

28 November 1986

CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS

h

I

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 The Governor .....	PAGE A.1
2 The Bill of Rights .....	B.1
3 Tiers of Government ' .....	: ..... C.1
4 The Provincial Legislature ..	..... D.1
5 Electoral System .....	' 12.1
6 Standing Committees .....	F.1
7 The Provincial Executive .....	6.1
8 Local Government .....	HA
9 Local Authorities .....	1.1
10 Traditional Authorities .....	J.1
11 Cultural Councils . .....	.. K.1
12 Economic Advisory Council .....	.. L.1
13 Approval. Review and Ammdment of ConstitutitSn ..	M 1

A.1

THE GOVERBOR

There shall be a titular Governor of the Province appointed by-the State President on the advice of hthe Provincial Legislature.

The Governor shall be responsible for assenting to and promulgating of legislation passed by the Legislature.

The Governor shall convene,; prorogue and dissolve the Legislature when so requested by the Prime Minister.

The Governor- shall not sign legislation which falls outside the area of gompotence of the Legislature.

8.1

THE BILL OF RIGHTS

2. The Bill of Rights shall be fully enforceable against the Governor, the Prime Minister , and Executive and the Legislature.

3. No amendment of the Bill of Rights shall such amendment is effected by means of an Constitution strictly in accordance with .the prescribed therein. ' '

be valid unless

EXPLANATORY NOTES

a. The Bill of Rights will only apply to legislation and executive action flowing from powers given to the Province. out and invalidated after the Constitution, Rights.

2x.

8-2

Bunan dignity and equality before the law

1. (1) All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.

(2) Everyone is equal before the law, and shall be entitled to equal protection of the law, without any distinction on the basis of race, colour, language, sex, religion, ethnic or social origin, property, birth, political or other opinion, or economic or other status.

Right to Life

2. (1) Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law, and no one may be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime -for which this penalty is provided by law.

(2) Deprivation of life shall not constitute a contravention of this article when it results from the use of such force as is absolutely necessary and justified in the circumstances-

(i) in defence of any person against unlawful violence;

(ii) to effect a lawful arrest in order to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained for a serious offence;

(iii) in action lawfully taken for the purposes of quelling a riot or insurrection.

Punishment

3. No one shall be subject to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. i

Right of liberty

4. (1) No one shall be held in slavery or servitude.

(2) No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour: Provided that this does not include-

(a) any normal work required to be done in the ordinary course of detention under the provisions of subsection (3) or during conditional release from such detention;

(b) any service of a military character in terms of a law requiring citizens to undergo military training, - -

(c) any service exacted in case of emergency or calamity threatening the existence or well-being of the Province;

(3)  
(4)  
(5)  
(6)  
8.3

(d) any work or service which forms part of normal civic obligations imposed by law.  
Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person and no one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law which does not deny his basic rights to physical and mental health and integrity-

(a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court;

(b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the lawful order of a court;

(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before a competent legal authority on reasonable grounds of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;

(d) the lawful detention of a person for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of a person of unsound mind, -an alcoholic or a drug addict; . '

(e) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the Province or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. '

Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him.

Everyone arrested or detained 'in accordance with the provisions of subsection (3)(c) shall be brought before trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial, which may be conditioned by guarantees to appear before trial.

In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial court established by law; judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interest of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the

(7)  
(8)  
(9)  
(10)  
(11)  
(12)

B.h

opinion of the court in special circumstances where the publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.

Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right- .

(a) to be informed promptly, in a language of his choice which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him:

(b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defense; -

(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it at no cost to himself when the interests of justice so require;

(d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; i '

(e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in the court, or if he so requests.

Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be informed promptly in a language of his choice which he understands'and in detail, the reasons for his arrest and detention, and shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention is decided speedily by a court, and to be released if the detention is not lawful: Provided that if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, he will be given it at no cost to himself. Everyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have no enforceable right to compensation.

No one who is tried for a criminal offence shall be compelled to give evidence at the trial.

No one who shows that he has been tried by a competent court for -a criminal offence and either convicted or acquitted shall again be tried for that offence or for any other criminal offence of which he could have been convicted at the trial :for the offence, save upon the order of: a superior court in the course of appeal or reviews proceedings relating to the conviction or acquittal.

8.5

(13) No one shall be found guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence at the time when it was committed.

5. (1). All administrative tribunals, public authorities and officials shall follow rules of fundamental fairness in coming to their decisions and they shall, unless inappropriate, be required to furnish reasons for such decisions.

(2) Delegated legislation shall be drafted with a reasonable allowance for public comment and participation.

(3) Everyone who has suffered damage as a result of unlawful action by public authorities shall have an enforceable right to compensation.

Right of privacy and protection of the family

6. (1) No one shall be subject to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or communications, nor to attacks upon his honour or reputation.

(2) The widest possible protection and assistance shall be accorded to the family, which is the natural and fundamental group in society, and the care and upbringing of children are recognised as a natural right of, and a duty primarily incumbent on, the parents. - '

Right of property

(1) Everyone has the right to lawfully own and occupy property anywhere in the Province.

(2) No one is to be deprived of his property without due process of law, and expropriation may only be authorised in terms of a law if it is for the public benefit and if equitable and fair compensation is promptly paid.

(3) Land and natural resources may not be expropriated Ethnic, religions, linguistic, cultural and educational rights

(1) A person belonging to an ethnic, religious or linguistic group shall not be denied the right to enjoy his own culture, to profess and practise his own religion or to use his own language.

(2)

(3)

(4)

8.6

Everyone shall have the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the province, to enjoy the arts, to share in scientific advancement and its benefits, and to the free and full development of his personality. - v

In all proceedings involving customary law followed by persons in the Province, such law may be applied accept insofar as the court finds that it has fallen into disuse or is contrary to the principles of natural justice and morality.

Every person shall have the same right to public education in an institution that will cater for his interests, aptitudes and abilities and the Province 7 shall make provision for this . right without discrimination: Provided: that, notwithstanding the provisions of section 1(2), it may, in providing facilities, distinguish between persons on grounds of language or sex.

Freedom of movement

9. Everyone lawfully present in the Province, shall be entitled to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of the Province.

Freedom of thought, conscience and religion

10. (1)

:(2)

I

Everyone shall be entitled to freedom of thought, conscience and religion and 'to change his religion or belief, to manifest his religion or belief in vprship, teaching, practice and observance, whether alone or in community with others, in public or in private. i

No one shall be compelled against his religious convictions to render military service involving the use of arms but shall be required to perform national service as required by law in lieu thereof.

Freedom of opinion and expression

11. (1)

(2)

Everyone shall be entitled to freedom of opinion and expression, which includes the freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive. and impart information and ideas.

Any advocacy bf national, racial or religious hatred or ' ,aggression between groups that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility, violence or political animosity is prohibited.



Freedom of association

12. (1) Everyone shall be entitled to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests, and no one may be compelled to belong to an association. '

(2) Everyone shall be free to form or to join political parties in order to participate in periodic and free elections, which shall be held by secret ballot or by equivalent free voting procedures.

Freedom of work and freedom of contract

13. (1) Everyone shall be entitled to equal work opportunities and to free choice of employment.

(2) Everyone with legal capacity' shall have' freedom to contract and to conclude agreements with others in the voluntary exercise of his rights and freedoms and generally for the promotion of his interests.

0

Restriction of rights and freedoms

14. (1) The rights and freedoms recognised, under the provisions of this Bill of Rights may be restricted by a law of the. Provincial legislature which has general application, for reasons which are necessary in a free and democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health and morals, for the protection of the- rights, freedoms and reputation of others, for maintaining the authority and Vimpartiality of- the judiciary and for the social, moral and economic well-being of all the inhabitants of the Province. '

(2) Everyone's exercise of his rights and freedoms shall be subject to such limitations as are legally determined for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedbms of others; and groups which by reason of their aims and the behaviour of their adherents, seek to impare or abolish the free democratic order or to endanger the security of the Province,'are prohibited.

(3) A fundamental\_ right and freedom protected in this Bill of Rights, pgy\_not be abolished or in 'its essence be encroached upon by a law of the Province.

anorcenent of rights and freedo-s

15. (1) The rights and freedoms protected in this 3111 of Rights are binding on the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all government institutions in the

I

(2)

3.8

Province insofar as they fall within the purview of and flow from the powers and functions devolved on the Province and any person may forthwith apply to the Supreme Court or to other competent authorities provided for in the Constitution by appropriate proceedings or by petition to enforce these rights and freedoms.

The Supreme Court shall have the power to make all such orders as may be necessary and appropriate to secure to the applicant the enjoyment of any of the rights conferred by the provisions of this Bill of Rights:

Provided that if at the commencement of this Constitution there are laws in existence in the Province which fall within the purview of the powers and functions bestowed on the Province and which are inconsistent with this Bill of Rights, such laws may, after the lapse of' one year after the commencement of this Constitution and on application to the Supreme Court be declared void to the extent of such inconsistency. i

I

I

C.1

TIERS OF GOVERNMENT

Three tiers of government are identified -

a Central

b Provincial

c Local, consisting of :

i) local authorities

ii) tribal or traditional authorities

iii) regional 'arrangements'

The Indaba is concerned with

government, and the powers

respectively should be defined

constitution.

only provincial

of these

and local

institutions

and entrenched in the

Their powers should be devolved to the maximum extent

practical. -

## 0.2

Before a bill is proceeded with, it must be discussed and dealt with by a standing committee of the two chambers. After a bill has been approved by the standing committee, it is sent to the first chamber for adoption. If the bill is passed by the first chamber, it is sent to the second chamber.

To become law, all legislation, including money bills, must be passed by both the first and the second chamber, subject to the following provisos:

a(i) In the case of legislation which affects the religious, language, cultural or other rights of the members of a Background Group or the South African Group, such legislation will require in addition to majorities in both chambers, a majority of the representatives of that group in the second chamber.

(ii) The second chamber will determine by a simple majority whether or not a Bill falls into the category requiring such a special majority as set out in (i) above.

(iii) Should a majority of members of the affected group be dissatisfied with a negative decision by the Second Chamber in terms of a(ii) above, they shall have the right to cast a suspensive veto on the Bill concerned until such time as the Supreme Court has ruled on the issue; . ' . '

(iv) In determining whether a Bill requires a special majority as set out in a(i) above, the Second Chamber and the Court, when asked to rule on the matter, shall determine whether the Bill can reasonably be expected to affect the rights of the group concerned: Provided that the passing of such a special majority vote shall not adversely affect the rights of any other group.

b. In the event of a money bill not being passed by either chamber, or if it is delayed in a standing committee for want of the required majority, the bill will be referred to a special committee consisting of an equal number of members of each chamber, proportionally elected by each chamber from its members, and presided over by the Prime Minister or his nominee; the special committee's recommendations will be submitted to both chambers in the form of a bill, which shall be passed by both chambers in that form. '

III

1.

III

0.1

#### THE PROVIFCIAL LEGISLATURE

##### GENERAL.

Size: There shall be a two chamber legislature consistin of a first chamber of 100 members and a second chamber of 53 members.

Elected: All members of the legislature shall be elected.

Qualifications: Voting will be by universal adult suffrage for all South African citizens resident in the Province in accordance with the Provincial Electoral Act, the qualifying age being 18 years old. .

Proportional representation: A system' of proportional representation will be adopted for elections.

Legislative powers/matters: The legislature will exercise legislative powers in respect of all the matters referred to under V below.

me rms'r mm

The first chamber will consist of 100 members elected using a system of multi-member, constituency based proportional representation.

##### IRE SECOED CHAMBER

##### Composition-

The second chamber will consist of 50 members composed of 'representatives of the following groups:

- the African background group (10 members)
- the Afrikaans background group (10 members)
- the Asian background group (10 members)
- the English background group (10 members)
- the South African group (10 members)

##### Voters

Save in the cage bf the 'South African group, a voter in a second chamber election must belong to the group whose candidate he intends voting for.

##### PROCEDURES

In the nornal course of events legislation will be initiated by the Executive.

...t,...\_.... ,.- N? ztmw v v ,7:- vm .-: w' -;;.a; .a' 1-; :- ' :  
D03

5. If any bill fails to obtain a majority in the second chamber, it is referred back to- the first chamber via the standing committee, unless the first chamber indicates that it is prepared to accept any amendments proposed by the second chamber.

7. Private members' bills may be introduced in either chamber.

8. By agreement of the chairmen ('speakers') of the two chambers, the chambers may sit together in joint session.

V MATTERS FALLING WITHIN THE POWERS OF THE LEGISLATURE':

1. Public Service Commission

- personnel administration system, development and maintenance

- creation, abolition, division and amalgamation of departments

- woristudy .

- training and bursaries

2. Law advice services

i.3. Language services ' V .

4. Printing services

5. Special services

- civil defence

- security services

- strategic planning

'KIPLAHAIORY IOTE The following list was made up from the various documents submitted by the committee of Specialists and the subsequent discussions in the Indabn.

D.4

strategic information  
protection of life, persons and property (tribal  
police force)  
prohibiting or counteracting of the furtherance of  
the objectives of undesirable  
persons  
office of the Auditor  
Computer bureau services  
Centralised auxiliary services  
personnel  
finance  
provisioning administration  
I  
central supplies services  
office accommodation  
stationery  
office equipment .  
typing services  
messenger services  
official transport  
microfilming  
registry services, etc  
organisations  
and

10.  
11.  
12.  
13.  
14.  
15.  
16.  
17.  
18.  
19.  
20.  
21.  
22.  
0.5

- Tender Board
- Provincial Gazette
- Establishment of public holidays

Planning, construction and maintenance of roads, bridges and other road-structures and outspans, ponts and toll roads

Road carrier transportation matters

Planning construction and maintenance and administration of official properties and accomodation

Planning, establishment, financing, co-ordinating and execution of industrial trading, finance and other business undertakings and projects, . including development corporations and zer06based regional areas

but excluding mining, \_ professions and trading in arms, ammunition and explosives ' 1 1

Q .

Control and licensing of business undertakings including:

- places of auction
- places of amusement and entertainment
- horse-racing and betting

9 totalisators

- casinos

jAspects of labour

Manpower training.

Tourism

Control and licensing in respect of intoxgcating liquor

Road traffic regulation and control

Vehicle and driver licensing administration and control

Road carrier transport inspections

Registration and cogkfol of domestic animals and pounds

Legal aid



23.  
24.  
25.  
26.  
27.  
28.  
29.  
\_30.  
31.  
32.  
33.  
34.  
35.  
36.  
37.  
38.  
D.6

Regulation and\_ control of the establishment and functioning of all local and regional government and'tribal authorities, including development and serviees boards, water supply boards, etcetera, and, where applicable, the division, amalgamation and constitution of tribes and the appointment of\_chiefs

Regulation and control of matters relating to cemeteries and crematoria, the removal of corpses and the exhumation of corpses

Establishment, administration and control of housing schemes

All physical and land use planning

Establishment and administration of nature reserves and facilities and amenities in such areas (including herbaria, botanic gardens, zoological gardens, aquariums, oceanariums, snake parks, recreational resorts, camps, accommodation, etc.)

Administratioh-and control of forestry areas and marine affairs .

Regulate and control of anti-shark measures

Regulate and control pollution (air, land, water and noise, but excluding oil pollution on sea)

Regulate ana control noxious weeds and vermin

Render agricultural economic advisory services

3Provide agricultural .preduce eontrol, including licensing and control of markets and abattoirs

Provide veterinary services

Research, administer and control nature and environmental conservation measures, including agricultural soil conservation

Financial assistance to farmers

Collection of and control over revenue (including personal .taxation, licenses, fees for services rendered by departments, tribal authorities or regional authorities, commissions, auctio&; and other dues, donations, bequests, etc.) 3

Raising of loane in consultation with the Treasury

39.  
40.  
41.  
44.  
45.  
46  
\_47.  
48.  
49.  
50.  
D.7

Rendering of a financial and economic advice service to the Executive

Co-ordinating of an economic, social and financial planning strategy

Development, management and maintenance of a budgeting, budgetary control and financial accounting system

Providing pre-primary, primary, secondary and tertiary education.

Establishment, development, maintenance and control of museums and art galleries (or the rendering of financial assistance, professional advice and supervision in regard to museums and art galleries run by local authorities)

Rendering of school and public library services

Development, administration and control of educational, cultural, recreational, amateur sport and fitness programmes for schools and adults

t

Render health services, including the establishment, management and control of hospitals, clinics and other health and supporting institutions

Provide social welfare services, including child welfare, social benefit schemes and school medical services

I

Police matters

Land survey and mapping (excluding deeds registry)

Aspects related to justice

Natal regional force

Radio and television licensing in the Province

Sunrise observance

Gambling

0.8

v1 mums to 235103 um: :33 CENTRAL W'

Hatters not mentioned under, V above \_vill vest in the Central Government, e.g.:

1. Foreign affairs
2. South African Defence Force
3. National Intelligence Service
4. South African Police and Railway Police
5. Prisons
6. Posts and Telecommunications
7. Home Affairs (population registration, voters' rolls, immigration, passports, etc.)
8. Mineral and energy affairs
9. S A T S (Railways and Harbours)
10. Transport (Civil Aviation, Civil Navigation, National Transport Commission etc.)
- \_\_11. Weather Bureau
12. Central Statistics Bureau 1'
13. Registrar of Companies
14. Registrar of Financial Institutions
15. Commissioner ef Inland Revenue
16. Customs and Excise
17. Archives
18. National Monuments and Art Galleries
19. State Libraries
20. Labour union and arbitration matters
21. Macro-water affairs

'IOIB A police force and a regional force were suggested for - natal; the justice function must still be finalised; Kwa?ulu has indicated that part of the population regletration function could also be done rin the Provxnce, possibly on an agency basis.

22.  
23.  
24.  
25.  
26.  
VII  
0.9

Oil pollution on sea

State Debt Commissioners

Deeds Registration v a

Trading/licensing in respect of mines, professions and arms  
and ammunition

Auditor-General

SCOPE OF LEGISLATIVE POWERSi

The legislature will have full powers to make legislation  
for the Province in respect of the matters listed under V  
above.

All laws applying in the Province at the date of the  
commencement of the constitution, will continue to be in  
force until repealed or amended by the competent authority,  
which may be either the provincial legislature or the South  
African parliament, depending on the nature of the matter.  
In respect of the matters entrusted to its legislative  
competency, the provincial legislature may repeal or amend  
any act of the South African parliament applying to the  
province at the commencement of the constitution.

I No act of the South African parliament that deals with a  
matter entrusted to the legislative competency of the  
provincial legislature, v and made after the commencement of  
the constitution, will apply to Natal.

.At the commencement of the new constitution, three sets of  
laws will apply to various parts of the Province:

parliamentary- legislation t(present Natal and KwaZulu),

.legislation of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly (present  
KwaZulu and possibly citizens of KwaZulu, the latter in  
respect of certain matters, whether such citizens find  
themselves inside or outside of KwaZulu), and ordinances of  
the now defunct Natal Provincial Council (mostly in present  
Natal, some older ones possibly in KwaZulu as well). The  
constitution will have to contain a provision governing  
possible conflicts in such legislation.

.3013

The scope of the powers outlined here corresponds to  
that presently enjoyed by the KwaZulu Legislative  
Assembly, and is wider than that enjoyed by the  
erstwhile Natal Provincial Council.

8.1

1-33 mm sysm

#### I THE FIRST CHAMBER

1. The electoral system will combine the advantages of a regional constituency-based system with proportional representation.

2. The salient features of the proposed system are:

a. The Province will be divided into 15 constituencies - based on the 13 -RDAC areas, with the greater Durban area (region 412) further subdivided into North Durban, West Durban and South Durban.

be determined by an Electoral Commission which by using populati&h census and other relevant data shall allocate a number of seats to each constituency. The allocation shall be done on the basis of the estimated adult polulation of the constituency as a proportion of the adult population of the Province as a whole. Sixty six seats shall be apportioned to constituencies in this manner-' '

c. No voters' rolls need \_be prepared, and a voter in the Province on election day may castv his vote in any constituenCy. Since everyt vote counts equally, there is no incentive to vote in the 'wrong' constituency. Indeed, there will be a territorial incentive to vote on 'home groundf. l

d. Participating parties and/or groups and/or individuals must register as such before nomination day. On nomination day, participating parties and/or groups and/or individuals must submit a list of candidates for each constituency it wishes to contest (Constituency List) and a list of candidates for the Province as a whole (Provincial List). The name of a candidate may appear on .a Constituency List and the Provincial List simultaneously, but not on e list for 'the second chamber (as to which see on page 3.3 (item II.3) below). Each list shall indicate the candidates in declining order: of preference. If a candidate ls elected .on a Constituency List, his name 18 automatically deleted from the Provincial List

### 3.2

e. Voters cast one vote only for the party list of their choice in the constituency in which they are voting.

For simplicity the ballot' paper will reflect only the party's name and symbol. The lists of candidates for each party will be displayed at each polling station.

f. An electoral quota will be determined in each constituency after the voting has taken place. The quota will be calculated\_ by dividing the number of Votes cast in the constituency by the number of seats allocated to that constituency.

9. After the votes have been counted a seat (or seats) will be allocated to each participating party in the constituency that has attained the constituency electoral quota of multiple thereof.

h. Thereafter the numbers of votes cast for each participating party on a prdvincial basis is determined by adding together the votes cast 'for each party in every constituency. ' This number is divided by the provincial quota (total number 'of votes cast in the Province divided by 100 seats) to determine the number of seats a party should have won. -

i. Additional seats are now allocated to parties on the - basis of the number of seats they should have won less rthe number of seats they actually won in the constitutencies. Such seats are awarded to parties on the basis of their Provincial Lists.

Vj. The overall effect ofl the system of 'proportional representation described above is that a party.will end up with 1 seat for each 1% of the votes it obtained in the election. For example: if a party gets 5% of the votes, it will get 5 seats. .

EIPLAHAIORY NOTES

5.

Postal votes, or any other system of dealing with absent voters are not'provided for. This is done for the sake of simplicity, to avoid malpractices inherent in such a system and because it is assumed that the outcome of the elections will reasonably retlect the -views of those who are out of the Province on election day as well.

nu.-. ,...A.-,r ., .

II

8.3

Constituency example: '5 seats, 121631 voted, quota : 24325

Party A : 7699 votes - seats

Party B : 36210 votes 1 e 1 (biggest remainder)

Party C : 51101 votes 2

Party D : 26621 votes 1

121631 4 e 1 : 5

Provincial example

Votes . . Seats shOuld Actual Additional

have won seats seats

Party A 508 000 ' 20 13 7

Party B 261 000 10 5 5

Party C 790 000 32 18 14

Party D 94:- 000 ' 38 3o 8

2 500 000 100 56 34

THE SECOND CHAMBER

The electoral system will be similar to that used for the election of members of the first chamber, i.e. proportional representation. For the second chamber, however, the Province will be treated as a single constituency for each Participating parties and/or groups and/or individuals must register as such before nomination day. On nomination day, participating parties and/or groups and/or individuals must submit a list of candidates for the Province as a whole. Each list must ihdicate the candidates in declining order of preference.

No candidate m3y be nominated in more than one category (background/interest group). The name of a candidate may, however, appear simultaneously on the Provincial List for the first chamber (83 to which see page 3.1 (item I 2.d) above). If a' candidate is elected to the second chamber, his name is automatically deleted from the Provincial List. No voter may vote in more "than one category (background/interest group). .

a.  
e. Marked votes are not tcounted with th  
"f. If the voter pursues the  
The Electoral Law will contain  
identification of voters.  
the General Interest group  
into that category.  
' criteria for the  
No criteria will be laid down for  
, as any voter may decide to fall  
The Electoral Law will provide for the  
disputes arising out of a voter's  
given category (except the  
Electoral Commission and the  
important roll in this regard  
resolution of  
choice to fall into a  
General Interest Group). An  
electoral officers will play an  
a. A voter reports at the relevant table and states the  
category of his choice for the second chamber election.  
b. If the official manning the table is in doubt about the  
voter's choice, or if any interested person or party  
objects against lthe voter's choice, the voter is  
immediately brought before the electoral officer who  
makes a'ruling. .  
c. If the voter accepts the ruling of the electoral  
officer, he receives his ballot paper and votes  
regularly. - -  
d. If the voter or the objector does not acce  
pt the ruling  
votes in the  
sealed in a  
the voter may vote in  
of his own choice, in  
d like any other).  
e regular votes,  
but when the result. is announced, an announcement is  
also made as the the number of marked (challenged)  
votes. . '  
of the electoral officer, the voter still  
category of his choice, but his: vote is  
marked envelope. (Alternatively,  
the General Interest category out  
which case his vote will be ceunte  
objection within. the  
prescribed period to the Electoral Commission, ani the  
objection is upheld, the vote becomes regular and is  
counted.  
9. If 'regularised challenged votes'  
difference to the election  
may be declared elected.  
eventually make a  
result, another candidate



9.

, ., , -7...-..v.u.. ..- 7..um.... .i vnww. . r .

of the legislature, and will wherever possible include members of each political party represented therein. There will be one standing committee of 15 members for each executive portfolio.

Standing committees will be composed as follows:

a. Each group in the second chamber will elect one member to each standing committee.

b. Members of standing committees from the first chamber will be elected by means of the proportional representation, single transferable vote system (PR/STV), provided that smaller parties that do not have members on all standing committees shall be entitled to appoint a member or members from either chamber to attend and participate in standing committee meetings, but without the right to vote.

c. No party will be entitled to more than 60% of the members of any standing committee.

All draft legislation shall be submitted to the relevant standing committee after the first reading for comment and approval. '

Standing Committees shall be required to receive and report on representations, and hear evidence from any Cultural Council in regard to any draft legislation or government action which the council contends is likely to effect the rights or interests of the group which it represents or any member thereof.

Standing committees shall hear and consider proposals and evidence submitted by the Economic Advisory and other councils instituted by the legislature.

In addition, standing committees shall consider written representations and, as far as possible, oral evidence, tendered by, any group or individual with a special interest in draft legislation being, or about to be considered by a standing committee. -

Decisions of a standing committee shall be by more than a two-thirds majority, provided that draft legislation which has not been approved by a standing committee by such a majority may be referred back to it by the Executive after the lapse of two months. .

1.  
9-  
10.  
c,1

#### TEE PROVINCIAL EXECUTIVE

The Executive shall consist of a Prime Minister and 10 or more other ministers.

The members of the Executive may be elected or appointed, as the case may be, from the first and the second chamber.

The leader of the party which secured an overall majority in an election for the first chamber (i.e. more than 50% of the votes cast), will become Prime Minister, or, if no party or ' coalition of parties obtained an overall majority in the first chamber, the Prime Minister shall be elected by the first chamber.

a. Half of the ministers shall be appointed by the Prime Minister from his party if it secured an overall majority, and the other half shall be elected by an electoral college consisting of the elected members of all other parties represented in both chambers.

b. If the Prime Minister's party failed to secure an overall majority, all ministers shall be elected by the two chambers. '

c. The composition of the Executive as described in a. and b. above shall be done in such a way that there is a minimum of one member from each group represented in the second chamber. It shall not be a requirement that such a member be appointed/elected from or by the second chamber.

An election by the Legislature or by an electoral college as referred to in 3 or 4 above shall be conducted using the PR/STV system (proportional representation/single transferable vote).

In the event of the death, resignation or permanent incapacity of the Prime Minister, his successor shall be appointed or elected as described above.

The first chamber may by a two thirds majority force the resignation of the Prime Minister.

The Prime Minister may secure the resignation of a minister.

In the event of dismissal, death or resignation of a minister, (other than the Prime Minister), the party responsible for his election may nominate a successor. If the Party is no longer in existence, or does not want to appoint a successor, the Prime Minister must appoint a person who represents interests similar to those of the erstwhile party. -2. ' - .

In the event of a new Prime Minister not assuming office within 30 days of the date when the previous Prime Minister ceased to act, the Governor must dissolve the legislature and within 14 days call a general election.

Decision-making in the Executive takes place, as far as possible, on the basis of consensus.

8.1

1. Local government will be dealt with under three headings:

- a. Local authorities
- b. Traditional authorities
- c. Regional arrangements (where necessary)

1.1

LOCAL Amoiurrxs

The existing system of local authorities in  
until amended by the Legislature, continue  
current legislation, and will be  
presently KwaZulu.

Natal will,

in terms of

extended to what is

The powers and structures of local authorities will be

entrenched in the constitution on a

non-racial basis in

accordance with the Bill of Rights.

The principle of extended powers

for local authorities,

well-known to Natal

n the constitution.

The principle of maximum devolution of powers will be  
guaranteed by the constitution.

I

I

### 3.1

#### TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES

Traditional authorities (for example tribal authorities) will be treated as part of the system of local government. Traditional authorities in the urban and peri-urban areas of the region will be encouraged to evolve into part of the system of local authorities.

Cultural Councils be constitutionally recognised and entrenched.

These-committees will deal with the protectionk maintenance and promotion of the religious, language and cultural rights and interests of groups representing the principal segments of the population in the Province.

The Cultural Councils should have the following rights and powers:

- i. to receive copies of all draft legislation;
- ii. to be consulted and kept informed by all branches and levels of government of 'action taken or intended to be taken which may effect the rights and interests of the groups they represent;
- iii. to make representations to all branches and levels of government, and in particular Standing Committees, to lead evidence and be heard in respect of matters affecting such rights and interests; -
- iv. the locus standi to apply to the supreme court for h an order prcnouncing upOn the validity of any bill passed by the legislature but not yet assented to by the Governor, or any subordinate law or executive order having the force of law which the court may consider likely to infringe or affect any right or cultural interest of the group concerned or its members generally;
- v. prior to approaching the court as aforesaid, the council shall endeavour to resolve the matter by approaching the relevant standing committee or other provincial or local government authority.

K.2

6.1 Cultural councils will be established on the following basis:

- i.
- ii.
- iii.
- iv.
- vi.

A commission consisting of three persons, one of which shall be a supreme court judge, will be appointed by the Governor on the advice of the legislature to consider applications for the establishment of cultural councils, and to supervise and control the election or nomination of members of cultural councils, with the power to grant or refuse any application.

Provision will be made for a registrar and secretariat to assist the commission in the performance of its functions. '

The commission will prepare guidelines for the establishment of Cultural councils, including requirements to be met by organisations and bodies interested in being represented in cultural councils. Such guidelines will be published for general notice, and for comment, recommendations and representations. (This is a form of public participation in decision-making as envisaged inter alia by section 5(2) of the Bill of Rights). The commission shall from time to time announce by notice in the Provincial Gazette, in newspapers and in any other way it deems fit, that cultural councils may be established in terms of the Constitution. : -

Cultural councils may also be initiated by cultural bodies and organisations themselves. The procedure would be to lodge an application with the commission, whereupon the commission will be enjoined to set the procedure for the establishment of a council in motion.

On receipt of an application for the establishment of a cultural council in terms of the constitution, the registrar publishes a notice in the Provincial Gazette, in newspapers and in any other way he deems effective, giving full particulars of the application and inviting all parties interested in the formation of such a cultural council to make representations on or before a specific date.

vii.  
ix.  
xi;  
xii.  
xiii.  
xiv.  
3.3

As soon as possible' after the return date, the commission considers the application together with all the representations received, and decides-

- a. whether a cultural council will be established '
- b. what the name of the council will be '
- c. when the council will be officially constituted
- d. what bodies and organisations will be represented in the council

A cultural council will consist of 8 to 12 members. They will be elected every five years by all the cultural bodies and organisations represented by the cultural council.

The commission will draw up rules governing the election of members of a cultural council (single transferable vote/proportional representation). Once a cultural council has been established, the commission will entertain any application from a cultural body or organisation to be represented by that particular council. This should as far as possible be done in consultation with the other bodies represented by the council; the commission will not be bound by the wishes of any particular body or organisation in connection with the accrediting of new bodies and organisations. The commission shall ensure; as far as possible, that there is no undue proliferation of cultural councils, and that cultural councils do not represent patently overlapping interests of any cultural group. b

An organisation or body feeling itself aggrieved by the result of an application, may lodge a complaint to the commission, which shall be enjoined to consider and rule upon such complaint, or such organisation or body may petition the supreme court if it feels that its rights in terms of the constitution (including the Bill of Rights) have been infringed.

Provision will be made for the establishment of a 'council of chiefs' to represent the interests of the traditional authorities. The size of the Council will not be restricted to the 10 members envisaged to in ix. above. The rights, duties and

---

functions of the council of chiefs will be the same as those of cultural councils;



LOI

ECONOMIC ADVISORY EOUNCIL

An Economic Advisory Council will be established, cemprising a chairman, vise-chairman and an equal number of representatives from each of the following categories: '

- a. Agriculture
- b. Commerce
- c. Industry, and
- d. Labour.

The Council will be entitled to:

.receive copies of. all draft legislation prior to

- a. publicatlon or consideration by standing committees;
- b. make proposals and representations to standing committees and to lead evidence and to be heard in respect of matters affecting the rights of agriculture, commerce, industry and labour;
- c. advise the eProvincial Government on all matters concerning economic policy.

The chairmeh and vice-chairman of -the- Council shall be appointed by the ?rovincial Government.

The Provincial Government shall provide the secretariat of the Council.

## H.1

### APPROVAL, AHEHDHERT LED REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION

#### I GENERAL

The Indaba constitutional proposals will be submitted to the people of Natal for approval by way of popular vote.

#### II AHEEDMEHT OF THE CORSTITUTIOH

1. A two-thirds majority will be required in both chambers of the legislature to pass a bill aimed at amending the constitution. 2'

2. A bill that affects the language, religious and/or specific cultural rights of a group as enshrined in the constitution, Vin addition needs the support of the majority of that group in the second chamber.

#### I

3; If the required majorities cannot be obtained in the second chamber, the government may submit the amendments to the electorate to be decided upon by referendum. In order to have the proposed amendment(s) accepted, a majority vote of 4 of the 5 groups represented in the second chamber will have to be recorded in favour of the amendment: provided that if such amendment affects the Specific language, religious and/or cultural rights .of a group, a majority of voters in that group must support the amendment in the referendum.

#### III COHSTITUTIOHAL REVIEW

A constitutional review committee will be appointed by the legislature and charged with the task of reviewing the constitution and formulating recommendations to the legislature regarding revisions and improvements to the constitution.

4 DECEMBER 1986

FINAL REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC COMMITTEE OF THE KWAZULU/NATAL  
INDABA'

28 NOVEMBER 1986

#\_ " - ' 'm\_K-x%

1. Review of the Work of the Economic Committee:

N

1.1. The Economic Committee of the Indaba, having identified the current functions of the administrations which supply services in the Natal/KwaZulu region, determined the amount of money that was Spent on such services for the 1983/84 and 1984/85 fiscal years. It was noted that over 84% of the current KwaZulu budget is spent on primary and secondary education, health and welfare services and the supply of housing, roads and other physical infrastructures. If all expenditure including Central Government expenditure in the region is considered, (see Table 1) the proportion spent on the services cited above is over 65%. Thus while the range of services that it is envisaged the new administration--would deliver... is considerable, the Committee concentrated on the cost of supplying these services, given the consequences of implementing the Bill of Rights proposed by the Indaba and the decision by the Indaba that any services distributed by the Regional Government would be equally available to all the people of the region.

1.2-. Three papers were produced for the Economic Committee which analysed :

(i) The 1983/84 expenditure by all first and second tier levels 'of Government. on the various population groups within the region as determined by the 1980 census (the latest available census which gave a break down according to age)' drawing attention to the current disparities that exist. (Indaba Econcom Document No. 9)..

(ii) The 1983/84 expenditure on education for each population group\_and the consequences of raising expenditure levels to those currently enjoyed by Whites. (Indaba Econcom Document No. 10).

Ill

(iii) The 1983/84 expenditure on old age pensions and the financial implications of equalising pension levels to those currently enjoyed by Whites (Indaba Econcom Document No. 10).

1.3. The reason for separately identifying education and designate

expenditure per racial group much more specifically than was the case in other categories of expenditure. When the committee had attempted to assess the extent to which each race group benefitted from Central Government- and Natal Provincial Administration Expenditure certain members of the Indaba stated that all expenditure, not specifically identifiable according to race, should be considered as general expenditure directed to benefit the community as a whole. The Whites and to a lesser extent Asians and Coloureds or, to require very considerable additional

1.4. This view was supported by a paper commissioned by

2. Implications of Fiscal Parity in KwaZulu /Natal:

2.1. The paper commissioned by the Durban Metropolitan

7 Chamber of Commerce attempts to analyse the economic consequences of implementing the decisions of the Indaba that services distributed to the people of the region by the Regional Government

will be equally available to all. It uses the term

'fiscal parity' to describe this concept and

defines it as follows:----- - - - - \_ \_ , \_

'(a) Government expenditure' on the quasi-private services, education and health is to be at the same level per

allowed to make private contributions towards improving the quality of the services. Furthermore, allowance for differences in costs of land and buildings in various areas has to be made.

(b) Whereas the level of physical infrastructural services in urban and rural areas can never be the same, the need for upgrading such services particularly in certain areas of KwaZulu is accepted. It is assumed that expenditure on physical infrastructure in KwaZulu/Natal remain at the same level per head of the total population as in the past but that priority will be given to the areas of greatest need.

(c) Salaries of Government workers including teachers and medical staff will be the same for all workers within a given category of qualifications and experience.

(6) Fiscal parity does not mean that the public or private workforce will be structured according to quotas in respect of race, sex, age, language group or similar characteristics. Furthermore, it does not mean equality of remuneration regardless of qualifications, experience or productivity.

The paper looks at three approaches to fiscal parity which are described as scenario 1, 2 and 3 respectively. Scenario 1 requires that the current level of education enjoyed by Whites should be achieved for all people by 1995. (Parity 1). This implies a growth rate of real expenditure on education of 17,3% per annum over the next 10 years. The second scenario would aim to achieve parity up by the year 2000 and this would imply a real increase in expenditure of 12,2% per annum over the next fifteen years. The third scenario would be to adjust expenditure on education down to current average levels within the region, namely R370 and 3860 per annum in the case of primary and secondary education respectively (Parity 2 - average regional). In order to maintain those schools currently costing more per pupil they would have to be additionally funded by a system of fees based on

2.3.

2.

2.

4.

S.

the principle of 'user 'pays'. Keeping real expenditure per capita on education constant and given the projected increase in population depicted in Table 2 and 3 the increase in real expenditure would be approximately 3,2% per annum. Table 4 illustrates current expenditure on -education per group. Tables 5, 6 and 7 illustrate scenarios 1,2, 3 respectively.

A similar analysis is made with respect' to expenditure on health.

No account is taken of the enormous backlog in housing. All other categories of expenditure other than expenditure on legislative and general executive functions are assumed to remain constant in real terms per capita. Expenditure on legislative and general executive functions are expected to fall by 25% as a result of doing away with wasteful duplication and bringing in a single regional authority.

The authors of the paper assume that there is a 'play-off' between overall levels of taxation and economic growth, that is the greater the levels of taxation the more difficult it becomes to generate significant economic growth. Conversely the lower the taxes the more attractive the area becomes for . new entrepreneurship and new capital investment and the better the chances of achieving a high level of economic growth. Several members of the economic committee felt that there are many other factors that can influence economic growth beneficially and that there . is ' no strong evidence directly correlating low economic growth with high levels of .taxation and Government expenditure. Indeed it was stated that Government expenditure has frequently been a stimulant for economic growth. The act of redirecting resources can make a society much more productive. However, it was accepted that within one South African economy markedly higher levels of taxation in the Natal/KwaZulu region would probably lead to a flightdddf"both"capital and skills away from the region. Therefore, while it 'may be possible to raise certain additional revenues for the Regional Government it would be very unlikely to raise sufficient to achieve 'parity up' (Scenario 1 and 2) in the fields mentioned without undermining the potential for economic growth.

2.5, Professor J.A. du Pisanie in his presentation to of the gross geographic product. (G.G.P.) Regional expenditure by Government currently stands at 26%

Scenario 1

---

(a) Low growth case  
'Parity up" in education and health by 1995  
G.G.P. growth - ' 2%  
Government expenditure as a percent of G.G.P. by 1995'will be - 49%  
Conclusion': unstable case - 2% growth is probably optimistic in these circumstances

(b) Very high growth case  
1 'Parity up' in education and health by 1995  
6.6.? growth - 1 9%  
Government expenditure as a percent of G.G.P. by 1995 will be - 25%  
Conclusion : highly improbably case - it merely illustrates the level of growth necessary to achieve 'parity up' by 1995 without increasing Government expenditure as a proportion of the G.G.P.

Scenario 2

---

Rapid growth case  
'Parity up' in educaton and health by 2000  
G.G.P. growth - 6%  
Tax claimed as a percent of G.G.P. . by year 2000 - a 24%  
Conclusion : Professor du Pisanie considers this stable and possible. The Committee considers it optimistic.

'Page 6

Scenario 3:

Private choice case

'Parity average, regional' in  
education and health by 1988-

G.G.P. growth - 6%

Government expenditure as

a percentage of G.G.P. by 2000 - 14%

Conclusion : The case is attractive. Everyone

wants tax reduced and the tax claim to fund

The Committee questions whether it is politically  
possible to have no increase in real expenditure on  
education given the high expectations of the vast  
majority of the people in the region. It also  
questions whether one can reasonably expect on  
going growth of 6% without directing additional  
resources for education. - .'

3. Fiscal Transfers between the Central Government and the  
New Regional Government:

3.1.

Whilst the Committee was impressed by the  
presentation of Professor du Pisanie it was noted  
that the analysis assumes that any additional money  
flowing into education and health, and presumably  
housing and infrastructure would come from within  
the region itself. The Committee felt that this  
was an unjustifiable assumption which placed  
considerable additional restraints on the region's  
economy. compared- with the position at present  
Currently there is no arrangement that requires  
that region. Indeed the geographic origin of taxes  
is not a consideration in the Governments,  
allocation of expenditure between regions. The  
principle of Government expenditure is that it  
should be directed according to need. For example  
a wealthy retired community might pay considerable  
taxes without getting or even expecting expenditure  
on schooling-facilities for their area. - . -  
currently exceeds income tax by approximately 22%  
(cf Table 6 and Table-EB Indaba Econcom Document  
No. 27). This is understandable as the area is  
disproportionately Black and disproportionately



3.3.

\_3.4.

3.5.

poor, (i.e. firstly, a larger percentage of the population are Black than the national average and secondly the region houses 23% to 25% of the population but produces 'approximately 15% of the gross national product). The -reasons for these substantial differences are principally due to the facts that:

(i) influx control has prevented people migrating to the areas of greater economic opportunity. and

(ii) much of the area is used as a dormitory to that benefit from the economic growth associated with their employment.

The Committee considers that it is most important that the Government of the R.S.A. , has committed itself to equalising expenditure on education, pensions (welfare) and health. care. This commitment implies that increasing proportions of the Central Government's income from taxes and other sources will be flowing into the region. Therefore assuming that the region's education needs are in proportion to its population (e/- 25% of the National Population) then the Government has committed itself to spending approximately e/- 25% of all monies spent on education nationally, in this region. Current expenditure on education is Rx. This principle implies the Government is committed to Spending 25% (namely Ry) in this region. This is Rz above that spent in the 1984/85 fiscal year. -' - s.' .

principle should apply to all transfers from the Central Government, the federal structure that is envisaged in the new constitution would be a farce because the Regional Government will be-constantly looking for additional resources from the 'Central Government and in the process would see its regional autonomy continuously undermined. namely 'parity average national'. For example this implies that the expenditure per pupil by the new regional department of education will be

h)

m

I

equivalent to the average national education expenditure per pupil. In paragraph 2.2 above the average regional expenditure per pupil for 1984/85 is R860. - " ' \_

' This new concept of parity gives a fourth scenario which would enable additional money to be spent on the services of education and health without the region facing an ever increasing tax claim as la proportion of the G.G.P. which could previous scenario would have gone to education and health care) to invest in new urban -land, infrastructure and housing.

'Parit avera e national' not only determines the level of expenditure on such services as education by the Regional Government but it also defines the fiscal transfers at-between the Central Government and the Regional Government.

4. Regional SourcEs of Finance:

4.1.

4\_.2.

4.3.

Expenditure on education and health care for Blacks would increase substantially with immediate effect. But there are large backlogs in the supply of other services and the political success of the new dispensation will depend on the extent to which the new Government will be seen to improve the urban infrastructure and the availability of housing. A strategy to achieve this will be necessary and that will be the responsibility of the new Regional Government. ' ' v

To meet these needs additional sources of finance from within the region would be required. The committee investigated the Provincial Taxes which applied prior to 1970/71. The analysis of these is contained in Annexure 1. The possibility of an increase in G.S.T. by 1% within the province was also considered. A combination .of.increases in . Companies Tax, individual tax, personal taxes and G.S.T. could generate an additional R150 to R200 million. a '

The Committee also investigated a apecial levy on fuel which would equalise the fuel price between Natal and thegtransvaal; It was conservatively

' v page 9

estimated that such a 'tax would generate an additional R120 million in 1985 taxes. (see Annexure 2). .

4.4. At the request of the Economic Committee the Indaba agreed to investigate the extent to which State object of using the money so raised to fund principle of using the funds raised by the sale of assets to fund current expenditure. However if the funds were reinvested in infrastructure,

4.5. Members of the Committee were also concerned that report on the extent of state assets and the possibility of disposing of them is still awaited.

5.1. The Committee was concerned about the equalisation of pensions. To reduce- White pensions to an average (parity average) would place many existing pensioners in an unacceptable position. To increase all pensions to the level currently region the position of pensioners is relatively satisfactory. Recent studies in parts of rural KwaZulu show the 65 plus age group to have some of

m  
the higher levels of income because of the high levels of unemployment in the younger age groups. In view of the above it is recommended that the equalisation of pensions be left to the Central Government (which has already committed itself to the principle of equalising pensions) and that the Regional Government should press for the equalisation of these pensions as soon as possible.

## 6. Growth:

### 6.1.

Unemployment in the urban areas and wider employment in the rural areas where the marginal product in each household is probably zero are the two most pressing social and political issues facing the region. It is not the function of the Indaba to prescribe detailed economic policy to any new regional Government; However the Committee would wish to draw attention to these problems and point out-that there can be no resolution of these problems without substantially enhanced economic growth.; The increased and better distributed expenditure on education, health care and housing can contribute to the spread of income and wealth. The manner in which it will be done will be important in addressing this problem. Policies directed at encouraging labour intensive industries, reducing the restraints on individuals and investing in the supply of basic needs can all lead to an improvement in the opportunities of the majority of the people of the region.

## 7. Recommendations!

### 7.1.

### 7.2.

The Committee notes that the regional economy would not be able to sustain expenditure on education and health at levels currently enjoyed by Whites. Accordingly . the Committee recommends that expenditure on these functions should be adjusted to the average level.

The Committee notes that the Central Government has committed itself to achieving parity as between race groups with respect to expenditure on education and health care. This implies- an on-going increase in the transfer of funds into the region and the Committee recommends that the Indaba negotiate fiscal transfers from the Central

\_ Page 11  
Government

1'

The same principle  
should apply with respect to health care using  
total population to establish the two factors  
7.3. Expenditure on housing should be funded from both  
Central Government transfers as well as provincial  
taxes. The Central Government transfers should be  
related to the national levels of expenditure on  
housing the proportion flowing to the region being  
equivalent to its proportion of the national  
population.

resources

Committee draws

arguments in paragraph 2.5 and  
points out that robust economic growth is essential  
if the minimum aspirations of those living in the  
region are to be met.

,n

3.  
1 I  
.1  
Q TABLE 1 - uovtnuntn7 EXPENDITURE IN  
..  
I!  
11'  
KuklULU NATAL ON SELECTED FUNCIIIONS. 1904/85  
R'OOO  
Ioul chhlauve Interior Physical Education Agrlcultllre 1lmm welfare 5 Police Economic Cul  
mni  
and general Infra- and forutry ' . affair;  
executive . structure  
functions  
I Central Government  
:5 General affairs 5 ' 1 553 209 594 67a 75 917 165 264 . 151 66s 53 064 52 604 172 952 .  
118 799 66.015  
, Own IHMrsl '  
1 - House of Asxewbly u 26! 067 , 2 594 ; 7 390 117 142 70 370 a 210 76 750 - .  
g - House of 021991193? 472 359 11 065 - 57 303 319 056 ' 551 4 904 so 335 . - -  
f: - 1:73;; of Represenu- 49 J71 7176 - J 901 5 29 561 254 1 419 13 NJ - -  
natal 7rovlnc1.1 Admlnl- 829 985 140 19s - 155 913 215 735 - 317 321 -  
. stratum - \_  
\$1 Figures for 1985/86. rigures  
non-rcpetltive payments,

. TABLE 2 - POPULATION OF KHAZULU NATAL, 1904-1980 AND 990055150 FOR 1985, 1990, 1995 AND 2000 -

---

1999	500	121	817	7	511	9	1
2000	519	131	901	8	555	10	217

TABLE 3 -  
NUMBER OF PUPILS IN KHZULU AND NATAL: PRIMARY  
COLOURED  
AND SECONDARY. 1900-1905 AND PROJECTED FOR 1990. 1995 AND 2000  
1 '00  
0  
YEAR Primary -Secondary Primary Secondary Primary Secondary  
1980 :68.6 41,2 20.9 ' 7.6 127.7 57.8 852.8 194.7 1 070.0 301.3  
1981 '69.1 42.4 20.9 17.8 120.1 60.1 905.0 202.7 1 123.9 313.0  
1982 69.7 13.9 - 21.1 7.4 128.5 62.2 951,9 226,4 1.174.2 339.9  
1981 69.1 45.9 20.7 . . 8.3 127.9 64.7 1 002.6 266.7 1 220.4 365.3  
1981- 67.3 47.7 20.5 9.0 127.4 67.9 1 046,8 261,9 1 252.0 0186.5  
1965 65.5 19.5 20.3 9.3 ' 125,8 70,6 1 090.7 260.5 1 302,3 397,91  
1990 63.5 48.4 19.8 11.0 - 124.9 03.0 1 302.6 363.0 1 510.9 505.4  
1995 \_ 60.4 48.3 I 19.1 12.8 123.2 95.8 . 1 510.6 449.9 1 721.3 1 606.8  
. 2000 57.3 47.1 18.4 14.5 121.4 100.6 1 734.5 536,8  
1 931.6 707.0  
'21



15.

TABLE 4 - EXPENDITURE on ORDINARY PRIMARY And SECONDARY EDUCATION BY POPULATION GROUP IN KHAZULU NATAL, 1985 - ' R'OOD

POPULATION TOTAL EXPENDITURE NUMBER OF PUPILS EXPENDITURE GROUP (R'DOO) ('000) PER PUPIL (R)

XN

Primary Secondary Primaty Secondaty Primary Secondary

--

Hhite 101 132 114 642 65,5 49,5 1 544 2 316

Coloured 17 513' 12 044 I 20,3 9,3. 863 1 295

Asian 172 723 145 436 125,8 70,6 1 373 2 060

:Black 190 873 70 616' 1 090,7 268.5 175 263

; . . '

7 TOTAL 482 247 342 738' 1 302,3 397,9 370 861

\_\_\_\_\_.\_\_\_\_\_3\_\_\_\_\_;

16.

TABLE 5 - EXPENDITURE ON ORDINARY PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION  
AT 1985-  
PRICES. 1985 AND PROJECTED FOR 1990 AND 1995 IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE  
PARITY BY 1995 ' , Rm

Year	Primary	Secondary	Total
1985	' 482 343 825		
1990	1 132 694	. 1 826	
1995	. 23558	' 1 405 4 053	

Based On the average expenditure per white primary and secondary  
pupil in Natal of R1 544 and R2 316 per year respectively in 1985  
and the growth in numbers as indicated in Table 6.

Total:  
' 1

A\_xrnu .- 0-,

17.

TABLE 6 - EXPENDITURE ON ORDINARY PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION AT 1985-PRICES. 1985 AND PROJECTED FOR 1990, 1995 AND 2000 IN ORDER TO

0..ACHIEVE PARITY BY 2000

Rm

\_Primary Secondary Total

Year

	Primary	Secondary	Total
1985	482 343	- 825	
1990	885 578	' . _ . 1 453	
1995	-f0525'	972 z 597	
2000	2 983	'1 637 4 520	

lote' Based on the average expenditure per white primary and secondary pupil in Natal of R1 544 and R2 315 per year respectively in 1985 and the growth in numbers as indicated in Table 6.

I

18.  
 TABLE 7 - EXPENDITURE ON ORDINARY PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION AT 1985-  
 PRICES, 1985 AND PROJECTED FOR 1990, 1995 AND 2000, HOLDING  
 AVERAGE REAL EXPENDITURE PER PUPIL CONSTANT

Rm

---\_1 .

Year Primary Secondary Total

EN

1985 482 343 ' ' 825 .9-

1990 . 559 5 0 \_ 435' 5 994

1995 - ' 1 '1'637 522 1 159

2000 715 609 1 324

RX

Note: Based on the average expenditure per primary and secondary pupil in  
 KwaZulu Natal of R370 and R851 per year respectively in 1985 and  
 the growth in numbers as indicated in Table 6.

eeeph x-  
ANNEibhsif  
19.

REPORT T5 THE ECONOMICS SUB comma: or THE xwzxzuw NATAL IKDAEF.

M

#### PROVINCIAL TAXES

##### HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The last references I have been able to find regarding Provincial Taxes is in 15? 0/1971. -

##### Companies

12ft of the normal tax payable by a company accrued for the benefit of the particular provincial revenue fund.

It is assume: that this was allocated accdring to there the he\_ \_ -office of the c::;any was situated.

##### Individuals

The prc"lnces levied two taxes on individuals

- Persznl Tex
- Provinzial Income Tax

##### Perscnal Taxes

This was payable only by petsons who were over 21 years of age eg. married rate - R2,40 plus 30 cents for every completed R20 taxable incom e over R500 ( maxim; R21 (.at 31740 ). These taxes were included in the annual assessme-t 0---

Compared with maximum rates in the other Provinces of

Transvaal R18 e

Cape R27 \_ n .

Orange Free State R20 --

all of which Here'arrived at by means of different formulas.

##### Provincial Income Tax

This was calculated at a fixed percentage of annual normal tax payable.

The rate applicable in Natal was 37i\$ which was the highest of all Provinces.

eg. Transvaal 32\$

Cape . 331

Orange Free State 32\$

Likely Present Revenue

---

##### Companies

Reimposition of the previous basis would mean that the company taxes in 1984/5 extracted from Table 23 of the Indaba Economic Document No 27. namely,

R439 612 000 could have been analysed as follows :

100 x 439 612 000 t State Tax : 390 766 222 .

1121

Therefore Provincial tax allocation would have .

been - 48 845 778

This does not in itself create additional revenue but merely diverts funds from Central Government to the Province and could lead to a corresponding reduction in the Provincial subsidy.

To generate additional revenue it would be necessary to consider Provincial Taxes in addition to the current rates of tax. H

In 1985 terms if Provincial Taxes were imposed at additional rates on taxable income --

It would generate . R 8,80 H additional revenue

2i would generate , ' R17,60 H additional revenue

2&1 would generate R22,00 M additional revenue

In 1983 terms if Provincial Taxes were imposed as a surcharge on taxes payable

'11 would generate R 4,40 M additional revenue

21 would generate R 8,80 H additional revenue

2ft would generate R11,00 M additional revenue

Individuals

----- --

If one assumes that

(a) The Province reimposes the ratio of 37i/32 and

I

(b) The present individual tax rate is based on the old

Transvaal rates

then one can simply apply 137% to the amount extracted from Table 23

of the Indaba Economic Document No. 27 namely,

137% x 1 008 176 000 : R 42 007 335

132 '

This figure would have applied for the 1984/5 year.

In 1985 terms if Provincial Taxes were imposed as a fixed percentage of normal tax payable then

1x would generate R10,08 H additional revenue

2x would generate . R20,16 H additional revenue

2it would generate R25,20 H additional revenue

General Sales Tax - -

In 1984/5 General Sales Tax extracted from Table 23 of the Indaba Economic Document No 27 was RI 072 448 000.

... / 3.

Page Three.

21.

The history regarding GST is as follows :

Fiscal Year Rate . Collections K Annual Increase

H

1979/79 7 4x 3/7/79 e93

1979/80 49 . 1 249 , 919

1980/81 4x 1 653 32:

1981/82 4S

5% 1/3/82 2 116 25S

1962352 5%

Si 1/9/82 3 184 50\$

1953/64 6i

7% 1/2/84 3 878 ZZi

1984/85 75

10% 1/7/84 \_

12% 25/3/85 5 878 52%

1985/86 122 . ' e 300 . '41s

' Amauzt given in\_Budget speech on 18/3/1985.

' 1

When the rate of 101 was introduced on 1/7/1984 ceftain exemptions were granted eg. fresh meat. '

The R1072 M reflected on Table 23 represents 18,248 of the total GST collections and appears to be a realistic allocation.

An increase of 1% in the 1984/5 year is difficult to calculate'in view of the changing GST percentage during the year. For the 1985/86 fiscal year an increase of 11 would have\_increased the National GST collections to R9 024 M. Assuming KwaZulu Natal's share-of this remained at 18,24t additicnal revenue of' ' 5 '

R9 024 M - R8 300 n : R724M 9 19,241 x R 132 057 600

wsdli accrue. If therefore the Province were to iEPCSE an aiiiticnal 18 Provincial GST R132 M would have accrued directly to the Province.

CONCLUS ION '

The revenue generated by increasing company and individual tax is fairly insignificant when compared to the revenue to ye generated by an increase in CST. - '

. \_/ \_ , , n , : . 55' . \_ . \_ 7 Am :-

ANNEXURE 2

22.

. EPORT TO THE ECONOMIS SUB COMMITTEE OF THE KWAZULU NATAL INDABA

Fuel Tax

The objective of this report is to consider the revenue that'aould be generated by imposing a fuel tax in Kwazulu / Natal amounting to an equalisation of the fuel price between Natal and the Transvaal.

Limitations

Fuel is a particularly sensitive product in South Africa and certain laws prevent people from disclosing any information regardzng fuel under threat of very severe penalties.

Reliance has therefore been placed on information which has me: been verified du: to this reason and in addition a lack of tize withzn which the report has hai to be submitted.

Th price of fuel varies throughout both KwaZulu Natal ani :he'Transvaal based on a grid system and for the purpose of this regcrt we have taken only two price structures, one fro: each area.

I

Present Pricing Structure in the Transvaal

We tabulate below the pricing structure of 93 Octane as extractei from the Financial Mail of the 12/9/1986.

Obviously each fuel product's pricing structure will be different for certain input costs but it is considered that 93 Octane gives us sufficient information to do the required projections. . 2

Cents per litre

Landed refined cost 3

6,4

Company margin 5,0

Customs and Excise 4:0

'Central energy fund - Synthetic Projects 3,725

Combating oil polution 0,055 '

Administration of

strategic oil supplies 0,220

N V A 2,600 6,6

Equalisation Fund 1'3

Fire Protection . '0,6

Crude Oil Purchase 5.0 ' 6.9

National Road Fund 7:0

Pipeline ;\_ 7,4

Retail Profit 5,2

CST 8,9

. \_ 87,4 '

Less Under recovery 4,4

---

83,0

Extracted from Financial H311 12/9/1985

(x



SIXTH SESSION OF THE FOURTH KWAZULU LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY  
BY THE CHIEF MINISTER  
MARCH 1988

Mr. Speaker, Sir, Honourable Members, we gather together in this Assembly as leaders of the people and my first message to you at the beginning of this year's work in the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly is that unless we do in fact lead, we will perish. Our striEe-torn country cries out for leadership. It cries out for the eradication of apartheid and for the leadership that can eradicate apartheid. It cries out for social, economic and political justice and it cries out for leaders who can lead South Africa into a new era in which social, economic and political justice will be realities for the ordinary man and woman. The people cry out for increased standards of living and they cry out for leadership which can win political battles in such a way that political vibtories are meaningful to the poorest of the poor. Political leadership of the people demands from us the leadership that history itself demands as it faces the massive burden of our tday and age on our shoulders. Our burden is so immense because there are desperately few Black leaders in the country who do in fact lead. Johnny-come-latelys are two for a penny. Around every corner in our townships boastful nobodies strut around posturing in leadership roles. Celebrity leaders abound in South Africa. They live on media acclaim and dance to the tune of political forces which the people should be employing but which. are, in fact, .employed by those who disdain the people's right to author their OWn destinies. h- -

Out country is in a mess. The South African Government is milling around on the very cross-roads of history where decisions have to be made and directions have to be struck that can set the people free - free not only from apartheid but also free from poverty, ignorance and disease. We have in South Africa a White Government led by' Whites for Whites. We have a Government that sees no reason whatsoever for White Members qt Parliament, who in fact make the laws that govern the 80 per cent of South Africans who are not White, to seek the democratic powers that they should be employing from those who have to live under their laws.

Not only do we have a White Government led by Whites pursuing the interests of Whites generally, but we have a White Government which is primarily concerned with the Afrikaners' future in the country. We in this country daily witness the ludicrous position in which the State President himself enacts his executive State President's role without any mandate from the majority of the people. South Africa has a racist government pursuing racist objectives and the people cry out for leadership which can alter this hideous state of affairs.

There are many who misread the South African situation who think that posturing is leadership, who think that powermongering is leadership and who think that political pointscoring among a suffering people is leadership. Mr. Speaker, Sir, Honourable Members, the very first hallmark of leadership is the ability to gather people together into a task force which can be directed and which can be deployed on whatever front demands immediate attention. Leadership that cannot lead in this sense of gathering people together and directing them is a curse on the future of South Africa. '

Mr. Speaker, Sir, Honourable Members, we in this House stand in danger" of becoming blasé about urgent imperatives which should be driving us forward in our leadership role. The struggle goes on and on and on and there is a sense in which some are tempted into regarding the struggle as a way of life which they are enmeshed in. Because there are no easy victories, there are some among us who behave as though there never will be a victory. They settle down into some kind of political stupor not actually believing that things are getting tougher, in the same way as it is darkest the hour before dawn. They are not on the balls of their feet fighting for that dawn. The cookie will crumble and when it does crumble, those who are then leading will continue leading and those who are posturing as leaders, will be cast aside by history as the political derelicts that they are.

We gather together in this House in 1988 to do a massive job of work for the people in the circumstances created by the deepest crisis that this country has ever known. Mr. Speaker, Sir, Honourable Members, the South African crisis is a crisis of deep historic importance because it is a make or break crisis. Not make or break for apartheid. Apartheid is doomed. It is finished. It is a politically defunct ideology. White power is real, yes, but a South African apartheid way of life for Whites is doomed. The South African crisis we know today is a make or break crisis because it is in this crisis we are now experiencing that the direction South Africa will take in the future, is going to be decided. What actually emerges in the foreseeable future will determine the kind of country we live in beyond the horizons we can now see as we look forward. This is a testing time for South Africans. It is a time in which the validity of democratic power itself is being tested and Mr. Speaker, Sir, it is a time in which our leadership capability is being tested.

South Africa's White Government is an imposter government occupying undemocratic institutions of government to the detriment of the people. Mr. Speaker, Sir, I continue to reject the Tricameral parliamentary system in part and in whole. The present constitution must be scrapped. There is no room in it for any of the manoeuvring that the politics of negotiation need to bring an end to a whole era of minority oppression of the majority in this country. For the record, Mr. Speaker, I must restate the views of this House about the nature of South Africa's present parliamentary system. It is necessary, Mr. Speaker, for me to do so because we can never escape the fact that we exercise our leadership at local level and at regional level within the context of national politics.

What we have done in the Buthelezi Commission; what we have done in negotiating with the former Natal Provincial Council; what we have done in the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba; what we now do in the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba and what we now do in the Joint Executive Authority, has always been and will remain focussed on our national role in the struggle for liberation. We have not sat twiddling our thumbs waiting for the day of liberation to come. We have laboured and we have led towards our aims and objectives when everything seemed hopeless and when others were crying out that nothing could be done through non-violent democratic opposition to apartheid. We were man enough to get on with the job others fled from because there were no immediate rewards in it for them. Each and every year we gather in this House deeply motivated to fight apartheid wherever it can be fought. We have devised tactics and strategies which have in fact gained us ground. We have employed a two-pronged attack on apartheid. In one horn of this attack, we attacked apartheid here in KwaZulu and we attacked apartheid in the broader KwaZulu/Natal region. In the other horn we attack apartheid at the national level and the international level. This direct assault on apartheid is a prime and real reason for our very existence and anything we do other than at the national level has always been designed to increase our bargaining power and the reality of our political power at the national level.

I make this point, Mr. Speaker, at a critical time in the struggle because we must now lead with this very firmly in our minds. I am not going to be bought off by anybody at any time. I will never be seduced into vacating my national responsibility in favour of securing regional gains which are incompatible with national gains that we have always sought. We must now lead the way the people want us to lead. We have a mandate from the people. We must do what the people want and I tell you bluntly, that if we in any way "Vminimise or water down our involvement at the national level, we will be stripped of all real political power at the local and regional level.

Mr. Speaker, Sir, Honourable Members of this House will in this sitting of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, have to make far-reaching decisions on the level of tactics and strategies. If we blunder in our deliberations now our decisions will not stand the test of time. We must now do what is right, not right in the wishyewashy sense that moralists sometimes say this is right or that is right. We must do the right thing that works for the people. We must become increasingly effective in our leadership and we can only do so if our opinions are informed opinions and if our feet remain firmly planted on the hard rocks of reality. Before I turn the attention of this House to a more detailed discussion of specific tactics and strategies that we are employing, I must present my perceptions of the broad South African political situation in which we have to make vital decisions. Before a wise general deploys his forces on a battle field, he gathers information about the nature of that battle field and before he even begins to deploy his forces, he knows where his advantages lie and where his disadvantages lie. We must, Mr. Speaker, stand back for a short while and review the South African political situation.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, there are realities in the South African situation which we dare not ignore. One of the fundamental realities that we have to contend with, Mr. Speaker, is that in South Africa there is White politics, there is Black 'politics, there is Indian politics and there is Coloured politics. This is the hideous aftermath of 40 years of National Party rule. Those who say that there is no racial struggle in South Africa and that there is only a class struggle, or only a worker's struggle, are political idiots. The very essence of the Black struggle for liberation is the Black political drive by Blacks for Blacks to eradicate apartheid for the bestial scourge that it is.

Everywhere in the world a people have got their own God-given sovereign right to author their own destinies by doing what they want to do. Wherever there has been oppression, history has placed the burden on the shoulders of the oppressed to do something about their oppression. The oppressed must do something about their oppression, and the poorest of the poor must do something' about their poverty. If Blacks do not fight a Black struggle for liberation there will be no liberation in South Africa.

By far the most dominant theme in South African politics is the Black/White issue. White politics is totally dominated by infighting amongst Whites themselves about how to deal with the reality of there being a Black majority in this country. The whole of apartheid in all its hideous elaborations is a White man's endeavour to do a White man's thing about the Black majority. The Broedertwis now emerging in Afrikanerdom itself is at heart conflict between Afrikaners in the National Party/Conservative Party conflict about how to deal with the Black reality. The

Progressive Federal Party in Parliament opposes the way the Government is dealing with Blacks. The Black/White issue is the dominant issue in every White parliamentary sitting. The very constitution itself has been formulated around Whites vested interests on this question of how Whites should deal with Blacks. Until Black/White political relationships are untangled in this country there can be no sane politics.

Mr. Speaker, we gather in this House as Black leaders. We have a Black job of work to do which nobody can do for us. We must lead for Blacks in this phase of the struggle, Another reality in the broad political scene we are looking at, is that the struggle for liberation is not only a struggle to eradicate apartheid. It is also a struggle to replace apartheid with an alternative to apartheid in an altogether new political era. It simply is a reality that Black leaders are struggling against apartheid not simply because apartheid is morally indefensible, but because apartheid does not make it possible to establish the kind of society they want for South Africa.

It is a harsh reality in our midst that the hideous Black-on-Black confrontations which take place in the name of the struggle for liberation are in fact Black-on-Black confrontations about the kind of society we are going to have after apartheid. The African National Congress in exile and the South African Communist Party are not simply struggling against apartheid because apartheid is a crime against humanity. They are struggling against apartheid because they want to establish a one-Party socialist State. In the way they are conducting their affairs it is patently clear that they see no room for a multi-Party democracy in the future. The African National Congress in exile are struggling to return home to become the government in the one-Party State for which they are striving.

In this regard, Mr. Speaker, I must say something about the Freedom Charter. For a whole decade after the old ANC sent a mission abroad to establish an external power base to assist the struggle here at home, we heard nothing about the Freedom Charter. It was one of the most disowned documents that existed in South Africa. It was regarded as a wishy-washy nothing and it most certainly was never ever elevated to a position of being a formulation of future political developments. In the early seventies an internal ferment began emerging in Black South African politics. The ANC in exile was faced with the reality that the masses in South Africa were demanding local leadership. Still we heard nothing about the Freedom Charter.

Right up to the disturbances in Soweto in 1976 the Freedom Charter was a disowned Charter; it was an ignored Charter. It was treated as a compromise document formulated in circumstances that history

left behind. Now suddenly in latter years it has become a conveniently recalled document and given the status of having centrality in ANC thinking. The ANC has played fast and loose with this historic document. They have made it a document of convenience in their nefarious politics of manipulative control. The Freedom Charter is what it is a a compromise document that emerged as people strove to find each other across the barriers that had been erected between Black and Black by Blacks in the 1950's.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members,. I raise the question of the Freedom Charter, in the context of the theme that opposition to apartheid is more than opposition to something which is morally heinous, which I am pursuing because the Freedom Charter is being used as a lump of clay which can be moulded into anything we want wit to be. Nowhere in the Freedom Charter, Mr. Speaker, is there any rationale which authenticates the ANC Mission in exile's claim to be the sole representatives of South Africa. By no stretch of anybody's imagination can you say that those who acclaimed the Freedom Charter in 1955 were proclaiming it because they supported the kind of things that the ANC's Mission in exile is now doing. What the ANC Mission in Exile is now doing would have horrified the thousands who gathered in Kliptown to adopt the Freedom Charter. What the ANC Mission in Exile is doing is in idiom horribly opposed to the idiom of the people who adopted the Freedom Charter. The ANC Mission in Exile is impoverished in its constitutional thinking. In fact it is worse than the National Party in its refusal to tell the people bluntly and clearly what kind of a constitutional future they can expect should it win the day.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, I today here in this House challenge Mr. Oliver Tambo and his National Executive to assure Black South Africa that it is struggling to give South Africans the right to form political parties which will have the constitutional right to campaign for support among the people and that they will support a constitution which makes provision for an independent judiciary which has the authority to challenge the Legislature on the question of human rights.

Mr. Speaker, I am discussing the issue of there being struggles within struggles in the struggle against apartheid. It is this internal Black struggle which is sapping the struggle for liberation of vital power to conquer apartheid. The die has been cast and there is now nothing one can do about it. The Black-on-Black struggle is tragic but there is every reason for me to say that things have gone too far for us to hope for an early cessation to this hideous internecine conflict. -

In their pursuit of being recognised as the sole representatives of South Africa, the ANC Mission in exile has lost its status of being

THE premier Black political organisation. It was that once. There was a time when I could proclaim it to be 15E political organisation in this very House. Its primary importance came from the fact that the masses really did support what the old ANC's leadership was doing. Take that support away and you have nothing but an empty shell of posturing politicians. We have the realities in the broad political scene we are looking at of there being Black,. White, Indian and Coloured politics. We have the realities that White politics is floundering around as Afrikaner confronts Afrikaner on how to deal with Blacks. We have the reality that in Black politics the struggle for liberation is being hamstrung by internecine Black- -on- -Black confrontations about the kind of government we will have after liberation.

eIt is important for us, Mr.Speaker, Honourable Members; for me to reestate our own position in the broad political scene we are looking at. We are firmly committed to eradicate apartheid in such a way that the people will at last have their sovereignty. We are struggling for the right of the people to determine their own future and to determine what kind of government they will have after apartheid. We, Mr. Speaker, in this House and in Inkatha, have never attempted to ram one or another constitutional form down Black South Africa's throats.

We have always maintained that no one political organisation, be it the ANC or be it Inkatha, can possibly subsume the totality of Black political aspirations. South Africa is more than an emerging Third World country. It is a country in which there are millions of people who wish to have the right to elect the leaders of their choice and support the Party of their choice. That we must have a multi-Party democracy is ordained by history itself. We in this House and in Inkatha strive only to break the shackles that bind democracy in South Africa. We strive only for the freedom to present our case to the people and to campaign for support for our aims and objectives.

Whereas the ANC Mission in Exile is bitterly intent on establishing itself as a government returned home to rule in a one-Party State, we in Inkatha say we will do whatever the people want us to do. I have on more than one occasion stated very clearly that I am not struggling to establish myself as the President of a future South Africa. Inkatha is not struggling to establish itself as the only contender for power. I have publicly stated that I will serve under a free Dr. Nelson Mandela if that is what the people want me to do. I would serve under whoever the people wanted me to serve. The people only have the right to ask me to serve under one or another leader if they also have the right to ask other leaders to serve under me. That is ultimately the sovereign right of the people and that sovereign right is what we are striving for. In broad perspective then, White politics is dominated by conflicts between White Parties about how the White man's interest can best

be secured and in this internal White conflict, the Afrikaners dispute amongst themselves how to preserve the dominance of White political decision-making. Nothing the State President has said and nothing that his Cabinet colleagues have said, indicates their willingness to serve South Africa under a Black President. They do not even envisage that as a possibility. We remember only too well how Mr. Pik Botha was given a public dressing down by the State President after he said that under National Party thinking, there could well be a future Black President. Ever since that day no word ever escapes Mr. Pik Botha's lips which indicates a willingness amongst members of Mr. P.W. Botha's Cabinet to serve under a Black President.

And also in broad perspective, Black politics has become dominated by internal disputes about what kind of constitution we will have in South Africa after apartheid. There is a struggle within a struggle among Afrikaners as they vie with each other about how best to retain the White man's dominant control and there is a struggle within a struggle in forces opposed to apartheid as we grapple with the constitutional future of South Africa.

Mr. Speaker, Sir, Honourable Members, because of the importance of the debate which we will have in this House about where we go from here as we meet the changing circumstances of 1988, I must summarise the salient features of the political activity of all the political Parties in South Africa. It would be rank foolishness for us to consider our own tactics and strategies if we do not have clear perceptions of the tactics and strategies and intentions of other political Parties and groups.

I start first of all with an analysis of what the ruling National Party is aiming to do with its tactics and strategies. In May 1987 the National Party won a Whites-only election. It would serve a useful purpose if we examined the National Party's election manifesto and saw the Government's stated aims and objectives and its tactics and strategies in the context of the kind of mandate that it sought from Whites. An abridged version of the National Party's Manifesto reads as follows:

ABRIDGED ELECTION MANIFESTO OF THE

NATIONAL PARTY

ELECTION 6 MAY 1987

FULL PARTICIPATION FOR ALL

As ground rules for our constitutional plan we acknowledge:

- the Preamble to our Constitution as a policy framework;



- self-determination and co-responsibility over matters of common concern;
- the right of selfgoverning territories to independence;
- the right of all other territories to share in a future dispensation as a part of South Africa;
- individual freedom without race discrimination, and the right of groups to selfadetermination;
- equality before the law, and an independent judiciary;
- representation for all in democratic institutions, and
- the preservation of group security inter alia by means of
  - \_ protection of and own community life in own schools and residential areas;
- serving group interests on an OWn affairs basis;
- protection of minorities against domination by way of equal opportunity, and
- a balance between individual and group rights

Much has already been achieved on this basis:

- the dispensation built on the 1983 constitution;
- national states with autonomous self-government:
- independent TBVC countries, and forums for co-operating with them:
- \_ participation by all groups in a new provincial system, and
- local government and regional services councils to provide services to all communities;

The National Party now proposes further institutions and prOCesses: w maximum devolution of authority;

- retention of self-governing .territories as part of South Africa until they themselves opt for independence;
- government structures in communities outside these territories; autonomy in metropolitan areas can progress to full independence;
- \_ common issues to be resolved by consensus, without domination;
- the establishment of a National Council as a forerunner to a

Council of State, which will be charged with policy determination on general affairs, and

- protection of the rights of individuals and groups on the basis of agreed norms.

#### FREEDOM

South Africa will not succumb to sanctions or other forms of coercion. Reforms to be undertaken will be based on our own judgement. They will remain aimed at power-sharing, -and will not result in surrender, as demanded from us by outside forces. The key role South Africa already plays in Southern Africa, will be further strengthened by:

- fostering cordial mutual relations and respect for the territorial integrity of each country;
- offers of assistance and exchanges of know-how;
- the promotion of free trade between countries in Southern Africa, and
- discouragement of the use of neighbouring territories as springboards for attacks on each other, or the harbouring of foreign troops, and the promotion of negotiation in the settlement of disputes.

#### PROSPERITY

A positive economic climate depends on:

- private enterprise, based on property ownership and competition; '
    - sound international trade relations;
    - w availability of capital, manpower and opportunities;
    - reduction Of state activities through privatisation
    - deregulation wherever rules and regulations stifle progress, and
    - the promotion of small businesses and the informal sector
- By eliminating backlogs herein, the National Party aims to:
1. promote the highest possible growth rate;
  2. create as many job opportunities as possible;

3. maintain price stability, and
4. achieve equilibrium in our balance of payments

Aids to achieve these ends!

- educational and training opportunities;
- optimal utilisation of capital and natural resources;
- geographical distribution of economic activity;
- a balanced population development programme, and
- a strategy for positive urbanisation

#### SECURITY

In order to achieve the political and economic objectives which the National Party proposes for South Africa, the onslaught of international communism must be resolutely resisted. -

In addition to the development of South Africa's armaments industry, social and constitutional measures must be 'taken to counter the ideological onslaught.

The National Party also pledges itself to:

w build a well-trained and equipped police force for all population groups, and

- maintain dedicated and adequately armed army, air force and navy units, consisting of a well-trained permanent force, a full-time national service force, citizen force and commando personnel and full-time regional units.

We 'Mr; Speaker, Honourable Members, I was totally appalled when I was confronted with this election Manifesto and I said to myself, God help South Africa if this is a mandate that the South African Government is going to get. Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, it is new historic fact that the National Party was returned to power by an electorate which supported this Manifesto. In the first section of the Manifesto under the heading 'Full Participation for All', the Government seeks a mandate to continue with its hideous distinction of there being 'own affairs' for each race group and there being 'common affairs'.

I ask, Mr. Speaker, the whole world to see the National Party in its true colours as we look at the constitutional context within which so-called 'common affairs' are decided upon. The National Party is South Africa's governing Party regardless of there being a Coloured House and an Indian House in Parliament. The National

Party rules South Africa as the Government of the day. It is the National Party which decides issues surrounding common affairs. Common affairs include the defence of the country; the security of the country; the economy of the country; and in fact include everything that goes to make domestic and foreign policy. The National Party is a ruling Party and it rules over every race group. This is the reality of the situation and then it has the audacity to say that there is a distinction between 'own affairs' and 'common affairs.'

I was particularly appalled, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, to read in this election Manifesto that the National Party still punched "the right of self-governing territories to independence." While the National Party is still manoeuvring to bestow so-called independence on what they call self-governing states, what hope is there for the politics of negotiation. How can you negotiate with people who are blind to the reality that what they are doing is destroying the circumstances in which serious negotiations can take place.

The South African Government must call a halt to what it has been attempting to do for 40 years and it must say let us negotiate about alternatives for South Africa. While the South African Government expects us to negotiate within the four corners of the present constitution and its hideous distinction between own affairs and common affairs, the politics of negotiation will never get off the ground. When negotiators meet: as equals, every negotiating party is quite entitled to bring whatever it wants to bring to the negotiating table. I do not want to restrict-what the National Party may or may not bring to the negotiating table. I, on the other hand, will not be restricted either. I want to negotiate about one South Africa, with one sovereign Parliament, elected by one or another system of one-man-onevote franchise. There is nothing else to negotiate about as far as I am concerned.

Having accepted that the TBVC countries will remain constitutionally independent and that so-called self-governing territories can continue to opt for independence should they so choose, the National Party's manifesto then goes on to state that: "Other territories" have the right to "share in a future dispensation as a part of South Africa." Mr. Speaker, I do not strive for the rights of territories. I strive for the rights of human beings; for the rights of citizens; for the rights of individuals. The sovereign individual is the only true repository for democracy. You cannot give territories democratic rights. I will not negotiate within the framework of the National Party's straitjacket on democracy.

The Manifesto then goes on to talk about equality before the law. Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, there will never be equality before the law if different laws apply differently to different race groups. Equality before the law in these circumstances is a

contradiction. While the Population Registration Act remains on the Statute Books, there can be no equality before the law. The Manifesto insists on the retention of group identity in law and under the constitution, and then goes on to tell the electorate what has been achieved thus far by the Government on this basis of racial distinctions and group distinctions.

It cites the 1983 constitution as an achievement. It cites the existence of autonomous self-government as an achievement. It cites the so-called independent TBVC countries as an achievement. It claims that there is participation by all groups in a new provincial system. It lauds Regional services Councils and then, Mr. Speaker, the National Party goes on to propose "Further institutions and processes." It starts, Mr. Speaker, by insisting that the achievements of apartheid are the beginnings of a new South Africa. The Manifesto affronts my every apolitical sensibility when the National Party commits itself to the "retention of self-governing territories as part of South Africa until they themselves opt for independence." I am incensed by the word "until" in this context. It shows a complete blindness to the fact that South Africa is embroiled in an upward spiralling of violence precisely because the National Party persists in preserving the idiom of apartheid under the new disguise. Then to add to my sense of outrage, the Manifesto goes on to commit the National Party to creating new elaborations of its divide and rule machinery. The Manifesto commits the Government to establish Government structures in communities outside these (so-called independent and so-called self-governing territories) territories" and goes on to say that "Autonomy in metropolitan areas can progress to full independence." And then, Mr. Speaker, the Government reveals its true colours by committing itself to "the establishment of a National Council as a forerunner to a Council of State, which will be charged with policy determination on general affairs and protection of rights of individuals and groups on the basis of agreed norms."

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, I will have no part whatsoever in such a National Council. This Manifesto smashes all hope that anybody could have had that the National Party was in fact moving towards the politics of negotiation. The National party in this Manifesto declares itself to be nowhere near ready to negotiate about the constitutional future of South Africa. It only wants to negotiate within the framework of a constitution that it has already decided on. The struggle will continue, Mr. Speaker. This Manifesto is a White man's call to a White audience to maintain the domination of White decision-making in South Africa. The rest of the Manifesto, Mr. Speaker, blusters that e6Eth'Africa will not succumb to sanctions, promises prosperity, and promises security. The Manifesto in its totality is appalling, given the crisis situation which should be demanding every bit of statesmanship the South African Government can muster.

Mr. Speaker, Sir, Honourable Members, the outcome of the May 1986 WhiteSeonly general election needs to be understood so that we can bring the whole White political scene into focus. You will remember that generally speaking there was an across-the-board shift to the right. The Progressive Federal Party lost seats to the National Party and the National Party lost seats to the Conservative Party to the extent that the Conservative Party replaced the PF? as the Official Opposition. Further analysis, however, needs to be done before we can understand the shift. I believe that it is important for us to understand that the National Party actually strengthened its parliamentary position in terms of its involvement in 'real politik.' Simple head-counting of what Party lost what seat to whom does not tell us the whole story. The shift in traditional PFP constituencies to support for the National Party is an important dimension of White politics. Within the National Party itself the verligte element was strengthened by this crossing to it from the PFP. The conservative element in the National Party was not strengthened to the same degree. The hard-line conservatives left the Party to join the CP and HNP. The cracks in the hitherto granite-like National Party are cracks in Afrikaner support for the Party. The National Party itself is now somewhat more broadly based than it has been in the past because the English-speaking voter has given it more support than it has ever given it in the past.

In real political terms the National Party's majority in Parliament does not even make it remotely vulnerable as far as losing an election goes. It remains the dominating Party in the White Parliament and any possible election victory by the Conservative Party is quite out of sight.

The' Conservative Party has probably made most of the gains that it can make and I do not believe the Government is seriously threatened from the right to the extent that it can lose an election within the foreseeable future. The Conservative Party would be nothing without the support it has gained from the northern platteland Transvaal constituencies. Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, I will deal with the Conservative Party elsewhere in my policy speech but I just want to remark here that the absurdity of its position and its unrealistic view of what can and cannot be done in politics in South Africa, makes it a non-starter as far as winning an election is concerned.

Yet Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, we are faced with a situation in which the State President continues to look over his shoulder at a right wing threat. What is he actually fearing? Why is he looking over his shoulder? In parliamentary terms, he is just as capable of flattening the far right as he is capable of flattening the far left. But he does look over his shoulder and we need to understand what is happening in the National Party to make him do so.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, the National Party's origins lie in the Afrikaner people's struggle against British imperialism. It was a Party formed by Afrikaners for Afrikaners. It is a Party that has always dedicated itself to Afrikaner self-interest. National Party leaders have been Afrikaner leaders who have always put the good of their Afrikaner Party before the good of the State. While the Afrikaners could do a mop-up operation in South Africa's own political back-yard, victories in this back-yard broaden the scope of Afrikaner interests. They are in recent history having to face the realities of Afrikaners in Africa and in the rest of the world.

The Afrikaner volk now have a spread of vested interests which cannot be served within the narrow domains of Afrikaner political Parties and Afrikaner organisations. Every Afrikaner industrialist is an industrialist in a wider world where narrow Afrikaner nationalism has no value to him whatsoever. South Africa has grown economically and the economy has outgrown Afrikaner control. The future of Afrikaner industrialists depends upon Afrikaners accommodating themselves to South, Southern and Central Africa. It depends "upon them fitting their success stories into an international climate in the outside world as they vie for shares of international markets. Afrikaner businessmen are dependent on the continued importation of technology. Neither the National Party nor the Broederbond can look after the broader interests of Afrikaner business. Small businessmen have become big businessmen and big businessmen have become captains of industry. In this development the dominating influence of the National Party itself has waned in the day-to-day affairs of Afrikaner businessmen. Afrikaner intellectuals now also have to face a world which their predecessors in decades gone by did not have to face. The high-tech nature of university research and the qualifications and experience of lecturers and professors who are in-bred, home-grown intellectuals cannot hold their own in international circles. Afrikaner universities as repositories of Afrikaner intellectualism must also reflect the fact that Afrikaner interests cannot be maintained within the narrow confines of the National Party and Afrikaner cultural organisations.

Afrikaner churchmen are also having to adjust to a new era of Afrikaner survival. I am always very cautious, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, when I talk about the Churches. The Christian Church has the hand of God in it which defies analytical understanding. The hand of God is at work amongst Afrikaner churchmen as well as amongst churchmen of other ethnic extractions. However, over the centuries one can discern patterns of development within the light of the Church. The Afrikaners' Churches have always had to reach out to non-Afrikaners. That central injunction of the Gospel simply could not be avoided. In decades, and perhaps even generations gone by, this outreach could take place within the idiom of the Afrikaners' racist interests. There was no harm in establishing a sister Black Church, a sister Coloured Church and a

sister Indian Church. This racist division in, for example, the Dutch Reformed Church, fitted easily into the South Africa of the past.

In latter days, however, the Dutch Reformed Church has had to face the spirit of revolt against its paternalism in the three sister Churches. We now have the anomaly of Dr. Allan Boesak being both a dominee of the Church and a patron of the United Democratic Front. The Dutch Reformed Church itself, like all Churches, has to survive the particular day and age in which it finds itself. The intellectual climate of Afrikanerdom works out. in the Dutch Reformed Church. The vested interests of Afrikaners are relevant to its decision-making. In broad terms, the Afrikaner Dutch Reformed Church is like a chameleon not only in that it has moved slowly to catch up with the times, but also in that it has to change colour as it goes.

Whether we are talking about Afrikaans businessmen, intellectuals, or churchmen, we are talking about the dynamics of inner change within Afrikanerdom itself. However, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, the matter does not end here. The ordinary Afrikaner in every-day life, is now perforce having to do things his forefathers would never have dreamt of doing in his attempts to serve his vested individual interest. Afrikaner workers are now working side by side with Blacks in ways which would have been impossible to envisage in the Afrikaners' by-gone days. They are sleeping in hotels where Blacks have slept before them. They are playing sport with Blacks. They are standing shoulder to shoulder with Blacks in queues at government offices and post offices. They are not necessarily being served first at cafe and supermarket counters. Afrikaners at the man-in-the-street level have also had to adapt to changing circumstances. It is they who face the on-the-ground reality that Blacks are irradicably present in their midst.

Across this totality of change within Afrikanerdom itself, there is a growing demand for reform. There is also a growing. impatience with the State President's habit of looking over his right-wing shoulder. The May election produced confirmation of this in the breakeaway movement. The break-away movement that Dr. Worrall led was not just a small one-off thing: It must be more accurately seen as an indice of that which must continue to claim importance. Afrikaner decision-making has in the past always been decision-making in a very authoritarian society. What the politicians, the dominees and the professors said was accepted as the voice of authority. The National Party's own internal decision-making process was seeped in this authoritarian Afrikaner idiom. It has never been truly democratic in the Western Party political sense. There were always lobbies and heeded authorities which swayed the way ordinary Party members voted. That is now changing and the National Party is experiencing grave difficulties in coping with the Dennis Worralls and Wynand Malans of this world. The Worrall



break-away is a consequence of the National Party's own brand. of internal democracy. It just cannot fit in today's South African realities.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, I have pondered a great length about the State President, Mr. P.W. Botha. I have spent virtually the whole of my adult life having the advantage of repeated man-to-man talks or eyeball-to-eyeball confrontations with national and international leaders. I have known them all, from our own ANC national heroes to successive South African prime ministers. I frequently walk in the corridors of power and meet with Heads of State and I have become accustomed to summing national leaders up. Right from the outset I recognised that there 'was something different about Mr. P.W. Botha. You will remember, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members that when Mr. Botha first assumed office as the then Prime Minister, I appealed to South Africa and the world not to judge him by his predecessors. I was right, Mr. Speaker, in making this appeal. I saw something that existed in the man which needed to be given a chance.

The State President may yet go down in history as the President who attempted so much and accomplished so little;- but history will, never be able to rob his image of the bold dimension of character which enabled him to lay the foundations for a final break away, from apartheid. There is just no point, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, in us indulging in make-believe worlds in which we dare not recognise propensities for change for fear that they will not materialise. If we adopt that mentality, we will continually be involved in fighting battles that have already been won. We in this House, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, are committed to the politics of negotiation. . We must be alive in our awareness of the potential for negotiation. Our job is to make that potential an actuality. We will never do so if we are so Party politically blind that we just cannot understand what the State President is wrestling with as he attempts to move forward.

Mr. P.W. Botha has done more than any of his predecessors to point his feet in the direction of statesmanship. Ironically, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, this is not praise for Mr. P.W. Botha. That statement actually reflects a deep-rooted criticism of the man. When a man is so politically inept that he does not know what is right and does wrong, he is wrong. When, however, a man does know what is right and does wrong, then he is very wrong. The State President's lack of courage to walk in the direction in which he has pointed his feet as a statesman, compounds the tragedy of him as an Afrikaner on the crossroads of history.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, the State President is a political Midas gone wrong. A true political Midas will touch something and it will turn to gold. The State President touches gold and it

turns to ashes. Where is his reform? What has happened to his National Council? Why does he squander the precious time left in this country in which we can reach non-violent solutions to our hideous problems? Why, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, does the State President look over his shoulder at the right wing threat which is no parliamentary threat?

Right now, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, it is deeply tragic that I can negotiate about nothing with the State President. He has not addressed the fundamental issue which South African society faces. It is as though the State President cannot make the quantum leap into being a true South African statesman. He remains locked into the history of Afrikaner leadership. Afrikaners do not have the solution to our country's problems. The State President must cease being an Afrikaner first and foremost and he must become a first true South African statesman capable of leading South Africa where South Africa has to go. He must cease being a brake on the desperately needed progress our country needs to make towards an open, multi-racial democracy. -

I have made the point before, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, that South Africa is in all reality a multi-racial society. While we have a constitution which makes it unnecessary for the State President to campaign amongst South Africa's African, Indian and Coloured populations for his political survival, he will remain locked in divisive Afrikaner politics. We must reach a stage in this country, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, where Black, White, Indian and Coloured leaders must campaign for their political survival amongst all race groups, and I mean campaign at the grass root level.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, a vitally important dimension of my African leadership has always been my readiness, willingness and ability to campaign for support for what we are striving for across all race groups. The opinion poll conducted by the independent Research Surveys (Pty) Ltd. designed to gauge support for leaders in the Natal region of all race groups amongst South Africa's White electorate established that I led the field as a prospective leader for a combined KwaZulu and Natal. The actual results, Mr. Speaker, are as follows:

"OF THOSE THAT YOU HAVE HEARD OF, WHICH WOULD YOU  
LIKE TO SEE INVOLVED IN THE LEADERSHIP AND RUNNING OF  
A COMBINED KWAZULU AND NATAL"AWNQW  
(ALL RESPONDENTS)

19  
 %  
 11111193. 'lqu r1392: 112911;. MA  
 7 #122231: 1126.51 921  
 6D: Mangosuthu Buthelezi 73% 17% 10%  
 g Dr Dennis Worrall 52% 19% 29%  
 2% Dr F van Zyl Slabbert 43% 32% 25%  
 % Hr Wynand Malan 29% 22% 49%  
 I Stoffel Botha 29% 26% 45%  
 Ray Swart 27% 218% 55%  
 Roger Burrows 23% 12% 66%  
 Oscar Dhlomo 19% 13% 69%  
 Peter Gastrow 17% 18% 65%  
 Derek Watterson 15% 13% 7 72%.  
 hr Renier Schoeman 10% 13% 77%  
 Mr Nelson Mandela 9% 73% 18%  
 uFEI7Danie Schutte 9% 10% ""82%  
 Mr George Bartlett 8% 13% 78%  
 ,Mr Archie Gumede 7% 19% 74%  
 20: Johan Steenkamp 2 7% 11% 82%  
 lArchbishoh Desmond Tutu 6% 79% 15%  
 AH: Govan Mbeki 5% 26% 69%  
 rrhr Duncan du Bois 2% 10% . 89%  
 ;It is interesting, Mr. Speaker, that when you look at this response  
 .across all White voting groups and compare it with responses from  
 ?oters who support the National Party, that the results still show  
 me as leading the field. The responses by Nat voters, Mr. Speaker,  
 7 Honourable Members, are as follows:  
 "OF THOSE THAT YOU HAVE HEARD OF, WHICH WOULD YOU  
 LIKE TO SEE INVOLVED IN THE LEADERSHIP AND RUNNING OF  
 A COMBINED KWAZULU AND NATAL"  
 (NAT VOTERS ONLY)

20  
 triage; met. raise): ".D.o.n.'-t\_ 112921  
 Eezeqit. new: 9L"  
 Dr Mangosuthu Buthelezi . 69% 22% 1 9%  
 Dr Dennis Worrall 44% 15% 41%  
 Dr F van Zyl Slabbert 39% 26% 135%  
 Mr Wynand Malan 29% 47% 23%  
 Mr Stoffel Botha 24% . 27% . 50%  
 Mr Ray Swart 17% 23% 60%  
 Mr Roger Burrows 15% 13% . 71%  
 Dr Oscar Dhlomo 13% 14% 74%  
 Mr Peter Gastrow 13% \_ 13% .75%  
 Mr Derek Watterson 11% 15% 74%  
 Mr Renier Schoeman 10% v9% 82%  
 Mr Nelson Mandela 10% 9% 81%  
 Mr Danie Schutte 9% 20% , 71%  
 Mr George Bartlett 8% 13% 80%  
 Mr Archie Gumede 4% 21% 75%  
 Dr Johan Steenkamp 3% 83% 14%  
 Archbishop Desmond Tutu 2% 86% 12%  
 Mr Govan Mbeki 2% 31% . 67%  
 Mr Duncan du 8015 2% 8% 90%  
 Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, I am not presenting the House with the outcome 06 these research findings in any sense of boasting. I present them to the House, Mr. Speaker, simply to underwrite what I am saying about the lack of the State President's willingness to put his political future in the hands of a multi-racial electorate. If I can succeed in gaining substantial support across all race groups, why do Afrikaner leaders, and in particular why does the State President, not follow suit? I stress that I am not suggesting that conductors of polls are necessarily political King-makers. I think, however, that this survey is interesting. I want to pause here, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, to speak very clearly and unambiguously, lest I be quoted out of context and am accused of sabre-rattling. Mr. P.w. Botha is on a suicidal

course because he does not throw himself and his political future yet the mercy of a non-racial electorate. There can only be a continuing escalation of violence in South Africa until the State President and his leadership cadres do just this. Afrikaners cannot survive as an insular group in modern South Africa on the continent of Africa. Afrikaners cannot survive without the Black helping hand to assist them to survive. The Afrikaner volk will be obliterated by history if they do not make rapid adjustments to being in Africa.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, we in this House and we in Inkatha have offered our hand of friendship to our fellow White South Africans. Our people are dying in defence of that which can save the White man's bacon in South Africa. We are being subjected to the most hideous brutality by the ANC's Mission in Exile and by the UDF and COSATU because we remain as willing as we are to deal with the State President and the South African Government around the negotiating tables. How long, Mr. Speaker, will we be prepared to face this total onslaught from the revolutionary forces of South Africa while the South African Government continues to pull the rug from beneath our political feet?

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, I lead as a Black leader in our South African crisis to give Blacks their historically rightful role in bringing sanity to our multi-racial society. We have a Black job to do for the sake of South Africa-and not for the sake of Blacks only. When we do this Black job for the benefit of the Whites as well as the other race groups, we are slapped down by the State President and his Cabinet colleagues. I am finding myself in an intolerable position in recent times.

I could not have warned the State President and the South African Government more clearly than I did that the present constitution would result in the escalation of violence and the deepening of the rifts between race groups in our already polarised society. I warned that the new constitution would radicalise Black politics. Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, those warnings were prophetic.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, I continue to talk in quiet, measured terms when I say that I face an Inkatha membership which is being radicalised just as much as the whole of Black South Africa is being radicalised. I dare not make assumptions about what the Black man can continue swallowing in his determined commitment to a negotiated settlement of the South African question. I am not 'playing one-upmanship and I am not just posturing when I say that the Government's tragic rejection of the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba constitutional proposals is something that I will have to take to the people. I am not going to be endorsed out of political relevance by making assumptions about hopes for the future which my massive constituency in Black South Africa does not have. 'I am a democrat and I will heed my people in the decisions I make.

sovereign Parliament, resting on universal franchise. This is our goal. It is not a precondition.

The State President and his Cabinet colleagues must now declare where they stand with regard to the purpose of negotiation. Thus is: they have talked about negotiation as a means of escaping racial conflict and the politics of violence. I am not interested in negotiating about means to only an indefinite end. I want to negotiate urgently. I want to negotiate today and I will do so without hesitation if we can reach agreement about the objectives of negotiation. Negotiation only becomes negotiation in the real sense of the word when there is a shared common objective between negotiators. Negotiation should be about how we should achieve an end. What that end is has already been fixed by history - not only the history of South Africa but the history of civilised mankind. We cannot rediscover the wheels of democracy in negotiation. We must negotiate about how to make the wheels of democracy work for us in this country.

I cannot and will not negotiate within the parameters of apartheid or any kind of neo-apartheid. I cannot negotiate with those who do not accept that legal distinctions between Black and White must be obliterated. I cannot negotiate with those who do not accept the irreducible equality of man as far as national and civic rights are concerned. I will never negotiate to establish one or another form of racist government. We need to negotiate away from inequality. Unless we set this as our objective, the politics of violence will overtake the politics of negotiation.

(

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, there will be one South Africa, with one sovereign Parliament, whether it is achieved through negotiation or through revolutionary violence. The choice is not whether or not there will be one sovereign Parliament in one South Africa. The choice is simply how we are to get there. The South African Government states its commitment to achieve political stability through the process of negotiation. That, however, in our circumstances is just not enough.

While the South African Government talks so easily and frequently about the need for negotiation it continues charging along the highway called 'The Grand Avenue of the Politics of Prescription.' Right now what the Government itself is doing is digging huge pitfalls on the road towards real negotiations. Right now it is demonstrating the fallacy of its commitment to the politics of negotiation by attempting to ram down our throats the tricameral Parliament's distinction between own affairs and common affairs. Right now it is attempting to ram the Regional Services Councils down our throats. And at heart, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, the South African Government is continuing to manoeuvre to retain the supremacy of White decision-making in everything that finally mixes to make it the sole determinist of the country's domestic and foreign policy.

I will come back to the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba after I have completed my survey of the current South African political situation. Before I move on to other political groupings, I need to add to what I have already said about the National Party. .

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, every one of us in this House knows that South Africa will know no peace and stability until we have established a multi-racial, multi-Party democracy here. That is what we are striving for. We are striving for a South Africa in which internal conditions enable every South African to maximise his or her own benefits in equal competition with other South Africans in all race groups. We know that there 'is one South Africa which demands one sovereign Parliament and demands a constitution under which a one-man-one-vote franchise provides everybody with equal opportunity either to be elected to Parliament or to support a candidate of his or her choice.

While South Africa's foreign and domestic policies are determined by one or another race group this country is doomed to racial strife. The only political progress in South Africa is progress towards a situation in which South Africans from all race groups participate as equals in the country's social, economic and political institutions. We in this House, Mr. Speaker, will never relinquish our final aims and objectives of establishing a multi-racial, multi-Party democracy in one South Africa. We only go as far as to say that there is no Utopian leap into democracy for any of us. We are committed to negotiate towards that final objective and we are aware that we will not negotiate a quantum leap into a democratic future.

We are prepared to compromise where compromises can be made that do not destroy the basic tenets of a political democracy. We know of no democracy worthy of the name which is not a democracy in one sovereign State. We know of no democracy worthy of the name in which there is not universal adult franchise. We know of no democracy in which Parliament is not sovereign. We cannot compromise on these things because if we do we will compromise a democratic future out of existence. We, Mr. Speaker, are prepared to look at alternatives to our cherished one-man-one-vote system of government in a unitary State. We are prepared to look at alternatives because history demands that we do so and because we can do so without betraying generations of heroes and martyrs who had striven for a democratic South Africa.

The State President and his Cabinet colleagues are very fond of saying that those who are prepared to negotiate must be prepared to negotiate without laying down preconditions. Mr. C.J. Heunis, the Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning in this year's No Confidence debate again made this appeal. My answer to Mr. Heunis is that we will lay down no preconditions of any kind whatsoever, provided we know that we are negotiating together with Whites for the establishment of one South Africa, with one

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, we in this House have always maintained that it is absolutely vital to the politics of negotiation that Blacks accept the need to negotiate with the South African Government. We do not live in cloud cuckooaland and say that the only thing to negotiate with Whites about is the handing over of power to Blacks. We accept the reality of multi-racial South Africa. We do not live in cloud cuckoo-land and say that the South African Government is not a legitimate Government. The South African Government is the de facto and de jure government of this country. It must be brought into the politics of negotiation or we must resort to arms in order to remove it. This is our fundamental quest and there is no escape from it. We have chosen the former. In our situation of racial oppression and iniquitous social and economic inequality; we have, however, to distinguish between what we request from the Government and what we demand from the Government. We do not request the scrapping of the Population Registration Act, Mr. Speaker. We demand it. We do not request the scrapping of the tricameral parliamentary constitution. We demand it. We back up our demands as demands. We back up our demands with our total unwillingness to be involved in any negotiations which do not accept the legitimacy of these demands and which do not contain agendas in which the Population Registration Act can be scrapped. The scrapping of the Population Registration Act is for us a non-negotiable.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, we come to this House with the very clothes we wear stained with the blood of our comrades who have died hideous deaths in defence of our noble aims and objectives. We lead as Black leaders in a very violent situation. If Revolution is not academic to us because we face revolutionaries f across our streets and in our homes as they attempt to wipe us off 1 the face of the earth. The blood of our comrades will not allow us to compromise the reason for their deaths into becoming ludicrous. They did not die for nothing. They died in defence of the noble and we will not abandon that which is noble; We are in no mood, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, to pussy-foot around the basic issues facing this country.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, I could go on to talk about the A National Party and the South African Government in the political g situation we all face today, but I have already drawn out what I j need to draw out to enable me to present the National Party in the ; context of the national political scene as far as the politics of 3 negotiation is concerned. Mr. Speaker, I summarise by saying that g the National Party is caught up in its own internal democratic 3 problems and it is caught up in the changing circumstances in which Afrikaners now seek to maximise their benefits. The Afrikaner g nation has outgrown the limitations of earlier' National Party governments. - 3

Before I go on to talk about Black politics, I must say a few words



about the Conservative Party and the Progressive Federal Party.\_ I Vdismiss the Conservative Party with the contempt that it "deserves but Mr. Speaker, we dare not ignore the fact that we have fellow White South Africans in that Party. I dismiss the \_Party with contempt but I will never fall into the trap of dismissing its membership. They are South AfricanS'and somehow or other they must also be dragged into the twentieth century. That is why I have never yet refused to address a White audience simply because it was a far-right audience. We need to talk to each other as South Africans .and there is so much to talk about which transcends Party political affiliations that we must do so.

. 'I say bluntly to the Conservative Party that it will never in the gnext million years achieve what it has set out to achieve \_ an .apartheid society run by a Conservative Party government. Black anger will explode into uncontrollable violence before this happens. I thank God there is virtually no prospect of' the Conservative Party ever becoming the government. I temper what I say, however, with the added statement that a great deal of fervent Afrikaner nationalism now finding a' home in the Conservative Party is employable for the good of South Africa. The Conservative Party members' fear of Blacks in government must be dealt with. The Conservative Party's fear that the Afrikaners will not survive radical change in South Africa must be dealt with. If we eliminate the fear syndrome in the Conservative Party, we will convert it to a positive force.

It is imperative that the Conservative Party be brought to the negotiating table. The heavens did not fall down on South Africa . when parks were opened to all races. The heavens did not fall down ion South Africa when Section 16 of the Immorality Act was scrapped. , The heavens did not fall down on South Africa when the iApprenticeship Act was scrapped. The heavens did not fall down on South Africa when Influx Control regulations and Pass Laws were scrapped. Members of the Conservative Party are already living in a new South Africa and like all people, they have vested interests which can only be serviced in the realities around them.

As a parliamentary force, however, the Conservative Party is lstetile. Conservative Party parliamentarians can bluster on their feet in the House and they can reduce the No Confidence debate to the political debate that it in fact became this year, but that is all they can do. Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, the political truth is that Mr. Amichand Rajbansi and the Reverend Allan Hendrickse have more parliamentary power than Dr. A.P. TreurniCht can possibly hope for. V And that, Mr. Speaker, is not saying very much about what Dr. Treurnicht can only hope for.

I am very hesitant to talk about the Progressive Federal Party because one does not want to kick somebody who has fallen down. The FF? is smarting under the way in which it has been side-lined as a parliamentary force. It is smarting under the growing

evidence of the White electorate not seeing it as a Party capable of vying successfully for power stakes. Its importance is not derived from the prospects of it becoming a major parliamentary force. The importance of the PF? lies elsewhere. \_ Whether or not it ever comes to terms with why it could remain important, I do not know. All I do know is that the very best in White liberalism needs protection and needs to be kept alive. The PFP does this. I thank God for South Africa's noble liberal sons and daughters. Our history is filled with dominating liberal personalities who were prepared to stand up and be counted in White South Africa. In the darkest hours of threats to everything decent in South Africa, they keep a flame alive which gives us all hope. They are the preservers of decency which is added to the parliamentary stew. Black South Africans have long since learned that White liberals are quite incapable of constituting themselves into a winning parliamentary force. We have learnt to value the pest in White liberalism and to live with the worst which inevitably accompanies it as White radicals posture as liberals to leaven the sour dough of organisations like the Black Sash and of NUSAS. We have learnt to live with the extent to which White liberals are so prone to justify their liberalism by leaning over backwards to be Blacker than anything Black. Although We in Inkatha, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, have not been able to throw our doors open to White liberalism for various reasons; we have however, learnt the lessons of history which teach us that Whites have got a White job to do and Blacks have got a Black job to do in politics at this stage of our history, as we move towards a non-racial South Africa. When the history of the transition of South Africa into a democracy is finally written, we will only then be able to see the great value that White liberalism had for the politics of change. As a national Black leader I cannot look the other way when some White liberals, particularly those who belong to .thel liberal left, blunder'the way they are prone to blunder. Sometimes a spade must be called a spade to stop White liberals using it as a toothpick. We in Black politics must know where we stand with all those we deal with. True genuine White liberalism backs the best that we do to the hilt. I have always appreciated that backing. When therefore, I register dismay whenever White liberalism is used to cover up stupid things, I must be forgiven. It is against the anvil of Black politics that White liberalism must be fashioned, but- it must be fashioned.by the Black hand that beats the spear into the plough. White liberals are just as prone to subject themselves to this fashioning as they are prone to fashion Black power on the anvils of their own making. When all is said and done, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, it is the National Party which Black South Africa has to deal with in the corridors of power and in the whole process of change. It is so tragic that the State President has come so near to being a man of

ii yn-u- ,wlejwe .Iw

i

g

F

2

ngga I now turn to Black politics.

27

history without actually becoming a man of history. What more could I as a Black leader have done to make it possible for the State President to negotiate with Black South Africans about things that really matter. I saw realities way beyond the vision of successive White South African Prime Ministers and the present State President. I refuse to become trapped into the dead end road of politics and I have kept alive the utility I have to my country of birth. When the time comes that Whites recognise the need for Blacks with real power bases, I will be there.

Mr. Speaker, in surveying the South African political situation of We are all political leaders in our own constituencies and we lead in our own constituencies within the broad context of South African politics. It is vital to understand the Black political situation in which we ourselves make our own contribution to the struggle for liberation. Unless we are fully aware of what other Black organisations are doing and why they are doing it, we will blunder in what! we do. There is too much at stake for us not to be sensitive to the Black political situation and there is too much at stake for us to be able to ignore the reality of the input of other Black leaders.

Whenever I think about Black politics in this country, I think of it in the context of the vital necessity for Black politics to attack the soft underbelly of apartheid and to score political victories where the South African Government and White politics generally blunders. Every blunder which the South African Government makes should give rise to a Black political gain. We are engaged in a struggle against apartheid. We are politically opposed to apartheid and to the ruling National Party which is the custodian of apartheid, Our first responsibility as Black leaders in the struggle for liberation is to attack apartheid where it can be attacked and to score against the National Party wherever we can.

I make these Observations, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, because there is so much rhetoric in Black politics these days that the whole world is confused about what Blacks in this country are doing. As I sum up the Black political situation, I want to avoid all polemic statements and present this House with an objective over-view of what is happening on the Black political front. Everything I say about Black politics will be guided by the thought that Black politicians should be in business to attack apartheid where apartheid can be attacked. We need to sharpen our focus on the vulnerability of the South African Government because it is imperative for us to attack the Government where it is vulnerable. I will assess Black political organisations against the background of this statement.

Right at the outset, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, I must further observe that the fundamental question of what kind of government we are going to have after apartheid must constantly be kept in mind. One of my first observations about the ANC, the United Democratic Front and the Congress of South African Trade Unions, COSATU, is that they do not attack apartheid where it is most vulnerable. Their attacks on apartheid are motivated by an over-riding need so to attack it that they end up ensconcing the ANC Mission in Exile here in this country as a government returned from exile.

I must say very clearly that we in this House and we in Inkatha are not jockeying for power advantages to form a government of the future. Future governments will be elected by the people. It is they who will decide who will govern. We struggle to give the people this right. We are therefore free to attack the South African Government where it is weakest and to mount the tactics and strategies which will be most propitious for the emergence of people's power at the polling booths. .

Some very fundamental differences have emerged between Inkatha and the ANC/UDF/COSATU alliance because we look to give the people power and they look to give the ANC power. We suffer all sorts of disadvantages because we are committed to giving a future multi-racial electorate the sovereign right of electing whom it will. This is a fact that is so frequently ignored.

When you look across the media treatment of Black politics, you will find that journalists and media commentators generally are totally preoccupied with dramatic reports about Black Party political advantages. They portray Inkatha and the UDF as vying with each other in the power stakes. They make assumptions about Inkatha's motivation which are totally invalid. They are blind to the realities which demand analysis in terms of the contributions the various political organisations are making towards the emergence of a democratic South Africa.

Inkatha is lambasted because it does not involve itself in school boycotts.

Inkatha is lambasted because it does not involve itself in consumer boycotts, which are not discussed with us and are organised on the basis of a general Black consensus. That is the reason why we have not been involved in the Consumer Boycotts which are organised on the basis of intimidation.

Inkatha is lambasted because it does not involve itself in the destruction of Black local authorities.

Inkatha is lambasted because it opposes sanctions.

There is a cheap journalists assumption that school boycotts, consumer boycotts, the destruction of local authorities and the effectiveness of sanctions is what really matters. They judge Black organisations by the extent to which they participate in these things.

The media, generally speaking, portrays a Black South African political situation in which readers are persuaded that there is widespread Black agreement from which Inkatha exempts itself in its tactics and strategies. The media make assumptions about the ordinary Black which are just not valid.

In these circumstances I must survey the Black political situation ; . in this country by analysing the effectiveness of the tactics and strategies of different Black organisations in attacking apartheid ' where it is weakest, and the effectiveness of the tactics and strategies of different Black organisations in moving South Africa towards a multi-racial democracy.

The Black political situation is a complex one and I am not going to attempt to over-simplify for the sake of making nice-sounding statements. I have to go further than linking the concept of . attacking apartheid where it is weakest and the concept of moving ' "south Africa towards a multi-racial democracy. I have to weave the \_ input of international governments into the mix of attacking apartheid where it is weakest and moving South Africa towards a multi-racial democracy.

, 'I must add this dimension because foreign intervention in the 'xinternal Black-on-Black confrontation is assuming ever greater proportions. Not only has apartheid been internationalised as a civil rights issue, but the vested foreign policy interests of Western, USSR and African Governments are always there in the background.

I must, however, be careful not to talk about day-to-day politics in such a way that simple statements are lost in the complexity of it; factors I have been enumerating. We need precise perceptions about if where we in this House stand and about where Inkatha and other 'Black political organisations stand. I will therefore adopt an \_ organisation for organisation approach and look at each organisation within the parameters that I have so briefly sketched.

Mr. Speaker, Sir, Honourable Members, I start with the 2, ANC/UDF/COSATU alliance. These three organisations hang together '\_ presently by design and by intent. Together they are committed to

the eradication of the free enterprise system. Together they are committed to making South Africa ungovernable. Together they are committed to remaining outside all possible negotiations with the South African Government.' Together they are committed to magnify and to multiply incidences of confrontation sand Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, together they seek to establish the ANC Mission in Exile as the sole representative of Black South Africa.

The ANC Mission in Exile claim COSATU and the UDF to be their organisations. In the Internal Commission Report - The Commission on Strategy and Tactics of the Afrxcan National Congress, prepared to; internal consumption in June 1985, the African National Congress Consultative Conference spoke of the UDF as follows, on -page 11 of that document

"...l(h) The United Democratic Front

The UDF, formed in 1983, has grown at an unprecedented rate, mobilising and organising millions of our people throughout the country. Today it has over 700 affiliates representing over 1.5 million people. The regime has acted viciously against the UDF and its affiliates. Hundreds have been arrested, many killed and many facing charges, including the 16 leaders who are facing treason charges, the main content of the charge being that they were the front section of the ANC/SACP/SACTU alliance.

Today the main issues confronting the UDF are:

1. Consolidation of organisational structures.
2. The necessity to bring in other constituencies into the UDF, especially the organisation of the working class.
3. Regional differences on questions of strategy and tactics.
4. Work among the rural masses.
5. African leadership of UDF structures.
6. Debate over whether the DD? should change from a front to becoming an organisation accepting the Freedom Charter as its programme.
7. The necessity to have a programme of action li.e. strategic planning. ' '
8. Does UDF involvement weaken grassroots organisations?
9. Necessity to train activists and cadres politically; ideologically and organisationally.
10. Criticisms of some sections of UDF 'socialist' - that UDF leadership 'populist' and petty bourgeois.

## Recommendations:

.1. We support the campaigns of the UDF around which mobilisation both on regional and national levels is planned.

- \_ High cost of living
- Education
- Militarism
- \_ Forced removals
- Influx control
- a New Zealand Rugby Tour
- Land issue
- Treason trial

In particular those campaigns which are in line with the strategy of generating a spirit of defiance and ungovernability.

2. The DOE remains a front and does not narrow its base. We should distribute internally a position paper based on the tactics of a united front and the necessity, at this stage, for the continued existence of such a front.

.i'3' We establish ANC collectives within affiliates as well as the leadership. These would not act as factions but as organised sections of our movement fighting for the strengthening of and consolidation of the UDF.

4. We take initiatives to resolve the regional and 'ideological' differences, real and otherwise, that exist within the UDF.."

'Kand in January 1987 Mr. Tambo boasted that they (The External Mission of ANC) had created what he called "these mass revolutionary bases". He stated "we have also succeeded to create mass democratic organisations representative of these conscious and , active masses ranging from Street Committees to COSATU, the DOE, 'the NECC and other affiliates and other democratic formations". The ANC Mission in Exile has declared war on Inkatha and the UDF \_tand' COSATU have done everything in their power to break the power of Inkatha and to destroy its political credibility. Right from the outset the UDF declared war on Inkatha. The day that it was launched the DD? leadership excluded possible co-operation with Inkatha. Right from the outset COSATU rejected Inkatha. It too declared war on Inkatha on the day it was launched.

There is not only an ANC/UDF//COSATU alliance against apartheid? there is an ANC/UDF/COSATU alliance against Inkatha. The political conflict between Inkatha, the UDF and COSATU was stage-managed into existence. The conflict has been nurtured ever since the UDF and COSATU were launched. It has been magnified in every possible way by the OD? and COSATU. v

The ANC/UDF/COSATU alliance has been demonstrated publicly abroad. I They have shared platforms in international forums and they have reinforced each other as each has waged its own international vendetta against Inkatha.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, we on the other hand have always held out our hand of friendship to all these organisations. It is not we who set the vendetta ball rolling. We have always pleaded for Black unity within a multi-strategy approach in which each organisation can do what each organisation can best do in its own circumstances. The totalitarian idiom of the ANC which wants to establish itself as an undisputed government in a one-Party State, wants no other organisation to develop a power base which it does not control. It rejects a multi-strategy approach in which different Black organisations play different roles in opposition to apartheid. They want a whip hand in everything that is done in Black politics. '

I must pause here to go back to my statement that our first responsibility as Black leaders in the struggle for liberation is to attack apartheid where it can be attacked and to score against the National Party wherever we can. I must now address the question of where the South African Government is the weakest. In my analysis of the National Party, I pointed out that the National Party is no longer monolithic and that social and economic realities are creating divisions in the Party's hitherto undivided Afrikaner loyalty. I pointed out how the National Party can no longer serve the vested interests of many Afrikaans businessmen, intellectuals and churchmen. \_ ' \_

The central theme of White politics is now how Whites should respond to the problems created for them by Black political development. The CP/NP conflict is dominated by the rejection and defence of the National Party's gravitation away from classical apartheid. The NP/PFP conflict is dominated by the rejection or defence of how little or how much the National Party is moving towards reform. i '

Let us look at the National Party as it faces the responsibility of government and ask where it is the most vulnerable. In broad undisputed fact the South African Government is condemned by every political Party in this country and by every Government in the



world because of its apartheid policies. It is vulnerable diplomatically.

It is a broad undisputed fact the South African Government has lost the ability to govern through normal legal and administrative processes. It can in fact now only govern the way it governs under a national state of emergency. It is vulnerable to the democratic procedures that it itself upholds as ideal and it is threatened by Black democracy which pursues these procedures.

In broad undisputed fact the South African economy suffers terribly because in South Africa and across the length and breadth of the world, there is a lack of confidence in the South African Government. The present rising hopes that we are entering a phase of economic growth could be dissipated overnight by further internal political upheavals.

In broad undisputed fact there is now a total White economic dependence on Blacks. This inescapably results in Blacks forming a majority wherever Whites work, eat and sleep. Inescapably Blacks are not political enemies who can be driven out of the White man's domains. The South African Government is vulnerable on the economic front.

It is undisputed fact that the National Party is experiencing its own internal problems. The breakaway movement was witness to this and the verlig/verkramp conflict is there in the National Party itself. It is there in the Church as the NGK struggle with White right wing Afrikaners who do not want to accept the equality of man in the eyes of God. It is there in Afrikaans universities and it is there in the business community. The South African Government has constituencies which are divided and these divisions work their way right up into the National Party caucus and cabinet.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, as opposed to the vulnerability of the South African Government on these levels, it constantly increases its towering strength on the military and police front. It can do just what it likes in neighbouring States and believe me, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, we in this country have not even begun to see what security measures the South African Government could take inside the country. Given the massive powers it could use, should it be driven to really putting its back to the wall, the scorched earth policies that could flow from this power are awesome.

I repeat, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, that when I look at Black politics in South Africa and when I look at Black political groupings, I only look at them from the point of view of their utility in the struggle for liberation. A Black political Party which cannot exploit the weaknesses of the South African

Government's position is worth nothing at all. A Black political Party that pits itself senselessly against the Government's strength and ignores its weaknesses, is stupid in the extreme. I make the broad statement when I talk about Black politics and the vulnerability of the South African Government that where the South African Government is most vulnerable, it is most vulnerable to a combined Black/White onslaught against apartheid. I do not want to digress too far here but I must just elaborate to say that Whites' will close ranks against real threats to their physical well-being and to military and police power. The more Whites are threatened by acts of violence in revolutionary tactics and strategies, the more they will close ranks. It is tactics and strategies which attack the Government where it is most vulnerable, where there are the best prospects of producing a united Black/White front to take effective action against apartheid. 9

I make this point to say that when I look at the vulnerability of the Government and look at the utility of Black political forces, I see Black forces which alienate themselves from White society as being extremely short-sighted. No one race group will ever author the destiny of this country. This is a multi-racial country and we must use multi-racial forces to produce a multi-racial future. i As a democrat, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, when I look at Black political organisations and I judge their utility in the struggle for liberation, I must also necessarily look at the extent to which they are rooted in the people. Ultimately it is that people who have power and it is the support of the people who give political Parties power. When therefore I find a Blacks organisation attacking the South African Government where it is strongest, and which alienates itself from White South Africans; and further has no real roots in the masses, then I must reject it. I now turn, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, to look at specific Black political groupings. I do, however, have a difficulty here. We have just again been witness to the State exercising powers to crush Black political organisations. I must, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, say very clearly that I as a Black leader have always rejected the banning of organisations and the banning of individuals. Bannings achieve no real political gains for anybody. The United Democratic Front and other organisations have now been restricted without the South African Government actually banning them. They are effectively banned.

The action taken against the DOE, COSATU and other organisations is action which will be detrimental to the politics of negotiation. I make the broad point that for as long as the South African Government thinks that it can control Black politics by coercive power on the part of the State, the basis on which violence continues to spiral upwards will remain intact; The only answer to

the politics of violence is the liberalisation of political control and the unshackling of Black democracy.

33 Mr. Speaker, I am in a difficult position of not wanting to kick an v' organisation which is down. I cannot rejoice that the DOE, COSATU and other organisations are crushed under a jackboot of the state.

On the other hand, I cannot hold my tongue in criticism of these organisations for using ordinary people, and children even, as cannon fodder and for bashing their heads against a solid brick wall. They have stupidly attacked the South African Government where it is strongest and their noses are now bloodied and it is their fault. They tried the impossible and failed. We as Black South Africans will be seen as politically stupid if we do not 2 avoid, as much as possible, inviting the Governments predictable -jstien by continuing to follow tactics and strategie\$W,Eh?t have failed us, in the past. '

The problem always is that when the politics of violence leads to the annihilation of a political organisation on the ground here in this country, the whole struggle fot liberation is set back. For a decade now Black politics has under-achieved in this country as the strength of Black South Africa has been dissipated on our street corners in Black-on-Black confrontations and in futile attacks on the military and police might of the State.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, there are times when one cannot ;count ene's words. I do not count my words today when I say that i:unless Black politics is purged of the kind of leaders and organisations which blunder and blunder and blunder again at 'the cost of the struggle, the people's suffering will be continued. There is one Black body politic and the defeat of any one part of it makes the whole of it suffer some loss. The annihilation of SASO and BPC in the 1970's is still fresh in our memories. All the brave talk in the world by the leaders of these organisations at the time did not help these organisations survive to fight another day.

a I want to make no predictions about what will happen to UDF, COSATU -g and other organisations. I am merely pointing to the fact that in rthe history of this country Black group after Black group has . become annihilated on the ground because of the stupidity of its -leaders who blundered until they ceased to be relevant, by 'following tactics which play into the hands of the minority Regime. fV'I must therefore, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, address the ' thole question of Black politics in South Africa today without pussy-footing around some issues, simply because altogether unacceptable aCtion has been taken against 17 Black organisations.

be striven for. We will have to work for it night and day and we will have to put it as one of our very highest priorities if it is ever to be achieved. I am writing to ask you to strive with me for its achievement.

I know that there have been ongoing discussions at different levels between Inkatha and the UDF. I see these discussions as neither detracting nor enhancing from Inkatha's political standing, nor do I see them as enhancing or detracting from the UDF's political standing. I see them simply as the first striving towards consolidating Black power in opposition to apartheid. It is history itself that will distill out of the Black struggle that which is finally going to win the day. The day will be won and the forces that are going to be most relevant to victory will be distilled out of the totality of Black political endeavour. Delays in Black unity simply heap up the cost of the final victory which is inevitably going to be ours.

It is love for my country and it is love for the ordinary man, woman and child in South Africa that motivates my approach to you again on the question of Black unity.

I do not intend in this letter to advance elaborate suggestions about how we can best go about enhancing Black unity. I seek in it simply an endorsement from your side of a commitment to do whatever can be done to advance Black unity.

Yours sincerely,

(SGD.)

MANGOSUTHU G. BUTHELEZI

PRESIDENT OF INKATHA

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, this letter reflects something which has always been there in whatever we have done. I have constantly held out the hand of friendship and appealed for the democratic right of all leaders and all organisations to present their views and tactics and strategies to the people for arbitration.

I make this point again and again. I will never meet with other leaders behind closed doors and decide on the destiny of Black South Africa. \_The people must author their own destiny. This is their God-given right. I will not be party to taking it away from them. If people have got this God-given right, then a multi-strategy approach flows from a God-given right. If people are not allowed to choose between their leaders and their Parties, they have got no rights to author the destiny of the country.

I make the point, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, that Inkatha Will defend its rights to exist and to campaign amongst the people whatever it costs us. This statement is not a reflection of any attitude on my part that Inkatha is the only political organisation in the struggle. My right to defend my right to exist and to campaign amongst the people would be entirely hypocritical if it was not at the same time the right to defend the rights of others to exist and to campaign amongst the people. If I denied them that right, I would deny myself that right. By the same token anybody who denies me the right to exist and to campaign amongst the people, denies themselves that right. '

Mr. Speaker, I will come back to this point shortly. I want now to bring to the House the so-called letter which Mr. Archie Gumede signed in response to my letter. I say so-called, Mr. Speaker, because the first I heard of it was when it was reported on in the media. It was written as an open letter and given to editors without me even seeing a copy of it. It took me days of endeavour eventually to extract a copy from Mr. Gumede.

This is not a genuine letter. It is a hideous piece of cheap propaganda authored by the UDF for national and international consumption. It needs detailed analysis, Mr. Speaker. The document to which I am referring reads as follows:

;"\_W, e UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT

1 PO Box 48060

Qualbert

Durban

4078

13/19 November 1987

I :. Dr. M.G. Buthelezi

1; 3865

President of Inkatha

VPO Box 1

Mahlabatini

Dear: Dr. Buthelezi,

Thank you for your letter dated 18 August 1987. Given the nature of its contents and the importance of some of the aspects raised in your letter, I referred it to my Executive and all township-based affiliates of the United Democratic Front for comment. This process has been partly completed and this letter attempts to synthesise some of the essential elements raised in these discussions.

The UDF affiliates were particularly insistent that while the DD? is in principle in favour of discussions and negotiations about ways to resolve the violence presently being directed against our people, any such discussions must occur within a properly structured democratic framework. In this regard, the UDF prides itself on the fact that before decisions are taken by the leadership, very wide consultation is undertaken with affiliates at all levels. Such consultation is at present very difficult given the fact that the South African Government, the KwaZulu Government and Inkatha have in various ways restricted the opportunities available to our membership to meet, discuss and deliberate on various issues.

We in the United Democratic Front certainly agree with you that the three central questions faced by anti-apartheid organizations at present revolve around unity, strategy and democracy and that any attempts to advance these must be wholeheartedly supported. As will become clear in my letter, however, we believe your understanding of, and methods of achieving, particularly unity and democracy appears to be limited, and limiting. In brief, one might contrast your calls for 'Black unity' with the UDF's call for nonracial national unity. Instead of your 'multi-strategy' approach to removing apartheid, the DD? has consistently called for 'unity in action' in removing apartheid. And while we certainly agree that democracy is a God-given right, democratic practices require that there be freedom of expression, freedom after expression, freedom of association, freedom of organization, and freedom of movement. We believe that Inkatha and the KwaZulu Government have done very little to cherish and preserve the limited freedoms we have struggled for.

I would like to reflect on some of the points raised in your letter, and through this indicate to you the feelings of the affiliates of the UDF. The UDF is the proud heir to the long and rich tradition of sparing no effort in mobilizing and uniting all sections of our people for a determined struggle against apartheid and the establishment of a united nonracial democratic South Africa. The birth of the UDF was an expression, in yet another form, of the centuries old desire of our oppressed people for freedom, justice and dignity. Our people have learnt through bitter experience that freedom and democracy do not simply descend from the sky \_ they have to be struggled for and won. We have overcome the jails, guns and death squads of the apartheid regime. We have overcome every effort on the part of our detractors both in our country and the capitals of the West to disorganise and disrupt us. .

The quintessence of the UDF has been unity in action in our long march to a democratic South Africa. Our message of unity and action against every form of apartheid spread across the length and breadth of our beloved land with incredible speed. Our people were hungry for freedom. They were eager to unite. If need be they are willing to die to rid themselves of the scourges of the apartheid

monster. The UDF does not belong to any one person or to 'any individual or to any leader. It is the people's organization. 'Since its inception the UDF has been embraced and nurtured by all sections of the people in every part of South Africa. It has become a vehicle for our people's historical quest for higher ' unity among the oppressed and their increasing number of

Of  
in the white community.

An essential pillar in the building of non-racial unity has been our consistent efforts to engender co-operation and united action , among all organizations committed to a democratic South Africa. In thhe first year alone, the UDF grew phenomenally. Since late 1985, iLou: struggling masses have laid the basis for a formidable working J'alliance among major national organizations: COSATU, SACC, NECC, VSACBC. We have never turned away the hand of friendship and co-operation from any organization with a genuine and proven record of 'mobilisation and action against apartheid.

As a keen student of history you are aware that the democratic movement has never had any difficulty in working with people operating within the golitical structures set up by the apartheid regime. Our watchword has always been to build unity in and through action. We remain convinced that our victory demands the unity in action of all the oppressed people and the patriotic and democratic forces of our country whatever their organized strength and regardless of secondary differences they might have among themselves on questions of policy, strategy and tactics. We shall 'therefore continue to work for this unity as a fundamental prerequisite of our victory.

V'We are, however, equally convinced that all these forces must , direct their attention and attacks on our common enemy, the itapartheid regime, and its imperialist allies, and at all costs tiavoid the fratricidal strife which the enemy seeks to provoke and abet. The case of Sabata Dalindyabo in the Transkei is now a ' matter of history. To all the struggling masses of our people Sabata died a hero. In the mid-1970's too there was no problem in supporting the struggle of the Labour Party to destroy the CRC from within. Nor has there been any contradiction in the UDF sharing a platform with Enos Mabuza of KaNgwane.

The decisive question therefore is not necessarily that of working within or outside the state structures. What is decisive is the pursuit of the aims of the national democratic struggle to create a united, nonracial and democratic South Africa. Specifically, this includes, inter alia

- the isolation of the apartheid regime on every front.
- non-collaboration with and isolation of all sections of the repressive security forces

- the development of people's organizations
- fighting against all forms of racism and tribalism. Ours is a struggle to end the forcible denationalization of the African majority.
- ending the bantustan system which is the cornerstone of the apartheid system. This involves the rejection of all federal, confederal and other regionalized solutions designed to perpetuate minority rule. -

In the light of these aims it is important to analyse the practices of officials of Inkatha in order to understand the basis upon which we might resolve our differences. It is the divisive and undemocratic practice and provocative rhetoric of Inkatha that is the greatest impediment to any meaningful unity between the Inkatha leadership and the democratic movement. In particular, Inkatha's practice of democracy and support for the apartheid system need to be addressed.

The practice of democracy

The practice of democracy requires that at least four pre-conditions are met:

1. Freedom of association,
2. Freedom of expression and freedom after expression,
3. Freedom of movement,
4. Freedom of organization.

Unfortunately, in Natal/KwaZulu such pre-conditions do not exist for the UDF. Not only are the affiliates of the UDF restricted in the exercise of these fundamental freedoms by the South African Government, but elements of Inkatha and the KwaZulu government play an active role in ensuring that members of the UDF are not allowed to freely associate, speak, move, organise, and, indeed, live. One could cite numerous instances in support of this statement, and many of these were noted by our affiliates in questioning the sincerity of your letter. We have enclosed some appendices wherein further claims are itemised, but to refresh your memory let me provide you with a few fairly well-known instances in which Inkatha was directly involved in restricting people's God-given democratic rights. Lest you claim that the DD? also actively inhibits these freedoms I would like to point out that no senior member of the UDF has been brought to trial for restricting these freedoms. Regrettably, this contrasts with the case of Inkatha where a number of senior officials have been convicted for such offences.



(a) Officials of Inkatha have often forced people to join its organization and/or pay dues

In many parts of KwaZulu-Natal there have been reports that members of Inkatha have forced people to join the organization. In addition, threats have been given by you to people in the employ of the KwaZulu Government. In last December, for example, you made it clear that it is Inkatha "policy to expect our KwaZulu civil servants to identify with us", and that UDF members were "unwelcome in state employ." Forcing medical practitioners and students to sign pledges also constitutes in my mind an unreasonable infringement of fundamental people's rights. We believe that the enforcement of this loyalty pledge has caused clashes even in Ulundi where many Government employees have been unwilling to sign the pledge. The situation has reached a most unfortunate stage where allegations are made that your security officers are interviewing government employees to check on their 'trustworthiness' to Inkatha.

2 There are even instances where law-abiding (and sometimes apolitical) citizens have been victimised when refusing to succumb to the pressure from Inkatha officials. Take the case of two residents of Lindelani who refused to pay the following dues to an Inkatha Central Committee member: "R5 for an Inkatha subscription fee, R1.50 for the Inkatha Women's Brigade, R3 for the United Workers Union of South Africa, R2 for the Inkatha Building Fund, and R3 for Tshabalala's bodyguard fund." Having successfully defended in court their right to not pay these monies, their house (including all their belongings) was burnt down by Inkatha vigilantes. As a result of this action, these law-abiding citizens, who belong to no political organization, feared for their lives and have not returned to Lindelani.

3 Inkatha: and particularly you are intolerant of

4 democratic organizations -

5; have often attacked our democratic organizations arguing that, if politics would produce a one-party state. But the "very practices and product of Inkatha appear to characterise what you interpret as the worst features of a one-party state. Included There would be Inkatha's control over the KwaZulu legislature, the prohibition of opposition parties in KwaZulu, the suppression of organizations (such as COSAS) long before the apartheid regime did so, the concentration of power in your hands, and the like, all of which do not really indicate Inkatha to be a democratic party in operation.

-I believe it is not an understatement to say that you personally, and Inkatha generally, are more hypersensitive to criticism than the South African Government. Witness here, the fact that you take legal action against almost anyone criticising you or Inkatha. And

your statement over the tragic Ngoye affair could also be regarded as overly sensitive: "continuing to label me as a sellout is going to have ugly repercussions. We know just how powerful we are. We know we can walk onto the campus any day of the week and do whatever we want to."

Inkatha's intolerance of democratic organizations is evidenced also by statements made by senior Inkatha officials. For example, Mr. Tshabalala argued that "he longed for the day that there will be open war between the UDF and Inkatha - it will prove who is who in the political war." Tshabalala continued, saying his gun alone "would leave hundreds of UDF supporters dead on the battlefields." King Goodwill Zwelithini has made this intolerance clear when, in an attack on the ANC, he said any criticism of you was "an insult to himself and the entire Zulu nation."

The attacks by Inkatha on highly respected individuals within communities is well documented. Take, for instance, the case of a Methodist Minister in KwaMashu, who said in 1985 that: "I was made to walk down the road in broad daylight (by Inkatha vigilantes). Many of the men were armed. I was forced to wave my fist in the air, and chant, 'The UDF is a dog.' About a hundred yards from my home, I saw Mr. Tshabalala of the Lindelani area. He is a well known Inkatha figure. He was with a large crowd of men. Only when I agreed to come to the stadium on the following Sunday, did they agree to release me. I no longer live in KwaMashu as I fear for my life."

This intolerance of democratic organizations has often resulted in the violent breakup of UDF meetings by Inkatha. For example, you might remember the meeting at Hammarsdale, organised to welcome back Robben Island prisoners, and which was broken up by Inkatha members who attacked UDF supporters and burned their cars. Apparently, your response was that when people see a rabid dog they kill it!

And the sad history of areas such as Hambanati and Mpumalanga where Inkatha violently drove out UDF activists provides further evidence of Inkatha's intolerance of democratic organizations. As a JORAC official pointed out a few years ago: "JORAC went to reason with Inkatha, stating that the war we were waging was not against fellow oppressed people, but against the Nationalist Government." Opposition to incorporation in KwaZulu was against the government's ideology aimed at making people lose their citizenship rights. But Inkatha refused to understand our point of view."

The NECC conference last year also indicated the lengths to which Inkatha must go to remove democratic organizations. You claimed the violent events which "took place there were not orchestrated by Inkatha!" Yet, buses transporting the vigilantes were booked by Inkatha, another vehicle was traced to the KwaZulu Department of

Works and even the South African Police indicated the impi involved in the violence was "backed by Inkatha." You claimed "no Inkatha central committee member organised" the violence yet Mr. Tshabalala was directly linked to it.

Inkatha's leadership has consistently opposed the strategy and tactics of democratic organizations. The opposition of twidelyw supported stayaways in the Transvaal (1984), Eastern Cape and Natal (1985) were opposed by Inkatha on the basis that the U0? and ANC were hijacking the unions! In November 1984 you warned that you would "crush those trade union leaders who allowed themselves to be used as pawns to get at Inkatha and its leadership." In September 1985 Inkatha opposed the consumer boycott in support of dismissed BTR Sarmcol workers and in 1987 Inkatha bussed supporters to Ladysmith to break the consumer boycott of the OK Bazaars retail chain. The violence used by Inkatha leaders and members against the UDF and COSATU activists in the tragic events of Pietermetitzburg also indicate the lengths to which Inkatha has gone in order to crush and remove all traces of democratic organizations; V,w v.

(c) Inkatha's tribalism

Inkatha's intolerance of democratic organizations often becomes played as opposition to non-Zulus'. While using the rhetoric of non-racialism you and Inkatha members have repeatedly used racial and ethnic terms to attack democratic organizations. Frequently, Inkatha members have claimed non-Zulu agitators ate behlhd the strategy and tactics employed by democratic organizations. "Xhosa and Sotho lawyers" were accused of paying , school-children in KwaMashu in 1980 to boycott. Similarly, you - ted the incorporation of Ingwavuma into Swaziland because 5 would never live under Swazis", when democratic . ations based their opposition not on tribal arguments but on fragmentation and denationalization that would result from such ' ratlon.

In addition, you often couch political conflicts in ethnic terms. For example, you referred to the Anglican priest and DOE patron Mcebisl Xundu as a "Xhosa priest troublemaker" who was "abusing 'Zulu hospitality" by criticising you. Reverend Xundu was eventually forced to leave Natal because of threats by Inkatha to close down his Lamontville church.

ftking Zwelithini's inflammatory statements are further examples of ;this tribalism. He claimed in 1984, for example, that "those who want to drive the Zuluness out of the souls of the people of Durban will be eradicated one by one. We are the people of warrior blood, forged as a people in war and peace."

Your continuing attacks on 'Indian' leaders within the UDF and ANC in my view provide other instances of racism and tribalism.

2.y Inkatha's support for the apartheid system

Your and Inkatha's participation in the bantustan structures of the apartheid regime is no longer another manifestation of a multi strategy approach necessitated by objective political conditions.

On the contrary, participation in and control of the KwaZulu administration has been consciously developed as the foundation of, and has become fundamental to, your political designs and ambitions.

It is a matter of profound regret that an organization which showed such immense promise to mobilise our struggling people against the Vorster/Botha regime was instead used to direct our people's energies towards

- aggrandisement of a failing strategy
- creating greater divisions within the ranks of the people
- attacking and eliminating democratic civic, youth, student and political organizations created by the very people who you say should be given a 'determining voice.'

There is no doubt that your refusal of independence for KwaZulu helped to avoid the terrors and absurdity of the Ciskei, Transkei and other homeland governments. The edifice of apartheid, however, is not about to collapse because of this strategy. '

We believe that Inkatha's weak democratic and anti-apartheid credentials arise out of the Inkatha's participation in, and active development of structures within, the apartheid system. Inkatha has actively accommodated itself to participating in the apartheid system. Inkatha's participation in the Community Councils, bantustan administration, the promotion of ethnicity, the opposition to democratic organizations such as the UDP, and the like has not served to undermine these structures, but in fact has given them credibility among supporters of the South African Government.

Overall, I would submit to you that Inkatha's role in the liberation of our beloved country needs to be addressed. If, indeed, the people are the deciding factor and their will the cornerstone of democracy, then we must submit that any liberation strategy must be based on the role of the people, that is, united mass action.

if sacrifice. No strategy which avoids appropriate context with the enemy regime can have any hope of success both in the short and long terms. This is not a mere strategy devised by a leader or an to-day struggles, victories and defeats of our people. This violence directed by Inkatha towards our organizations. However eager we are for unity among all anti-apartheid peoples, and however generous we may be in interpreting the violence directed towards the UDF, can we meaningfully 'engage in any discussion on joint commitment to unity while daily our workers, youth, and families of activists and people generally are being terrorised by Inkatha and the security forces.

help people?

work for peaceful co-existence.

21. At the very least you need to take steps to stop the violence and aggression unleashed by Inkatha against members of our affiliates both in and out of the townships. Here, the interference with and harassment of democratic civic, youth, publicly condemned by you, and disciplinary measures taken against of democracy.

22. In the interests of unity you should publicly distance yourself from the intimidatory actions of the KwaZulu police force, and should resolve to never collaborate with the SADF and SAP. At the same time, the Inkatha leadership should act decisively to condemn any encouragement, collusion with and incitement of vigilante and death squad actions against our activists and local

" EVV. ! '3 A"

There can be no freedom without struggle; no struggle without elite in an organization. This is the course chartered by the day. The violent confrontation between sections of our people is not due, to the "intensity of political moments" but is a direct result of your political strategy. Violence against our people by Inkatha, vigilantes, and the security forces separately or together was inevitable. The attached Appendix 2 provides a few examples of Do we not need instead a different type of commitment - a commitment to create the conditions for the moulding of maximum unity among all forces against apartheid and all sections of our If there is a genuine desire on your part for unity in our quest to dismantle apartheid, there must certainly also be the willingness to 'address and act on the following urgently to create a climate where women's trade union and other community-based organizations must be any Inkatha members, especially Inkatha Central Committee and KLA members who violate these basic freedoms necessary for the practice .. nzmoyuzm-Amm.m\_wmhs .... , A 4A A t A-

leadership. Moreover, many affiliates feel your portfolio as Minister of Police in KwaZulu is contradictory with your alleged commitment to democratic practices and overthrowing apartheid.

3. You and Inkatha spokespersons should desist from all forms of public attacks on the UDF, COSATU, their affiliates and other democratic organizations. We would be happy to create appropriate channels for communicating any criticism, suggestions or apprehensions about the actions of our affiliates. At the same time, you should allow democratic practices to operate freely without fear of recriminations, whenever criticisms are made of Inkatha. Your obsession with seeking legal redress whenever public criticism is made of you should stop in the interests of public debate.

4. You should actively commit yourself to the development of genuinely representative and democratic community and political organizations among our people. This would include allowing all democratic organizations the use of facilities under the control of the KwaZulu government (halls, meeting places, etc.) for the purpose of strengthening their organizations and the democratic process.

The development of mutual commitment to the building of unity in our struggle for a non-racial democratic South Africa is going to be a long and strenuous process as you have observed. Those of us that have the vision, tolerance and humanity-steadfastly to pursue this process must do everything necessary to clear all impediments on what comrade Mandela aptly called, this "no easy walk to freedom."

The UDF, its numerous affiliates and allies and the overwhelming majority of our people have clearly demonstrated this commitment in action, not only in words. Many generations of gallant patriots have paid a heavy price, even with their lives, in our struggle for freedom.

A decisive hour is at hand. I ask that we set aside our personal desires and ambitions to put the interests of our people first.

The art of true leadership is to make every endeavour to acknowledge the errors of the past, recognise the need to remove those impediments within one's control and contribute everything possible for the advancement of our suffering masses.

We will be eager to pursue the quest for unity once your commitment to the above can be seen by all who live in and observe our struggle. '

Sincerely,

(SGD.) A. GUMEDE

President

United Democratic Front

ll have read it into the records, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, to put the record straight. Future analysts of what is happening Ml South Africa today will see it for what it is. The UDF is actually on a path to nowhere and the future will show this to be true. Right now, however, it is hideously destructive of Black imity which history now so demands. The document has a kind of ;/ glib olausibility about it as all pieces of propaganda do. When, ',however, you take it apart and look at it in detail, you not only see that it is a piece of political propaganda but you also start seeing it as a mirror reflecting the deep inadequacies of the :mited Democratic Front and the criminal foolhardiness of its bravado. Take, for example, this sentence in the second paragraph: . "The UDF affiliates were particularly insistent while the OD? is 13 grincigle in favour of discussions and negotiations about I, ways to resolve the violence presently being directed against or '2 people, any such discussions must occur within a properly structured democratic framework."

'Mr. Gumede immediately goes on to say that the UDF leadership is consults its affiliates at all levels before making decisions and immediately goes on to say that such consultation is "at present very difficult given the fact that the South African Government and the KwaZulu Government and Inkatha have in various ways restricted the opportunities available to our membership to meet, discuss and deliberate on various issues."

i Mr. Speaker, there is not one single elected member of this House who could not have been opposed in his constituency during the last telection. In fact Independent Candidates stood against Inkatha Candidates. There is nothing in KwaZulu's constitution and there is nothing in practice in KwaZulu which necessitates Inkatha having to win every elected seat in the House. There was nothing at all to have stopped the UDF from presenting its case to the people and ibeing elected to this Assembly.

It is the UDF which has endorsed itself out of the political power advantages that come with fighting an election, winning it and controlling the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly. We have always struggled for a multi-Party democracy. I yearn for the day when I H can lead in an elected body facing an opposition. That day will twcome because that is what we are committed to bring about. t It is the UDF's insistance on raising non-participation to a political principle that has led to its inability to consult with the people. Not only this, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, but the UDF is itself structured so that it cannot consult the people. It is an affiliate organisation and no UDF leader has ever to stand before a grass root membership to account for his or her actions. The UDF does not want to consult with the people. It only wants to connive in committee structures, where committees represent other committees which represent yet other committees.

This deep malady of separating leadership from the grass root people of the country has its origins in the trouncing of the BPC, SASO and other organisations in the 1970's. Leaders of these organisations set themselves confrontationist tasks in which their noses were bloodied because they tackled that which they could not take through to its logical conclusion. God knows how I abhorred the brutality of the State which crushed the ANC and PAC and which crushed the BPC and other organisations in the 1970's. This abhorrence of State brutality has, however, not driven me to political insanity. Because the State had the brutal power and used the brutal power necessary to crush confrontationist organisations courting violent opposition from the State, many Black leaders indulged in the romanticism that you could have an organisation without members.

They argued in the late 1970's that putting a man or a woman's name on a membership list gave the State a name and address to attack. There was the romanticism which thought that political constituencies can be dispensed with as though Black leaders have got some kind of magic access to the hearts and minds of people and could read what was in them. We, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, know that that is political balderdash. We know that even revolutions have to start with the hard, grinding work of organising people. We know that there are no short cuts to lasting political power.

The ANC itself became intensely aware of its failure to properly mobilise people prior to being banned. Mr. Oliver Tambo himself sent me a message after the 1977 bannings urging me to learn from the history of the ANC. He pointed out that after they had gone into exile, they suffered the terrible disadvantage that they had no viable structures inside South Africa. He said that the ANC was leadership heavy and that they should have paid a great deal more attention to the need to develop local and regional leadership structures.

b

I did not have to be taught this lesson by Mr. Oliver Tambo. I was part of the ANC structures and in the 1960's I knew that there was nothing on the ground to support what they were trying to 'do abroad. I myself had learnt the lesson and I applied that lesson as I organised Inkatha and developed it as a membership-based organisation with democratic procedures to ensure the importance of local and regional leaders.

There is another bit of political reality which I must bring to the attention of members. In the 1976/77 period, the same Black leaders who were abandoning membership-based organisations were actually convinced that the South African Government was on the run and that the struggle would be over within a year or two. They conceived of themselves as being supported by some kind of invincible historical surge forward of Black power. How totally and dismally wrong they were. They abandoned the people who



yeatned to be organised. They abandoned the people who had been through more than a decade in which there were no viable political ,organisations here in this country. There was at demand. for ?TEganisations within which the people themselves could express their aspirations and direct their leaders.

:We had a repeat of this kind of euphoria in the 1983/84 period. You only have to read the ANC's broadcasts from Radio Freedom to see the documentation of this view that the end had at last come within sight. The euphoria spread and spread and once again Black leaders Saw themselves being pushed forward by an invincible tide t(of history. Now the UDF complains that it has difficulty in Iconsulting with the people.

iI make a further point, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, I will not be gagged because the UDF, COSATU and many other organisations have f\_how been battered by Draconian measures. I cannot betray the ,l membership of Inkatha and I cannot betray the millions of- Black lfSouth Africans who look to me for leadership by sitting silent because the UDF, COSATU and other organisations are facing yet # again a South African situation in which those with double agendas ?rorchestrated by elitist leaders out of sight of the people have . been battered so brutally by the State. This in itself is a matter Of great regret to all of us.

iMr. steaker, Honourable Members, we continue the struggle to give Mthe 33F, COSATU and whoever the right to exist and the right to presen: :hei: case to the people. If the UDF ever does survive to rhengey the tight to consult the people, it will be because we on our fside 5:019 forwari into the future never abandoning the cause of ;liberation The objectives we seek, Mr. Speaker, are objectives as much for the UDF and COSATU as we do for ourselves.

e I go on to the next point I want to pick up ins Mr. Gumede's 3 document:

"We in the United Democratic Front certainly agree with you V'that the three central questions faced by anti-apartheid forganizations at present revolve around unity, strategy and democracy and that any attempts to advance these must be . wholeheartedly supported. As will become clear in my letter, Vhowever, we believe your understanding of, and methods of ;yachieving, particularly unity and democracy appears to be limited, f and limiting.''

i'Mr. Gumede says that while I call for "multi-strategy" approaches, the DD? calls for "unity in action." He again complains that KwaZulu and Inkatha have restricted the freedoms on which unity in action must depend. He says that:

- Inkatha forces people to join it.
- That I threaten people employed by the KwaZulu Government and that UDF members were unwelcome in State employ.
- I force medical practitioners and students to sign pledges.
- That my security officers are interviewing people to establish their trustworthiness to Inkatha. -
- That citizens have been victimised when they refuse to succumb.
- That I burn down people's houses who refuse to pay Inkatha subscription fees.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, it is because Mr. Gumede lives out there in some political cuckoo land that he is totally unaware of democratic practice throughout the free world. Nowhere in the free world does any State department or any local authority employ anybody who is committed to undermine the State violently, murder for political purposes and to destroy the property of the State. Everywhere in the free world, civil servants are allowed to join whatever Party they want to join, but nowhere in the free world are civil servants allowed to use their official positions to further Party political aims hostile to the administrations they serve. I will continue to insist that we in this House are responsible for spending money that is rightfully the money that Blacks are entitled to. It is the Black tax payments: it is the Black contribution to the profitability of companies; it is the Black involvement in the economy itself which entitles them to a fair share of the wealth of the State. We do not have a fair share and we will never have a fair share while there is taxation without representation. The burden of responsibility we bear to do the best we can with the little that we do get, demands that we do the best we can with the little that we have got.

I will not tolerate any civil servant who is party to tactics and strategies aimed at destroying KwaZulu property and killing the people of KwaZulu. I simply demand a pledge to assist this House to carry this burden.

Mt. Speaker, Honourable Members, Mr. Gumede is just unreal as the modern idiom goes. He paints a picture of Inkatha having a mass membership because we extract membership fees from people at the point of a gun. Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, if it was possible to do this, if it was possible to gather a membership of over 1.5 million in the short space of ten years through the politics of intimidation, the ANC/UDF/COSATU alliance would long since have had a combined membership of more than 25 million. It is they who specialise in the politics of intimidation. It is the ANC which exhorts Black South Africans to kill their fellow Blacks .. M unsur-unmxg. w).

V'WEQ disagree with them politically. It is the ANC which is attempting to popularise the slogan: "Every combatant a patriot and every patriot a combatant." It is the ANC which is attempting to justify incidences of Black-on-Black confrontation in their attempt to be the only political organisation of note.

Honourable Members, I constantly come back to my theme: looking at Black political organisations in terms of their ability to attack the South African Government where it is weakest. A leader locked in the struggle for liberation, the only merit I can ever find in any Black organisation is the merit that it has to make a contribution to the eradication of apartheid. To do this we must attack the Government where it is weakest.

One of the gravest areas of concern I have always had is a concern that apartheid could be strengthened by the Government establishing political arenas in which it trounces all Black opposition. The Government's homeland policy has had to be opposed. Where did the non-participation principles succeed in trouncing the Government in the arenas that the Government has created for its own victories? How did the non-participation principle assist the millions of our brothers who were abandoned in the TBVC regions? What would have happened in KwaZulu had we in Inkatha not trounced the South African Government here in this arena? What could the UDF have done for the people of KwaZulu as the Government attempted to persuade, cajole and force to accept its offer of so-called independence? We have done our job of work here and we have gone on to do the next job. We have defeated apartheid here in this House. We not only were victorious here in this House but we then used this victory as a springboard for further victories.

We continue to mobilise the people in opposition to apartheid and we continue to expand Inkatha's horizons to go on to break down the barriers between Black and Black as well as between Black and other race groups which apartheid has so desperately attempted to erect. We smash down these barriers in the politics of negotiation and for the first time in the history of South Africa there is real politik on the ground in a major region in which members of every race group jointly support the rejection of apartheid and its replacement by a multi-racial society.

Our opposition in participation has been an opposition which the whole of South Africa depends on. The non-participation of the GDP in the stirring political developments that have taken place in the KwaZulu/Natal region has endorsed them out of real politik. Now they complain that they are not able to consult the people.

Mr. Gumede has to deny the importance of fighting apartheid wherever it can be fought, whether it is inside or outside structures. He says:

"The decisive question therefore is not necessarily that of working within or outside the state structures. What is decisive is the pursuit of the aims of the national democratic struggle to create a united, nonracial and democratic South Africa.

Specifically, this includes, inter alia

- the isolation of the apartheid regime on every front.
- non-collaboration with and isolation of all sections of the repressive security forces.
- the development of people's organizations.
- fighting against all forms of racism and tribalism. Ours is a struggle to end the forcible denationalization of the African majority.
- ending the bantustan system which is the cornerstone of the apartheid system. This involves the rejection of all federal, confederal and other regionalized solutions designed to perpetuate minority rule."

Mr. Speaker, I am always so infuriated with the lack of political sophistication amongst so many Black political leaders. We cannot afford blundering idiots who do not know the first thing about politics. One of the problems that I again and again have to face is that Black leaders so often confuse aims and objectives with tactics and strategies. The isolation of apartheid is an objective. Non-collaboration is an objective. The development of people's organisations is an objective. Fighting all forms of racism and tribalism is an objective. The ending of bantustans is an objective. Mr. Gumede agrees with me. He calls them "aims". The people want more than the aim of isolating apartheid. They want to know how it is going to be done. They want tactics and strategies which can do so. '

Those who want non-collaboration want more than this objective. They want to know how it can be brought about. Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, we strive for non-collaboration ourselves with everything we have got. We strive to prohibit the South African Government succeeding in making us party to our own subjugation. We have tactics and strategies which succeed. Where are the tactics and strategies of the U0? which succeed?

People want more than the objective of fighting all forms of racism. and tribalism. Racism to us is hideous and if tribalism is what Mr. Gumede makes tribalism out to be, then it too is hideous. We have got tactics. and strategies which attack racism and which attack the fragmentation of South Africa into so many small groups where each fight for their own benefit. We have succeeded, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members. We have turned KwaZulu into a bastion

'f strength in the struggle for liberation and everything we do is hne for South Africa and in everything we do, we act first end oremost as South Africans. How does Mr. Gumede think that he can , do better than we have done when he endorses himself out of Elsituations in which it can be done?

'll am utterly sick and tired of the UDF screaming that only their 3 tactics and strategies comprehend the totality of the struggle ?;against apartheid. The ODng leadership does not have tactics and ?strategies capable of achieving specific goals. Protest, they scream, protest; confront, they screamA confront; batter those, they scream, who don't protest and confront the way the DOE :fprotests and confronts, as though so long as there is protest and : confrontation, headway will be made in the struggle for liberation. ?Everywhere the UDF screams that the Freedom Charter says it all.

'eri Speaker, Honourable Members, I respect the Freedom Charter for gthe document that it is, but I never delude myself that it iis a gCharter of action or that it even approaches being a constitution. ?There are in it only broad objectives that were set in the 1950's jphase of the struggle for liberation. It was never authored to be ?a Charter for political action in the 1980's. It simply reflected gthe mood of the people who met at Kliptown in 1955. The UDF has ?to do more than uphold the Freedom Charter. It has to devise itactics and strategies which can bring about the objectives which itthe Freedom Charter sets for them.

Where in the Freedom Charter is there a mandate to set Black ,brothe: against Black brother, Black sister against Black sister :and Black child against Black parent? Where in the Freedom Charter is these a mandate to do everything possible to produce "internecine Black-on-Black confrontation? What the UDF actually does on the ground is alien to the politics of the 1950's. Then Black South Africans struggled with the ANC to bring about Black political unity. They struggled with the ANC to join'peasant and townsmeh into one united whole. This whole quest for unity around the ANC was a quest which was democratically pursued with the highest possible political value being placed on unity between all Blacks.

In the document Mr. Gumede signed as a letter to me, he says: "The practice of democracy requires that at least -four pre-conditions are met:

1. Freedom of association,
2. Freedom of expression and freedom after expression,
3. Freedom of movement,
4. Freedom of organization.

Unfortunately, in Natal/KwaZulu such pre-conditions do not exist for the UDF. Not only are the affiliates of the UDF restricted in the exercise of these fundamental freedoms by the South African Government, but elements of Inkatha and the KwaZulu government play an active role in ensuring that members of the UDF are not allowed to freely associate, speak, move, organise, and, indeed, live."

Mr. Gumede charges Inkatha with:

- Opposition to what he calls "widely-supported" stayaways in the Transvaal in 1984, the Eastern Cape and Natal in 1985.
- With threatening to crush trade unions.
- Opposing the consumer boycott in September 1985 in support of dismissed BTR Sarmcol workers.
- Breaking the consumer boycott of the OK Bazaars in Ladysmith in 1987.
- Going to extreme lengths in the use of violence in the Pietermaritzburg area against the UDF and COSATUw-

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, Mr. Gumede does not mention that Inkatha was not consulted about any one of these confrontationist manoeuvres. The UDF apparently believes that once it has dictated, the whole of Black South Africa must say yes sir, and support what they are doing. It is the UDF which has rejected Inkatha from its very inception and it is the UDF which does not want Inkatha involved in what it is attempting to do. Our members are supposed to involve themselves in stayaways and boycotts because the OD? dictates that they do so. The UDF's action amounts to travesties of democracy. It dictates and then it intimidates to ensure that what it attempts can succeed. Democracy is based on presenting a programme to the people and in persuading them to accept it by choice.

Mr. Speakers, Honourable Members, we are looking at the value of the UDF as a Black organisation which can attack the South African Government where it is weakest. I have never ever argued that the power of workers and Black consumer power should never be used in our struggle. I was, in fact, the first Black leader to talk about these strategies in the seventies. I have only insisted, and I again insist today, that the successful use of consumer power and the power of labour will depend entirely on there being Black unity behind them. There will only be Black unity behind them when Black organisations with grass root membership support, confer with each other about what should be done jointly and what should be done independently.

The UDF endorses Inkatha out of all political discussion and out of all discussion about tactics and strategies. Then the UDF has the sheer naked audacity to attack Inkatha as being undemocratic. The

i'UDF is not interested in Black unity. It is not interested in  
 i islack democracy. It wants to gather together cannon fodder for its  
 " ;conf:entationist tactics and strategies which aim to bring about a  
 - state of ungovernability in South Africa. That, Mr. Speaker,  
 hticannot be done as I have said before, by playing marbles. Violence  
 i has to be used and the use of violence attacks the South African  
 iGoveznment where it is strongest.

\_Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, we set ourselves the objective of  
 u'establishing a mass grass root membership-based organisation and we  
 5 succeeded in establishing Inkatha. We set ourselves the objective  
 ?kof ensuring that KwaZulu is not manipulated into accepting the  
 (firidiculous quasi-type independence the South African Government has  
 Toffeted us, and we succeeded in finally making the Government  
 recognise that Black South Africans are South Africans and that is  
 , what they shall remain. We set ourselves the objective of  
 establishing negotiating bases at the regional level while we at  
 the same time work for negotiation at the national level. We  
 isucceeded at the local and regional levels and while we have not  
 7 yet succeeded at the national level, we have done more than any  
 Vitother organisation in the whole of South Africa to hoist the South  
 'African Government with its own petard. It says that it is  
 / negotiating with Blacks and while it can pick and choose with whom  
 "fit wants to negotiate, it cannot ignore the reality that those  
 einegotiations are pitiful replicas of what negotiation ought to be  
 'as long as KwaZulu and Inkatha are not willing to negotiate the way  
 the Government wants us to negotiate.

We have changed history, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, by the  
 i way in which we held our own on the question of KwaZulu accepting  
 thhe Government's ridiculous quasi independence. It was my refusal  
 to be involved in the Black Advisory Council which the State  
 5 President wanted to establish when he established the President's  
 ' Council. It was my refusal to be involved in the Special Cabinet  
 Committee which made the State President attempt to establish the  
 nonestatutory Negotiating Forum. It was my refusal to be involved  
 in both of these that is now leading the State President into an  
 attempt to establish the National Council. His National Council  
 will not get off the ground unless we are involved in it.

i'This gives emphasis to my contention that each organisation must do  
 what each organisation can best do in its own circumstances and  
 , that Black unity should be based on a multi-strategy approach. Had  
 ? we not stood firm where we did stand firm, South Africa today  
 would be a confederation. Had we not stood firm where we did  
 stand Eirm, today KwaZulu would be a so-called independent country.  
 Had we not stood firm where we did stand firm, the South African  
 Government would not be hung with its own petard and it would have  
 escaped its present dilemma of desperately needing Black  
 endorsement for what it is doing.

The UDF could never have stood firm on these issues because it endorsed itself out of the politics in which standing firm actually achieved something. It is Inkatha's tactics and strategies which were effective in achieving these major objectives. It was Inkatha which successfully attacked the South African Government at these soft points on its under-belly.

Mr. Gumede then goes on to complain about what he sees as the characteristics of Inkatha. He says:

"You have often attacked our democratic organizations arguing that our style of politics would produce a one-party state. But the very practices and product of Inkatha appear to characterise what you interpret as the worst features of a one-party state. Included here would be Inkatha's control over the KwaZulu legislature, the prohibition of opposition parties in KwaZulu, the suppression of organizations (such as COSAS) long before the apartheid regimes did so, the concentration of power in your hands, and the like, all of which do not really indicate Inkatha to be a democratic party in operation".

- It is a blatant political lie that opposition Parties are prohibited in KwaZulu.

n It is a blatant political lie that we suppress organisations.

- It is a blatant political lie that I concentrate power in my hands.

The UDP is not man enough to survive in honest and open elections. It can only specialise in double agenda political work which can be carried out in the dark of the night. The UDP has sought refuge in the non-participation principle because it hasn't got the political guts to participate and win.

We do not suppress organisations. We risk our lives fighting for the right of organisations to exist and to present their case to the people. We are only intolerant of killing for political purposes; and of necklacing, burning, looting and other acts of political barbarity against defenceless people.

In the interview which 'Leadership' magazine conducted with Mr. Gumede he emphasised that UDF leaders were not real leaders and that the people did not listen to them. Now he complains because I have got political power and do command the kind of political respect which makes people want to serve the cause I serve. Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, I do not have power in my hands. I abhor power in a Party political leader. It is the people who have power. It is the electorate in a democratic society which has power. It is the members of Inkatha who have power. I just do their bidding as their servant but this is a brand of politics from

. - Aa- mimn-vmm-mrw sum s n; W;



which Mr. Gumede is alienated. The UDF has not sought to harness the power of the people. It has only sought to ride on the backs of the suffering masses and to be the kind of political opportunist organisation which thinks that political power comes from being at the right place at the right time as the masses move forward.

Hevtnng accused Inkatha of being undemocratic against the background of its own politics of prescription to Black South Africans. Mr. Gumede then goes on to attack what he calls "Inkatha's tribalism." He says that:

"4 Inkatha's intolerance of democratic organisations often becomes displayed as opposition to non-Zulus.

- I and Inkatha repeatedly use racial and ethnic terms to attack democratic organisations.

- That Inkatha frequently accused non-Zulu of being the agitators behind the strategy and tactics employed by democratic organisations.

- That I base my opposition to the inclusion of Ingwavuma into Swaziland because "Zulus would never live under Swazis."

- That I labelled the Reverend Mcebisi Xundu a "Xhosa priest troublemaker."

- That he attacks His Majesty the King for defending the right of Zulus to retain the Zuluness in their souls.

That I attack Indian leaders within the UDF and ANC.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, whenever there have been outbreaks of violence in the Greater Durban Area or in the Pietermaritzburg Area, it has been reported to me that many of the activists involved do not even come from the place where violence has broken out. They have been imported there as agents provocateur from elsewhere. They have been imported as trained activists capable of instigating violence which the UDF then passes off as local Black anger. We know that kombi loads of students arrived at the University of Zululand from the Transvaal to orchestrate the anti-Inkatha violence there. We know that political activists have been transferred from the Eastern Cape and Transvaal to ferment violent conflict in our townships. Even in the recent violence, activists from Pietermaritzburg have been transported to KwaMakhutha, KwaNdengezi, Estcourt, Mnambithi in order to foment violence in those areas.

I would be reneging on my responsibility as a political leader if I did not draw attention to the fact that these activists could be distinguished by the language they spoke. Again and again the UDF has set about making one or another area a no-go area for Inkatha.

They had to import activists to do so and then they had the gall to say that the explosions of violence were proof of local populations turning against me. Of course there are those in our Black townships who are pro-Inkatha and there are those who are anti-Inkatha. Inkatha has never demanded uniformity of mind and heart .and we have never ever pretended to be the only organisation in the field.

i

When it comes, however, to claims that Inkatha suffers landslide losses of face when activists foment violent confrontations as they capitalise on the legitimate grievances of the people, that is an entirely different matter. The United Democratic Front would have been as free as Inkatha to campaign for support if it engaged in non-violent tactics and strategies. We will not have grass-root democracy destroyed by imported political activists trained by revolutionaries to set Black brother against Black brother, Black sister against Black sister and Black child against Black parent. I am totally disgusted at the cheap propaganda Mr. Gumede tries to make against me when he says I base my opposition to the inclusion of Ingwavuma into Swaziland because "Zulus would never live under Swazis." Of course Zulus would refuse to live under Swazi rule. Of course they would refuse to be torn from the land of their birth and put under a foreign government. When I said that Zulus would never live under Swazis, I was making no ethnic comment. I was simply saying that we would die rather than agree to being sold like a huge herd of Black cattle to a Swazi bidder. Mr. Gumede's seizure on these words shows the depths to which he has to sink in order to attempt to make political points against me.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, we in this House are primarily concerned with \_developing democratic structures at grass root levels. Any local population has the right to hang together as a community and to develop communal responses to their environment and to their political circumstances; Wherever there is democracy in the world, the local community is a vital structure. Everywhere in the world where there are democracies there is local government, regional government and national government.

People indigenous to any particular area have a sovereign right to respond to their circumstances as people of that area. We in this country have been faced with a hideous migrant labour system in which the members of local Black communities have been dispersed by the need to escape starvation as they seek work wherever it can be found. They had been precluded from taking their families with them. There is a dynamic in local politics which revolves around the fragmentation of local communities by apartheid. Apartheid has eroded the will of the people at the local level to develop local responses to their circumstances.

Also everywhere in the world, local communities expand and shrink as some of its members leave and new-comers enter the community. Where this happens, communities constantly adjust and re-adjust as they seek to find common cause that binds them together. I have already pointed out that this process is disrupted by activists who are drafted in from other areas by the UDF to usurp the right of a local community to do what that local community wants to do about its circumstances. The UDF has a hideous kind of paternalism in which they treat local residents as "kaffirs" who have to be taught what to think and told what to do for their own good.

The Reverend Xundu was a political activist, and he did come from outside, as he came from the Republic of the Transkei. He never attempted the things in the Transkei which he was doing here. He was abusing the fact that in KwaZulu we did not have perpetual emergency regulations, such as those which apply in the Transkei. When he returned to the Transkei he was in fact locked up by the Transkeian Government under those emergency regulations. He is a Transkeian, but it was not his being Xhosa-speaking that I had trouble with. We have tens of thousands of Blacks in Inkatha who are Xhosa-speaking, plus others. I never attacked him as a Xhosa as Mr. Gumede is now distorting my words. I was simply pointing to the fact that he was not an indigenous member of the community in which he was fermenting Black-on-Black confrontation. There is also the moral perception that any man or woman has a particular kind of responsibility to the community from which he or she came. The question of what political activists do for their own communities is a vitally important question in South Africa. We have seen again and again how community after community became engulfed in violent activity as activists moved across the country to cause maximum disruption. In any case, can Mr. Gumede tell us what the Reverend Xundu did to stop the "independence" of the Transkei.

It is apartheid which has divided Black from Black. It is hideous politics for Blacks to fall victim to this divisiveness of apartheid and turn KwaZulu's urban people against KwaZulu's rural people. The smear of tribalism which Mr. Gumede so happily uses makes him one of the most tragic victims of apartheid. Black South Africans belong together. Their political organisation and their political tactics and strategies ought to transcend the limitations which apartheid has attempted to place on them.

There is no Black community anywhere in South Africa which does not live within the boundaries of Government-created structures. Soweto was created by the South African Government. Anybody who lives within Soweto is living within an urban homeland. There is no escape from a law which makes every Black South African a member of one or another ethnic group. This is what we struggle against. We in Inkatha are deeply committed so to conduct our affairs that we contribute significantly to the scrapping of the Population Registration Act. This will happen, Mr. Speaker, and when it does happen, Inkatha will have contributed to creating a situation in

which it will not be possible to distinguish between Zulu and non-Zulu, legally or constitutionally. If we were tribalistically inclined, we would campaign for the retention of the Population Registration Act which gives us a legal and constitutional identity as Zulus.

These are not simply propaganda statements. The whole world now knows how seriously we strove to reach consensus in the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba. The Indaba's constitutional proposals which we have thus far supported in principle, contain not one single element which can distinguish between one Black and another Black. If we were tribalistically inclined we would have argued for the recognition of the right of Zulu people as Zulus to form a constitutional structure within first and second tier government. I have always abhorred the Government's homeland policy. It is because I abhor it that I accepted the people's demand that I lead them to oppose the structures which the Government at the time was foisting on us. We opposed the introduction of Tribal and Regional Authorities. I personally stomped the length and breadth of KwaZulu mobilising the people against the introduction of these structures. Finally, the South African Government simply told us we had no choice in the matter and foisted these structures on us in exactly the same way as they foisted the structures of Black townships on Blacks living in them. Given this reality, I would have been a political coward had I not accepted the responsibility of carrying on the fight. It is the non-participation of Blacks in these structures in some regions of South Africa that led to some areas being afforded so-called independence. Had those who opposed these structures as vehemently as I opposed them not sought an easy out by espousing the nonparticipation principle, and had instead remained in their respective areas to fight this evil from within, they would have achieved what we in KwaZulu have achieved - the first stage defeat of the homeland policy.

Mr. Gumede also has the audacity to attack His Majesty the King. He attacks His Majesty for defending the right of Zulus to retain the Zuluness in their soul. His Majesty is beyond Party politics..1 Zuluness in the soul of Zulus gives Zulus a quality in whatever political Party they choose to serve. We are a proud people with a rich cultural heritage. That cultural heritage adds vitality to our struggle against apartheid. Our whole history as a Zulu peoples has again and again demonstrated how our unity worked to help us ; oppose first imperialism and then racism.

I was born a Zulu, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members. I will die a Zulu. I am proud of my Zuluness. It adds purpose to my being and it adds meaning to my life. It adds strength to my determination, & to fight for the eradication of every form of racism in South African politics and in South Africa's social and economic life. As a proud Zulu is not precluded from being a South African first. It is in fact assists him or her to be a South African of note. 7

It is only in socialist/communist dictatorships that regional cultural forces are seen as threatening. Culture makes people walk tall. It arms them against being victims of the politics of prescription. It arms them against being told what to think and how to think. It arms them against being turned into the flotsam and jetsam in the stormy seas of Party political strife. There is no contradiction between being a highly cultured person and being a true patriot in South Africa. Those who want to make this contradiction a political reality side with the successive South African Governments which have always striven to do just this. They carry on the hideous work of apartheid as they turn Black brother against Black brother, Black sister against Black sister and Black child against Black parent.

Mr. Gumede also complains that I attack Indian leaders within the UDF and the ANC. Nowhere in anything I have ever said do I deny Indians the right that God has given them to participate in the (freedemocratic politics that they choose to espouse. I have always urged Indians to fight side by side with their Black brothers and , fSistets for the good of South Africa. I have never treated the . Indian community as a community of political lepers. All I have i ever done is to abhor anybody who participates in the tactics and strategies which set Black brother against Black brother. There is a political reality about the hideousness of this when it emanates from other race groups which are in fact much better off than are a Black South Africans. There is something hideous about turning 1;Blacks into a pack of dogs who kill each other for the bones that are lying around. I can withdraw no word I have ever uttered in condemnation of Indians who have been guilty of doing just this. thence are a great many Indians, a silent majority of Indians, who Wideeely appreciate many of the things I have said about Indian troublemakers in Black politics. The Indian community of South Africa wants a just country and it wants a country in which there 1-.will be equality for all before the law and the constitution. They know that I strive for precisely this and that my political i victories will be victories which in the end will scrap the Population Registration Act and give them sovereignty as individuals in their own right with the right to pursue whatever they want to pursue as individuals. The Indian community at large ,; knows that I am not a racist and that I fight for the country they would wish to see emerge. One of my closest political partners is Mr. Yellan Chinsamy who remains standing with us to this day in the South African Black Alliance.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, I have in fact.already said more than enough to show Mr. Gumede up for what he is. What I have said refutes the totality of Mr. Gumede's letter to me. I must, however, bear in mind that this was not in fact a real letter to me. It is a propaganda document. I have to set the record straight on every section in it. We know what kind of an organisation the DD? is and I need to take up more of the valuable

time available to us in this year's KwaZulu Legislative Assembly session to look at the remaining sections of the so-called letter. Having attacked me for furthering tribalism, Mr. Gumede incredibly goes on to attack me for "Inkatha's support for the apartheid system." Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, let me first of all say in summary:

1. Apartheid has stciven to establish a divided South Africa and to hive off Black ethnic groups to form their own governments to achieve a South Africa in which there will 'be one domindLinJ ceqtral White State surrounded by dependent Black satellite states.

Inkatha cherishes the ideal of a one-man-one-vote system of government in a unitary State and in any compromise we are prepared to make for the sake of South Africa and all its people, we insist on

- there being one South Africa
- there being one sovereign Parliament
- there being one electorate
- there being universal adult franchise
- there being no legal and .constitutional distinction between people on the ground of race, colour or creed.

k)

Apartheid attempted to use the divide and rule principle to weaken Black opposition and to give a divided Black South Africa ethnic interests which would undermine national Black unity.

Inkatha has opposed this divide and rule policy and it has opposed it effectively. -

- In eyeball-to-eyeball confrontations with successive South African Prime Ministers and later with the present State President, I have insisted that even if the law can take a horse to the water, it cannot make it drink, and that Black South Africa will never participate in its own subjugation.

- Inkatha is a product of history in which Blacks insist on their rights to form political organisations which defy every boundary apartheid ever attempted to erect.

- It was not long after Inkatha was formed that the then Minister of Police, Mr. Jimmy Kruger, told me bluntly to my face that he would not tolerate the activity of Inkatha beyond KwaZulu's boundaries. I rejoindered by saying bluntly that Inkatha would continue to do so as a national liberation organisation.

After the support of Inkatha began spreading and spreading and spreading, the Department of Information attempted to ferment internal KwaZulu resistance to Inkatha by funding the formation of the Shaka Spear Party. Inkatha has mobilised the whole of KwaZulu to reject every overture and every pressure from the Government to make us accept socalled independence.

Inkatha has never done anything to give any kind of credibility to the Tricameral Parliament as a divide and rule instrument.

I criss-crossed the length and breadth of South Africa campaigning against the new constitution during the referendum.

I refused to have anything to do with the Black Advisory Council which the State President attempted to set up to give the Tricameral constitution superficial. Black support. It died stillborn because of my refusal to participate.

I would have nothing to do with the Special Cabinet Committee which was set up to do exactly the same thing.

I would have nothing to do with the Non-statutory Negotiating Forum which was set up to supplement the failing Special Cabinet Committee.

I have declared my total opposition to Regional Services Councils which the Government attempts to make one of the legs on which the Tricameral Parliament rests. W

I now declare my total opposition to the kind of National Council which the State President is attempting to set up because he refuses to unshackle Black democracy and to make possible national Black unity around the issues which must be negotiated if we are going to reach consensus on the future of South Africa.

Inkatha's own membership is open to all Blacks and every Black whatever his or her ethnic background may be, is eligible for election to every office in the organisation.

When I established the Buthelezi Commission I defied the Government's insistence that the Commission only look at KwaZulu affairs within the framework of separate development.

I now say bluntly to Mr. Chris Heunis and the State President that I have made the Government's acceptance of the reality of there being a Black majority in the country a fundamental issue in any negotiations, whether they be negotiations about the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba

proposals or anything else to do with the future constitution of South Africa.

\_ I have met the State President formally only thrice in the nine years of his term of office and I have only met him informally once. I have now nothing to say to the State President other than what I have already told him to his face, namely that he must release Dr. Nelson Mandela, Mr. Zeph Mothopeng and othef political prisoners\_ and that he must accept that there is one South Africa, with one people with one destiny.

- I successfully opposed the South African Government's intention to excise the Ingwavuma area from South Africa for inclusion in Swaziland. The matter went from the Supreme Court to the Appellate Division and I trounced the South African Government's determined intention to further its divide and rule policy.

- Inkatha has been successful in opposing the Government's divide and rule policy on a very wide range of fronts. Most importantly in this regard, I have been able to develop strong White, Indian and Coloured constituencies in complete defiance of apartheid's intention to encapsulate me in KwaZulu politics. Of all the Black organisations in the country, Inkatha has done the most to develop common cause between Black, White, Indian and Coloured. The tactics and strategies I adopt at the demand of Inkatha's Annual General Conferences, are tactics and strategies which bridge racial gaps which the Government has so desperately tried to create.

- Inkatha has played a very valuable role in heightening the awareness of West European and vNorth American governments that they now need to do something about South Africa. For decades these governments paid lip service to the struggle against apartheid. Inkatha has done more than most to give 'hope that democratic opposition to apartheid will succeed. The West now has something worth backing. If there is no hope of democratic forces succeeding, the West would have adopted a condemnatory hands-off attitude towards South Africa. They now adopt a condemnatory hands-on attitude which would not be the case if they had to choose between apartheid and violent revolution. It is this recognition of Inkatha's importance that has led to invitations to me to consult with Western Heads of State. When I met President Ronald Reagan, Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Prime Minister Jacques Chirac, I met them at their request because they wanted to express Western hope that sanity would prevail in this country and that we would avoid a bloody revolution. After all this, Mr. Gumedede has the effrontary to state that:



g

"2. Inkatha's support Egg the apartheid system

Your and Inkatha's participation in the bantustan structures of the apartheid regime is no longer another manifestation of a multi-strategy approach necessitated by objective political conditions. On the contrary, participation in and control of the KwaZulu administration has been consciously developed as the foundation of, and has become fundamental to, your political designs and ambitions."

,Mr. Speaker, I again remind Honourable Members that our prime political concern is to eradicate apartheid for the scourge that it is. I again say that we can only judge Black organisations in terms of their utility in the process of eliminating apartheid. I again say that we can only judge Black organisations in terms of the extent to which they attack apartheid where it is weakest. It is absolutely true that my and Inkatha's participation in and control of the KwaZulu Administration has been consciously developed." Of course we have developed this control. Of course we have established ourselves in a commanding position in KwaZulu. There is nothing wrong with us having done this but instead of conferring accolades on us for this success, Mr. Gumede says that my "and Inkatha's participation in the bantustan structures of the apartheid regime is no longer another manifestation of a multi-strategy approach necessitated by objective political conditions." Mr. Gumede is politically illiterate if this is what he believes. In the National Party's election manifesto it still undertakes to lead ; for the so-called independence of so-called homelands or 5 national states. As recently as the 29th of February Mr. F.W. de Klerk, the leader of the National Party in the Transvaal and a member of Mr. P.W. Botha's Cabinet, told Dr. A.P. M. Dlamini, leader of the Conservative Party, in front of millions of viewers, that the South African Government had not attempted to get Blacks in the national states to lead independence.

0

m

L!) 1,

"0 fl. 0 H O

. r' .,

"J F' r4

r4 0' r-

:3 if 'we vacated our positions here in this House today, -with the South African Government would tomorrow begin manoeuvring for the emergence of a KwaZulu Legislative Assembly which would accept its offer of so-called independence. Objective conditions demand our continued resistance to this divide and rule policy. We will not renegade, on our commitment in the South African struggle for liberation to block the South African Government at this level. Because Mr. Gumede's and the UDF's opposition to apartheid is based on their deep envy of the political might of Inkatha's entrenched position in the struggle for liberation because of our tactics and strategies and because of the fact that we have created a bastion of strength against apartheid here in this House.

TmrTrT

Our success proves them wrong. They smart under the political lessons that we are teaching them. Of course we will do everything in our power to strengthen our bastion against apartheid here in this House. Of course we will do everything in our power to develop our opposition to apartheid as we constantly expand our participatory opposition tactics. That is what we are in business for. That is why we were elected to this House. This is what we owe not only Zulu South Africans but every Black South African in the country. .

The UDF has no solid political base because it neither relies on direct membership and roots its power in the people, nor does it move to attack the South African Government where it is weakest. We do so, and we succeed, and they become insanely jealous.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, it was Black politicians and so-called leaders of Mr. Gumede's ilk who condemned Inkatha in the 1976-78 period, just as Mr. Gumede is condemning us now. He is saying nothing new. We have heard it all before. Mr. Gumede, however, now becomes all sanctimonious in his so-called letter to me by saying:

"It is a matter of profound regret that an organization which showed such immense promise to mobilise our struggling people against the Vorster/Botha regime was instead used to direct our people's energies towards

- aggrandisement of a failing strategy
- creating greater divisions within the ranks of the people
- attacking and eliminating democratic civic, youth, student and political organizations created by the very people who you say should be given a 'determining voice.'

Mr. Gumede suddenly now says that Inkatha showed such immense promise to mobilise our struggling people against the Vorster/Botha regime. How hypocritical can you get. We are doing now what we did then. Mr. Gumede should see now the promise which he sees that we did have then. We face the same threats now from apartheid as we faced then. The same soft under-bellies that apartheid had then, are there to be attacked today. In fact they are not only there but the soft underbellies of apartheid which were there then are now much softer because of Inkatha's attack.

We are not Ely-by-night leaders who chop and change with each prevailing publicity wind. No matter how hard the road to final victory becomes, we follow that road. We see a tactic through to its final successful conclusion. We have sunk our teeth into the apartheid problem, and we will not let go. Mr. Gumede expects us

ezwmwkvvagsWIWW'mM?" .3"wa-

to abandon everything and rush to do what new-fangled leaders. in new-fangled organisations with new-fangled tactics and strategies, tell us to do.

Speaker, Honourable Members, there are some sections of Mr. S 'so-called letter which are really beneath my dignity to go to great depth. Having accused us of bolstering apartheid -icipating in it, he goes on to say we aggrandize a failing strategy, create divisions within the rank and file of the people, attack and eliminate democratic, civic, youth, student and . political organisations created by the people.

W

(TH

How dare Mr. Gumede talk about organisations created by the people ;:when he himself is a President of an organisation which committees hvformed out of the blue in Cape Town in 1983? How dare he talk about organisations created by the people when he is President of an organisation which is not membership-based and which does not have annual conferences at which he and others are held accountable to the people for what they do and say?

(I)

He has the sheer audacity to say that we are divisive. The UDF's tactics and strategies are scorned by the people until they are battered and bruised into doing what the UDF tells them to do. It ;718 against this battering and bruising of ordinary people, and it is against this hideous form of political dictatorship that we in ; Inkatha direct our opposition. We are democrats who work entirely h within the framework of what the people instruct us to do. The UDF in a very sick way aggrandizes apartheid by saying only a successful revolution can topple the South African Government. w They aggrandize apartheid by making it appear so powerful that the 'best non-violent tactics and strategies which Black South Africa can mount, will fail. However they talk out of both sides of their mouths and however much they squirm, they cannot escape the . implications of their commitment to establish the ANC as a "-government returned from exile. They are fetch-and-carry boys for an organisation which has declared the armed struggle the primary means of bringing about change in South Africa and which uses violence in South Africa for political purposes, whether or not it is violence against Blacks or Whites, just as they plant bombs in public places regardless of whom the bombs kill. The UDF has declared its intention to make South Africa ungovernable and has declared its intention to annihilate Inkatha. i It is the UDF'S involvement in the politics of confrontation isuported by intimidation, and it is the UDF's attempt to dictate to Black South Africa that is the root cause of the divisiveness of which Mr. Gumede now complains.

Mr. Gumede then goes on to say:

"If there is a genuine desire on your part for unity in our quest to dismantle apartheid, there must certainly also be the willingness to address and act on the following urgently to create a climate for peaceful co-existence."

Mr. Gumede then makes the following demands:

1. That I stop the violence and aggression unleashed by Inkatha against members of UDF affiliates. i

Ex)

I should distance myself from what he calls the "intimidatory" actions of the KwaZulu Police Force.

3. I and Inkatha spokesmen should desist from all forms of public attacks on the UDF, COSATU, their affiliates and other democratic organisations. - '

4. I should actively commit myself to the development of what he calls "genuinely representative and democratic community and political organisations".

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, Mr. Gumede is now beginning in this so-called letter to say the same thing over and over again. It is as though he has learnt the lesson of political propaganda that if you say one thing in three different places in one document people just believe what you say.

There never has been and there never will be violence and aggression unleashed by Inkatha against members of UDF affiliates. It is Inkatha which faces organisations committed to use violence not only against the State but also against Black South Africans who dare to disagree with them. Inkatha will defend itself to the death. .

Wherever the KwaZulu Police are permitted by law to operate, Blacke on48lack confrontations leading to Black killing Black are quelled. We all know that if KwaZulu Police had jurisdiction to operate within the Greater Pietermaritzburg Area, the most hideous spate of political killings in living memory would have been averted. The KwaZulu Police support every attempt to establish non-violent ways and means of bringing about radical change. If the UDF were committed to bringing about change through non-violence, the KwaZulu police would be its greatest friend. It is against the violence unleashed by members of the UDF and its affiliates that KwaZulu Police act.

Then, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, Mr. Gumede demands that I be politically gagged in the face of the hideously defamatory political propaganda which the UDF and its affiliates launch

i

i

l

i

i,

,l

i

i

g

.3

g

l%;

a

me before he is prepared to talk with me about Black unity.

t

It the DD? wants me to stop attacking it publicly, then it must  
 hrs: cease attacking me publicly. It must also first cease being  
 -wvoived in inhumanly hideous political practices. Wherever I find  
 it that which is hideous in politics, I will condemn it. We in  
 5..Inkatha end this House, Mr. Speaker, wage an honourable struggle  
 Eww iteration which enables us to walk tail before all men. We  
 i ttacked, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, because we  
 trate the power of the hallowed values of the struggle for  
 tion as they gather people together. " " V'

E, On the question of Black unity, I want to make the additional point  
 it that Inkatha has unified more Blacks in South Africa than anyv  
 Q organisation has ever done in the history of the country.

g,,Inkathais over 1.5 million members are united Black South Africans  
 g vspeaking with one voice and striving for the same commonly held  
 ,"ideais. - Inkatha is not riddled with internal problems vand it  
 ' shows none of the tendencies to split and split again which has so  
 fcharacterised Black political organisations which are not  
 V,membership-based and whose leaders are not elected directly by the  
 ipeople and held accountable to them. We do have internal dissent  
 'now and then, and always try to settle our problems through  
 structures set up for the purpose in our constitution.

:N;Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, I had to deal with this so-called  
 LC letter from Mr. Gumede in depth. I have done so in the context of  
 eurVeyng Black South African organisations involved in politics.  
 ?The deepest poverty of the UDF, however, cannot be exposed in my  
 " responses tothe so-called letter signed by Mr. Gumede. I want to  
 hstand back and take a broader look at the UDF and its tactics and  
 fstrategies.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, I earlier expressed my anger-at  
 the iask of political sophistication in so many Black political  
 leaders; and that some of the problems I again and.again have to  
 ,face are the problems created by Black leaders who confuse tactics  
 hand strategies with aims and objectives. I want again to pick up  
 ithis point as we continue looking at Black politics and judge  
 . organisations and the action they take in terms of whether or not  
 .they attack apartheid where it is weakest.

,Protest against racist discrimination is vital. It keeps alive the  
 hallowed values of the struggle for liberation and draws the  
 world's attention to how Blacks are treated in this country.  
 Protest must be made wherever a proud people face subjugation.  
 Protest must be made whenever there is injustice and protest is  
 valuable in the mobilisation of people.

Pretest, however, has its greatest political utility when it is  
 included in tactics and strategies which are designed to gain  
 political ground towards a.clearly defined objective. It is one of

t

the sicknesses of South Africa's Black body politic that protest which originated as one facet of a multi-pronged attack on a particular objective, lives on to become a way of life. Protest for the sake of protest takes over to delude those involved that they are struggling for the liberation of their country. Protest that is indiscriminate in its targets is protest for the sake of protest.

A local community that finds a rent hike or a bus fare hike totally unfair and intolerable has a God-given right to air their grievances in protest. There are many examples of constructive protest used by aggrieved communities which have "achieved alleviation from one or another burden. Having achieved the objective, however, the protest action concerned will then be put aside as something that was used successfully in particular circumstances. The danger is, however, that wherever genuine protest does take place aimed at a particular objective, there are always high profile celebrity and media-created leaders who leap to the fore to claim the protest as their protest and to present themselves as heroes of the people. They develop a kind of hunger for protest prominence and turn all protest into schemes of self-aggrandizement.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, some of the maladies in Black South African politics are difficult to uncover because they are so often clothed in all the trappings of the liberation struggle. It is the double agendas of those involved that gives many a protest action the sickness I am talking about. 'Protest politics is the happy hunting ground for Black leaders who have not got the guts or the stamina to establish viable political constituencies. It is the happy hunting ground of those who want to fan the flames of confrontation leading to violence because they want to make the country ungovernable. Worse still, it is the happy hunting ground of those who want to prostitute genuine political grievances to make Party political gains for groups which are not at all interested in the grievance, nor are they interested in the people who are genuine in their protest.

Rent boycotts, bus boycotts, boycotts of commercial centres which originated in genuine protest have been hijacked by civic organisations and other UDF affiliates across the length and breadth of the country. The UDF does not have a grass root constituency. It is not a membership-based organisation. It cannot direct people in discipline drives towards achievable objectives. The UDF reaches out for the stars, postures as being committed to achieving what is impossible and emerges from it all as the darlings of Western Europe and North America. The UDF breeds celebrity leader after celebrity leader who trot around the world and posture on international platforms as the saviours of South Africa, whereas they cannot come home to accumulate political gains and take the struggle forward.

The 1976/78 period was re-lived in the 1984/86 period. Confrontation leading to violence which we saw so frequently in the 1976/78 period was repeated in the 1984/86 period. The 1976/78 period saw the emergence of a wide range of self-appointed leaders, mediawcreated leaders and celebrity leaders, just as the 1984/86 period did. The 1976/78 period generated a dangerous euphoria that the South African Government was on the run and militant protest 'leaders were well on the way to leading the country to a final victory. The same euphoria developed in the 1984/86 period. 7' We have seen it all before - self-righteous posturing of those who condemn Inkatha because we are adamant in our commitment to the rtactics and strategies that achieve political objectives - sneezing contempt for what we do because our strategies have not yet finally won the struggle for Black South Africa because we will not jump on handwagons that go nowhere. Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, we -have seen it all before. The 1984/86 period in South African political history, however, saw a growth in the solidarity and txrdetermination of Inkatha, just as the 1976/78 period did.- Our

i  
E  
E  
E  
E  
E  
E  
l  
i  
i  
r  
E

commitment has again and again been reconfirmed as the correct commitment by those who sneer at us one day and who are lost to the struggle the next day. The correctness of our approach to politics has again and again been demonstrated by the fact that Inkatha has moved ever closer to the political centre of gravity of South Africa.

t'WIt is ttue we have lost an individual here or there. We have not emerged entirely unscathed from the politics of intimidation ccnducted at the height of these passing euphorias. This I say however. Inkatha is today more internally coherent and characterised by a deeper sense of solidarity than has ever been the case before. Inkatha has emerged to stay as a political force in South African politics.

--

l despair when I begin to realise that the United Democratic Front is the pawn that it is in the wider political battle which it neither controls nor understands. One thing everyone can be quite sure of is that the ANC will do everything in its power to crush any rival organisation in this country. It postures as the sole representative of Black South Africa and it claims single-handedly to lead the real struggle. Our brothers and sisters in the External Mission of the ANC are terrified of any kind of Third Force development. Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, we love Third Forces, Fourth Forces, Fifth Forces - any amount of forces - because we struggle to give Black political organisations the liberty to campaign amongst the people and we struggle to give the people the liberty to support whichever organisation they want to support.

This is not the case with the ANC Mission in Exile. The power-mongers in it are only interested in ensuring their total political supremacy which will give them total command over all South Africa.

They are using the United Democratic Front affiliates as pawns in their political game. They know that the UDF is not structured to make political decisions and to give effect to these decisions by commanding forces on the ground.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, groups of comrades and street corner committees which the UDF is being instrumental in setting up, will ever-increasingly become a law unto themselves. They cannot be directed; they cannot be disciplined; they cannot be sent out and recalled. They can only be unleashed on the Black public to help create the kind of ungovernability from which the ANC alone could possibly benefit. '

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, the UDF will yet burn out politically but that ironically will be tragic for Inkatha. When the day comes that the UDF should be involved in picking up the pieces that they smashed asunder, and when the day comes when they should put right that which they put wrong, they, will be but nothing, capable of doing nothing. We will have to pick up the pieces that the UDF is scattering asunder. We will have to put, right that which they put wrong. We will have to mop up the UDF mess. The ANC will not do so because they are directing the UDF to be a passing phenomena with no lasting value which in any way threatens them. The ANC's manipulation of the UDF is revolutionary callousness at its very worst.

The ANC has declared war on Inkatha because Inkatha has all the value of being permanently involved in the South African struggle for liberation and of being an organisation in which the people themselves determine what we do and what we do not do. The ANC does not want the people to determine what political organisations on the ground in this country do. The ANC only wants to dictate what we should do and how we should do it. The ANC attacks Inkatha because Inkatha is growing politically ever more powerful. Inkatha also threatens the ANC with real prospects of being able to pull the South African situation together sufficiently to enable the politics of negotiation to establish a new society in which the ANC will be but one of many organisations entitled to campaign for power.

The ANC Mission in Exile attacks the Government where it is strongest and it wants to destroy every organisation capable of succeeding in attacking the Government where it is weakest. Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, I suffer deep pain as I have to say these things. I constantly hold out my hand in friendship to all Black organisations, including the ANC, but they constantly spit in my face and reject my right to lead the way the masses in South Africa demand they be led. It is the ANC which has declared war on Inkatha. It is the ANC which is moving events to the point where there could only be a fight to the finish. It is the ANC which orchestrates the killing of Inkatha members and it is the ANC which puts a price on my life.



Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, Inkatha has to survive the Ohlslaught directed against it. Too many things are at stake in this country for us to lay down on our backs in submission to the dictates of revolutionaries. I do not care two hoots whether I have any political role after the struggle for liberation has been achieved. I struggle for my country and I struggle for the people of South Africa. I struggle for justice, whoever may lead a just government. It is not personal ambition that drives me on to ,persevere in that which I am doing. I never want to be anything other than an elected leader and if the people want me to step aside, they will have the freedom to ask me to do so when I have achieved what I want for them. I have no personal vendettas . against the ANC or any of the members of the National Executive of 'the Mission in Exile. They are my brothers and sisters and I yearn for their safety and return to this country. I feel the pain of knowing their pain in exile. If I could do anything to return them to the land of their birth for which they so yearn, I would do it today.

. .Jyngyvfn) \_.' .y

I would, however, be irresponsible to the people who elected me to office if I did not take issue with the ANC's Mission in Exile about some of the things they are doing which the people who elected me to office reject in part and in whole. I would be irresponsible if I allowed the things the people want, to be destroyed by the ANC Mission in Exile. Here, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, I want to pause and look at some of the things V our brothers in exile, together with the UDF and COSATU in South iAfrica, are endangering.

g Inkatha's internal solidarity and its real politicalw strength 4 enable it to go beyond self-preservation to attempt to do something i for the people of South Africa. When I set up the Buthelezi 5 Commission, Inkatha per se had no need for that Commission. The xButhelezi Commission was my hand of friendship which I held out to -ace groups and to all organisations in this country. Mr. r, Honourable Members, I personally stepped aside to let the 'Commission get on with its work without influencing it. I created the Commission as a forum for opinion in my commitment to establish the politics of negotiation, whatever the outcome of such negotiation would be for me and Inkatha.

I There is an old saying which says that if you are in love with ' love, you will never know true love yourself. In the same way, if you are in love with power, you will never know true power yourself. Real and lasting power comes as a by-product of doing lthat which is historically right and ethically correct. Real and lasting power also comes only to a few in a certain ripeness of time because others have done what ought to have been done to create that ripeness of time. I, Mr. Speaker, lead to do what ought to be done now, regardless of who will finally benefit. The Buthelezi Commission was called into being to achieve objectives far beyond Party political objectives. Yet the ANC and the UDF have done everything in their power to destroy the credibility of

this historic meeting of minds across racial and political barriers.

When we set about negotiating with the then Natal Provincial Council to establish a Joint Executive Authority, we again involved ourselves in attempts to do something for tSouth wAfrica. We attempted to negotiate an historical breakthrough into existence.- The value of what we negotiated finally would be there for South Africa, whether or not I continued as a leader or whether or not there was an Inkatha. Our strength enabled us to do something out there for the people.

When we went on as the KwaZulu Government to negotiate about the emergence of a Joint Legislative Authority in this region of South Africa, we took an even bolder step which was totally unrelated to any Party political ambitions Inkatha may have. The Joint Legislative Authority would be supported, Mr. Speaker, by the Members of this House, whether or not the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly continued to exist or was dissolved. We in this House are committed to what is good for South Africa.

We supported the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba's constitutional proposals in principle because they started to move this region in the right direction. We supported them in principle because the full weight of the hallowed values of the struggle for liberation demand that we put the State before the Party. We in this House have always been prepared to enter a new era in which the hallowed values of our struggle would become a reality for the people, whoever held high office.

Yet the ANC, UDF and COSATU have done their damndest to discredit the negotiated 'Joint Executive 'Authority and the negotiated constitutional proposals of the Indaba. They have sullied that which was a beautiful beginning. They have trampled under foot deeply hallowed values and they have done so because they see no Party political gain in the moves for themselves. The ANC most certainly does not want the politics of negotiation to succeed. The UDF as the fetch-and-carryboys for the Mission in Exile have never participated in the politics of negotiation and they have never worked on the ground with us to make the politics of negotiation a reality, not only because they do not have the political weight necessary to do so, but also because they are obedient to Lusaka.

I believe we have now to stand back awhile and re-examine what we have done in the Buthelezi Commission, negotiations between the then Natal Provincial Council and in the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba. In all these endeavours to reach out to our fellow South Africans and to reach out to all political groupings, we had to venture to the very extremities of the compromises we dare make without betraying

glthe people. The extent of our daring must now clearly be stated  
itfor everyone to hear.

iuLet us list the compromises, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, so  
i'that we put a name to what we are talking about. In the Buthelezi  
:LCommission, in the negotiations with the Natal Provincial Council  
'and in the negotiations in the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba, we had to  
; compromise to keep negotiations alive and to speak with a consensus  
'Evoice. In all these negotiations we knew:

The winner-takeSeall principle in our cherished dream of a  
one-man-one-vote system of government in a unitary State would  
have to be re-examined if compromises from the other side  
promised to meet us half way.

The Black struggle for liberation originated in the  
acceptance of the Westminster model and the Black demand to  
be included in it. As we negotiated, we knew with growing  
certainty that we would have to look for an alternative  
constitutional model if we were ever to bridge the gaps in  
our polarised society. We were prepared to look at federal  
and other constitutional forms in our search for the supreme  
objective of joining Black, White, Indian and Coloured into  
one electorate with the right to establish one sovereign  
Parliament in one sovereign country.

We who have suffered so terribly under the hideously unjust  
racial laws of South Africa have come to know that the finest  
form of group and cultural protection is to be found in the  
pretection of the individual. The more we negotiate, however,  
the more we realise that those who had not suffered oppression  
but were in the past the oppressors, were mortally afraid of  
he monster of racial domination that they themselves had  
d, would be used against them. We realised that this was a  
ear unto death in scorched earth policies. We had to  
promise and look seriously at allying a Bill of Rights with  
;stem of minority right protection. l

what is so seldom perceived, Mr. Speaker, 13 that we had to  
Vcompromise on the time factor in all the negotiations we were  
involved in, whether they were in the Buthelezi Commission or  
in the Natal Provincial Council or in the KwaZulu/Natal  
Indaba. A ruling passion of the struggle for liberation has  
always been the achievement of a once and for all victory if  
not now then at the very soonest. Black South Africans  
always have been deeply sceptical about delayed gratification  
in political matters. Blacks want political victory and they  
want .it now. In all our negotiations, we had to say to  
ourselves that compromises would have to pave the way and that  
we would have to give South Africa more time than we hoped  
would be necessary.

5. Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, when we talk about compromise in real politics, we cannot confine ourselves to constitutional matters. The idiom of politics itself must come into play. Expectations of people, whether they be realistic or unrealistic, must come into play. That is why so many leaders and Parties turn to promise people Utopias tomorrow which they know can never be produced. We had to make serious political compromises as we declared our preparedness to stand aside and forego the political gains that could be achieved by campaigning amongst the people for final political victories now.

We in this House and we in Inkatha have to risk a degree of rejection by the people because we were saying that compromises will have to be made which will delay the cherished hope that political freedom would give rise to an early massive redistribution of wealth in this country. Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, we had to risk being prepared to make the compromises which would leave us the task of campaigning amongst the people to accept that political victories would not bring immediate relief to their poverty-stricken situations. i

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, I have moved to look at the compromises we have been prepared to make at this point in my Policy speech while I have been looking at Black politics and the UDF in particular, because I want to look at this last point I listed very closely. To win a debate around a negotiating table or to make compromises is one thing. But to live with those compromises among the harsh realities of constituency politics, is another thing altogether. Everywhere in the world mass poverty is the enemy of democracy. It is the enemy of democracy in this country. '

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, I am totally immovable in my rejection of Regional Services Councils. Not only are they structures foisted on us in the politics of dictation but they are structures under which the masses of the poorest of the poor will experience too little gain to justify us being charged with a willingness to participate in our subjugation and our consequent destitution. Regional Services Councils ignore the reality that there is an unconstituted massive squatter population who will have no form of representation in the Regional Services Councils. Not only will the dominant White local authorities in the RSCs continue to get the lion's share of whatever value can be found in them, and not only will the large White local authorities dominate in the RSC'S decision-making process, but the unconstituted poorest of the poor in the squatter areas will feel abandoned by our participation in the RSCs. If we accepted involvement in the RSCs, we would be seen to be doing a lot for the haves and very little for the have-nots.

I am quite prepared to support compromises which will lead to political gains yet to come, but I am just not prepared to support compromises in which political gains will not be forthcoming and the masses of ordinary Africans will not experience tangible improvements to their lot. The Regional Services Councils are designed as regional and local legs on which the hated Tricameral Parliament stands and I will have nothing to do with them for this Qreason as well.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, we just dare not make compromises with which we will not be able to live politically because the people we represent reject them. We have never led Black South Africa up the garden path. We have never promised them Utopia tomorrow. We have always inculcated in them a spirit of self-help and a realisation that political victories will not give each and every one a big bank balance, a well paid job and a beautiful home to live in. We are prepared to grapple with the reality that political victories can do no more than give people freedom to pull themselves up by their own boot straps.

When we make compromises, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, which neither result in tangible improvements in the lifestyle of the people, nor set them free to do something effective for themselves, then we will be committing political suicide. We will experience a terrible backlash from people who regard our compromises as acts of betrayal born out of political weakness.

When I listed the kind of compromises we have to make to keep the politics of negotiation alive and to reach consensus across the gaps in our polarised society, I said we had to compromise on the time-scales within which people expect to reap real rewards after real gains. If the compromises led to political gains which people have an immediate-awareness that these political gains will give them the ability to do something for themselves, they would not be prepared to suffer a little longer because they were now in a position to do something about their suffering. If, however, our compromises are not met with compromises from the other side, and lead to no real political gain which people would perceive as setting them free to do something about their poverty, we would endorse ourselves out of relevance.

When we go a step further and have to compromise on our compromises, we can only end up on terribly dangerous ground. We have been deeply earnest in our attempts to establish compromise solutions and as I said a little earlier, we have gone to the extremities of our ability to compromise. If we could have compromised further to ensure greater prospects of the politics of negotiation getting off the ground and becoming successful in the eyes of the people, we would have done so while we negotiated. We really are not in the position in which we have compromised sufficiently to win the day but still have further compromises up our sleeves which we could bring out if things got tough. We have

given all that we had to give. The things we have refused to compromise on are things we dare not compromise on.

We dare not compromise on the reality that there is a Black majority in this country. If the South African Government wants to force us to make this compromise then I say enough is enough and we will withdraw all the offers of compromise that we have made. The Regional Services Councils demand recognition that the present constitution is right in distinguishing between own affairs and common affairs amongst a range of minority groupst in South Africa. The present constitution denies the existence of a Black majority. Mr. Chris Heunis rejects the Indaba's constitutional proposals because these prbposals are formulated around the reality that there is a Black majority. He has thrown a gauntlet down in front of us which I pick up today..

I say bluntly to Mr. Chris Heunis that we see his( formal press statement rejecting the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba constitutional proposals as giving effect to a consensus decision in the South African Cabinet. I say bluntly to the State President-that there is a Black majority in South Africa and that unless he begins negotiating around this reality, there is nothing I would wish to negotiate with him. The compromises we have been prepared to make have been thrown in our face and the best we have done at such great cost and such great earnestness must be met with compromises from the side of the South African Government.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, I return now to continue looking at Black politics in terms of the utility of Black organisations in attacking the South African Government where it is -weakest. I reiterate that spreading mass poverty is the enemy of democracy. It.is the terrible destitution of the people which has always given fly-by-night leaders, who are too clever by half, a field day in which to whip up emotions and gather support by promising people impossible early victories and Utopias tomorrow. The UDF elements which were mobilising the people in the Greater Pietermaritzburg Area would never have gained a foothold there were it not for the massive poverty problem in the area.

Wherever there is mass poverty, the UDF will move in to ferment internecine Black-on-Black strife. It will move in with its double agendas to capitalise on genuine protest to make Party political gains on behalf of the ANC. It will move in to taunt people with their poverty and woo them into the politics of confrontation which inevitably culminates in violence. The UDF will move in to ferment discontent with the best that we can do and they will exploit our vulnerability to the very fullest because we are prepared to make compromises.

We must never delude ourselves that there is not a race against time between the politics of negotiation and the politics of

violence. Nor must we delude ourselves that political violence  
 edoes anything other than retard the emergence of the democratic  
 weeocess in this country capable of bringing about radicalw.change.  
 ,WMQubtedly the rise of the Conservative Party can in part be  
 imeced to the upward spiralling of violence inside South Africa and  
 G the escalation of international campaigns to isolate South  
 mfrica economically, politically and diplomatically. The CP  
 keptesents white South Africa running into a laager.

WMoubtedly the retarding effect of the rising right wing activity in South Africa is reinforced by the effects of Black-on-Black Confrontation. Fear-filled White South Africans are claiming Histification for their fears that Blacks are not capable of behaving democratically. Undoubtedly whatever commitments .the South African Government had to bring about whatever change they had in mind, have now been weakened. We can anticipate that the remaining part of this year before the October nation-wide, local authority elections will be spent wooing and appeasing the far right. ' '

We cannot carry on blind to what is taking place around us. We cannot delude ourselves that any tendency the Government may have of now stalling on reform programmes will not affect us detrimentally. The Government is further than it has ever been before from recognising that there is a Black majority and that it has to address fundamental issues arising from this reality. The State President's much publicised National Council has already been watered down to make it innocuous to right wing Afrikanerdom. x International hostility towards South Africa will also undoubtedly increase. The rug will continue to be pulled from beneath my feet by the Government as it refuses to move forward fast enough to give Blacks hope.

Unemployment and the spread of poverty will continue to erode the politics of negotiation. Black anger will continue to rise and be ever more difficult to harness in constructive action which is capable of attacking the South African Government where it is weakest. A difficult year lies ahead and we should carefully take stock of the realities around us, lest what could be constructive for us to do in the near future, or in the medium term, is destructive when done in the short term. Perhaps we ought to think more deeply about standing firm where we are and to be a bit more cautious in forging ahead as we have thus far planned.

Timing is critically important in effective political action. We have yet to see what the effect is going to be of the action recently taken by the Government against the UDF, COSATU and other Black organisations. For the last two years failed violence and the disillusionment of those who were drawn into violent confrontation by the UDF and COSATU, have created the circumstances in which Inkatha can take another leap forward. Backlashes against failure always rebound to strengthen the relatively strong. We saw

this after the 1976/78 period and we will again see it after the 1984/86 period.

I now want to summarise briefly what I have said about Black politics in present day South Africa. I have pointed to the fact that Black organisations are divided between those which attack the South African Government where it is strongest and those who attack the South African Government where it is weakest. I have, however, also drawn attention to the fact that in a very real sense those who attack the South African Government where it is strongest not only have the effect of making the South African Government stronger yet where it was already strong, but also of being counter-productive for those who have seen the soft under-belly of apartheid and have been homing in to attack the South African Government where it is weakest. Inkatha's cause has undoubtedly been hurt by the escalation of violence, the rise of internecine Black-on-black violence giving rise to Black killing Black for political purposes and by the swing to the right in White politics. I have also indicated possible future dangers to Inkatha and to this House, Mr. Speaker, if we stand by the compromises we offered to make if there were matching compromises from White South Africa when these matching compromises are just not forthcoming. There is a sense, Mr. Speaker, that we can do just so much to assist White South Africa to come to terms with its own fears and its own problems.

I have repeatedly said that the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba is not my Indaba. Whites are like human beings everywhere - you can take them to the water but you cannot make them drink. There is a very real sense that the politics of negotiation now entirely depends on Whites at last recognising the value of what we are doing. If they reject what we are doing and sabotage the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba of its political effectiveness, I do not see why we should bear the brunt of paying the cost of their blunders. We have been encouraged by the extent to which independent research commissioned by the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba has shown relatively widespread support for its proposals among the White electorate. Attitudes are, however; one thing. It is political action that counts in the end. Perhaps we have to wait and see how political attitudes which were changed by the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba negotiations work out in White politics.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, there are many things which are fundamental to my whole approach to politics in South Africa. One of these is that at heart we have a Black/White problem and both Blacks and Whites must be involved in the solution to South Africa's problems. This perspective tells me that the historic burden of political responsibility that Blacks must bear, as Blacks because it is they who are the victims of oppression, is the burden of drawing Whites into the political solution.



his perception stands out in stark contrast to the perception of  
 owe Blacks that the Black struggle must produce a Black victory  
 nd establish a Black government which will then deal with the

l

hite. problem. It is this perception that has in the past formed  
 he rationale behind the need for an armed struggle to return the  
 ANC to South Africa as the Black government in power. The  
 perception of a Black-only victory over a White government and  
 White society through the employment of violence, has bedevilled  
 ithe politics of negotiation in recent years.

This perception of the need for a Black victory over White society  
 has led to very substantial international backing for the ANC's  
 'armed struggle and for its attempt to isolate South. Africa  
 heconomically and diplomatically. Again and again we have' seen  
 ispokesmen of national and international prominence talking as  
 though the only settlement that there can be will be a settlement  
 between the ANC and the National Party. Once you have moved to  
 perceive the need for a Black victory over White society, it is  
 ; natural to gravitate to look for a dominant Black group whom you  
 -think can lead Blacks to that victory.

i\_Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, I say now that there will be no  
 EjBlack military victory over Whites in this country. There can only  
 g be a final scorched earth policy confrontation on both sides which  
 gjwill destroy everything and leave nobody the victor. This  
 quereception of the need for a racist victory over White society can  
 only continue to escalate the upward spiralling violence. It can  
 only continue to retard and eventually annihilate the politics of  
 negotiation. If we want a victory over apartheid in this country  
 to be a victory which establishes a fair and race-free just  
 society, then we must abandon violence as a primary cause of  
 bringing about radical change.

- We saw how the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group became entangled  
 in the myth that an ANC/NP rapprochement was the odly thing that  
 3 would give hope for the future. We have again and again seen this  
 , view evidenced as businessman like Tony Bloom and Church leaders  
 iglike Archbishop Desmond Tutu, the Reverend Allan Boesak and others  
 work to give the ANC the credibility of being THE Black  
 organisation which alone can ensure that there is a triumph over  
 apartheid.

This myth must be abandoned becauSe it is dangerous for everything  
 of any value in this country. Other myths associated with this  
 \_ myth must also be abandoned. It is sheer myth that in real political  
 .terms the ANC is striving to mount a multi-racial response to the  
 South African problem. However much they campaign for multi-racial  
 support and however much their allies in the UDF and COSATU claim  
 to be multi-racial organisations, the ANC remains committed to a  
 Black victory by Blacks to establish a Black government capable of  
 dealing with Whites. They do not want a shared victory with  
 Whites. They want to employ the utility that some Whites have for

them. They want to use them as pawns in their power games. In the end it is a Black victory through violence to establish a powerful Black government that is their total preoccupation.

There are some Whites, Indians and Coloureds who want such a victory and who are working to make the ANC such a victor. This bit of reality, however, does not gainsay the fact that what the ANC and its allies are doing further polarises South Africa into Black/White political camps. It does not gainsay the fact that the ANC may use Whites in its tactics and strategies but that it abhors a Black/White partnership at any real political level.

I said that we would have to wait and see how political attitudes which were shaped by the KwaZulu/Natal negotiations work out in politics. , There is undoubtedly a groundswell demand in White society for the normalisation of South Africa as a modern, Western-type industrial State. There is undoubtedly a propensity amongst South African Whites to start thinking about a society in which there is no apartheid. The independent market research done on attitudes to the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba constitutional proposals clearly documents this.

These are reliable and independent surveys of what is in the minds of people now. What overt political action they give rise to in the future, however, cannot be discerned in the survey results themselves. Black and White politics simply cannot be separated in this country. What happens in Black politics will affect what happens in White politics. The reverse is obviously just as true. What the South African Government does will either be seen some time in the future as sowing a whirlwind that it had to reap, or it will be seen to have taken courses of action which are beneficial to a Black/White rapprochement in the politics of negotiation. Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, history in the end must not find that we were wanting in making the latter course of action by the Government possible. If the South African Government wants to move, we will move with it. We remain committed to work for a negotiated future in which Blacks and Whites can be joined together to take part in watershed events which eradicate apartheid in all its entirety. The White electorate is far more ready to move in this direction than is generally perceived.

I am on record as saying that one of the underlying factors in the State President receiving a massive mandate to continue governing is the White expectation that he is capable of introducing reform; They gave him a blank cheque to do so. It is the reality of this mandate which has given rise to the ascendancy of the Conservative Party as the official opposition in Parliament. I find it extremely vexing to again and again have to defend the politics of negotiation on the grounds that majorities in both Black and White society want the process of reform to get off the ground and that

gboth are ready to make the kind of compromises that will enable  
hthis to happen.

.This is not the image of South Africa which is conveyed in the  
media across the length and breadth of the world. Generally  
Hspeaking, the political recalcitrance of the State President and  
whis National Party is laid at the feet of all Whites. Generally  
sgeaking, a picture of South Africa is painted in which foreign  
fgovernments and political activists in pressure groups around the  
5globe, will have to apply coercion to bring about change in this  
country.

These perceptions of the need for a Black/White partnership in the  
erahication of apartheid and the defence of them on the grounds  
,that the majorities in both Black and White society are ready to  
negotiate a new South Africa, are however not fixed dimensions of  
Seuth African politics. I am as aware as anybody that the time  
could arrive when these dimensions become as doomed as apartheid  
itself now is. The readiness of Black and White society to  
negotiate a new South Africa has been created by history. If we  
\_now spurn that which history has offered to us, history will march  
yon and the sun will set on the day of negotiation.

That is why, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, I told the  
Honourable Minister of Education and Development Aid, Dr. G. van N.  
hViljoen, at the opening of this Session, that the time has come to  
say enough is enough. The South African Government must now move  
10: be doomed with the apartheid that it knows is doomed but will  
'not abandon.

It will be truly historically tragic if we Blacks are one day going  
to be held responsible for the fact that we did not grasp this  
golden day of history in which Black and White can still find each  
other. Black politics is no longer reactionary politics responding  
to White initiatives. Black politics has come into its own. It  
ultimately calls the tune. Black politics now dare not play a  
death march as a political anthem. Black politics must move to  
\_assume the full responsibility which political power places on  
Black shoulders.

I have said that there will only be a really meaningful future for  
'South Africa if it is produced by a Black/White partnership and I  
; now add that if there will be no future worth having, Black and  
' yWhite will be jointly responsible for that as well. The  
yviolent internecine Blackuon-Black confrontations now taking place  
in South Africa negate any notion of Black political  
.responsibility. Blacks are just as capable of screwing up the  
future of South Africa as Whites are.

It is in the context of these thoughts, Mr. speaker; Honourable Members, that I want to look at the hideous internecine Black-one Black confrontations that have now been taking place in the Greater Pietermaritzburg Area for many months.

The real and immediate cause of political violence in the Pietermaritzburg area is the multi-dimensional UDF/COSATU/ANC alliance's attack on Inkatha. The background factors which are very real and very hideous would have remained background factors were it not for the immediate cause which can be traced to the UDF/COSATU/ANC alliance's desperate attempt to make the Greater Pietermaritzburg Area a no-go area for me and Inkatha.

It was a really desperate attempt on their part, Mr; Speaker, Honourable Members, because their 1983/84 boast that the South African Government was on the run has since been proved to be sheer wishful thinking. The escalation of violence ever since 1984 has not made the political gains that the perpetrators of political violence promised the people. They could not turn June 16th in 1984 and in 1985 into launching days for victories by the militantly violent. Those who attempted to do so attacked the South African Government where it is strong and they were battered by the strength they attacked.

The people in the Greater Pietermaritzburg Area who had been drawn into the politics of confrontation courting violence paid the price of failed violence for no political gain. There was a backlash against violence as the ordinary worker and peasant said enough is enough as they first did in the SARMCOL saga and as they later did in reaction to failed consumer boycott action, and action designed to disrupt the educational process. One of the factors of this backlash was a general move by the people in the area to join Inkatha.

Not only therefore did the UDF/COSATU/ANC alliance suffer the ignominy of being proved politically stupid in promising people that which they could not deliver, and not only did they get battered when they attacked the South African Government where it is strongest, but they saw a move by the people to join and support Inkatha. They mounted a vicious attack on Inkatha in a desperate attempt to maintain a political foothold in the area.

These immediate causes for the escalation of violence in the Pietermaritzburg Area do not, however, negate the background causes which provided the circumstances in which the immediate causes could take effect. We must look at them because they demand to be looked at.

Mr. Speaker, I have chosen to talk about the Pietermaritzburg violence at this point in my policy speech where I was dealing with

31

a

a3

87

one of the fundamentals of my political position, namely the need to establish a joint Black/White partnership to eradicate apartheid. I have done so because I went on to look at the behaviour of reform-minded White South Africans and noted that we would have to wait and see what the White political attitudes produced by the Indaba's research would give rise to by way of White political action.

There are Whites who point to the Pietermaritzburg violence as reason enough to withhold demands on the State President that he moves faster in his reform programme. Political violence in Pietermaritzburg has most certainly given impetus to the rise of far right wing Afrikaner thinking in this region of South Africa. It has certainly contributed to the climate in which the National Party began getting jittery about the October Local Authority elections and decided to reject the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba constitutional proposals for public consumption.

It is as though Whites who are primarily responsible for the background factors which produced the Pietermaritzburg circumstances in which immediate causes of violence against Inkatha could take place, feel they can now point a finger at Blacks. It is Whites who produced the apartheid circumstances in which Black democracy is shackled. It is Whites who produced the apartheid circumstances in which poverty drove factions of the Black masses to adopt desperate means to improve their lot. It was Whites who produced the political recalcitrance which made many Blacks lose hope. -

Whites have no right now to sit back as though they are the democratic purest of the pure and say that violence in Pietermaritzburg proves that Blacks are unworthy partners, in a future democracy. White South Africans must realise that Inkatha 7, buries its dead because it stands adamantly firm in defence of the things that so many Whites themselves aspire to.

White South Africans must recognise that attacks against Inkatha in the Greater Pietermaritzburg Area are in actual fact attacks against multi-party democracy and against the free enterprise system. 'In Pietermaritzburg Whites should have seen how Black democrats are ready to die for their political beliefs. What better proof could they want that Blacks are worthy partners in the future of South Africa?

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, I must register my total disgust with the UDF and COSATU, and with the ANC, for mounting a hideous and deliberately planned and executed campaign to hold Inkatha responsible for the Pietermaritzburg violence. It is this campaign to discredit Inkatha that has had such terribly detrimental effects on White perceptions of Black politics. Whites are denied the truth that Inkatha's members died in defence of that which is

noble. They are fed dramatised news stories; about so-called inkatha war-lords going out to kill for political purposes. They know that the ANC kills for political purposes. " The ANC claims responsibility for bombs it plants in public places. They know that the ANC has deliberately adopted a policy in which distinctions are no longer made between soft and hard targets.

VLCK.

They know that the ANC has military camps in Africa and in the USSR in which they train Blacks to kill. 4

A great many Whites, however, continue to believe that the majority of Blacks are different and reform programmes should now be mounted to move South Africa away from apartheid. It is this residual belief in the decency of Black South Africans that the hideous UDF/COSATU/ANC propaganda against Inkatha attacks and disillusioned. 1

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, White opinion-makers have been disillusioned about Inkatha by these attacks. It is not only White radical activists who now argue that Inkatha is responsible. The accusations permeate through all levels of society and many Whites of considerable influence - whether they be clergymen, professors or businessmen - now argue the same. 1

H

These attitudes blaming Inkatha for the violence that is taking place in Pietermaritzburg emerged in strange places. Mr. Speaker, I would like to share with the House exchanges that have taken place between myself and the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce. The Chamber mounted a peace initiative in which it presented itself as an honest broker between the UDF and COSATU on the one hand and Inkatha on the other hand. This initiative co-existed with an initiative which Archbishop Desmond Tutu announced that he was launching and it later also co-existed with an initiative that a group of clerics announced that they were going to make, and with other less publicised initiatives.

. 1

I

This was the first time that a Chamber of Commerce in South Africa had seen itself in the role as an adjudicator in Black political disputes and one must assume that the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce, dominated as it is by rational businessmen, was serving its own business interests by mounting the initiative. Chambers of Commerce are not altruistic organisations which themselves mount humanitarian projects. They may support them morally or their members may contribute to projects financially, but there was something very different about the interest of the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce in the violence in its area.

Pietermaritzburg businessmen were well aware that spreading violence would not leave their undertakings and enterprises untouched. They were also well aware that the kind of political forces in the Greater Pietermaritzburg Area which were being drawn into violent confrontations, were dominated by the UDF and COSATU

E

in which organisations there were activists always ready to mobilise consumer boycotts. They knew that attempts had been made to mount consumer boycotts in the Pietermaritzburg area and they were intensely aware of the difficulties SARMCOL experienced as a result of GB? initiatives.

E Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, I and every member of Inkatha 2 would have welcomed any initiative made by anybody which could have made a contribution to the cessation of violence in the f Pietermaritzburg area. We all abhor violence for political \_ purposes and we of all people had the most to gain if hostilities between Inkatha and the UDF/COSATU/ANC alliance came to an end. We soon came to realise, however, that the Chamber had tackled something which it was ill-equipped to handle. Preliminary meetings served only to define the intractable nature of the problem the Chamber was facing. It was being used by the UDF/COSATU alliance to cast aspersions on Inkatha's sincerity in seeking peace.

While the Chamber was drawing the UDF/COSATU elements into discussions, these same elements were so conducting themselves outside the Chamber's initiatives that it was really a case of political Jekylls and Hydes. While the UDF was professing to be interested in peace, vicious propaganda programmes were being mounted against Inkatha, villifying us. Elements in the press and media were being manipulated in well-orchestrated propaganda smears of Inkatha. The Courts were being used as political platforms as the UDF sought injunctions against Inkatha office bearers and members. In the discussions which took place those involved from the side of Inkatha soon realised that Whites and Indians were . emerging as important spokesmen for the UDF in peace initiatives. :?\_The Chamber was not negotiating with the people most involved in violent confrontation, nor was it negotiating with people who had any right to claim that whatever they did and said, would have any effect whatsoever on the levels of violence taking place.

Then to compound the Chamber's problems, John F. Burns in an article in the New York Times publicised the attitudes of the Managet, Mr. Paul van Uytrecht, of the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce. He was quoted in the New York Times as saying: "Inkatha warulords had tried to enforce loyalty to the Zulu group at schools, hospitals and work places, even insisting that disaster relief after floods in October be channelled exclusively through its hands." He was also quoted as saying: "Over a period of -time communities that were not politicised have begun turning spontaneously against Inkatha. Now things have swung in a way that is very unsatisfactory to Inkatha, and they may in fact be left with very little."

When the Chamber's President, Mr. Stewart Smith and its Vice-President, Mr. R.H.D. Pater came to see me in Ulundi on 25th January this year, Mr. Paul van Uytrecht was not with them. I told Mr.

Smith and Mr. Pater that the Pietermaritzburg violence was symptomatic of the consequences of the raging battle for minds which is taking place in South Africa. I told them that there was a race against time between the forces of democracy and the forces of violence and that the forces of violence led by the ANC simply did not want the politics of negotiation to succeed. I pointed out that the UDF and COSATU were allies with the ANC in a desperate bid to eradicate Inkatha entirely. The Pietermaritzburg violence is violence in a very much broader context than the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce seemed to realise.

When therefore I read Mr. Burns' article quoting Mr. van Uytrecht, I was particularly incensed. Here we had the Manager of the Chamber himself taking sides in a situation in which the Chamber was purporting to be neutral. I therefore wrote to Mr. Stewart Smith, the President of the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce as follows:

Mr. Stewart Smith 2 February 1988  
Presidentvrx ,\_M  
Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce  
PO Box 65  
,Pietermaritzburg  
3200

Dear Mr. Smith,

The blunt truth is that South Africa is in a mess. There is a raging battle for minds being waged. The South African Government is deploying troops across the country's borders. Whites have been militarised and the battle for minds takes place in the context of the upward spiralling of the violence of insurrection and the national emergency under which the South African Government attempts to govern.

Across the length and breadth of South Africa, Black townships repeatedly witness outbreaks of violence. Some Black township councils cannot function and others are teetering along on the brink of collapse. Violence moves its centre from place to place and however much the Government clamps down under its harsh security laws within a state of emergency, violence continues because the root cause of violence has not yet been addressed. It is in this situation of a national emergency and nationwide sporadic outbreaks of violence, that I have to lead as the President of Inkatha and as Chief Minister of KwaZulu. It is in this situation that Inkatha members are brutally murdered and suffer awesome intimidation. Inkatha is a particular target of the forces of violence and insurrection because it is committed to the politics of negotiation and is prepared to thrash out a compromise



isolation with White South Africa in general and with the South African Government.

In the battle for minds which is raging, those committed to the armed struggle and the bringing about of ungovernability through the politics of violence, attack Inkatha because it is relevant to the process of reconciliation and central when it comes to the politics of negotiation. These are the facts of the matter.

Revolutionaries detest anybody or any group which is capable of making real inputs into the non-violent resolution of South Africa's problems.

The ANC, and those in the UDF and COSATU working in tandem with it, not only want to escalate violence in Black areas but also want to spread violence to White areas. In broadcasts from Radio Freedom in Dar-es-Salaam and other places, the ANC weekly exhorts Black South Africans to do what those responsible for violence in Pietermaritzburg are in fact doing. They claim the UDF as "their" organisation. Prominent UDF leaders share international platforms with them. The UDF and COSATU receive very substantial funding from agencies abroad on the strength of ANC recommendations to these agencies. There is a working relationship between these UDF and COSATU leaders and the ANC. UDF and COSATU leadership have nailed their flag to the ANC mast. They claim the ANC leaders to be their leaders and to be the true Black South African leaders. This is not political propaganda. It is not a figment of my imagination. It is not a justification for my existence. It is the facts of the matter, fully substantiated by what the ANC itself writes and broadcasts and what the UDF and COSATU leaders themselves say.

In the totality of the South African situation violence thrives most where there is the most confusion about who is responsible for it. I make the point that the ANC has been in exile for over a quarter of a century and for that quarter of a century it has been schooled in the art of revolution by people like Yasser (Arafat), Fidel Castro and Colonel Qaddafi. For this quarter of a century it has had the full backing of the Soviet Union. Its cadres are trained in the Soviet Union. It is supplied with arms by the Soviet Union and its allies. The ANC's Mission abroad has turned into a butchering leadership which now does not distinguish between soft and hard targets and which directs their forces to escalate violence, whether it be Black-on-Black violence or Black-on-White violence.

I am sending you under cover of this letter a batch of the British Broadcasting Corporation's transcripts of ANC broadcasts. Please look at these and decide whether the points I am making are figments of my imagination or whether they are simple statements about the truth of the matter.

In the crossroads of history where South Africa is now located, a great, great deal hangs in the balance. I cover vast distances, not only in this country but across the length and breadth of western Europe and North America, doing whatever I can to salvage South Africa from the ruins of violence which now threaten us. violent confrontations can only lead to scorched earth policies opposing scorched earth policies until there are only ashes left. As things are now going, the best we can hope for is a war of attrition which will stretch out the time which it takes for the South African Government and the South African economy to collapse. Mr. Smith, I am a serious politician. For a decade now I have had to direct Inkatha in such a way that it not only survives in a very violent political situation, but it remains committed to the politics of negotiation and becomes ever-increasingly relevant to the whole process in which we can achieve national reconciliation in South Africa. I have had to be a hundred people at once as I involve myself in a multitude of strategies and as I develop constituencies in every race group in the country. Above all, I have had to survive, and I have had to keep Inkatha intact in the face of the abysmal failure of the South African Government to address the root causes of South Africa's drift towards a soulless and mindless blood-letting which would be all-destructive. In 1975 I started to put Inkatha together. It now has over 1.5 million members. I succeeded in building up a force for reconciliation in circumstances in which other Black leaders did not even dare to attempt to establish a mass membership-based organisation. I have handled my portfolio as Chief Minister of KwaZulu over this decade to trounce the South African Government again and again in its terribly dangerous attempt to fragment South Africa into one central White dominant state and ten or more Black states related to the White State in a confederal structure. The components which the South African Government envisaged during Verwoerdian politics were the components of a time bomb which would have to explode sooner or later. I have kept KwaZulu out of the clutches of the apartheid ideologues and I have developed it as an area in which real initiatives could be made to make the politics of negotiation a reality. I established the Buthelezi Commission and after it had produced its report I directed negotiations with the then Natal Provincial Council. My lieutenants now serve on a Joint Executive Authority which resulted from those negotiations. Another consequence of those negotiations was the Natal Provincial Administration/KwaZulu Indaba. While I was doing these things in circumstances where other people dare not try to do them, I criss-crossed the country and the globe, meeting with international Heads of State such as President Ronald Reagan, Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, Dr. Helmut Kohl and Mr. Jacques Chirac.

93

LIV

) (e)

e will be a multi-Party democracy, a vibrant free enterprise  
em and a Black, White, Indian and Coloured population making  
national effort to conquer poverty, ignorance and disease after  
litical victories have been won. I am serious about what I do.  
O it with vigour. I do it with sustained commitment and each  
I build up on the gains of the previous year.

V3

am serious about my commitments to a new South Africa in which

:

J 2"

.

(

i

(Lt

kc. mud or m r? H

J L

4 m (

m

9:

ts

When, therefore, John F. Burns publishes an article in one of the  
world's largest mass circulation newspapers, The New York Times, in  
which he reports that Paul van Uytrecht the Pietermaritzburg  
Chamber of Commerce's Manager, says "Inkatha wax lords had tried to  
enforce loyalty to the Zulu group at schools, hospitals and work  
places, even insisting that disaster relief after floods in October  
be channelled exclusively through its hands" I am appalled at the  
kind of organisation which the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce  
must be. Mr. van Uytrecht is reported to have said: "Over a period  
of time communities that were not politicised have begun turning  
spontaneously against Inkatha. Now things have swung in a way that  
is very unsatisfactory to Inkatha, and they may in fact be left  
with very little."

T

i write this letter to request you, Mr. Smith, to lay it before the  
full meeting of the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce and to  
declare where the Chamber stands as publicly as Mr. van Uytrecht's  
views were stated. -How can your Chamber play peace-maker when it  
has already taken sides and made Inkatha the villain of the piece?  
Your Chamber has either tried and condemned Inkatha and sentenced  
it to oblivion or it has not done so. I need to know which is the  
case. I

There is too much at stake not only in the Greater Pietermaritzburg  
area, and not only in the whole KwaZulu/Natal region, but there is  
also too much at stake for the whole of South Africa for me to  
stand idly by while the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce plays  
a nefarious role in a life and death situation.

A great many around me are shocked by Mr. van Uytrecht's reported  
statements. It is being repeatedly said to me, and I convey the  
idiom of what is being said, that the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of  
Commerce is covering its arse because it is shit-scared of the UDF  
and possible commercial boycott action that the UDF so desires to  
specialise in. Is the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce simply  
the tool of small-minded businessmen who think they can make a few  
extra bucks by appeasing revolutionary forces? Has the Chamber  
already accepted the demise of the best that there is in South  
African society, and does the Chamber now behave in such a way that  
it is trying to ensure the best possible place there can be for its  
businessmen in the kind of socialist economy that the ANC and UDF  
want?

These are tough sentiments I express, and I convey to you, Mr. Smith, that they are sentiments which are arising around me. They must be tabled and I believe that the Chamber of Commerce owes it to itself and to its members to call a halt to blundering in a very difficult situation.

I would not bother to write this letter if I thought that the sentiments I convey to you, which are around me, were objectively valid. One of my great sources of hope for the future of South Africa, lies in my perception that now at last economic forces are beginning to work in tandem with Black liberation forces, to bring about an end to the hideous apartheid era under which we have all arrived at the terrible impasse we see in South Africa today.

Apartheid must go. It will go. What we now do will lay the foundations for the kind of post apartheid society we will have. Across the length and breadth of South Africa captains of banking, mining, commerce and industry and organised interests of big and small business, form a formidable chunk of reality that is now pressing heavily on the South African Government.

The last thing in the world I want is the permanent alienation between Inkatha and the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce. I write this letter, using blunt language about difficult matters, hoping that the air can be cleared.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd)

MANGOSUTHU G. BUTHELEZI

CHIEF MINISTER OF KWAZULU

AND PRESIDENT OF INKATHA

The text of Mr. Smith's reply which he wrote on the 11th February 1988 was: -

Dear Chief Minister,

Thank you for your letter of the 2nd February 1988, the contents of which we have noted.

We do not wish to be involved in a protracted debate by correspondence in regard to all of the points which were raised in your letter, but we do wish to make the following points, and the position of the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce, very clear. The passages from the relevant article which appeared in the New York Times, and which have been attributed to the manager of the Pietermaritzburg Chamber, in no way express the policy of the Pietermaritzburg Chamber, and I am assured by Mr. Van Uytrecht that

he has been inaccurately quoted, certain of the alleged quotations did not emanate from him and the quotations are certainly reported out of context. Given the inaccuracy of the reporting we disassociate ourselves from the report as a whole.

The position of the Pietermaritzburg Chamber is one of complete impartiality and neutrality. The Pietermaritzburg Chamber became involved originally in this matter in the position of "honest broker." The members of the Pietermaritzburg Chamber in its Executive Committee, as also naturally all of our members, are extremely concerned by the trouble which exists in the greater Pietermaritzburg area and are deeply concerned by the hardship, suffering and loss of life of so many people following upon the recent unrest.

. Our Executive Committee has had a number of recent discussions to \_ confirm its position in the process, and to reaffirm its position "as one of absolute non allegiance and neutrality, and this position is unanimously confirmed.

I would also mention that I have had discussions with very senior members of the Board of Management of ASSOCOM and these senior members, as also the Chief Executive of ASSOCOM, Mr. Raymond Parsons, have reaffirmed ASSOCOM's concern for the hardship and suffering of the people of Natal/KwaZulu. Mr. Alec Rogoff, the National President of ASSOCOM, Mr. Raymond Parsons and other members of the Board of Management of ASSOCOM will be ,embarking upon a fact finding tour of the region next week. ' '

If there remains any doubt in your mind as to the position of the Pietermaritzburg Chamber in regard to the Peace Talks, I would sincerely welcome a further communication, or contact, from you.

Yours sincerely,

STEWART SMITH

PRESIDENT: ?IETERMARITZBURG

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE

The question I had to ask myself was obvious. If the Chamber was truly neutral, why did it not then repudiate its Manager? It cannot be neutral if its Manager is reported across the length and breadth of the world wherever the New York Times is read as blaming Inkatha for the violence. The Chamber, however, continued in its initiative without remedying that which was wrong. The day after I received the above letter from Mr. Stewart Smith, Mr. Pater wrote to me enclosing the UDF's proposal about how a meeting between Inkatha and the UDF should be conducted and asked for my comments.

The following is the letter Mr. Pater wrote to me, as well as the UDF proposal and conditions under which the meeting they proposed was to take place.

Pietermaritzburg Chamber  
of Commerce  
P.O.Box 65  
Pietermaritzburg  
3200

12 February 1988

The Honourable Dr. Mangosuthu G. Buthelezi  
Chief Minister of KwaZulu

"KwaPhindangene"

P.O.Box 1  
Mahlabatini  
3865

Dear Chief Minister

Further to the talks which Mr. Stewart Smith and I held with you in Ulundi on the 25th January, we enclose a proposal received from the UDF/COSATU Alliance.

For the purpose of the record we would like to state that the Chamber at no stage presented the issue of the presence of National Leaders as a demand from Inkatha.

Please let us have your response as soon as possible.

We would like to take this opportunity to thank you for seeing us at short notice on the 25th and for the hospitality afforded to us.

Yours sincerely

(Sgd)

ROBIN H.D. PATER

VICE PRESIDENT: PIETERMARITZBURG CHAMBER OF COMMERCE

PROPOSED FORMAT DOCUMENT TO GOVERN THE CONDUCT OF A MEETING BETWEEN  
INKATHA/UWUSA AND COSATU/UDF

In the meetings with the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce on the 8th, 15th and 28th January and from press statements it has become clear that Inkatha believe that national office bearers of Inkatha

;.and Cosatu/UDF should be involved in the "Peace Talks". Cosatu/UDF " believe that local people are best able to solve the problem of giviolence in Pietermaritzburg. However, it would appear that the - talks will not continue unless we accommodate Inkatha. To this end we make the following proposals.

P

#### 1. INVOLVEMENT OF NATIONAL OFFICE BEARERS

1.1 National office bearers of the respective organisations will attend the next meeting.

The presence of such national office bearers is not intended to replace existing delegations or local office bearers.

#### 2. DELEGATIONS

k)

c

5...:

In order to keep the meeting within manageable proportions it is proposed that 10 delegates represent Inkatha/UWUSA and 10 delegates represent COSATU/UDF.

2.2 It is proposed that 4 delegates be national office bearers and that 6 delegates be either existing delegations or local 'edelegates.

The choice of the individual delegates would be left to the respective parties with the proviso that no person who is directly subject to legal action concerning violent incidents in the area will be eligible to be a delegate.

#### 3. AGENDA AND CONDUCT

3.1 It is acknowledged that there are substantial differences of political policy between the organisations.

3.2 However, it is agreed that the meeting will not be used to debate or resolve these differences.

3.3 The purpose of the meeting will be to establish common cause and agree common actions that will lead to a cessation of the present violence in the Pietermaritzburg area.

3.4 The agenda should facilitate such a discussion and avoid any exchange of recriminations by the parties.

3.5

4.1

4.2

4.3

5.

98

The parties agree that their chair will be empowered to overrule points outside the spirit of this agenda.

CONVENORS, CHAIRPERSONS AND OBSERVERS

The meeting be convened by Mr. Paul Van Uytrecht of the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce.

The meeting be chaired by Mr. Rob Pater of the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce assisted by Mr. Paul Van Uytrecht and Messrs. John Radford and Phil Glaze: of IMMSA. Mr. Dave Robbins and Rev. Ben Nsimbi continue to attend the meeting as observers.

VENUE

The venue shall be in Pietermaritzburg at a place to be decided by the Convenor.

6.

6.1

6.2

PRESS

In the event of there being agreement or partial agreement in the meeting the format of any press statement will be agreed in the meeting.

In any event confidentiality and principle of without prejudice discussion will be respectedi

COSATU/UDF - MIDLANDS REGION

1/2/88

I wrote to him as follows:

Mr.

R.H.D. Pater 23 February 1988

Vice-President,

Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce

PO Box 65

Pietermaritzburg

3200



Dear Mr. Pater,

Thank you for your letter of the 12 February 1988 with which you enclosed a proposal received from the UDF/COSATU alliance. You will no doubt have read a copy of the letter I wrote to Mr. Stewart Smith on the 2nd February 1988 and you will also no doubt have read his reply to me dated 11th February 1988. You would agree with me that issues have been raised in this correspondence which are still somewhat hanging in the air. I cannot comment on the UDF/COSATU proposals without referring to these issues. I accept the bona fides of Mr. Stewart Smith and accept the honest intentions conveyed in his letter that the position of the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce is one of complete impartiality and neutrality. I must, however, express disquiet that when an international newspaper such as the New York Times with its mass circulation publishes the stated views of Mr. Paul van Uytrecht as an officer of the Chamber, Mr. Smith can assure me that Mr. van Uytrecht was misquoted without taking any steps to ensure that the damaging article in the New York Times has been countered by setting the record straight for its readership. We are talking about very serious matters when we talk about the violence in Pietermaritzburg. We are talking about life and death issues and in a very real sense we are talking about issues which will determine the future of this country. The same issues that we face in the Pietermaritzburg situation are being faced elsewhere in South Africa and have been faced ever since 1976. Whether the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce is truly neutral in its interfacing role between Inkatha and the UDF/COSATU alliance is important.

This neutrality is a double-edged sword and I believe that it is time that somebody told the Pietermaritzburg Chamber that this is the case. In my letter to Mr. Smith about Mr. van Uytrecht's reported statement I asked whether the thoughts expressed by people around him - that the Chamber is taking out insurance policies against UDF/COSATU victories which they anticipate, are true. How can the Chamber be truly non-aligned in the conflict between Inkatha and UDF/COSATU, when the UDF/COSATU alliance with the ANC is committed to bring about the total destruction of the free enterprise system and multi-Party democracy? If the Chamber is neutral towards the formally stated intentions of the ANC and the UDF/COSATU alliance, then it is not neutral as far as Inkatha is concerned.

I must therefore ask myself whether the Chamber can put its vested interest aside and act as an honest broker and show no evidence of influencing discussion between Inkatha and the UDF/COSATU alliance.

The Chamber. certainly does not show evidence of being really neutral when it does not repudiate the reported sentiments of Mr. Paul van Uytrecht, which are terribly detrimental to Inkatha. There are unresolved issues between myself and the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce which need to be addressed. Beyond these issues, however, we face the nitty gritty of what is happening on the ground and I provisionally comment on the UDF/COSATU proposals about how the meeting between Inkatha and UDF/COSATU should be conducted. I accept your statement that the Chamber did not precipitate these proposals by conveying to UDF/COSATU that Inkatha insists on national leadership of the organisations concerned being involved in negotiations. The UDF/COSATU alliance states that they believe that "Local people are best able to solve the problems of violence in Pietermaritzburg." If it was a situation in which violence could be traced to what locals were doing, then I would agree with them wholeheartedly. This is, however, not the case. The violence in the Pietermaritzburg area echoes violence which has been taking place across the length and breadth of South Africa. It may be different in intensity but it is not different in origin. Political violence is being championed across the length and breadth of the country by the ANC, and the UDF/COSATU alliance has repeatedly stated its public commitment to the ANC as the country's premier Black organisation. The UDF/COSATU alliance has also committed itself to make South Africa ungovernable and as I have said before, this cannot be done by playing marbles. Is the Chamber neutral on the issue of whether South African is made "ungovernable", or not?

The origins of the Pietermaritzburg violence are not to be found in Pietermaritzburg itself. For this reason national leaders will have to pull together to bring about a cessation of hostilities. I have also the unfortunate experience of having been involved in discussions with the UDF and its allies in the Greater Durban Area where those who came together agreed on courses of action subject to those courses of action being endorsed by the UDF's national executive. This endorsement has never yet been forthcoming. The Chamber will yet find that the troubled waters in which it attempts-to mediate are very much deeper and more turbulent than it recognises.

I turn now to some of the more detailed aspects of the UDF/COSATU proposals. I accept that if there is to be another meeting convened by the Chamber, the presence of national office bearers will not replace existing delegations or office bearers.

see no reason, however, to limit the number of delegates

u M

etzsentsing elther side. If discussions are going to be full and productive, then we must commit ourselves to having all the necessary people there. I am quite sure that the Chamber agrees with me that it is capable of reducing a greater number of people than 20 to manageable proportions.

I must state very clearly that I am affronted by the UDF/COSATU'S clause 2.3. In it they insist on the proviso "that no person who is directly subject to legal action concerning violent incidents in the area will be eligible to be a delegate." The UDF/COSATU alliance has made shaming attempts to use our Courts to further distorting political propaganda. They have attempted to smear Inkatha by filing urgent applications for restraining orders against Inkatha. If I am not free to have whoever I want to have with me in the negotiations, then I am afraid the Chamber must count me out. I have personally been a party in the Supreme Court because Inkatha as a movement was sued by them. Where does that place me?

If I do attend any meeting convened by the Chamber aimed at bringing about a cessation of hostilities in the Pietermaritzburg area, I will need to go free to make any point that has to be made. The reservations the UDF/COSATU alliance has in wanting to bar any discussion of substantial differences between the organisations present, may act to debar the kind of exchange of views which is essential for the sake of peace. I simply cannot understand why the UDF/COSATU alliance make this demand. It is totally unrealistic and it is just as unrealistic for me, who would go to such a meeting with every intention of ironing out difficulties and establishing peace, as it would be to anybody else.

I

The UDF/C()3ATU al-liance demands that Mr. Paul van Uytrecht convene ' e't' I have already raised the question of the need for tablish his bona fides as far as we are concerned. To ave hlm included as convenor, and to have him included as one who ll assist you to conduct the meeting, may prove an insurmountabl.e problem for me and Inkatha members who were so maligned in the words attributed to him.

('1:

U) H

L)

TLQ

On my side, I do not wish to follow suit and give the Chamber an ultimatum such as a list of preconditions before I agree to go to the meeting. If I go at all, I will go with a total commitment to ado whatever can be done, and rely on the Chamber to conduct the meeting properly. My response to the UDF/COSATU proposals, however, has to be made.

would also advise the Chamber to clearly ascertain whether the uational leadership of UDF and COSATU concur with the contents of the document which has been presented to it. We have so repeatedly found that at the national level the GB? in particular does not

I) #4

back up what its office bearers commit themselves to at local and regional levels. I have again and again found that it takes months before the attitudes of the organisation's national leaders become known. Mostly, things fail by default as they do not respond at all.

I am sending a copy of this letter to you, to Mr. Stewart Smith. I owe him a letter in response to his last communication with me and I believe that I have said everything that I need to say to him in this letter to you. I will of course send it under' a short covering letter.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd)

MANGOSUTHU G. BUTHELBZI

PRESIDENT OF INKATHA

CHIEF MINISTER OF KWAZULU

I also wrote to Mr. Smith on the 25th February to express the view that a private assurance that Mr. Paul Van Uytrecht was wrongly quoted by Mr. Burns was insufficient. I said:

Dear Mr. Smith,

Thank you for your letter of the 11th February 1988. It is very gratifying to hear that the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce disassociates itself from the New York Times article in which Mr. Paul van Uytrecht is quoted by Mr. John Burns. I am certain, however, that when you reflect further on it, you will see that the matter cannot be left there and that a private assurance to me that the Chamber is satisfied that Mr. van Uytrecht was misquoted and quoted out of context, will not suffice.

The New York Times article referred to was in fact followed by a further article a copy of which I enclose for your information. If the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce accepts that Mr. van Uytrecht was inaccurately quoted in both these articles, then it should feel bound to do whatever can be done to undo the damage that they have caused.

As I explained to Mr. Rogoff and those who came to see me in Ulundi yesterday, nothing short of a disclaimer which is given as much publicity as the original article received will suffice to establish the bona fides of the Chamber.

Since receiving your letter, I have received a letter from Mr. Pate: to which I had to reply. I informed him in my reply that I

would send you a copy of the letter I wrote to him under cover of a short letter. I believe that I have said everything in that letter which I need to say to you and I sincerely hope that we can now move to a proper resolution of the difficulties which have arisen between myself and the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce. Right throughout my political career, I have been supported by ASSOCOM and the various regional Chambers of Commerce. I have always valued the friendship of South Africa's business community. I strive for a South Africa that businessmen themselves want and there should be a great deal of common cause between myself and your Chamber. That common cause now needs to be established beyond the doubt that Mr. van Uytrecht's reported remarks have created.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd)

MANGOSUTHU G. BUTHELEZI  
CHIEF MINISTER OF KWAZULU  
AND PRESIDENT OF INKATHA

On the 23rd February Mr. Alec Rogoff the President of ASSOCOM came to see me here in Ulundi. We had frank discussions about the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce's involvement in peace initiatives and I followed this discussion up with a letter to him the following day in which I wrote:

Dear Mr. Rogoff,

It was good to see you again yesterday in Ulundi. Discussions were not easy but I am afraid that realities have to be faced in forthright talking and honest exchanges of views. There is too much at stake for us to pussyfoot around central issues. However much my convictions remain strong that South Africa can sort out its own problems, and however much I believe that there is sufficient goodwill between Black and White to enable the politics of negotiation really to get off the ground, I make the point that goodwill is not located in an impenetrable bastion. It lives out there in the hearts and minds of the people and is vulnerable in political developments orchestrated by revolutionaries who see goodwill as unnecessary or even as a stumbling block.

Goodwill is vulnerable in situations where violence is on an upward spiral. However much you and I know that there is enough goodwill in this country for us to get together as Blacks and Whites, to find solutions to the country's problems, we need to protect it. I have always appreciated ASSOCOM's and the country's various regional Chambers of Commerce for the support they have given to me. I do not appreciate this support as Party political support.

I appreciate the support because it is support for noble aims and objectives to which Inkatha is committed. It is this support for decency that does exist in White society which has been such a great preserve: of goodwill. When Whites cease to support decency, then that goodwill is threatened.

I hope I made it absolutely clear in our discussions yesterday that honest brokerage cannot be pursued either if the broker is partisan or if it talks out of both sides of its mouth and acts on the ground to support one or another of the disputing parties. I called attention to an article in the New York Times written by Mr. John Burns quoting Mr. van Uytrecht. I enclose a copy of a letter I wrote to Mr. Stewart Smith, the President of the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce together with a copy of his reply to me. I also enclose a copy of a letter I received from Mr. R.H.D. Pater, the VicePresident of the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce, and my reply to his letter. You will recall that in our discussions, I insisted that the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce publicly disassociated itself from the reported statements of Mr. Uytrecht. Last night I received a copy of another article by the same Mr. John Burns written for the New York Times in which, amongst other things, Mr. Paul van Uytrecht is quoted as saying: "The Indaba is dead." This statement is put in an article the gist of which is that Pietermaritzburg has shown that my political base is in jeopardy and that the Indaba has no future because the gap between moderate Whites and major Black groups has not been bridged.

The Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce now really does need to declare publicly where it stands. Does it hold a brief for the UDF and COSATU? Does Mr. van Uytrecht reflect the Chamber's views about the Pietermaritzburg violence and about the Indaba?

I make the point, Mr. Rogoff, that when socalled honest brokers have to trample on important moral and political principles and renege on important commitments, then their brokerage is very destructive. I am totally taken aback that the General Manager of the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce is reported as making utterances which gives the average reader the right to believe that he sides with those who have vowed to destroy the free enterprise system. The Chamber's General Manager is appointed by the Chamber and is answerable to the Chamber. The Chamber must now do more than write to me privately saying that Mr. van Uytrecht was misquoted. This second article in the New York Times by Mr. John Burns makes this more imperative than ever. I enclose copies of both articles by Mr. John Burns.

My demand that the Chamber publishes a statement disassociating' itself from the reported utterances of Mr. van Uytrecht rests on my concerns for the future of South Africa. The Chamber's mediating role in Pietermaritzburg is probably rapidly coming to an

.. unsuccessful end. The violence in the Greater Pietermaritzburg area will be terminated with or without its assistance but the Chamber's position on fundamental issues will continue to be significant. What businessmen now do in South Africa and how they go about their participation in the process of change is very important.

I raise the question of Mr. van Uytrecht's reported attitudes in this broader South African context. A battle for minds is raging in South Africa and all the country's Chambers of Commerce can now no longer remain ambiguous. The crisis of Africa is living through demands that we all stand up and be counted. Business cannot take a middle of the road position hoping to curry sufficient favour on both sides to enable it to benefit from whoever wins.

There are businessmen like Mr. A. Bloom, and others, who have done a great deal to give credibility to the ANC, UDF and COSATU. In doing so they have participated in the raging battle for minds. They are opinion-makers and they acted as opinion-makers and influenced opinions, just as Mr. van Uytrecht ranks as an opinion-maker who has influenced opinions by his statements. There is a difference between a Mr. Bloom of this world who is entitled to hold whatever opinions he holds and to campaign for whatever he wants to campaign for, and a constituted Chamber of Commerce. Mr. van Uytrecht's formal position on the Chamber cannot be ignored. The Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce must believe in the free enterprise system. It must be appalled by any headway the ANC, UDF and COSATU make in turning mass Black opinion against the free enterprise system. The Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce must believe that the free enterprise system can only survive in a future South Africa in which there is a multi-Party democracy and the rule of law. It must be appalled at any gains which revolutionaries make towards establishing a Black demand for a Marxist/Socialist, one-Party State. Why then this ambiguity by the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce's General Manager? My confidence in the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce as an honest broker can now only be restored by the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce buying space in "The New York Times" and putting the record straight.

K

rnO

Q.

(Dz

)

.1

( )OEOLIHnmEbm-r-S

(D

.1)

I think it is fair to say that the businessmen who are dominant in South Africa today owe their dominance to their participation in apartheid society in which they did more to make profits than to sing about radical political change. I think it is fair to say that there is a demand in the air that business now pays the price for its earlier gains. Black politics is deeply divided between those who want that price to be the extinction of business' free enterprise hopes, and Blacks who are willing to work with business to help business pay the price that business has to pay for its past. I adopt the point of view that only bold action in favour of peace working for the peaceful solution to South Africa's problems and the retention of the free enterprise system in a multi-Party democracy, will be acceptable to the latter.

If this bold action necessitates bold condemnation of the ANC/UDF/COSATU alliance, then it must be taken. If in taking it, business pays the price of ANC/UDF/COSATU anger, then that price must be paid. Business cannot appease the ANC/UDF/COSATU alliance and at the same time take bold action in support of Black political forces working for a future that business itself wants.

I put these thoughts on paper, Mr. Rogoff, in order to gain the most value out of the intense discussions we had in Ulundi yesterday and to put my total rejection of Mr. van Uytrecht's reported position in a broader context. I am not quibbling about words. I have no concern about personal image. I am only driven by what is best for South Africa. I must see what is happening in Pietermaritzburg in the context of South Africa as a whole.

Blacks in the Greater Pietermaritzburg Area will never ever forget the way in which ordinary people were forced to drink detergents and cooking oil because they dared disobey the U0? call for a commercial boycott. Blacks in the Greater Pietermaritzburg Area will never forget the hideous intimidation that was meted out to them during UDF attempts to produce situations of confrontation. It was decency in ordinary Blacks that broke the boycott action designed to damage business and the White community. No Chamber of Commerce that has been subjected to UDF action should ever forget who the UDF are and what they stand for. No Chamber of Commerce should ever delude itself that the UDF can be successfully appeased and that each act of appeasement will only strengthen the DD? resolve to do more of that which resulted in appeasement until business itself is annihilated.

Mr. Rogoff, if I could, I would put more sugar around the pill that business has to swallow. I cannot turn the clocks of history back and I can now only do what is possible to ensure that the free enterprise system survives. That possible may not always be as palatable as businessmen would like it to be, but they must always remember that I strive for a future they themselves would like to see materialise.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd)

MANGOSUTHU G. BUTHBLEZL  
CHIEF MINISTER OF KWAZULU  
AND PRESIDENT OF INKATHA

On the 8th March, Mr. Rogoff replied to me as follows:



Dear Chief Minister,

Thank you for your letter of the 24th ultimo. I regret that I have been unable to answer it sooner as I spent most of last week in Cape Town on Assocom business.

.wleam telefaxing my reply to you in order that you may receive it as soon as possible but will post the original to you as well.

We, in Assocom, were most distressed to read of the quotes by Mr. van Uytrecht in the New York Times and I have discussed the matter with Assocom's Board of Management. Let me state quite categorically that we in Assocom disassociate ourselves completely from the remarks attributed to Mr. van Uytrecht. We feel that they were totally uncalled for and were a serious breach of the "honest broker" role being played by the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce. We have indicated our views to them.

Assocom recognises the vital role that you are playing in upholding the free enterprise system and in seeking a solution to South Africa's problems through peaceful negotiation and dialogue and has a positive attitude towards the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba.

I have had discussions with the outgoing President of the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce together with the incoming President and members of its Executive. I have indicated your wishes for a repudiation of these remarks to be sent to the New York Times. The necessary statement is now in the process of being drafted by the Pietermaritzburg Executive.

Let me once again say how much I regret that these remarks have been published and I sincerely trust that it will not affect the cordial relations that exist between yourself and Assocom.

Thanks once again for meeting with our delegation in Ulundi and for your warm and kind hospitality.

Kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, I have gone into the detail of the exchanges I have had with the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce

about their role as honest brokers because I believe that there are lessons to be learned here.

Firstly that in the politics of negotiation it is always dangerous to talk through intermediaries. Inevitably the intermediaries act as more than conduits of information. They filter information as they pass it on. There is a danger of Whites believing that they can adjudicate in Black political disputes. However much one appreciates honest peace-making initiatives in violent situations, nothing of lasting value will be achieved until Black democracy is unshackled and the masses themselves can settle the who's who of Black leadership and decide which organisation articulates their aspirations.

The second more valuable lesson that I think we must learn from the Pietermaritzburg Chamber's attempt to play honest broker is that honest brokerage amounts to more than suspending one's own beliefs or attitudes for the sake of negotiating.- How can the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce act as an honest broker when it is dealing with the UDF/COSATU/ANC alliance which has threatened total destruction to the free enterprise system and the kind of society to which the office bearers of the Chamber are committed? Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, there are some things in which honest-minded men and women can adjudicate, but there are other things in which they can only participate. When it comes to dealing with forces committed to the destruction of everything one holds valuable, how can you adjudicate between them and others? Is it not now time for White South Africans to realise that the UDF and COSATU are committed to bringing about a future South Africa which is the antithesis of what Whites hope for.

White religious leaders, White professors at universities and White businessmen are championing the cause of the UDF in this country in some terribly misguided belief that it is apartheid which has radicalised them into what they are and that after apartheid, they will cease to be what they now are. These Whites are playing terribly dangerous games with the future of our country.

I call on all White South Africans to stand up and be counted. Those who are in favour of the politics of negotiation and would support such initiatives as the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba, must not only convey their inner thinking to those who conduct surveys. They must stand up and be counted in their own social and political environment. They must tell the State President to get on with the job of reform. If they dilly-dally too long keeping their opinions private, they will find that the worsening security situation gives continued momentum to the upward spiralling violence which in turn will cause the State President to move ever further away from mounting real reforms. '

Those Whites who feel that they have to be bold and have come out in favour of the UDF must re-think their position. If they want a new South Africa in which there will be a free enterprise system and in which there will be a multi-Party democracy, they must back Black forces which are committed to these ideals. They cannot hope for the future they want if they set out to strengthen the forces that are intent on destroying prospects of that future ever emerging.

Hr. Speaker, Honourable Members, there are Whites who are rather chameleon like when it comes to the shades of Black politics. They don't want to stick their necks out; they don't want to be caught in cross fires and they leave Blacks to fight it out amongst themselves. The time has come for these people to know that they are fiddling while Rome is burning.

.hr. Speaker, Honourable Members, in the context of what "I" have been saying about the need for Whites to stand up and be counted, I want to add that Blacks also must now stand up and be counted. The erosion of political options has narrowed political alternatives. We face a future in which apartheid will be annihilated by violence and those who do so will set up a socialist/marxist one-Party State and eliminate the free enterprise system, or we face a future in which apartheid will be rooted out by the politics of negotiation to give as a multi-Party future in which the free enterprise system will be liberated to work for the benefit of the total population. There are very subtle shades that chameleon's can adopt and there are very many ways in which people can hedge their bets. The time has come to say boldly No to Mr. P.w. Botha when he refuses to get On with the process of reform. The time has also come to. say boldly No to the ANC Mission in Exile in its headlong drive to establish its sole right to political power in a one-Party State. This brings me to a statement I must make, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members. I, as the Chief Minister of KwaZulu and as the President of Inkatha, see no earthly use in any longer hoping for constructive discussions with the ANC Mission in Exile. .I want to pause awhile to look at what they themselves say their stated aims and objectives are and what they themselves say in conducting a vicious vendetta to the death against me and Inkatha.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, in looking at the current political situation, I have drawn attention to certain aspects of Black and White politics and it is against the background of the remarks that I have already made, that I now turn my attention to the African National Congress. I am not going to indulge in Party political rhetoric. I am not going to make polemic statements. The time has come for me to address some very\_fundamental issues and Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, I am not going to talk about the ANC. I am going to address Mr. Oliver Tambo and I am going to

address his National Executive and I will send this section of my Policy Speech to Mr. Tambo so that I from my side have been politically open and honest. How he responds is entirely up to him.

I am not addressing Mr. Oliver Tambo in order to get a response from him. If he does nothing about what I send him, then that is his response. The time has come to call a spade a spade. It is time for some straight talking. It is time to cut through political bullshit and stop playing to galleries. It is time to stop pussy-footing around some very fundamental issues. History demands that we all declare where we stand and in addressing Mr. Tambo and his National Executive, I will spell out where I stand. I feel obliged to express my thoughts, feelings, perceptions and to formally draw a line and say so far and no further. I do so deeply aware of how terribly difficult it is for Mr. Oliver Tambo and his Executive to keep their feet on the ground. Mr. Tambo and senior members of his Executive have been outside South Africa now for nearly 28 years. For that period of time he has not had the advantage that Inkatha's and KwaZulu's democratic structure gives me. When I speak about the National Executive in Lusaka, I frequently refer to them as the ANC's Mission in Exile. It may well be that history will one day reconstitute the real ANC after Dr. Nelson Mandela and others have been released from jail and after Black democracy has been unshackled and the ANC can once again have the lifelines that it used to have to the hearts and minds of the people. '

Mr. Tambo and his Executive live in alien environments. They have to survive where they are and they are now sleeping in the bed that they themselves made. I know just how difficult it was for our brothers and sisters who were sent into exile to prepare for a future situation in which the ANC could not operate legally in this country. I know how difficult it was for Mr. Tambo to establish any kind of base abroad. I speak to him man to man with a sympathetic understanding of how difficult his role has been and how Godforesaken he must have felt when he went out into the world as a nobody.

I know of the difficulties he experienced in getting backing from Western industrialised nations for what he was attempting to do. I know that he had to survive somehow and that in the end it was the Soviet Union and its allies which eventually came to his rescue. I know that this harsh world in which he had to take what he could get from whom he could get it was more than instrumental in the decision of the ANC's Mission in Exile to declare the armed struggle to be the primary means of bringing about radical change in this country.

am also deeply aware of the extreme difficulty with which Mr. ambo managed to keep the ANC's Mission in Exile intact. I am aware of the extent to which he had to preside over factions which inevitably evolved in the harsh and alien world in which his mettle and the mettle of his colleagues was so terribly tested. I am deeply aware of the extent to which the adjudicating and reconciling role that he had to play amongst his own colleagues prohibited him from evolving into a Kenyatta, a Nyerere, a Kaunda, or a Machel. These great sons of Africa led in their own right and they put their own stamp on history itself. Mr. Tambo was denied this opportunity of emerging as a leader in his own right because unlike these great sons of Africa, he could not operate in his own country; he could not tread the soil of his beloved South Africa and to command forces on the ground.

J.

M

J.

5'.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, my heart has always gone out to Mr. Tambo because I was always aware of the extent to which he did not lead nor did he direct Umkhonto. Having opted for the armed struggle as the primary means of bringing about change, the ANC's Mission in Exile left Mr. Tambo in a position in which he had to be entirely dependent on lieutenants who neither consulted him nor informed him about what they were doing on a day-to-day basis. I have always also been deeply aware of the extent to which unlike the Mau Mau, or unlike Frelimo, the ANC's Mission in Exile was not a single organisation. Not only did Mr. Tambo have the commanders and decisionmakers of Umkhonto always there in the background describing the circumstances in which he had to lead but he was also faced with the necessity of working within an ANC/SACP alliance. There was a time when serious moves were being made to relieve him of his post and to establish a one or another kind of triumvirate to divide the ANC's executive power between those on whom the ANC was dependent for its very existence.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, it is this understanding of Mr. Oliver Tambo's very difficult role that has always guided me in whatever I have said about him and his leadership. I never expected more from him than I knew he could actually deliver. That is why, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, nowhere in anything I have ever said right across all the years of my leadership have I ever attacked Mr. Tambo's person, nor have I ever insulted him. 'The time has come for me now to say enough is enough. He and his organisation have responded to this understanding of Mr. Tambo's position on my part with the most hideous attacks against my person, my integrity and my political leadership.

Mr. Tambo, the time has now come for me to say to you that unless you now forthwith return a semblance of Black dignity to what your lieutenants and followers are saying about me, the KwaZulu Government and Inkatha, we will be forced to regard you and your

organisation as not fit to sit around any table with us. Mr. Tambo, you will need to sit around a table with us. You must be aware that Dr. Nelson Mandela will sit around a table with us. You must also be aware that he knows that I will be there and has said just this. We are not going to go away. We are not going to disappear' into thin air. Whether it is you, or who in the and exert the more powerful influences to bring about the final eradication of apartheid, is to me irrelevant. We both know that apartheid will be eradicated. Whether it is before apartheid is eradicated or whether it is after apartheid is eradicated, I will have to deal with you. Whether you yourself retain the leadership of the ANC's Mission in Exile and whether or not your leadership continues after you and your colleagues return from exile, I and Inkatha will be there to be dealt with and to deal with you. Mr. Tambo, I make no assumptions about your future leadership role. If there is finally a military victory in some distant future in South Africa, it is your generals who will be in the executive of government. If there is not finally a military victory, as I believe will be the case, there will be yourself and Dr. Nelson Mandela and others to form whatever executive needs to be formed. When therefore I speak to you about you having to deal with me before or after liberation, I want you to bear in mind that how you and your colleagues conduct yourselves now will influence who sits with whom to talk about what.

It is terribly tragic!-Mr. Tambo, that you and your colleagues made the assumption that you could drum Inkatha out of political existence. It is a reality and will remain a reality whether I lead it or not. You are stuck with it. The reverse is just as obviously true. We are all stuck with you. There is no South African destiny in which we will not both share equally.

I hold you accountable, Mr. Tambo, for what you and your organisation say about me. As far back as 1973 the Third Quarter edition of African Communist said that Chief Buthelezi is a black mercenary. After that last discussion we had in London in October 1979 which was attended by your people and my people, personal attacks on me began multiplying. In your February edition of 'Sechaba' in 1984 it was stated that: "Gatsha Buthelezi spoke as a member of the Special Branch." And in the same issue, it said that Gatsha Buthelezi has an illogical mind. In the same year, the September issue stated that "Chief Gatsha Buthelezi believes he can continue to slander and distort the prestige and image of our movement for ever with impunity." It is a lie, Mr.s Tambo, that I slander the ANC Mission in Exile. The statement was then followed with words which were calculated to insult. The statement went on to say that I could continue slandering the ANC "because the ANC simply does not have the time, resources and energy to waste in acts of terrorism against individuals." I have never said you are a nobody. Why do you say it of me?

the same issue of 'Sechaba' you further attack my integrity .by yina I (he) "cynically condemns and threatens whole communities cause the leaders of the Labour Party and Reform Party have done more than to really follow (my) leadership example." -And this sue of Sechaba also says "Chief Gatsha Buthelezi has turned his back on the strong and proud tradition of the struggle." It said: )-

.  
Juli P"!

:  
msanrmchmivs

:5 O" W- Z

Chief Gatsha Buthelezi betrayed the cause of the people." It said: "Buthelezi desperately seeks greetige and credibility by all means possible.w It said: "What Buthelezi does turns him into a political clown who will never deceive anyone except the hand that feeds him." And it also said: "Chief Gatsha Buthelezi is an opportunist and double-talker." .

(n  
A year later in September 1985 the ANC made scathing attacks on my honour and my integrity in a radio broadcast beamed to Black South Africans and the whole world. It was broadcast that: "Anybody who mobilises Zulu-speaking people is regarded as a rival to be wiped from the scene by Buthelezi." And the broadcast made me to be most treacherous when it was stated: "Buthelezi's choice swear words are directed against the people's forces rather than against the enemy."

Two months later your official magazine 'Sechaba' again went on an extravagant spree of insults. It stated that: "Looked at from the eyes of the people Gatsha Buthelezi is far from being a moderate. He lacks modesty, he is a tyrant." It said: "Gatsha Buthelezi is jealous because the ANC has become more popular than his Inkatha." And went on to say: "The people have decided to render South Africa un governable. To Gatsha this is a nightmare."

Two months later, in January 1986, you yourself were disdainful of me. You said: "It is Chief Gatsha Buthelezi who is fighting his: own battle against the ARC but the ANC is too preoccupied with the struggle to take much notice of what he is saying." Why, Mr. Tambo, if this is true, do you and your organisation spend so much time and money insulting me as I today am showing you do do?

In the third quarter edition of the African Communist in 1986 another hideous statement was made about me. The statement is: "In 1961 when the ANC called for a national convention to include the government of the day, in the belief that the government could still be brought to reason by peaceful negotiation, ,Chief Gatsha authelezi then working as a clerk in the .Bantu .Administration Offica in Durban...kep: on the sidelines with ThisI arms folded while :he apartheid monster unleashed terror and havoc against the members' of the ANC and detained its leadership." How hideous can your political propaganda get?-

A couyle of months later in November the ANC in a broadcast for the whole world to hear said: "It is clear that this puppet Gatsha is being groomed by the West and the racist regime to become a Savimbi

in a future free South Africa." This places hideous connotations on my leadership but the statement which immediately follows passes all bounds of decency. In a broadcast it was said: "The onus is on the people of South Africa to neutralise Gatsha, the snake which is poisoning the people of South Africa. It needs to be hit on the head." Where, Mr. Tambo, is your dignity as a son of Africa? Don't you squirm? Aren't you ashamed? You do not have the goititcal guts to face me and you present me to the people in such a way that you obviously hope that either your organisation or some maniac roaming around will kill me so that you do not have to deal with me. Why present me as something so hideous as a snake that needs to be hit on the head?

The next month, again in a broadcast, you malign me by saying that I, together with other "puppets of the bantustans, ... will fail to get 'the support of the people." You know that iyou' yourself passed messages on to me in the late seventies and early eighties telling me not to rock the boat too much and you know bloody well that during those years you were telling your executive that nobody entrusted with the difficult role I had been entrusted with could have done better. You know that I took up my position in the politics in which I have remained ever since after full discussions with Chief Albert Lutuli and his senior executives. Why now talk about me as a puppet?

Some months later in May 1987 you continued this attack on me as a puppet. Again in a broadcast for the whole world to hear the ANC referred to me as a "well-known Botha puppet." In the same broadcast referring to my demand for the release of Dr. Nelson Mandela the ANC said that I "just want to use our leader's name for his opportunistic intentions." It is the most hideous form of personal insult to ascribe hideous motives to honourable deeds. You know very well that I yearn for the release of Dr. Nelson Mandela and that I campaign for his release in a way that the ANC is quite incapable of doing. You are aware that I never make political capital out of my behind-the-scenes constant commitment to campaign for his release. You are aware that I have made his release a precondition for any involvement I may have at negotiations about the constitutional future of South Africa at the national level. I do not make cheap propaganda out of it and at the same time profit from his continued detention. You, Mr. Tambo, and your ANC will not break the walls down of Dr. Mandela's jail. South Africa needs him to be released. You cannot effect his release. For God's sake let other people who can possibly do so get on with the job you can't do; Don't be jealous. We are not campaigning for his release in order to gain 'anything for ourselves. We do so for the sake of the people of South Africa. A month later an ANC broadcast again went on a slandering attack against my honour. A broadcast referred to me as the "trusted and committed puppet" which the regime entrusted with "all the murderous police that are operating in townships under the so-called KwaZulu government." The broadcast said they had done so



because "Mangosuthu Buthelezi has over the years demonstrated -his commitment to the maintenance of the apartheid system." The broadcast said that "Gatsha went to Adriaan Vlok to beg for these powers" and said I "wanted to use them to wipe out the offensive of the people." The broadcast said that I "spoke viciously against our people's drive to render the country ungovernable and the apartheid system unworkable."

The same broadcast continued to indulge in every excess possible to malign me. It said I, referring to me as "Gatsha", have a "brutality against the patriotic forces." It said that I "will be used to strengthen the enemy's hand within the people and allow them to speak of blacks killing blacks." When your people, Mr. Tambo, plant bombs in public places killing women and children in your determination not to distinguish between hard and soft targets, you and your people are involved in blacks killing blacks. Your propaganda, Mr. Tambo, demands the spreading of the violence in South Africa in the development of what you so euphemistically call the people's war. Your people, Mr. Tambo exhort Blacks to kill their fellow Blacks as they exhort them to kill township councillors and anybody else they determine to be opposed to their violent intentions. How dare you pretend that there is not a Black-on-Black confrontation in this country and that you are responsible for it.

In the same broadcast, Mr. Tambo, the ANC says that I am "not following the traditions of the heroic Kings of Natal, of Zulus." The broadcast said that I am "a Stooge placed there by imperialism and reactionary circles in our country." The ANC goes on in its broadcast to say that "emotions that Gatsha portrays illustrates once again not only his fears of the masses but his rank opportunism."

This hideous slandering attack in June 1987 over the air was followed the next month by another attack on my honour in your 'official publication 'Sechaba.' The ANC said "Gatsha Buthelezi, so-called Chief Minister of KwaZulu bantustan, is one of the opportunists so far exposed by the revolution currently going on in South Africa." The article said "The Boers have been and are making Gatsha look like one of the prominent leaders. of the bantustans. He has been allowed to say anything he likes about apartheid and its upholders." Mr. Tambo, your official, magazine f vsays that Pretoria "Through Gatsha Buthelezi" ... "commits Inkatha to such atrocities" because "the Boers want to justify their black-on-black violent slogan" and to "confine our struggle to townships and thus prevent the struggle from spreading into white areas." trhen article went on to say that "On the part of Gatshaw atrocities are aimed at intimidating our people in and around KwaZulu bantustan into supporting his divisive and dangerous actions. He is also thereby defending apartheid which monthly gives him a bulging purse through the bantustan scheme;" Every time I see

something like this I think that your people could not possibly stoop lower, Mr. Tambo. But they continue time and again to show me that there is no bottom to the barrel of muck from which they scrape up the dirt they sling at me. If you are so opposed to me, why do you not meet me head on in political clashes in which you say you could be sure that the people will support you? You and your people malign me like this because you are politically empty-handed as far as the people on the ground inside the country are concerned. The massive base of support that I have built up threatens you with its viability. You cannot confront it politically. You will, however, in the end find that what you have been saying about me you have been saying about not only all my lieutenants but every member of Inkatha and every Black who supports my leadership in KwaZulu and in South Africa. In the end you will find that these slanderous attacks against me are the weakest form of political opposition that you can offer. The people will hold you accountable for what you and your organisation have been saying. . i

This attack on me in 'Sechaba' in July 1987 comes with a hideous sting in it. The article says "History has no mercy for those who misread it nor does it have sympathy for those who pretend. Gatsha Buthelezi, the Chief Minister of the KwaZulu bantustan circus and commander in chief of the regime's vigilante's base in Natal, will Hlearn a lesson he will never forget," and then threateningly adds "if he survives." Why do you want me dead, Mr. Tambo, if you think your hideous personal attacks against me are well-founded? You deently insult Black South Africans. You know that they support me in their millions. You know that Inkatha has a membership that the ANC could ever only dream of. Are you making all these millions of Black sons and daughters of South Africa idiots who support the kind of perSOon you say I am? I say enough is enough. I do not toletate the sons and daughters of South Africa being insulted in this way. You and your organisation are showing-just how empty-handed you are politically when you resort to such hideously low forms of political propaganda.

Later in 1987 in September, your organisation again turned to continue the attacks against my honour. In a broadcast for all the world again to hear the ANC said that "The Pretoria regime handed over police powers in the KwaZulu bantustan to its loyal puppet Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi. This avowed enemy of democracy is now using those powers to crack the DD? and other democratic formations in the area."

The broadcast stooped very low when it said "Police and soldiers have enlisted puppets like Buthelezi which they use to terrorise black people." The broadcast went on to say about me "Today his task in selling out our people's birth right has become complete." The broadcast referred to me as a "demagogue that attacked a meeting in 1979/80 and feathered and tarred" somebody from the

South African Council of Churches. The broadcast accused me of hideous racism in threatening Indian people with "resurrecting the ghosts of the 1949 riots." And in this context the broadcast 'atcused me iof murder. It said "Then came the GriffithS' Mxenge muroet and again the hand of the Wellington (sic) Sabelos, part of the Inkatha impi, was present."

Straight after this attack in 'Sechaba' against me the ANC turned again to attack me in the 'African Communist' in its third quarter issue of 1987. In this issue it was stated "Buthelezi has sat there in the KwaZulu seat of power like a fat cat licking up the cream and has done precisely nothing to 'lead the people in opposition to apartheid except to make endless speeches and decline one lunch invitation from President Botha." The political imagery of your colleagues, Mr. Tambo, is nauseating.

IIn this article I am accused of betrayal. It is stated "Having abandoned the two key principles which have been the basis of ANC and liberation politics throughout this century, universal suffrage in a unitary state, Buthelezi has had little difficulty in abandoning others." This is a political lie, Mr. Tambo, and you know it. You know that I have always been prepared if necessary to die striving for one South Africa, with one sovereign Parliament, based on one universal adult franchise system. I know that you are out of touch with what is really going on in politics in South Africa but you have got access to copies of the text of every speech I have ever made.

You and your people know that you lie when you say that I have abandoned the ideals of one South Africa with one sovereign Parliament. Unlike you and your organisation I regard it as the people's sovereign right to finally decide what form one sovereign Parliament in one South Africa will take. You are not in the new political ball games now dominating our country. You have endorsed yourself out of the internal political process.' That process, however, goes on without you and you will find in the end, Mr. Tambo, that it is a process which will really give the ordinary South African the sovereign rights the struggle has always been about. The people in the end may decide that they need a Westminster-type model. They may decide that they need a federal-type model or another type model. I have never ever for one moment doubted that the people will want one sovereign Parliament in one South Africa, nor have I ever doubted for one moment that in the end, we will have a multi-Party democracy. I know that you and your lieutenants are totally preoccupied with returning to South Africa as a government returned from exile. I know that you can only achieve this if you bring about the circumstances in which the people are robbed of their sovereignty and a one-Party State can be foisted on them.

This 'African Communist' edition of the third quarter 1987 regurgitates past propaganda against me when it says "President

Botha considers Buthelezi a fit and proper person to be entrusted with the administration of the apartheid laws in Durban's townships. For it will be Buthelezi's job now to see that rents are collected, bus boycotts broken, strikes smashed, agitators rounded up and carted off to jail. Buthelezi is now pledged to work side by side with Botha's military and police in maintaining law and order and eradicating violence and the politics of intimidation."

In this issue your Secretary-General, Mr. Alfred Nzo, called Inkatha members "thugs" and called me their leader who was a "puppet who was working with agents of the Pretoria regime to ferment unrest." -

As recently as February this year, the ANC continued in its despicable attempt to malign my person and destroy my honour. Again in a broadcast for all the world to hear, the ANC said "It has become clear to the majority of the people as more lives are lost that the apartheid regime is being actively assisted in its attempt to prolong the fighting by none other than Gatsha Mangosuthu Buthelezi. Also it is clearly in Gatsha Buthelezi's self-interest that the fighting must continue." And added that "The people's confrontation with the apartheid regime has forced Gatsha Buthelezi to take a clear position in support of his employers."

We have met with you, Mr. Tambo, several times in Europe and in Africa all these years, and I was even then the head of the KwaZulu Government. Were you meeting me at all these meetings as an employee of the Pretoria racist Regime, or as your brother? On all these occasions were you embracing the stooge of Pretoria that your organisation and your partners in the South African Communist Party are now portraying me to be? Have you just suddenly awakened' to the fact that I am all these things?

The broadcast went on to say that for me "to take part in the people's struggle against the apartheid regime is to deny Gatsha Buthelezi a monthly salary that he receives from the apartheid regime as a bantustan puppet and an active apoliceman- of the regime." 1

Do you realise that the Zulu people will find it difficult ever to forgive you for these insults, unless there is some rapprochement, for after all it is their money which makes up my salary. In the last financial period alone, more than R300 million of our budget came directly from the Zulu people's revenue funds. Even the rest of our budget is our money after all, as citizens of South Africa who contribute to all developments which have taken place in South Africa. We pay taxes like anybody. We do not even get our full share and that is what our struggle for liberation is about. We do not blame you for not having contributed anything for nearly 30

years of your life abroad, as we know that it is apartheid which is responsible for your being there. But the sweat from our brows has recontinued to produce the wealth of South Africa, while you are abroad. Are you really blaming us for continuing to struggle here at home?

Mr. Tambo, I am speaking to you personally. I am addressing you. You must hear me for the sake of South Africa. Political honour in the hearts and minds of Black South Africans has always been beyond destruction by apartheid. Honour was not smashed when the old ANC -was banned and its leaders jailed. You left South Africa, Mr. niambo, with- a deep sense of South African honour. : Where in the history. of the old ANC would any national leader in it ever have Htolerated his lieutenants stooping to use the low political ypropaganda that your organisation is now using? I could understand you accepting the kind of language your people are using if you yourself saw them walking around with hands dripping with the blood of innocent people because such language would only be expected from such people. The kind of propaganda that your people have been involved in should only be expected from people with hands thus dripping with blood they shed which is blood the struggle has always relied on.

You and your colleagues in your collective wisdom decided to attempt to make the armed struggle the primary means of bringing about radical. change. Mr. Tambo, were on yourself in South Africa, you would have been deeply shocked y any political leader who tried to tackle the military might of Pretoria and failed and then turned to planting bombs in public places. We in South Africa Aare shocked by the ANC's attacks on soft targets. We are shocked by the politics of violent intimidation. We have been shocked by the fact that the ANC has resorted to killing Black town councillors because it disagrees with what they are doing. We have nbeen shocked by the soft line you and your colleagues took on the 'question of necklacing. However much you now distance yourself from this hideous method of killing for political purposes, we remain shocked that you ever saw fit to condone it politically. We are shocked by the callous way in which the ANC's MissiOn in Exile orchestrates the increased poverty of Black South Africans in campaigning for disinvestment. You are setting yourself apart from the people. We are shocked by your total inability to deal with "Inkatha politically. We are shocked by a lot else besides. I ask you, Mr. Tambo, what political purpose will really be ultimately 'served by the ANC's attempt to lay at my feet that which it itself is trying to do?

Even as I address you now, Mr. Tambo, I address you as a brother in the struggle. I have made no single attack on your own integrity. I have asked you questions but I have done so in the context of understanding the severe limitations under which you have to survive in your leadership. It is tragic that the ANC has been

progressively endorsing itself out of the only kind of political process which could ever lead to an honourable victory over apartheid. I have never said that what the External Mission of ANC does in our struggle is irrelevant. Why try to endorse me and Inkatha out of the struggle?

You know, Mr. Tambo, as well as I know that a White organisation like the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging would have facilities at its disposal and would have the training in sabotage and killing which would \_make the ANC's best look like amateurish bungling -if there was ever a military victory over apartheid. You know as well as I do that the hallowed, timeehonoured values of the struggle thave always demanded and continue to demand reconciliation between South Africa's race groups. The ANC's Mission in Exile is endorsing itself out of the process of bringing that reconciliation into being by what it is now doing. Why has it abandoned these time-honoured and hallowed values? If the job is too tough for you, leave it to people like me who can get on with it.

Even now I continue to appeal for Black unity ,based on the acceptance of the need for a multi-strategy approach. Deny that need at your peril. Deny that need at the expense of the honour of the ANC. South Africa is a different kettle of fish entirely to Mocambique or Zimbabwe. Models of the struggle in lthese States will not have any long term utility in South Africa. You will find, Mr. Tambo, that the present re-thinking about the ANC and its role in the struggle now emerging in Moscow will hobastop with the present level of questioning.t Perhaps the ANC's Mission in Exile is perilously close to being given some kind of tenuous existence by African States and other States for old times sake. 'Don't put yourself inva position in which you are pensioned off somewhere in Africa as a friend who failed to make the grade.

You, Mr. Tambo, actually know how harsh the realities are here in South Africa. You know that I have survived these realities and that I have an ever-increasing political relevance. No amountooof slanderous attacks against my honour can erode my power bases. I am not addressing you as I am addressing you because I need anything from you politically. I am addressing you as a brother in the struggle who has lost his way out there in the outside world and who stands in the real danger of being finally alienated in the land of his birth.

If there is anything that I could do to help bring you back home, I would Vdo it. The attacks that you and your \_otganisation semake against my honour are, however, so offensive to people at the grass , root level who support me in their masses that I am beginning to doubt that the people will ever permit me to bring you in from lthe cold. There will be no military victory. There' will be a political victory. Black South Africans no longer doubt this. There will be negotiating tables and conference tables. History has ordained this. Begin now to work with historygand not against lt, viva".

There was a time in which you yourself were concerned about the cheap and nasty propaganda used against me by your organisation. You. and I have talked about this. That time appears now to have passed because you yourself are now beginning to indulge in the same language. In a broadcasted statement made on the 13th January this year, you Mr. Tambo called for the cessation of carnage, in Pietermaritzburg. You said that fighting must end and that we must unite our forces against the oppressor and then, Mr. ?Tambo, you charged me with fanning and promoting the conflict. As recently as the third of this month in speaking about the Pietermaritzburg situation you said: "This is a racial war. In actual fact it is the Whites fighting blacks in a camouflaged way by using black agents to look as if blacks are fighting blacks." And you said that attempts have been blocked to put an end to the Pietermaritzburg violence by the racist regime as well as "the leader of Inkatha Mangosuthu Buthelezi." You said that the regime is now using the Inkatha movement as an instrument to promote conflicts and killings." You said that about a thousand people arrested all of them from the GDP or COSATU and none from Inkatha. You said "The recent ban on organisations included UDF and COSATU but not Inkatha." You added that "This goes to prove that the :egime has no cause to act against the Inkatha movement." Et tu Brutus?

Mr. Tambo, I am putting aside the feeling of revulsion I have for the kind of vicious propaganda that your organisation has levelled at me ever increasingly in recent years. I have to do so because the struggle for liberation does not hinge on what you or your organisation think of me and Inkatha; I now want to address you, -Sir, on some questions of tactics and strategies which underlie the ANC Mission in Exile's verbal attacks on myself and Inkatha. They also underlie the physical attacks to which we are being subjected. I bury my dead, Mr. Tambo, and I address you in the vein of one who is talking about life and death issues.

You will by now have come to realise that Inkatha is not the pusha over that the ANC Mission in Exile may have thought it to be. I am quite ,sure that if you had heard me at the time when I told you that Inkatha was rooted in the hearts and minds of millions of Black South Africans, your organisation would not have mounted its violent attack against Inkatha. It did so, however, in the ill-considered assessment that Inkatha could be wiped off the face of the earth. Having started the violent vendetta against Inkatha that was started, your organisation may now be trapped in a political action which it can only abandon at great cost to its prestige.

You, Mr. Tambo, know very well that in your inner councils decisions were made to annihilate Inkatha and to use all the means necessary to do so. It would be really tragic for everybody around you if you and they are already past that point of no return along the road to a fight to the finish. There are some of my own colleagues who would regard me addressing you as I am addressing

you today as a waste of time. They would say that we have already passed the point beyond which addressing the issues between us must give way to the survival of one or the other organisation on the ground. They would say that the ANC Mission in Exile has already committed itself and those who support it in South Africa to place the annihilation of Inkatha as the ANC Mission in Exile's highest priority. ANC spokesmen have described Inkatha as its major enemy in South Africa. It is intent upon destroying Inkatha and sees Inkatha's destruction as essential to the achievement of its other objectives.

I address you today, Mr. Tambo, in such a manner that you can find reprieve for your organisation in commitments to destroy itself by attempting to destroy Inkatha. I therefore concentrate on some underlying tactical and strategic issues which are there in your attacks on Inkatha and my leadership.

It is the ANC Mission in Exile which has raised non-participation to a principle. Participation or non-participation remain tactics and must be decided on in ever changing circumstances. You yourself know that you participated in the ANC support there was for my entry into participatory opposition to apartheid. I have been unswerving to the same commitments I had at the time you and your colleagues supported me when I first entered participatory opposition to apartheid. You know this is true. However much you distorted this reality in talking about Inkatha at the Consultative Conference in 1985, you yourself have recognised that I started doing what I am now doing with your full blessing.

Who are you, Mr. Tambo, and who is any one of your colleagues, or who are you collectively, to dictate to millions of South Africans here on the ground in this country that non-participation must be raised to a principle? You are not elected to office by the masses as I am. You are not answerable to the masses as I am answerable to them each and every year when I stand before Inkatha's Annual General Conference to be held accountable and to be judged. I tell you now, Mr. Tambo, that the people themselves in their millions refuse to be obeisant to your demands to elevate non-participation to the level of a principle. If we don't fight apartheid where it is strangling us, we will be strangled. If we don't fight apartheid in the arenas apartheid creates to subjugate us, we will be subjugated. '

Where did your nonparticipatory principle land the people of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei? Where would your non-participatory principle have landed the people of KwaZulu if I had not been there to save them from the fate that Pretoria had in store for them? You are now attempting to make no-go areas for me in the KwaZulu/Natal region. You would not have been able to do this if I had not kept Black democracy alive here. Where are your no-go areas in Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei? Are the governments in these areas more than a match for you and you can't

mmmvnmnmvMu-mlmw \_\_.W\_\_I.m\_-\_u I I .\_\_



even put a foot in them? No, Mr. Tambo, non-participation has not been raised to a principle by the Black people of South Africa and you will have to live with that reality.

Again as far back as 1973 while you were still personally fully supporting what I was doing, the 'African Communist' in its third quarter issue of 1973 stated that "Chief Buthelezi is the most effective weapon found against the State Department's critics on the left." In the October issue of 1984 'Sechaba' stated "Chief Gatsha Buthelezi has become a far better defendant and apologist for the status quo than anyone else."

In a broadcast by the ANC in August 1985, your organisation stated "Buthelezi is against the international isolation of apartheid South Africa and is virulently opposed to the armed struggle and is happy to justify the violence of the apartheid system in the name of law and order." In the same month the ANC broadcast that "Buthelezi draws his salary from posts within apartheid institutions created by Pretoria to perpetuate the criminal system of white minority rule." A month later in September 1985, the ANC again broadcast that "Gatsha spends all his time attacking the ANC, GDP and COSATU. In doing so he serves the objectives and interests of the Botha regime."

In June 1987 the ANC again broadcast attacks against Inkatha. Your organisation said "Gatsha must be exposed for what he is. He is not a leader of the Zulu people. He is not following the traditions of the heroic Kings of Natal, of the Zulus. He is a 'stooge placed there by imperialised and reactionary circles in our country. That is why Botha now and again sends him to America to argue for more investment, to go and campaign against the disinvestment in America and the Western countries. That is why we see him hugging Margaret Thatcher from time to time because he is their running dog, he is a lackey."

A month later, the July issue of 'Sechaba' stated that I committed atrocities aimed at intimidating the people and said "He is also thereby defending apartheid which monthly gives him a bulging purse through the bantustan scheme.

Again before the ANC started attacking me for my participation in my opposition to apartheid, the 'African Communist' gave notice of what is to come as far back as 1973. In the third quarter edition of that year's 'African Communist' it was stated that "Chief Buthelezi is a prisoner of the bantustan set-up" and that "Chief Buthelezi works within the system." It is stated that "Chief Buthelezi allows himself to be used to further the aims of Vorster and Nixon." This 'African Communist' voice was later picked up by the ANC .

The September issue of 'Sechaba' stated "Chief Gatsha Buthelezi came out in his true colours in 1976 as an apologist of the apartheid system and spokesmen of US imperialism." It stated that "Chief Gatsha Buthelezi misleads people into believing that he and his tribally based Inkatha disagree with the ANC and its millions of supporters only as far as the question of armed struggle is concerned. In reality he uses this as a smokescreen to continue serving his masters in Pretoria and Washington." It was stated that "Chief Gatsha Buthelezi and Inkatha are basically serving and upholding the interests of the apartheid system and world imperialism." And that "Chief Gatsha Buthelezi turned the scales in favour of the hated bantustan system."

Mri Tambo, the attack on my involvement in the KwaZulu government has continued unabated since. I continue to be attacked for waging the struggle where you yourself agreed it should be waged. The 'Sechaba' issue of November 1985 stated "Gatsha Buthelezi is increasingly playing the role in a literal sense of Botha. He has learnt a lot from himw"

In broadcasts in May 1986 the ANC said "Gatsha Buthelezi is a puppet of the capitalists" and said that I opposed disinvestment "to strengthen the apartheid economy." It said that I opposed those who wanted to make the apartheid system unworkable. In December 1986 the ANC broadcast that I use "death force and vigilante squads" in "the interests of apartheid."

In June 1987 an ANC broadcast said that I "spoke viciously against our people's drive to render the country ungovernable and the apartheid system unworkable." An ANC broadcast said, referring to me as Gatsha, that "He will be used to strengthen the enemy's hand within the people" and that I serve "objectively the interests of the Botha regime."

The next month, in September 1987, 'Sechaba' said that Inkatha "has become an extension of the regime's army and police." In September 1987 the ANC said, again referring to me as Gatsha, repeated in a broadcast that I served "objectively the interests of the Botha regime."

The 'African Communist' in its third quarter issue of 1987 repeated the accusations by saying that "Buthelezi has been part of the state apparatus of the Botha regime", that I have been part of the state apparatus ever since I was installed in 1950 and said that "the power of Inkatha has never been used to mobilise the people in any campaign of opposition to apartheid." In February 1988 the ANC said in a broadcast that I was prolonging the fighting in the Pietermaritzburg area to actively assist the apartheid regime.

Mr. Tambo, there are major differences of opinion between you and I about tactics and strategies that should now be employed in the struggle. At least I think this is the case. I can never be quite sure to what extent you really lead the ANC and that its actions and stances are determined by you. Whether you originate action or whether you have to concur with those who do, you remain the head of the Mission in Exile and you are held responsible for what the ANC does. Differences of opinion between us whether they are actually differences between you and I or differences between myself and your organisation, does not really matter that much. The differences are there and they have to be dealt with. You cannot go round condemning people to death because they differ with you about what tactics and strategies need to be employed. For millions of Blacks inside South Africa, there would be absolutely nothing for them to do to assist in their liberation if they could only do what you wanted them to do. You may bluff the world but you cannot bluff your fellow South Africans here on the ground in this country. We know that you do not control our townships' street corner committees. We know that you do not control groups of comrades. We know that although you can fan the flames of violence, you do not control violence that does erupt nor could you stop it even if you wanted to. The people of South Africa will have to do that.

You are not in a position to ram non-participation as a principle down Black South Africans' throats. It does not help you one iota when your organisation swears at those who oppose apartheid with everything they have got inside this country in the very arenas Pretoria created to drum you and your colleagues out into exile. I must speak bluntly, Mr. Tambo. I cannot pussy-foot around life and death issues. You cannot author the whole of the South African political process by the way you and your organisation swear at me. Surely you have by now seen that what Inkatha has done has already altered the course of history in South Africa.

Were it not for my participatory opposition to apartheid and if I did not pick up the challenge of doing battle against apartheid in the arenas apartheid created, South Africa would not today be in the state of flux that it is in. If I had sanctimoniously stepped aside and allowed Pretoria to make KwaZulu a so-called independent state, there would by now have been a confederation of Southern African states which would have included Swaziland. We would all be facing a totally different ball game and the clocks would have been set back to Vorster's or Verwoerd's time.

Had I not opposed Pretoria's hideous plans to make KwaZulu a so-called 'independent state, there would not now be national and international recognition that Black South Africans are South Africans and would stay South Africans. I have done more to stamp on the Government's homeland policy than anything you have ever been able to do. Participatory opposition to apartheid has led to gains which you yourself profit from politically.

Had I not opposed the new constitution in the way that I did oppose it, and had I co-operated with Pretoria the tricameral parliament would have been a mill-stone around every Black South Africans' neck. I refused to do anything which would legitimise it. I refused to participate in the Black Advisory Council the State President wanted to set up when the President's Council was authoring the present situation. I refused to have anything to do with the Special Cabinet Committee the State President set up to ensure that Blacks provided the present constitution with a degree of legitimacy.

You know I campaign relentlessly for one South Africa, forv one Parliament, and for a universal adult franchise system. Mr. Tambo, for the decades that the ANC was operative in South Africa, no real bridges were built between it and institutionalised White South Africa. The ANC only had White drop outs who were inconsequential in their own society. You know that the name of the game even for the old ANC has always been racial reconciliation. My participatory opposition to apartheid has done more to make it possible to reconcile South Africa's race groups than anything you have ever done. The political reconciliation of race groups is now a looming reality with no thanks to what you and the ANC have done. Mr. Tambo, I ask you directly to your face: Is it because I have been moving ever closer to the political centre of gravity of South Africa, and is it because my participatory opposition to apartheid has had important results; that the ANC Mission in Exile now hates me? Is it because you have none of the real action which is moving this country forward that you want to destroy everything that those who are succeeding have done? If you feel so far out in the cold, it is because you have done the wrong things at the wrong time and you have turned to brutalising Black South Africans with indiscriminate bomb blasts and because you have left your bands of so-called freedom fighters loose to instigate violence that you neither control nor direct.

In everything I say, Mr. Tambo, I still refrain from maligning your person. I sympathise with your plight. I sympathise with the fact that you cannot exercise true African-style leadership in your own organisation. I sympathise with you because you cannot control your own people here on the ground in this country. I carry all this sympathy for you as a Black brother and I will never ever stoop to attack your honour or your integrity. You do very, very stupid things politically. You are mistaken in your analysis of South Africa. You are mistaken in your understanding of White South Africa. You are mistaken in your reading of history. These things are all there for all the world to see. But I still say, however stupid you may have been politically, I address you as a brother and I do not insult your person.

Mr. Tambo, when I see you doing something that is failing which will continue to fail, I cannot look the other way. When you

blunder, Black South Africans suffer. There is a certain sense in which revolutionaries in your organisation, committed to violence as they are, think that they are justified in taking risks which involve other people dying. They set themselves up as though they were commanding generals with troops that can be sent into battle where there will be casualties. That is all very well for those Black South Africans who have crossed our borders and joined the armed struggle. They have made their choice. They have offered to lose their lives. They have placed themselves at your disposal. When therefore they try to confront Pretoria's military might and they are battered, that is something which rests on your conscience and their consciences.

Your armed struggle has, however, failed and you know it. That is why you have turned from conducting an armed struggle in South Africa to fanning the flames of violence which may erupt. For your generals it is not important whether the violence achieves anything or not in terms of political gains. You want South Africa ungovernable and violence, just any violence, no matter who are the casualties, benefits you. Your generals move from commanding troops who have enlisted for active service to spending the lives of people who have no commitment to you and your objectives. They are ordinary people driven to desperation by poverty who are there for you to use in the politics of confrontation which inevitably becomes violent.

You can romanticise about what you do as much as you like but it does not wash with me and millions of Black South Africans. We know who you are. We know what you are doing. When those who die as pawns in your lethal game of cowboys and crooks who play with the South African army and South African Police, their bereaved and their friends turn to me and Inkatha. That is why during the 1976/78 bloodshed Inkatha's membership doubled, trebled and quadrupled. It is your blunders that have recruited Inkatha's mass membership. Inkatha's over one and a half million members reject your armed struggle and reject your fanning the flames of violence which has erupted which you did not plan.

When I address you directly, Mr. Tambo, I can mention things which you and I both know are absolutely true. Both you and I know that the 1976/78 violence took the ANC Mission in Exile by surprise and really shook it. It was the first major demonstration that Black South Africans turned to do something for themselves because the ANC was doing nothing for them. You and I both know that SASO and BPC were not formed as allies to the ANC. Inkatha emerged at the same time in contrast to them seeking unity with the ANC. You cut rather a pathetic figure when you stand up on a platform and claim that you told me to form Inkatha. I had to form Inkatha because you were doing nothing for my people.

Mr. Tambo, you know that I sent emissary after emissary abroad pursuing the ideal of establishing Black unity based on a multi-

strategy approach. You know that the 1976/78 violence shook the External Mission of ANC down to the ground and you and your people were shocked at the massive evidence that Black South Africans were taking political action quite outside anything the ANC was doing or planning. The emergence of a possible alternative political drive for victory in South Africa really shook you. Instead of learning a lesson of history that was being taught to the ANC, you began having nightmares about what you and your colleagues talked about as a "third force development."

What you were regarding as a threatening third force could have led to alliances and to the pursuit of common purpose on the principle of each doing what each can do in their OWN circumstances in the pursuit of common objectives. You rejected the possible advantages of parallel political action because there were no common objectives possible between yourself and myself. In hindsight I now have the wisdom which clearly tells me that a common objective between us was impossible because I was striving for the right of Black South Africans to choose their leaders and their organisations, and you were striving to give Black South Africans only one choice - the choice of the ANC.

It is this very fundamental issue which actually divides us. I and many millions of Black South Africans will die rather than see our democratic birth rights destroyed. The Black South African struggle for liberation has always been a struggle to give Black South Africans freedom of association, freedom of, political association and equality before the law and the constitution. I reject any equality before the law and constitution which does not go hand in hand with freedom of political association and freedom of political expression. I reject the politics of prescription. I and millions of South Africans will not be dictated to politically. You could not do what had to be done to eliminate apartheid in all its entirety and then take your chances before a liberated electorate. No, you and your lieutenants could only dream of returning to South Africa as a government returned from exile.

Mr. Tambo, however much you have suffered in exile and however many crosses you have borne, everything you have suffered will be for nought if, in the end, what you have done only results in a one-Party State. The struggle in South Africa is about the establishment of a multi-Party democracy. This is the ideal that is engraved in the hearts and minds of the people and it is an ideal that the people will accomplish.

I said that I would drop personal feelings and move to address you on questions of tactics and strategies. My tactics and strategies are designed to liberate South Africa and to liberate it in such a way that reconciliation between South Africa's race groups begins to emerge strongly enough during the process of eradicating apartheid, that a multi-Party democracy becomes possible after apartheid. My tactics and strategies claim now the rights which

God gave us when He created us - the right to participate in the working out in the destiny of the land of our birth. The destiny of South Africa cannot be decided by the ANC's Mission in Exile. Mr. Tambo, the ANC's Mission in Exile is no more and no less than another political Party as far as South Africans are concerned. You talk very pretentiously about the ANC being the country's vanguard movement. You talk very pretentiously about the ANC's Mission in Exile being the sole true representative of Black South Africans. Your tactics and strategies must include the thrashing of Black South Africans to make them accept that which they have always rejected. Whether it be the ANC, the PAC, Inkatha or any other. organisation, no organisation will survive to enjoy the genuine support of the people if it attempts to arrive at a position of power by thrashing people into conformity.

When I address you directly as I am now addressing you, I do not play political one-up-manship with you. You have at your disposal a multi-million dollar propaganda machine. On my side I only have the pennies that come out of the pockets of the poorest of the poor. Your propaganda machine has laid at my door the violence that you yourself are committed to. You know this is the case. Whenever violence did erupt in South Africa between Black and Black, your propaganda machine laid the blame at my door. In the February issue of 'Sechaba' it is stated "Supporters of the Inkatha headed by Gatsha Buthelezi killed 'five students and injured hundreds" at the University of Zululand. The issue stated that people had to flee from Inkatha at an ABRECSA Conference for fear of their lives. It was stated "Gatsha Buthelezi justifies the violence of Inkatha against other blacks" and "Gatsha Buthelezi protects his honour at the cost of innocent young lives and injuries to many others." This issue of 'Sechaba' said "Gatsha's talk about non-violence is just empty talk because he is very violent against blacks."

In the September issue of 'Sechaba' 1984 it was stated "Chief Gatsha Buthelezi sent his henchmen to violently disrupt meetings in which innocent and unarmed people including stalwarts of our struggle were maimed and killed and he put himself at the services of the South African Defence Force and Security Police." Prior to the negotiations breaking down between us in London in 1979, your propaganda machine stepped up its hideously foul propaganda against Inkatha and my leadership. In 'Sechaba' in October 1984 I am accused of using violence for political purposes. 'Sechaba' stated "Inkatha has been instrumental in breaking up several UDF meetings and many activists have been assaulted. No activities genuinely opposed to the regime are tolerated in KwaZulu."

In an ANC press statement in August 1985 the ANC said "An Inkatha-organised gang attacked students at Ngoye University College during

1983 and inflicted serious injuries leading to the death of some of their victims." This press statement also stated "Organised Inkatha groups of ruffians brandishing spears and other lethal weapons have attacked political rallies, meetings and even funerals." In the same month the ANC continued its attack on Inkatha in broadcasts beamed to South Africa and the world. In these broadcasts it was stated "Buthelezi commands a para-military and tribally based political force, Inkatha, which does not hesitate to beat up or murder Buthelezi's opponents" and that "Mobs inspired by Chief Buthelezi have been responsible for a pattern of vicious beatings, armed attacks and even murders in the Natal region." In this broadcast referring to me as 'Gatsha' it was stated that I am a Botha 'henchman and trenchman and hatchet man.' The next month in September 1985 'Sechaba' returned to the attack. It stated "Buthelezi has been terrorising in the literal sense anybody who differs with him although he claims to be a leader" and that "All the talk of Gatsha Buthelezi about his noneviolent stances is hot air because he is very violent when it comes to confronting unarmed UDF members, students of Ngoye University and ministers of religion such as the Reverend Xundu."

Mr. Tambo, these kind of attacks are not attacks on tactics and strategies which you have a democratic right to make. They are hideous lies aimed at hitting foul blows below the belt. I am asking Black South Africans to pass judgement and you can believe me that they will do so. These vicious attacks based on lies and distortions shame Black South Africa.

The attacks continue. Two months later in November 1985 'Sechaba' returned again to the attack of accusing Inkatha of violence. It stated "Prince Gideon Zulu left the Shaka Day rally with three bus loads of armed supporters of Inkatha to travel to Lamontville to attack houses, smash windows and doors of houses of ordinary people to terrorise, injure and to kill." Mr. Tambo, this is altogether too disgusting. You know that Prince Gideon went there to protect the lives of ordinary people who were having their houses plundered and who were being brutalised by UDF-inspired mob behaviour.

In the same issue of 'Sechaba' Inkatha is accused of murdering Victoria Mxenge, of employing death squads and using thugs to terrorise people and UDF activists and I am accused of murdering. Again two months later in January 1986 you yourself said in a press conference that Inkatha has been instrumental in breaking up several UDF meetings and many activists have been assaulted. You stated "No activities genuinely opposed to the regime are tolerated in KwaZulu." It is not only your propaganda machine which is doing something out there. You yourself have stooped to demean your stature. You are getting on in years, Mr. Tambo, like all of us. Your health is not all that good. We all hope that God Spares you



but why in your older years when wisdom should be emerging, do you so stoop to sully your own image? It is sad.

In August 1986 the ANC broadcast that "Police and soldiers have enlisted puppets like Buthelezi which they use to terrorise Black people so there is no question of Black against Black, it is the question of the enemy on the one hand with his troops, policemen, and puppets against the people."

Mr. Tambo, whatever your real position of power is in the ANC Mission in Exile, you are at least in direct knowledge that the ANC has decided to annihilate Inkatha. You are no doubt kept uninformed about what your activists are actually doing in South Africa itself. You are not their commander on the ground in any real sense and those who do command do not share details with your organisation's National Executive. You may not be personally responsible for each and every act of violence against Inkatha and the KwaZulu Government. You know, however, that they take place. You know that arms caches have been found around Ulundi and that it was the intention to use arms and explosives against me, Inkatha and the KwaZulu Government. You know that the ANC is behind attacks made on KwaZulu Government property. You attempt to destroy KwaZulu buildings and motor vehicles. The ANC has attacked the homes of Inkatha members. The ANC has given licence to all and sundry to kill Black town councillors and anybody else who they condemn to death by passing the verdict of collaborator on them. You must be aware that my office in Amsterdam was attacked and its contents destroyed. You carry your attacks against me on to foreign soil and you have never denied that the attack on my Amsterdam office was made by the ANC. You know that the ANC has formally decided that -Inkatha must be destroyed. It is your propaganda that tells Black South Africans that I am a snake that must be Killed. Enough is enough, Mr. Tambo. That is why it was absolutely essential for the Black struggle for liberation that I took personal control of the KwaZulu Police.

Inkatha is not going to be annihilated. No Black leader in South Africa has a stronger or longer track record than mine when it comes to commitments to non-violent tactics and strategies. It is because I am committed to the politics of negotiation and to the peaceful solution of South Africa's problems that you want me destroyed. You have already found that tragically you were wrongly advised that Inkatha was a push-over organisation. For God's sake now learn the lessons of the history of the past number of years. Stop now this hideous violence against Inkatha and the KwaZulu Government. I unashamedly say that we will defend what we do with our lives if necessary because we are exercising God-given rights in doing what we are doing. We are striving for the upholding of all the hallowed values of the struggle for liberation. We are pursuing ideals which the history of the struggle has inscribed in the very soul of Black South Africa. All that you can do by

attacking Inkatha in anger and violence, is to prolong the struggle.

Your organisation attacks Inkatha brutally and threatens the lives of ordinary people and I respond in self-defence. Then you accuse me of being violent. You accuse me of using the KwaZulu Police to further the ends of apartheid. You yourself know how I abhor apartheid and yet you still stoop so despicably to present my defence of the hallowed values of the struggle as violent acts perpetrated to support apartheid.

In a radio broadcast in June 1987 the ANC said "The apartheid regime decided to hand over to their trusted and committed puppet Gatsha Buthelezi all the murderous police that are operating in townships under the so-called KwaZulu government" and that I wanted to "use them to wipe out the offensive of the people" In July 1987 'Sechaba' said that Inkatha has become "an extension of the regime's army and police." In July 1987 'Sechaba' said that "Gatsha requested Vlok to arm Inkatha vigilantes openly." In September 1987 an ANC broadcast said that "The Pretoria regime handed over police powers in the KwaZulu bantustan to its loyal puppet Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi."

In the third quarter edition of 'African Communist' of 1987 it was stated "On June 1st all police stations in Greater Durban were taken over by the KwaZulu administration which is controlled by Mangosuthu Buthelezi and his Inkatha organisation. Since June 1 therefore Buthelezi has been part of the State apparatus of the Botha regime charged with the maintenance of the political system of apartheid and the administration of apartheid laws." It was stated that I am "now pledged to work side by side with Botha's military and police." It stated that I was a "puppet and active policeman of the region" and that Inkatha "has become an extension of the regime's army and police."

Mr. Tambo, let me tell you that the KwaZulu Police are the defenders of democratic rights; they are the defenders of freedom of movement; they are the defenders of the rights of political association; they are the defenders of the lives of the people and of their property. The KwaZulu Police are welcome wherever they go. The masses daily call for their assistance. They are a proud Police Force which will ever increasingly play a positive role in the Black struggle for liberation. Rant and rave as much as you like but the people are solidly with me because they know the hideousness of political violence perpetrated against the people. The ANC's subterfuge really is transparent to the people. They know that the ANC has declared the armed struggle. They know that the armed struggle has failed. They know that the ANC has not got springboards from which to mount a telling armed struggle. They know that there are no liberated zones in this country. They know

that every bridge in the country is intact; that every road system is intact; that the country's electricity and water supply systems are intact; that the rail transportation system and the country's harbour systems are intact. Evidence of the ANC's failure to conduct an armed struggle successfully is there for every Black South African to see wherever he or she is.

Black South Africans also know that the ANC which has been whipped by Pretoria's military might is now creeping and crawling around Black townships in the dark hours of the night encouraging street corner committees and groups of young comrades to take the law into their own hands and to go on the rampage against ordinary people. Mr. Tambo, you are far away and do not have direct feed-back from the people. You carry on unaware of what the consequences are of action such as those taken to enforce consumer boycotts. You are unaware of the revulsion it creates in ordinary people when they witness ladies being forced to drink detergents because they dared disobey a group of kids who want to enforce consumer boycott action.

You are unaware of the deep revulsion that is the aftermath of tying a persons hands together with barbed wire, placing a tyre over his or her head and dousing them with diesoline to be set alight to die an unspeakably agonising death. This sense of revulsion is transferred to the ANC which for so long condoned necklacing and was responsible for the climate in which Blackeon-Black confrontations take place. Being unaware of these things because you are far removed from the actuality of the struggle here on the ground, you will not be able to appreciate the very real support that there is amongst the people for the KwaZulu Police. Ultimately everything comes to the cost, Mr. Tambo, and generally speaking hideous failures come with hideous costs. The people know that you do not pay the cost. Your Mission in Exile does not pay the cost. It is the poorest of the poor here, the real victims of apartheid, who must bear the brunt of your blundering. You cannot go around annihilating the people you purport to lead. You cannot escape the consequences of your blunders. That is why Inkatha is here to stay and there is nothing that you can do about it. I know that if there is anything that you could have done to destroy Inkatha that you have not yet done, you will go ahead and attempt to do it. I throw down the gauntlet, Mr. Tambo, and tell you that if you really want a fight you have got it.

In everything I have said in talking to you today, Mr. Tambo, I have been constantly concerned about the consequences the conflict between your organisation and my organisation has for the struggle for liberation. We have the strange anomaly that ANC propaganda maintains that I am spurned and rejected by the masses, whereas in actual fact Inkatha is the largest Black political organisation ever to have emerged in the history of the country. If Inkatha was what you make it out to be in your propaganda, you would in fact

not have to attack it. You attack Inkatha because it is powerful. You attack Inkatha because it continues to grow vigorously. Those who want to please you may mislead you, but you can take it from me, Mr. Tambo, that after every outburst of violence that leads the people nowhere, Inkatha's membership takes another leap forward. Your attacks are not destroying Inkatha. I am not fighting for my political life. You know this, Mr. Tambo. I am not addressing you because I am suing for peace. That is why I throw down a gauntlet and say if you want a fight, you have got one. No, Mr. Tambo, my concern is for the struggle for liberation and both you and I know that internecine Black-on-Black confrontation delays the day of victory. You know that Inkatha will not go away and that it cannot be driven away. I ask you again to think about future conference tables and the fact that you and I and I and others will have to deal with each other. This will never happen if the ANC Mission in Exile continues with its slanderous campaign against me.

In June 1987 in a broadcast beamed to Black South Africans, the ANC Mission in Exile said that I am being used to strengthen the enemy and that I am now using force to impose myself and Inkatha on the people and then added "The emotions that Gatsha portrays illustrates once again not only his fears of the masses but his rank opportunism." The next month 'Sechaba' said that "Inkatha vigilantes on the orders of Gatsha Buthelezi on behalf of the Boers has committed many crimes in a futile bid to destroy the UDF." This slant emerged in ANC propaganda fairly soon after the UDF came into existence. The UDF was formed in August 1983 and from the day of its inauguration it set out to discredit Inkatha. The ANC Mission in Exile leapt to take the gap and began accusing Inkatha of hideous atrocities against the UDF. In speaking directly to you, Mr. Tambo, I tell you bluntly that you may fool some people some of the time but you cannot fool all the people all of the time. The ANC Mission in Exile's screams of abuse against Inkatha are cheered amongst the converted but it deepens Inkatha's solidarity and encourages ordinary Blacks to think again about Inkatha. Mr. Tambo, the growth of Inkatha's membership shows that the more Blacks think about Inkatha, the more they turn to join it. In the October issue of 'Sechaba' in October 1984 it was stated "Inkatha has been instrumental in breaking up several UDF meetings and many activists have been assaulted. No activities genuinely opposed to the regime are tolerated in KwaZulu" and that "Inkatha is being used against the democratic forces and not against the regime." In August 1985 the ANC Mission in Exile broadcast that "In 1981/82 Buthelezi took it upon himself to break up and suppress the boycott of schools in Natal."

In January 1986, you entered the scene to make another person to person attack against me. In singling me out for special treatment

you said "Other homeland leaders have not attacked workers when they went on strike. They did not attack the ANC when it hit SASOL. They did not kill students. They did not attack members of the UDF killing them." Mr. Tambo, this is you speaking to me. What has happened to you? For a great many years you conducted yourself in a manner that encouraged people to describe you as a benign, soft-mannered gentleman. It is unbefitting of you and it is certainly unbefitting of your role for you personally to stoop to this low level. Or, Mr. Tambo, are you simply a dog that has been shaken by its tail? How do I distinguish between the new perplexing Tambo and the man I always knew? The man I always loved, the man I always respected as my elder brother.

Black South Africa has always known the extent to which you are beholden to the SACP and to the USSR for the military aid you receive. The SACP speaks and you must concur. The third quarter issue of the 'African Communist' in 1986 stated that "The power of Inkatha has never been used to mobilise the people in any campaign of opposition to apartheid but has been directed again and again against the ANC, SACTU, the UDF and any other organisation which has tried to challenge the apartheid regime through direct action." Is ASAPO and other Black-consciousness movement organisations not opposed to apartheid? Why are they not in your list?

In June 1987 the ANC broadcast the statement that "Gatsha today spends all his time attacking the ANC, the UDF, the progressive trade unions, and community leaders."

I am talking to you, Mr. Tambo, when I say that you must divert from what you have been doing against Inkatha before it is too late. May I remind you that you have failed to destroy Inkatha. You will continue to fail. Let me tell you bluntly that you ought to know that historic forces are all powerful. History is at work in South Africa and history itself will mould circumstances to ensure that the ANC's Mission in Exile does not succeed in destroying all Black opposition. It is also at the same time moulding circumstances to bring Black and White together.

The founding fathers of the old ANC and its leadership for many decades in South Africa had an unshakeable faith that history would in the end produce a multi-racial democracy in our country. You are not a script-writer for history; Political Parties rise and fall in the course of history. I am always terribly conscious of the need to move as history moves. You are, Mr. Tambo, personally painfully aware of how long it took you to travel right through Africa and to eventually temporarily sojourn in Egypt before you began putting together international support for the ANC's Mission in Exile. You did not set out to gain the allies that you eventually ended up with. Every Black leader in one way or another at some time or another shares what you experienced. .

It would be truly tragic if Black solidarity in the struggle for liberation continued to be so totally unobtainable that the Black-on-Black confrontation eventually necessitated the South African question being settled one way or another without Blacks being the united task force that directed South Africa into the future. It is Blacks who are the most oppressed. It is they who bear the real responsibility to do something about their oppression. Mr. Tambo, stop thwarting history and make it possible for them to do so. You would have no need whatsoever for foreign allies if you stopped being divisive and participated in bringing Black South Africans together.

Historically the time is now absolutely right for this to happen. You know as well as I know that apartheid is doomed. The struggle has already ensured that that is the case. All that is now required is for each Black organisation to do what each Black organisation can best do in its own circumstances. All that is required is that we accept a multi-strategy approach. You will never ever win the struggle on your own - neither will I. You will never ever succeed if you make Black unity a question of total and blind allegiance to your organisation. I have a very powerful advantage over you and that is that I do not attempt to do this. I have potential working partners in South Africa which you have ensured that you do not have. History will work its course in South Africa and the alliances that Inkatha is developing are alliances that will stand the test of history. Inkatha is allied to forces working for change which are there in their own right. The ANC Mission in Exile has to create these forces one at a time. Mr. Tambo, if you have your way a decade or perhaps two or three decades hence, this country will still remain locked in that equilibrium of violence which neither the government of the day nor revolutionaries of the day can escape. Break out of the sterility of being locked into a situation in which equal force constantly meets equal force.

Mr. Tambo, I have addressed you in front of the people because what I have said is a matter of deep public concern. You are very aware of the fact that opinion-makers across the length and breadth of South Africa and across all race groups, think that you and I should get together. I have chosen to address you here in the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly for all to hear because this Assembly is an Assembly of men and women who have grassroot constituencies. That is why they are here. They actually represent the people you claim to be yours. Those people have a right to hear me talking to you. Mr. Tambo, I am now going to stand before these representatives of the people gathered here today and ask them to debate the things I have been saying and to formulate a message to you from the people of South Africa themselves - the grass root people, the victims of apartheid.

Mr. Speaker, Sir, Honourable Members, it was high time that I addressed Mr. Tambo as I now have done. When he remembers the past personal contacts we have had and he thinks about what I have said, he will know that as a Black I have addressed him as a Black brother. It is he who now faces the challenge of himself behaving like a Black brother. i

I have often wondered how the ANC Mission in Exile would have developed, were it not for the South African Communist Party's influence in it. The National Executive in the ANC Mission in Exile always leaps to defend the fraternal relationship between it and the SACP, so much so that one is entitled to say "Me thinks thou dost protest too muchu" I know from personal discussions with senior members of the ANC Mission in Exile that the Communist/Nationalist division is a very real division and that Nationalists have frequently had to toe the line or face axing. We know our Black brothers and sisters in exile and we know that there is something at work which has made some of them as alien to Black South Africa as they have become. The South African Communist Party in large measure most certainly is responsible for the alienation of some in the ANC Mission in Exile and Black South Africans.

Communism is an alien policy to us. I am not talking here only in political terms. The very idiom in the way in which Communists in the ANC Mission in Exile relate to each other and deal with us, is alien. Somehow it goes a lot deeper than ideology can account for. Debates between Black South Africans on ideological differences can still be debates between Black brother and Black brother and Black sister and Black sister. Debates about socialist-type political and economic structures need to take place. It is not the political differences between the SACP and us that gives rise to my sense of alienation when I meet them. It is more than that. It is as though they do not belong here in Mother Africa. '

Black African States have learnt to their cost that communist ideologies do not prevail against poverty, ignorance and disease. Black State after Black State which started off with communist ideals after liberation, have had in the end to begin wooing Western industrial nations for financial and technical assistance. I have never even thought of castigating my Black brothers and sisters in other African States for choosing to establish communist governments in their countries. Every people have a sovereign right to choose their own destiny. I simply observe that the USSR is far more useful in producing violent revolution than ensuring that successful revolutions end up benefitting the people. I remember the demonstrations which took place outside the Hotel where I was addressing "The World Affairs Council of

California, in San Francisco in 1986; and I remember the demonstrations which were staged in Vancouver when I visited Canada after touring the United States on the same trip.

A group of Caribbean Blacks, led by a local representative of the External Mission of ANC were shouting in San Francisco -

"Buthlezi, Botha's Lackey; Buthlezi, Botha's Lackey" and so it :hymed!

These demonstrations had that sense of alienation about them which I am talking about. On both occasions I later heard that the prime movers in the demonstrations were members of the American and Canadian Communist Party. It is as though they move in to contaminate Black politics.

The 'African Communist', the official journal of the South African Communist Party, is always in the forefront of any mud-slinging aimed at me, and it is the SACP which provides the tone in the ANC Mission in Exile's attack on me, KwaZulu and Inkatha. It is un-African. Those who are more vituperative in their attacks on me in the External Mission of ANC are invariably those members of the External Mission who are also members of the South African Communist Party; people like Joe Slovo, Mac Maharaj, Chris Ham and others of that ilk.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, I have said what I have said to Oliver Tambo in front of you because it is now time that this House makes a very clear statement. As far as I am concerned, we have passed a point in time in which there is now nothing to be gained by pussy-footing around issues in the hope that somewhere, sometime my lieutenants and Mr. Oliver Tambo's lieutenants could begin preliminary discussions about future Inkatha/ANC relationships. That time has passed. I have drawn a line and said enough is enough and this will remain my position until the ANC Mission in Exile approaches us for talks with convincing evidence that they are serious about the need to establish Black unity in this country. .

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, I remember with disgust how the Honourable Minister of Education and Culture and Secretary-General of Inkatha, Dr. O.D. Dhlomo, engaged in discussions with Mr. Thabo Mbeki in order to set up Inkatha/ANC Mission in Exile dialogue. I remember his very responsible endeavours with disgust because I remember how he and the Honourable Minister of Health and our National Chairman, Dr. F.T. Mdlalose, the Honourable Minister of Justice, the Reverend C.J. Mtetwa and the Honourable Minister of Welfare and Pensions, Mr. E.S.C. Sithebe, all travelled to London in October 1987 to meet with Mr. Thabo Mbeki and others as had been arranged. They arrived in London to find no sign of Mr. Mbeki. Even Mr. Albert Dhlomo who had also been a go-between talked to them only by phone, and did not come to see them in the Hotel. A



cock-and-bull story about not having flights from Lusaka was told. A suggestion was then made as to whether my colleagues could not consider stopping in Lusaka on their way home. Quite clearly they could not fall into that booby-trap! This was not only an insult just to my colleagues who were fouled in this way, but to the masses that they represent here at home.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, every leader of Inkatha, including myself as President, is elected to office by representatives Chosen by the masses. In KwaZulu we have genuine and open elections and those of us who are elected to this House represent the people. An insult to a leader is an insult to those who elect him and follow-him.

The ANC Mission in Exile first attempted to alienate Inkatha's leadership from the Movement but did not attack Inkatha as such. When they failed to get Inkatha's members to reject the Movement's leaders, they began attacking them too. Political attacks have now been turned into murderous physical attacks. The ANC has declared war and Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, all honour demands that we force the ANC's hostility against us out into the open. Cowardly insinuations and direct statements that it is Inkatha which attacks the ANC must be rejected with the contempt that they deserve. That is why I provided the detail in chapter and verse which shows that it is the ANC Mission in Exile which has initiated and maintained a vendetta against Inkatha. The ANC Mission in Exile is the divisive factor in Black South Africa. They must stop being divisive or alternatively, Black South Africa must cut this cancer from our country's Black body politic.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, I have exposed the ANC Mission in Exile's vindictive vendetta against myself, Inkatha and the KwaZulu Government because the record must be set straight. There are a great many South Africans in all race groups who have been deceived by the political propaganda of the ANC Mission in Exile and the South African Communist Party. These deceived people actually believe that the ANC Mission in Exile is the vanguard force in the Black struggle for liberation. They see apartheid as being invincible to all else and they turn to work with the ANC and sometimes for it.

Some of these people who have been deceived are deceived because they want to be deceived. It is as though in their frustration, they want action, any action, which is as dramatic as their repugnance for apartheid demands. It is strange how genuine repugnance for apartheid can lead some people to join in action against apartheid simply because it is dramatic action and they can appear to the world as participating in a heroic struggle. The thing that strikes me again and again is that some inner compulsion to participate in dramatic opposition to apartheid,

smashes wisdom. Rights and wrongs are only sought within the framework of dramatic action and always sought in high profile roles in which celebrity leaders so like to come into their own. South Africa has produced one crop of celebrity leaders after the other, created by the media and supported by the media. Those who most dramatically claim to support the ANC Mission in Exile have themselves rejected the opportunity of crossing the border and becoming a freedom fighter, as they would see it. Some of our clerics fit into this mould.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, I am a political leader who knows that real politics begins and ends in the development of real life constituencies. I know that every Black leader worthy of the name has done back-breaking work at grass root level unifying people and giving them common purpose in action. I also know that leaders who shine most when they are upon stages with international TV cameras focussed on them mostly shine least at the grass root level.

Dr. Allan Boesak is the epitome of a posturing, high celebrity publicity-loving, glib-mouthed political imposter. Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, he speaks for you and he speaks for the grass root communities which you represent. He himself, however, has no constituency which he has built up from nothing and turned into something. He is a political opportunist who flits from one committee to another and one forum to another, speaking on behalf of the people he does not lead.

How would Dr. Boesak survive and what would become of him if he in some bold action resigned from all committees he serves on and ceased campaigning for limelight acclaim and went into Black South African communities to start up a new political movement of his own? What would he say to peasants, what would he say to the poorest of the poor, - and what would he say to the most oppressed if he could no longer attempt to tell them what they thought and how they felt? If he had to put himself in a position of articulating only what people told him to articulate, in structures that he had created with them to enable them to do so, we would respect, what he says. We now reject what he says on behalf of Black South Africa with contempt because he speaks on behalf of people who cannot speak for themselves and he has done nothing worth noting to enable them to speak for themselves.

Dr. Boesak is a patron of the UDF and the UDF's National Chairman, Mr. Archie Gumede has spelt out for all the world to hear, that the UDF's leadership does not lead at the grass root level. He has spelt out that people do not listen to UDF leaders. He has even spelt out that members of the UDF's affiliate organisations do not listen to UDF leaders. Yet Dr. Boesak is feted across the length and breadth of the world and jets from country to country and from one lime-lit venue to another speaking on behalf of the oppressed.

)

An articulate manner and a stage-grooming that makes a man at ease on a public platform where he says what people want to hear is just not enough. Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, when a committee elects a committee which elects another committee and you become chairman of that other committee, which was elected by a committee, a committee election away from another committee, which in turn is an election away from yet another committee, just who are you?

Whom do you represent? When Dr. Boesak stood up at a press conference with Archbishop Tutu soon after action was taken against 17 anti-apartheid organisations, and said that the South African Government forces more people to work underground and brings more and more people to the persuasion that violence is the only thing left, on whose behalf was he then talking? He cannot come back to a grass root meeting in this country to tell the poorest of the poor that he had gone abroad to do what the people asked him to do. I do not question his disgust with the Government's action against Black organisations. We are all disgusted by it. However, I do question his right to say on behalf of the Black masses- that violence is the only thing left, without telling us on whose mandate he is declaring that kind of violent war?

Again and again in South Africa we have seen how leaders of committees elected by committees are very destructible by State brutality. Ever since 1976 there has been crop after crop of Blacks recognised by the media and the outside world as leaders, despite the fact that they lead nobody because they have nobody to lead. There is a malady in the politics they pursue. Some kind of deep inbred rottenness which always comes with a claimed leadership which has nobody to lead. It is in these committees elected by committees elected by committees that all the new-fangled too-clever-by-half leaders emerge.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, I have spoken my mind on the action the Government recently took against 17 organisations. I did so in this House on the day that Dr. Viljoen performed the opening ceremony for this Session. I abhor Government action of the kind that was taken. I can, however, not be silenced by this abhorrence and condone the political action against which the Government took such hideous steps.

Yet this, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, is what the world expects me to do. Particularly in the outside world, the hallmark of recognition is only gained when you so behave in South Africa that the South African Government smashes what you do. If you oppose apartheid in such a way that the Government cannot smash you and dare not smash you, you are cursed because you are not seen as a victim of apartheid. There is something very wrong politically with this kind of thinking. How on earth will we ever finally vanquish apartheid for the evil scourge that it is if only leaders who blunder to the point of being totally vulnerable to State brutality are recognised as leaders?

That, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, is a very serious question. I am not going on a personal rampage against Dr. Boesak. In talking about him, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, I am talking about a deep malady in Black politics which concerns every one of us. I am talking about the romanticisation of the struggle on national and international platforms which creates a new cuckoo land of politics quite incapable of making progressive gains against apartheid here on the ground in this country.

It is my duty at this point in history to call for leadership in opposition to apartheid that actually does lead. I would be betraying my calling if I did not do so. It is now in this crisis situation in South Africa that we so desperately need a real, viable leadership capable of leading the people on the ground. I rightly condemn those who are chairmen of committees elected by committees elected by committees who speak on behalf of Black South Africa with no real political right to do so.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, the problem of the kind of leadership I am talking about runs very deep. These kinds of leaders have some way or other and at some time or another, to back up their spurious claims of being leaders by some visible action on the ground. It is when this need arises to substantiate their self-appointed leadership roles that they encourage the kind of politics of confrontation in which the politics of violent 'intimidation naturally emerges. It is when leaders do not lead grass root forces that they turn to mobilising bands and groups which for the duration of a particular action is capable of intimidating the real victims of apartheid into submission.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, I have been in politics the whole of my adult life. I have seen real political action. I have seen real political movement. Whenever I have seen real political action and movement it has been produced by an upsurge of peasants and workers and of the poorest of the poor who are the real victims of apartheid. The old ANC had fallen into severe disrepute when Chief Albert Lutuli first emerged as a leader of the future. He did not rest on being a member of a committee elected by a committee elected by a committee. I know, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, because I was there when it happened.

When Chief Albert Lutuli realised the extent to which the old ANC had fallen into disrepute, he did not begin with the re-election of committees, elected by committees elected by committees. Chief Albert Lutuli returned to his home area and began mobilising people at the grass root level. It was the massive success of his mobilisation programme here in this province of South Africa that gave him that very distinctive authority with which he ended up. Leaders elected by committees elected by committees may at times exert influence among other committees elected by committees but they have no authority. Dr. Boesak is not a man of authority and certainty because he has not based his political action on grass

root support which he himself has mobilised. That is not to underestimate his Church leadership position as the President of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches.

Again I say, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, I am not attacking the integrity of Dr. Boesak himself. I am pointing to a malady in Black politics. It is a malady which spreads very viciously and corrupts the genuine struggle for liberation. I must deal with it. Unlike the ANC Mission in Exile which is terrified out of its mind by what it fears as third force developments, I want other Black leaders to emerge with massive grass root support.

Mr. Speaker, the malady that I am referring to has been greatly encouraged by the ANC Mission in Exile. They do not want what they call the Third Force to emerge in South Africa. They want no other Black organisation to emerge as powerful in its own right. They know the vulnerability of chairmen of committees elected by committees elected by committees and that is why they encourage them. Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, when a man is about to tread on a snake, I must shout out a warning and I must do so whether or not I believe the man will hear.

I have warned Black South Africans in the past, and I warn them again today, that the ANC Mission in Exile bent as it is on becoming the only real political force in the country, only needs cannon fodder and it only needs the support of high-profile leaders who can be axed at any time. This is why the ANC Mission in Exile has given such encouragement to the development of the UDF and COSATU. They hold no threats to it because they are not politically powerful in their own right. All their power is a borrowed power which can be reclaimed whenever the ANC Mission in Exile decides to do so.

I am appalled at the extent to which some clerics in South Africa do not see the real vicious intentions of the ANC Mission in Exile. They romanticise about freedom and about the struggle for freedom and become pawns in the hands of those wily minds in the ANC Mission in Exile which are schooled in the politics of subterfuge and deceit. In this Policy Speech I have given chapter and verse of the ANC's vicious political propaganda against myself, Inkatha and the KwaZulu Government. Some of South Africa's clerics join in this propaganda by presenting themselves as earnestly holy. The South African Council of Churches has now for many years housed these clerics. It is the SACC which has spearheaded the ANC-type vendetta against me and Inkatha and the KwaZulu Government. The SACC, has I am informed, listed Inkatha as a South African Government apartheid organisation. Only recently Dr. Boesak and the SACC attempted to get the German donor agencies and government to sponsor a conference of all South African parties involved in the struggle for liberation. They specifically said that they

excluded Inkatha. This conference did not get off the ground because in this case they did not get the backing they sought. I am myself a deeply committed Christian and I have always valued the fellowship and the succour that I have received in fellowship from the Church. I have never attacked the Church, nor have I ever despised genuine ecumenical movements which draw the Churches of the country together in common purpose and in a common discovery of the meaning of Christ in this day and age in South Africa. I have only lamented the lack of unity amongst Church leaders, and I have only lamented those from the clerics who have gone so far out in front that they cease to be relevant to the Church's development in South Africa. .

When I received a circular from the Reverend Dr. K.E.M. Mgojo in Pietermaritzburg about possible peace initiatives that some clerics were mounting, I had to seriously consider the approach. Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, the letter I received was:

THE PRESIDENT OF INKATHA 10.2.88

Dear Brothers,

On behalf of the South African Council of Churches I the undersigned have been requested to convene a meeting of Natal Church leaders with organizations engaged in conflict. The meeting will be held at KOINONIA Conference Centre, Old Main Road, Botha's Hill on Tuesday 23 February, 1988 from 9 a.m.- 5.00 p.m. This is a follow-up meeting on one held between Churches and members of Inkatha and UDP. The purpose of the meeting is to explore ways and means of implementing the recent call by parties in conflict with one another in Natal, to stop committing acts of violence. Tragically killings continue unabated. The purpose of the meeting is to consider ways of dealing with this fact. As this is such a critical issue and affects the lives of us all we look forward to your attendance and contribution to the discussions.

For your information invitations have been sent to the following organizations: INKATHA, UDF, COSATU and UWUSA including representatives of the Church leaders in Natal and representatives of Pietermaritzburg and Durban Chambers of Commerce, and Pietermaritzburg Council of Churches. Teas and lunch will be provided.

Yours faithfully,  
CONVENOR

I just had to ask myself how genuine the South African Council of Churches was in making this approach through the Reverend Mgojo. I had to ask whether it was worthwhile sitting around a table talking about life and death issues with clerics who were painting a picture of me and Inkatha across the length and breadth of the world which showed us to be the perpetrators of apartheid which ultimately is responsible for the violence that erupted in Pietermaritzburg. I am on record, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, as saying that I would talk to the devil himself if that would help the struggle for liberation. I have, however, at least to be sure in my own mind that in talking to the SACC it would help in the struggle and would help to defuse the Pietermaritzburg violence.

I therefore wrote as follows to the Reverend Mgojoz-

Rev. Dr. K.E. Mgojo, 15 February 1988

President/Chairman

of Natal West District,

Methodist Church of Southern Africa,

P.O. Box 2539

PIETERMARITZBURG 3200.

Dear Rev. Mgojo,

Thank you for your letter of February 10, 1988 and your invitation, on behalf of the South African Council of Churches, to attend the proposed meeting, as outlined, in Botha's Hill on February 23, 1988.

I applaud the sentiments expressed and the desire to resolve the present hideous conflict. You can always be assured of my co-operation in any sincere endeavour to promote unity and peace. So much has already been lost, and so many people have been so brutally murdered and maimed, that I believe we simply cannot afford to become involved in initiatives in which individuals and organisations merely posture for peace and accusations and counter-accusations form the basis of non-productive and hostile dialogue. From my own point of view, it would serve no purpose for me to be present if the leaderships of other organisations invited do not intend to participate and it is for this reason that I respectfully request that I be informed of those who have positively indicated they will be attending.

Regretfully, past experience has shown that little can be achieved

if individuals who do not have the authority to speak and make decisions on behalf of their respective organisations are involved in important meetings of this kind. The result is that they invariably express the need to seek mandates which eventually do not materialise.

I would be prepared to involve Inkatha's leadership at the highest level if I could receive some assurance that we will not be wasting our time.

without intending to be prescriptive and in all sincerity, I believe the agenda needs to be one in which the various leaders involved can get on with the job of devising ways and means of stopping the bloodshed. It would be futile if, yet again, hackneyed and divisive polemic and recriminations -- which have so far characterised this tragic issue -- were to be regurgitated. We all need to be able to walk away from the meeting knowing that we have, at last, been able to rise above the dialectic that has divided us for far too long. God willing, those present may be able to acknowledge that we all have a right to pursue without hindrance and villification, the tactics and strategies supported by our respective constituencies. i

In this regard, I am enclosing two letters I have sent to the President of the UDF, Mr. Archie Gumede, setting out my fervent desire to effect a rapprochement between our two organisations. We all want peace, we have already signed agreements to that effect. What we need to do now -- and I presume this would be the crux of your meeting -- is to set up mechanisms that will effectively convey to the people that human decency and democratic opposition to apartheid must prevail and that black unity is crucial.

I see no profit whatsoever in any of us trying to score political points. Our differing tactics and strategies are well known and we each have a right to pursue them. What use would be served if participants attempted to turn this meeting into yet another forum at which particular alignments were emphasised and divisions highlighted?

As you are no doubt aware, the hierarchy of the SACC has, for a considerable time, shown precious little Christian charity towards myself, Inkatha and KwaZulu. Its support for the UDF, COSATU et al is undisputed. This is something which has hurt me deeply as it is ordinary men, women and children who have had to suffer the consequences of this opposition to my leadership and the support Inkatha receives from the people.



However, if this request by the SACC for you to convene this meeting is meant as a signal of their recognition that we all have a right to exist and should bury our differences for the common good, then this too would usher a new era of conciliation and co-operation of another kind which would also receive my wholehearted support.

I have on numerous occasions expressed my total commitment to non-violent tactics and strategies in the South African struggle for liberation. The totality of Inkatha's tactics and strategies are directed towards bringing about fundamental change through non-violent tactics and strategies. Of all the Black political organisations in the country, Inkatha has the least to gain in violent political upheavals and we have the most to lose as we stretch out our hand in friendship to all Black political organisations and as we seek to establish meaningful negotiations across colour barriers in South Africa.

I make these points to underwrite the importance of my response to your letter inviting Inkatha participation in the forthcoming meeting. We will go anywhere to do anything that could make a contribution towards the achievement of peaceful relationships between South Africa's Black political organisations. We regard Black unity based on the acceptance of a multi-strategy approach as being critically important to the cause that Black South Africa's heroes and martyrs have served down through the generations.

It is because I am so deeply concerned about restoring peace to the Pietermaritzburg scene, that I have reservations about attending the proposed meeting. We just dare not put our hand to that which will fail in the terrible circumstances which confront people in the Greater Pietermaritzburg Area. When we do something about peace, we must do it in earnest and we must do it in order to succeed. More talking shops will, I believe, merely confirm the diplomatic stalemate which now prevails between the various forces on the ground in the Greater Pietermaritzburg area.

While there has been constant talk about peace initiatives, there has been an unrelenting media war against Inkatha and against me personally. When I sit down to talk about peace in the Pietermaritzburg area, I want to feel that I am doing something meaningful. How can I regard the proposed meeting on the 23rd February as being serious when those invited to come to it are those who are involved right now in slandering Inkatha and my leadership by every possible means? I need to be persuaded that those to whom I talk about peace in Pietermaritzburg are worthy of the discussion and are sincere in their attempts to bring about peace.

I have raised objections to the way in which Mr. Paul van Uytrecht talks publicly about Inkatha. I have asked the Pietermaritzburg

Chamber of Commerce to declare where it stands. Mr. van Uytrecht's very damning remarks published in the New York Times recently either reflects the Chamber's views or it does not reflect its views. I need to know where I stand with the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce before I can sit down to talk with them and others seriously. The President of the Chamber has not yet responded to my request for clarification of the Chamber's attitude to Mr. van Uytrecht's statement. I enclose a copy of the article in the New York Times to enable you to see for yourself what I am talking about.

The UDF and COSATU are using every possible opportunity which the Courts of our country Offer them to bring absurdly false accusations against the intentions of Inkatha's leadership. While COSATU and UDF are so intent on continuing with their slanderous attacks against Inkatha and my leadership, how can I sit around a table and talk to them about peace. I need to know that they are serious about peace before I can talk to them.

At this stage of developments, discussions at a meeting such as you are proposing, can only cement the divisions which the politics of violence has caused so successfully. At such a meeting we could not even get down to discussxng the realities of the situation. I see no purpose in me attending a meeting at which the root causes of violence will remain shrouded in political rhetoric and in games of one-upmanship for the sake of the media.

It is absolutely true to say that the majority of victims who die so hideously in the Greater Pietermaritzburg Area are caught in the crOSSzire between those who are being attacked violently and those who defend themselves against such attacks. By-standers are suffering terribly and the total disruption of community and institutionalised life is the end product of the violence that is taking place. Violence in the Greater Pietermaritzburg Area is a hideous indictment against human decency. We owe it to the people to be serious about our commitment to bring about peace in the Pietetmaritzburg area. I am just not prepared to sit around playing committee games in order to vie with others for media acclaim.

When I met Archbishop Tutu, the Reverend Stanley Mogoba and others on November 6th I pointed out the need for Black leaders to move on the ground and to do so in unison. We need to stand shoulder to shoulder before the people to condemn what is taking place and to work among the people where violence is taking place. I suggested that Black leaders come together in a mass meeting in the Greater Durban Area from whence we could move as a solid force into Pietermaritzburg to demonstrate our joint commitment to eradicating violence. We need to stand up and be counted where the people can count us - in front of them. Behind-the-scenes committee meetings will achieve nothing in the circumstances which now prevail.

I have repeatedly made the point that the UDF representatives at meetings held to consider ways and means of eliminating political violence in the Natal/KwaZulu area come with no mandate from their National Executive, and are structurally hog-tied by the UDF'S constitution. They can make no decisions; they can make no commitments. It is not even worth insisting that the UDF'S national leadership attend peace initiative meetings in person. They too are structurally hog-tied and can make no decisions because they have been given no mandate within which the decisions needed can be made.

I find myself in ever greater agreement with many around me who say that peace initiatives directed at the Pietermaritzburg violence require the participation of political heavy-weights who accept each other's credentials in the exercise. I am just not any longer prepared to go to meetings at which the UDF is represented by nobodies or by people from race groups who never experience violence at first hand in their own communities. The Pietermaritzburg violence is violence in a Black-on-Black confrontation. It is Blacks who are being slaughtered there. It is Blacks who must do something about the hideous state of affairs there.

This is not a racist statement. It is simply a reflection of the reality that just as the poorest of the poor have to do something about their own poverty, and just as the most oppressed have to do something about oppression themselves, the recipients of political violence must also themselves do something about their hideous circumstances. -

Peace in Pietermaritzburg will only be established by the people who perpetrate violence and who are subjected to it. Peace initiative must be a grass roots movement. Political leaders capable of producing this grass root movement need urgently to get together. There is no point in leaders getting together in venues where those who cannot lead on the ground hold sway.

My advice to churchmen who earnestly seek peace for the Greater Pietermaritzburg Area is for them to do a lot of homework and a lot of behind-the-scenes lobbying and at all costs to avoid high profile attempts to make the futile look feasible. I am not only prepared to give Inkatha directives to drop all aggressive onslaughts against others but I am also prepared to ensure Inkatha's leadership on the ground in Pietermaritzburg really do work for a truce. I can do so because Inkatha is a disciplined organisation where leadership does lead and I can also be sure that instructions from Inkatha's top leadership will be taken seriously because Inkatha is not on the attackland is not responsible for the violence that takes place.

How many other national leaders are in this position? They either want violence to continue or they are quite incapable of influencing events on the ground because they do not lead a disciplined organisation. It is tragically true that revolutionaries who call for the emergence of a so-called people's war and for the spreading of violence, fan the flames of violence without being able to control its direction or development. They ride some kind of wild horse which they can only spur on to more frantic activity but which they cannot control. I face the realities which these kind of revolutionaries produce in our midst. We cannot talk about the Pietermaritzburg violence if we clothe the whole situation in unrealism and posture as do-gooders in a hopeless situation. .

-Those who are interested in convening meetings about peace initiatives in the Pietermaritzburg area must not allow themselves to be drawn into fiddling while Pietermaritzburg burns. There is a serious job of work to be done by serious leaders. These leaders should be got together but they will only be got together by a lot of hard background work.

It is therefore with great regret that I find myself unable to accept your invitation to be present at the proposed meeting on the 23rd February. Perhaps this meeting should take place to consider the points I have made in this short letter to you. I will respond positively and immediately to any request to act where action could lead to the cessation of hostilities in Pietermaritzburg. It is perhaps because Inkatha has the most to gain by the restoration of peace that key leaders in the UDF and COSATU must continue to toe the line of the External Mission of the ANC which is to eradicate Inkatha as one of their highest priorities. The ANC's input into UDF and COSATU politics and into the Pietermaritzburg violence is a reality that simply must be faced. If the issues I have stated above were clarified before such a meeting is scheduled, that is an entirely different matter, as it would present us with an acceptable framework for such a meeting.

Yours sincerely,

MANG O S U ' I ' E i g \_\_\_\_ g . \_ BUQHELEZI

PRESIDENT OF INKATHA

CHIEF MINISTER OF KWAZULU

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, I only wrote this letter after giving very considerable thought to the matter. My own sources of information are reliable and I had been told that Dr. Boesak thought that it was not yet time to end the Pietermaritzburg violence. Those who wanted to drive Inkatha right out of the area had not yet succeeded and there were many in the UDF and COSATU who wanted violence to continue until a final victory against Inkatha had been won in the area.

This reluctance to actually do something about the Pietermaritzburg violence was evident on a number of levels. Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, I had a meeting with Archbishop Tutu, Archbishop Hurley, the President elect of the Methodist Church, the Reverend Stanley Mogoba, the president of the Congregational Church the Reverend Ron Steele and the President of the Presbyterian Church in South Africa - in Durban on 6 November. I came to this meeting in response to an initiative which Archbishop Tutu had announced he was going to make to bring an end to violence in Pietermaritzburg. I went to this meeting reluctantly, again after giving the matter a great deal of thought.

At this meeting, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, I presented the following Memorandum:

MEMORANDUM BY MANGOSUTHU G. BUTHELEZI, PRESIDENT OF INKATHA AND CHIEF MINISTER OF KWAZULU  
FOR DISCUSSION AT A MEETING IN DURBAN ON 6 NOVEMBER 1987 WITH:

The Most Revd Dr DM Tutu - Archbishop of Cape Town

The Most Revd Dr D Hurley OMI - Archbishop of Durban

The Rev S Mogoba - President-Elect, The Methodist Church of Southern Africa

The Rev P J Montgomery - Moderator Congregation Church

The Rev R L Steel-Chairman - Congregation Church

Dr OD Dhlomo - Secretary-General Inkatha and KwaZulu Minister of Education

Mr RI Arenstein - Participant in Reconciliation Committee

Mr V Ndlovu MLA - Vulindlela Pietermaritzburg

Mr V V Mvelase - KwaZulu Government Representative in Pietermaritzburg

Mr Musa Keith Zondi - National Chairman - Inkatha Youth Brigade

Gentlemen, we are meeting today as a group who could make a significant contribution to the emergence not only in this 'region of South Africa but also in the whole of South Africa, of a powerful movement towards peace. If this were not the case, I would not have bothered to come. I can no longer sit around tables talking about ending violence with those who are not effectively committed to doing so. People are dying. Black-on-Black brutality is there for everybody to see. I am just not any longer interested in adding to the credibility of those who posture for peace to gain limelight. Quaint Hut Ndu are frail and useless when it comes to the actual doing of things.

Everyone in this room knows the extent to which it is being stated that I as the President of Inkatha and Chief Minister of KwaZulu have formed impi which I send on missions of death and intimidation to bolster my own Party political position. Enough is

enough. I am either part of the problem or part of the solution. You, gentlemen, must decide this for yourselves but I need now to know how you think and where you stand so that I know how to deal with you today.

I did not ask for this meeting. It is your meeting. I have always said that I will speak to the devil himself if it is for the good of South Africa. I have always attempted to turn every possible stone over under which there might be some factor of peace. Of all the Black leaders in the country I have perhaps been the most consistent in my commitment to employ non-violent tactics and strategies in our struggle for liberation. I seek to establish a climate in which the politics of negotiation can begin reconciling South Africans during the process of bringing about radical change. It is because I am thus committed, and will remain thus committed even unto death, that I am rejected by some.

It is because I have gathered a massive following behind me in my commitment that I have to be declared by the ANC as its main enemy. It is because Inkatha is a powerful force on the ground that the ANC, the UDF and COSATU seek to establish no-go areas in regions where I am powerful. Gentlemen, let us cut the cackle and look at this reality.

From its very inception, the United Democratic Front endorsed Inkatha out of everything it could possibly do. From its very inception the Congress of South African Trade Unions also did this. You, Archbishop Tutu, have given your patronage to the UDF. You are a patron of an organisation which has declared war on' Inkatha. In this region of South Africa we have again and again shown the extent to which the UDF is quite incapable of contributing towards peace initiatives. We have with us today Mr. Rowley Arenstein who has personally been involved as a non-Inkatha member in attempt after attempt to establish an Inkatha/UDF peace initiative. We also have with us Mr. Keith Zondi, the National Chairman of Inkatha's Youth Brigade who has been involved with him and who in his own right has sought peace. Nothing positive ever said in a series of ongoing meetings between Inkatha and UDF leaders in this region has ever been backed by the DD? as such. Time and again initiatives have petered out.

Professor H w van der Merwe came from the University of Cape Town to do whatever he could do to further dialogue about peace in this region. Again and again he found Inkatha quite capable of making immediate decisions to support positive suggestions and time and time again he found that it was the United Democratic Front which hummed and hawed and dragged its feet.

These lower-rung meetings have been backed up by higher level meetings on the question of violence in this region. What, Archbishop Tutu, has been achieved by discussions such as we are

having today? Are we just not fiddling while Rome is burning. Meaningful peace initiatives cannot be achieved by jetting in and jetting out and by expressing lofty sentiments. Gentlemen, people are dying brutal deaths. A whole new generation of young people is being brutalised. History will see that this new and hideous Blackeon-Black brutalisation rides on the back of the brutality of apartheid. There is a desperate need now really to establish that noble ends can only be achieved through noble means.

You, Archbishop Hurley, have met with me on a number of occasions with and without Archbishop Tutu. You know that Paddy Kearney has been involved in a number of our attempts and the attempts of others to work towards reconciliation between Inkatha and the UDF. We talk now in the kind of climate created by such things as placards displayed this week in KwaMakuta denigrating Inkatha and calling for the 'necklacing' of Inkatha members. I again say let us cut the cackle and talk about the realities we face. Where is the Catholic Church's bold and continuous condemnation of these kind of goadings towards violence. Let us face the fact that Archbishop Tutu is a patron of the UDF, backs the UDF and that you, Archbishop Hurley, preside over such organisations as Diakonia which has a deep-rooted UDF orientation. You are both involved in Party politics and you lend to the UDF considerable tacit and overt support from high places in the Church.

Reverend Mogoba, you have now for quite some time walked the corridors of ecumenical power in the South African Council of Churches. You are very well aware of the fact that the SACC has entered the political arena, that it makes political statements, that by association and pronouncement it backs the ANC and the UDF, the same ANC and the same UDF which here in this region refuse to participate in any real peace initiatives. The SACC gives high office to people like Dr. Beyers Naude, Archbishop Tutu and Dr. Allan Boesak who are in one way or another UDF activists, UDF leaders or UDF lobbyists. Again, for the sake of God let us out the cackle and talk about realities.

I simply do not believe that clerics can sit on the fence on the question of violence in this country. It is either justified or not justified. If it is justified, further it. If it is not justified, oppose it boldly and effectively and don't hide behind carefully worded and carefully timed theological rejections of it. Don't moralise about it, I have very repeatedly said that Inkatha has never considered itself to be the only liberation force in the country. I have repeatedly said that no single Black organisation can win the day. I yearn for the day when leaders like Dr. Nelson Mandela and Mr Zeph Mothopeng and others will be released from jail to pursue whatever role he wants to pursue in South Africa, I yearn for the day when Black democracy will be unshackled and that every leader will have equal opportunity to compete with or to join with any other leader. I am a democrat and the people have a sovereign right to form organisations and to back leaders of their choice.

I have frequently condemned the South African Government for banning the ANC and driving it underground and for limiting its options. I have always held successive South African Governments and apartheid finally accountable for violence in South Africa. I have always pleaded for the acceptance of a multi-strategy approach precisely because no one organisation will ever be able to control the totality of the struggle. That can only be attempted by developing the kind of brutal dictatorial philosophy which has long characterised the ANC's Mission in Exile. They arrogate unto themselves the position of being South Africa's only representative. They demand total say in the struggle for liberation. Their primary commitment is a commitment to the armed struggle and in recent years, that commitment has taken the hideous turn of a commitment to develop what they themselves call a people's war. It is they who liken me to a snake which must be hit on the head. It is they who have called for the murder of Black Town Councillors and anybody else they stigmatise as a collaborator. It is they who put me in this category. They cannot control, me they will never control me and they know this. They therefore want me dead. Gentlemen, let us cut the cackle and look at these realities.

In this historic time, critical to the very future of our country, it is cleric after cleric who gives sanctity to the view that the South African Government cannot be reformed. The attacks starts off with saying that apartheid cannot be reformed and is extended in such documents as the Kairos document to saying that South Africa cannot be reformed. It is cleric after cleric who has given sanctity to political violence. Whether they do so in the disguised form of arguing that violence is now totally inevitable as a choice in bringing about meaningful change, or whether they actually call for revolutionary violence, is irrelevant. They give violence sanctity by either lamenting its inevitability in a just war, or by holding the hand that throws the bomb now.

I argue boldly as a Christian that it is utterly wrong to popularise the view that real reform cannot take place and that non-violent tactics and strategies and democratic opposition to apartheid cannot win the day. Inkatha members are now dying because we really do believe this and we act out our belief in non-violent tactics and strategies for the whole world to see. Gentlemen let us again cut the cackle and let me just bluntly say that we are both committed to non-violence as a means of bringing about real change and that we are prepared to die in defence of that commitment. We are not lily-livered moralists who posture for peace. We will not be intimidated out of our stances and commitments.

I would not be here today if I did not believe that the love Christ has for us could draw us together in a united commitment to work with each other on the ground for peace. We are all very busy people, with diaries crammed with commitments. I am quite prepared to re-shuffle my commitments and to create the space for definite  
u-..i..m.w.w... ,.. . 1- i



action. -If we are going to act together, then we must do so boldly and publicly as a team for peace. I could call for the biggest mass meeting that this region of South Africa has ever seen; I could create the platform on which we could all stand boldly together to enunciate a joint ongoing drive for peace. We could put together teams to work in every and any area where there is the threat of violence. I come to this meeting prepared to make these kind of decisions and I am quite capable of backing them up by appropriate action.

Gentlemen, are you here as emissaries or as mediators? Or are you here in your own right because you yourselves have a deep-felt commitment to bring about peace in this region? With whose authority have you come here? I am not saying you could only come if you did come with the authority of one or another organisation or Church. You may have come here on the authority of God Himself. I certainly hope the latter is the case and that- in today's discussion we can actually make decisions and issue a joint statement afterwards about what we have all agreed now to do.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, in this Memorandum I made firm proposals for joint action between myself, Archbishop Tutu and others to lead an initiative for peace that could actually have achieved peace. Throughout the meeting, Archbishop Tutu avoided any discussion of the proposal I had made that we stand shoulder to shoulder on a platform for all the world to see and to gather the biggest peace rally that had ever been seen in this region, and to then use the momentum for peace that this would give us, in the Greater Pietermaritzburg Area.

I have always been shunned as some kind of South African pariah by the UDF both in this country and abroad. The truth of the matter is that the UDF's leadership dare not share a platform with me because they would be shown up politically. They could not stand the scrutiny of their side and my side of things being presented at the same time. I am not privy to Archbishop Tutu's inner thoughts and I do not know why he avoided the suggestion I made. He is, however, known to be a patron of the UDF and he and Dr. Boesak frequently share platforms with each other both in this country and abroad. He did, however, tell me on that day that he had resigned as Patron of the UDF. I then suggested that the public does not know this and that this should be published.

Archbishop Tutu's inner thoughts are perhaps reflected in what subsequently transpired. At this meeting he produced a joint statement which he himself had authored. I read the statement and declared my willingness to put my signature to it. He, however, said that he must first refer the statement to the UDF for approval and acceptance. Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, he was making this move at a time at which people were actually being killed daily. He came with no backing from the UDF. He came with no

approval from its leadership.' All he did was produce a document which was then put into some kind of UDF pipe-line.

When I saw what he was doing, I feared the worst and it was only a full month later that the Reverend Mogoba informed me that the UDF had approved an amended version of the document. He re-read it out to me over the telephone, and I repeated that I had no objection to repeating our endorsement of it. That, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, is yet another indication that the UDF is not so very concerned about the deaths that were taking place in the Greater Pietermaritzburg Area. Needless to say people in the Pietermaritzburg Area went on killing each other and needless to say that the peace initiative announced by Archbishop Tutu was doomed there in Durban on November 6th.

I am deeply concerned about the role that Archbishop Tutu is playing in South Africa. I must here and now register my protest that the State President has seen fit to challenge Archbishop Tutu publicly. It is yet further proof that the State President thinks that he can control Black politics and intervene directly to give Black politics the direction that he wants it to take. If there is anything wrong in what Archbishop Tutu is doing in the sphere of politics, it is the Black people of South Africa who are capable of speaking to Archbishop Tutu in kindness and love, or in anger to get him to change his ways. Black democracy must be unshackled. White politics cannot assume the responsibility that only an unshackled Black democracy could discharge with any degree of effectiveness. It will do nobody any good to have a State/Church confrontation" emerge in circumstances in which people like Archbishop Tutu cannot be held accountable for what they do politically by ordinary Black South Africans.

The malady of Black politics revolving around self-appointed Black leaders and self-acclaimed spokesmen for the real victims of apartheid runs very deep and emerges in surprising places. Prior to this meeting in Durban and as early as August, Bishop Manas Buthelezi told me that he had met Mr. Oliver Tambo in Harare at the World Council of Churches consultation, and that Mr. Oliver Tambo had requested him to pass on his warm greetings to me and to add that it has never been the policy of the External Mission of ANC to attack me. At the meeting with the Clergy on 6 November, I mentioned this fact and the Reverend Stanley Mogoba confirmed that he had been present in Harare when Bishop Manas Buthelezi was asked by Mr. Tambo to convey this message to me. I find it strange that Bishop Manas Buthelezi can undertake to deliver such a message to me and actually deliver the message while he remains the President of the South African Council of Churches which mounts such vicious ANC-type propaganda against me. I then sent Bishop Buthelezi piles of anti-Inkatha and anti-Buthelezi pronouncements, obtained through transcripts from the BBC, and I have never heard from him-again.

It is time, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, for every Black South African to stand up and be counted. It is time for celebrity leadership to be eradicated and for self-acclaimed spokesmen who have no constituencies at all to be told to shut up. The tragedy is that these celebrity leaders and self-acclaimed spokesmen are in a very real sense the products of apartheid. It is apartheid society which shackles Black democracy which makes it possible for them to act with the impunity that they do act. They are accountable to nobody because the masses are shackled by apartheid. They take the gap and romp around making ex cathedra statements and clerics make absolutist political statements as they choose sides in internecine Black-on-Black confrontation.

This malady I am drawing attention to, keeps spreading and spreading until it permeates the whole world to the detriment of the struggle here at home. When the United States and European countries adopted economic sanction measures to exert influence on Pretoria, they tried to balance this negative punitive action with stepped up humanitarian aid to the victims of apartheid. Mr.

Speaker, Honourable Members, all of us in this House are black-listed as unworthy of handling this foreign aid to the victims of apartheid. In the European Parliament it was decided that the millions the EEC would contribute to humanitarian aid in South Africa would only be spent if the following conditions are met:

- no support in whatever form or through whatever channel to the South African Government or Administration;

- no contributions to programmes which the apartheid regime could be expected to cover under its programmes;

- no contribution to programmes or organisations initiated, run or controlled by homeland governments or so-called independent states.

It is the UDF leadership and their allied clerics working to support the ANC Mission in Exile who are responsible for the black-listing of the KwaZulu Government because it is regarded as unworthy of transmitting humanitarian aid to the victims of apartheid. In the 1986 budget of the EEC, something like 10 million was put aside for humanitarian aid for the victims of apartheid. By the end of 1986, 89 per cent of this 10 million had already been transmitted to South Africa. 49 per cent was channelled through churches; 43 per cent through the Kagiso Trust and 8 per cent to trade unions. Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, you will know what part of these millions have found their way to the poorest of the poor in KwaZulu.

The exclusion of the KwaZulu Government from participating in dispensing humanitarian aid provided by the BBC has in all practical effect been the exclusion of the victims of apartheid in KwaZulu from receiving any help.

The Kagiso Trust was specifically formed to receive millions in support from the BBC. The Kagiso Trust is dominated by the Beyers Naudes, the Allan Boesaks and the Archbishop Tutus of this world. It is a UDF front designed and manipulated to make sure that the UDF receive the lion's share of this European money. When questions are asked in the European Parliament about what this money actually in the end was spent on, members are told that disclosures cannot be made because that would be detrimental to the victims of apartheid receiving help. Mr. Speaker, millions are voted for humanitarian aid in Europe which end up being secretly spent by the UDF in pursuit of its Party political aims. What a travesty of humanitarian justice.

This story repeats itself again and again as far as aid from foreign governments and donor agencies in Western Europe and North America are concerned. I must here also, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, state very clearly that I reject the South African Government's newly-acquired powers to cut off humanitarian aid to South Africa whenever it thinks that this money is being spent to further the politics of violence. Again, I say, Mr. Speaker, that the State President, his Cabinet colleagues and the South African Government are totally unfit to assume the responsibilities they prohibit the Black majority of this country from exercising by keeping Black democracy shackled. There would be no need for controlling the flow of funds for humanitarian aid if Black democracy was unshackled and Black leaders were accountable to the people themselves for what they were doing with the millions that they receive.

Mr, Speaker, Honourable Members, now you can see why I am discussing this deep malady in South Africa's Black body politic. When leaders are not elected, when they have no real grass root constituencies, when they cannot be held responsible by the masses for what they are doing, when they do not have to get a mandate to act before they act, and when they decide in secret committees to act in secret ways, hideous politics must result. There must be a developing hunger for power which millions spent in secret ways makes possible. It is a self-perpetuating malady and will remain a spreading malady for as long as Black South Africa remains shackled democratically.

The malady not only spreads in this country but it also spreads into the whole of Africa, West Europe and North America - the world in fact. Like the carriers of so many diseases, the carriers of Black South Africa's political maladies, show no outward signs of the malady itself. In due course the maladies will destroy those who carry them. In the end the will of the people has a way of asserting itself, but until that happens and ordinary Blacks are in a position to censure self-appointed and celebrity leaders, they will act with a great deal of impunity and are acclaim for what they do.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, you will remember that during the last session of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly I undertook a trip to France at the invitation of the French Prime Minister, Mr. Jacques Chirac where I met the who's who of French politics. In June I met with the Swiss Ambassador, here in Ulundi. In September last year I met a delegation from the Austrian People's Party, the British Ambassador, the Swiss Ambassador again, the American Consul General in Durban, the Consul in Durban of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Ambassador. In October, I met the Canadian Ambassador and in December the Austrian Ambassador. In January this year I met the Ambassador to the United States, in February I met Parliamentarians from Portugal, a British Member of Parliament, and then again in February I met another group of British Parliamentarians, as well as German Members of Parliament and the Italian Ambassador.

In addition to these meetings with Ambassadors and Members of Parliament from foreign governments, I undertook a trip to Italy Switzerland and Germany in August and September last year, where I met the Foreign Ministers of these countries. In Germany I also had a meeting with the Chancellor, Dr. Helmut Kohl, and a meeting was scheduled between myself and the Prime Minister of Bavaria, Dr. ?J. Strauss who was, however, away in China. Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, I have had extensive discussions with foreign governments in both face to face meetings with Heads of State and Cabinet Ministers in Western Europe and North America, and through visiting Members of Parliament and resident Ambassadors and Consuls.

In all these meetings and contacts I have ample opportunity to gather, what the impressions of West German and West European and North American Governments are concerning this country. Again and again I find myself having to counter the distortions which self-proclaimed Black political leaders and celebrity leaders make of the South African situation. They paint pictures of a South Africa in which Inkatha is not legitimised because it does not participate in what these political Charlatans and imposters are attempting to do. When you oppose the tactics and strategies they are \_actively pursuing, you are labelled a traitor to the Black South African struggle for liberation.

Everywhere I go in North America and Western Europe, I find that the influence of the ANC Mission in Exile working in tandem with local Communist Parties sow lies and distortions about the South African situation. They paint pictures of a South Africa in which there is no hope for democratic opposition to justify their hideous commitment to violence in Black-on-Black confrontations. Mr. Speaker, Members will see the extent to which they sink to low levels when I tell them that Mr. Francis Meli, a spokesman for the ANC Mission in Exile said in West Germany, that only a tractor tyre would be good enough for my necklacing.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, Mrs. Coretta Scott King invited me in January this year to participate in a national symposium on "A New US Policy Towards South Africa" to be held in honour of Dr. Martin Luther King. The symposium was intended to focus on a new US policy which could effectively utilise creative non-violence methods to, as she put it, "address a potential tragedy of immense proportions." The symposium was to be held at the Martin Luther King Jr. Centre for Non-violent Social Change, Inc. in Atlanta, Georgia. She was also inviting a cross section of South African Black political opinion and international figures, which would include both myself and Mr. Oliver Tambo. I accepted the invitation and Mrs. Scott King accepted my nomination of the Honourable Ministers, Dr. O.D. Dhlomo and Dr. F.T. Mdlalose, to attend the Conference and to speak on my behalf. Right at the last moment, Mrs. Scott King informed me that the Symposium had been cancelled because she could not get all the parties together that she wanted to get together. '

Those who front for the ANC Mission in Exile such as Randall Robinson of Transafrica, in Washington, ensure that they sabotage any sharing of platforms between Inkatha and the External Mission of ANC. They play us down as having no political consequence in South Africa because they argue that we serve Pretoria's interests. Only last week, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, we were again faced with attempts to keep us ostracised in the international community. I had received an invitation from General Olesegun Obasanjo to present my views at a Policy Board meeting of the InterAction Council to be held in Harare between the 20 and 22nd March. As Members will understand, Mr. Speaker, I could not personally be there because it clashed with my responsibilities in the opening phase of this year's KwaZulu Legislative Assembly session. I again nominated the Honourable Dr. O.D. Dhlomo and the Honourable Dr. F.T. Mdlalose to attend the meeting on my behalf and to present my views to the InterAction Board. A matter of days before they were due to depart, the Zimbabwean Trade Mission in Johannesburg informed Dr. Dhlomo that they had been refused visas. It was only after further representations were made that visas were granted to them. This was strange because on two occasions before this, I had sent my two colleagues to Zimbabwe after independence. On both those occasions they were well received and on the first occasion they were not only hosted by the Vice-President His Excellency Mr. Simon Muzenda, but His Excellency the President Dr. Robert Mugabe actually briefed them. They met the Vice-President again on the second occasion they were there.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, at the meeting itself Sir Shidra Ramphal, Secretary-General of the Commonwealth, made a scathing attack on us and Inkatha during a plenary session knowing that my colleagues the Honourable Dr. Dhlomo and the Honourable Dr. Mdlalose would not be given the opportunity to reply to him at a plenary session.

At this plenary session Sir Shridath Ramphal made idiotic accusations about Inkatha because it had not been battered together with the 17 organisations against which the South African Government has recently taken action. Sir Shridath may hold the prestigious position of Secretary-General of the Commonwealth, but he loses our respect in carrying on the vendetta he has been carrying on against me. In this vendetta he acts as a front man for the External Mission of the ANC. I Spurn the insult of implying that we in Inkatha are collaborators with Pretoria made by Sir Shridath with the contempt that it deserves. I have been in politics in this country for the greater part of my adult life, and I do not need the Ramphals of this world to tell me and my movement how to conduct the struggle for the liberation of my people.

As far as I am concerned, he can go and jump into the Indian Ocean. It is arrogant for anyone who has not lived in this country to try to anoint Black leaders on behalf of Black South Africans. It is, in fact, a very racist tendency detectable in some people. They do not regard Black South Africans as capable of deciding the who's who of our country's Black leadership.

However oppressed we are and however shackled Black democracy is, it is Blacks in this country who must find ways and means of supporting political activity that they want to support. While we are shackled democratically, it is we here in this country on the ground who have to do what can be done. I find it a grave insult to the integrity of Black South Africans that all and sundry move in to act as king-makers because Black democracy has been shackled by apartheid. The Ramphals of this world totally disgust me. They add their particular brand of prescription to the brand of prescription which apartheid uses. I often wonder whether the world would ever have heard of people like Sir Shridath Ramphal if he had to fight for political existence in the circumstances in which I have achieved political prominence.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, I have spoken bluntly to Mr. Oliver Tambo. I have told him enough is enough and I now tell Sir Shridath Ramphal and anybody else who can sit in the ldxury of foreign eminence and attempt to dictate the who's who of Black South Africa's leadership to take a run and jump at themselves. I pity this eminent spokesman of the Commonwealth for being so egocentric that he imagines that he can tell us who are Black leaders and who are not. What contemptible arrogance! Our South African problems will be resolved in South Africa by South Africans of all race groups who will act with whatever leaders they choose to act.

I appeal for the unshackling of Black democracy precisely for this reason. I will never do a deal with the Pretoria regime behind the backs of any section of the Black population, nor will I act behind the backs of any Black leaders to do so.

When the South African Government took such harsh action against 17 organisations recently, Inkatha's interests were battered in a terrible way. We in Inkatha are only as free as the rest of Black South Africa. The shackling of one organisation is the shackling of Black democracy which affects all organisations. In taking the action it took, the South African Government made it impossible for Inkatha in any way to be involved in whatever reform process the State President may get under way. I have already made the release of Dr. Nelson Mandela, Mr. Zeph Mothopeng and other political prisoners and absolute precondition for my involvement in meaningful negotiations at the national level about the constitutional future of South Africa. The more the State President acts against Black organisations, the more he makes it impossible for me to talk with the South African Government.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, when I travel abroad to meet Western Heads of State or their Cabinet colleagues, or when I meet Ambassadors and Consular staff in South Africa, I am often confronted with discussions or asked questions relating to what options would be if the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba proposals were rejected by the South African Government. The context of these discussions and the questions that are asked clearly shows the extent to which some of the things I have been doing are regarded as all that I could ever do. It is as though there is a proneness in the world at large to believe revolutionary propaganda that non-violent options have run out in South Africa.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, political realities quite often take months or even years to surface in the media and in the perceptions of foreign observers of the South African scene. Quite often the questions I am asked by foreigners show the extent to which flexibility in the South African situation has increased and the extent to which much of what the ANC's Mission in Exile is concentrating on has already been outmoded and outdated.

When it comes to their national interests neither the USSR nor Mocambique, or Zimbabwe will author internal and foreign policy to suit previous commitments made to the ANC Mission in Exile. The winds of change are sweeping across the Soviet Union and all indications are that it does not want to be embroiled in a losing ANC war in Southern Africa. Mocambique had to act in terms of its own national interests to bar the ANC from conducting military excursions into South Africa from Mocambican territory.

The ANC's Mission in Exile, however, has commitments to its people on the ground in Africa and it is trapped in its own propaganda. It will be a miracle if it moves with the times and begins shifting emphasis to enable it to participate in the politics of negotiation which will win the day. Whatever shifts it may attempt to make will have internal repercussions which will really shake the whole organisation. I will not put Inkatha in the position in which its vibrant flexibility is dampened and I will not lead Inkatha into a .im-\_\_.\_w-



cul-de-sac where it has nowhere to turn to. This is exactly what would happen if I was not man enough to exercise my own leadership and to sum up for myself the mandates the people give me.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, had I followed the advice of those very clever fellows out there in the outside world who think' they know far better than we in this country know, I would have been a political nobody today. I have the courage of my convictions and I have the sure knowledge that millions of Black South Africans support what I am doing because I am doing what they want me to do. For Sir Shridath Ramphal or anybody else to come now to tell me what I ought to be doing for the sake of the struggle or to tell me what I ought to be doing to save my own hide, is totally intolerable.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, I will have to continue doing whatever can be done to bring the voice of sanity to the international debate on the apartheid issue. It is because I have taken steps to save the West from its own madness in its attempts to beat Pretoria only to batter Black South Africa, that the ANC's Mission in Exile has become ever-increasingly venomous about the role that I play. Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, as far as I am concerned, they can jump in the Indian Ocean with Sir Shridath Ramphal. They are not here on the ground with me to be guided by Black South Africans as I am guided. They have to read newspapers and to speak to self-appointed, dial-a-quote spokesmen to attempt to find out what is going on. I will continue to tell the world what is going on.

Last year I had to address a communication to all Heads of Non-Aligned States and to Heads of Commonwealth countries. I could not stand by idly as these members of the international community blundered in their dealings with South Africa. In communicating with them, I was very aware that foreign governments are in fact dominated by serious-minded people who are genuinely appalled at what apartheid is doing to Black South Africans. They are not all like the Ramphals\_ of this world. I therefore addressed them seriously and spelt out some of the realities that we have to face in this country.

The communication I sent Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned and Commonwealth countries was as follows:

MEMORANDUM ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN MINISTERS OF COMMONWEALTH  
STATES AND NON-ALIGNED STATES

"A CONTINUING INTERNATIONAL INPUT IN THE POLITICS  
OF NEGOTIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA"

By Mangosuthu G. Buthelezi

Chief Minister of KwaZulu, President of Inkatha and  
Chairman, The South African Black Alliance

AUGUST 1987

There is a very significant overlap of membership between the Commonwealth and the Nonaligned States of Africa. Dual membership implies dual responsibility and both Non-aligned States and Commonwealth States have the same international interests in helping to rectify that which is so very wrong in South Africa. At this point in our history, it is the Commonwealth countries which have taken a direct line of action with regard to South Africa, and I therefore call to mind the Commonwealth Conference in Nassau in October 1985 as I address Commonwealth and Non-aligned countries. IAt the historic Nassau Commonwealth Conference Heads of State took a decision to establish an Eminent Persons Group to negotiate and to mediate in the South African situation. This decision reverberated around the world. The failure of the South African Government to respond to this historic decision is now history. This failure in its own way contributed towards the increased solidarity with which the international community has more recently begun to look at South Africa. We cannot allow initiatives of this magnitude to become milestones of failure in the deteriorating South and Southern African situation. The Commonwealth has a role to play in the eradication of apartheid. Each Commonwealth country has a role to play but Commonwealth countries collectively have a different role to play and I address some thoughts to this subject. Few anticipated a resounding success after the Nassau decision. A negotiated settlement of South Africa which the whole world regards as the most desirable, will be difficult to achieve and the Nassau decision must be seen as a step along a difficult road. Everywhere in the world where balances of power exist in violent situations, negotiations are always fraught with difficulties and dangers. A lot has happened since the CEPG made its attempt to establish a negotiated situation in South Africa and I would like initially to share with Heads of States my perceptions of South Africa today. The first of these perceptions is that there is a fluidity in the South African situation not seen since 1910, when modern South Africa was established by the Act of Union. It is an important

point to dwell on. It is absolutely true that we in South Africa still have a recalcitrant Government which remains deeply committed to make racism the cornerstone of constitutional development and while this remains the case, Mr. P.W. Botha as State President will want only to negotiate a settlement within a racist framework. The Commonwealth and Nonealigned countries will only want to negotiate a non-racial settlement. This is the central negotiating logjam. There is however fluidity around this logjam but. part of the problem 'is that people persist in describing this fluidity in ideological Party political terms which give power advantages to the participating groups in the South African struggle for liberation. However, when one breaks through ideological terminology to perceive the reality of the South African situation, we should be left with a common perception that there is fluidity and that there is hope for negotiations.

Government recalcitrance does not mean that the only thing left for us is to respond with violence which will produce a destructive final violent conflagration. The South African Government is recalcitrant in a very fluid situation. Racism is vulnerable as it has never been before. The vast, vast majority of South Africans will continue to behave in such a way that fluidity increases. The South African Government is powerless to stop this process of increasing fluidity and its recalcitrance must be seen as the recalcitrance of the weak.

EE\_M!%E\_AEEQEE\_EEQE9\_EEE-EQEEX\_is\_EQE\_EEQEEsE

Mr. P.W. Botha remains the most powerful man in Africa, if power is defined as ability to resist intervention from without and to carry out acts of military aggression against others. The State President's vulnerability does not lie in the military field. He must be attacked where he is most vulnerable. He must not be attacked where he is strongest. This immediately brings to the fore the question of tactics and strategies in the South African struggle for liberation.

I want to make the point that we who are involved in the South African struggle for liberation have become deeply aware that we have to seek compromises which take us away from the ideal. I would like to put this statement in perspective. First World members of the Commonwealth nations are deeply aware of the fact that their Third World members are daily faced with the need to make compromises. A Head of State who has to have a national state of emergency as a relatively permanent feature of its Administration compromises democracy. That compromise has had to be made. A Head of State who cannot get either a socialist economic system or a capitalist economic system functioning dynamically, finds himself in a position of having to compromise with economic ideals to do what is economically most desirable within his limitations for the sake of progress. If African Heads

of State have had to make compromises in the government of their countries after they have thrown off the shackles of colonialism, racism and foreign control, how much more do leaders in the South African struggle for liberation have to do the same.

We have to attack Mr. p.w. Botha where he is most vulnerable and we have to eradicate apartheid but we are not entirely free to determine how this should be done. We will not win our struggle for liberation even for the very foreseeable future if we ignore harsh realities.

I am not alone in recognising that there is fluidity in the South African situation. I would like to compare my thoughts and statements with those lying behind statements made by Mr. Gleb Starushenko who is a member of the USSR Academy of Sciences. I am not quoting him as a spokesman of the USSR. What he said is only indicative of the re-thinking which is taking place in Moscow. I quote him nevertheless because there are other indications that Moscow is prepared to re-think its approach to South and Southern Africa. See, for example, the address of Dr. Goncharov, Deputy Director of the Institute of African Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences to a conference in Harare on Southern African Regional Security.

I draw from the paper Mr. Starushenko read - 'Problems of Struggle against Racism, Apartheid and Colonialism in South Africa' at a Soviet-African Conference 'For Peace, Co-operation and Social Progress' in Moscow in June 1986. In speaking about the basic South African situation he says: "The controversial issue,. however, which is the object of acute political struggle not only on the world scene, but in South Africa itself, is that of means and ways to achieve the desired end." He points out that "This practical aspect of the problem acquires special significance in the light of the latest developments in South Africa that tend to aggravate international tension to a dangerous limit and call for concerted actions to clear up the conflict situation."

When you read this statement in the context of his paper, it is clear that it is related to his later suggestions that the time is ripe to re-think strategy and tactics.

I am at one with him in these sentiments. Commonwealth and Non-aligned countries' Heads of State are at one with him in these sentiments. He believes, as he must within the framework of Soviet thinking, that societies evolve within the framework of a kind of scientific absolutism and that every society in the world is destined to become a socialist society. Many members "of the Commonwealth and Non-aligned States would not agree with him but, in speaking about the current South African struggle and the role

of Communist leadership in the ANC, Starushenko says: "Proceeding from the objective laws of social development, the Communists do not advance at the present stage of social development any other slogans but general democratic ones. They believe that the restructuring of South African society along socialist lines is a matter of the future and will be possible only after the necessary conditions are ripened." He points here to compromises which have to be made even within exacting thought in Communist theory. He points out that Communists wisely now strive for an interim goal to set the stage for a final future goal.

This is in fact talk about participating in a fluid situation and tailor-making tactics and strategies to meet the realities of today. He says the process of shaping the revolutionary situation is far from being complete and he makes the point that there is a "crisis of the upper strata" which precipitates a "crisis of the lower strata." He points out that in this crisis of the lower strata, that "... if revolution does not go ahead, does not set any new tasks and does not gain appreciable results, it is bound to sustain a defeat." He agrees with me that we cannot win a revolutionary struggle and that the action of students and the unemployed is insufficient to bring about victory against racism. Mr. Statushenko obviously takes sides in the internecine Black-on-Black conflict in South Africa and he describes the Pan Africanist Congress, AZAPO, the National Forum and other organisations as being reactionary in nature. He sees that the Black body politic as being in a crisis situation and claims that the broad masses of the Black South African population remain aloof from the struggle. He sees the revolutionary movement in South Africa in danger of stagnation and his final word on the weakness of the South African Black body politic is that its remedy is a Black South African affair. He says: "We are firmly convinced that the solution of all internal problems of the liberation movement is the sovereign right of the people and their political Parties."

I do not give Mr. Starushenko any particular political status. I draw from him as a Soviet recognised analyst simply to define the fluidity of the South African situation. There is a need to strive for interim positions and I end my drawing from his paper by pointing out that he also says the new South African State might be a unitary system with autonomous components or that the new South Africa may, for example, follow the Kenyan or Zimbabwean model. But, he argues, whatever the new South Africa will look like, it gives rise to, as he puts it "concrete issues related to the functioning of such a system Iwhichl might become the object of a national conference, its main participants being the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the true representatives of the non-White population." He sees fluidity and in that fluidity he sees the need for negotiation with the South African Government.

I would not have used the same terminology as Mr. Starushenko in talking about the realities I face in South Africa but when we break through terminology I see him seeing so many of the things I see. I do not have to share his ideals of a distant future South Africa. I in fact do not have to share with him his ideals for an interim South Africa. But whatever ideals he would strive for in my situation, and whatever ideals I strive for in my situation, we are at one that realities demand imperative recognition that the South African struggle is a phased struggle and that compromises have to be made as we determine tactics and strategies which put us in a position to grapple with realities.

I stand totally committed to the full participation of all Black South Africans in the search for solutions to South Africa's problems, and I have long argued that a prerequisite for a negotiated settlement in South Africa is the unshackling of Black democracy. In this sentiment I reflect the gut feeling of many millions. It is this sentiment which is a monumental stumbling block which Mr. P.W. Botha cannot ignore. He is powerless when it comes to any possibility of restoring South Africa to a classical apartheid society as conceived by earlier National Party Governments. He is just as powerless when it comes to foisting on South Africa a new form of apartheid. The only thing he could do which will stand the test of time must be done with Black consensus and Black backing. The days of the politics of prescription are over. He will not establish a permanent racist society in South Africa because Blacks will not permit him to do so. He cannot do so without Black co-operation and Blacks will not co-operate in this matter.

I relate this point to the need to unshackle Black democracy. It is hypothetical to talk about a solution to South Africa's problems which Black South Africans would support if the Black body politic remains shackled. Mr. P.W. Botha gives all the indications that he intends crying in the face of a terrible storm during the current election campaign. When he now talks about negotiation between Black and White, he talks about negotiation between the South African Government and those Black leaders who are willing to discuss their Black group ethnic interests with him. He still does not see the need to unshackle Black democracy. I have pointed out in South Africa and abroad that any Black leader who is party to important negotiations about the future of South Africa must be free to seek a mandate from the people for a position he adopts in negotiations and must be able to go to the people to sell to them that which was negotiated. South Africa belongs to the people of South Africa and not to the National Party and the future of South Africa will be determined by the people.

Unless Black democracy is unshackled, I will be involved in no negotiations with Mr. P.W. Botha about the constitutional future of South Africa. I must be free to get a mandate to do so and unless

I am free to test the negotiated solution against the wishes of the masses, I am not free to negotiate. When it comes to determining the future of South Africa, I believe the masses are entitled to hear point and counter-point by all political leaders they recognise. I have therefore said that if Dr. Nelson Mandela, Mr. Zeph Mothopeng and other political prisoners are not free to accept or reject Mr. P.W. Botha's invitation to serve on the National Council or on other negotiating bodies, I feel free to use my democratic right to refuse to do so. Dr. Mandela and others must now be released from jail. I stand for the right of others to differ from me and I stand for the right to differ from others. Unless we are free to differ, we are not free to concur, and if Black South Africa is not free to concur, Black leaders are not free to negotiate on behalf of the people.

i  
s  
I  
E

The Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group saw this and in their attempt to find a negotiating position for South Africa, they recognised the need on the part of the South African Government to: a (a) Removal of the military from the townships, providing for freedom of assembly and discussion and suspension of detention without trial.

(b) The release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners and detainees.

(c) The unbanning of the ANC and PAC and the permitting of normal political activity.

On the part of the ANC and others:

Entering negotiations and suspending violence.

The Need for International Commitment to the Achievement of Intermediate Goals \_\_\_\_\_

The CEPG did not achieve these objectives but in the fluidity of the South African situation we will and must achieve them sooner or later. I am committed to them and I make a special appeal to Commonwealth and Non-aligned Heads of State to remain committed to them and thus continue to find very important common cause with virtually every Black South African political grouping.

I mentioned the position of Dr. Mandela and others and my and Black South Africa's attitude to them, to note one of the dimensions of the South African fluidity. The South African situation cannot crystallise until Black political prisoners are released.

There is in South Africa now a total White economic dependence on Blacks and nowhere in the world are economic systems dysfunctional for political systems and nowhere are political systems

disfunctional for economic systems. The economic interdependence of Black and White demands political interdependence. There is right now a momentum towards political interdependence which Mr. P.w. Botha with all his power can not stem. The very obvious gap between South Africa's economic realities and its political realities also contributes towards the fluidity of the South African situation. The South African Government will now have to do something. It faces its OWN internal and external imperatives to do something. The South African Government cannot freeze the present situation and the South African Government can only fail and fail again in any attempt it makes to thwart the development towards the political interdependence between Black and White. Repeated failures will therefore also continue adding to the fluidity of the South African situation.

The Developing Weakness of the south African State President's  
2212;\_que

---

The fluidity of the South African situation is also contributed to by the fact that apartheid is no longer a White monolithic granite edifice. The State President is under very considerable pressure from important financiers, industrialists and entrepreneurs to move resolutely towards normalising South Africa as a modern industrial democracy. Leading thinkers in South Africa's commercial, industrial, mining and financial world are right now reorganising their enterprises and laying the foundations they will need in a post Group Areas Act and post Population Registration Act South Africa. There is a ferment among South African intellectuals and there is ferment among South African theologians which also adds to the pressures being exerted on Mr. P.w. Botha to move towards establishing an open democracy. These pressures on him have evoked the emergence of far-right counter-pressures, and there is now a White Party political ferment unprecedented among the traditional supporters of the National Party. Again, fluidity is added to.

The recent White general election showed a very lamentable swing to the right, but even so it is actually inconceivable to think of South-Africa being ruled by the extreme right. Political Parties to the left of the National Party are just as much in ferment as Political Parties to the right of the National Party. To the right there is no consensus between Parties which can lead to a power alliance. To the left, the White political scene is characterised by a break-away element in the National Party joining it. There is ferment about how best to challenge the Government's power with very important groups of erstwhile National Party academic supporters in active opposition to the National Party. In the recent White election they threw their weight behind the break-away element from the National Party. These academics are supported by influential businessmen and clergymen.

In this ferment within the National Party itself and to the left of it, there is a growing felt need for the politics of negotiation to



get off the ground. After eight months of very serious negotiations, the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba produced a set of constitutional proposals in which Whites radically departed from their past political thinking. All indications are that the White electorate, while swinging to the right to entrust the National Party with the responsibility of leading in bringing about change, is likely to support the Indaba proposals. In a recent survey conducted by Markinor, an independent organisation, it was ShOWN that overall, research indicated very positive attitudes to the Indaba amongst people of all races. I enclose a copy of a report on this research.

Steps Against the South African Government which Weaken Internal A denial by the international community of the fact that there is fluidity in the South African situation runs counter to South African realities. I am aware that Black South African leaders committed to bringing about change primarily through the armed struggle, wish scepticism to deepen. They want the international community to be sceptical about any prospects of non-violent change through the politics of negotiation.

The South African fluidity is not the kind of fluidity which makes the thrashing of the South African Government productive. The international community should support the Black components which keep the situation fluid and which are driving towards a negotiated settlement aiming at establishing an interim position in South Africa which can be a true base-line for the final shaping of South African society. A way has not yet been found to thrash the South African Government without thrashing the victims of apartheid and without thrashing the poorest of the poor in South Africa. The 7 crippling of the South African Government at the cost of crippling Black democratic forces would be disastrous. That will leave the forces of violence locked into a final race war.

Powerful Black democratic forces are evolving in the fluid South African situation. They are already powerful enough to thwart the National Party in its objective of establishing a neo-apartheid society. Black democratic forces are powerful enough to ensure that the present abortive Tricameral constitution of South Africa will prove to be a failure. They are powerful enough to ensure that Black leaders will not be able to sell the Black South African democratic heritage for the proverbial pottage. They are powerful enough to ensure that no Black quislings could survive in the reality of politics. There is therefore fluidity with hope. The international community must now service this hope by servicing the real needs of internal Black democratic forces.

South Africa will not be salvaged from the ruins of apartheid by forces operating from beyond the borders of the country. Unless those who do so really do join forces with those inside the country

who are there in the forefront of the daily struggle, they will be deluding the world in their acclaim for eminence of recognition and this brings us to the question of Black tactics and strategies. The South African Government is Strengthening its Ability to Resist The South African situation is in fact not becoming fluid for the forces of violent revolution. The arguments against violence succeeding in eradicating apartheid and establishing a true, open, non-racial democracy are very formidable arguments. I have never been a true pacifist and I espouse the cause of non-violent democratic opposition to apartheid as a transforming opposition on pragmatic grounds.

I do not have to argue the merits of a non-violent solution to the South African problem. The international community is at one with me in believing that this is the most desirable of all possible approaches. We therefore share a joint responsibility to make non-violent tactics and strategies the final winning tactics and strategies. If violence has a play at all in the South African struggle, it will have to assume the role of supporting the internal democratic struggle leading to the politics of negotiation. Violent forces are lamentably very prone to a winner-takes-all attitude which forecasts only doom for the country unless there is a violent victory.

Black States who are members of the Commonwealth did not resort to destroying the economic foundations of their countries in their struggle for liberation. Prime Minister Mugabe returned to an intact industrialised Harare. President Jomo Kenyatta returned to an intact Nairobi. President Kaunda returned to an intact Lusaka and so for the rest of them. They were all involved restructuring and re-organising but they conducted their struggles so that they would have something left which could be restructured and reorganised. After the struggle for liberation has finally vanquished apartheid for the scourge that it is, I want something left in South Africa which future democratic governments could restructure and re-shape.

A final violent conflagration between Black and White will not leave us in the position of having something to restructure. Whatever else is demanded as an interim objective, we must all accept the need for the preservation of the foundations of the South African economy in the tactics and strategies we employ to achieve an interim victory. There simply will be no Utopian leap into the future for us and any democratic Government which supercedes the racist government of Mr. P.W. Botha will face vast poverty problems of sufficient magnitude to threaten future democracy in even the best hoped for situation. I simply express these sentiments without feeling the need to argue them at length because they are sentiments shared by the international community.

I have conceptual problems with the argument which says that democratic procedures have failed and therefore there is no alternative but to resort to violence. I say violence has failed and that therefore now we have no alternative but again to resort to democratic options. In the new fluidity now evident in South Africa these options are ever increasingly the more viable options. I do not feel the need here to go into detailed reasoning to back up this statement. I make the point only that if we are to achieve an interim position from which we can launch the final shaping of South Africa, we must be prepared to compromise away from the winner-takes-all demand. If we are not going to be involved in a winner-takes-all situation in the very foreseeable future, and if we have to strive for an intermediate goal, we have to learn from past experience.

I do not regard the EPG's attempt to bring about a negotiating position in South Africa as a failure. I see it as a first venture in exercising the Commonwealth's and Non-aligned States' international responsibility towards South Africa. I think the lesson that we must learn from the CEPG experience is that in future attempts to establish negotiating positions must be rooted in an ongoing participation in things that are happening in South Africa. I do not use the word 'change' because change as a concept implies a movement towards giving Blacks formal constitutional power. Things are, however, happening and in this sense there is change.

It is tragic that the CEPG report terminated its involvement in the ongoing attempt to establish a negotiating position in which both the South African Government and Black leaders can participate. I believe that it is possible to do this even now. Could the Commonwealth not have the courage now to reconstitute the EPG and involve it in an ongoing attempt to bring about the degree of consensus that talking is necessary which will prepare the ground for both the South African Government and Black political groups to work towards a negotiating agenda.

I understand that the Eminent Persons Group was constituted in a situation made very difficult by Commonwealth countries not being able to agree on a final approach to South Africa. I am aware that there must have been in the minds of the eminent persons in the group the need to test the water, so to speak, and some Commonwealth countries may now be satisfied that the Commonwealth should have adopted a far more aggressive stance in the first place. For them the EPG experience may serve to justify their scepticism. The EPG wisely or unwisely had to pursue its objectives with a threatening attitude of harsher measures to come than the limited sanctions agreed to if the South African Government did not make significant moves to meet the BPG half way. This was inherent in the message that they brought from the Commonwealth.

Past Failures Should be Turned into Building Blocks of Future  
 I believe there is no shame for Commonwealth countries to recognise that the EPG did not achieve the objective of establishing a negotiating climate in the country. The Commonwealth should reconstitute the EPG with the longer and more far-reaching objective of participating in events in the forefront of the interface between South Africa and the external world. The Eminent Persons Group has the distinct advantage of having had discussions inside South Africa. They will not have to start from scratch, so to speak. As a group they could re-establish contact with Pretoria and could re-establish further dialogue with the ANC and the PAC. They could also re-establish contact with other Black groupings in South Africa and could be involved in the definition and re-definition of negotiating positions until there was sufficient common ground between all the parties. This would justify the EPG's continued existence.

I am aware of the fact that it is now being suggested, in some circles that foreign participation in the negotiating process in South Africa could take the form of, say, Britain and Malawi undertaking to carry a Pretoria perspective to, say, the Governments of Mocambique, Zimbabwe, Rumania, which would in turn table an ANC position. This internationalisation of the preparatory work necessary before negotiations begin in South Africa is perhaps vital. It has in it the same recognition of the need for shuttle negotiation which I have already briefly outlined in my paper last year to the Mini Commonwealth Conference in London. It is in the interests of the Commonwealth and Non-aligned countries that progress be made in South Africa which justifies the re-inclusion of South Africa as a respectable member of: the international community.

The Ales: \_f\_9r\_.0.\_gn 9123 \_Sihlitt.le\_2i\_2l\_0.m\_a\_\_cx

There is I believe a great deal of merit in the suggestion that shuttle diplomacy could serve the international community's interest in participating in positive developments in South Africa. In shuttle diplomacy the activity of foreign governments could be associated with a permanent secretariat in South Africa constantly in touch with developments as they occur. There have been developments since the EPG presented its final report. The South African situation is dynamic and it is constantly shifting and constantly requiring new insights and perspectives. The full weight of the representatives of foreign countries already in South African diplomatic missions could be mobilised to support such a secretariat. Their liaison could ensure full international participation in urgent attempts to steer South Africa away from a final violent holocaust.

Whatever events lead to real negotiations taking place, there is a need to pay more attention to the kind of negotiations which can in all realism be expected. Thus far a great deal of media prominence

has been given to the prospect or otherwise of a Lancaster House-type negotiating situation emerging in South Africa. There has for many years been talk of the need for a National Convention in South Africa and when one mentions the words negotiation about the future of South Africa, people leap naturally to the conclusions of a round-table conference at which the South African Government and other political groupings take their place to determine the kind of constitution that South Africa should have. The ANC has a clearly stated position that it is only prepared to negotiate about the handing over of power to the people. If we accept a winner-takes-all philosophy that position would be understandable.

Negotiations about the future of South Africa may not necessarily be negotiations that work from the top down.

I believe in fact that it is more likely that final success in negotiating a settlement which will re-introduce South Africa as a respectable member of the international community will follow on negotiations which work from the bottom upwards. Negotiations must have a give and take element in them and in our South African circumstances anyone who hopes to negotiate with the South African Government with it capitulating and negotiating about abdicating does not found his or her thinking on the South African realities. If we cannot expect negotiations in the context of a capitulating South African Government handing over power, we must work towards negotiations which work upwards from local, regional and provincial levels to national levels. The former kind of negotiations could only become a reality once the South African economy has been broken and the military might of the country has been drastically reduced. Necessary conditions for successes in this direction are quite out of anybody's sight. We must now look at negotiating from the bottom upwards. .

I: is in this process that the negotiating power of Black South Africa will be the most telling and it is in this direction that negotiating successes could accumulate to give Black South Africa the final negotiating advantages at the top. The Commonwealth and Non-aligned States need urgently to explore whether or not these assertions are founded in political realism and whether 'real politik' can be established through bottom to top negotiations. The politics of coercion is the politics of diminishing utility. The politics of coercion always relies finally on the full force of the State but there are limitations on what the full force of the State can in fact force people to do. It is a negative force when it comes to Black South African politics. It can prohibit but it cannot direct. In its prohibitive function, even the full power of the State cannot make a horse drink once it has been forced to the water. The people of KwaZulu resisted participating in the so-called homeland institutions authored by the Government right until the last when we were told bluntly that the South African Government was legislating to introduce these institutions whether

we agreed or not. That it did; the legislature was under the control of the National Party and the National Party had the power of State to draw lines on the map and call it KwaZulu, but no power on earth could have made us take the next step expected of us and that was to accept the so-called independence which Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei accepted.

After the South African Government failed to author this eventuality through the power of the State, it attempted by various and often devious means to negotiate us into this position. It was our adamant refusal to be co-conspirators into the division of South Africa into a central White State surrounded by so many little satellite so-called states, which more than anything else has led to recognition that the homeland policy as conceived by Dr. Verwoerd and Mr. Vorster is now failing. This recognition has fundamental political significance.

cutiait 1.995; 3111331 11695: -99.; L91

It is this recognition which enabled me to establish the Buthelezi Commission to seek for a regional formula outside the aims of apartheid. The fact that the South African Government rejected the Buthelezi Commission outright as soon as its report was published, did not inhibit the local and regional negotiations continuing which had been started within the Buthelezi Commission. The Commission was established in 1980; it produced its report in 1982; negotiations continued in 1985 as the Whites-only Natal Provincial Council and the KwaZulu government reached a negotiated agreement about the need for a non-racial executive authority with jurisdiction over both KwaZulu and Natal. Negotiations continued and in the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba agreement was reached in 1987 about the establishment of a multi-racial legislature for the region, inherent in which would be a Bill of Rights which defies every norm of apartheid. Even if the South African Government rejected the proposals now laid before it for a multi-racial legislature in the KwaZulu/Natal region, negotiations would continue. I enclose copies of the Bill of Rights and the constitutional proposals which the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba produced.

The politics of negotiation are building up a moment in the Natal region and the South African Government now must tread more warily as far as we are concerned, and it is doing so in a way in which it has thus far spoken about the proposals. The door is now really open for further negotiation. The South African Government has in fact already rejected some of the more important proposals but it has declared its willingness to negotiate with the parties which negotiated the proposals laid before it. There may be a long road ahead but we have already travelled a considerable distance from the point at which we opened the negotiating agenda in the Buthelezi Commission.

Other negotiations can be started in other regions and provided that as was the case with the Buthelezi Commission and the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba, negotiations need not be dependent on the sacrificing of very fundamental democratic principles. Prime Minister Mugabe found it necessary to entertain certain guarantees to White Zimbabweans and those involved in negotiations in South Africa will find it necessary to be involved in one or another kind of guarantees to White South Africans. As Mr. Starushenko in his paper said: "The misgivings of a certain part of the South African white population viewing the majority rule in their country in terms of doomsday horrors are largely traceable to racist propaganda combined with hoary provincialism and downright ignorance." He ventures the opinion that "...already today the ANC might work out comprehensive guarantees for the White population which could be implemented after the elimination of the regime of apartheid."

I do not want to speak for anybody but myself but I believe that if Mr. Starushenko is wrong in this latter observation, the ANC will finally be endorsed out of the struggle and only those who are willing to work for an interim position from which the final shaping of South Africa can proceed, will be left in the political running. We can make progress in this direction by recognising the importance of negotiations working from the bottom upward and participating in them. The international community needs to participate in this kind of upward negotiating strategy and a secretariat of the kind I am mooting could provide invaluable assistance in numerous negotiations at different local, regional, provincial and final national levels.

Negotiations from the Bottom upwards Need Regional Power Bases  
Regional power bases are important in South Africa and they become even more important in the political process in which political advantages are accumulated in negotiations which move from local levels upwards. I make the point that negotiating power at whatever level is dependent on the ability of Black leaders to develop disciplined followings on the ground and the ability to direct Black forces.

Power is no real power if it initiates forces it cannot control. The politics of violence has threatened to do just this. Bands of young people called Comrades are emerging to perpetrate acts of violence which are actually under nobody's disciplinary control. They cannot be moved into action and withdrawn from action. They are soliciting violent responses in the townships where they enact their violence. Vigilante groups are emerging which are also out of anybody's control and the internecine Black-on-Black violent confrontations are in places assuming horrible proportions. If South Africa is going to be involved only in heightening the levels of equilibriums of violence as State violence solicits counter-violence and as comrade-type violence solicits counterviolence, and as counter-violence at both levels initiates yet more violence,

South Africa will head for a conflagration of violence which everybody deems totally undesirable. There is the need to develop local and regional power bases in which there are disciplined forces subject to political leadership.

The real political power of any leader cannot be measured by surveys of sentiment among the masses. Real power has either to defeat the enemy on military terrain or defeat the enemy on the negotiating terrain. It is tragic that during the last decade there has been a Black South African history of military endeavours competing and conflicting with negotiating endeavours. Revolutionaries want total control in their all-or-nothing philosophy and they are now directing more attention to intimidating Black South Africa than they are in confronting apartheid itself.

A watchdog secretariat involving itself in shuttle negotiations with a secretariat in South Africa supported by the diplomatic corps, working towards getting international backing for moves in the right direction, whoever makes those moves, will be invaluable. The international community must be more than participants in a developing logjam and a political as well as a military Stalemate.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, I have always had to be particularly careful in what I say both in this country and abroad. I am particularly aware that anything I say when I am abroad or any message I sent to the outside world is said and sent outside the view of the masses in Black South Africa. I have always therefore reported back to Inkatha and to this House, Mr. Speaker, so that Black South Africans are fully aware of what I say on their behalf.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, it is very important that I keep the record straight and today I want to table the document the Honourable Minister of Education and Culture, Dr. O.D. Dhlomo and the Honourable Minister of Health, Dr. F.T. Mdlalose delivered on my behalf to the Harare Meeting of the InterAction Council Policy Board. It reads as follows:



## INTERACTION COUNCIL

## MEMORANDUM PRESENTED TO THE INTERACTION POLICY BOARD

By Mangosuthu G. Buthelezi, Chief Minister, KwaZulu

President of Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe /

Kgare ya Tokoloho ya Setjhaba

Read on his behalf by Dr. O.D. Dhlomo

Minister of Education and Culture, KwaZulu and

Secretary-General Inkatha

"SOUTH AFRICAN REALITIES: A BLACK VIEWPOINT"

HARARB, ZIMBABWE 20 MARCH 1988

## INTRODUCTION

The InterAction Council is a prestigious body which brings together some of the world's most able political thinkers who are themselves past and present Heads of State and Cabinet Ministers and many other individuals of international stature. While its very composition must lead to statements about South African issues which are already decided in some of the countries of the world, it is a forum specifically set up to think world problems through and arrive at conclusions which can make new initiatives in the right direction possible. The InterAction Council is not a political party, or a ruling party even, which has to make sense of the positions it took to receive the mandate it did receive.

I really do believe that a successful international initiative is required to break the South African log-jam. However much final South African solutions must be determined by the people inside the country, the internal democratic process in South Africa takes place against the background of the internationalisation of the apartheid problem. '

I therefore approach my briefing of the InterAction Council on the current South African situation in a sense of urgency in which I recognise the legitimate right of the international community to regard apartheid as infringing fundamental human rights as an international crime against all the countries of the world. The infringement of human rights anywhere should be the concern of countries everywhere.

The InterAction Council has, in the past, adopted very clear policy decisions about South Africa and has advocated specific international action programmes against South Africa. It is my sincere hope that this session of the InterAction Council will deliberate on the evidence being laid before it in this session with an open mind and with a recognition that Pretoria has remained impervious to the best that international initiatives have been able to do.

Whenever tactics and strategies fail to reach objectives, there is a tendency to resort to saying that the same thing must be done more intensely and for a longer period of time to ensure success. We would not be concerned today in this session, about the South African issues which we are concerned about, if past initiatives had succeeded or were about to succeed. It is my plea that at this session of the InterAction Council new innovative thought be explored and past thinking be subjected to critical constructive review.

I want to make the statement that we have reached a no-holds barred point in South African history. The only thing that matters is to mount something that will now work. The expression: 'That will now work' must, however, be qualified. I would not regard any solution as having worked if it replaced one kind of tyranny with another kind of tyranny in South Africa. I would only regard a solution as having worked if, in the end, it gained democratic freedom for all the people in South Africa and left a government of the future in a position to govern in such a way that the battle against poverty, ignorance and disease after political victories could proceed with real hopes of success.

When I therefore review what has happened in the past and what is happening now, I will not be making ideological statements, nor will I be making party political statements on behalf of Inkatha. Anything that would work, done by whoever did it, would benefit me and the whole of Inkatha. We will back anything that will really work. By the same token, we would resist anything that will not work and we would resist anything that would work in the short term to destroy apartheid but would involve South Africans paying future crippling prices for any immediate gains.

#### THE REALITIES OF TODAY

Politics and diplomacy must ultimately be rooted in reality. In both politics and diplomacy ideals are mixed up with subjective judgements. These serve to dramatise truth and guide action but ultimately political representations which distort realities put the parties concerned beyond the ability to deal with the realities they talk about. As I develop the theme of my Memorandum, it will become clear that I call for action that can work because it is action that does not try to ignore the questions of having to deal with realities.

The Location of South Africa on the African Continent

The ruling National Party in South Africa has ignored this reality. South African Whites for generations have laboured under the misguided belief that they can establish a White-dominated enclave on the tip of Africa. Black opposition to apartheid on the other hand has always been totally aware of the futility of attempting to establish a South African solution which would be condemned by the whole of Africa.

As far as I am concerned, the South African problem is located in Africa and there can be no real solution to South Africa's problems which does not contribute to the development of African States in the whole of Southern Africa and in Central and Eastern Africa. Again, as far as I am concerned, we owe it to Africa to liberate South Africa and Africa owes it to South Africans to assist them in doing so.

The effect of what happens to African States bordering on South Africa and beyond is very important to me. I will not pursue political objectives and I will not adopt tactics and strategies in South Africa which will detrimentally affect South Africa's African neighbours. I will do everything in my power to ensure that a post-apartheid South Africa does not have to keep the whole of Africa at bay to survive.

South Africa's location on the continent of Africa has vast implications for Western industrialised nations and for nations in the Soviet bloc. They will have to deal with South Africa in the context of Southern Africa and Africa itself.

I am a Black leader in South Africa and I share Africa's concerns about South Africa and I demand to be treated as such. This is an important point to make because my African identity in South Africa and on the continent of Africa precludes me from participating in anything the South African Government may want to do to deny Black South Africans democratic rights which Africa demands for them. It is also an important point because there is the danger that some leaders in Africa border on treating White South Africans as alien ex-patriates and do not share the wisdom of Dr. Kenneth Kaunda and others summed up in the Lusaka Manifesto that White South Africans are Africans. There is a danger of waging a struggle against apartheid as a struggle against the best and the worst that there is in South Africa simply because a White minority government is in power.

The Reality of the South African Military Might

It is commonly recognised that the State President of South Africa, Mr. P.W. Botha, directs the most powerful army in Africa. There is, however, at times a lack of understanding which the implications that Pretoria's military might have for international initiatives against apartheid.

One of the too-little discussed implications is that there is no point whatsoever in now pursuing what amounts to attempts to establish a Lancaster House conference to deal with the future of South Africa. Pretoria's military might produces a time factor dimension which is indeed very problematic.

International initiatives tend to ignore the time that Pretoria can buy with its military might. The national efforts which have thus far been mounted have been mounted to run a course in time schedules which are totally unrealistic. The 'do so-and-so or else formula' leaves Pretoria unperturbed. If Pretoria can survive the worst that can be done in the time schedules set out in initiatives against it, the initiatives can in practical terms be ignored.

The military might of Pretoria has obviously got vast implications for Black opposition to apartheid. Frontline States have paid the price of Black initiatives in South Africa which under-estimate the military might of Pretoria and which have demanded backing for that which cannot work.

South Africa's economic might does not rest on bits of paper or on formalised institutions. The real economic might of South Africa rests on the day to day behaviour of millions of people. When internal and external forces act against the South African economy, the real target is not the South African Government but the people in the country who keep the economy alive and who are dependent on it.

The South African Government has an immediate awareness of this fact and remains impervious to threats of economic sanctions. There were none in the world who predicted that the mandatory arms embargo placed on South Africa in 1978 would by 1988 result in South Africa being among the five largest arms exporting countries in the world. They would not have predicted that the sale of arms would bring in more foreign currency in 1988 than any other single manufactured commodity.

The resilience of the South African economy has been woefully under-estimated inside South Africa and abroad by those who see it as a foundation for apartheid and wish it destroyed.

.For over a quarter of a century the ANC has led an armed struggle against South Africa which has not succeeded in really getting off the ground. This is not a judgement. It is a statement of harsh reality. It is fact that after this quarter of a century there were no liberated zones, there are no viable springboards from which to make attacks from beyond South Africa's borders and every bridge and every road system and every water and electricity supply system remain entirely intact. There is no factory out of production. The impact of the armed struggle per se has not been felt in South Africa.

The failure of the armed struggle has a reality about it which now demands iattention. Frontline States cannot bear the cost that a failed armed struggle produces and I believe that there is real reason to suspect that even the Soviet Union is having second thoughts about the implications which the failed armed struggle in South Africa has for it.

I isolate these realities because they simply must be taken into account. More of the same thing that has been done in the past will produce more of the same consequences that they have produced in the past. To continue to attack Pretoria where it is strong and make it stronger yet where it is attacked, makes no strategic sense and it makes no political sense.

#### BLACK POLITICAL POSITIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA

All the oppressed in South Africa belong naturally together in their fight against apartheid. Throughout the world it is recognised that those who are brutally oppressed owe it to themselves and to the world to do something about their oppression. In South Africa it is the Black people who are the worst affected by apartheid and there is a Black struggle for liberation led by Blacks for Blacks in the broad Black response to their oppression. However true it is that apartheid is terribly detrimental to all in South Africa including Whites who are dehumanised when they dehumanise others, the Black struggle for liberation is a very distinctively central component in the broad struggle for human rights.

In the struggle that Blacks wage there should be no room for fundamental dissent and there certainly should be no room for internecine Black-on-Black strife. Black-on-Black confrontations

are, however, realities which cannot be wished away. They must be dealt with by Blacks in South Africa in the first instance and finally they must be dealt with by all who are involved in the eradication of apartheid, whether they be in South Africa or beyond her borders.

The hideous heights to which Black-on-Black confrontations have risen is not only terribly detrimental to the Black struggle for liberation in South Africa, but it is also detrimental to neighbouring States and to the whole of Africa. Black/Black confrontations compound the problem the international community faces in dealing with apartheid. There is no unambiguous Black voice and governments around the world are faced with the ever-increasing inevitability of having in practical terms to choose sides.

The present prominence of Black-on-Black confrontations in South Africa must not be seen as a passing phase. Life and death issues are involved, the destiny of South Africa is involved and all those in the Black community who struggle against apartheid do so with a deep intensity which lends itself to adopting bloody-minded positions.

It is too little realised that it is the now inevitable collapse of apartheid which is further fanning the flames of Black-on-Black confrontation. The question of what replaces apartheid is no longer an academic question which must be settled some time in the distant future after a long drawn out struggle has run its course. Black South Africa is alive with vibrant expectations of life after apartheid. Black South Africa knows that apartheid is doomed. They know that what they now do to finally eradicate apartheid for the scourge that it is will lay the foundations for the future. Differences of opinion between Black and Black therefore run deep. By the same token if the collapse of apartheid is now inevitable what the international community does assumes a new significance. I therefore believe that the InterAction Council should think about apartheid realising that:

1. Economic realities are ever-increasingly making apartheid untenable as a State philosophy. The now complete economic dependence of White on Black makes nonsense of classical Verwoerdian apartheid which envisaged the complete separation of South Africa's race groups.

Economic realities will ever-increasingly also militate against any form of neo-apartheid which the ruling National Party may now be hoping for. It is short-sighted not to recognise that even Afrikaner businessmen, academics and theologians are undermining the power base on which a neo-apartheid South Africa would have to be built. Only the

wilfully blind can now believe that any form of neo-apartheid is doomed for the same reasons that apartheid is doomed.

2. Demographic realities militate against apartheid. It is just not feasible to plan a future in which Blacks will not dominate numerically in so-called White South Africa.<sup>i</sup> Blacks are in these areas to stay and the co-existence of Black and White in the country's major urban areas has to be recognised as an imperative.

Demographic realities reinforce economic imperatives. The expansion of the economy now entirely depends on a rate of Black/White worker substitution which is totally incompatible with apartheid. Ever-increasingly Black/White worker substitution will lead to Black/White supervisor substitution and Black/White manager substitution. Employers will ever-increasingly have to recruit amongst the demographically dominant Black group in all industrial areas.

3. Black bargaining power is now becoming a vital political factor. Market-place realities are ensuring that this is so. The Black customer has now become all-important. in the consumer market. Black customers are becoming very important in the financial market. This two-fold importance to South Africa's business community, allied to the businessman's dependency on Black labour, supervisors and managers demands the scrapping of apartheid. Organised mining, commerce, industry and banking in South Africa are already preparing for a post-apartheid South Africa and are entering into negotiations with Blacks on numerous levels.

The extension of -trade union rights born out of economic necessity has given Blacks bargaining powers in the market place and the White community is aware that shop floor bargaining now legitimately includes wider social and economic issues beyond the factory gates.

The White community is also aware that social and economic issues of workers beyond the factory gates cannot be tackled without tackling political issues.

Black bargaining power is also enhanced by the fact that the National Party is no longer the monolithic power in Afrikanerdom. Again only the wilfully blind will maintain that apartheid is not being challenged within the National Party. Last year's breakaway movement led by Dr. Denis Worrall did not end with the events which surrounded the 1987 Whitesonly general election. The ferment within Afrikanerdom and the National Party continues.

The rise of the Conservative Party in South Africa would not have taken place were Afrikaners not involved in internal disputes about

the future of South Africa. The National Party has to defeat the Conservative Party and it is only puerile propaganda which does not distinguish between the two Parties. I certainly hold no brief for either. Both have to be brought under mass democratic control or be destroyed. I am only arguing that apartheid is doomed and the essential foundations of apartheid are now so cracked that its final collapse is inevitable.

In this situation of internal dissent between Afrikanerdom, Black bargaining power is enhanced. Afrikaner leaders and opinion makers have seen the writing on the wall; they have come to accept the reality of White dependency on Blacks in the economic sphere and are beginning to create a climate in which political interdependence must eventuate.

It is imperative for the good of South Africa that Black political forces mount tactics and strategies which exploit the opportunities market forces and dissent within the National Party have now created. I know that a rough road lies ahead but it is a road that I must take.

I am aware that those campaigning for the supremacy of the armed struggle as a primary means of bringing about radical change in South Africa do not want Black leaders now in the country who are working to establish the supremacy of the politics of negotiation to succeed. They want the armed struggle to succeed because they are not now in the country. They also want the armed struggle to succeed because it will create a future very different to the future which the politics of negotiation will produce.

Those involved in the armed struggle campaign for acceptance as the true leaders of South Africa with the sole right of international recognition. They are not struggling to give me or anybody else the right to participate in the eradication of apartheid through the politics of negotiation. I am on the receiving end of their opposition to me. I count my dead as a consequence of what they are doing. For me it is not a question of discerning what the ANC's position on the politics of negotiation is. They have answered that question for me in their violent onslaught against my followers.

The stated position of the ANC as far as the politics of negotiation is concerned is changing. They have dropped the hard line that the only thing to negotiate is the handing over of power. They now declare their willingness to negotiate if certain conditions are met. While they have changed their stance in front of the international community, they constantly re-commit themselves to intensify the armed struggle and constantly take ever farther harsher action against me and my followers.



Black-on-Black confrontation is very real in South Africa and the international community will misconceive the South African situation entirely if this is not recognised. It will also misconceive it entirely if it does not recognise that the real Black-on-Black confrontations in South Africa are about the kind of future we are going to have.

The issues are a one-Party State or a multi-Party State, a socialist economy or a free enterprise economy, and fundamentally important, whether there is a people's victory against apartheid which gives them the right to support whatever party they wish to support and elect whichever leader they wish to elect, or whether there is victory by a dominating ANC which comes into power as a government returned from exile.

#### THE GOVERNABILITY OF SOUTH AFRICA

The ANC and its allies inside South Africa are working to make South Africa ungovernable as though government by Draconian measures ceases to be government. The Government of South Africa is now being governed by the National Party. It is a de facto government, whatever the world thinks of it and it can continue to govern as a de facto government for a very long time indeed if it is given no option but to continue meeting escalating force against it with escalating State force.

There is now a hideous equilibrium of violence in South Africa which can get a lot more hideous in the upward spiralling of violence and counter-violence. Those employing violence for political purposes in South Africa have not made a half-hearted attempt to bring about the downfall of the Government through revolution. They have thrown everything they have into what they have done but they have attacked the South African Government where it is strongest and indeed made it stronger.

We have again very recently witnessed the employment of Draconian powers to keep South Africa governable under the National Party. The steps taken to neutralise Black political groups and to isolate a number of Black leaders, will not only be effective from the Government's point of view in the short term but also devastatingly destructive of the politics of negotiation in the longer term.

Non-violent democratic leaders like myself have suffered devastating set-backs by the same action which is seen only as action against some groups. The national state of emergency under which the action was taken is terribly restrictive of the politics of negotiation. I have not been arguing as I have argued today with any belief that the military and economic might of Pretoria favours any kind of tactics and strategies I have espoused. Body

blows to Black democracy anywhere in South Africa are body blows to Black democracy everywhere. The shackling of some Black organisations is a shackling of all Black organisations.

#### MY OWN FACE-TO-FACE MEETINGS WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN

I have also not been arguing as I have been arguing today because something vital is developing between myself and Mr. P.w. Botha. In fact, I have nothing at all to say to the man now which I have not already said. I have only met him thrice formally in his nine years of office as head of the South African State. I have stated very clearly that I will continue to have nothing to say unless: 1. Dr. Nelson Mandela, Mr. Zeph Mothopeng and other political prisoners are released.

2. Black democracy is unshackled.

3. It is recognised that the present constitution of South Africa must be scrapped in its entirety.

4. The Population Registration Act as the fundamental enabling Act which makes possible the political separation of race groups is scrapped.

5. It is recognised that South Africa is one country in which there can only be one sovereign parliament and in which universal adult suffrage determines who serves in that Parliament.

6. The National Party's contention that South Africa is a country of minorities is abandoned.

Abandoning any one of these demands would involve me in forfeiting the mass support I now have in South Africa. These demands are immutably fixed in the Black struggle for liberation. They are time-honoured demands which Black leaders can only abandon at their peril. It is because I have articulated these demands so repeatedly and campaigned so vigorously for their acceptance, that Inkatha has become what it has become.

#### Inkath

The establishment of Inkatha was demanded by the political vacuum which emerged in South Africa during the 1960's. The ANC was the oldest and most prominent Black membership-based political organisation in the country by the end of the 1950's. In 1960 the South African Government banned the ANC and it went underground to operate from bases which it had established abroad in anticipation of government action against it. i

It was not the banning per se which created the political vacuum Black South Africans experienced in the 1960's. There was deep Black South African commitment to the ANC which could have continued supporting it in exile had the ANC perceived the vital political importance of continuing to support the democratic struggle on the ground in the country. Instead, they adopted the armed struggle as the primary means of bringing about change and turned to regard involvement in the democratic struggle as detracting from their central strategy.

No single major political initiative emerged in South Africa for a decade after the ANC was banned. Black South Africans kept looking over their shoulders waiting for the ANC to assist them. When assistance was not forthcoming, they demanded the right to do something for themselves. This gave rise to the birth of Inkatha on the one hand and the birth of the Black Consciousness Movement on the other hand.

I initially established Inkatha as an organisation which would keep alive old ANC loyalties and give Black people in South Africa a political action programme in which the struggle for liberation's time-honoured values were kept alive. For years after its inauguration, I acted in concert with Mr. Oliver Tambo by doing what was legally possible to do inside South Africa. I heard his advice that I must not commit the same errors of judgement that the old ANC had committed by becoming leadership heavy and ignoring the real need to develop local and regional power structures.

I pursued the development of Inkatha's democratic structure to ensure that at local and regional levels people were given an involvement in the decision-making process which affected their future. This commitment to the development of the democracy of Inkatha and the overall framework of attitudes and values which had been established at such great cost over so many decades, led to a phenomenal expansion of Inkatha's membership.

Every African Head of State would recognise that you simply cannot establish a political organisation with a membership of over 1.5 million in the space of 12 years unless you articulated the aspirations of the masses and gave them a constructive involvement in doing something about their circumstances.

I will for ever be grateful to Dr. Kenneth Kaunda for the role that he played in the early 1970's in helping me formalise my thoughts about the need for a new political structure. Inkatha's structure is, in fact, based on the UNIP model and the massive success of Inkatha's ability to attract mass membership bears testimony to the farsighted perceptions of Dr. Kaunda at the time.

Well over 1.5 million Black South Africans have become card-carrying members of Inkatha. This makes Inkatha at the very least one of Black South Africa's leading voices. The rejection of my leadership and the denunciation of Inkatha's tactics and strategies and of its aims and objectives which they serve, is a rejection and denunciation of the will of millions of Black South Africans.

I say millions because again every African Head of State would know that the formal membership of any political organisation is no more than an index of its importance at the grass root level.

What I have been arguing today is supported by millions of Black South Africans. Their voice demands to be heard by the international community. Inkatha's members are dominated numerically by peasants and workers. They are the ultimate victims of apartheid. They have the opportunity each and every year to direct and re-direct Inkatha's leadership which they have elected to office. To ignore Inkatha is to ignore a very substantial proportion of Black South Africans.

Inkatha is in politics to stay. It has been in existence now for nearly 13 years against very virulent and at times violent Black opposition and it is stronger now than it has ever been before. Inkatha continues to grow in strength because it has learnt the lessons of history in the Black struggle for liberation. These are:

1. Political organisations are the strongest when they are membership-based.

2. Political organisations must do more than campaign for new future states of affairs; they must campaign for them in such a way that the day to day interests of the grass root masses are served. i

3. Political tactics and strategies which do not accumulate gains as a result of the tactics and strategies they employ, are subjected to internal dissent which leads to their disintegration.

4. Political organisations are strongest when they are kept alive by the poorest of the poor and kept free from any dependencies on donor organisations or countries.

Inkatha has by now outlived many failed national and international strategies against apartheid. Its growth and survival can in part be traced to its refusal to be drawn into tactics and strategies which cannot survive against the realities of the South African situation.

This session of the InterAction Council will receive my comments and come to their own conclusions. I have thus far not said one word about what it should or should not come to conclude. That is not my role. I simply present the Council with a Black viewpoint which is backed by millions of Black South Africans.

It is also a viewpoint which has the most prospects of breaking down the barriers which apartheid has erected between South Africa's race groups. It is a viewpoint which could assist in the de-polarisation of South Africa during the process of eradicating apartheid. Inkatha has developed stronger multi-racial support than any other organisation on the ground in the country today.

In moving to a conclusion, I make the following points:

1. The South African problem will be made ever-increasingly intractable by the upward spiralling of violence.
  2. No international initiative will work to assist in bringing about a lasting solution to the South African problem unless it is backed by all race groups.
  3. The international campaign to isolate South Africa diplomatically and to punish it economically has done more to radicalise the right-wing tendencies in South African White politics than it has done to get Pretoria to move in the right direction.
  4. The international campaign to isolate South Africa diplomatically and to punish it economically undermines a vast network' of anti-apartheid forces in the country which amount to a groundswell across-the-board rejection of apartheid in all race groups than anything else. '
  5. The international campaign to isolate South Africa diplomatically and to punish it economically represents legitimate international outrage against apartheid but does more to illustrate party political differences in Western industrialised countries, and does more to illustrate First World/Third World international problems than it does to assist the struggle for liberation in South Africa;
  6. The failed intentions of the international campaign to isolate South Africa diplomatically and to punish it economically has a cost which ultimately only the real victims of apartheid - the poorest of the poor in South Africa - have had to pay.
- In drawing attention to these points I have not intended to be prescriptive. If what already has been done by the international community is all that can be done by it, then so be it and God help South Africa. I, for one, do not accept that the international community is as impotent as it has thus far proved to be.

There is a desperate need for new innovative thinking and the mounting of new approaches by the international community. I sincerely hope that this session of the InterAction Council's meeting in Harare will be able to contribute to the international community breaking out of the political sterility of repeating past fendeavours which failed in the belief that more of the same thing will succeed in medium or longer term. That would be devastatingly destructive of the good for South Africa.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, self-appointed leaders and celebrity leaders play duets with the ANC Mission in Exile claiming that non-violent, democratic opposition to apartheid cannot succeed in bringing about the kind of radical change that would gain massive support from the vast majority of Black South Africans. There is so much that has not yet been done that can be done and there is also so much that has been done which needs to be continued, that it is politically nonsensical to talk as though there is nothing left to do by mounting international sanctions against South Africa as a final step before our country's problems are solved in violent confrontations.

The ANC Mission in Exile and celebrity leaders in this country are not capable of leading, or not in a positibn to lead, democratic forces on the ground and that is why they have to posture as eminent in what they can do. We are constantly being judged within the framework that they want the world to heat as the only framework which comprehends South African realities. When we oppose what they do, we are treated as traitors to the causes of the Black struggle for liberation.

In the September/October 1986 issue of 'Frontline' Mrs. Albertina Sisulu is reported as saying about me: "He uses illiterate people who still believe in the wars of Shaka. But that is coming to an end. Even in Natal there are places where he wont put a foot down. In the hostels of Clermont - We are getting closer." Black South Africans have a great respect for the wife of a political prisoner who has been in jail now for more than 20 years. This kind of utterance, however, disgusts millions of Black South Africans.

Mrs. Sisulu is one of the two national presidents of the UDF. She is a typical case of somebody being elected to office by committees which were elected by committees which were elected by committees. Mrs. Albertina Sisulu is a typical celebrity leader who leads no real grass root constituency. She has no organisation to which she can say, do this and it will be done, or don't do this, and it will cease to be done. She commands no political power, if political power is defined as it should be defined - as the ability to pursue objectives and get things done.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, we would be deluding ourselves if we ever turned to believing that this country's self-appointed leaders, celebrity leaders and media-anointed leaders who become prominent because the media can use them as dial-a-quote sources, are not dangerous. Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, a political baboon sometimes succeeds in throwing spanners in spokes and that makes political baboons very dangerous.

I am terribly aware that we have to continue pursuing our aims and objectives through the tactics and strategies we have chosen to employ in a full awareness of the minefields which are laid for us by the kind of leaders I have been talking about. Mr. Speaker, they do influence public opinion through the media. They do influence foreign governments. They do create the circumstances in this country in which the politics of negotiation is made very, very difficult. '

I want to make the point Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, that we have always sought Black unity based on a multi-strategy approach and we have always stood for the right of others to oppose what we are doing if that opposition is based on constituency politics and is exercised in a broad democratic framework. I make the point that we have elected to work within the limitations of telling Mr. P.W. Botha that we will not be able to serve on the National Council unless Dr. Mandela and other political prisoners are there to serve with us should they so desire. I have repeatedly said in this Policy Speech that restrictions against our Black political enemies and against organisations which oppose us, are restrictions against us as well.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, I have thrown down a gauntlet in front of Mr. Oliver Tambo and I throw the same gauntlet down in front of the UDF. I tell both organisations that we cannot wait forever for them to come to their political senses. The day may come when the extent to which we put the good of the State above the good of the Party, will force us to act unilaterally.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, I we have never yet acted unilaterally. Before we have acted, we have shared with every organisation in South Africa what we intended doing. We have done nothing out of the blue. We have always invited their participation. We invited the ANC's Mission in Exile to find ways and means of being represented in the Buthelezi Commission. We did the same in putting the delegates of the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba together. There has always been an open offer from my side to have talks with Mr. Oliver Tambo. There is a long-standing invitation to Mr. Archie Gumede to have discussions with us and even to come and address the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly. Inkatha's membership has always been open to all and Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, there is no reason whatsoever that the UDF could not have put up candidates in KwaZulu Legislative Assembly elections.

If things go on as they have been developing in recent years, we may have to reconsider our accommodating attitude. If others do not want to move with history then history must leave them behind. I make an important point, however, when I say we have not yet turned to regard any of our Black brothers and sisters as being so beyond the pale that they would not be welcomed to act with us should they so choose. This is what they have said to us. We have not yet said it to them.

It is in the context of these thoughts, Mr. Speaker, that I now turn to consult the Members of this House about a very crucial issue - the support in principle we offered for the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba constitutional proposals. We were party to the formulation of these proposals. It is we more than anybody else who made these proposals possible by a willingness to compromise.

'Mr. Speaker, I ask Members to pause for a moment to consider to whom we actually made this offer to compromise. The compromises were made in the context of an ongoing debate and a process of give and take amongst the working members of the KwaZulu/Natal' Indaba. It does not, however, make political sense to regard the compromises we made as compromises we were offering to the Indaba itself. We offered South Africa the compromises. In the Indaba debates we said we would be prepared to make the compromises we did make to enable a consensus opinion to develop which could make possible a Joint Legislative Authority.

The compromises we did make were made in a specific context to achieve specific objectives. Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, I make an important point when I say that the compromises we did make did not amount to evidence of an internal adjustment we were making in South African politics. The compromises we made were made while we were saying that we would be prepared to meet other political groupings half way if they were prepared to meet us half way.

I am always guided by the very exacting demand that whatever I do must be supported by the Black masses to whom I am responsible as a leader. Whatever I do must be supported by them. As the President of Inkatha and as the Chief Minister of KwaZulu, I lead because I am expected to lead. I am expected to translate the mandate I have into action programmes. Because I am a democrat, however, I will not turn the mandate I have got into a formula for the politics of prescription. I reject the Regional Services Councils because I know that I would be involved in them without that involvement benefitting the Black masses. The majority of Blacks in the KwaZulu/Natal region fall under no local authority and are precluded structurally from benefitting from anything the Regional Services Councils may do. If I joined the Regional Services Council system these masses beyond the sphere of the operation of the Councils would be left out in the cold.



I make these points, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, because I carry the same thought into what I have to say about our support in principle for the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba constitutional proposals. It is imperative for me to think in terms of beneficial consequences for the people in everything I do. We supported the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba constitutional proposals because we were convinced that if others made matching compromises to the compromises we made, a joint Legislative Authority could become a reality in this region and every race group would benefit. The KwaZulu/Natal Indaba is not some kind of juggernaut on to-which we leapt and which we cannot abandon if it is hurtling on to doom. The KwaZulu/Natal Indaba is an exploration of partnership between race groups. If the White race group now does not want to become involved in that partnership, then we have compromised for nought. Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, this is, however, not a simple matter. We all know that Mr. C.J. Heunis, the Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning, did not speak for the rank and file members of his Own Party when he rejected the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba proposals in his press statement of 27th November 1987.

I was so shocked by what Mr. Heunis had to say that I immediately issued the following press statement:

PRESS STATEMENT

BY DR. MANGOSUTHU BUTHELEZI

CHIEF MINISTER, KWAZULU & PRESIDENT OF INKATHA

Certain media, published at the weekend, reports of a statement made on Friday by Mr. Chris Heunis, Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning, which has been described as a rejection by the Minister of the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba proposals.

a

I am appalled by what Mr. Heunis has said, as well as appalled by the way in which he chose to say it. I must now ask myself whether Mr. Heunis and his Cabinet colleagues even know the meaning of the word negotiation.

After long and careful deliberations the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba published a set of consensus proposals for the constitutional development of the KwaZulu/Natal \$region. I was subsequently requested by Mr. Heunis himself to provide him with the response of the KwaZulu Government to these proposals. I did so formally on on

the 29 October 1987. Mr. Heunis had undertaken to table my response and the response of the Natal Provincial Administration to the proposals formally so that the South African Government could react to them. While we were waiting for this reaction Mr. Heunis issued a statement reported in the press in which he slams the Indaba proposals in detail and in principle.

There is clearly nothing to negotiate about but that aside I find it a contravention of every diplomatic norm and basic good manners for Mr. Heunis to respond to the document he himself asked me to produce, through the media. If Mr. Heunis wanted to wipe the Indaba proposals off the negotiating board, he could at least have been man enough to inform me that this was his intention.

I cannot subscribe to the view attributed to Professor Dawid van Wyk, the Director of the Indaba, that Mr. Heunis' statement was not a rejection of the Indaba but rather a re-statement of some of the objections expressed by the Government in the past. The rejection of the proposals by Mr. Heunis breaks entirely new ground in the rejection not only of the proposals but also of the politics of negotiation.

I want to make it quite clear, as I have done repeatedly, that the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba is not my Indaba. Their proposals are not my proposals. Inkatha did participate in the work of the Indaba and the KwaZulu Government did support the Indaba proposals in principle. This support was support for that which could possibly break a political log-jam. This support did not indicate any basic shift in thinking shift by the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly or Inkatha. I and all my political associates have always cherished a one-man-one-vote system of government in a unitary State as an ideal for South Africa. Our support in principle for the Indaba proposals was an indication of our preparedness to meet other points of view half way if they in turn would travel their half of the way.

Mr. Heunis' statement indicates that the Government itself is adopting an all-or-nothing stand and I reject the reasoning he has given, as reported in the press, for his rejection of the Indaba proposals. It appears to me that we are a million miles away from political reconciliation and that the Government does not only not know the meaning of the word negotiate, but it also does not know the meaning of the word compromise.

Mr. Heunis rejects the Indaba proposals because he says they are more suitable for "minority protection in a majority model rather than efficient group participation on the basis of equal power-sharing." No amount of twisting of words, no amount of filibustering will change the reality that there is a Black majority in South Africa and that there is a Black majority in the KwaZulu/Natal region. There is indeed a Black majority in Natal

itself. Unless the South African Government comes to terms with this reality, what is there to negotiate about? You cannot negotiate political reality out of existence.

The KwaZulu/Natal Indaba proposals have made a great many Black South Africans uneasy because they go too far in the protection of the country's White, Indian and Coloured minorities. They are the minorities. What is there to negotiate about either in the Indaba or in the National Council if Whites reject the best that democratic Blacks can do to ensure that Whites' minority rights will be protected in the constitution and by law? The whole of democracy is about establishing majorities for parliamentary purposes. Mr. Heunis complains that under the Indaba proposals the majority party would be dominant in all government institutions. This is complaining about democracy itself.

I must also now ask myself what the value is of KwaZulu's participation in the Joint Executive Authority. Is it only to be authority in which rands and cents are shuffled around within the oppressive framework that the White minority National Party imposes on the vast Black majority? I have never seen the Joint Executive Authority as anything other than a step in the right direction. I made this clear to the State President at the opening session of the J.E.A. on the 3rd November. Is the statement issued by Mr. Heunis the State President's rejoinder to what I had to say? It is so deeply tragic that Mr. Heunis made his statement at a time in which there has never been more consensus between Black and White about the need to break away from apartheid. His statement pulls the political rug from beneath my feet and he shows total disregard not only for my views but for the correct handling of differences of view. He is being the baas, laying down the law and stating that the hard work and the commitment to democracy by- all the delegates of the Indaba must be discredited because they were not delegates from the Government and the ruling National Party. Why in heaven's name does the representative nature of the composition of the KwaZulu/Natal count so little for this Party political baas?

It is truly tragic that the State President is a leader who cannot lead. What hope is there of normalising South Africa as a modern, Western industrial-type, multi-Party State in which the free enterprise system is free to make its contribution to the development of South Africa? It is the enemies of democracy who will be rubbing their hands in glee at Mr. Heunis' statement. It is those who kill for political purposes whose arm has been strengthened by his statement. His statement plays right into the hands of revolutionaries who want to wipe away multi-Party democracy and the free enterprise system.

I have today expressed my own views as a Black political leader with responsibilities as President of Inkatha and responsibilities as the Chief Minister of KwaZulu. I will now have to consult with the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly and Inkatha to hear their views before I formally react to Mr. Heunis' statement. I intend today only to express my own total dismay and my deep disgust that the politics of negotiation is being so trampled upon while it is passing through one of its most delicate phases in the history of South Africa. I

29 NOVEMBER 1987

ULUNDI

Market research has indicated the extent to which National Party members give very substantial support to the Indaba's constitutional proposals. We must therefore in one sense exercise caution in making up our minds about whether or not we now withdraw our offer to make the compromises which led to us supporting the Indaba's constitutional proposals in principle. Were it not for my background knowledge of Mr. Heunis' speaking against the wishes of a very substantial number of people in his own Party, I would have withdrawn from having any further involvement in the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba when Mr. Heunis released his press statement.

I sum my own feelings up when I say we were prepared to make compromises and it is now up to the White electorate to get their Party political leaders to make matching compromises. The National Party's local, Durban and provincial leaders rejected the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba out of hand from the outset. The Indaba has thrown a cat amongst the National Party pigeons. Politically speaking, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, that cat is now there and it will remain there whether or not we continue supporting the Indaba's constitutional proposals or not.

I am just terribly concerned about the time factor. We have never ever adopted a laissez faire political philosophy. We have never expressed any kind of belief that a just society would evolve in this country over time if we do not do anything ourselves. I see it as terrible dangerous for Inkatha and this House, Mr. Speaker, to be hung up at some kind of cross-roads while we wait for Whites to arrive there and to decide which direction-they are going to take. Our support in principle for the KwaZulu/Natal constitutional proposals must not be allowed to become a millstone around our necks and to limit our political options.

In practical terms, we cannot act on our support for the KwaZulu/Natal constitutional proposals. There is no political programme in them for us right now. Mr. Heunis has rejected them on behalf of the Government after a full Cabinet meeting. The Cabinet has closed ranks on this issue.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, it is not as though it has closed ranks over the specific constitutional proposals that were made by :dm \_:::aoa. It has closed ranks in rejecting the Indaba per se. We in YwaZulu and Inkatha would not have made one single compromise

if we had to entertain the prospect of having to re-negotiate the constitutional compromises around the acceptance that South Africa is only a country of minorities. When Mr. Heunis rejects the majoritarian basis of the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba, he rejects every compromise we made and he rejects the basis on which we were prepared to make compromises. It is this issue on which the South African Government has closed ranks.

In this Policy Speech, I have ranged far and wide. I have drawn the attention of the members of this House to what the ANC's Mission in Exile is doing and what the UDF and COSATU are doing in harmony with it. I have drawn attention to the fact that Black politics is being corrupted by constituency-less leaders. The country as a consequence is witnessing an upward spiralling of violence and a necessity the Government finds of ruling only under a national state of emergency. It is in this total context of everything I have said that I am now looking at our support in principle for the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba constitutional proposals. On the 20th February this year, the Central Committee of Inkatha met and adopted the following resolution:

We the members of the Central Committee of Inkatha applaud our President, Dr. Mangosuthu G. Buthelezi, for the bold way in which he has explored every possible avenue of negotiation.

We hold him in the greatest esteem for the way in which he has constantly supported the leaders of Inkatha who each at their own level have been involved in the politics of negotiation.

WE THEREFORE RESOLVE:

1. To express our unanimous support for our President's stated intention of referring KwaZulu and Inkatha's support in principle for the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba constitutional proposals to the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly and to the Annual General Conference of Inkatha. -
2. To unanimously support our President's view that the politics of negotiation demand compromises from all those involved in negotiations and that when compromises are made on one side without there being accompanying compromises on the other side, the original compromises must be withdrawn until Compromise is met with compromise.
3. To establish a Work Group composed of members of Inkatha's Central Committee which will be charged with the responsibility of formulating a response to the rejection by Mr. Chris Heunis, the Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning, of the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba constitutional proposals and his rejection of the reality of there being a Black majority in South Africa. And to charge the Work Group to draw up their response after detailed and widespread

consultation with Inkatha's members, Inkatha leaders, Black opinion makers and the constituency leaders within and outside the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly.

:10

I nominated members of the Central Committee, some of whom are members of this Assembly, as members of the Work Group under the Chairmanship of the Honourable Dr. F. T. Mdlolose, and the following is the list of their names and terms of reference:

#### WORK GROUP Margins

INKosi S.H. Gumede

INKosi Biyela

Dr. D.R.B. Madide

Dr. F.T. Mdlalose

Mr. S.E. Sithebe

Mr. Musa Zondi

Prince G. Zulu

Mr. Eric Lucas

Mr. M. M. September

Mr. John Bhengu

Dr. B.s. Ngubane

Mr. S. Bhengu

Secretariat : Inkatha Office

His Excellency the President to appoint the Convenor from the above members.

#### TERMS OF REFERENCE

1. To undertake whatever investigation and/or assessment is necessary to enable the members of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly and Inkatha General Conference to engage in a constructive and informed debate on the wisdom or otherwise of KwaZulu's continued involvement in the JEA and of Inkatha's and KwaZulu's continued support of the Indaba proposals in the light of the rejection of the Indaba proposals by the Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning.

2. To interview any persons and/or groups that might contribute to the success of such investigation.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, the issue I am addressing is so very fundamental that I would not dare to act unilaterally as the President of KwaZulu or as the Chief Minister of KwaZulu. Inkatha as Inkatha will have to respond to the situation I am now addressing. The final response of Inkatha simply cannot be formulated anywhere other than at this year's Annual General Conference of Inkatha. Democracy places time restraints on leadership. I have a dual role in my political life. I am both the President of Inkatha and the Chief Minister of KwaZulu. This does not, however, mean that I have a divided role. Inkatha is in political terms the ruling Party in KwaZulu even -if in

constitutional terms Inkatha does not control the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly as Mr. Archie Gumede so erroneously stated was the case.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, I say it is prudent not to leap to act on our rejection of Mr. Heunis' press statement of 27th November 1987. It is however also not prudent for us in this House to hitch the whole of our political future to a KwaZulu/Natal Indaba star. It would be suicidal for us to subjugate this House to the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba. We are not in politics to sink or swim with the Indaba. The Indaba is an exploration in co-operation and if that co-operation does not work, then we must be free to experiment again until we end up in something that does work.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba constitutional proposals were arrived at after years of hard, work and negotiating. They were the final outcome of initiatives I mounted as far back as 1979 when I began the preliminary steps to set up the Buthelezi Commission. The Commission itself took something like two years to produce its findings. The Buthelezi Commission was followed by difficult negotiations with the then Natal Provincial Council which eventually led to the establishment of the Joint Executive Authority which is a constitutional reality today.

In everything we did from the early days of the Buthelezi Commission right through to our involvement in the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba, we pursued the kind of political and constitutional breakthroughs in this region of South Africa that would enable the people of this region to escape the tyranny of apartheid. Every step we took was related to the next step we were going to take. In a very real sense, the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba was a culminating step which made sense of what we were doing ever since we mounted the Buthelezi Commission initiative.

I make the point, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, that in reconsidering our support in principle for the constitutional proposals for the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba we must necessarily also have to reconsider our involvement in the Joint Executive Authority. We never became involved in this Authority as an end in itself. \_ We have always seen it as a first step towards establishing a Joint Legislative Authority. If the second step is not possible, the first step will be isolated in political history as nonsensical.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, this is one of those very important occasions on which I need a clearly articulated view of this House. It is vitally important that the issues I have raised in connection with the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba be thoroughly debated within the context of everything I have said in my policy speech. Mr. Speaker, I now ask for that debate.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, in the totality of the political mess in which we have to consider constitutional issues and life and death issues which affect the very future of the country, we have at the same time to deal with the betrayal of the true cause of liberation by some of this country's academics.

I have the profoundest respect for real scholarship and I regard our universities as the spawning ground for constructive innovation as this country grapples with the problems it faces. In our constant drive for racial reconciliation, we have always been deeply grateful for those Whites who have stood head and shoulders above their peers in grasping the realities of Africa around them and making their White liberal contribution to meaningful change. It is therefore for me all the more tragic that in more recent times, South Africa's White universities have also produced a crop of too-clever-by-half academics who dabble in esoteric politics with all the trappings of really being involved in the struggle for liberation. NUSAS was a forerunner to these academics in the early 1970's when Black students started telling White students that they wanted to go it alone in SASO. From this development onwards, more and more White academics have leant further and further over backwards in attempts to be blacker than Black in their perceptions. They did this usually by adopting some pseudo kind of Marxist orientation in which they regarded the struggle for liberation as being an ongoing conflict between workers and capital. For them the struggle for liberation was merely symptomatic of a deeper political process which made activists in the struggle for liberation mere puppets pulled by the strings of unfolding history in the outworking of some kind of political laws of the universe.

The book "An Appetite for Power: Buthelezi's Inkatha and South Africa" by Gerhard Mare and Georgina Hamilton climbs the very heights of analytical absurdity all in the name of the struggle for liberation. It claims to be a well-researched academic document and it is written as though it is a major work. In the book we find that the authors think that Inkatha is the cause of violence in Natal's townships; that the leaders of Inkatha are mostly officials of the 'KwaZulu bantustan' who are paid by the apartheid State and that Inkatha is involved in an unholy alliance with "political and economic forces which seek to prevent the radical transformation demanded by the main political and union movements." The book paints a picture in which Inkatha usurps "the status of the banned African National Congress, appropriating ANC colours, songs and language" and that Inkatha is led by myself is promoted "by conservative politicians in the West as a moderate anti-apartheid force."

In chapter 1 the authors lament my growing popularity with the media, the business community of South Africa, Western governments and so-called conservative reformers in South Africa. It argues



Q3

the thesis that I use the status of the Zulu royal family to achieve Zulu political hegemony over Natal and the rest of South Africa through Inkatha. The book states that I never played any significant role in the ANC League and that I never opposed the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951. The book denies the reality of Inkatha's million plus membership and it equates the Inkatha of today with the Inkatha organisation King Solomon founded in 1928. The book accuses me of deviating from the socialist approach propounded by Dr. Sibusiso Bengu when he was Secretary-General of Inkatha. Against these accusations, the book goes on to argue that Inkatha has clashed with virtually all organisations that oppose the system. It goes very far in stating that Inkatha is responsible for violence in townships and that Inkatha co-operates with the South African Police.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, when you look at these accusations against the background of what I have been saying in my policy speech you yet again see the extent to which the ANC's vicious propaganda is working out in surprising places. Far from being academics with independent minds pursuing scholarly analysis, Gerhard Marais and Georgina Hamilton have only applied their minds to give the ANC Mission in Exile's blatantly Party political propaganda a semblance of academic respectability.

In normal circumstances it would have been beneath my dignity even to comment on a book such as this which is pretentiously trying to be academic when it is no more than a pathetic re-statement of Party political propaganda. We do not live in normal circumstances. A battle for minds is raging in South Africa and we cannot ignore political poison which flows from the pens of so-called academics, nor can we simply throw it in the gutter because it is the gutter activists who are doing their best to destroy the hallowed values of the struggle. Violence is spiralling upwards and books like "An Appetite for Power" fan the flames of violence.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, I commend the Honourable Minister of Education, Dr. O.D. Dhlomo, for his very accomplished review of this book. He states:

"This recently published book can best be described as a compulsory political bible for the anti'Buthelezi forces and taboo for serious minded and objective researchers on the Inkatha Movement and South African politics in general.

The fact that the two authors make no attempt to conceal their pathological bias against Dr. Mangosuthu Buthelezi and Inkatha and their paternalistic and uncritical support for all that the UDF, ANC and COSATU stand for (presumably including indiscriminate

bombings and necklacing) reduces their allegedly 'well researched' book into a party political propaganda pamphlet."

After dealing with the book's content in some detail, the Honourable Dr. Dhlomo concludes:

"The book presents an openly biased assessment of Inkatha and the politics of Dr. Buthelezi. All sources that have been extensively quoted are written by authors who are 'equally biased. The one source that has been sparingly quoted (and seriously challenged by the two authors where it appears to be sympathetic towards Dr. Buthelezi) is Temkin's biography. In fact the authors do make a revealing admission of their bias on page 233 when they state: 'Temkin's biography of Buthelezi (1976) has been used rather reluctantly.' Quotations from Dr. Buthelezi's speeches and from other Inkatha spokesmen are lifted indiscriminately from the text, analysed and criticised out of context to fit in with the authors' preconceived thesis.

However, one moral weakness of the book is that the two authors never once interviewed their main character Dr. Buthelezi. They have instead relied on his statements (some of which were made in the early 1970's) without even bothering to check whether or not they are misrepresenting his official standpoint on a number of issues. One cannot escape the conclusion that the initial intention was in fact to misrepresent Dr. Buthelezi and Inkatha to ensure that they come out in the worst possible light. This fact will not be lost to discerning readers."

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, I again and again realise just how hideous apartheid really has been for so long when I see the effect of apartheid in academics like Gerhard Mare and Georgina Hamilton. It is as though apartheid is so hideous that even its proponents are contaminated by the poisonous values which have always pervaded it. It is as if one must call them the alternative academics now that we have the so-called alternative press.

It is interesting that this book is published with the assistance of the Catholic Institute abroad. I say this because we have also been at the receiving end of vicious attacks continuously from a newspaper which is published in this country by the Southern African Catholic Bishops' Conference called The New Nation. They want it to pass as a newspaper but it is in reality no more than a propaganda rag which promotes the ANC/UDF/COSATU alliance at the expense of Inkatha.

I regret the fact that steps have been taken against The New Nation because the kind of action taken against the The New Nation makes things worse for South Africa. It underscores the image of this

country as a totalitarian State. When I criticise The New Nation I am not approving of the action the Government has taken against it, nor do I approve in any way of the incarceration of the Editor of The New Nation Mr. Zwelakhe Sisulu, for so long without being charged before the Courts of our country. Long before Draconian laws were used against The New Nation I had decided to comment on The New Nation in my policy speech.

The New Nation is so very counter-productive that I had to deal with it. It is counter-productive in the search for Black national unity on which the whole struggle now tests. I cannot see how we can hope to achieve the Black unity which we are all craving for in the foreseeable future if the so-called alternative press does its damndest to portray Inkatha as the number one enemy of the people. We can indulge in all the formal blandishments of leaders seeking Black unity but for as long as The New Nation and The Weekly Mail write as they do write about Inkatha's leadership, it will have to be accepted that the fight which has already begun is going to be a fight to the finish.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, I am deeply saddened about Black disunity because it gives our oppressors the borrowed time they now so desperately seek in which to prolong our oppression. It is as though we are under some curse which condemns us into perpetuating our own oppression. The so-called alternative press, in the company of what one can now perhaps call "alternative academics" are the channels along which this curse enters the hearts and minds of people.

The contamination which The New Nation and some academics bring to South Africa's Black body politic is spreading. We are now witness to another Catholic Church newspaper called 'Umfrika' emerging to be a Zulu version of The New Nation. Together these Party propaganda rags are promoting the illusion that by villifying Inkatha and its leadership hard enough, Inkatha and its leaders will vanish into thin air.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, the complexity of the South African situation is virtually being compounded daily. While on the subject of the alternative press, so-called, I want to bring to the attention of Members of this House that Nasionale Pers is publishing what can only be called a Government-sponsored alternative press endeavour in publishing the City Press.

I find it hideously anomalous that the South African Government takes the action it has taken against The New Nation, whereas Cabinet Ministers and eminent Afrikaners have always sat on the Board of Nasionale Pers which publishes the City Press. The City Press has also conducted a vicious propaganda programme against

Inkatha's leaders. It has eulogised about Inkatha's enemies and in doing so it promotes UDF and COSATU developments.

I wonder sometimes just how many rank and file National Party members are aware that their opinion-makers are promoting the kind of vicious propaganda against the politics of negotiation in funding City Press as a failing commercial venture. It is actually costing money to maintain the City Press vendetta against Inkatha and the politics of negotiation. One can only at times shake one's head in disbelief and sadness at some of the dimensions of the South African problem.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, it is in this context of expressing total disbelief that I now turn to the November 1987 issue of 'World Marxist Review'. This Review publishes an article by Joe Slovo under the heading "Cracks in the Racist Power Bloc." In this article, Joe Slovo says:

1. "...It is clear that the iSouth Africanl situation hasl within it the seeds of a very sudden transformation."

2. "Although the process is not yet complete, signs have emerged in the last two and a half years that there is developing in our country a kind of nationwide crisis affecting both the exploiters and the exploited which, according to Lenin's classical formulation, sets the stage for a major social transformation."

He adds that two psychological barriers of "great importance have been permanently breached and these breaches have an impact on the struggle equation in our country." He says that the impotence the people felt for 350 years under colonial domination has been severely eroded and that the people are "now convinced that however long it may take, race rule can be destroyed."

He says that confidence in the permanent survival of race rule has been badly eroded and that there is the beginning of the political disintegration of the previous relatively monolithic racist power bloc.

He says "Apartheid and its inherited social framework has, in certain key sectors, begun to act as a break on the development of productive forces." He points out that South Africa is poised to move into a higher technological level of production and this process is hampered by the shortage of skilled and semi-skilled labour resources brought about by race barriers. He points out that "Growing numbers among the white middle class are becoming aware that, in the long run, a defence of the status quo is not feasible and will lead to sharper and more violent conflictu" He

sees ferment in White society being caused by the breakdown of apartheid. He sees a White South African dependency on the Western industrialised community of nations. In political terms he sees that "In the result, those among the bourgeoisie who are reform orientated have no mass political constituency and, for the moment, find themselves in a political wilderness. He says: "It has become abundantly clear in the recent period that the racist regime and its supporters no longer have the confidence that they can continue to rule in the old way."

In this article, Joe Slovo talks about a massive fermentation in Black society and adds that "But the crisis and ferment which we He then adds "An important group that falls into this category is made up of that sector of the bourgeoisie whose class interests are no longer served by old style apartheid. They seek the kind of transformations which go beyond the reform limits of the present regime but which will at the same time pre-empt the longer term objectives of the revolutionary forces." And then a sentence later he says "Despite these limitations, the reform orientated bourgeoisie cannot be regarded as part of the main enemy camp." He argues that "A serious revolutionary movement must work to broaden the base of opposition to the main enemy, implying ever widening varieties of opposition some of which may not be motivated by revolutionary intentions."

Against this kind of thinking, Joe Slovo then states: "The question is, however, continually posed whether a negotiated solution to the crisis is possible" and says:

starting point, many other questions can be tossed about including legislative provision to secure the rights of the individual, the safeguarding of the diverse cultural and linguistic heritage of the ethnic entities which make up our nation, and the precise shape of the democratic institutions which will replace the apartheid tyranny."

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, I want to pause here and observe that someone would be excused for making the mistake that in speaking in this way Joe Slovo was a member of Inkatha's Central Committee. He perceives the realities he perceives and it is these realities which give rise to our commitment to the politics of negotiation in the realisation that the disaffection with apartheid across race groups, including the White race group, makes political reconciliation a possibility.

Having written in a way that concedes that Inkatha's analysis of the South African situation has always pointed to vitally important factors in our South African society, Joe Slovo talks about "Puppet administrations in the so-called bantustan homelands." And then a little while later adds "The regime itself no longer believes that the bantustans (the fragmentation of the country into so-called independent ethnic homelands) can serve as a solution to the present crisis." Again a little while later he adds "The search for a middle force of the Muzorewa variety has so far met with little success. Buthelezi, the KwaZulu tribal chief, who was a possible candidate, has lost all credibility as a viable national leader because of his support for the regime on many vital issues." Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, 'Inkatha's political line in the realities of the South African situation have taught Joe Slovo a thing or two. He now concedes in major respects, Inkatha's thinking is based on the realities around us. He must,, however, continue with his Vicious vendetta against Inkatha. He can say that a wide variety of non-revolutionary organisations are important in the defeat of apartheid. When, however, it comes to Inkatha he exempts it from every analysis he makes and the uninformed are left wondering why.-

The key to the strange mental and political acrobatics of Joe Slovo are found in a series of his utterances in recent years.' For some time now he has been arguing for a two-phased approach to a final socialist victory in South Africa. He has stated what Inkatha's preconditions are for negotiations with the State President when he talked about negotiation and said "The bottom line for engaging. in serious negotiation must be an acceptance of the principle of majority rule (one person one vote) in one united democratic South Africa. Once this is accepted as a starting point many other questions can be tossed about including legislative provision to secure the rights of the individual, the safeguarding of the diverse cultural and linguistic heritage of the ethnic entities which make up our nation, and the precise shape of the democratic institutions which will replace the apartheid tyranny."

If this is Joe Slovo's bottom line and it is an Inkatha-originated bottom line because that is what it is, why does Joe Slovo regard Inkatha as beyond the pale never to be dealt with. The answer is simple, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members. Inkatha represents power and Joe Slovo only envisages the return of the ANC as a government returned from exile. It is under the ANC's wing that he sees a possible next phase of the struggle \_ the struggle to establish a truly communist State in South Africa. He must now ensure that all opposition to that development will be eradicated with the eradication of apartheid.

Joe Slovo is alien in his thoughts to the idiom of Black South African politics. He has not yet grasped the reality that the struggle in this country is about giving the ordinary Black man and

woman' the liberty to choose leaders and organisations which they want to follow. Joe Slovo is not interested in this liberty. He only wants the ANC to have the liberty to form a government under which he as head of the South African Communist Party can pursue a final victory over the people and, in the final analysis, over the ANC itself.

In this article he says "There are no differences between our Party and the ANC on the immediate objectives of achieving victory for the national democratic revolution, essentially a struggle to destroy racism and to build a united democratic South Africa based on the freedom charter. Nor do we differ on the immediate shape of post-apartheid South Africa. Our Party does not however hide its commitment to a socialist South Africa. Indeed, it concentrates a considerable part of its energies to spreading socialist perspectives and working class organisation. Nor do we hide our belief that the winning of democracy will facilitate an advance towards socialism."

There we have it, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, the South African Communist Party riding on the back of the ANC worming its way into enjoying power advantages which will facilitate its forward drive to establish a communist South Africa. The South African Communist Party is now so vehemently opposed to Inkatha because it knows that Inkatha is a vital force to keep a future South Africa a true multi-Party democracy. Joe Slovo does not want a multi-Party democracy.- He wants a one-Party ANC government to set the stage for a future one-Party communist government.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, the political crisis into which this country is now moving is a crisis of national historic proportions. There is a battle for minds raging and it is because there is so much at stake in the deep crisis we are experiencing that I have had to dwell at such length on many issues. At this time of deep national crisis I have said to Mr. Oliver Tambo that if he wants a fight he has got it. I say to Joe Slovo that if he wants a fight too then he has got it, and if he wants a fight to the finish, then he has got that too. Enough is enough. Black South Africa will trounce those who usurp their God-given right to form the multi-Party democracy that the Black South African struggle for liberation has always had as its primary objective.

Mr. Speaker, I now have to turn to yet another perennial issue with some considerable sense of distaste. I refer to Dr. Sibusiso M. Bhengu and his continuing vendetta against Inkatha. He continues to sit in the offices of the World Lutheran Federation in Geneva involved in what he calls research. He continues to produce anti-Inkatha propaganda and he was again at it addressing an International Young Men's Christian Association meeting on apartheid. In this address he took the line that capitalism is all evil and socialism is all virtue. He painted a picture of South Africa as a country in which apartheid was a form of Nazism and

made astounding statements such as "It must be remembered that Christianity came to Africa with some Nazi influence. If none of the missionaries could be identified as being Nazi, many of them were influenced by Nazi attitudes and thinking." This shows the kind of "research" that Dr. Bhengu is undertaking. The same "research" led him in this article to quote Cedric Mayson, whom he knows at one time befriended me, only to turn traitor to loyalty when he became contaminated with that White liberal syndrome of leaning over backwards to appear blacker than Black by articulating what a White frontline activist thinks Blacks are thinking and feeling. There is the so-called alternative press, there are the so-called alternative academics and there is the so-called alternative theologian as well. Anything that is eye-catchingly dramatically different is good enough to those who posture up-front with no constituency backing amongst the poorest of the poor for whom they talk with no consultation and no prospect of being censured for what they say.

Dr. Bhengu in saying that the behaviour of the South African Government proves that racism is used as a tool of economic exploitation quotes Cedric Mayson as saying "This is the clue to understanding the apparent ambiguity by which the South African authorities will permit some people to criticise them and not others. Andrew Young or the Reverend Leon Sullivan are allowed to visit South Africa even though they are black Americans who are strongly critical of apartheid, because they are promoting a version of black capitalism which is acceptable to the South African Government, which knows it can control and administer it. Chief Gatsha Buthelezi of KwaZulu and Chief Mangope of Bophuthatswana are given much licence in their criticism of apartheid because they accept the capitalist structure and are seeking a place in it; but boys are sent to jail for five or ten years for possessing T-shirts or literature which suggests a link with the ANC because the ANC advocates economic and political change."

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, the glib shallowness of this kind of language shows that Cedric Mayson and Dr. Bhengu who quotes him have no grasp of the vital realities of the South 'African situation. They have no grasp, Mr. Speaker, because they have no real involvement in the struggle. They both have to posture and utter for acclaim among the already converted. They were both dismal failures when it came to the hard, on the ground work of constituency-building and the development of deployable forces inside our country. They must both wander around in some kind of make-believe world in which they attempt to author realities to prove themselves correct.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members in December 1987 I had to deal with Dr. Bhengu in my Presidential Greetings to a Central Committee Meeting of Inkatha. Mr. Speaker, I need to update members on



developments in the ongoing saga of Dr. Bhengu's vitriolic opposition to Inkatha. In December I said:

"Racism is particularly hideous to me because I have suffered from racism. Blacks have suffered from inhuman exploitation and exploitation is particularly hideous to them. When Black turns to exploit Black by misusing positions of influence gained because of their Inkatha status, they are perceived as more hideous than anybody else. I make the pertinent observation -that so often in-fighting amongst an organisation's leadership rungs is not in-fighting about high principles but in-fighting about advantages in nest-feathering. As is my want, I am not today going to name people. I am simply going to ask whether you, my Comrades, see the extent to which Dr. Sibusiso Bhengu was fatally flawed by a desperate desire to feather his own nest. His venture into personal gain commenced from his position in Inkatha. It was I who sent him abroad to further his studies. It was I who elevated him to a leadership position in Black South Africa. But it is he who betrayed the trust I put in him and reneged on his Black manhood. If I had not elevated him who would have known that there was a Sibusiso Bhengu in this world! Just look at the clipping which I asked my Personal Assistant to photocopy for you.

Dr. Bhengu's latest outpouring of his anti-Inkatha poison as published in the New Nation of November 26th is unbelievably hideous. He postures as the architect of Inkatha and makes me the pathetic small boy of politics who reneged on the great Sibusiso Bhengu's important political role in life. Bhengu says that "At present, Inkatha is neither national nor is it working for liberation." He says that Inkatha was never intended to become a permanent part of KwaZulu. The poor man criticises Inkatha for its stand against disinvestment because, he says, the majority of Black people in South Africa have openly spoken in favour of sanctions. He claims that those who are against violence should be pro-sanctions. Bhengu challenges the claim that Inkatha has more than a million members and he parrot cries the claim that Inkatha's membership was swelled only because people need membership cards to attend school or to qualify for housing. He Claims that Inkatha is steadily losing ground and that we are engaged in a struggle for survival as the rank and file in Natal had increasingly turned from passive acceptance of the organisation into active opposition. He says that the violence in Pietermaritzburg is Inkatha's last attempt to re-assert itself. He says that Inkatha is South Africa's UNITA and that although at one time he thought that Inkatha would play the role of Rhodesia's Muzorewa, the reality was far worse. He says Inkatha is sponsored by the South African Government and could become a dangerous long-term destabilising force.

I have it on good authority that this same Dr. Bhengu who speaks so like a saintly political prophet out there in the Western world, was so lacking in African humanity that he refused to come home to bury his mother. He claimed that were he to put his foot in South Africa he would be arrested and cast into jail. This is the extent to which his delusions of political grandeur distorts his soul. He knows bloody well that were he come to South Africa he would not even be questioned as he crossed the border, or as he landed at Jan Smuts. He has been here quite a few times without being harassed by the Police. He is a political nobody and a charlatan whom I am quite sure even the South African Security Police sneer at in disdain. All he does is posture abroad about his importance at home while he luxuriates in Western affluence. For us as Africans what Bhengu has done in staying away from his mother's funeral is the ultimate in being dehumanised by his political ambitions. It is a negation of our Ubuntu-Botho ideal to stay away from the funeral of one's mother on the pretext that one fears arrest. Most of us would prefer arrest than miss any of our parent's funerals. Who does Dr. Bhengu imagine he is?

What went wrong with the man who now so debases himself in the knowledge that he betrayed the sacred by abandoning the struggle in the search for personal pre-eminence and monetary gain? Before greed took over and drove him to seek a high salary in a fast-living international set of globe-trotters, he was given the choice of remaining on in South Africa to become full-time Secretary-General of Inkatha or going overseas to further his own ambitions. He chose the latter and is damned by his choice to his everlasting shame. He now tries to escape that shame by making his act of betrayal a noble act in support of "the true struggle for liberation." I have dealt with this man Bhengu extensively in the past year. I did so again this year in my policy speech, to the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly. I do not have to go into the details again. The truth is irrelevant for him. The truth is irrelevant to those who splash what he says in the New Nation. The truth is irrelevant to those who spend their time destroying truth while they are clothed in the cloth, or bow and scrape to those who are.

It is a lie that when Bhengu was studying in Switzerland he met with the ANC's leadership and they instructed him to return home to establish Inkatha. It is a lie that he was a prime mover in the establishment of Inkatha. It is a lie that he parted company with me because he thought my views were becoming too conservative. He actually left South Africa grovelling to remain on as Inkatha's Secretary-General. He left South Africa after he had failed to get what he considered a plum job as Rector and Vice-Chancellor of the University of Zululand. The best he could get was the

position of Student Adviser, which was quite adequate for his experience and qualifications. He was not satisfied with that position and thought that he was better than the present Rector and Vice-Chancellor.

I am not saying this to villify him, he said so in so many words. Was Bhengu not aware that the University of Zululand was directly under Pretoria? When he received his salary as Principal of Dlangezwa High School was he not aware that he was the employee of the KwaZulu government which he now villifies? When he sought a loan to build his house at Esikhawini from the KwaZulu Finance and Investment Corporation was he not aware that KFC was the economic arm of the KwaZulu government. He desperately sought to further his own ambitions, feather xhis own nest, while at the same time retaining some kind of Inkatha importance. When he had finally to make the choice, he made the choice of gain for himself and abandoned those whom he now purports are being betrayed by me.

He could not come back to bury his poor mother because he dare not show his face of shame in our midst. He dare not come back to prove to the world that I am right and that he is a nobody who would be totally ignored as he went back and forth. He postures in Europe in political ignorance about the reality of the South African struggle. He now makes it his mission in life to politically prostitute himself at the drop of a hat, to anyone who is politically opposed to me and Inkatha. That is why his statement denigrating me and Inkatha is like political manna to "The New Nation" whose target is no longer apartheid, but whose target is now Inkatha and my leadership. Comrades, we must face the stark realities around us in this country while at the same time we face the stark realities of the Bhengu-type betrayals of the values our people are dying for in the streets of Pietermaritzburg townships and elsewhere. We must face the reality that the flaw of greed in the Bhengus of this world continues to grow in depth and width until it has opened the way for evil to enter hearts and souls. We must face the reality that this is human failure at its worst which began not with things people objected to, but with things that were a lot more in hidden danger than people ever saw. The path to greed and grandiose concepts of self is a path down an incline which is hardly noticeable at first but which eventually becomes so steep that you have to keep running ever faster or fall on your face.

Those who betray are bad enough but there is even a worse danger than those who do the betraying. That danger comes from those in our midst who give respectability to those who betray. We dare not turn a blind eye to the beginnings of future betrayals. We dare not condone those who seek worldly

riches at the expense of political integrity. We dare not pretend that we are not human and that we too are not subject to all the temptations that all mankind is subjected to. Ironically enough, the higher one's calling in life is, and the higher one climbs up the tree of success, the further you have to fall when you do fall. Comrades, let us be warned. We should be on the alert lest we find ourselves doing a Bhengu political somersault tomorrow, to the political glee of rags which posture as respectable newspapers and who give him the credibility he does not deserve, at our political expense. Inkatha being like a man on the mountain top who can see down both sides into two valleys. For God's sake hear me as I speak. Know that I do not cry wolf when there are no wolves. Know that the going will get tougher and that the ultimate test of Inkatha's resolution and its commitment to political decency as it serves the time-honoured values of the struggle for liberation, will be tested as it has never been tested before. Know that when I talk about the need to charter a course into 1988 in total unity of purpose and solidarity with each other, that I am talking about a very real need and I am talking about the urgent need to begin responding to the needs of 1988 as we meet this year at the close of 1987."

It is in the context of the ANC Mission in Exile's and the South African Communist Party's continuing onslaught against Inkatha because it is a powerful grass root organisation insisting on the liberty of the people to choose their leaders and their organisations, that Dr. Bhengu and others find the licence to make their kind of attacks on Inkatha and the KwaZulu Government. The sooner Black South Africa now finally deals with the ANC and the SACP and their working allies in the UDF and COSATU, the sooner all the hideous sniping and back-stabbing productive of so much Black disunity will cease.

The corruption of social institutions and the roles of people in them and the corruption of South Africa's institutionalised life, is also there in some Black trade union developments. As a Black leader I represent the aspirations of the masses. Inkatha itself being the largest Black political organisation ever to have emerged in the history of South Africa is representative of Black South Africa. It is therefore only natural that it is itself dominated by workers and peasants. These workers and peasants exercise their democratic power in Inkatha when its leadership is elected, when its priorities are being determined and when it adopts tactics and strategies.

It is therefore natural that I have led to represent the interest of workers. I have always championed Black trade union development and as circumstances change in South Africa, I see the importance

made effective. When, however, those structures turned to usurp the real power of the union at the factory floor level and at the industry level, then it is another matter altogether. In a sound trade union development, a federal body would undertake no action of its own and would only be brought into action by the collective interests of the individual units when they decided to do so. COSATU represents the exact opposite of this healthy process. COSATU lays down the laws for individual unions. It tells them what to do and not what to do and uses them as pawns in its own game. One has only to look at the amount of money that COSATU receives which it uses in its own programmes and never passes on to the grass root unions where the money 'really is needed.

It is COSATU which has usurped the rightful role of trade unions in South Africa and made the black trade union movement a highly suspect Party political force. Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, I constantly have strings of complaints by Inkatha members in unions affiliated to COSATU. We all know that COSATU is using its access to unions and shop floor stewards to politicise workers in a direction which has nothing to do with working for their labour-related interests or their interests as workers beyond the factory gate.

Mr. Speaker, -every Honourable Member of this House is a representative of Black communities in which workers or peasants dominate. This House has the interests of workers at heart and Mr. Speaker, I am sure I speak for everybody when I say bluntly that if COSATU -never came into being, there would never have been the SARMCOL strife and workers in the Howick region would today be better off than they now are. I say bluntly that the COSATU instigated SARMCOL strife was the forerunner to the hideous Pietermaritzburg violence which followed in the wake of employing brutal power for political purposes by COSATU in the Howick region.

COSATU betrays worker interests when it works with the UDF and the ANC Mission in Exile to set Black brother against Black brother in hideous violent conflicts. It betrays worker interests when it does its damndest to escalate violence until the hard-won democratic practice on the ground which has been won as a triumph over apartheid, is destroyed. COSATU heads a vicious onslaught against all workers who do not toady to their political demands to do whatever can be done to establish a future South Africa in which the life-giving free enterprise system will be destroyed.

I yet again say to the South African Government that it must unshackle Black democracy because it is only in an unshackled Black democracy that organisations like the UDF and COSATU just could not survive the people's right to be democratic and to choose the

leaders and organisations which they wish to follow. The unshackling of Black democracy would establish the kind of worker rights which workers want and which COSATU would not survive. The national state of emergency under which the Government rules is productive of the UDFs and the COSATUs of this world. In this very real political sense, COSATU'S activities are a product of apartheid.

I said at the end of my Policy Speech last year, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, that we were in for a tough year, and I say this year we are in for an even tougher year yet. All reality works to destroy the false euphoria that the South African Government was already on the run and that there was only a short final push to the kind of victory which the ANC Mission in Exile is wanting. Mr. Speaker, Honourable Members, this year's KwaZulu Legislative Assembly session will have to grapple with the realities which this euphoria denied and in our work during this Session, we will have to carry the additional burdens which celebrity leaders and self-appointed leaders impose on South Africa.