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HOW BRITAIN FUELS THE APARTHEID WAR MACHINE

A report on Britain's role in supplying oil
to South Africa

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30p

Foreword

This report examines how Britain is involved in supplying oil to South Africa. It was only when studying it that I became aware of just how important a role Britain is playing in fuelling the apartheid economy and its war machine.

This is no normal case of collaboration. Here we are dealing with a situation in which Britain is involved in undermining the action taken by the great majority of oil-exporting countries. It is reminiscent of the conspiracy that kept the oil flowing to the Smith regime in Rhodesia.

I trust this report will be read and studied and the implications drawn from it. It is clear to me that unless the Government acts to stop all British involvement in the supply of oil to South Africa there is a real prospect that retaliatory action may be taken either against Britain or British companies - or both.

I am sure that there will be particular concern about any possibility of North Sea oil going to South Africa, either directly or indirectly. It is not enough for the British Government to give assurances that no North Sea oil has gone directly to South Africa. It must be made an offence to supply North Sea oil to South Africa and all "swap arrangements" should be banned.

I was amazed to discover that the Government cannot stop South African controlled companies from obtaining a stake in North Sea oil. The plans of the Anglo-American group to obtain such a stake must be stopped and measures taken to stop any South African controlled companies from becoming involved in the North Sea in any way.

The major priority must be to secure the imposition of a mandatory United Nations oil embargo. I trust that this report will alert the public to the urgent need for action. The first Anti-Apartheid Movement publication on this subject, "Shell and BP in South Africa", was released in March, 1977. Within a few weeks the Bingham Enquiry was established. Is it too much to hope that this report will prompt the Government into action?

Robert Hughes MP
Chairman, Anti-Apartheid Movement

How Britain Fuels the Apartheid War Machine

**A report by the Anti-Apartheid Movement on
Britain's role in supplying oil to South Africa**

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Britain's role in the supply of oil to South Africa has usually been seen mainly in relation to its Permanent Membership of the United Nations Security Council, where through the use of the veto it has been repeatedly able to protect South Africa from international action.

This report shows that Britain's role goes far beyond merely its protection of South Africa at the United Nations. Britain is playing a central role in ensuring that South Africa continues to be supplied with oil. In particular:

- * Shell and BP, two British based oil companies control approximately 40% of the South African market
- * at least 55 tankers, either flying the British flag or owned, managed or chartered by British companies docked in South African ports during the period January 1979 to March 1980
- * Britain is responsible for the external relations of Brunei, the only country now openly supplying oil to South Africa
- * two swap arrangements have involved North Sea oil and South Africa; now Charter Consolidated, part of the Anglo-American group, is negotiating with BP for a stake in North Sea oil.

In the face of growing anger in African and Third World countries at South African aggression and most recently South Africa's sabotaging of the UN Geneva Conference on Namibia, support for the imposition of a mandatory oil embargo by the United Nations Security Council is gathering momentum. In December, 1980, when the UN General Assembly debated a resolution calling upon the Security Council to implement such an embargo only seven countries voted negatively⁴ (see Appendix One).

Oil and South Africa

South Africa's oil industry is shrouded in secrecy. No official statistics are published and a law introduced in June 1979 makes it a serious criminal offence to publish information on "the source, manufacture, transportation, destination, storage, quality or stock level of any petroleum products acquired or manufactured for or in the Republic"⁵. This alone is testimony enough to the strategic importance the South African authorities attach to oil. The oil companies themselves equally recognise its role in fuelling the apartheid war machine. One company, Mobil, received legal advice from its South African solicitors that "as oil is absolutely vital to enable the army to move, the navy to sail and the airforce to fly, it is likely that a South African court would hold that it falls within . . . the definition of munitions of war".⁶

Introduction

During the first quarter of 1981 there was a dramatic escalation in South Africa's aggression against the neighbouring African Front-line states. A major invasion of Southern Angola by South African forces in mid-January was followed by the South African commando raid against ANC residences in Maputo, Mozambique, on January 30th. These and other actions by the South African military forces led Zimbabwe's Prime Minister, Robert Mugabe, to warn that South Africa's aggressive activities "encompass the whole of the front-line region, from the Indian Ocean to the Atlantic Ocean".

These acts of aggression are but manifestations of South Africa's rapid military and nuclear build-up, which has been accompanied by the complete militarisation of South African society. South Africa's military expenditure per annum has grown dramatically - from R40 million at the time of the Sharpeville massacre in 1960 to R1,972 million for the period 1979-1980¹. Today this war machine is the most powerful on the entire African continent.

South Africa's apartheid war machine consumes huge quantities of oil. Each year an estimated 75 super-tankers dock in the South African ports of Durban and Cape Town to off-load crude oil². Without these supplies both South Africa's defence forces and its economy would grind to a halt. South Africa has no exploitable oil deposits and its only indigenous sources are the small quantities from the SASOL oil-from-coal plants.

The United Nations Security Council has unanimously determined that the supply of arms and related materials to South Africa is a threat to international peace and security³. But oil, a vital strategic commodity, is not covered by this embargo and efforts to extend the arms embargo to cover oil have been blocked by the three western permanent members of the UN Security Council (the USA, France and the UK); significantly these are the home-bases of the five major oil companies operating in South Africa.

However, all OPEC members impose an embargo on oil exports to South Africa. Most other oil exporting countries also embargo oil sales to South Africa or have a policy of not selling to South Africa. Only one oil exporting country, Brunei, openly admits to supplying South Africa.

Shell and British Petroleum

The Anti-Apartheid Movement/Haslemere joint publication Shell and BP in South Africa, by Martin Bailey, describes in detail the activities of the various Shell and BP subsidiaries¹¹. The two main affiliates are Shell Southern Africa and BP Southern Africa, both of which are wholly owned by their parent companies. They jointly hold Shell and BP South Africa Petroleum Refineries, which owns the Durban Shell/BP refinery. The output of this refinery accounts for approximately 40% of the South African market.

The publication of Shell and BP in South Africa in March 1977 predated the fall of the Shah of Iran. It has been estimated that prior to the Iranian revolution 90% of South Africa's oil imports came from Iran¹². In February 1979 the Iranian authorities imposed an oil embargo against South Africa. Thus, while prior to 1979 Shell and BP had little difficulty in finding sources of crude oil for their Durban refinery, the story is very different today. Shell and BP's subsidiaries are having to search very hard to find the supplies of crude oil to keep their refinery running at the level necessary to maintain their percentage of the South African market.

There are basically four sources for Shell and BP:

- (1) supplies could come from the handful of relatively small oil exporting countries which do not embargo South Africa (such as Brunei);
- (2) supplies could come illegally or illegitimately from countries which officially embargo South Africa;
- (3) supplies could come from countries which have policy guidelines excluding direct oil sales to South Africa (e.g. the UK or Norway), but which do not have a legally enforceable embargo;
- (4) supplies could be purchased from intermediaries who disguise the original source of the oil without the knowledge of the oil exporting country.

Oil Tankers to South Africa, published in March 1981 by the Amsterdam based Shipping Research Bureau, the first comprehensive survey of the traffic of oil tankers in and out of South African ports covering the period January 1979 to March 1980, provides some insight into South Africa's sources of oil¹³. Shell and BP both figure prominently in this report. Out of 23 tankers considered most likely to have delivered crude oil when they called at South African ports, in 12 cases Shell was the Manager, Owner/Manager or Charterer. In two cases it was BP.¹⁴ However, not all these deliveries would be destined for the Shell-BP refinery, for as explained

Five transnational oil corporations have major holdings in South Africa and between them account for 85% of the oil market. They are:

* SHELL

A joint UK/Netherlands company

* BRITISH PETROLEUM

A UK company in which the UK government has a 25% holding

* MOBIL

A US company

* CALTEX

A company jointly owned by two US corporations, Texaco and Standard Oil of California

* TOTAL

A French company in which the French government has a substantial holding.

South Africa has four refineries. Two are in Durban (the joint Shell/BP refinery and the Mobil refinery), one is in Cape Town (the Caltex refinery), and NATREF, the National Petroleum Refinery, in which the parastatal SASOL and TOTAL each has a stake, is inland near Johannesburg and connected by pipeline to Durban.

It has been estimated that oil provides only about 25% of South Africa's primary energy needs⁸. Coal is by far the most important source of energy. Massive reserves means that coal, unlike oil, is not vulnerable to international action and cheap African labour makes it economically viable. In addition to energy from coal burning South Africa has sought to develop oil-from-coal in particular, as a further means of reducing its dependency on imported oil. The first oil-from-coal plant was opened in 1955. The programme was expanded as pressure for an oil embargo mounted. SASOL II and SASOL III are due to go operational by the mid-1980s. But in June 1980 guerillas of the South African liberation movement, the African National Congress, struck at the plants, together with the NATREF refinery, causing millions of pounds worth of damage. It is not known how much oil is currently produced from these plants. But even when they are fully operational they will only provide 95,000 barrels a day (b/d). South Africa's oil requirements are estimated to be at least 240,000 (b/d).

This shows South Africa's vulnerability to an effective international oil embargo. Such an embargo would have an immediate effect and it has been calculated that its theoretical survival period would be a maximum of 2.7 years¹⁰.

A number of matters are clear. Britain's two major oil companies, Shell and BP, are directly involved in marketing up to 40% of South Africa's crude oil requirements. In this process there is evidence that tankers owned or on charter to them have transported oil from states which embargo sales of their oil to South Africa. Is the world witnessing a repeat performance of the oil conspiracy which sustained the Smith regime in power in Rhodesia?

British Tankers

Tracking the routes of tankers sailing into Durban and Cape Town provides the simplest means of discovering possible sources of South Africa's crude oil. But the tankers themselves are also a vital part of the chain of collaboration. The Shipping Research Bureau identifies 150 tankers known to have sailed to South Africa during 1979, and the first quarter of 1980. The report also identifies the owner, manager and charterer (where appropriate) of these tankers. This information reveals that Britain is playing a central role. Of the 150 tankers 55 were linked with Britain. Furthermore:

- * UK companies managed the largest number of tankers (31 out of 150);
- * UK companies chartered the second largest number of tankers (14 out of 70);
- * UK companies owned the third largest number of tankers (24 out of 150);
- * the UK ranked third in the list of tankers by flag (16 out of 150).

In addition to tankers with a direct British link 9 were tankers managed or managed and owned by companies based in the Crown Colony of Hong Kong.²¹

It should be explained that the Manager is the company which truly manages the ship, technically and commercially. The owner is the genuine and ultimate owner. The tanker carries the flag of the country in which it is registered. A charterer is a company which reaches an agreement with the manager of the tanker to transport a certain cargo.

Since it is the manager or charterer who plays the most direct role this only serves to emphasise the central role of Britain in transporting oil to South Africa. A list of the tankers flying the UK flag and/or owned, managed or chartered by British companies is found in Appendix Two²².

below Shell International Petroleum has a long-term contract to supply crude oil from Brunei for the NATREF refinery and five of the cases involving Shell were of tankers sailing from Brunei to South Africa¹⁵.

The sources of crude oil for the Shell-BP refinery remains highly classified information. However, in February 1981 the Observer newspaper reported that Shell owned super-tankers had apparently shipped crude oil from the Omani port of Mina al Fahal to Durban¹⁶. The report gave details of five journeys involving four different tankers - the Litiopa, the Mytilus, the Latirus and the Macoma. This is evidence of Shell directly supplying crude oil from a country which imposes the embargo.

The Shipping Research Bureau report confirms the three of these voyages which took place during the period covered by the report¹⁷. It also discloses that the 216,796 ton Energy Evolution, flying the Liberian flag and under the management of the Hong Kong based Island Navigation Corporation was in fact under charter to BP. On February 6th, 1979, it arrived in Durban from Dubai in the United Arab Emirates. After a short stay, long enough to off-load a cargo of crude oil, it set sail straight back to Dubai. The only logical explanation for the voyage was that the Energy Evolution was transporting oil from the United Arab Emirates to South Africa. The UAE, an OPEC and OAPEC member, embargoes all sales to South Africa.¹⁸

These few tanker voyages would have provided only a fraction of the requirements of the Shell-BP refinery. Here there is prima facie evidence that embargoed oil has been supplied to South Africa. They may be exceptions, but more probably they are the tip of the iceberg. Moreover, it is difficult to believe that the South African subsidiaries are acting independently of their parent companies. In the case of BP this was confirmed in correspondence to the AAM which stated:

"There is nothing improper or illegal in supplying oil to customers of subsidiary companies in South Africa at present, providing one observes the restrictions imposed by oil producing countries on the ultimate destination of their oil".¹⁹

This statement should be considered in the context set by BP's former chairman who, during a visit to South Africa in March 1974 was quoted as saying that oil companies had "intentionally set out to thwart Arab attempts at enforcing embargoes on countries like South Africa"²⁰.

Shell may well take advantage of this situation to increase sales of Brunei crude oil to South Africa. It is difficult to believe that Shell does not have considerable influence in Brunei, since oil, petroleum and gas exports account for well over 99% of the Brunei export revenue.²⁷ Shell may well be in a position to influence the situation, so that if progress is achieved in effectively enforcing the embargo internationally then the percentage of Brunei oil to South Africa can be increased: it could ensure that existing contracts are honoured through some form of swap arrangement. Since it has been estimated that Brunei's oil exports to South Africa account for only about 7% of its total exports there is clearly a basis for such concern²⁸.

North Sea Oil

Britain does not embargo the supply of oil to South Africa. However, British Government guidelines restrict the direct sales of North Sea oil to EEC countries, members of the International Energy Authority and a small number of additional states, but not including South Africa. Government Ministers have given assurances that no North Sea oil has been sold directly to South Africa.²⁹

However, on two separate occasions Government permission has been granted for oil companies operating in the North Sea to enter into swap arrangements involving South Africa.³⁰ The most widely publicised was the arrangement disclosed in June 1979 whereby CONOCO was supplied by BP oil from the North Sea in return for CONOCO supplying BP's South African subsidiary.

Apart from these swap arrangements Government officials have admitted that the existing guidelines provide no guarantee that North Sea oil is not reaching South Africa indirectly. The Government refuses to introduce measures to make direct or indirect sales illegal.

The recent case of the Jane Stove, a tanker which was loaded with crude oil from the Norwegian sector of the North Sea which had been brought on shore at Teeside illustrates this problem. Norway's guidelines exclude the sale of oil from the Norwegian sector of the North Sea to South Africa. However, it required a leak to the press and prompt government action to halt a tanker which was off the South African coast when it was turned back under pressure from the Norwegian Government. There is no reason why similar cases could not occur with North Sea oil from the UK sector. It highlighted the ease with which current guidelines can be ignored.³¹

The mere visit of a tanker to Cape Town or Durban does not prove that the vessel unloaded crude oil. The Shipping Research Bureau, having traced the voyages of all the 150 tankers listed 23 tankers considered most likely to have delivered oil when they called at South Africa. (This does not mean that the other tankers did not deliver oil. These 23 only account for approximately 25% of the tankers which delivered oil during this period. It is simply that in the other cases one cannot assume that they delivered oil.)

Again, Britain's central role is confirmed. Of the 23 tankers, 14 were owned, managed or chartered by British companies. The principal company in 12 cases was Shell, and in two cases BP. Hong Kong companies were involved in five cases.²³

Given the central role Britain is playing in transporting oil to South Africa the enactment of legislation by the British Government to prohibit tankers flying the UK flag, or owned, managed or chartered by British companies from delivering oil to South Africa would greatly facilitate the enforcement of the oil embargo.

Brunei and Oil to South Africa

Brunei appears to be the only country which openly admits to supplying oil to South Africa. The only oil company operating in Brunei is Brunei Shell Petroleum Co. Ltd. Total exports of crude oil and petroleum products from Brunei, according to the latest available figures (for 1978) amounted to Brunei \$2,784 million²⁴. It has been reported that Shell International Petroleum supplies approximately 25,000 barrels per day of crude oil from Brunei to SASOL for the NATREF refinery²⁵. Movement of oil from Brunei to South Africa is confirmed by the Shipping Research Bureau report which gives details of five tanker sailings, three on charter to Shell and two owned by Shell, which are in the category "considered most likely to have delivered oil when they called at South Africa"²⁶.

Brunei is immune to international pressure. Although it is internally self-governing the United Kingdom is responsible for its external affairs. This means that representations cannot be made directly by the OAU, UN etc., to the Brunei administration. They have to be made through the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London. It would seem that as long as the British Government continues to oppose an oil embargo against South Africa international pressure on the Brunei administration is unlikely to be effective.

Britain is therefore not only aiding and collaboration with South Africa, but undermining the action taken by and sacrifices made by other states. The British Government's stated policy, if one is to judge by the Prime Minister's own words, is that it believes that there is a chance "to make progress towards the ending of the isolation of South Africa in world affairs". It is putting this into practice by undermining the oil embargo. Should Britain choose to continue to pursue such policies it should not be surprised if retaliatory action is taken against the companies involved, or Britain itself.

It will require determined campaigning to challenge both the policy of the British Government and to expose the role of Shell and BP. But it is clear that this is what is required and what the people of Namibia and South Africa expect.

In particular, the Anti-Apartheid Movement calls for:

- * the British Government to support the imposition of a United Nations mandatory oil embargo against South Africa, and the necessary international measures to secure the supplies of neighbouring independent states;
- * action by the British Government to make it illegal to supply North Sea oil to South Africa;
- * British Government measures to prevent South African and South African controlled companies from obtaining a stake in North Sea oil;
- * British Government action to prohibit UK companies and their subsidiaries from importing oil into South Africa or refining or marketing oil in South Africa, and the withdrawal of Shell and BP from South Africa;
- * legislation to make it illegal for tankers flying the UK flag, or owned, managed or chartered by UK companies to transport crude oil to South Africa;
- * action by the British Government to ensure that similar measures are taken by the Brunei authorities.

A further issue of concern arises from the efforts of South African controlled companies to gain a stake in North Sea oil. As part of BP's take-over of the mining finance house Selection Trust BP agreed to open negotiations with Charter Consolidated, one of the Anglo-American group of companies, for a stake in the North Sea.³² Government Ministers have indicated that they have no powers to prevent this or other South African companies buying into consortia operating in the North Sea.³³

Anglo-American, it will be recalled, were directly involved in the Rhodesia sanctions-busting operation through their subsidiary Freight Services, which acted as the intermediary between the South African and Rhodesian subsidiaries of the oil giants. Anglo-American is actively securing oil interests in the USA, Canada, the Phillipines and Indonesia.³⁴ If this deal goes ahead it will be surprising should Anglo-American not take advantage of its direct involvement in the North Sea to seek ways to ensure that North Sea oil flows to South Africa.

Conclusion

When the Shah fled from Iran South Africa lost a crucial ally. Iran had provided apparently secure supplies of crude oil for the apartheid economy and its war machine. It has been estimated that oil from Iran accounted for at least 90% of South Africa's requirements. Suddenly these supplies were cut off.

South Africa has survived this dramatic action thanks to a handful of collaborators, and this report provides concrete evidence that it is British which has played a central role. Two British companies, Shell and BP, dominate South Africa's oil market. It is tankers which are owned, managed, or chartered by British companies which have transported much of the oil to South Africa (including in a number of cases oil from countries which embargo their oil to South Africa). When South Africa is short of oil the British Government approves swap arrangements involving North Sea oil. And now there are plans for the Anglo-American group to obtain a stake in North Sea oil. At the same time Britain blocks effective international measures to stop the fuelling of apartheid, especially through the use of its United Nations Security Council veto.

- (26) "Oil Tankers to South Africa", op. cit., p.4
- (27) Brunei Chamber of Commerce Journal, 1980, p.7
- (28) "Oil Sanctions: South Africa's Weak Link", op. cit., p.12
- (29) Information provided at a meeting of Department of Energy and Foreign Office Ministers with the Anti-Apartheid Movement, February 26th, 1981
- (30) Ibid
- (31) The Guardian, London, 19th/20th January, 1981
- (32) The Guardian, London, July 8th, 1980 and "BP's Oil Deal with South Africa", Anti-Apartheid Movement, London, September, 1980
- (33) Information provided at a meeting of Department of Energy and Foreign Office Ministers with the Anti-Apartheid Movement, February 26th, 1981
- (34) "BP's Oil Deal with South Africa", op. cit., p.2

Suggested Further Reading

- "Shell and BP in South Africa", by Martin Bailey, a joint Anti-Apartheid Movement/Haslemere Group publication, (Second Edition 1978).
- "British Petroleum's Oil Deal with South Africa", Anti-Apartheid Movement, September, 1980
- "Oil Sanctions against South Africa", by Martin Bailey and Bernard Rivers, UN Notes and Documents 12/78, June 1978
- "Oil Sanctions: South Africa's Weak Link", by Martin Bailey, UN Notes and Documents 15/80, April 1980
- "Fuelling Apartheid", by the African National Congress of South Africa, UN Notes and Documents 13/80, April 1980
- "Oil Tankers to South Africa", Shipping Research Bureau, Amsterdam, 1981
- "Oil Supplies to South Africa: The Role of Tankers Connected with the Netherlands and the Netherlands Antilles", Shipping Research Bureau, Amsterdam, 1981

References

- (1) "The Apartheid War Machine", International Defence and Aid Fund, London, 1980, p. 10
- (2) "Oil Tankers to South Africa", Shipping Research Bureau, Amsterdam, 1981
- (3) UN Security Council Resolution 418, November 4th, 1977
- (4) UN General Assembly Resolution 35/206/D, December 16th, 1980
(The seven countries voting against this resolution were - Belgium, Canada, France, FRG, Luxembourg, UK, USA).
- (5) Financial Times, London, June 23rd, 1979
- (6) Extract from legal opinion by Hayman Godfrey and Sanderson (Johannesburg) for Mobil, July 14th, 1976
- (7) "Oil Sanctions against South Africa", Martin Bailey and Bernard Rivers, United Nations Centre against Apartheid Notes and Documents, No. 2/78, June 1978, p.40
- (8) "Oil Sanctions: South Africa's Weak Link", Martin Bailey, United Nations Centre against Apartheid Notes and Documents No. 15/80, April 1980, p.1
- (9) "Fuelling Apartheid", African National Congress of South Africa, United Nations Centre against Apartheid Notes and Documents No. 13/80, April 1980, p.12
- (10) "Oil Sanctions: South Africa's Weak Link", op. cit., p.12
- (11) "Shell and BP in South Africa", Martin Bailey, Anti-Apartheid Movement/Haslemere Group (Second Edition), London, April 1978
- (12) "Oil Sanctions: South Africa's Weak Link", op. cit., p.3
- (13) "Oil Tankers to South Africa", op. cit.
- (14) Ibid p.28
- (15) "Oil Supplies to South Africa: The Role of Tankers Connected with the Netherlands and the Netherlands Antilles", Shipping Research Bureau, Amsterdam, 1981, p.4
- (16) Observer, London, February 22nd, 1981
- (17) "Oil Tankers to South Africa", op. cit., p.66
- (18) Ibid, p.44
- (19) Correspondence to AAM, January 15th, 1981
- (20) Rand Daily Mail, Johannesburg, March 5th, 1974
- (21) "Oil Tankers to South Africa", op. cit.
- (22) Ibid, pp 69-70
- (23) Ibid, p.28
- (24) Brunei Chamber of Commerce Journal, 1980, p.7
- (25) "Oil Sanctions: South Africa's Weak Link", op. cit., p.19

(h) Ban on the participation of corporations and individuals within their jurisdiction in the oil industry in South Africa, including exploration, storage, refining, transport and distribution;

5. Requests and authorises the Special Committee against Apartheid to continue its efforts, including the undertaking of missions, the holding of seminars and the publication of studies, in co-operation with the Organisation of African Unity, to enhance and intensify world-wide support for an effective oil embargo against South Africa;
6. Invites Governments, international and non-governmental organisations, trade unions and other appropriate bodies to lend their full support to the oil embargo against South Africa.

Vote: 123 in favour, 7 against and 13 abstentions

Appendix One

United Nations General Assembly Resolution number 35/206 D, adopted on December 16th, 1980

Oil Embargo against South Africa

The General Assembly,

Recalling and reaffirming its resolution 34/93 F of 12 December 1979,

Having considered the reports of the Special Committee against Apartheid, /

Taking note of the report of the International Seminar on an Oil Embargo against South Africa, 2/

Convinced that an embargo on the supply of petroleum, petroleum products and other strategic materials is an essential complement to the arms embargo against South Africa,

Reiterating the urgent need for the imposition of a mandatory oil embargo against South Africa under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Commends all Governments which have imposed an oil embargo against South Africa and have taken effective measures to implement the embargo;
2. Reaffirms its conviction that a comprehensive and mandatory embargo on the supply of petroleum, petroleum products and other strategic materials is an important measure in international action for the total eradication of apartheid;
3. Again requests the Security Council to consider urgently a mandatory embargo on the supply of petroleum and petroleum products to South Africa under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations;
4. Urges States to take effective legislation and other measures to ensure the implementation of such an oil embargo against South Africa as well as embargoes already imposed by states, individually or collectively, including the following:
 - (a) Enactment and enforcement of "end-users" agreements to stop the supply of oil to South Africa directly or through third parties;
 - (b) Prohibition of transport to South Africa of all crude oil or oil products, wherever they originate;
 - (c) Action against companies or individuals who supply or transport crude oil or oil products to South Africa;
 - (d) Seizure of tankers owned by their nationals or registered in their countries which are used to transport oil or oil products to South Africa;
 - (e) Prohibition of all assistance to South Africa - through finance, technology, equipment or personnel - in the construction of oil-from-coal plants;
 - (f) Prohibition of the importation of oil-from-coal technology from South Africa;
 - (g) Prevention of the efforts of South African corporate interests to maintain or expand their holdings in oil companies or properties outside South Africa;

Tanker

Tanker linked with UK by means of:
of:

Name	Line Number in Table A	FLAG	MANAGER	OWNER	CHARTERER	SAILED FROM THIS COUNTRY TO SOUTH AFRICA
Laconica	70			*		
"	71			*		
Latirus	72			*		
Latona	73			*		
Lima	76	*	*	*		
* Limatula	77	*	*	*		
Liparus	78	*	*	*		
Litiopa	79	*	*	*		
* "	80	*	*	*		
London Glory	81	*	*	*		
Lottia	82			*		
Mobil Kestrel	90					*
Mobil Magnolia	91		*			
Mobil Marketer	92		*			
Mobil Petroleum	93		*			
Myrtea	98			*		
Mytilus	99			*		
* "	100			*		
* "	101			*		
Nai Mario Perrone	105					*
Nordic Clansman	110	*	*	*		
Nordic Sky	111	*		*		
Norheim	112					*
Norse Queen	113				*	
Norvegia Team	116	*	*	*		
* Olympic Archer	120				*	
* Philippine Star	123			*		
* Polyscandia	125				*	
* Salem	129				*	
Satucket	132	*	*			
Texaco Africa	137		*			
Texaco Copenhagen	138	*	*			
Texaco Denmark	139	*	*			
Texaco Ireland	140		*			
Texaco South America	141		*			
World Princess	150				*	
TOTAL	59	16	31	24	14	6

Note

This table is adapted from Table B in "Oil Tankers to South Africa", published by the Shipping Research Bureau, Amsterdam, pp 69-70.

* Where an asterisk appears to the left of tankers named above it indicates that they are amongst those considered by the Shipping Research Bureau report "most likely to have delivered crude oil to South Africa".

* The column above headed "Line Number in Table A" refers to Table A in the same report which provides further details on the tankers listed here.

Appendix Two

Tankers calling at Durban or Cape Town
January 1st, 1979 to March 31st, 1980

United Kingdom

Tanker		Tanker linked with UK by means of:				
Name	Line Number in Table A	FLAG	MANAGER	OWNER	CHARTERER	SAILED FROM THIS COUNTRY TO SOUTH AFRICA
Al-Ain	1		*			
Al Funtas	2		*			*
* Alva Sea	6	*	*	*	*	
" "	7	*	*	*	*	
Antclizo	10		*			
Archontas	12		*			
* Berge Brioni	14				*	
Berge Septimus	15				*	
* " "	16				*	
" "	17				*	
Brazilian Peace	26		*			
British Promise	30	*	*	**		*
Burmah Endeavour	31	*	*			
Cast Gull	34		*	*		
Chaumont	38			*		
Dalma	45		*			
"	46		*			
* Energy Evolution	48				*	
* Energy Progress	49				*	
* " "	50				*	
Erviken	53					*
Globtik Saturn	58		*			
I.D. Sinclair	63		*			