

s 4 -

We

rejected

power sharing

in this form even before we went

to CODESA I. We went to CODESA

II hoping that we would

emerge

from

there

with enough

agreement

to

enable

us to

proceed

directly

to the

establishment

of

an interim

government

of

national

unity.

This

would

culminate

in

the

free

and

democratic

election

of

a constituent

assembly

to

draft

a

constitution

for a

non-racial

and democratic

South

Africa.

Once again we ran into

power sharing.

We

proposed to

CODESA

II

that, in

the

constitutionâ\200\224making

process, decisions on issues

of fundamental importance

should

be taken on

the basis of

a minimum

strength of a

two~thirds

majority. We

further preposed that

the distribution of

seats

in

the

constitutionâ\200\224making

body

should

be

based

on

proportional

representation.

We remain

convinced that this,

rather than the

simple majority and winnerâ\200\224take~all system

of

distributing seats, as

used in the past,

would ensure a broad

enough

base of support for the resultant constitution. This is

essential for a stable democracy.

The

National

Party counterâ\200\224proposed

that

the

constitution*

making

body should

take decisions by the

most unusually high

majority

of seventy~five per

cent. This

flew in the

face of

all known precedent. It was far in excess of the

twoâ\200\224thirds

majority to

which

the
regime had
agreed
in the
comparable
situation
of
Namibia.

It
was
also
a
radical
departure

from the fiftyâ\200\224one per cent majority that the regime
had successfully insisted upon, in similar situations, in itâ\200\231s

-3...

Apartheid

has

always

been

rejected

by

the

overwhelming

majority.

Their struggle has made it politically, economically

and structurally unworkable. Though

it remains in place, it is

terminally

ill.

It

has

become

the

most

costly

all~ronnd

liability to our country.

There is sufficient

consensus that

apartheid

must go.

This, however,

has, evidently

not

yet

translated into

a workable

consensus that

apartheid must

be

relieved off

itâ\200\231s death pangs and consigned to final rest. The

National Party

still has to be brought into the near consensus

that apartheid must give way to the

creation of a united, non~

racial,

nonâ\200\224sexist and democratic

South Africa.

The National

Party must abandon it's dubious

power sharing

schemes.

' Power Sharing

â\200\235

is based of

the strange assumption

that

the

people

of

South Africa

are

a

tormented

aggregate

of

incompatible ethnic

and

racial minorities.

In it's

original

form, it postulates that

a future

South Africa should have

a
two-tiered parliament
with the second
chamber serving as
the
forum for
the representation of
minority or group
interests.
It
also
postulates
that
seats
in
this
chamber
shall
be.
distributed equally among
all parties without regard to
their
real
electoral strength.
It proposes
suggests that decisions
of the first
chamber should
be subjected
to ratification
by
the second chamber before
they can
take effect. It goes on
to
suggest

that all

decision~making shall

be

by consensus.

In

practical

terms,

this

means

that

any

dissenting

putative

minority can prevent the majority from making decisions.

-2...

We

still want

to

believe

that a

peaceful

solution to

the

conflict in

our country

stands the

best chance of

enduring,

provided it is

just and democratic.

We remain

convinced that

the situation in our

country is

ripe enough to allow

serious

negotiations to take

place. However, we are

not wedded to the

idea of

talking for

the sake of

talking.

It was from

this

perspective

that we

decided

to

engage the

ruling
National
Party and other political organisations in talks.
Yes,
we have
since decided
to suspend
our
participation in
these
talks,
but
our
perspective
has
not
changed.
Our
decision
was shaped by
our determination
to remain
true to
the
letter
and
spirit
of
the
Harare
Declaration
of
the
Organisation of African Unity and the
United Nations Consensus

Declaration
on Apartheid.
The fundamental
principles and the
broad guidelines contained
in these two documents continue
to
provide the essential
basis for an
internationally acceptable
solution to the conflict in South Africa.

In
more
specific
terms,
our
decision
reflects
our
unwillingness to accept
stratagems such as
power
sharing
under whose guise the
minority National
Party seeks to go
on
clinging to
power,
regardless of
it's political
strength. It
also signals
our unwillingness
to go
on talking

to a
party
that continues to use
it's illicit
state power to promote
or
condone violence.

-5...
racist
parliamentary
past. Obviously
the National
Party was
seeking to
arm the
minority with the constitutional
power to
veto
the will of
the majority.
It clearly wanted
the future
constitution
to
ensure
that
the
minority
National
Party
continues to
wield effective power
in a post~apartheid
South
Africa.
This
is an
arrangement
which was
as certain
to be
rejected
by the majority as we could

not have accepted it. It
is a
prescription for the still~birth
for the very
democracy
we have been struggling for.
There
is
also
the problem
of
the
mounting violence
which
proponents
of
apartheid
continue
to
promote
in
order
to
obstruct
progress.
Evidence
culled
from
the
press,
the
hearings of the
Goldstone oommision and other sources,
points
to rightwing elements in the regime's

security establishment ~

especially

military

intelligence,

as

the

source

of

this

violence.

Recently released reports of the Amnesty

International and the

International Commission

of Jurists,

both lay

the blame

for

this

violence at

the

feet

of the

Pretoria

regime and

the

Inkatha Freedom Party.

The regimeâ\200\231s continues to reject evidence of

the complicity of

itâ\200\231s security forces

in this violence. It

goes on refusing to

take action against these elements. It persists

in refusing to

cooperate with the people

in order

to bring this violence

to

an early end. This continues to strength suspicions that it

* a_;

agreement. This, in turn, will make it that much more
difficult
to
govern
the
country
in
the
future. The
international
community
must
help
exert
all
necessary
pressure
on
the
Pretoria regime so
that the search for
a peaceful solution to
the South African
conflict can be put back
on track before it
is too late.
Meanwhile,
we the people of
South Africa still
have a lot of
struggle
ahead of
us. We
intend to
use every

means
at our
disposal to wage that
struggle to
final victory. This is
the
least we can do to
vindicate and honour the sacrifices
of our
martyrs
and heroes.
Besides, our
gratitude to the
people of
Ghana, of Africa
and the international community must
consist
of no less than a truly liberated South Africa.

- 3 -

has a

secret agenda which thrives

on this violence.

This is

consistent with it's refusal to surrender power.

Our

recent

National

Policy

Conference,

reaffirmed

our

committment

to the

search for

a

negotiated solution

to the

South

African conflict.

It

decided

that we

must

launch

a

rolling Campaign of Peaceful Mass Actions to:-

(a)

impress

a

greater

all-round sense

of

urgency

to

the
search
for
a
peaceful solution
to
the South
African
conflict;
(b)
help bring the violence to a speedy and decisive end;
(0)
to protest and campaign
against the illegitimacy, chronic
corruption and
scandalâ\200\224ridden conduct
and structures
of
the Pretoria regime;
(d)
to
mobilise
and
prepare
the
people
to
be
ready
to
participate
effectively in the electoral process when the
time comes.
The
regime has

since sought to
create a climate
of fear and
hysteria around
our campaign. It's
hope is that the resultant
tensions will flare
up into violence.
It's private
army, the
South
Africa
Defense Force,
has called
up its
reserves and.
conspicuously placed them
on alert at strategic points
around
the country.
The purpose of this
move is to flex the
muscle
of the state and to inflame passions.
The regime also goes on
claiming, in the same breath, that
it is our campaign that
is
likely to provoke further violence.

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r -

Mr

Vice Chancellor;

Members

of

the University

Council

and

Senate;

Members of

the faculty,

staff,

workers and

student.

body; In the

name of the

ANC I greet you

all most

warmly. I

also want to thank you

very sincerely for turning out in

such

large numbers to

hear about South Africa.

It is indeed always

an honour for me
to come face
to face with the
daughters and
sons of Kwame Nkrumah.

I
shall
talk
directlyâ\200\235
to
the
issue
that, I
suspect,
is
uppermost in
your minds, right now. I
shall do so fully aware
that, to talk about the final
item in the agenda for
Africaâ\200\231s
political
liberation is
to honour
the
illustrious memory
of
Kwame Nkrumah.

It
was the
ANC which
initiated the
process that led
to the
creation

of
the
Convention for
a
Democratic
South
Africa
(CODESA). It
is within
this structure
that
the majority
of
South
African political
formations
made
the first
serious
attempt
at
talking
to
one
another.
The
hope
was
that,
together, we
could work
out a common
future satisfactory
to
most if not all of our people.
We have not lost that hope.

Our campaign was
launched peacefully throughout the country
on
the 16th of June.

It has, up to now,
not been sullied
by any
incidents
of violence. However,
this did not deter the regime
from its sinister agenda.

Despite advanced
warning, from the
residents of Boipatong
to
the police,
that inmates of the nearby Kwa Madala
Hostel were
planning
to
attack
them,
the
police
took
no
pre~emptive
action.

On the night
of the
same day, the
17th of June, the
attack took
place without
police hinderance.

It resulted
in
the loss of the lives of close to fifty
innocent residents of
Boipatong.
Many more
were left gravely injured.
Mouthpieces
of
the regime were
predictably quick
to claim that
our mass
action campaign had provoked the attack.
Not surprisingly, the
people themselves vividly absolved the ANC.
Several
days
after
the midnight
massacre,
F.W.
De Klerk
ventured
into the Scene of the carnage
and was unceremoniously
hounded
out of
Boipatong.
Their
understandable fury
at
De
Klerk
graphically captures

the -mood
of the
people
against
apartheid. It also
captures their growing impatience with
the
National Party's obstruction of progress.
We are faced
with a grave situation.
Tensions go on mounting.
The need for progress grows
more and more urgent. The longer a
new
and democratic
dispensation
is
deferred, the
more
the
violence escalates, the more difficult it will be to reach