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VOICE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN COMMUNIST PARTY

BEWARE THE TRAPS AHEAD!

The situation is full of promise for a major advance. But it is also full of traps. And the key question facing all of us is how to guide the advance without falling into the traps.

In general, there are two extreme positions which spell danger for the future of our struggle. The one is to maintain that nothing has really changed. This would close our minds to certain tactical readjustments needed to build on the victories already scored. The other is to exaggerate the meaning of the changes. This could lead to an abandonment or toning down of those aspects of our strategy which made those victories possible and which will lay the basis for the ultimate victory.

The need, therefore, to reflect on the relationship between our strategy and tactics in our developing situation has never been greater. It calls for both flexibility and adherence to principle.

It is plain that the regime's tactical approach has shifted. It is responding to mounting internal struggle and external pressure and its failure to contain and reverse the people's militancy. There is, however, no doubt that, in all essential respects, De Klerk's shift is designed to continue old policies by other means. **But merely to say this is not enough.** In order to assess the significance of the shift for our own tactical approaches, we need to go further.


Firstly, the fact that the regime is forced to change course creates certain new conditions of struggle which cannot be ignored. Events have already shown that the 'new means' have also opened new space for advance.

Secondly, we should not judge the effect of an enemy's initiatives solely by its intentions. History has shown over and over again that the objective results of an action often turn out to be the very opposite of what was intended.

In short, it is, above all, our responses which will play the key role in determining whether De Klerk's tactical readjustment will result in holding back or advancing our cause. We must undoubtedly make full use of whatever new space has opened up. But in doing so we must not be trapped into positions which will play into the regime's hands.

What are the main danger areas, and how do we avoid them?

- We must frustrate the regime's intention to trap us into substituting 'legal' protest politics for active resistance, defiance and armed challenge. These terrains of struggle must be pursued with mounting vigour; they must not be treated as alternatives
- A new relationship is clearly beginning to emerge between legal and illegal work. But this should not tempt us to overlook the borderline between the two. **The style of our legal work must make it less easy for the regime to 'justify' going back to its previous positions.** At the same time, we must use the space won and even expand it without burning our strategic boats. Legal and illegal work are both separate and inter-connected terrains of



THE CONFERENCE FOR A DEMOCRATIC FUTURE

The defiant mass struggles of the past months have now created even more favourable conditions for building the broadest anti-apartheid coalition. The Conference for a Democratic Future (CDF) in December must mark another important step forward in this process.

But there have been debates and even tensions at times about whom to include in the coalition. These problems have often been caused by a failure to understand the nature of a broad anti-apartheid coalition. Such a broad coalition of necessity includes many different forces. Many will have their own separate agendas. **But what is essential is that they should all be united, not just in words, but actively in practice on a common anti-apartheid platform.**

The fundamental objective of the anti-apartheid coalition is to strengthen the democratic forces and to weaken the enemy to the maximum. This is done by:

- Mobilising the widest range of oppressed and democratic South Africans.
- Winning over from the regime a sizeable section of its own mass base.
- Deepening the divisions within the ruling class.

To realise these objectives, the front needs to be as broad as possible. Non-participation in government structures is an important but not decisive criterion. After all, we cannot ignore what has been happening before our very eyes in the last period.

White town councillors, mayors and parliamentarians have participated actively in legal and even illegal mass defiance campaigns and marches. Some bantustan leaders are now taking far-reaching practical steps to express their solidarity with the liberation movement. At such a time, the abstract likes and dislikes of certain small activist circles cannot be the basis for deciding which forces should be included in or excluded from the Conference for a Democratic Future. At the same time we, of course, have to draw a line when it comes to those demagogues who have no track record in the liberation struggle and who merely want to jump on to the band wagon for personal power gains.

A conference like the CDF can be an important focus and motivation for a broad coalition. But the anti-apartheid coalition is not a one-off event. It is a process. And, as a process, it may also have different characteristics at different times and in different places.

The building of a broad anti-apartheid front at a local level is often misunderstood. There is sometimes a tendency simply to copy what happened nationally. This does not mean that the only broad front anti-apartheid task within a particular township or black campus is to echo the national arrangement. For instance, a formal alliance between a Sansco branch and half a dozen black consciousness student activists does not, in itself, make a very significant campus-level anti-apartheid coalition. A much more meaningful campus coalition should embrace Sansco, campus workers, teaching and administrative staff, sporting and cultural groups, and — yes — also the local BC activists.

Finally, it is essential that the CDF has a mass character. To be successful, it cannot simply be an agreement at the top between national executives. And here those formations with a real mass base (Cosatu and UDF affiliates in particular) have a special responsibility. They must act as a real leading force within the coalition. They must not just advance the specific interests of their members, but also act resolutely for the achievement of the common aims.

Above all, Cosatu and UDF affiliates must ensure that the objectives of the Conference for a Democratic Future are democratically debated and actively implemented right down through their ranks, to the smallest branch on the ground.

CDF'S SEVEN UNIFYING PERSPECTIVES

- One person, one vote in a united democratic country.
- The lifting of the State of Emergency.
- Unconditional release of all political prisoners.
- Unbanning of all political organisations.
- Freedom of association and expression.
- Press freedom.
- Living wage for all.



WOMEN INSIDE THE MOVEMENT

THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN

Let's be honest, when it comes to sexism we still have a lot to correct within our own ranks. This includes the ranks of the Party, the ANC and the Mass Democratic Movement.

Surely every woman in the struggle has experienced situations where she is kept out. Why? ... Simply because she is a woman. These are situations where she could have made an effective contribution. There are many areas where this happens.

In political discussion women are often excluded. When they are present, their contributions tend not to be taken seriously. Male comrades yawn, intervene, change the subject, or nod patronisingly with ears shut. Male comrades who would fiercely deny sexism are guilty of such behaviour. When it comes to deployment in political work, how often are women simply forgotten, while a desperate search is made among a few available male comrades? Of course, when it comes to service or administrative work it is a different story. Then comrades only look among women.

It is usually only a fierce battle on the part of individual women comrades that enables them to escape the problem. There is often a high cost to this individual struggle. Women raising issues of sexism are dismissed as 'Western feminists'. Women fear this label because it is used to suggest you are 'politically unreliable'.

Many women themselves become the victims of these attitudes. Sexism can have exactly the same effects as racism. How many racially oppressed people, without realising it, begin wrongly to regard their situation as somehow their own fault?

So it is with women. They start to be undermined by an uneasy feeling that perhaps they are not really capable of serious, difficult, responsible or demanding tasks.

Unwelcome physical approaches are often made to women without condemnation or discipline being used against the male offenders. Behaviour, like undermining sexist jokes, is often simply ignored in our ranks.

It's not enough just to profess a progressive and revolutionary outlook and to have Lenin and socialism on our lips, if, when it comes to women, chauvinism inspires our practice.



Women's Organisations

As organised women we have for a long time accepted a service role in the struggle. We have cake and jumble sales. We make banners, do catering, organise crèches and make other practical contributions. These tasks can be important in themselves, and they can serve to draw the mass of women into organisational structures.

But do we regularly and seriously question the relative absence of women in leadership and other responsible struggle positions? Do we always look for a more direct or combative role for our organisations around issues which are at the root of our sufferings?

Women have courageously played a key role at times of mass uprising in our country. But women's organisations seem to step aside when the planning, strategising or tactical work is done. We need to balance our activities more if we are both to draw the mass of women into active struggle, and also allow our organisations to realise their full revolutionary potential.

Women's organisation is essential. But it runs the risk of comrades generally feeling they can ignore women's issues because there is a separate structure to deal with them. Only by women being an active and vital force in all aspects of the struggle can we avoid this danger. We have to learn not to be afraid of raising women's issues in the Party, in the People's Army, in the ANC, in the trade unions, and wherever women are.

Involving the greater number of women actively in the struggle, enabling women to reach their full revolutionary potential — this is not merely a question of morality. It is primarily a political question.

Women, more than half the population, suffer some of the worst effects of apartheid colonialism. Our success in unleashing their fullest potential now will affect the speed with which we obtain our victory. And it will affect the degree to which we are able to eliminate oppression and exploitation in the future.

FIGHT FOR WOMEN'S RIGHTS!

differentiated programme depending on the political understanding and maturity of the comrades concerned. Every member should undergo a course of basic political training.'

A serious deficiency in our educational programme is that there is no authority responsible for political education. We should set up a Department of Political Education whose functions should include:

- a. Appointment and monitoring in every region of political officer;
- b. The drafting and implementation of a syllabus of political education and ensuring fulfilment;
- c. The preparation of such material as may be found useful for conducting political classes.

The syllabus of political education should include:

- The history of our country, with focus on the struggle of our people against the colonisers. The Wars of Resistance must form the basis of this.
- The history of the liberation struggle and the policy development of our Movement, e.g., how the different constitutions of the ANC have developed, the Freedom Charter, the question of seizure of power, methods of armed struggle, the dismantling of the racist state and the leading role of the working class.
- The relationship between the ANC, SACP, etc.
- The current resistance movement — Youth, Students, Workers, Women.
- The history of the trade union movement in South Africa, its importance and role.
- Liberation policies and programmes (SACTU, SACP, etc.)
- Theory of revolution. This is to be taught in such a way that comrades do not only regurgitate the theory, but apply it to the concrete South African situation and to the specific tasks assigned them.
- The South African state and political economy.
- The ideological and theoretical understanding of the relationship between the concept of national liberation, class struggle and the emancipation of women.
- Experience of other revolutions.

To ensure the successful fulfilment of the programme on political education, the commission recommends that:

- Cadres liable for selection as political instructors should be committed for a minimum of two years.
- Every region must have a circulating library which must contain relevant literature and works that would supplement the political education cadres receive. Steps should be taken to develop the reading of progressive literature. This can only be achieved through the creation of reading groups.
- A comprehensive list of reading material must accompany the political programme. Special attention must be paid to material from inside the country and to the experience of other revolutionary struggles.
- Teaching aids such as films, videos, tape-recorders and projectors must be procured for such study groups.
- The use of documentary films, especially from socialist

countries, must be encouraged.

- Films produced at home must be made part of our education programme, and not only viewed as entertainment films.

Recommendations for

Political and Ideological Work in the Army

1. Ideological work constitutes an essential factor in creating the nucleus of a people's army which will be ready at all times and under all circumstances to fight for and defend the gains of our revolution.

In the words of our President C. R. Tambo, 'In building up our political army we aim therefore not only at the overthrow of the fascist regime, we aim at building up a politically conscious and revolutionary army, conscious of its popular origin, unwavering in its democratic functions and guided by our revolutionary organisation.'

We recommend that the Movement implement in full the principle of political guidance and leadership over the army to ensure strict control and accountability through the relevant structures of our army.

2. The Commissariat, in conjunction with the Department of Political Education, must ensure through its organs, continuous, uninterrupted political work within the ranks of the army. It must work on a comprehensive programme of training and education of political activists in our army, viz. commissars, instructors, propagandists, etc. Emphasis in this should be put on producing field workers at grassroots level. In this regard short term political courses should be introduced, based on our own experience as an army and as a Movement. Opportunities offered by fraternal countries abroad should be fully utilised in this regard.

Veterans and stalwarts of our Movement should be fully utilised for the purpose of conducting short courses, lectures, seminars, etc., for selected cadres and the membership of our army in general.

To ensure that our political programmes meet the demand of producing the required cadre, the problems of political literature and training facilities must be solved decisively. In this regard a proper mechanism should be worked out to supply the army with the required literature, particularly literature from the home front.

- There is a need to establish an effective and dynamic link between the rear and the front.

- We must pay particular attention to the all-round improvement of the material, cultural, and spiritual well-being of the soldiers especially in the camps. We should solve the problem of how to combine the improvement of the material, cultural and spiritual life of a soldier with the strengthening of his or her political conviction.

subjective tasks.

What is demanded is a vision of how power is to be seized and a plan for the building of the forces and means to carry out this task. This vision and this plan must be clearly understood by all activists, at home and abroad, within the terms of their tasks and responsibilities so that all have a clear and common understanding of their own role within the machinery of struggle.

Central to the creation of the subjective factor is Umkhonto we Sizwe. For to achieve our goal — the seizure of political power through our strategy of revolutionary armed struggle — it is necessary to create a Revolutionary Army.

The main obstacles on the way to power are the SA Defence Force and SA Police. These obstacles can only be defeated or removed through a Revolutionary Army. At present MK is only the nucleus of such an army. It has to be extended and developed to embrace all potential revolutionary forces.

3. THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMY

A Revolutionary Army must be composed and structured in such a way that it can be situated among the masses. The problem facing us is that the bulk of our army is recruited, trained and stationed outside the country. We face considerable problems in the infiltration and rooting of our combatants inside the country. The enemy understands this and his security forces work overtime to prevent this from occurring. For once we succeed in basing our forces within the country the armed struggle will merge with the mass struggle and this will really spell the end of white supremacy.

An ex-Rhodesian farmer who has settled in the northern Transvaal border area said that our land mines, whilst creating a nuisance, would not really change the situation because we simply run in and out of the country. What caused the problem in Zimbabwe was that the 'terrorists' were living among the people. And one might add that until the Zimbabwean guerrillas learnt how to live among the people their struggle remained in the doldrums as they engaged in hit-and-run raids into and out of their country.

My contention is that a clear conception of what the Revolutionary Army could and should be will help solve this problem.

Clearly the Revolutionary Army is the armed force of the revolution. But we should not see it as a single uniform organ. It should consist of three component parts.

Firstly there are the **Organised Advanced Detachments** — the nucleus of the Revolutionary Army;

Secondly, the **Revolutionary Armed People** — who are the most active elements within the mass struggle who in time swell the ranks of the Revolutionary Army;

Thirdly, there are the elements of the **Army and Police** which are won over to the side of the revolution.

It is essential to identify each of these components and have an organisational plan as to how to recruit them, prepare and train them, and bring them into the Revolutionary Army. Each of these components represents a different level of political and combat readiness and they require different

forms of organisational work.

(i) The Organised Advanced Detachments

This is the nucleus of the Revolutionary Army, the base or core around which the Revolutionary Army will build. The trained, full-time combatants of MK are at the core. But they have different specialisations and are grouped into combat units of various types and specialisations. (a) *Guerrilla units of the countryside* — whose mode of operation will depend on the terrain. They will link up with the villagers and farm labourers.

(b) *Underground combat groups of the urban areas* based in the factories, townships, residential areas and other workplaces. They may be combat groups, sabotage units, elimination squads, those who are not full-time MK combatants and who 'work by day and operate by night' (and this is preferable).

(c) *Self-defence units* — based in the factories, townships and rural areas. These have already begun to emerge out of necessity. The popular democratic organisations have been forced to defend themselves, their leaders, their homes, offices and meetings from the enemy forces. Self-defence units can be organised by legal or semi-legal organisations, as well as the underground, and form the basis of a people's self-defence militia. Trained MK cadres must merge into these self-defence units and lead them.

Creating the Advanced Detachments is the first necessary step to building the Revolutionary Army. For over 25 years we have concentrated on building one element of this core — MK. This has been done under extremely difficult and problematic conditions and has been a tremendous achievement which should not be belittled. Conditions have now developed which give us the possibilities of extending MK into the Advanced Detachments spelt out above. The example of the emergence of the self-defence units illustrates this point.

By creating underground combat groups in the townships, and especially the factories; by developing the self-defence units in towns and villages; and by basing small units amongst the rural people we will begin to recruit combatants inside the country, amongst the workers, the women, the rural people and the youth, and overcome the most problematic consequences of having been based externally for so many years. We will lose our dependence on having to recruit only those who are prepared to leave the country for training. By being locally based we will also considerably restrict the enemy's possibilities of infiltrating our ranks.

The development of the Organised Advanced Detachments, from their MK base, will enable us to root the armed struggle amongst our people within our country. This will enable us to arm our people and realistically prepare and plan for the armed seizure of power.

(ii) The Revolutionary Armed People

These are the most conscious, active elements from amongst the masses who have shown their readiness to confront the enemy with whatever means are at hand, from stones to petrol

struggle. A clumsy collapse of the one into the other will do damage to both.

- As yet, De Klerk is doing little more than experimenting with new safety valves to take the steam out of the militancy which the old methods failed to dampen. We need to prepare ourselves organisationally to meet a possible backlash and resist being lulled into pure 'legalism'. **The consolidation and strengthening of the underground and the spread of grassroots people's organisation remains top priority.**
- We have never rejected the possibility of meaningful negotiation. But it is political suicide to spread the illusion that this could come about through anything short of intensified struggle and pressure on all fronts. A key tactic in the regime's attempts to demobilise our people is to present De Klerk as a leader who has both the will and the capacity, in the long run, to 'dismantle apartheid'. We must be on the alert to frustrate this deception in everything we say and do.
- The recent outstanding gains in the international arena, including the widespread acceptance of the ANC-sponsored negotiating concept, must be consolidated and expanded. In particular, we must actively thwart pressures from Pretoria's allies, and even isolated tendencies among some of our friends, which objectively encourage the idea of 'peace at any price'. It is, of course, important to counter the enemy-fed slanders that we are unreasonable and wild in the pursuit of our objectives. But in doing so we should not put at risk our standing among our people as militants and revolutionaries.

If a time ever arrives when the regime is ready to genuinely negotiate the process of moving to democracy as understood by the whole civilised world, it will come as a wonderful surprise. And if the preconditions for talks are met, a dialogue about the process may become possible. Until then there can be no retreat from our policy of mounting even greater pressures on all fronts of struggle, internal and external, legal and illegal.

There is nothing in the present situation which justifies a departure from the perspective of a seizure of power. We must skilfully use the new space which De Klerk has been forced to concede to advance this perspective.



- We stand four-square behind the immediate objectives of the National Democratic Revolution. This will bring about a multi-party, non-racist democracy based on one person one vote, a mixed economy and constitutional safeguards for the social, cultural, linguistic and religious rights of all individuals. The struggle to achieve this calls for the broadest coalition of all class and democratic forces who support these aims and who are not hostile to the ANC and the Mass Democratic Movement. We must also be on our guard against the pseudo-revolutionaries who attempt to narrow the base of such a coalition. At the same time the working class and its political and mass organisations must maintain their independence and vigorously spread their ultimate perspective of socialism.

MAYIBUYE FEATURE

It is nearly a full year since the banning of the Cape Town Anti-apartheid Conference. Over this period, in Workers' Summits, in the field of sport and health, among teachers and other forces, the idea of broad anti-apartheid unity is taking concrete shape. Defections from the ruling bloc - by youth, students, professionals and others - has grown apace.

On the other hand, faced with the deepening crisis of apartheid, the regime continues to rely on brute force to maintain itself in power. At the same time, it desperately seeks to present a "new and reasonable" face and form around itself an "acceptable apartheid coalition"

In this regard, the decision of the MDM to reconvene the Anti-apartheid Conference could not have been more appropriate.

The experience we have gained since last September will certainly enrich our efforts as we move closer to a national Anti-apartheid Coalition. Many debates have taken place and continue to rage. Among workers, soccer bodies, teachers and others, the process has not been easy. But everything points in one direction: **that there is more common ground among anti-apartheid fighters than what might divide them.**

Prospective Participants

As we approach the Conference, we have to ensure the involvement of all the prospective participants in working out plans, setting up Conference structures, thrashing out the agenda, and so on. Further, the Conference comes at a time of great upheavals. The campaign to defy unjust laws, opposition to the labour law, support for the people of Namibia - all these and others require joint actions and a clear allocation of responsibilities among the anti-apartheid forces.

In other words, preparation for the Conference should manifest itself in active struggle and be guided by thorough-going democracy. An in-

consistent and half-hearted approach to the principle of consultation can only lead to suspicion among potential allies. Failure to make all forces view the initiative as their own also leads to indifference among the less-motivated forces. Supportive as these forces may be, they might not engage in active struggle, awaiting "directives" from the "organisers".

It is in active struggle and through democratic practices that the leading forces and their organisations shall win their status as such. Herein lies the challenge of the assertion in the COSATU Congress resolution, that "...COSATU and the UDF are to play a leading role in such a coalition...". What does this mean in actual practice?

The initiative to convene the Anti-apartheid Conference as part of the process towards the broad Coalition was taken by the Mass Democratic Movement - COSATU and UDF in particular. By realising the objective need for anti-apartheid united action and translating it into practice, the MDM captured the imagination of all forces opposed to the regime. It asserted itself as the leading mass force in the resistance against apartheid.

To gain the status of leader, an organisation should have, under its command, the most decisive mass forces. It should commit these forces to action and be seen to be dealing the common enemy telling blows. Its programmes, strategy and tactics should define viable alternatives to the apartheid system, and mechanisms of achieving them. In relating to allies and potential allies, it must do so with an open mind and listen to constructive proposals of others. It should educate its members and close its

ranks around a given policy approach.

The common platform of a coalition is adopted because it advances the interests of its constituent parts. Different forces within the coalition will certainly have common as well as conflicting agendas. The role of a leading force consists not only in advancing the interests of its members, but also in acting resolutely for the attainment of the common objective.

In so far as the other concerns of its allies are not antagonistic to its own, a leading force should promote and defend them. For instance, while not undermining their own struggles, workers should promote the grievances of black business-people who are also victims of apartheid; for their unfettered right to operate where they choose. Not believing in religion does not mean that one should not advance the interests of believers to worship unrestricted by apartheid laws and regulations.



Delegates at the present conference announce

TOW ANTI-APART



...inch of the Conference for a Democratic Future

RDS THE ID COALITION

On the whole, the MDM has asserted itself as mass leader of the broad anti-apartheid forces. Its standpoint occupies the central position in the political agenda of South African society as a whole. But the challenge of the COSATU Congress resolution lies in the realisation that the status of leader cannot be assumed. It must be perfected all the time.

Again, the issue of the array of forces to take part in the Conference and the Coalition has emerged as one area of debate and even tensions. In the complex task of searching for answers to this question, we have to consider the fundamental need to:

- * reach out to and mobilise all the motive forces of the revolution;
- * minimise conflict among democratic and socialist forces;
- * wrest from the regime a sizeable portion of its mass base; and
- * widen the rift within the ruling class.

Basing ourselves on the moral superiority of our cause, and the cold

reality of strategic and tactical demands, we need to pursue all these objectives with vigour. The criteria we adopt for acceptance to Conference should not be formulated on the basis of the likes and dislikes of given organisations. The fundamental question is whether a particular tactical and strategic approach will advance the struggle!

The practical guide should certainly be the Conference/Coalition basic demands. Such a platform should be reinforced with the necessary organisational principles and mechanisms to achieve the common objective. Declarations against apartheid, on their own, are certainly not enough. They have to be backed by concrete actions.

Participation or non-participation in government structures is an important but not decisive criterion. The central question here is the track record of a given organisation within the bantustan or parliamentary structures: does it operate in such a manner as to undermine them and does it co-ordinate its actions with the MDM and other anti-apartheid forces? Such an organisation should be so committed that, if the general anti-apartheid approach at a given moment is for withdrawal from such enemy structures, it would act accordingly.

While striving to win over as many forces as possible, the democratic movement should certainly be wary of those who try to run with the hares and hunt with the hounds. Among such forces are elements of big business who want to make the best of both worlds by condemning apartheid and being seen to hobnob with the MDM, while bolstering apartheid, including its repressive and aggressive machineries. They dutifully avoid and even oppose anti-apartheid actions.

But this does not mean that we differ with all such forces on everything. There might be a set of issues - such as the release of political pris-

oners and communal peace in Natal - on which we are at one. On these specific questions, we should encourage joint actions, or even actions in one direction but as 'parallel' or separate formations.

Therefore, the Coalition we seek to create cannot be seen as a rigid bloc with definite colours. There will be shades of grey as it tapers towards and beyond its perimeters. It will have a series of concentric circles with an inner core and outer layers. Rigid formulas will weaken our thrust; while broad guidelines will allow for flexibility, including redefinition of the Coalition boundaries if and when the need so arises.

At regional and local levels, the Coalition will certainly have its variations: in terms of affiliates, campaigns and structures. The manner in which we relate to the white Democratic Party in the Transvaal and in the Western Cape might differ. In Natal, for example, we have to consider how to transform the peace process into a pro-active anti-apartheid movement.

Central Objective

Similarly, our definition of the platform and character of alliances should be principled but also avoid being frozen in time. Characterising a particular relationship as short-term, should not inhibit discussion and even agreement on post-apartheid Constitutional Guidelines. On the other hand, campaigning for the creation of a climate for negotiations (See article on Page 6) should not be seen as raising this issue to the level of absolute principle for all time and under all circumstances.

The central objective of all our actions should be to strengthen our forces, weaken those of the enemy and, in action, effect the transfer of power to the people.

**UNITE AGAINST
APARTHEID!**