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Present: as per register

NM:

there is only one item on the agenda: strategic perspectives. I received a document from Pallo,

which I have asked to be distributed. You should all have it.

The meeting will have to last till 1pm today, due to an emergency situation of the delegation

going to Natal tomorrow. I also leave tomorrow for Zimbabwe and Nigeria.

I want Cyril to indicate how the paper should be handled today. But this paper was given to

members of the PF on Thursday, and I should explain the circumstances under which this was

done. It was done at my suggestion. I read the draft speech for the PF and it referred to two

statements, the implications of which I did not fully grasp. I therefore read this to the PF, and

mentioned that we would be circulating to members to the PF two documents, namely the proposed agenda of the meeting with the government. and secondly this document on strategic

perspectives. After I had delivered the address comrades reminded me that this document was

still being discussed by the NWC, and that it would not be proper for us to distribute it. I raised

the question that we had already told them we are going to distribute the document, and some had

already asked for it. I said that for the purpose of confidence building we should consider if it

would be wise, having said we would circulate it. now not to do so. We therefore decided to get an

undertaking that the document would be treated confidentially "nti! adopted by the NWC.

Secondly that there were two paragraphs which Pallo, in his contribution referred to, and in

view of that fact we should blot them out. This was done prior to giving it to members of the PF.

It was my proposal over which other comrades were reluctant. There was no sinister motive

, but really only concern that would be created in the PF if we did not distribute it in these

circumstances. Since then there has been a hard-hitting memorandum sent to my office. which

has not yet reached my desk, prepared before the motivation of distributing the document was

explained.

Cyril:

We discussed that we should raise one other matter. which is that of time-keeping. We seem to

start our meetings late and the situation is getting worse. We propose that we should try to start

on time. We are 25 minutes late today. We should as a matter of practice make each of us accountable on why we arrive late, giving an explanation to the chair and to the meeting.

The

meeting should be stopped to hear the explanation of the comrade arriving late, and it should be a

credible reason. If we begin to be accountable to each other things may improve in our organisation as a whole.

We discussed with the officials how this debate should be handled. The mistake of the last NWC

was that the NC presented a consolidated paper. without taking the NWC through the process it

had gone through. The NC had been presented with three papers - JS. Thabo and Mac - and arrived at a point to consolidate the three papers. The version we had last week was the

consolidated one. Feeling it was need to take the NWC through the process, so we can hear at least

two of the papers. And they should do so in a summarised version. before we start the discussion

in full. Both JS and Thabo agreed to make brief presentations, and then we get into the debate.

NM:

Before we call on JS, are there any observations to be made on the way the paper was distributed.

Joel:

Can we discuss it at the end of the meeting.

Terror:

We should accept the explanation and there is no need to discuss it further.

Gill:

Broader consequences: firstly, time allowed for preparation of presentations

Cheryl:

Agree with Gill. Does not make it easy for us to discuss the document, as it goes to the regions in

a particular way. for instance Western Cape response on power sharing. Not correct to give the

document to PF prior to our structures, and has placed us in a defensive position in relation to

the document.

Peter Mokaba:

YL taken aback that a document not approved by the NWC was presented there. Accept my explanation. Other problems arose, as they felt that even yesterday's negotiation for the z thus

were attempts to bring up the matter. This paper also featured outside the meeting of the Tripartite. Seems that people who believe in the document did not abide by the decision of the

NWC about non-distribution. We will, however, take your explanation and the circumstances of

the distribution to the YL.

NM:

Comments noted. I will be more careful in future.

Trevor:

My concern was a sense that this document has been leaked. I often find myself in circumstances

where matters unresolved in constitutional structures are then taken to the papers. Reflects a

sense of mistrust here. I am raising that the question of leaks must be dealt with.

WS:

Noting reservations, explanation of president should be accepted.

House agrees.

JS:

Approach the question with an open mind.

Urgent need for a theoretical framework for the negotiation process. Too often we respond subjectively. Response depends on image of militancy, or a passing event that makes us angry.

Need for a lasting framework. First question such a framework must answer is: why are we

negotiating and why did we initiate negotiations. Answer given previously is that the enemy was
 tr. crisis at such a nature that it was forced to make a major break with the past. not with white
 supremacy, and it could not do so without the ANC. Our assessment was that the seizure of
 power
 was not on the agenda as an immediate perspective. Seizure of power through a protracted
 struggle is always there, but the moment was not there. So question was how to handle the
 contradiction arising from the fact that neither side had been defeated.
 Question: can we expect the enemy to surrender. The answer is that the ruling class does
 not give
 up voluntarily. We cannot win at the negotiating table what we cannot win on the ground.
 It is
 not the place where we will get the surrender of the enemy precisely because we cannot force
 this due to balance of forces. The enemy cannot rule in the old way, but we cannot place
 on the
 agenda an uprising and seizure of power.
 Conclusion I draw is that negotiations is only one of the elements, a key element. towards
 liberation. but will not deliver a full liberation package. If we go to negotiating table
 expecting a
 full liberation package we are wasting our time.
 This all depends on the balance of forces, which are not a static concept. Two options: hold
 out,
 continue negotiations until mass pressure forces a surrender. problem with this option is
 that
 it can work both ways. Our status and support have by no means consistently risen among all
 sectors of our people. We are weaker today than in 1990 among Indians and Coloureds. The
 black
 middle class is getting tired, the masses fed up with economic plight and violence.
 internationally, more so. when we were on top internationally, but before De Klerk
 was making remarkable headway. We cannot proceed on the assumption that the balance of
 forces
 can improve, but must try to do this. If the option is not a correct one, which I believe
 it is not,
 then we must work out a realistically based scenario on balance of forces now. Must use
 political
 pressure and mass action in support of this scenario.
 Delays are not in the interests of the masses of our country.
 What can we achieve at the negotiating table. We can achieve a package which will enable
 us to
 occupy greater heights from which to advance, occupy a dominant majority position in the
 legal
 process, and favourable to achieve objectives of the national democratic revolution. If we
 get rid
 of De Klerk and we have a majority in the CMB structures, by that fact alone we will have
 achieved a qualitative transformation to enable us to advance the struggle for democratic
 power.
 Negotiations is a key element in the struggle for power as it holds out the possibility of
 bringing
 about a radically transformed political framework. Project possibility of outcome for
 negotiations which will result in the liberation movement occupying more favourable heights,
 eg if tricameral parliament replaced by elected representatives
 From all that there are four other points to take into account:
 As we will not get the surrender of the other side, the outcome will be less than perfect
 and will
 involve compromise. i.e. -
 We are not only faced with problem of winning power, but in conditions that will enable us
 to

consolidate and retain that power. We cannot postpone to the point when we have won that power to decide what we can do to consolidate and I'd fill that power. So must address need to address the inevitable counter-revolution. This is not the question of allaying fears, but is the question of the survival of the revolution. In a cold, scientific manner, how do we secure and defend the transformation. Remember that when political victory comes, and we win a majority, we will be in a position to occupy political office, but we will not have power. The day after the election the heights of power will still be in the hands of the other side. The economy will be in the control of the same people who controlled it the day before the election, the same for civil service, judiciary, police and army, as will the media. The problem of backward ethnicity, manifested in the form of LFP/quzo approaches, will be there. And what we have to address is how we can take steps in order to minimise this immense block of power which we will face after we achieve a political victory. In deciding what kind of package we want to introduce we must take this into account.

A negotiated solution is a package. We must not approach problem of negotiations by tagging onto one element, but must see the package as a whole to see if in the circumstances it will advance or retard our revolutionary objectives.

What then is the test for compromise. How do we decide what is permissible. The main test is does that compromise permanently block advance to real people's power. This is the real test. A permanent entrenchment of power sharing, or veto rights in a second chamber, permanently block the advance to real people's power. So must have bottom lines from which we can never depart.

The bottom lines are:

- The CMB is democratically elected, sovereign, 1910 borders and no veto
- The general constitutional principles are only limitations on CMB
- Free and fair elections, time frames, dead lock breaking mechanisms. transitional constitution etc.

Quantitative and Qualitative compromises

Quantitative: does not affect bottom line and gives negotiators room to manoeuvre.

What are impermissible qualitative compromises.

- Any permanent power sharing or veto power, or that decisions on regions be taken by Codes and CMB.
- Any imposition on the CMB which will paralyse the future government's economic policy, as this relates to affirmative action. Cannot bind CMB so that a future state is prevented to effectively intervene to address racially accumulated imbalances.

There are further major qualitative compromises for which we would have to get a mandate that we must consider:

- Major compromises with merit in themselves because they will help consolidate majority rule and diminish potential of counter revolution. They will consolidate majority rule and help defend example of such compromises in economic field we have been forced to retreat from nationalisation. We have to take this into account into the sphere of the kind of transformation in reality of period after we have won political victory. There are other compromises that do not

violate bottom lines.

Even if my specific proposals are wrong, people must not confuse those proposals about the broad characterisation of what we face.

A temporary period of power sharing has caused most reaction, after constitution has been adopted. Worth considering this. I am not sure I am 100% right, but it is really making a virtue

of necessity. Comrade President has said we will face such a terrible socio-economic situation

that we as ANC will voluntarily have a government of national unity. We have not said this as a

collective. Merit of making this virtue of necessity is that it will divide the right wing, and we

must try to divide the other side, weaken the opposition of smaller parties whose only interest

is it they will have some share in the state, and even in the enemy there are some individuals

who are concerned about their own participation. It will tempt elements, but the proposal is not

equal power sharing, it is conditional. first of all on being part of the package with bottom lines,

and power sharing itself subject to proportional representation with decision making procedures which will not paralyse its functioning.

Examples. power sharing arrangement in Namibia. During the last war, power sharing arrangement in Britain. In 1976 when there was a call for Angola not to break a government of

national unity between MPLA, Unita and FNLA. We know what has happened. But it might have even gone the same way and now they are going to have a government of national unity.

if a constitutional commitment to power sharing is too strong a medicine :3 take, we should then

stick to a collective undertaking that we will do it. which we have never committed ourselves to

do.

The rest is not entrenched in any constitution. What I suggest is that we reach agreement between the two parties: amnesty, regional powers, restructuring of the police and army - on

these three things it is not suggested we bind the CMB, but a bilateral arrangement. We are

talking about a transition period in relation to a bottom line of affirmative action. One of first

tasks of new government will be to undermine all these structures of white power.

There must be no illusions about De Klerk's intentions. No one here believes that De Klerk will

deliver liberation. or that he will use any major compromise we make for his own purpose and

exploit temporary power sharing. We know that. But we have to decide whether the overall new

dispensation will place the ANC-led liberation forces in a favourable position to defeat such

manoeuvres. We must get rid of them. the tri-cameral and have a popular mandate that we have

been elected into the majority and with that political power we will be more equipped to deal

with the manoeuvres of the other side.

So as a stage in the process of the struggle for power necessary to consider what real tactics are

and not merely sloganised revolutionary cliches.

Thabo: a

Agree with JS, not sure if 'further input is required. except for one issue. President said some

paragraphs were removed, which raise question of a contradictory relationship that exists between ourselves and the NP. The process that JS has been describing and the changing balance

of forces. there are moments of co-operation. but this does not mean we become allies or belong to the same pack. Questions are important tactics! questions arising out of concrete situations. in Lusaka in the mid-80s, we received a message from the regime saying: why do we not take certain steps to secure Mandela's release. As a result of struggle they accepted our demand for the release of Mandela. They had certain concerns: fear that it would be a signal for insurrection. We said what can we do to secure this release. address their concerns. We had arrived at a point where we agreed on a common objective. and we could then meet and discuss. They were pursuing different objectives, stated that he had become too powerful a mobilising factor and wanted some controls. Despite different purposes, we both wanted the release. Take the white referendum in March. We took the same position as the regime as it was important to defeat the ultra-right, for different purposes. But this did not mean that we belonged to the same camp as the purposes were different. This question will arise throughout the course of our struggle. When elaborating tactics and strategy, we must be able to identify these points when we can act together. but this does not make us allies. Critically important to understand the need for co-operation. If you take the Second World War: Nazi Germany, a bourgeois state. in class terms in the camp with Britain and the USA. yet other bourgeois states co-operate with a socialist state to defeat the Nazis. Did not mean that the US wanted Germany at the end of the war to become a socialist country. chiet leadership recognised it was possible to secure co-operation with other camps

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Praehw. .eauty uc-nunuu "a IUBIIUIy tllauu umments so we can take uO-feut taut-CCE d:c:::cns.
Say interim government of national unity as there are areas we can co-operate on, but does not mean we have become one. Must determine with whom you co-operate. at what stage and about what.

' Discussion
Valli:
Procedural point: need to report on forthcoming bilateral. We have met with alliance and PF. and held a national negotiations forum. But NWC has not had the opportunity to discuss. so we hope we can find time to give that report.

NM:
Problem is that when do we accommodate Pallo's input?
Terror:
Suggest that we have had this input, and suggest we ask Palio to summarise his paper in a similar manner, so we can then discuss and take a position as a body.

NM:
Agree PalLo present his paper
Pailo:
It was not presented on basis of presentation by JS and Thabo. It is based on the consolidated

document. I have read JS's article. The approach JS is adopting I cannot quarrel with, though it is a theoretical framework within which to view the whole question of negotiations. NSC have no quarrel with his submission that neither side has been vanquished. Where we part company is on the issue of what the negotiations are about and what we should try to attain through negotiations. Take on board Thabo's submission that there are moments when forces that are diametrically opposed do find areas which need co-operation or objective circumstances impose such co-operation. I point to the provisional governments in Angola and Mozambique. Objectively there was a basis of co-operation. What I point up is that the fundamental difference in our instance is that where the Portuguese administration would go back to Lisbon, we are not faced with that situation in South Africa. given that ourselves and the regime entered negotiations for different reasons, negotiations in our instance must end with one side losing. Both sides cannot win. How they define the losing and extent of the losing is a matter that will be decided by the balance of forces, which I submit is constantly fluid. The paper suggests that it might be static and there cannot be qualitative changes in the balance of forces. The theoretical framework must be based on the framework that one side will be the loser, and we cannot approach the negotiations as both sides being the winner. The manner we conduct ourselves in negotiations is to enhance our capacity to be the winners, and reduce the other side's capacity to win. Make them losers as much as possible. This goes to the core of the questions in the consolidated paper, that is the package. My fear is that while JS and the consolidated paper say neither we or the regime have lost, they proceed as if we have lost, and it is we who have to make the concessions. If neither side has lost, we have no reason to behave that way. The other side cannot possibly win. If the other side can win, then our whole conception of history needs to be revised. The fact that we are not as strong in the Indian and Coloured communities as in 1990. but does that mean we are going into decline. We stand at the head of a record of understanding that we have imposed on the regime. We have imposed the release of remaining political prisoners. able to tease out big business's strong alliance with the regime. eg on eve of strike. All these we claim as victories. And at the end of these victories we conclude that the regimes immediate demands are: a government after the elections in which they have a voice, secure greater part of white civil service, in police and army, and so condition the terms on which the democratic government comes into office that its capacity for affirmative action is limited. JS says we should not make compromises that will block the way forward. Their suggestions do precisely that. What are the victories if you win and then give the other side the victory. JS is right that we will not win on the negotiating table what we have not won on the battlefield. All we are asking is that we do not give away what we have won on the battlefield in the negotiating table. Conceptual confusion: power sharing and a government of national unity. Churchill's government was a Tory government. not a government of power sharing. It was a government of national unity. Difference between power sharing and government of national unity. Dangerous

precedents to deal with regions, general amnesty, which should be the province of the national

assembly. What we are saying is that issue should be determined by the balance of power that is determined through the elections. .53 says we should make agreement bilaterally now with the NP. This is dangerous. Equally dangerous will be the notion of trying to address the counter-revolution by giving assurances to the white civil service. SAP and army. I defy anyone here to quote one instance where a progressive government that has attempted to diminish the chances of counter-revolution by accommodating the reactionary police, army or civil service has succeeded in doing that. In every example it has emboldened them - Franco, Pinochet are examples. When we deal with societies, and the way classes behave. we are dealing with probabilities and how they have behaved in other instances. The question is: will these compromises make the way forward or block it. My submission is that they will block it. if you give assurances that you will not tamper with the civil service, leaving aside politics, you are dealing with a bloated civil service, in the instances of austerity you will have to tackle the civil service. Diminish chances of counter-revolution by consolidating your support base and enhancing their confidence in the ANC.

I am not offering any prescription in terms of what needs to be done immediately in a negotiating process, this process has to be framed so that at the end of the day one of the sides has to lose.

Discussion:

JN:

Do we have an option that is an alternative to JS. We want to deal with the realities on the ground.

Pallo:

My point of departure was that the options posed are based on a foundation and what I posed the last time is that the foundation is fundamentally flawed. This is what I have tried to demonstrate. if it is accepted that the foundation is flawed, then the options should be discussed in a different framework.

NM:

We are not just debating. we want solutions to the problem. We cannot resolve the problems now and will need another meeting.

Trevor:

Pallo raised question about defence force. Good example in Nicaragua. Chimora unable to govern because backbone of the army is Sandanista. We must set our sights on quality of change, which will be constrained by objective conditions. But need to take account of where the power of government is based. Cabinet meets for one hour on Wednesdays, and can do this because civil service prepares and cabinet merely rubber stamps. This indicates power of the civil service. Unless we address that issue we cannot conceptualise the quality of change. We were involved in the Mont Fleur scenarios) What I have heard from JS and in the paper we received is the classical lame duck scenario: a government of national unity taking decisions and constrained by lowest common denominator and civil service. Government is not only assuming elected office. In

respect of those scenarios capital understanding that lame duck government is incapable of delivery. In that respect at least some segments of capital have been dislodged from the block.

There were some points that JS threw in: retreat from nationalisation. transitional constitution which is new and I do not know that the ANC has accepted this in any constitutional structure, loss of support in Indian and Coloured communities. Must not introduce our subjective weaknesses as objective realities. Must ask what we need to do to recover in these communities.

What we need is a strategy to transform the civil service. because even if we assume government tomorrow we will be sitting with a civil service that must be transformed. We would do that regardless. To suggest that those circumstances only arise because of the issues raised in the document. This is what we have to grapple with. This strategy must observe what is happening around us. in Namibia Swapo found the civil service entrenched by the negotiations and today you have a bloated civil service because Swapo has had to introduce its own members, but its ability to transform Namibia is hampered by the old civil service which is continuing to strip the country bare. We will have to consider pensions etc. Transforming the civil service must not be conflated with the need for a government of national unity. Those who remain in the civil service do so at the behest of the victor in elections. To suggest that you can entrench the civil service is to show your hand when you do not need to. What distinguishes this document from the notion of entrenchment. I am saying you need a strategy for the civil service. Paragraph 6 gives a feeling of entrenchment.

Klll.

I tlvlc

One of the problems are questions asked today about what we propose to do with the civil service: how do we answer?

Trevor:

Cannot afford to have a situation where all civil service packs up and untrained people take over. identify nodal points central to transformation and we need to have people trained to take over these areas that are key in each department.

Joel:

3rd option: combination of mass action. international mobilisation and capture beach-head in structures of power and change balance of forces so we can move to democracy. Basic problem faced in Zimbabwe: either they reject Lancaster and go to war weakened, or accept some of the concessions proposed and use them to consolidate national liberation. ANC has reached such a time where we have to make similar hard choices. Either we lead the nation or drown in our own slogans. Points of departure become clear and Pallo's presentation is fundamentally flawed. Confusion arising out of phrases we have used and taken as absolutes. We say negotiations are a terrain of struggle. We say they are a form of struggle, but this only describes a function of negotiations. We also say negotiations can represent the form of transfer of power. Pallo only takes one aspect. a tactic. when they are a combination of terrain, form and transfer. Pallo challenges formulation in document that ANC turned to armed struggle but armed struggle adopted when a negotiated transfer of power became impossible. Negotiated transfer of power is the conjuncture we are at.- the formulation on consolidated document on competition is not good, can use conflict instead. Contradictory elements of co-operation should be elaborated. Pa

llo says

lG as we propose is is not an expression of an lG of national unity, but an expression of what the

Harare Declaration says. Most of the criticisms of the document are faced on a fundamental

,... A e L- O a "-

Hasstiicn he dc:u...cnt deals mainly with sunsc. ciauxcs. but not with .. sunnse measures . and

does not address fears of the majority. Third presentation by Mac addressed those questions and

not incorporated in this document. Must incorporate temporary coalition means that ANC should

be the dominant force in that coalition and how it should be achieved, or how army integration

and threat analysis is dealt with, so compromises we are talking about are golden handshakes in

the process of restructuring. We also need to say while we deal with the NP, what do we do

directly with the army, civil service etc. Document not harsh enough with the civil service, but

harshness depends on balance of forces and this can invite retaliation.

TerrOr:

Propose we adjourn discussion and resume them later, and have a briefing on the negotiations

and the bilateral meeting which needs concrete action.

Cyril:

Agree if we had enough time to deal with questions that arise. But if we are stopping at 12.45 we

do not have time enough for that.

NM:

AGree we get information so comrades are aware.

House accepts.

Trevor:

Delegation to the US next week. No one knows what is going to be said there. There is also the

question of Natal.

Cyril:

On the USA and Natal. I propose that we agree that meetings of the delegations be held. We do not

need substantial discussion here. Natali delegatio meet today at 2pm, and US delegation meet on

input. Many people presenting papers. documentation distributed by our office. We need to ensure that those inputs have a common thread.

Trevor:

There are some particular problems. Must take account of the fact that this is the first major

conference in the US after the elections. and speaking to the foreign policy of whoever is elected.

Who decides when sanctions are lifted? The delegation or the NWC. Cannot get any joy, and must

be considered by constitutional structures.

Cyril:

Most helpful way is for delegation to get together. Do not see how the NWC will input until the

delegation has focused on those issues that are policy matters be brought to the NWC. Delegation

to meet on Thursday.

Pailo: t v

Could we suggest that as the BIA is responsible for the conference that it convene a meeting of

the delegation not later than this weekend, and that meeting process what should be the input of

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