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MEMORANDUM FOR A DISCUSSION WITH THE RT HON DOUGLAS HURD, MP MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
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Mr. Foreign Minister, I really am pleased to have this opportunity of discussing the South African situation prior to your visit to South Africa next month. I will be meeting you there but this advance meeting is really welcome and I would like to take this opportunity to tell you what Inkatha Freedom Partyâ\200\231s position in South African politics is today and how we read the signs of the times.

I have an uneasy feeling that the peace process in South Africa and progress towards negotiations about the constitutional future of the country are going to be unnecessarily impaired and delayed and

I would like to share with you some of the reasons for this unease.

Far too few people appreciate the fact that the negotiation process is going to be, so to speak, hungry for next steps which are not going to be forthcoming. Mr. F.W. de Klerk has now scrapped all statutory apartheid which were its cornerstones. The apartheid that remains in practise and will remain as an anomaly until a new constitution is adopted, is something we will have to live with. Apartheid is now dead though even if we have not yet got the vote.

In the space of 16 months, Mr. de Klerk has moved with astounding speed and determination and he has done what he said he would do in his now famous address to Parliament on the 2nd February 1990. He has done it with determination, finesse and statesmanship.

We should now be going on directly to commence with negotiations proper about a new constitution for South Africa. That Tisy however, out of sight and we have got this awkward waiting period in which we will not be negntiating.

I do not believe it is going to be possible for any major Party to withdraw from the negotiation process. They may delay it, they may complicate it, but every political Party will be willy nilly involved in it. The only politics in South Africa that will gather mormentum is negotiation politics.

The ANC has \hat{A} »n various occasions threatened to withdraw from negotiations or even talks about negotiations. The latest of these threats of course were contained in the ANC \hat{a} 200\231s Open Letter to the State President which was published on the 5th April. In it the ANC said that they would not continue with any discussions about

the constitutional future of South Africa if the State President did not summarily sack the Minister of Law and Order and -the Minister of Defence, and if he did not show that the Government was taking effects to eliminate violence by the 9th May.

The 9th May has of course come and gone and the sackings have not taken place. Formally now the ANC is committed to withdraw from even discussions about negotiations or the constitutional future of South Africa. We are waiting to see what political weight there is going to be to the mass action programmes which the ANC has fhreatened to employ, should Mr. de Klerk not meet the demands in their Open Letter to him.

This kind of politicking and this kind of posturing is probibiting the next vital steps which should be taken now that apartheid is in every real meaning of the word scrapped. Instead of getting on with the next step in what should be a march of events, we are now milling around with the ANC posturing in protest because it is not politically coherent enough to do anything else.

I am really concerned that the whole peace process and the politics of negotiation are going to become enormously complicated because of the nature of the African National Congress \hat{a} 200\231 organisation.

It is an organisation in which frantic attempts are being made to re-write its most basic policy. I do not know whether it is going to succeed in making the transition from a revolutionary organisation committed to the a:med struggle and committed to making South Africa ungovernable to becoming a political Party amongst other political Parties in a multi-Party democratic process.

All its lleadership, all their mind-sets, all . their polifical thinking and all their strategic and tactical thinking have been developed in preparation for a bloody violent revolution in which they would sieze power and set themselves up as a Socialist government in a one-Party State. They have been preparing to do this for more than a quarter of a century and now ir the space of one year we are expecting them to be constructive and procuctive of leaders who can direct events lin the peace process and in negotiations.

There is nothing in the ANC \hat{a} 200 \hat{a} 31s history which encourages one to think that they have a leadership ready and prepared to take up the challenges of establishing a multi-Party democracy.

The $ANCa^200^231s$ July Congress this year will be faced with an impossible job of sorting out leadership and assigning responsibilities to different leadership posts. More than half of the present National Executive Committee of the ANC is made up py South African Communist Party members.

These members have no constituencies in South Africa. The Communist Party hardly even exists at grass root level and yet they dominate in the direction of ANC \hat{a} 200\231s activities.

The SACP members in the National Executive Committee have virtual

sole control over Umkhonto we Sizwe. The NEC leadership has just not been developed to take on the responsibilities which now lie ahead of us in South Africa. Umkhonto will have no role to play.

It must be disbanded or there will be no new democracy.

The politically bizarre dream which the ANC has of keeping Umkhonto intact and then amalgamating it with the country $a \times 200 \times 231$ s security forces giving Umkhonto commanders national command posts in the new South African Defence Force and Police Force is patently absurd. Yet it is motivating action, it is determining stances and I am worried about this kind of thing.

The ANC also faces the more than daunting task of reconciling a returned exile leadership and their ways and their organisational approach with the internal leadership which the United Democratic Front and the Congress of South African Trade Unions have developed between themselves. There must be many, many takers for any possible ANC post at every possible level.

None of this will of course be reflected in the $ANCa^200^231s$ public stances, its statements and the image that it is creating with such vicour and determination. The ANC is presenting itself as a coherent functioning whole which knows what it wants and knows how to.get it.

What is even more worrying than anything else is the gulf that exists between the ANCâ\200\231s grass root support bases and its $a\200\230$ top echelon leadership. For years, decades even, the ANC has Dbeen propagating the values of violence and the armed struggle. It has been arguing that what it now has to do is totally possible and is not worth doing. The ANC for years presented the South African situation to Black South Africans as one in which only revolution can succeed.

For years and decades the ANC has been a work establishing groups of young comrades in black townships committed to making South Africa ungovernable and committed to confrontationalism and violence. This is not a judgement; it is a statement of fact. $-\hat{a}\geq00\geq34$ Any analysis of, for example, the ANC $\hat{a}\geq00\geq31$ s broadcasts over Radio Freedom which was beamed to Black South Africa will show the extent to which I am correct.

The cult of violence has been insiduously inculcated in the hearts and minds of ANC followers at grass root level. Now the ANC should go to these people and say no we were wrong, we must do differently. They are not doing that, however. The message at the grass root level is that the struggle remains the same and that the ANCâ\200\231s involvement in the negotiatior process is just another form of the same struggle.

The leadership crisis and the cult of violence which the ANC has established amongst its followers, explains why the ANC has now committed itself to mass action politics rather than to the politics of persuasion and constituency building.

The ANC is not faring very well in establishing branches and setting up democratic Party machinery. It knows the power game and it is playing the power game it knows. It is taking issues, delicate issues even, which properly belong on the negotiating table and trampling them under foot in its street corner mass action programmes.

I am in the very unfortunate position of having to say — and to say sincerely — that if the ANC was what it says it was, and if it did have the commitments it says it now has, I would be doing everything to make gquite sure that it was involved in the negotiation process and I would be co-operating with it in every possible peace programme mounted.

To put it as strongly as it should be put, the hell of it is that we need the ANC to be what it says it is but we need to oppose what it is doing.

Take one important issue — the issue of local government and the whole question of the administration of black townships. We all know that the haves/have-nots divide is a Black/White divide and we all know that apartheid has thrust the have-nots in black townships and the haves in affluent White suburbs. This must change. We must find a formula in which there is one authority for one tax base and there is one authority in one natural urban functional region.

There must be a more equitable spread of the wealth that accrues to local authorities through taxes and income from ratepayers. There are complicated issues involved and there is a lot of hard and detailed planning is being undertaken about how to put Black and White Local Authorities together to form a workable whole.

The work that was done in the Buthelezi Commission and in the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba has revealed some of the complexities. They are not complexities which can be politically stage-managed by political bosses commanding street corner mass action politics.

When you are in South Africa, Mr. Foreign Minister, ask about the ANCâ\200\231s mass action programmes against Black Local Authorities. If you did research, you would find that the ANC mounted violent attacks against Black Town Councillors. They exhorted Blacks to kill Black Councillors. They exhorted Blacks to mzke townships ungovernable. They exhorted Blacks to make Black Town Councils inoperative.

As a result of this exhortation, dozens of Black Councillors have died violently, dozens of Black Councils are inoperative and many more dozens are so hampered with vacancies that cannot be filled that they are either defunct or very inefficient.

It is this action which was started by a revolutionary organisation which is now continuing in the form of mass action.

Perhaps more disturbing even is the mass action approach which the ANC is adopting to back up its demands for the establishment of a Constituent Assembly which will lead to an Interim Government. Dr. Nelson Mandela has announced that this is the commitment of the ANC and will back up this commitment with mass action programmes.

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Nothing could be more central to the initial rounds of negotiation than the avenues that we are going to use to move from where we are now to a new democracy. The ANC is making demands about that which it should be prepared to negotiate.

The Harare Declaration is a prescription for this kind of disaster. It calls for a Constituent Assembly and an Interim Government and it establishes an idiom of action in support of the politics it calls for which really only belongs to situations in which the ANC

 $\hat{a}\200\230s$ the victor and the South African Government is the vanquished.

It is not like that. ~Mr. de Klerk is not vanquished. Opposition Parties to the ANC are not vanquished. There is a vast South Africanism at work supporting Mr. de Klerk and Inkatha Freedom

Part which is there in all institutionalised life and in, @il public life, which the ANC is pretending just does not exist.

The ANCâ\200\231s commitment to move on to all-or-nothing politics so that it can become a winner that takes 41l is a commitment that 1is typical of revolutionary organisations acting in the guise of a

democratic organisation.

The next logical step is a national ali-Party Conference where Parties can come together to table their notions about the negotiation process and how we should proceed from here onwards. We desperately need a forum in which we can now begin moving towards consensus about what we really mean by negotiations and about negotiation agendas and negotiation partners.

There must be a sense of partnership between negc ciators in South Africa. We are not going to be negotiating about the modalities of handing over government to any one particular Party. We must sit around the negotiation table as equals and as partners committed to producing a new democracy .

The State President has called for the establishment of Multi-Party

Conference. The ANC rejects this notion because it says it was unilaterally decided by the Government that an all-Party Conference was necessary. In similar fashion, the ANC rejected the Summit

Conference on Violence and Intimidation which the State President held in Pretoria for the same reason.

If there is only one scape route and only one Party calls for it, are the other Parties going to refuse the only escape route because they did not call for it. Parties must get together to plan how to negotiate together. There is no alternative.

I have presented some advance views about the difficulties that we are facing in South Africa when it comes to taking the next step in negotiations and I may have so dealt with some issues that you, Mr. Foreign Minister, would be entitled to believe that all was under threat and that I see the ANC as a final spoiler.

I conclusion I want to dispel any such impression. I made the statement that no one political Party could in fact survive if it withdrew from the politics of negotiation. It is nogotiation or nothing for all of us. There are enormous pressures on all political Parties exhorting them to enter negotiations and to stick with it until a new democracy emerges.

I am not pessimistic about the future of South Africa. I am confident in fact. I am confident because the whole of institutionalised South Africa is now demanding that political Parties negotiate a new democracy into existence.

There is a veritable groundswell demand for negotiations which lis running across all race groups. Every language group is dominated by those who want negotiations to get off the ground. Political Parties which do not want to negotiate or which are being unduly obstructive are going to be put under increasing pressure, not only from institutionalised South Africa but from grass root society as well.

All political Parties are being herded towards the negotiating table by South Africaâ\200\231s social, economic and political forces. And this brings me, Mr. Foreign Minister, to making an appeal to you, Sir.

There will be a Commonwealth meeting later this year in Harare. Mr. de Klerk has now done enough to Jjustify the Commonwealth lifting sanctions long before it meets in Harare. The ANC is still drumming up international diplomatic and financ.al support on the ticket of the negotiation process still being under threat. They are calling for continued sanctions, arguing that Mr. de Klerk could still renege and pressure on him needs to be kept up.

That is patently not so. If the Commonwealth and if the EEC and the United States could be persuaded to adopt the British view, the ANC would be served notice that it must now stop the posturing and get on with its involvement in the negotiation process. We need that pressure to be put on the ANC.

The international community must now declare its support for the politics of negotiation. Britain can play a very valuable role in making this happen. I appeal to you, Mr. Foreign Minister, to use your forthcoming visit to South Africa as an event from which you will be able to launch an international campaign to 1lift sanctions, cease the punitive isolation of South Africa and gather support for all political Parties in South Africa which are committed to taking up their place at the negotiating table.

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