

This document should be read in conjunction with the SALSCOM booklet entitled "A possible role for White South Africans" ~~the~~ the subsequent "Military Project" and "Military Dissenters Programme".

From the above documents as well as from discussions with those involved in SALSCOM, the political history of those involved in the committee is clearly that of a breakaway group of the original ATLAS/OKHELA organisation. Don Morton, Terence Shott and Bill Anderson were all officially involved in Okhela and it seems that the only other well known Okhela person ^{AT LIBERTY,} Barend Schuitema, is not involved in SALSCOM. It also appears from information available that the so-called Okhela underground within South Africa is not claimed to form part of the SALSCOM structure.

Information has been received about a fundraising drive by SALSCOM in which Terence Shott travelled to France, Holland and Switzerland where he made contact with traditional sources of income for SA opposition groupings. According to reliable sources a Dutch group named X minus Y have given some financial backing to SALSCOM. Not much is known about X minus Y by the authors of this report except that it is a "Christian/Socialist" group which raises cash by a percentage levy on the income of members.

It is further claimed that the World University Service has given some backing to SALSCOM and that WUS is further considering ^{HAVE} ~~the~~ application. However it seems that the WUS support was more a nominal emergency grant rather than a long term commitment.

In addition SALSCOM raised its case with other organisations and individuals such as Church groups in Holland and Geneva, including the WCC. Information has it that the attitude of David de Beer and Horst Kleinschmidt to SALSCOM is negative and that they told Shott that the only legitimate organisation backing SA liberation is the ANC and that the initiative for backing SALSCOM would therefore have to come from the ANC.

Information also has it that SALSCOM approached the ANC and PAC but ~~had~~ ^{HAVE NOT} had any reply. It seems that the PAC attitude will be "wait and see". In addition SALSCOM approached what they believed to be a BCM representative, Sipho Buthelezi, who they claim was positive. However the official BCM leadership say that they know nothing about SALSCOM and that Buthelezi does not represent any BCM group.

SALSCOM have also approached organisations and individuals in the UK for support and seem to, at least, have gained support for printing materials. In addition the January 6th 1978 edition of "Africa Confidential" carries an article on SALSCOM entitled "South Africa: The White Underground". (Copy appended). However prominent white exiles such as Hugh Lewin have dismissed SALSCOM's approaches.

It also seems that SALSCOM will seek support in the USA amongst traditional supporters of Don Morton and Okhela.

No information exists on whether or not SALSCOM has real contacts inside South Africa but messages have been received to the effect that SALSCOM documents were posted to individuals inside South Africa.

b.) Some Background.

A long time before OKHELA was even thought of or conceived, some whites in South Africa, all committed to revolutionary change in that society, considered it necessary ~~to~~ to play a role in the liberation of their country. These people committed their support to the ~~movement~~ ^{NATIONAL LIB. MOVEMENT} representing the masses of the South African people and ever since that time the number of ~~whites~~ revolutionary whites in South Africa has grown.

However this has not been easy and ^{THE} despite the nature of the SA State the movement has succeeded and grown which is due only to a detailed and disciplined understanding of the nature of SA society and of revolution.

In any study of liberation groups in any country where the people have been oppressed by a harsh and unjust regime or system, certain common factors emerge. These are factors which have led to the success of many such resistance groups and so should be applied to the South African situation.

In no case in history has an internal regime been deposed by action directed from outside the country only. An active resistance/ liberation movement within the country is vital to the achievement of the desired liberation. In the case of South Africa it is not enough for there to be a liberation movement aimed at merely changing the personalities or group implementing the status quo. What is needed is a radical transformation of the society and this necessitates that the liberation movement be a revolutionary one.

In the South African situation the liberation movement can gain the committed support of individuals who realise the inherent evil of the South African system and so feel that their support is for a just cause. The liberation movement then provides a base for individuals and different groups to focus their efforts towards defeating the common enemy. Internal resistance and liberation activity of this kind is especially important in sustaining the psychological independence of the oppressed as well as in disrupting the internal repressive system of the oppressor.

In the first stages of the development of a resistance/ liberation movement individuals who are members of the oppressed people have unspoken thoughts of opposition to the oppressor and also make unseen gestures of defiance. This serves to maintain their psychological independence in the face of the attempted psychological control of the oppressor. In the second stage, individual resisters express their resistance and desire for

liberation in visible but still individual manners such as graffiti on walls etc. However despite the individual nature of these acts they create the possibility for contact between individual resisters and the possibility of co-ordination and organisation of resistance activity. The third stage is reached when such resisters band together and a progressively enlarging revolutionary group emerges which confronts the ideology and force of the oppressor. This in turn creates a corporate spirit amongst the oppressed people and this they express in demonstrations, freedom songs and the display of the colours or flag of the liberation movement.

The fourth stage in the development of the movement is reached when the liberation/resistance forces move onto the offensive against the

Becomes fully organised into the classical structure as follows:

- i. Psychological warfare-underground press/radio i.e. ENCOURAGES MILITARY PERSONNEL DISAFFECTION
- ii Intelligence section-to collect and distribute vital information on the political, military, economic structure etc.
- iii Escape lines- for moving people and supplies around the country as well as in and out. - i.e. DEFECTORS FROM MILITARY i.e. MILITARY
- iv Direct military action-infiltration of persons into key sectors, strike sabotage, guerilla warfare.

In the South African context, because of the extreme efficiency of the state security apparatus great care needs to be exercised in the development and control of liberation/resistance groups. At present more and more individuals in the country are becoming committed to the liberation struggle and so more liberation/resistance groups are appearing, some only comprising of a few members. It would be counter-productive to the overall liberation movement if many independent groups emerge and operate as they see fit, without any co-ordination and co-operation between them, ~~and~~ with the established liberation movements. It is vital that the tactics employed by all in the struggle fit into the overall strategy for liberation or else the only group which will benefit will be the regime.

This discussion is not one of academic interest but one of life and death and part of the struggle to liberate South Africa. We have discussed the origins of a liberation/resistance movement and now we turn a discussion of the criteria for the successful operation of such a movement.

Firstly and most important, the success of such a movement will always depend on the overall strategy employed as well as on the success of the tactics used in conjunction with this strategy. The South African regime has a strategy to protect and preserve its political structure and it is that strategy which must be identified and attacked.

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Thus it can be clearly seen that within the framework of the above analysis both the Okhela and the SALSCOM phenomena can be explained. Further it is clear that the SALSCOM programme relating to military deserters has some intrinsic value in that it fits into the framework of revolutionary action. However the question which needs to be asked and answered, is whether SALSCOM is the best manner in which to achieve the stated aims and indeed, whether SALSCOM has identified the correct goals and procedure to be used?

c. Conclusion.

After intensive consultation with various South Africans, the consensus of opinion was that SALSCOM, per se, is not a suitable approach ^{WHICH NEEDS} to be made on the question of young whites in the military. Firstly it was felt that the political history of those running SALSCOM is a severe drawback. While not here questioning personal commitment of the individuals concerned, they ^{CERTAINLY} lack the confidence of most young South Africans approached on the matter.

Secondly, it was felt that while SALSCOM has, as an element, humanitarian support for conscientious objectors, more importance should be placed on those persons who refuse to serve in the military for purely political reasons.

Thirdly it was felt that it would be unwise to encourage a stream of progressively minded persons to leave South Africa because of the difficulty of placing them in other countries and because of the drain on the resources of progressive groups operating inside South Africa. A decision has been taken by the leadership of the main progressive youth groups within SA to remain inside the country and to work for liberation. The decision is that only those persons who have no alternative should leave the country and even then this should be by a joint decision ^{at} the group with whom the person is operating. It was felt that genuine conscientious objectors, as well as those who are not prepared to form part of the SA defence force but who are not politically involved in opposition to the system, should be encouraged but that the manner for doing this and the structure whereby it be done should be more thoroughly investigated.

Fourthly it was felt that at this stage participation in the SADF by politically active persons is desirable, especially when done with revolutionary motives. It is still possible for university and other students to obtain exemption from the army while studying and even when obliged to serve it is perfectly possible to play a non-combatant role, which does not detract from the potential revolutionary tasks that such a person can fulfill. Some examples are information/intelligence gathering as well as the distribution of propaganda and learning of military skills which will be of use later. Many present SA revolutionary whites learnt skills useful to them in the security forces from ^{THE} mundane ^{AS WELL AS} ^{THROUGH} such as shooting the handling of firearms to being au fait with bushcraft.

Thus the basic reaction of many revolutionary whites to SALSCOM was one of distrust, coupled with a questioning of the clarity of their planning. Basically the action needed on the military front in SA can be divided into humanitarian/non-political and political sections. It is felt that at this stage the first activity can well be left to overseas groups and organisations who are prepared to assist deserters and draft dodgers with some needed guidance from people in touch with the National Liberation Movement.

The political aspect of military action can safely be left to the National Liberation Movement and those white revolutionaries who have placed themselves at its disposal. It should be borne in mind that infiltration of personnel into the SADF and other security forces cannot be a haphazard affair and neither can the gathering and analysis of information obtained in this way be amateur. The other aspect of spreading dissatisfaction amongst whites who are called up to serve in the security forces is also no task for amateurs and falls within the realm of the ^{LIB. MOVEMENT} propaganda network. It should be remembered that revolutionary work is hazardous, the more so within a repressive organ such as the security forces. Also most recruits to the security forces are taken direct from school and so propaganda needs to reach them both while they are serving and before they complete school. This task is not as easy as SALSCOM may think.

Information was received during 1977 that the individuals involved in SALSCOM were, while still in Okhela, trying to set up a propaganda manufacturing and distribution centre in Gaborone. This effort failed due to the collapse of Okhela but the fact remains that if they had succeeded, all they would have done is attract more unwelcome attention to the exile community in Botswana from the SA authorities.

In 1975 the Okhela fiasco cost plenty in terms of people exposed and activities halted, especially when considering the years of effort which went into ~~building~~ building up. Now many revolutionaries have the feeling that SALSCOM is busy building another "sandcastle" which when it falls may destroy other and ~~valuable~~ valuable activities. In addition it is felt that SALSCOM is an unnecessary political confusion in the SA arena and it is hoped that some manner will be found whereby the energy of those involved in SALSCOM can be channelled to more constructive use.

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In addition SALSCOM raised its case with other organisation and individuals such as Church groups in Holland and Geneva, including the WCC. Information has it that the attitude of David de Beer and Horst Kleinschmidt to SALSCOM is negative and that they told Shott that the only legitimate organisation backing S.A. liberation is the A.N.C. and that the initiative for backing SALSCOM would therefore have to come from the A.N.C.

Information also has it that SALSCOM approached the ANC and PAC but have not had any reply. It seems that the PAC attitude will be "wait and see". In addition SALSCOM approached what they believed to be a BCM representative, Sipho Buthelezi, who they claim was positive. However, the official BCM leadership say that they know nothing about SALSCOM and that Buthelezi does not represent any BCM group.

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SOME BACKGROUND

A long time before OKHELA was even thought of or conceived, some whites in SA, all committed to revolutionary change in that society, considered it necessary to play a role in the liberation of their country. These people committed their support to the National Liberation Movement representing the masses of the S.A. people and ever since that time the number of revolutionary whites in S.A. has grown.

However, this has not been easy and despite the nature of the S.A. State, the movement has succeeded and grown which is due only to a detailed and disciplined understanding of the nature of the S.A. society and revolution.

In any study of liberation groups in any country where the people have been oppressed by a harsh and unjust regime or system, certain common factors emerge. These are factors which have led to the success of many such resistance groups and so should be applied to the S.A. situation.

In no case in history has an internal regime been deposed by action directed from outside the country only. An active resistance / liberation movement within the country is vital to the achievement of the desired liberation. In the case of S.A. it is not enough for there to be a liberation movement aimed at merely changing the personalities or group implementing the status quo. "What is needed is a radical transformation of the society and this necessitates that the liberation movement be a revolutionary one.

In the S.A. situation the liberation movement can gain the committed support of individuals who realise the inherent evil of the S.A. system and so feel that their support is for a just cause. The liberation movement then provides a base for individuals of different groups to focus their efforts towards defeating the common enemy.

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The third stage is reached when such resisters band together and a progressively enlarged revolutionary group emerges which confronts the ideology and force of the oppressor. This in turn creates a corporate spirit amongst the oppressed people and this they express in demonstrations, freedom songs and the display of the colours of or flag of the liberation movement.

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1) Psychological warfare-underground press/radio (i.e. encourages military personnel disaffection). 2) Intelligence section - to collect and distribute vital information on the political, MILITARY, economic structure etc. 3) Escape lines - for moving people and supplies around the country as well as in and out (i.e. defectors from Military). 4) Direct military action - infiltration of persons into key (i.e. military) sectors, strike, sabotage, guerilla warfare.

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