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HAYIBUYE CARRIED A SERIES OF ARTICLES
UN PEUPLE' S WAR UURINU 1985.

Below we reproduce extrecte From them as a contribution to the
discussion on this ell~imperteht issue.

...The South African regime does not govern our country by the
consent of the people. It has impeeee iteelf on us by force of arms.
Therefore, it knows that to survive it hee to rely on military might.
Accordingly, over the lest twenty five years in perticuler, it has
built
up its armed Forces with the two aims of ensuring that these Forces
are of Sufficcient strength to eubjugete our people forever end else
that they can conquer and dominate the people Of Southern Africa.
EMThe people elem, in this period, have created their own ermy,
Umkhonto we Sizwe. Fro some time MK has carried out actions
aimed at giving further impetus to the heightened political activity
of the people. In the coming period these actions will have to conâ\200\224
tinue, both asblows against the enemy end es armed propaganda
t0 activiee the meeeeee and increase their confidence in People's War
es 8 decieive form of struggle in our efforts to dislodge the
fascists
From power.
EMThe open re volts that have erupted in various perte Of the country
have ereeted the basis end the necee eity fer the further development
of our armed struggle into People' 8 War 1. e. e war which involves
all the messes Of the oppressed people and their democratic ellies

'who have decided to break with the forces of oppression in favour
of the netienel demeeretie revolution.
EMPeople'e War cannot be confined to certain ereeee. It must spread
to ell corners of our lend. Thus, the underground ectiviste'of our
movement must undertake a vigorous campaign to recruit those
petriote who have been displaying their heroism and dedie etion in
the popular struggle. Needless to say, we will have to go about this
with the utmost ceutteh in erder to outwit the enemy which may
have ite spies planted in our midst ...
EMUrgenieieg for People's War heede careful plenning fer the teeke
that will have to be carried out at the different stages of its
develop-
ment. In our present phase, we cannot speek about the arming of
the people in eveyr piece. There still looms ahead the gigantyic task
of political mobilieetion which is essential For the eventual
widespread
distribution of arms by the People's Army, Umkhonto we Sizwe.
This will else depend on the military victories increasingly scored
by the People' 8 Army which will be continually swelling its ranks
from the mee eee Of the people.
EMAll the major urban centres have been affected by the recent peo-
ple's struggles. In such a situation the teek lies with the ANC
underground to recruit and train cadres in the use of email arms,
expleeivee end grenades to ambush police patrols end attack police
stations and other government ettucturee. In certeih areas there have
been euch-ettecke carried out by organised local groups which have
withdrawn into the community after each opeletion, leaving the racist
p011 e floundering in the dark cane threetenlgh the neighbouring

etetes

when they know that the guerrilla e are locelly based.

EMwot only are such ectione en eeehtlel element lh our continuing and growing offensive, but they also demonstrate the simple actions which can even be conducted by home-made weapons, ere effec- tive against the enemy. Such ectione also make the police afraid of ettecking the people in their mess politieel etrugglee, es wee demonstrated in Soweto eho Eldore do Perk when the terrorist police ran into embuehes. In Leheeeie the poi ice were forced to keep to their stations during the Indieh 'elee tion' when snipers took shots at peesihg

police cars and the police stetion.

EHWe are conducting a war against en enemy that is well armed and which hes a developed economy to eupport its military machine. On the other hz2nd the people ere unarmed, except for the Few weepone in our hands. We have to Function on the baeie that there is very little prospect of receiving erms from other sources. This requires that the activists and people must be resourceful and daring in their seerch for arms. For exemple, the acquisition of e revolver by one individual should begin the process of training others in its use. in the pitched battles that are eonetenti y being tougwt with the enemy, the disarming of one or eeeverel of them should be a deliberate eim

EMUur leeouroefulheee should not end here. We should also attack the enemy's economy EM- the backbone of its military strength. By burning Fields, forests, factories and many other economic resources we will weaken its capacity to concehtrete its funds on military exâ\200\224- penditure, while at the same time stretching its Forces ...

EMIn People's Wer we pureue a definite political objective set by the liberation movement. This was clearly evident in the actions of several organised armed groups that petrol-bombed many enemy structures and personnel last year. To continue to give political guidance to the organised groups in the country, the underground has to engage in e publicity campaign to spur other units into ec- tion, end direct end co-ordinate the eotione of the groups that ere already in existence. The final aim eould be an increase in the organised Strength of our People's Army, Umkhento we Sizwe EM- end-direot recruitment of ell those petriote who want to fight for their country.

EMWith the racist government' 3 dependence on the success of ite bah- tusten system, we eould etrive to tlein and recruit the meese e of these areas in the same manner as we do in the urban aree . not enough for ue to recogniee that the people do not went the beeâ\200\224 tueten system, we have to turn them against the administrations and their puppet armies. Our task will be to destroy theee organs of government of the apartheid regime and acquire arms from the puppet ermiee ... We have to orgahiee the people for ermed confrontation and sabotage in these ereee, with the aim of causing the collapse of one or more bentuete h. It is oleet that the enemy will act brutally

to save its sytem, but as the meesee of the people in the other areas ere spurred to action, the enemy will not be able to crush our ac- tions. In the end, the bentuete h will cease to perform their intendâ\200\224 ed Functions, but will ineteed be turned into the revolutionary beeee of the People's Army.

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EMAt this stage the development of People's War will depend to a large extent on the skills of the cadres of Umkhonto we Sizwe. AS MK creates combat groups of the people, these grOUps will be transformed into larger eontingents, able to train and create other combat groups.

EMThe enemy Fights with arms in hand. Let us also Fight arms in hand! There is home of us, the oppressed eeople, who does not have a role to play in People's War. We can play our roles in keeping military supplies, in transporting end sheltering the guerrillas, in misleading the enemy EM- in short, in just about every field of armed struggle!

MASTER THE TECHNIQUES OF PEUPLE'S WAR
(Weyibuye No.9 of 1985)

South Africa is ruled by the gun ... Our answer to the regime's op~pression and violence is People's War. We have to use arms to defend ourselves, to challenge the illegal regime and remove it from power. Armed struggle EM- in which all patriots must participate EWâ\200\224 reinforces our mass actions and guarantees the victory of cor just struggle. Our aim is the seizure of power and the creation of a free and democratic South Afrios in which the people shall govern.

Combat Groups

PLENThe formation of combat groups in various erees\of the country is a greet step forward in the development of our struggle. These units are an important layer of the People's Army. They are the in-â\200\230struments to h@lî-\202SS the enemy and to make it difficult for the army

end police to operate in our midst. We must form such units in all areas of the country. In time, they must spread to the Factories and other places of work including the white suburbs.

PLENCombat groups must operate in a manner that will ensure their long-term survival by using, in the first place, clandestine methods. We must act in smell groups; know only the few comrades we have 'to work with; use secret pieces to hide our equipment and secret means of communication. We must structure our groups to suit our manner of operation: to have, for example, a long command with comrades in charge of planning, reonnaissehoe of targets end obser- vation of enemy activity, propaganda, getting equipment and funds, safe storage fecilites, etc.Â»

PLENThe experience of many combat groups has shown that we can get weapons From various sources. We can capture them From the soldiers and police, from hiding places of farmers and other employers. We should also establish links with individuals work- ing in the armaments factories, enemy camps and police stations EM- even soldiers end police who are prepared to assist. We sen also buy them. If in contact, We shall also get them from MK units operating among us.

PLENThis work is dangerous, it is challenging. We must exercise cau- tion ell the time. Uperete only with tried and tested patriots. Seek the help only of committed Fighters. We must exercise patience and cool-headedness in our operetions end in recruitment. We must be thorough in reconneisenoe; choose the right moment to attack; disap- pear instantly From the seene of action. Beware: eating without proper

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planning only leads to blunders; it makes it easy for the enemy to track us down and to infiltrate our ranks.

Remember! Combat groups are first and foremost political units. They are armed contingents of the people pursuing the cause of freedom and justice for all South Africans. Our choice of targets, timing of operations, style of work and everything we do should be guided by the politics of liberation. We must here and there weaken the enemy, disrupt his life line EM- both economic and political.

PEOPLE'S WAR AND THE WHITE AREAS

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... A large section of the white population still believes that the SADF

and the South African Police can 'keep peace in the country and suppress the people's struggles'. The havoc that these wreak in the black townships represents, to many whites, strength rather than weakness. That is what Bethe wants them to see on SATV.

They remain ignorant of the growing strength of the people which has penetrated certain areas in the black townships 'no go areas' for small contingents of the SADF or the SAP. The past experiences of Umkhonto we Sizwe have inspired thousands of our people to take up any weapon, including guns and bombs, to attack the SADF and the SAP in their petrol stations in the black townships. The false sense of trust in the SADF and SAP by most whites must be shattered once and for all. We must move deeper into the white areas EM- and shatter the myth of peace that prevails there. The only way to do

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This is through highly visible action as in the black areas. EM... Looking at the military targets we can hit in the areas, we realise

just how wide is the range. For instance, many levels of the racist state are militarised. We need only to look at the communications system, terms where all the white farmers belong to the Skietkommando, the energy industry like Eskom, etc, to see the range of targets

that are situated in areas where our actions would make the racist whites realise that the war is all over the country, and not confined to the black areas.

While black mothers and their children of even less than ten years of age already know the sounds of explosions and gunfire aimed at them, there is no corresponding knowledge on the part of whites. We have hit many targets in white areas, but it does not seem that the sound of explosions and gunfire have been loud enough. There have been power blackouts in black and industrial areas, but not many white racists have seen their homes paralysed by the sound of a sudden explosion followed by sudden darkness and fear.

We, the people, are our own liberators and it is only through our own efforts that our struggle will develop. The racist whites are not going to suddenly realise that they are oppressing us unless we force them to see that we are prepared to fight their oppressive system. They are not going to realise that the might of the SADF and SAP cannot withstand ours unless we hit them in a visible way which will shake their confidence.

SkillsFully, we must try to win over these forces among the whites who are losing confidence in the Bethe regime. Obviously, these

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will not make up any significant number but the division arising on how to continue ruling us will become bigger. The question we have been asking South African whites must begin to penetrate every white ear and render an answer: why serve in the SADF and SAP? They are occupying military trenches. Blindly they hope our struggle will not reach their 'safe' white areas. It is our task, the oppressed and democratic whites, to take it there where they think they are safest! In People's War we are constantly developing our fighting techniques. We develop from where we are hitting the enemy in its weakest spot and move on to the 'secure' areas where each of our blows will inflict the most damage. Developing our popular offensive will increase our strength until our army will fully face the fascist SADF until Umkhonto's growth will enable us to take on the SADF anywhere on terrain chosen by us. Taking the war into the white areas is the beginning of our selecting the terrain!