

LHM/043/0001/08

REPORT OF THE SECRETARIAT ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Introduction :

The organisation of the Secretariat flows from a number of decisions taken at the Morogoro conference. For some time, the movement had felt that there was overdue emphasis on "external work" as against internal organisation of the revolution. Hence the new structure had as an aim the separation of the external work from other aspects in departmental terms. Owing to the absence of a specific department dealing largely with external work, the national executive found itself losing its power of strict control and supervision of many aspects of external work. Although there has been a complaint suggesting much emphasis on external work in relation to internal work, it should be stressed that in fact our work in the field of foreign affairs, international solidarity and propaganda leaves much to be desired.

Our present meeting is called upon to take decisions on a number of matters of policy affecting our foreign relations and also to examine our administrative structure and the running of our offices abroad.

Foreign Relations :

The needs of the South African revolution require that we must take some major decisions about our relations with various countries in Africa and elsewhere. The African National Congress is the sole representative of the South African people. It is the alternative to the present regime of white supremacy in our country. The ANC has a comprehensive programme for the creation of a new society in South Africa. We are determined to achieve our aims by means of a people's war. All this carries certain implications in the field of foreign affairs.

It is clear that the South African regime and the combination of powerful imperialist states who support her cannot be defeated except by the African National Congress allied with a similarly powerful combination of anti-imperialist states. We are called upon to assess various countries and decide on the basis of our strategy, tactics and policy which of them are at least potential allies whom we must go all out to cultivate. Our relations with such states cannot be those between a liberation movement and an anti-imperialist government. Much of our relations with countries has been on that level. We must now develop with a number of states

relations of a much deeper kind in which we really lay our cards on the table.

The most obvious African countries which are essential to our struggle have up to now been accepted as being Zambia and Tanzania. There are ample reasons for us to regard these countries as vital to the prospects of our revolution. We exclude from consideration Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland which from all strategic and practical points of view are part of the internal work of our movement and are wrongly regarded as external to South Africa.

Recently, there has been a cloud overhanging our relations with Zambia and Tanzania. In fact the situation has reached a point where suspicions of a "betrayal" of the revolution are being talked about. Yet it must be admitted that the series of "incidents" that involve our relations with these countries - the apparent overt support for PAC; the attitudes taken at Liberation Committee and OAU meetings on the ANC and ZAPU; numerous irritations on such matters as travel documents; customs clearance of our goods; interference with our equipment especially arms; unconcealed hostility from certain sectors of officialdom - all these do not yet amount to a serious analysis on our part of the role these countries are required to play in our revolution from our point of view. This analysis must be made with a full sense of responsibility which we bear for the destiny of not only our movement but our people.

It was inevitable that as Tanzania and Zambia began to grapple with their own national problems and we with ours, the old camaraderie and easy-going relations with individuals in the government would no longer serve as a basis of political alliance and friendship. After a time newly independent states begin to develop national interests. The tasks of government become more complex and are subject to pressures of all kinds both internal and external. It seems that, having established good relations at the top of government and Party we allowed the situation to drift in terms of policy. Contacts with government was then confined to raising of problems especially in moments of difficulty. More and more our activity in Zambia and Tanzania seemed to become one of reaction to this or that action taken against us. An unconcealed "war" developed with suspicions mounting till the climax was reached which has precipitated our present problems of maintaining our bases in these countries.

If Tanzania and Zambia are essential for the success of our cause for the foreseeable future, and we believe that they are

essential, then we ought to adopt a series of very comprehensive decisions aimed at maintaining our "presence" in these countries. Such decisions as we take must amount to a programme at all levels of society. This should include the mobilisation of all our potential international support to consolidate our position in these countries. When last have we given a comprehensive report of our activities, problems and future hopes to the leaders in Tanzania and Zambia ? It is a very grave risk for impressions of our organisation and policy to be derived by the leaders of Tanzania and Zambia from the reports of civil servants or security police. Such reports must be obtained from ourselves.

We would suggest as a start that a powerful delegation from the ANC should request to see Presidents Julius Nyerere and Kenneth Kaunda. The meetings should be carefully prepared on our side and must include a really comprehensive and frank report of our problems in regard to our revolution; an enumeration of the difficulties we face in relations with them; the prospects of our struggle; an assurance of long-term alliance with their countries. At such meetings we should request to meet Party delegations from TANU and UNIP respectively with the same object of outlining our policy and approach. In addition we have to mount a careful policy of cultivating key areas of government and society in support specifically of the ANC and its struggle for a free South Africa.

Another key area of support for our organisation is the Arab World and in particular Algeria. During the recent visit of our delegation to Algeria, it became clear that our friends there were very keen to know very much more about the direction, strategy and tactics of our revolution. It is also clear that we stand to obtain much in the way of ideas and material support from the Algerians. They are also the key to the Arab world which has vast material resources which could be mobilised in our support. We need to lay our cards very plainly on the table and hold serious negotiations with our Algerian comrades. They are expecting us to do so soon and we must not fail them. We need to do a great deal of planning jointly with the Algerians at many levels of our revolutionary work. But with the Algerians as with Zambia and Tanzania we will pay dearly for any attitude that takes countries for granted. In politics nothing can be taken for granted. Every success, every friendship is the result of hard, consistent work at many levels.

This must not be forgotten especially in regard to our great supporters in the Socialist World - the Soviet Union and the GDR.

To some extent we have worked so closely with our comrades in these countries that they are in a better position than other countries hence they support us more effectively and not only because it is their policy but because they work so closely with us. We need all the time to ensure that these relations are kept at a high level on the basis of frequent mutual exchanges on all manner of questions.

To sum up, we would suggest that in regard to a certain number of countries such as Algeria, Zambia, Tanzania, USSR, GDR, we must adopt a policy fundamentally different from the general one of seeking support as a liberation movement. We must in fact seek to establish long-term relations of an alliance type which will be essential for the prosecution of our revolutionary struggle no matter how long it takes. All the countries we decide upon must understand what they are being asked to do for us. Already Zambia and Tanzania risk the retaliation from South Africa and are under all sorts of pressures from our enemies in imperialist states. No country or people will willingly take such risks for another people unless they fully appreciate the struggle being waged by the people they are helping. Such an appreciation will not come automatically nor will national risks be taken solely on idealistic grounds. We have to build solid alliances on hard political and strategic grounds. Only the ANC is capable of fulfilling this role on behalf of the South African people. We must make our friends especially in Zambia and Tanzania understand this. The initiative rests with us.

International Solidarity Work :

International solidarity work in support of the South African struggle at present suffers from two maladies from our point of view. Firstly, there is the malady of what we might call "over-expansion". This is particularly the case in regard to the international solidarity movement against "Apartheid". The whole world seems to be anti-apartheid. The actions taken in the name of anti-apartheid cover a large variety of fields. Countries, international organisations, national bodies and individuals initiate actions of all kinds to demonstrate their abhorrence of Apartheid. All this creates a general mood of anti-apartheid and fosters the isolation of the South African regime. Yet this world-wide campaign is diffuse, undirected and often, for that reason, ineffective. Thus we find that the South African lobby in spite of its apparent moral disadvantage is continuing to score disconcerting advances at our expense. More and more countries in Africa seem to be falling under the spell of White South Africa. The economic power

of South Africa is being skillfully utilised to buttress the regime. Forces are arising all over the world which in fact challenge the anti-apartheid forces more boldly.

Much more serious from our point of view is the fact that whatever is happening to the international solidarity campaign against Apartheid our own credibility as an organisation that leads the struggle for freedom is bound to diminish unless we can make a more effective impact in the actual arena of the struggle for power, namely, South Africa itself. This is fundamental if we are to regain tactical control over the vast and diffuse campaign of solidarity which must be transformed into support for the African National Congress and its programme as against its present motivation of a humanitarian reaction against the evils of racism and apartheid.

We really need to undertake a serious study to be followed by decisions about the way we can promote effective initiatives which will nullify and defeat the specific measures that our enemies are undertaking in the world arena. In the field of Sport the international solidarity campaign is achieving success precisely because the field is one in which it is possible to be very precise as to aims, targets, strategy etc. In every field of activity - culture (i.e. plays, films, broadcasting, records) we need to achieve similar precision in order that our friends can hit effectively at the white supremacists with us holding the initiative as planners. In the economic field too we could conceivably achieve more if the strategy and tactics moved beyond the vague framework of "boycott". We could borrow some lessons from the Arab world in this regard although even they have not found it easy. But their campaigns are much more specific and directed. The absence of a machinery at headquarters or in London consisting of specialists in the working out of practical ideas for use in the campaign to isolate South Africa is one that ought to be put right straight-away.

The projection of the ANC as the alternative to the present regime is a complex matter compounded of many factors of which the most vital is one we have mentioned before - namely, the extent to which we are successful at home in the revolutionary struggle. Nonetheless even at this stage much can be done in the propaganda field with the use of the best modern techniques to achieve this.

THE SECRETARIAT AND ITS ADMINISTRATION.

The structure adopted at the Morogoro Conference provided for the setting up of a Secretariat under the direction of the Secretary-General. Since May efforts have been made to organise the Secretariat and appoint personnel to it. In the course of this report proposals will be made designed to make the work of the Secretariat more efficient and to eliminate certain shortcomings that have emerged.

The purpose of the changes suggested in our structure at Morogoro was to provide for centralised control combined with responsibility and initiative of heads of departments or sections. There has been a feeling that many of our departments, sections and external offices have functioned too autonomously without strict guidance from headquarters. On the other hand an absence of clear definition of the scope and duties of officials has often stifled initiative and caused constant reference back to headquarters of many petty matters.

To begin with it was envisaged from the beginning that the Secretary-General as head of the Secretariat would in time create a collective functioning within the Secretariat to guide the work of the division. This has not in fact happened yet. We would propose therefore that there should be a collective body consisting of the heads of all the departments in the division of the Secretary-General. These departments are already in existence though we propose to define their functions and structure more precisely. The Secretary-General and the Directors (or heads of departments) will act as a collective to deal with routine matters that do not require reference to the NEC or other divisions such as the Treasury or the Presidency. The collective can itself be referred to as the Secretariat although this is a word used in describing the division as a whole.

THE DEPARTMENTS.

Department of External Affairs. The department is the central controlling channel for our various external offices. Not only should it deal with routine work but should be concerned with assessment for the areas covered, development of our activities etc.

Department of Political Affairs. This department is responsible

for all the work of mobilising our members outside South Africa - the National Youth Secretariat, the Women's Secretariat and branches. In addition it will be concerned with our work at the United Nations, OAU, World Peace Council, Afro-Asian Solidarity Council and all international solidarity organisations.

Department of Publicity and Information.

This department is concerned with all the external publicity of the movement. It is responsible for the production of our regular and occasional publications. In addition the department plans and supervises the publicity and propaganda activities carried out through our various external offices.

Department of Research.

This department is concerned with the more fundamental research on behalf of our movement as well as the production of serious analytical pamphlets, briefings and memoranda; the custody of reference materials and documents of a fundamental character.

Secretaries of Departments.

Provision should be made in our administration for the appointment of Secretaries of Departments at headquarters whose duties shall be to handle correspondence, administration and generally to specialise in the routine functions of the department. This would leave the Secretary-General and/or Directors free to deal with the policy aspects.

External Offices.

Our external offices all fall under the Department of External Affairs.

The functions of our offices may vary in different countries, but apart from the particular functions arising from special circumstances, there are certain general functions that our offices are required to perform.

(1) To mobilise political support in the country/area of jurisdiction for our movement and for specific issues and campaigns. To do so effectively the office must:-

- (a) Keep abreast of developments in the area, so that we are not taken by surprise, and so that we are able to continue to function inspite of internal developments in a particular country; and also to enable us to exploit every avenue of potential support for the movement.
- (b) In those countries where it is necessary and politic to establish friendly contact with the government and ruling party at all levels.
- (c) Establish independent contact and machinery for mobilising public support - trade unions, women's organisations, students, youth, non-government parties, solidarity organisations, local press and radio etc.
- (d) Project at all times the image of the ANC as the voice and sole representative of the South African people.
- (e) Disseminate our national publications and execute local publicity and propaganda.

(2) Obtain the maximum financial and material assistance for our movement.

(3) To mobilise all South Africans within the area.

(4) Special functions.

Though each external office falls directly under the Director of External Affairs, certain functions within each office pertaining to other departments will have to be performed under the direction of the heads of those departments. To illustrate this:

OFFICE STRUCTURE

- 1) Chief Representative - Representative of the ANC - i.e. Ambassador and Head of Mission.
Responsible to Director of External Affairs for overall work in area of jurisdiction.

- 2) Publicity Officer - Responsible to Director of Publicity and to Chief Representative.
- 3) Political Affairs - (Youth, Women, solidarity, branches) Responsible to Director Political Affairs and Chief Representative.
- 4) Financial Officer - Responsible directly to Treasury.
- 5) Presidency Functions. Responsible directly to Presidency.

Internal Organisation of Department of Political Affairs.

International Secretariat

Our work and relations with various international organisations will fall under the Department of Political Affairs - UNO, OAU, AFRO-ASIAN etc.

All solidarity movements fall under this department, directly or through our offices where they exist.

The department will be responsible for our delegations to various conferences, our specific demands and contributions, and any papers or memoranda that may be required.

National Youth Secretariat.

The National Youth Secretariat functions in accordance with the policy statement on youth and students already issued. The NYS is responsible to the Director of Political Affairs who represents the S-G.

Branches of the ANC Youth and Students are responsible to the National Youth Secretariat. They must also be co-ordinated with the branches of the ANC External Mission (see below). All members of the Youth and Students who are of age (18) must be members of the local ANC branch.

WOMEN'S SECRETARIAT.

The Women's Secretariat is concerned with all international solidarity work concerning women and will be responsible to the

Director of Political Affairs. Where ANC women's branches are formed they will be responsible to this secretariat.

BRANCHES.

The functions of the branches of the ANC external mission are to mobilise all South Africans in support of the revolutionary struggle. All branches come directly under the Director of Political Affairs. Branches can only be formed on the authority of the Director.

The number of members necessary to form a branch need not be rigid. The matter can be left to the Director of Political Affairs who should consider each case on its merits and authorise small branches where necessary.

The branches should function as our branches have always done at home with the right of direct contact with headquarters through the Director of Political Affairs.

Where there are branches of the Youth and Students or Women, these should function separately as at home, except that it should be required that all persons of age (i.e. 18) must be members of the branch. The executives of the Youth and Students and Women's branches should nominate one of their members onto the executive of the branch. The branch executive will consist of a Chairman, Secretary, and five members elected by the branch. Where such branches exist there will, in addition be one member each from the executives of the Youth and Students and Women.

Relations between Branch and External office.

The branch will naturally maintain the closest co-ordination with the office within whose jurisdiction it operates. It is proposed that the Chief Representative, who represents the external department of the organisation should be ex-officio member of the branch executive. The job of the Chief Representative and the office is to reflect headquarters in the manner of an embassy representing a particular state. The function of the branch is to mobilise all our people into active units in support of the ANC and our struggle. The branch is not an adjunct of the external office and indeed

in some countries branches may well exist without any office of the ANC and vice-versa. It is important that the autonomous character of branches vis-vis the external office should be understood. Naturally it is expected that all branches and offices will work in the closest collaboration and commonsense should be used to work out the best forms of achieving this within the framework of our general policy.

M O R O G O R O

29th December 1969.