of power to the people. The balance of forces has shifted in favour of democracy and peace. The masses support our movement and its demands. We still enjoy the support of the international community.

We need to be realistic and not have false expectations about our strength. Some mass action activities we embarked on were successful, yet other were poorly attended.

There has been the perception that we are neglecting our political work and concentrating too much attention on negotiations. This point is clearly covered in the 1991 January 8 statement that it is a mistake to contrast negotiations and mass action as opposed forms of political struggle.

Our support among the minorities remains weak. We must discuss these weaknesses thoroughly and find solutions. The winning of substantial numbers of whites is going to present us with far more difficult challenges. The rightwing should not be underestimated.

The question of violence has to be addressed. We must put pressure on IFP we must make them pay for the privilege of meeting us. Our meetings with them must be preceded by a preparatory meeting.

Then there is the PAC. They should give a clear explanation why they acted in the way they did when they held their press conference.

The All Party Congress which was convened under the name CODESA laid the foundations for an Interim Government.

We ought to strategise on how we keep the Patriotic Front alive despite the withdrawal of the PAC.

We are faced with the challenge of expanding the organisational structure of our movement in all areas, rural and urban. We must ensure that we are organisationally strong and based among the people and strengthen the Women's and Youth Leagues.

We are soon going to participate in elections. If our

organisation is weak we will not do well in the elections. Unless NEC members make it their task to embark on house to house recruiting campaigns our organisation's growth will be slow.

6.2. Discussion

6.2.1. Political Situation

- We must anticipate what de Klerk will say on 24;
- We must analyse what effect PAC/AZAPO strategies are having on our constituency;
- We must get clear report of our organisation in the rural areas;
- Get report on the planned march on parliament;

6.2.2. Policy Conference

Must get full programme and other details.

6.2.3. On Building The ANC

- We should get Programme of action from Organizing dept.
- Organizing Dept. should give guidance on the deployment of NEC members;
- Look at building the W and YI;
- Prepare plans for mobilisation for elections;
- Develop campaign for pensions;
- Conduct surveys to assess support;

6.2.4. On Minorities

- Hold discussions with NIC/TIC to discuss strategies to organise in Indian Community;
- Work out different approach to organise Whites and Coloureds.

6.2.5. On Women's League

- NEC should address the question of dis-integration of WL;

- NEC should address the fact that the WL and YL are not represented on the NWC.

6.2.6. House to house work.

- There is no suggestion that NEC members should go from house to house recruiting members;
- NEC members are expected to work with regions to ensure that regions launch their recruiting campaign.

Adjournment

The meeting was adjourned on the understanding that it would be resumed on 23 and 24 January 1992.

Meeting Reconvened on 23 January 1992

8. President's Trip to N. Africa

The President gave a report on his trip to N. Africa and particularly about the intervention he had made on the Lockerbie disaster. The NEC endorsed the position that had been taken by the President as set out in the statement that had been issued.

9. NWC Report

The NWC report was presented and adopted by the NEC.

The following matters in the report were discussed:

9.1. DIP Media Resolutions

The resolutions recommended by the DIP Workshop were adopted as policy.

9.2. Policy Conference

It was decided that the Policy Conference date should not clash with Ramadan. It was also decided that the

Conference Committee should make sure that all documents should be distributed in time to enable regions to prepare themselves thoroughly.

9.3. Staff Conditions of Employment

Amendments were proposed on the following issues on the Condition of Employment Document:

- Sick Leave - 45 days was too long for sick leave;
- Reference to security information should be changed to confidential information.
- Staff Association - Conditions of Employment should provide for the recognition of staff association.
- Hours of Work - The provision for hours of work should accomodate time off for staff members who work on two successive weekends.
- Private Work - the section should be reformulated to prohibit people earning two salaries.
- Overtime and weekend work. It should be agreed that Departments are authorised to make arrangements with staff to take overtime into account.

10. **CODESA**

Written report was tabled and discussed. The following matters were raised:

10.1. Co-ordination of Working Groups

Must ensure that there is effective co-ordination of our working groups and the link with the Negotiation Commission and the NWC must be dynamic.

10.2. Statement on what ANC wants out of CODESA

It was agreed that we should issue a statement which would outline our negotiating positions at CODESA.

10.3. Participation of Regions in Negotiations

It was agreed that regions should participate in a more meaningful way by being part of the strategising process.

10.4. Strategy to deal with PAC and AZAPO

It was agreed that we should devise strategies of dealing with PAC and AZAPO propaganda on CODESA ; one of the effective ways of dealing with them is calling a meeting of the PF.

10.5. IFP proposed amendments to Declaration of Intent.

IFP's proposed amendments to Declaration of Intent were discussed and were found to be unacceptable.

10.6. Proposals for Working Groups

Working Group 1

- Call for trials to be stopped.
- Political prisoners must be released
- Must ensure that exiles return and get general amnesty
- Repressive legislation should be scrapped
- Creation of climate must include giving attention to what happens in the homelands
- Must work out clear role for International community
- The question of MK must be resolved at bilateral level.

Working Group 2

Written proposals on CA discussed and adopted.

11. Sports Policy

It was decided that this matter should be deferred as the cdes who had raised were not present.

12. Commission of Inquiry

The suggestion that the report of the Thami Zulu inquiry be released was deferred so that the matter could be discussed thoroughly.

13. Closure

The meeting was closed.

N W C

REPORT

(TO BE DISTRIBUTED TOMORROW)

ANALYSIS
OF
CURRENT
POLITICAL
SITUATION

The Current Situation: Introductory Remarks

*By Raymond Suttner
7 June 1992*

Introduction	1
Contest on the terrain of negotiations	1
ANC and negotiations as a site of struggle ..	3
Crises of the regime	3
Mass action and negotiations	4
Compromise	4
What type of ANC are we building?	5
Alliance building on our side	5
Electoral battle	6
Conclusion	6

The current situation:

Introductory remarks

By Raymond Suttner, 7 June 1992

INTRODUCTION

1. The deadlock at Codesa and the adoption of Policy Guidelines broadly developing the principles of the Freedom Charter have highlighted the gap dividing the objectives of the ANC-led alliance and the regime. It is an appropriate time for us to reconsider the terrain within which the two opposed sides have tried to achieve their respective objectives and the strategy and tactics that are most likely to lead us to success.
2. February 2 saw the opening of a new terrain of struggle. For the ANC this terrain was to take us from apartheid South Africa to a nonracial, nonsexist democratic South Africa, in which the social, economic and cultural effects of 3 centuries of colonialism and 40 years of apartheid would be progressively eradicated
3. For the regime the same terrain was intended to produce something less, not apartheid South Africa, but a variant of that, which would guarantee privilege and power, disguised in one or other way.
4. For us there must be a moment, or a series of moments that cumulatively amount to a qualitative break from the apartheid past, empowering a democratic government and the people as a whole to take decisive steps to build a fundamentally new entity.
5. For the other side it is important to present whatever is decided as representing a qualitative break and indeed what has already happened is depicted as that. There is no denying fundamental changes in the NP and important changes in South Africa as a whole. But it is clear that the goals that they seek represent, in the main, continuity, with the language of discontinuity. We have to ensure that there is *in fact* a democratic rupture with the past, and a decisive break as a result of this process.
6. Obviously if this analysis of the character of the difference between the two sides is contested, if they are not as stark as suggested, then there may be room for minor compromise that can bring the two sides to almost identical positions. That, in turn, would demand a different strategy and tactics from what is presented here.

CONTEST ON THE TERRAIN OF NEGOTIATIONS

7. February 2 then raised the question of whose objectives would be realized and to what extent. Either the regime would have to fundamentally compromise its objectives and concede a democratic constitution or the ANC would have to limit its democratic objectives.
8. Given the character of a negotiations relationship between parties with contradictory objectives, we have always declared that negotiations are a terrain of struggle, forming part of a wider strategy to achieve (on our side) the transfer of power to the people. In order to have negotiations succeed, we have said, one needs to deploy a variety of forces to strengthen the hand of the negotiators.

HOW HAS THE TERRAIN ACTUALLY BEEN USED BY BOTH SIDES?

9. The regime has clearly adopted the approach that sees negotiations as a 'site of struggle', supplemented with a variety of other weaponry. It has unleashed low intensity warfare entailing massive violence against our organisation and its supporters. It has used funds to increase covert activities.

10. On the international level it has projected itself as the manager of a process leading away from apartheid towards a stable dispensation, whose content will be broadly democratic. It has also launched an electoral campaign seeking to enter areas that are traditionally within the base of the ANC

11. It has also sought, with varying degrees of success, to reconstitute its base and thus widen support for its positions, beyond sections of the white community. The Inkathagate scandal was corruption but aimed at building a credible ally, within a broad anti-ANC alliance

12. The success or otherwise of attempts at building support in the black community, in particular coloured and Indian communities is difficult to assess with most members of these communities remaining uncommitted. The NP appears to have made little inroads into the African community. Its main allies, in particular IFP appear to have declining support, though the effect of the violence may be to limit people's willingness to identify with us. Even in a secret ballot the intimidation factor means that we will have to ensure that people know that it is in fact secret.

13. At a public media level, the regime has sought to appropriate the language of liberation and made the battle for legitimacy much more complex than it was before February 1990. We have often allowed ourselves to be put in a corner defending nationalisation or debating in general *on the terms of our opponents*, instead of asserting our broad, democratic and patriotic message, which includes the obligation to address the dispossession of our people in all its manifestations, including the social and economic spheres.

Instead the de Klerk regime has made a lot of headway, at the level of the public, despite its responsibility for the violence, as a unifying force, managing the process.

14. Internationally prior to February 2, there was 'no contest' with the ANC as the internationally accepted custodians of a just cause and the regime recognised as a wrongdoer.

15. But the language of de Klerk is now heard in a changed world, where conceptions of democracy of a relatively limited sort are part of the dominant consensus. Consequently, de Klerk's language has acquired a powerful resonance in a world more than ever dominated by the major imperialist powers bent on imposition of their new world order. This may be sufficient to provide justification for the anti-apartheid international consensus settling for something less than we would desire.

16. We should avoid complacency about the international support for our struggle. It may well have changed or the changed South African situation may also now be testing its depth and character. Prior to February 1990 that support was often behind a struggle understood as one for national liberation, as opposed to a more limited anti apartheid civil rights struggle.

17. The international consensus is now behind the Codesa *process* and we should understand that a power sharing arrangement is quite compatible with the new consensus in international relations over what constitutes democracy. The ANC's policies, in contrast, are less compatible with this

new consensus.[cf van Zyl Slabbert's new book *The Quest for Democracy*]

ANC AND NEGOTIATIONS AS A SITE OF STRUGGLE

18. On our side there have been two oscillating approaches in the main. One approach has relied on persuading the regime that our positions are correct. It has periodically been reported that on the basis of discussions, the other side is accepting our positions. At various moments there is not this consensus. Sometimes these differences between us and the regime are merely described as storms in a teacup and they are resolved through further bilateral talks. Sometimes, as in Codesa II, there is a breakdown in this apparent consensus.

19. This has led to an alternative position that has resulted in sporadic ultimatums and resorts to mass action. The object of such ultimatums and mass action has been to make the other side 'see sense'.

20. Both of these positions lead one to rely on the regime coming to understand that it must accept our position. *The idea of weakening the regime, in a general sense and strengthening and deepening of our mass mobilisation and organisation for the long-haul process of national democratic transition, as opposed to changing its mind, is absent in both approaches (despite it being integral to the regime's dealing with us)*

21. The resort to mass action in the second approach is *essentially for the immediate purpose of deadlock breaking.*

CRISES OF THE REGIME

22. Numerous international examples underline that crises of ruling regimes do not necessarily lead to revolutionary breakthroughs for their opponents, struggling for democracy. The consequences can be deadlock and stagnation, right wing coups, or a successful crisis management by the regime. while the all-round crisis of our regime presents us with real possibilities, the outcome of the present crisis is *not* pre-ordained.

23. February 2 was a result of crises experienced by the regime. The failure of the ANC to deploy all its forces in the period since February 2 has meant that we have not always been able to take full advantage of the factors that signify further crises.

24. The result of this approach has been that we have not always taken advantage of crises of the regime e.g. Inkathagate. At that time we announced a strategic shift to the effect that because of Inkathagate it was now obvious that the regime itself was the main blockage and thus, instead of removing obstacles prior to setting up an IG we should remove the regime itself.

25. This had an appealing logic which won support amongst a wide range of forces. It also appeared as a radical demand directly raising the question of state power. Unfortunately, however we did not deploy forces beyond logic to win this demand and it failed.

26. The programme developed from the Alliance campaigns committee and the policy conference appears to be correcting this situation

MASS ACTION AND NEGOTIATIONS

27. If we want to succeed in ensuring a transfer of power to the people we need to see mass action as a permanent feature of South African life. This is not only to ensure that negotiations succeed in winning our objectives but also empowering ordinary people to play a continuing role in shaping their own lives.

28. One recognises the need for compromises and that our objectives will not be realized to the letter, but in a situation where both sides have contradictory objectives, neither is going to weaken their resolve unless power is exerted to persuade it. This is recognised by the regime. Hence the violence.

29. We are now witnessing a massive onslaught against the principle of mass action. It is being argued that mass action is dictatorial and against the spirit of negotiations. The ANC, Pik Botha and others say, are using mass action as an alternative to negotiations.

30. It is essential for us to hold onto our right to mass action, not only in order to ensure the success of our goals, but also as a democratic right. There is nothing undemocratic about mass action. In fact it ought to be seen as a desirable manifestation of direct democracy. It is our job as a democratic organisation to think of ways in which our members and the people at large can be empowered to exercise their rights in numerous ways.

31. There prevails a stereotypical conception of mass action, now, born of our using it purely as a deadlock breaker. The period of the 1980s showed the creativity of ordinary people in establishing a variety of forms of people's power. We need to reawaken this creativity at all levels, encouraging people not to wait for directives from head office but to initiate their own campaigns towards democratisation and transformation. The campaign against murder, corruption and mismanagement provides such possibilities, as do the continuing campaigns against the drought and food prices.

32. We need to understand the need for mass action beyond a new constitution and beyond the moment of enfranchisement. We will need it to deepen and consolidate our national democratic revolution in the future. We may wish to mobilise students to send them out into rural areas in literacy campaigns, or, in the face of IMF hostility to our national democratic economic policies, we may need to mobilise the masses in support of our state policies etc etc.

33. This issue also raises questions regarding our reliance on the concept of 'transfer of power' as automatically democratising a society at every level. The collapse of Eastern European socialism and many African states contains a warning against an approach that relies on a transfer at the level of the state to an ANC government as being sufficient to involve ordinary people, to actually transfer power to them. We need to think of the structures, now and in the future, through which such power can be meaningfully exercised at every level.

COMPROMISE

34. Negotiations for a new constitution are critically important. But any new constitution, however democratic doesn't in itself liberate people. Given the balance of forces, even if we deploy all our forces, we may have to make compromises. However, whether or not a compromise is legitimate depends on whether the resulting constitution is empowering or not,

whether it provides scope for further struggle, especially over social and economic rights.

35. Obviously the type of compromise desired by the other side, including the big conglomerates is a constitution that has the effect of shutting off further struggle. That is clearly what the regime sought in Codesa II.

36. Our ability to resist such compromises is diminished by the fact that our positions are not actively canvassed in the streets, factories and other sites of people's power. We need our positions to be taken up by those who have the most interest in full and deepening liberation.

37. But we also need to canvass more deeply what is the character of a constitution that blocks off such further struggle for social and economic rights.

38. It is clear that the battle lines shift from one phase of struggle to another and that if we win the battle for political democracy, the battle will shift towards protection of existing privilege and there will be attempts to block off any attempts at redistribution. We need to be alert, in our conception of what is a legitimate compromise that, even if our goals are not enshrined in a bill of rights that they are definitely not blocked off as something for which the working class and other oppressed can still wage energetic struggle

WHAT TYPE OF ANC ARE WE BUILDING?

39. A number of the developments described above throw up the question of the character of our organisation. Is it still a national liberation movement and is that form still suited to the terrain on which we operate? By liberation movement is understood, here a broad, national movement trying to meet the interests of a range of people suffering under colonial oppression and having an interest in democracy. Such a movement would be close to the people, not merely 'representative'

40. It is clear that the Codesa process has the potential to undermine this national liberation movement character by closing the leadership off in secret discussions. It has tended to be 'politics at the top' and we need to be aware that it has the potential to imperceptibly change the organisation.

41. We need to ask whether, given, as repeatedly stated, that our strategic objective remains one that can only be achieved with broad mass involvement, we need to pay attention to the way the ANC is being built and ensure that it conforms to the requirements of that type of struggle. In other words, it remains essential that the ANC remains a broad liberation movement.

ALLIANCE BUILDING ON OUR SIDE

42. In conformity with this perspective, while consolidating the tripartite alliance at the centre, we need to conceive of the forces for liberation as representing as broad a base as possible under the overall leadership of the ANC. We need to build alliances with a view to bringing in as wide a range of people from as many sectors as possible behind our broad demands.

43. Unfortunately, the re-establishment of the ANC within the country has not moved smoothly in terms of relationships with other mass organisations. In particular, relationships with civic and other structures on the ground have tended to be confused and contradictory.

44. It is essential that we take active steps to rebuild the mass democratic alliance as a force representing a wider range of sectors than a purely political organisation like the ANC can, whatever its size.

45. We also need to examine a situation where the ANC, through its concentration on the Codesa process has appeared to prioritise its relationship with PF partners in Codesa over other forces in the broad democratic movement. What we share with many allied forces in Codesa is much less than the overall strategic agreement with sections of the churches and other forces of the MDM.

46. We need not pit one against the other. It is essential however that we understand all relationships within a perspective which locates us within a broader range of liberation forces, that are more active in support of our struggle, than is the case at present.

47. As a counterpart to our national tasks we need to consider the more complex situation within which we now seek international solidarity and one of the areas where we need, perhaps to pay more attention in the light of the consolidating 'new world order' is the question of south/south relations, consolidating our relationships with third world governments and liberation movements.

THE ELECTORAL BATTLE

48. What has been said up to now about overall strategy does not pretend to ignore that at particular moments certain terrains, such as negotiations may be of crucial importance and demand urgent direction of an organisation's resources. In the same way, the question of elections is an issue which at this given moment can have decisive impact on the future of our struggle.

49. We have all become increasingly conscious of the fact that an election campaign is already in motion. The tasks of winning an election requires an achievement that no political organisation has come near performing in the history of SA. We have to deliver *at least* 13 million voters to get a 2/3 majority. In many areas our members are few and generally inactive, our resources for getting to voters and getting them to the poll (let alone registered if that is required, is very limited)

50. As things stand, now, we will have difficulty in delivering most of those who might vote for us. We need to address urgently the way in which we are organising ourselves for this campaign and set up the type of strategising and organisational machinery that can correctly identify what has to be done and deploy the forces necessary to achieve the massive victory that we can achieve.

51. One point that we need to address in the context of the NP crisis and the way they relate to it is the question of de Klerk himself. De Klerk as a person is one of their strongest cards and we know that he is more popular than the NP and the use of his name in the referendum question was no accident. Leadership in the NP is concentrated amongst a few individuals. If we can nail de Klerk personally it is possible that their electoral strategy will fall apart.

CONCLUSION

The object of much that has been written here has been to question our slogan which states that 'victory is certain'. It is not certain, but properly organised, using our undoubted strengths within a coherent strategy that weakens our opponents and broadens our base, there is little doubt that victory will be ours.

BALANCE

OF

FORCES

DISCUSSION DOCUMENT:

**BALANCE OF FORCES AND
THE CHALLENGES OF TRANSITION**

I. INTRODUCTION.....	1
II. A CHANGING WORLD.....	1
III. INTERNAL FACTORS.....	3
IV. THE CURRENT EQUATION.....	4
V. CHALLENGES IN THE COMING PERIOD.....	6

(NB: Compulsory Reading - Sections IV and V)

I. INTRODUCTION:

1. The outcome of Codesa II has raised many crucial questions for the ANC. To understand these questions, it is necessary to soberly examine the balance of forces within SA and abroad and how this balance has and can be shifted in struggle.
2. This Discussion Paper is based on deliberations at the Policy Conference. The paper can only be fully understood against the backdrop of the relevant decisions at the Conference.

II. BALANCE OF FORCES - A CHANGING WORLD:

3. The international environment in which we wage our struggle is crucial in determining what we can and cannot do in the conduct of our struggle. Our task however is not only to respond appropriately to this environment, but also to seek actively to shape it in our interest. What then are the main factors which we need to take into account?
 - 3.1. As a result of the collapse of the socialist countries, the balance in the international arena between the rich on the one hand and the poor, oppressed and down-trodden on the other has shifted in favour of the former. The previous environment in which the actions of states representing the interests of the rich were somewhat checked - whatever its many and profound weaknesses - created better conditions for the liberation struggle. The present unipolar world order means that international relations are based on the dictates of the US administration backed by its European and Japanese allies.
 - 3.2. Resistance in the developing countries to domination by these powerful states has been somewhat weakened. While the issues of North-South relations continue to feature and will assume greater significance, the main interest for the developing countries has become how to position themselves individually and collectively in a geo-political set-up and international economic relations which are less favourable than before.
 - 3.3. The so-called end of the Cold War means in essence the victory of one party in the contest. But it also means reduced regional conflicts perceived in the context of "super-power" relations. This has in part ensured that the central issues at hand in both regional and local conflicts come to the fore, rather than the extraneous factors which tended to mask this reality.

3.4. In this regard, a "new culture" has emerged, also impacting directly on our own situation. This is the culture of contest around the issue of democracy, understood to mean multi-partyism and certain limited formal rights. While there is an abstract "liberal" underpinning to this contest, this is not antagonistic to our own objectives within South Africa. What is crucial is that it helps to shape international perceptions about our performance and that of the regime in the negotiations process.

4. The ANC and the rest of the democratic movement seized the strategic initiative in what culminated in the adoption of the OAU and UN Declarations on SA. By achieving consensus among world nations on how the transition to democracy should unfold, we helped ensure that the fight against apartheid not only remains on the agenda of this changing world, but also assumes the status of a "common human value". However, there are a number of weaknesses that we need to address.

4.1. African countries remain united against the apartheid system. But the alignment of forces in Southern Africa has shifted against us, with changes in Zambia and the processes unfolding in Mozambique and Angola. Within the region and further afield, economic self-interest and other political considerations are becoming an even more powerful motive force in the policies of African countries. Combined with the counter-offensive of the regime, this is leading to the weakening of the isolation of apartheid SA as well as pronouncements and activities on the part of these countries which undermine our struggle.

4.2. Various factors precipitated the adoption of anti-apartheid positions by governments of western industrialised nations. In time they came to acknowledge that the ANC is not only a central player in South African politics but also sought to relate to it as a movement they could "do business with". Primary in their consideration is the fact that there cannot be stability in SA without a central role for the ANC in a new dispensation. But the ideological mistrust against the movement remains. They therefore strive for a dispensation in which the National Party would have a strategic niche. This is reinforced by the regime's campaign of violence and propaganda - invoking the conclusion that there would not be stability in the future if the NP and its allies are not centrally involved at the executive level.

4.3. Since the unbanning of the ANC we have conducted our work in a manner that has effectively marginalised the mass of the people internationally. As a result, campaigns conducted within the country around such issues as violence,

deadlocks in Codesa, SABC, complications around prisoners and exiles, etc have not been adequately taken up by the anti-apartheid movement.

5. There are therefore both positive and negative factors in the international balance of forces. Some are objective and there is nothing much that we can do to change them. But a deliberate strategy including reviving mass mobilisation, efforts to promote what the ANC stands for in the transition and the future, and its attempts to cater for the interests of the nation as a whole, etc should help to influence the balance in our favour.

III. BALANCE OF FORCES - INTERNAL FACTORS:

6. The following factors need to be taken into account when examining the internal balance of forces:

- * state of the socio-economic system and its capacity to regenerate itself;
- * state of the ruling bloc including the appeal or otherwise of its policies and the extent of unity and diversity within this bloc; and
- * state of the forces of opposition.

7. Briefly, the current phase of struggle was precipitated by the following factors:

7.1. The regime could not rule in the old way. Faced with mounting pressure and sensing the increasing possibility of revolutionary overthrow of the old order, it instituted measures that would give it some leverage over the transition as well as power to impose its own notion of a new dispensation.

7.2. The masses, led by the ANC, were resolved to intensify struggle on all fronts despite the state of repression. The regime's system of rule was fast becoming unworkable and its isolation wreaking further havoc on the economy. However, while these forces possessed the capacity to debilitate the system in a process building up to a decisive uprising, they did not as yet have the necessary strength to overthrow the regime.

8. In this instance, the two main camps entered the new phase with the aim of gaining maximum advantage out of it: on the part of the liberation movement, to pursue the objective of transfer of power; and on the regime's part, to salvage as much of the old order as possible.

8.1. The regime's main aims in the transition are to disorganise and undermine the opposition and thus take overall charge of the process. It wants to emerge as having "beaten the ANC at its own game" which is the wide political appeal the latter enjoys. The main prongs of this strategy are violence, propaganda and fomenting divisions within the liberation alliance. Aware that an outcome in the negotiations process which does not enjoy the support of the ANC would not have mass legitimacy, the regime aims, ultimately, to so weaken the democratic opposition that it would then accept a permanent power-sharing arrangement.

8.2. The ANC, in this phase, seeks to weaken the capacity of the regime to act against the people, broaden the space for its operation by levelling the political playing field, keep the organisation intact and growing and appealing to broader forces as the alternative power in South Africa. Using negotiations and the weapon of mass action, the ANC seeks a truly democratic outcome in a process in which the masses are involved.

What then is the current balance of forces and the capacity of the two main camps to realise their aims?

IV. BALANCE OF FORCES - THE CURRENT EQUATION:

9. The crisis of the apartheid system continues to deepen. The regime is facing serious difficulties resulting both from the objective problems of the apartheid system and the manner in which it has been handling them.

9. 1. The economy is in serious decline. According to an most optimistic assessment (refer for instance latest figures by SANLAM chief economist) the growth rate is at 0,5% and it is declining, while utilisation of industrial capacity in manufacture is 80, 4%. Some of the reasons advanced do relate to the political process: uncertainty in the drawn-out transition, violence and so on. The strategy of the regime in the current situation is therefore not in the immediate interest of big business.

9.2. The ruling bloc's crisis of policy has deepened. If in the past the masses refused to be ruled in the old way, today "the new way", the alternative, has been positively identified. Their rejection of the regime's policies is therefore fuelled by an impatience with its delaying tactics.

9.3. For a regime that seeks to portray itself as an agent of change and expand its base to include the oppressed, the crisis of legitimacy is made the more

serious by its behaviour in Codesa and revelations around corruption and murder.

10. How do all these factors impact on the unity and diversity within the ruling bloc? It is an open secret that there are different views in government circles about their approach to the transition. These are however around tactics rather than overall strategy. While we cannot base our own policies on these family quarrels, we need to examine closely the question whether given tactical positions on our part could help deepen this fissure and facilitate the transition. The fundamental aim should be to isolate the forces bent on totally disrupting the negotiations process.

11. In spite of these weaknesses, the regime commands huge resources and potential support among a wide array of right-wing forces. Its counter-revolutionary base transcends narrow NP confines. It includes the white and black extreme right-wing forces in the CP, AWB, IFP and Ciskei and Bophuthatswana administrations. It also enjoys the following advantages:

- * military, intelligence and financial resources;
- * secret networks to wage violent acts against the democratic forces;
- * confidence among big business circles as the defender of their long-term interests; and
- * control of state media, Afrikaans press and other connections to influence public opinion.

12. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the ANC and other democratic forces?

12.1. The overriding strength of the ANC lies in its policies which articulate the aspirations of the mass of the people. The openness with which we conduct our negotiations strategy, formulate our policies and seek to engage the people impact on the confidence that the masses have on the ANC. In the context of power relations, our main strength resides in the fact that apartheid governance is possible only with the consent of the governed. The impatience of our people with the long drawn-out process is a crucial mobilising weapon and an invaluable resource for organisational work. This is reinforced by the elaboration of policies which clearly indicate the way forward for the whole country, policies which our most accomplished detractors find difficult to attack even when they scrape at very bottom.

12.2. The approach of uniting the widest possible array of forces in the transition has also redounded to the advantage of the ANC over the recent period.

This has found concrete expression in the work within Codesa where the regime increasingly finds itself isolated by most parties except for a few stable hangers-on. Corrective steps taken to ensure proper consultations and joint planning helped to shift the balance within Codesa and reinforced our proposals about the way forward.

12.3. But we do suffer from many weaknesses both objective and subjective. Among others:

- * lack of resources - financial, military, intelligence and otherwise;
- * weaknesses of leadership structures especially at regional and local levels in grasping the current situation and thus taking advantage of the possibilities that exist;
- * organisational weaknesses among our structures at national, regional and local level;
- * weak links with mass democratic structures; and
- * the failure to creatively employ in a coherent and systematic way mass action and negotiations as mutually-reinforcing elements in our broader strategy.

13. From the above, it is quite clear that both the major camps do have the capacity to shift the balance of forces to their own advantage. The regime has systematically pursued its own strategy with a limited measure of success: violence, propaganda, etc. However, it is heavily circumscribed. For instance, short of massive repression, it is not able to contain the growth, vibrancy and assertiveness of the ANC. It is also constrained by the reality of managing a system which is in terminal decay. On the other hand, the ANC has managed to build a nation-wide organisation and asserted its role as the initiator and leader of the negotiations process. Within Codesa, its proposals have become the framework for discussion and some agreements. But the enormous potential of the organisation has yet to be fully exploited. In the final analysis success for the ANC consists not in managing to maintain a balance or achieving small tactical victories. For the regime marking time would constitute a victory. For the ANC, success should be measured in terms of decisive movement forward.

V. CHALLENGES IN THE COMING PERIOD:

14. The ANC initiated and entered the negotiations process because it is of the conviction that, given all the positive and negative factors, it is the most probable route through which power can be transferred to the people. This consists in the implementation of agreements on interim arrangements,

elections for a Constituent Assembly, the adoption of a democratic constitution and finally the setting up of a democratic government. Negotiations are therefore, in the present order of things, a central element in the struggle for power. But their result depends on the actual balance of forces which is in large measure an expression of factors outside the negotiations chambers.

15. As stated earlier, the two major players entered this process in a situation in which one could not overwhelm the other. They therefore strive, within and without the negotiations chambers, to shift the balance in order to achieve their strategic perspectives. The reality two years on is that the regime cannot overwhelm the democratic movement. It seeks to so debilitate this movement that a permanent power-sharing arrangement, in which the NP is effectively in control, becomes irresistible. On the other hand, the democratic movement cannot in the foreseeable future overthrow the regime by means of an uprising - and successfully defend such an outcome. It therefore seeks to shift the balance - within the context of negotiations combined with other elements of struggle - to make genuine transfer of power possible.

16. The following crucial questions arise:

- * What is the capacity of the liberation movement to ensure that the immediate outcome of this negotiations process is an unadulterated transfer of power, a full-blooded democratic constitution?
- * What effort is required to achieve this objective?
- * Is it possible to make tactical compromises, a detour, whose immediate result would be limited, and yet create a firm platform for the final objective?
- * How would such a detour compare, in terms of cost and effort, to the alternative scenario of building the capacity to achieve an unadulterated transfer of power?

Herein lies the challenge. It is these considerations which should clarify how we address the actual political deadlock in Codesa. The bone of contention is not technical: about how to manoeuvre around traps and get to the kind of Constituent Assembly that we want and the regime does not want!

17. To recapitulate. The two basic and steps that we envisage for the transition are:

- * to limit the capacity of the regime to act against the people and level the political playing field; and
- * democratic elections for a Constituent Assembly leading to the adoption of a

democratic constitution and the setting up of a democratic government.

These steps should also be understood against the background, firstly, of the "strategic shift": that the first step cannot be realised by the regime, but through interim governmental arrangements. Secondly, that such arrangements cannot be implemented if the second step has not been agreed upon.

18. In pursuit of these objectives, the ANC worked out a scenario which had three main elements:

18.1. A two-phased transition with the first phase supervised by structures controlling limited areas of government pertaining particularly to the levelling of the political playing field.

18.2. A second phase after elections in which the parties represented in the CA would form a comprehensive Government of National Unity which would find expression at the executive and legislative levels. In addition to accommodating the regime's response to our original proposals, this approach was also premised on the realisation that the tasks in the second phase would be somewhat different, and that it would not make any sense to continue with an executive composed of parties some of which will have been proved to have no legitimacy at all.

18.3. In drafting and adopting a new constitution, the Constituent Assembly would be sovereign, with no other body having veto powers over its decisions.

19. The scenario also took account of the balance of forces and the imperative not only to ensure the transfer of power but also to defend that power. It is in this context that the issue of "sunset clauses" was in principle agreed upon. These are measures which would, for a given period, impose certain limitations on the full-blooded democratic constitution emerging from the Constituent Assembly. Options such as entrenched "white seats", a coalition government for the first few years, a package for elements within the Civil Service, etc have been hinted at, but the matter has not been taken any further. It is necessary urgently to elaborate this concept as well as the possible time frames - if only to complete the scenario!

20. But more critical for the current period is whether such "sunset clauses" can, in addition to mass action, help to break the deadlock on the constitution-making process. Is this approach justified and viable? At what point in the negotiations should this matter be tabled? This tactic can only be employed if

there is sufficient reason to believe that it will produce the desired result. For, argue as we may later that it was a "settlement proposal", the fact of the matter is that we will have introduced it and we will not be able convincingly to retreat from it. Needless to say, maximum consultation with our constituency and allies will be necessary in this regard.

21. The mass actions that have been decided upon are the single most powerful force to help break the deadlock. The focus is on deepening the crisis of legitimacy of the regime and shifting the balance further in our favour. Therefore, while symbolic mass actions will be important, the necessary emphasis will need to be put on actions that help us to build our forces and impact directly on power relations. As outlined in the five pillars (refer Programme of Action), the overall programme should aim at protesting against "the old" at the same time as it projects "the new". It is crucial though that the programme should be based on clear perspectives as posed in paragraph 16 above.

The challenge that the ANC faces today is how to combine good negotiations tactics and effective mass action in order to realise our objectives.

5 June 1992

DECISIONS
OF
POLICY
CONFERENCE

DECISIONS OF THE POLICY CONFERENCE

1. EVALUATION OF THE CONFERENCE

The National Working Committee deferred an evaluation of the National Policy Conference to the NEC. It is therefore appropriate that the NEC does record its views on an evaluation of Conference.

2. DECISIONS OF CONFERENCE

A number of resolutions were received by the NPCC. To facilitate discussion, these resolutions can be divided into 3 categories viz. very specific resolutions; resolutions which relate to the Interim phase; and the way forward.

2.1 Very Specific Resolutions

Included in this grouping are the following resolutions, some of which were not retabled in plenary on Sunday:

- * The NEC should ensure that childcare facilities are arranged at all future conferences.
- * The departments of Housing and Local Government should be separated.
- * In deciding on sports symbols for South Africa, the symbols identified with apartheid should be avoided. This should be done in consultation with the sports bodies.

2.2 Resolutions which relate to the Interim Phase

- * The resolution on unilateral restructuring refers to the economy, land, health and social welfare. We can add the civil service to this list. Effectively, in all sectors, the resolution calls for a moratorium on all unilateral restructuring. **The NEC needs to apply its mind to how we can give effect to this moratorium.**
- * The resolution on Foreign Investment in the Interim Phase is in line with the views of COSATU, the churches and some parts of the international solidarity movement. **The NEC is charged with popularising this call.**
- * The resolution on Local Government effectively places all local level negotiations on hold. **This must be communicated to our regions and branches, and must be discussed with the civic organisations. During these discussions consideration must be given to dealing with current negotiations and to rendering support to civic organisations.**
- * The resolution on ex-combatants needs to be advanced. **Is the paragraph 3 negotiations the most appropriate forum?**

2.3 The Way Forward

- * Popularising the Guidelines Document

There are a number of processes which need to happen - the document requires a stylistic edit, simplification, translation and be made available in a form suited to popular education. The NPCC will oversee

this process jointly with the DIP. It is unlikely that this process will be concluded in less than 2 months. The stylistic edit should therefore be undertaken by DIP as a matter of urgency to allow the document to be disseminated in some form which improves on the present density. Decisions will have to be taken on the production of the video, for which the conference footage is available.

* Urgent Tasks

The conferences on Regions and Rural Development will need to be organised, presumably by the Constitutional and Economics Departments respectively. **The NEC should set a time limit.**

The issue of abortion and sensitising the membership to the importance of the environment should be piloted by Health and the DEP in consultation with the organising department.

* Establishing a 'preparing for governance unit'.

This matter should be referred to the NWC with time frames set by the NEC. Such a unit should translate the guidelines into strategies (both for transformation and elections), should take responsibility for designing a training programme in line with the strategy, and prepare for more detailed policy work. Within this context, the debate on establishing a **shadow government** should be raised.

ooOoo

ANC POLICY GUIDELINES CONFERENCE - THE WAY FORWARD

This National Policy Conference of the ANC held from 28 to 31 May 1992 at Nasrec resolves as follows:

I. Popularising the Policy Guidelines Document

Recognising the importance of the document for members of the ANC, the broad democratic movement and all South Africans, we resolve that:

- a. It be translated into all languages and be accompanied by other forms of media to make it accessible to all;
- b. Regions undertake to set up policy teams whose task it will be to hold seminars, workshops and meetings, especially at branch level, to distribute and discuss the document and deepen understanding of ANC policies.

II. Urgent Tasks

Noting that the discussion at the Conference revealed that certain urgent tasks were to be undertaken by the ANC, we resolve that:

- a. A broad-based conference be organised with the view to evolving a comprehensive policy on regions, their structures, powers, delimitation and development within the context of a united South Africa;
- b. A special conference be organised to discuss the formulation of a programme of socio-economic development in the rural areas;
- c. The issue of abortion be discussed at all levels in the ANC, and especially at branch level, in a sensitive manner which respects all points of view and bears in mind all the implications, with a view to working out a consensus position on the subject;
- d. A programme of sensitising the membership of the ANC to the importance of the environment be undertaken;
- e. Mechanisms be established to ensure that in general terms the means of communication of ANC policy be enriched with a view to making the policy better understood on the ground through the length and breadth of the country.

III. Establishing a Preparing for Governance Unit

Believing:

1. That our vision for a non-racial, non-sexist and democratic South Africa must be supported by rigorously developed and implementable policies affecting all aspects of social and political life;
2. That policy development is an ongoing process which must involve the fullest participation of our broad constituency;
3. That the reconstruction of our country will require us to have well developed strategies and plans to transform the financial, legislative and institutional framework which informs the current socio-economic and political system, and that this applies most importantly to the immediate period of transition.

Noting:

1. That the policy guidelines we have adopted do provide a small but important start towards our longer term policy development goals;
2. That the commendable levels of participation of our constituency in developing these guidelines needs to be expanded and deepened;
3. That a clear strategy for the transition will impact heavily on our ability to meaningfully address the socio-economic problems affecting the majority of our people;

We hereby resolve:

1. To develop a programme that will continue to involve our constituency in developing policy for a democratic future by making policy options more accessible and taking these to the branches and regions for debate and discussion;
2. To call upon the NWC to establish a 'Preparing for Governance Unit' within the ANC that will be entrusted with the task of translating these broad policy guidelines into detailed strategies to transform the institutional, financial and legislative arrangements within various sectors of society to achieve our policy objectives;
3. To continue with the longer term policy work already underway within policy departments of the ANC;

We further resolve to call upon the NWC to convene a workshop within the next three months, that involves the leadership and key policy workers within the ANC, to translate the broad resolutions above into a concrete plan of action.

UNILATERAL RESTRUCTURINGA ECONOMY

A1 Noting that,

In recent years the state has embarked on a systematic campaign of unilaterally restructuring the economy through:

A1.1 The privatisation of public-sector companies;

A1.2 The privatisation of state land and the dissolution of the South African Development Trust;

A1.3 Attempts to borrow abroad; and

A1.4 Other measures to give a minority control over large parts of the public sector, for instance through the process of commercialisation leading up to privatisation.

A2 Noting further that,

These measures by the state have two aims:

A2.1 First, to compel poor communities to pay more for basic services, and

A2.2 Second, to entrench minority control over national resources in order to prevent a future democratic government from redressing the inequalities and poverty created by apartheid.

A3 And that,

The state has established these policies in secret, with virtually no attempt at democratic debate and participation.

A4 Resolves that,

A4.1 The ANC condemns the secret and undemocratic restructuring of the South African economy and the disposal of public assets, and calls for a moratorium on such actions. We further demand that the state fully disclose all planned and current actions of this type;

- A4.2 The ANC reserves the right to renationalise any enterprise, land, service or other assets privatised by the state;
- A4.3 The ANC reserves the right to renegotiate any new foreign debts acquired by the regime, its agencies or parastatals, if those debts will impose excessively onerous conditions on a democratic government; and
- A4.4 The ANC will examine and, where necessary, re-organise the policymaking and management structures of the public sector in order to ensure democratic control.

B LAND

- B1 Noting the regime has embarked on a process of disposal and transfer of state-owned land
- B2 Resolves that such action on the part of the regime be stopped forthwith, and that all such land disposals be reviewed.

C HEALTH (1)

- C1 Noting the present government's unilateral restructuring of the health services, including the privatization of public health services and the introduction of private practice into academic complexes;
- C2 Calls for a moratorium and an immediate end to all forms of unilateral restructuring;
- C3 Resolves
 - C3.1 To intensify the campaigns against these measures; and
 - C3.2 To reserve the right to re-incorporate back into the public sector those services that have been privatised.

D HEALTH (2)

- D1 Noting** that the violence perpetrated by decades of minority rule has left in its wake a brutalized society including
- D1.1 Victims of imprisonment and detention;
 - D1.2 Victims of enforced relocation;
 - D1.3 Ex-combatants; and
 - D1.4 Victims of violence;
- D2 And believing** that the challenges of reconstruction demand the participation of all our people;
- D3 Resolves** to urgently develop support mechanisms for all the above categories of persons.

E SOCIAL WELFARE

- E1 Noting** the present crisis in the present welfare system and the inequalities inherent in it;
- E2 Resolves**
- E2.1 That a moratorium be observed by the government on any future legislation until a non-racial, non-sexist and democratic government is in place;
 - E2.2 That the present government refrain from taking initiatives to develop a new welfare system, and that a National Welfare Forum of all relevant formations, to formulate a new welfare system be established; and
 - E2.3 That an enquiry be instituted into the objectives and administration of the Food-aid programme in order to ensure just distribution of resources free of political bias.

F FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE INTERIM PHASE

- F1 Noting** that in a democratic South Africa, the ANC will welcome foreign investment that contributes to the growth and socio-economic development of our economy, and that such foreign investment can provide an important complement to domestic resources;
- F2 Further noting**
- F2.1 That the current apartheid laws that govern investment do not adequately promote growth and socio-economic development; and
- F2.2 That the basic ILO conventions do not apply in that discriminatory practices are widespread and that measures to protect the environment are weak.
- F3 And believing** that foreign investment that takes place in such a context will not automatically contribute to growth, development or the eradication of apartheid;
- F4 Therefore resolves** to campaign for the following principles to govern any investment in the interim phase:
- F4.1 Labour practices should accord with all basic ILO Conventions;
- F4.2 Investment should enhance employment creation;
- F4.3 Employment practices must actively counter discrimination in the workplace;
- F4.4 Investment must enhance the productive capacities of South Africans, and should, in particular, incorporate affirmative action programmes; and
- F4.5 Investment must incorporate environmentally sound and clean practices and technology.

G LOCAL GOVERNMENT

- G1** **Whereas** local government in South Africa is characterised by unrepresentative, unviable and racist structures;
- G2** **Noting** the government's cynical attempts to promote the unilateral, undemocratic and pre-emptive restructuring of local government;
- G3** **And believing** in the need for a system of strong and effective non-racial, non-sexist and democratic local government;
- G4** **This Conference hereby resolves**
- G4.1** To call on all progressive forces to resist any attempts by local and provincial authorities to unilaterally restructure local government;
- G4.2** To emphatically reject any local negotiations involving the use of the Interim Measures for the Local Government Act;
- G4.3** To reject the unilateral and pre-emptive attempts to create joint administrations as outlined by Minister Wessels on 27 March 1992; and
- G4.4** To demand that the regime immediately suspends and withdraws the Interim Measures Act, and immediately enter into meaningful negotiations to establish a set of national guidelines and peremptory legislation to guide negotiations and the restructuring of interim local government.

H ENVIRONMENT

- H1** **Conference resolves** that immediate attention be given to the need to initiate a programme aimed at sensitising the ANC structures, local, regional and national - including its different sectors and allies - on understanding the importance of the Environment and its use.

**I RESOLUTION ON DEFENCE AMENDMENT BILL FROM THE COMMISSION ON
POLICE AND ARMY.**

- I1 Conference notes with concern that the Defence Amendment entrenches the racist nature of the SADF, based on whites-only conscription, and provides for compulsory prison sentences for those who refuse to be conscripted and are not classified as "conscientious objectors";**
- I2 Conference condemns and totally rejects the Bill, and demands that it be withdrawn immediately; and**
- I3 It further demands that the regime put an immediate end to all racially-based practices in the SADF.**

**J EX-COMBATANTS: IN RECOGNITION OF THE SERVICE GIVEN AND
SACRIFICES MADE BY COMBATANTS IN THE
STRUGGLE AGAINST APARTHEID**

- J1 Recalling and honouring the service given and sacrifices made by compatriots in the struggle in the national interest against apartheid and for a non-racial and non-sexist democratic South Africa;**
- J2 Conference resolves**
 - J2.1 That the acknowledgments, entitlements and benefits accorded to ex-combatants of the SADF, the police and prison services, be accorded to ex-combatants of MK;**
 - J2.2 That existing and past legislation covering the rights of ex-service men and women be extended to cover ex-combatants of MK with immediate effect and paying special attention to War Graves, Memorials, gratuities, disability and pension rights, resettlement, housing and education grants;**
 - J2.3 That the same principles be extended to cover ex-political prisoners and their families, the families of those who lost their lives in the struggle against apartheid, and persons who were victimised in the course of participating in the struggle against apartheid, especially victims of torture and state violence; and**
 - J2.4 That these principles apply on a non-sectarian basis to all ex-combatants in the struggle against apartheid.**

PROGRAMME OF ACTION

TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY

*"From corruption, murder and mismanagement
to democracy, justice and good government. "*

REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION ON NEGOTIATIONS

TO PLENARY

ANC NATIONAL POLICY CONFERENCE

28-31 MAY 1992

CONTENTS

SECTION I :	BALANCE OF FORCES	p. 2
SECTION II:	GUIDELINES FOR THE TRANSITION	p. 4
SECTION III:	PROGRAMME OF ACTION	p. 6

INTRODUCTION

The special commission on negotiations considered the balance of forces within South Africa and internationally, our vision of the transition and the mass actions necessary to realise the objective of a united non-racial, non-sexist and democratic South Africa. Our country has entered a decisive period in which the issue of transfer of power from the white minority regime to the people as a whole is on the immediate agenda. The impatience of the majority of South Africans and the international community with apartheid rule is such that the transfer of power, which should lead to the fundamental transformation of our society, can be achieved in the shortest possible time.

I. BALANCE OF FORCES

1. On the international balance of forces, the following issues were noted:
 - (a) that, despite fundamental changes in the international balance of forces, the system of apartheid remains rejected by the international community;
 - (b) that, on the basis of the false assumption that the country has irreversibly entered a transition to democracy, there has been a tendency in many countries to weaken the isolation of the apartheid regime;
 - (c) that, in the final analysis, the extent of international action against apartheid and solidarity with our struggle depends on the work done by the ANC and other democratic forces among the people in these countries and their respective governments; and
 - (d) that we need to embark on a deliberate campaign to galvanise these forces to help ensure a speedy transition to democracy.
2. On the balance of forces within South Africa, the Commission noted:
 - (a) that the all-round crisis of the apartheid system continues to deepen as shown by the economic decline, rejection of the policies of the ruling bloc and the exposure of the corruption and state involvement in the violence signifying the moral decay to which the National Party regime has sunk;
 - (b) that the regime continues to command huge military and other resources; and

- (c) that the regime pursues a strategy in the transition aimed at weakening and destroying the ANC and other democratic forces through violence and other means, and at locking these forces into a permanent "power-sharing" arrangement in which the system of white minority domination will be largely intact.

3. It was further noted:

- (a) that the ANC and other democratic forces derive their strength primarily from the mass of the down-trodden people;
- (b) that these masses yearn and continue to struggle for a speedy end to National Party minority rule and the establishment of a democratic society in the shortest possible time;
- (c) that in the conduct of day-to-day struggle, the ANC should ensure that negotiations and mass action are creatively linked;
- (d) that the ANC needs to further strengthen its organisational structures and links with the mass of the people in their struggles around day to day and national demands; and
- (e) that we should all the time co-ordinate our actions with other structures in the Tripartite Alliance, the mass democratic formations and the broad patriotic front.

4. The Commission further agreed that the National Party regime's positions at Codesa II once again confirmed that it is bent on clinging to power at all costs, and prevent the democratic transformation of our country. Combined with the recent revelation around state involvement in the violence and assassinations and rampant corruption in government circles, these developments have further exposed the NP and its allies in the eyes of our people and the international community.

On the other hand, the ANC and its allies have shown their unwavering commitment to democratic ideals and practices, and their preparedness to find lasting solutions to the problems plaguing our country. The possibility exists for the democratic forces to consolidate their hold onto the initiative and ensure speedy progress to democracy.

5. Further noting:

- (a) that the balance of forces is not a static

phenomenon but that it is fluid, influenced in part by the work of the democratic movement to build its forces both nationally and internationally; and

- (b) that in the current phase, negotiations and mass action constitute mutually-reinforcing elements of our struggle.

The Commission adopted broad guidelines to guide our vision of the transition to democracy and a Programme of Mass Action for the coming period.

II. GUIDELINES FOR THE TRANSITION

1. OBJECTIVES:

The transfer of power to the majority leading to the transformation of society.

2. CREATION OF A CLIMATE FOR FREE POLITICAL ACTIVITY:

In the phase prior to elections the following, amongst others, must be ensured:

- 2.1 Release of political prisoners;
- 2.2 Repeal of all repressive legislation;
- 2.3 Effective monitoring of the violence by the international community;
- 2.4 Effective independent control of state owned media;
- 2.5 Independent control of the electoral process;
- 2.6 Effective multi-party control of all security forces;
- 2.7 Multi-party control of state finances; and
- 2.8 Effective multi-party control of further specified areas of government, including provincial and local levels of government.

3. THE CONSTITUTION-MAKING BODY:

- 3.1 A democratically elected single chamber Constitution-Making Body (CMB) on the basis of proportional representation and one person one vote whose decisions will not be subject to the veto of any other body;

- 3.2 The CMB will take its decisions by a two thirds majority;
 - 3.3 The CMB will complete its work within a specified period of time;
 - 3.4 An effective deadlock breaking mechanism. In the event of a deadlock, for example, a constitution which enjoys the support of 51% of the delegates in the CMB will be put before the people of South Africa for a decision by means of referendum. Another option could be to call for fresh elections.;
 - 3.5 The elections should be effectively monitored by the international community, and various sections of our community.
4. INTERIM GOVERNMENT
- 4.1 After the elections the tri-cameral parliament and other legislative structures will be dissolved and legislative functions during the transition will pass into the hands of the elected CMB;
 - 4.2 The elected CMB would appoint a new executive authority for the country in line with the principle of interim government of national unity;
 - 4.3 All existing regional and local administrations will during the transition period fall under the jurisdiction of the CMB and its executive arm. The creation of new regional and local levels of government and the definition of their boundaries, powers and functions shall be decided by the CMB.
5. People residing in the 'TBVC States' shall as of right be entitled to participate fully in the phases of transition especially as it concerns the right to vote.
6. The above measures should be legislated through the enactment of a 'Transition to Democracy Act' which would replace the 1983 Constitution of South Africa Act. This Act should be strictly confined to measures necessary for the transitional arrangements needed for the limited period of transition to a democratic constitution. A limited time-frame for the entire process should be agreed to and enacted by the Transition to Democracy Act.

III. PROGRAMME OF ACTION

1. STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE

- 1.1 Negotiations are an arena of struggle, and our people's participation through mass action should be central to our approach. The context of negotiations is the on-going reality of apartheid and the continued efforts of the regime to entrench minority rule. Therefore the underlying strategic approach of the programme of action is the removal of the De Klerk regime from power and the institution of a democratic government.
- 1.2 Our campaigns should not merely be symbolic or one-off events, but should, in very practical ways advance our struggle and shift the balance in favour of the oppressed and democratic forces. The campaigns should have the following elements:
 - (a) Deepen the crisis of legitimacy of the apartheid regime by exposing its gross abuse of power, focusing sharply on the escalating scandals involving fraud, corruption and murder;
 - (b) Demonstrate that the De Klerk regime has no moral and political authority to rule our country;
 - (c) Expose the blatant attempts by the government and its allies to block a democratically-elected constituent-making body from drafting and amending a democratic constitution for our country;
 - (d) Level the political playing field and further strengthen our organisational capacity and rectify our organisational weaknesses;

2. GUIDELINES FOR ACTION

The Commission proposes the adoption of the Revised Tri-Partite Alliance "Programme of Action" (POA) of 13 May 1992 (attached) as the basis for the ANC Programme of Action, with certain amendments and additions.

Underpinning the overall approach to this document is our determination to break the resistance of the regime and its allies to the proposals for a speedy transition to democracy, to strengthen our organisational structures, to strengthen the agreements reached in negotiations, to advance the basic aspirations of our people, and bring

about a democratic constitution in the shortest possible time.

The main features of this Alliance Programme of Mass Action are:

- (a) the action must be coordinated, sustained "rolling" mass action to ensure that our objective of transition to democracy is achieved in the shortest possible time.
- (b) the programme involves an intensive process of reportbacks, consultation and mandates on the Negotiations Process and POA to mobilise for mass action.
- (c) the POA focuses on the strategic approach of removing obstacles to an Interim Government and election of a sovereign Constituent Assembly within specified time frames.
- (d) the POA involves the setting of deadlines (end of June) for the regime to meet our demands for, amongst others, an Interim Government and Constituent Assembly and the unleashing of unprecedented mass action in July, if these demands are not met.
- (e) the POA must, at the same time, address issues of immediate concern to the masses, for example the current violence, the drought, and so on. Further, our campaigns should seek to link local, regional and national issues.
- (f) the POA is also seen as part of the unfolding process of preparing for democratic elections.
- (g) Even if our broad demands are met, most elements of this programme will be vigorously pursued in order to advance to a democratic society.

3. A BROAD-BASED COALITION CAMPAIGN

Apart from galvanizing, a **broad-based coalition**, incorporating as broad a front of organisations as possible, should be formed around the themes: **"End Corruption and Murder: End Apartheid Rule and Advance to Democracy"** and **"From Corruption, Murder and Mismanagement to Democracy, Justice and Good Government"**.

These themes need to form the basis for popular slogans.

The pillars of this campaign shall include the following:

First pillar: End Corruption

Campaigns to expose the scandals and gross abuse of power of the regime to demonstrate their moral and political bankruptcy. The emphasis here should be upon the regime's failure and inability to govern properly. This may include campaigns around rent and service boycotts, and the scandals in departments run by Gerrit Viljoen, Stoffel van der Merwe and Pik Botha, amongst others.

Second pillar: End Murder

Campaigns to expose the government's complicity in murder, violence and destabilisation of political opponents. The emphasis here should be to expose the regime's double agenda. This may include campaigns around police and army death squads and covert operations; third force operations; massacres of our people on trains and taxis; and revelations around the involvement of top government officials and ministers in these operations.

In particular, to embark upon a campaign to ensure that Gen. van der Westhuizen and his team of assassins are brought to justice.

Third pillar: Dismantle Apartheid Rule

Campaigns to expose the regime's attempts at restructuring Apartheid rule in many disguises at national, provincial and local levels of government. The emphasis here is to show that the book on Apartheid is not closed.

To embark on campaigns in defiance of the 64 pieces of Apartheid legislation on the statute books, as well as ways to ensure free political activity.

The intransigence of the Bophuthatswana and Ciskei administrations to the democratisation process, must be met with appropriate actions to compel them to meet the peoples' demands.

The regime continues to manipulate the SABC as its private propaganda organ. The democratic movement should demand that the SABC is democratised within a given time frame, failing which we will mobilise for a national boycott of all products advertised on SABC from that date. Furthermore, we will launch a boycott of T.V. licences. The democratic movement should elicit support from business to pressurise the government to meet our demands in this respect.

If the regime continues to block the process of transition, we will undertake appropriate actions to make apartheid

truly unworkable.

Fourth pillar: Advance to Democracy

Campaigns to expose the regime's dishonesty in the negotiations process, particularly at CODESA. The objectives of such campaigns should be to expose the moral and political bankruptcy of the National Party's vision for the future of our country. The emphasis here should be to expose the regime's double agenda of participating in negotiations, whilst destabilising and undermining its political opponents.

To facilitate the process of mass involvement, the need for openness and access to information for all, the ANC must campaign to ensure that all CODESA processes are opened to the public. For our part, the ANC has nothing to hide.

We need to embark on a campaign to popularise our guidelines for a transition towards democracy, as soon as possible, in all corners of our country.

4. IMPLEMENTATION STEPS

4.1 The POA must be implemented without delay. Immediate reportbacks to all ANC branches and structures of allied organisations must be organised with a view towards immediate implementation of the POA.

4.2 The National Campaigns Committee must ensure that Regional Campaigns Committees are functioning and meet as a matter of urgency to immediately embark on implementation of this POA. At least one senior official of the REC must serve on the Regional Campaigns Committee (RCC). Each RCC must be administered by a full-time, paid employee.

4.3 The Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) rces must be drawn into this POA as a matter of urgency and necessity. The ANC must in each region must convene a forum of all MDM forces within the next two months. The main purpose of these forums would be to:

- (a) intensify the implementation of the POA; and
- (b) establish Coordinating Committees of the MDM Forums.

4.4 A National Forum of patriotic forces must be held as soon as possible in order to involve the broadest range of patriotic forces in this programme.

- 4.5 The Tri-Partite Alliance Campaigns Coordinating Committee must be strengthened.
- 4.6 The Organising Committee should arrange National Campaigns Coordinating Forum meetings at least once every three weeks. This Forum should be composed as follows:
- (a) all members of the National Organising Department;
 - (b) members of the National Negotiations Commission;
 - (c) two representatives from each region: One from the Regional Campaigns Committee; and one REC member ;
 - (d) two representatives each from the ANC-WL, ANC-YL;
 - (e) representation of COSATU and SACP;
 - (f) representation of the South African National Civics Organisation (SANCO); and
 - (g) representation of SANSCO, COSAS and other democratic formations.
- 4.7 The Electoral Commission needs to be strengthened and restructured, as a matter of urgency.
- 4.8 The NEC is directed to convene a special national conference of the ANC, to map out an integrated strategic perspective for the transitional period.
- 4.9 The ANC should organise a conference in South Africa of all international anti-Apartheid and solidarity organisations to map out an international programme of action.

Alliance Programme of Action

Revised Version of Alliance Campaign's Committee Proposals adopted at the
Alliance Summit - 13 May 1992

1. Introduction

- 1.1. On 13th May 1992, an Alliance Summit attended by national and regional members of the executive structures of the Alliance considered an earlier draft of this document.
- 1.2. The suggestions from this meeting have been incorporated into the document and the outcome of CODESA 2 taken into account. We would now like the document to be further discussed and the approach endorsed at all levels of our organisations.
- 1.3. The fact that CODESA 2 failed to meet the bottom lines discussed at the Summit i.e. IG by end of June and a commitment to democratic elections for the Constituent Assembly by the end of this year, makes the need for a programme of action as identified below all the more urgent.
- 1.4. This document should not be regarded as a blueprint or set of instructions but rather utilised as a flexible guide in developing an approach to a programme of action of the Alliance.
- 1.5. Regions are encouraged to further enrich this document so that local and regional conditions and struggles can feed into a nationally coherent and integrated programme. We need to transform this document into one that is "owned" by our structures and leadership.
- 1.6. The programme of action attempts to link the CODESA negotiations process, the election campaign, local and regional struggles and struggles around socio-economic issues into a nationally co-ordinated framework. In this way, our efforts to make negotiations a terrain of struggle will be enhanced and the actions of our people will be able to determine what happens at the negotiating table.

2. Our Approach

- 2.1. In this period our emphasis should be on getting rid of the De Klerk regime and putting power in the hands of the people in the shortest possible time.
- 2.2. We believe that a co-ordinated and comprehensive programme of action of the

Alliance is needed to achieve the transfer of power to the people and the last two steps to our freedom i.e..

- 2.2.1 The achievement of an interim government as ~~rule.~~
- 2.2.2. Democratic elections for a new constitution. *Source ca*
- 2.3. The achievement of above will be the key to unlocking many of our other demands e.g.. end to unilateral restructuring, worker rights, an end to the violence e.t.c..
- 2.4. The outcome of CODESA 2, demonstrates loudly and clearly that the government is not prepared to accept meaningful democracy. We need to take this message to our people.

3. Our key demands in this period

- 3.1. The strategic focus of our programme of action is the removal of obstacles in the shortest possible time for an interim government and democratic elections for a constituent assembly.
- 3.2. However, we should continue to struggle for the achievement of the following other important demands:
 - 3.2.1. Ensuring the implementation of CODESA decisions within agreed time frames.
 - 3.2.2. Other obstacles in the negotiations process such as Bop and Ciskei, equal access to the mass media and the release of political prisoners.
 - 3.2.3. State sponsored violence.
 - 3.2.4. State unilateral restructuring including government attempts to catch votes e.g. through drought and poverty relief.
 - 3.2.5. Resolution of burning socio-economic issues such as high food prices, the effect of VAT and drought relief. There is a possibility that food prices will continue to rocket as we have to rely on imported food as a result of the drought.
- 3.3. The recent expose's in regard to corruption and death squads heightens the unacceptability of continued Nationalist Party rule. In addition to using this issue to further emphasise the need for an interim government, we need to make the following specific demands in relation to the above:
 - 3.3.1. An independent commission of inquiry into corruption and death squads.
 - 3.3.2. The resignation and prosecution of all those responsible.

- 3.4. This list should not be regarded as a comprehensive or exclusive list of demands. Particular regions have particular circumstances. Regions and locals will need to focus on the demands most pertinent to their constituencies.

4. Achieving our demands

To achieve an interim government and an overwhelming majority in the elections, we suggest that the following is necessary:

- 4.1. Unprecedented mass action if our "bottom lines" are not met.
- 4.2. A highly well organised and dynamic election campaign which, while driven by the Alliance, is as inclusive as possible.
- 4.3. Enhanced participation of our members in the negotiations process:
- 4.3.1. On the one hand, we should not underestimate the capacity of our people to take action to achieve their freedom. But on the other, we should not take the masses for granted.
- 4.3.2. The mobilisation of the masses for support and action can't be a process which is switched on and off; where the people are only called upon where there is a deadlock or problems.
- 4.3.3. Uppermost in our minds must be our people's impatience for freedom and the fact that our demands have been for an interim government by mid-year and elections by year-end.
- 4.4. Concerted efforts to resolve some of the burning socio-economic problems of our people including the effects of the drought, high food prices, violence.

5. Implementation of programme of action - Time table

5.1. Outcome of CODESA 2

The Alliance Summit said that if CODESA 2 did not meet our "bottom lines", the ANC/Alliance should give the government a deadline of four weeks (15 June 1992). We said that if there was no progress by this date, we would be considering breaking off negotiations or other appropriate mass action.

In the light of the outcome of CODESA 2, we suggest that the end of June should be regarded as sufficient time for the present deadlock to be broken.

5.2. ANC Policy Conference - 28th - 31st May

The ANC Policy Conference is an important forum to begin developing an election platform for the ANC. The ANC needs to be at the forefront of articulating the aspirations of our people.

5.3. Report back and consultation process

The ANC/Alliance must embark on a process of report backs and consultation to consider renewing its mandate in relation to the obstacles placed by the government in the negotiations process and on what should occur if the deadline is not met. This should include seeking a mandate on mass action.

This process should include local and regional forums including shop steward councils, general councils, local mass meetings and utilising June 16th and June 26th events.

5.4. Voter education seminars

Preparing for elections must be seen as an integral part of our programme of action (see below). The first step in our election campaign should be educating our people on voting procedures and the significance of the vote. We also need to creatively link voter education with our ongoing demands.

The programme already launched by the ANC which includes setting up of regional and local electoral commissions needs to be intensified and extended to embrace all allies who are prepared to work for an ANC-led victory e.g. the Alliance, youth and student formations and civics.

5.5. Tuesday June 16th

The ANC Youth League to organise June 16th events under the slogan of "Youth action for the vote, peace and democracy". This needs to be linked to a build up of our forces towards breaking the CODESA deadlock.

5.6. Friday June 26th and following weekend

The ongoing preparation and activities for Freedom Day must continue and be part of the build up to breaking the deadlock in our favour.

Activities like People's Assemblies are appropriate forums for projecting our demands and preparing for elections.

5.7. Consultative conferences - beginning of July

This above report back and mandating process should culminate at the beginning of July in the holding of:

5.7.1. Firstly, a special ANC conference (suggested dates - 4 -5 July).

This conference should be larger enough to ensure adequate local and regional representation as well as representation from components of the Alliance.

5.7.2. A broader forum involving the patriotic forces, civics, other components of the

mass democratic movement (suggested dates: 10 - 12 July). The exact composition of such a conference can be decided at a later date.

The agenda of these events should be to review the deadlock in the CODESA progress and decide on appropriate action.

5.8. Mass action - Monday 20 July

Depending on the outcome of the above process, we should target the third week of July for unprecedented and sustained mass action until our demands are met.

The form of this action should also be subject to consultation. We need to consider various forms of simultaneous action e.g. strikes, marches and occupations.

6. Preparing for elections

We can't stress sufficiently, the vital significance of decisively winning the elections. Our people have never voted before and a large amount of work is going to be needed to ensure success. All sectors of the democratic movement need to be mobilised to ensure an ANC-led victory. The above timetable must also be regarded as an integral build up to electioneering.

The significance of the election campaign has been detailed in other documents. Here, we have merely identified some principles and then the preparatory steps that need to be taken.

6.1. Principles to guide our election campaign

6.1.1. An integrated approach

We need to gear up our whole movement to task of winning the elections. This includes integrating our organisational work, recruitment, local and regional campaigns e.t.c..

6.1.2. An inclusive approach

We need to embark on an inclusive process which involves civics, churches, students, the CODESA patriotic forces, small businesses e.t.c.. We need to build and provide leadership to a broad coalition committed to a common election campaign.

6.1.3. A democratic process

The decisions about the election platform, national and regional lists needs to be a democratic and participatory process within the Alliance as well as with other allies.

6.2 Preparatory steps

In order to decisively win the elections, thorough preparation is essential.

- 6.2.1. Sensitising and educating the mass of our people to the issue of elections. This involves telling people to exercise their democratic right and how to do so.
- 6.2.2. Information gathering: This includes the identification of constituencies to be targeted including people's fears and expectations.
- 6.2.3. Taking up of "bread and butter" local and regional issues: The ANC alliance needs to be active in all the struggles affecting our people. We need to integrate an election campaign with campaigns against state restructuring, food prices, local government e.t.c..
- 6.2.4. Development of our organisational capacity through intensive training of cadres. We need to equip our activists not only to manage the election campaign and contribute to strategising.
- 6.2.5. Widespread discussion and a democratic process to decide on an election platform. The ANC policy conference at the end of May is an important part of this process.
- 6.2.6. A democratic process to decide who should be on national and regional lists.
- 6.2.7. Appropriate and effective electoral structures embracing the Alliance and other allies need to be set up urgently.

7. Resources

To ensure that such a programme succeeds, adequate resources need to be deployed. This includes personnel and financial resources to regions for report back and mandating processes, media, adequate training of cadres and embarking on socio-economic campaigns.

8. The next steps at national and regional level

Below are practical tasks that arise out of the programme of action.

8.1. National level

- 8.1.1. The Alliance Campaigns structure must be strengthened i.e. it need to consist of five representatives from each component of the Alliance. It should meet as soon as possible.
- 8.1.2. The Electoral Commission must urgently apply itself to the principles endorsed in this meeting. A meeting should be convened as soon as possible including all components of the Alliance.

- 8.1.3. The Alliance Summit, composed of national and regional leadership should meet regularly to assess and strategise the way forward.
- 8.1.4. It is suggested that the Negotiations Commission should prepare a briefing explaining and assessing CODESA 2 for use at regional and local levels. The national leadership must be involved in these briefings.
- 8.1.5. A mass alliance publication should be produced reporting back on CODESA 2 and the way ahead.
- 8.1.6. Preparations for the Consultative Conference's need to begin as soon as possible.

8.2. Regional level

- 8.2.1. Regions need to discuss this document in their structures and in particular begin to implement the following:
 - * Report backs from CODESA
 - * Voter education seminars
 - * Preparing for June 16th and June 26th.
 - * Consider appropriate protest action in relation to the outstanding issues of CODESA 2 and the fact that the government has not yet accepted majority rule.
- 8.2.2. Regions need to establish appropriate structures to carry out this programme of action including:
 - * Strengthening alliance campaign structures at regional and local level.
 - * Setting up broad based electoral commissions.

Addendum A: Methods of mobilisation

Below are a number of suggestions to improve our mobilisation for the programme of action identified above:

1. Reportbacks

Mobilisation can only be effective over a sustained period if there are adequate reportbacks spelling out clear goals, the gains we have made towards these goals as well as the obstacles to achieve them. It is important that people can see the effects of their action in achieving these goals.

2. Gatherings

Forms of mobilisation to be considered should include mini-rallies in popular open spaces and the naming such open spaces, "freedom squares".

Such mini-rallies could be seen as a build up to a major event or rally.

3. Door-to-door

It is never too early to start on door-to-door activity to win support for the platform of the ANC.

4. Media

There is need for more of our own mass media produced by the Alliance as well as on developing mechanisms to use the commercial media to keep our members abreast of activities.

In this regard, the idea of a "Alliance Campaigns/Negotiations" bulletin is suggested - a short mass produced document which would be produced regularly to highlight the major issues in the negotiations process and programme of action.

The ANC May Day poster "Vote for workers rights" should be extended to other areas e.g. "Vote for youth rights" on June 16th and vote for women/pensioner/religious rights e.t.c..

5. Slogans

Attention needs to be given to formulating dynamic slogans such as "From Interim Government to Constituent Assembly" and "From a Constituent Assembly to a People's Government".

In the short term we need slogans that relate to the leveling of the playing fields e.g. media, political prisoners, integration of MK and an end to repressive laws.

6. Building alliances

We can't merely assert our leadership in communities - this needs to be won.

This involves being concerned about the problems of all sectors of the community and taking them up if possible. It further involves identifying the link between community problems and the end of Nationalist Party rule.

7. **Action**

We need to think more creatively about the kinds of actions we embark on.

For example on June 26th, activities could take the form of people's assemblies where laws are enacted and/or symbolic voting occurs. This could help focus on the forthcoming elections, issues for an election platform and what we would like to see in a new constitution.

On-going action can help educate our people about and highlight our negotiations demands and thus help to strengthen the negotiations process e.g marches on the SABC for an independent media commission; to prisons/police stations demanding releases; occupation of railway stations and peace trains to demand an end to violence; to government departments to demand sacking of corrupt officials; to social welfare departments demanding pensioner's rights e.t.c..

Local communities who have been affected by death squads or corruption need to consider local campaigns in this regard e.g.:

- * Relatives of assassinated and missing activists to form committees to demand inquests.
- * Communities which were victims of Department of Development Aid corruption, need to be recompensated.

NEGOTIATIONS
COMMISSION

76

NEGOTIATIONS COMMISSION
REPORT
TO THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
8 - 10th June, 1992

- 1 Subsequent to the Codesa II plenary, the Management Committee of Codesa reconvened to look at:-
 - a) the procedure to unblock the deadlock; and
 - b) implementation of the agreements already reached.
- 2 The Management Committee expanded its structure to include 2 delegates and one advisor.
- 3 The Management Committee, when it reconvenes on Monday, 10th June, 1992, will also consider the chairpersonship of the Management Committee and the structure of the Daily Management Committee.
- 4 The Management Committee has thus far created three sub committees which are effectively the steering committees of Working Groups 1, 3 and 4. The tasks and terms of reference of these sub committees are contained in the annexure hereto.
- 5 The blockage in Working Group 2 (i.e. about the constitution making body) will be discussed by the Management Committee on the 15th June, 1992.

TERMS OF REFERENCE

Sub-Committee on matters related to Working Group 1

1. The Management Committee (MC) at its meeting of 25/5/92 agreed to reconvene the Steering Committee of Working Group 1 as a Sub-Committee of the MC.
2. The tasks of the Sub-Committee shall be as follows:
 - 2.1 Based on the report tabled by WG1 at CODESA 2, the identification of those agreements which require elaboration or refinement.
 - 2.2 Based on the report tabled by WG1 at CODESA 2, the identification of outstanding matters as well as any other aspects arising from the Terms of Reference from Working Group 1.
 - 2.3 The formulation of a modus operandi with regard to the further handling of outstanding matters and the implementation of final agreements. The MC shall convene a meeting of a WG as soon as possible after the commencement of the work of the Sub-Committee with a view to inform the WG on the modus operandi proposed by the Sub-Committee. The MC shall also convene a meeting of the WG as and when necessary to report to the WG on progress, and finally upon the completion of the work of the Sub-Committee, with a view to obtaining the WG's comments and formulating recommendations to the MC.
 - 2.4 The formulation of a priority list and target dates (where possible) in respect of the above.
 - 2.5 Considering the agreements already reached with a view to ensuring that the agreement as a whole or any part thereof has been recorded with adequate definition of the parameters so as to proceed with the work of drafting the agreement in the form of proposed legislation.
 - 2.6 To recommend steps which would facilitate the implementation of the agreements including setting up and supervising a panel of drafts-persons for the above mentioned task. In this regard it should be noted that this task should be carried out under the coordination of the MC. Further, that the Sub-Committee will call upon the assistance of the MC to identify and provide suitable drafts-persons with the necessary specialised skills.
 - 2.7 In regard to the agreement on the release of political prisoners, the MC recommends that the Sub-Committee advises on the composition of a Task Group for purposes of identifying and compiling a list of political prisoners in order to facilitate giving effect to the agreement. The MC suggests that the Task Group considers invoking the assistance of the Department of Justice, the Department of Correctional Services, the Human Rights Commission and of any other experts or interested persons to facilitate the execution of this task. The Sub-Committee shall invite such bodies to participate in discussions. [REDACTED]
 - 2.8 In regard to the recommendations on the National Peace accord, the MC would like the advice of the Sub-Committee as to whether this agreement should now be forwarded to the NPC and to advise the MC as to how and when this should be effected.
 - 2.9 The Sub-Committee should report progress on the above-mentioned tasks to every MC meeting and to report agreements to the MC for finalisation.

Sub-Committee on matters related to Working Group 4

1. The Management Committee (MC) at its meeting of 25/5/92 agreed to reconvene the Steering Committee of Working Group 4 (WGSC4) as a sub-committee of the MC.
2. The tasks of the Sub-Committee shall be as follows:
 - 2.1 Based on the report tabled by WG4 at CODESA 2, the identification of those agreements (subject to 2.3 below) which require elaboration or refinement.
 - 2.2 Based on the report tabled by WG4 at CODESA 2, the identification of outstanding matters as well as any other aspects arising from the Terms of Reference from Working Group 4.
 - 2.3 To examine the implications of a) Ciskei's position tabled at CODESA 2 to the effect that it may not participate in any interim arrangements at present until all conditions pertaining to such participation are clearly defined and b) of Boputhatswana's position with regards to their commitment to the Declaration of Intent; and to make recommendations to the MC especially with regard to the following:
 - 2.3.1 How this would affect the participation of the people in those territories in any elections emanating from agreements reached at CODESA.
 - 2.3.2 How the necessary legislative changes and administrative practices could be effected in these territories to ensure that all repressive legislation is removed in accordance with agreements reached at CODESA; how a climate for free political participation and activity is effected.
 - 2.4 The formulation of a modus operandi with regard to the further handling of outstanding matters and the implementation of final agreements. The MC shall convene a meeting of a WG as soon as possible after the commencement of the work of the Sub-Committee with a view to inform the WG on the modus operandi proposed by the Sub-Committee. The MC shall also convene a meeting of the WG as and when necessary to report to the WG on progress, and finally upon the completion of the work of the Sub-Committee, with a view to obtaining the WG's comments and formulating recommendations to the MC.
 - 2.5 The formulation of a priority list and target dates (where possible) in respect of the above.
 - 2.6 Considering the agreements already reached with a view to ensuring that the agreement as a whole or any part thereof has been recorded with adequate definition of the parameters so as to proceed with the work of drafting the agreement in the form of proposed legislation.
 - 2.7 To recommend steps which would facilitate the implementation of the agreements including setting up and supervising a panel of drafts-persons for the above mentioned task. In this regard it should be noted that this task should be carried out under the coordination of the MC. Further, that the Sub-Committee will call upon the assistance of the MC to identify and provide suitable drafts-persons with the necessary specialised skills.
 - 2.8 To report progress on the above-mentioned tasks to every MC meeting and to report agreements to the MC for finalisation.

**CODE
OF
CONDUCT**

DRAFT PROPOSALS - RE: CODE OF CONDUCT FOR NEC MEMBERS

1. All NEC members based at Headquarters (HQ) or present in Johannesburg for official business shall keep the Secretary General (SG) or his deputy informed of tasks being carried out by them and shall (unless duties make it impossible) report to HQ or the office in which they are deployed on a daily basis.
2. No NEC member shall leave the country or travel to other parts of the country without the authority of the SG or his deputy. All applications for such travel must be made timeously and must specify the purpose of the trip, the period of absence and contact points throughout the journey. In the event of permission being refused, an appeal can be made to the President.
3. In the case of NEC members based in regions other than HQ their internal travel shall be undertaken in consultation with the Region to which they are attached. Permission to leave the country must however be obtained from the SG or his deputy.
4. Attendance at meetings of NEC and National Working Committee is obligatory and shall take precedence over any other meeting. If a member of the NEC is unable to attend because of any prior arrangement, he/she shall seek permission to be absent from the SG or his deputy.

5. The proceedings of the NEC and its working committee and other leading structures are confidential. No NEC member shall convey the contents of the proceedings without express or implied authorization. It shall also be the duty of NEC members to ensure the safety of all documents in their possession.
6. All NEC members shall be members of branches.
7.
 - a) NEC members shall keep the SG or his deputy informed (through written reports where considered necessary) of all meetings and assignments carried out. With embassies and other official of governments, both local and foreign.
 - b) All interviews with the media should be carried out with the knowledge of the DIP.
8. All requests by regions and other structures for NEC speakers or participants in meetings of any of the structures shall go through the organ in charge of allocating such speakers.

9. The NEC and Working Committee shall from time to time take steps to ensure that its members are not overburdened with too many responsibilities. For this purpose an immediate census shall be taken of the exact duties and responsibilities being carried out by each NEC member with a view to spreading work more equitably.
10. All members of the NEC shall strictly adhere to the letter and spirit of all decisions of the NEC.
11. All departmental heads shall regularly report the progress of their departments to the NEC and seek guidance on the broad thrust of their work.

Beyond -
real meaning

Formal democ.

Mass action - after democ.

Peace - economic

Checks & balances.
Good govt
Rule of law.

Not one thing

Negots.

1 Isolate them: middle strata
internatl.

Speedy settlement
let economy going

Broad coalit. of forces
End killing - bring peace.

Formal
democracy.

Bring good govt
rule of law

role of organs of civil
society.

For negots. 2 differ. concepts.

Not just punish - isolate.

Middle strata
Internatl.

End killings - bring peace.
Good govt
Rule of law.

End to turmoil, killing
corruption.
Speedy settlement.

Auton. orgs.