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WASHINGTON, D.C. May 23, 1986 XX NO.o el 9

THE NEW YORK TIMES MAY 20 1986 [â\200\230HE WASH[VCTON POST MAY 22 1986

PRETORIAâ\200\231S FORCES RAID 3 NEIGHBORS New Hill Effort Ope INMOVE ON REBEL To Pressure South

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Capitals of Zimbabwe, Zambia

and Botswana Are Hit \hat{a} 200\224 U.S. Voices \hat{a} 200\230Outrage \hat{a} 200\231

By ALAN COWELL special to The New York Times

JOHANNESBURG, May 19 â\200\224 South African forces attacked the capitals of Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe today in what military officials said was part of a continuing drive against guerrillas of the African National Congress.

Three people were reported killed in Botswana and Zambia. There was no mention of South African casualties in official statements here.

In Harare, Zimbabwe, a spokesman for the African National Congress said none of its members were killed, wounded or seized in the raids.

The coordinated raids were the most extensive military action by Pretoria in its 25-year-old war against the Congress, the most prominent of exiled and outlawed movements seeking the overthrow of white minority rule.

Raids on Three Capitals

The raids involved attacks by aircraft on the Zambian capital of Lusaka, and by helicopter-borne commandos in and around Botswanaâ\200\231s capital, Gaborone, and Zimbabwe'â\200\231s capital, Harare.

It was the first time that South Africa had struck directly at Zambia and Zimbabwe. Botswanaâ\200\231s capital, Gaborone,

was last attacked in June, 1985, an event that prompted the United States to temporarily withdraw its Ambassador to South Africa, Herman W. Nickel.

[The Reagan Administration expressed $a\200\230a\200\234a\200\230$ over the attacks and, after filing an official protest, said it was considering $a\200\230a\200\230$ further steps $a\200\231$ against Pretoria. In Harare, glass and rubble littered a downtown street outside the shattered building that housed an office of the African

monwealth to set up negotiations between the white minority Government here and the Congress.

Commonwealth Negotiators

A Commonwealth negotiating team, called the Eminent Persons Group, had just returned from talks with the African National Congress in Lusaka, and was in South Africa when the raids were carried out.

There was no official explanation for the timing of the raids. There have been no major attacks in recent weeks by the African National Congress, and political commentators suggested that the only immediate political gain for the authorities was to assure restive whites of the Governmentâ\200\231s strength.

The low casualty toll reported by the Governments of Botswana and Zimba-bwe did not seem to indicate that the South Africans had scored any major military victory beyond reminding those countries of their vulnerability, these analysts said.

Official word of the raids early today emerged in separate statements issued by the head of the army, Lieut. Gen. A. J. Liebenberg and the air force commander, Lieut. Gen. D. J. Earp.

General Earp said all the South African airplanes returned safely io their bases and said the targets attacked had been used for harboring \(\frac{200}{230} \) terrorists \(\frac{200}{235} \) and their weapons on their way to infiltrate South Africa and for planning attacks on South Africa.

All three countries attacked today have denied providing the African National Congress with military bases.

General Liebenberg, in announcing the raids on Gaborone and Harare, said $\frac{3}{200}\frac{234}{200}$ action taken against the terrorists should be interpreted as indicative of the firm resolve of the Republic of

South Africa to use all the means at its disposal against terrorists wherever they may be. $\hat{a}\200\235$

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By David B. Ottaway

Washington Post Staff Writer

Forty-four members of Congress yesterday introduced a bill calling for extensive new sanctions against South Africa, including a ban on new U.S. investments, that would be lifted if the white government there releases all black political prisoners and begins â\200\234good-faith negotiationsâ\200\235 to end apartheid.

The bill, whose chief sponsors are Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) and Lowell P. Weicker Jr. (R-Conn.) in the Senate and William H. Gray III (D-Pa.) in the House, would go considerably further than the sanctions imposed by President Reagan last September.

The legislation would include not only an end to U.S. investments but a ban on landing rights for South African aircraft here and a prohibition on importing South African coal, uranium and steel.

In addition, if South Africa did not free within one year its black political prisoners, most notably the head of the African National Congress, Nelson Mandela, the bill would require U.S. computer companies to withdraw from South Africa and would ban computer exports to that country.

At a news conference, Kennedy said the proposed legislation is a response to the recent call by Bishop Desmond M. Tutu, the South African black Nobel Peace Prize laureate, for the world community

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Selected by AF/P for reference use by the Bureau of African Affairs,

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S. Department of State

MAY 18, 1986

A War of Attrition Continues in the Townships

South Africaâ $\200\231s$ Promises Come - $\A1th$ Fine Print

JOHANNESBURG â\200\224 Two and a half years after it was launched, South Africaâ\200\231s program of limited and cautious racial change seems to be foundering, sending -eanflicting signals to outsiders and offering the countryâ\200\231s 31 million people no clear vision. White rulers are balking at drastic measures to ease the violence in the face of black radicalism that demands their surrender and â\200\230right-wing white radicalism insistent on a return to the -apparent security of what was known as Grand Aparthetd:

 $\hat{A} \gg '\hat{A} \ll$ "South African analysts say the nation has changed, —and whites are addressing questions $\hat{a} \geq 200 \leq 224$ such as sharing

 $\hat{a}\200\230$ power with the 23 million blacks - in a manner that once wolld have been unthinkable. Since the program acceler $a\200\234$ ated with creation of a racially segregated, three-chamber Parliament, which embraced some nonwhites but ex-.cluded blacks, there have been changes that deny the logic of white suprernacy. For example, a black may now $a\200\230$ marry or have a sexual relationship with a white pe?on. And the Government has promised that blacks will be permitted to move freely in search of work, with--Out loathed official passes. $200\234$: " - Yet, the measures seem also to illuminate their own [imits. Should a black marry a white, where would they '1;ilgâ\200\230i)r send their children to school, while education and hm; glng remain segregated? And if blacks are able to form labor unions and move freely in search of employ-£ mei:\tâ\200\224 an acknowledgement of the intertwined nature of thie Ã@conomy â\200\224 why are political rights constricted? \hat{a} 200\234 \hat{a} 200\234With the promised abolition of pass laws, blacks no longer must carry documents defining where they may -Tiveâ\200\230or work. Yet, Gerrit Viljoen, a senior Cabinet minister, said the other day that whites would not feel secure

yithout segregated education and housing. So the new, freedom is diluted to mobility among segregated township\$ and schools. .

' 'The Government has promised to restore citizenship td blacks stripped of it under Grand Apartheid, which held-that blacks could never be citizens, but details have yét to be made public. The authorities, additionally, have agfféred unidentified black leaders a negotiating role in a $\frac{3}{200}\frac{30nÃ@w}{a}\frac{3200}{230body}$ that might influence $\frac{200}{231}$ policymaking. But no blatk leader $\frac{3200}{24}$ not even those called sellouts by radical $\frac{3200}{230pÃ@er'}\frac{3200}{24}$ has publicly come forward to accept the offer.

__ More significantly, perhaps, the nation seems to have \$\tilde{A}\tilde{\tilde{O}}\$ slipped out of synchronization as the Government, 3 jg \$\tilde{\tilde{G}}\$ \gamma 2020us of its power base among the 2.8 million Afrikaners; offers only limited advances to blacks. These might \$\tilde{a}\200\230\$ have brought appeasement two decades ago but now seem outstripped.

* What blacks demand, the recently elected Archbishop,. Desmond Tutu, told a predominantly white and avowedly liberal audience in Cape Town the other day, is hot'a readjustment of Grand Apartheid but political power.

__-_Since September 1984, more than 1,500 people, nearly all of them black, have died in protests and violgnce that, has brought some segregated black townships to near-an-archy. These areas, as radicals loyal to the outlawed African National Congress describe the phenomenon, have become \(\frac{a}{200\230\angle 230\angle 230\230\angle 230\angle 230\231\angle 200\231\angle 200\231\angle and call themselves comrades hold the political high ground and official controls, aside from the volice and army, have disappeared.

+-Fheâ\200\231'war, confined inside the black townships and kept-far from whites, is one of attrition, a campaign that pits .vastly superior firepower against harsh tactics of mass protest pursued by â\200\230â\200\234â\200\230comradesâ\200\231â\200\235 who view vict ory as somehow imminent and are ready to seek it in brutal

Homelands and townships

7 $\hat{a}\200\230$ Independent homelands $\hat{a}\200\231$

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ (Areas established by South Africa for blacks on a tribal basis and declared to be independent countries; none have received international recognition, however)

 $\hat{a}\200\230\non-independent homelands \hat{a}\200\231$ (Areas established by South Africa for blacks on tribal basis)

O Some townships that have figured in South Africaâ\200\231s unrest

ZIMBABWE

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KwaThems Duduza

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Fort Elizabeth

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ due to be Independent on Dec 11 L

ways. The police have increasingly accused black radicals of doing much of the township killing, turning on blacks deemed stooges of white rule and executing them by a method known as the $a\200\234$ necklace $a\200\231$ and ignited withgasoline.;

The Government program, in this grim light, seems only to illuminate the polarization. Change is offered to the black majority at a pace set by the demands of whites who might, if pressed, share some power but will not surrender it.

Last week, a group of Commonwealth dignitaries called the Eminent Personâ\200\231s Group sought to persuadeâ\200\231 President P. W. Botha to release the jailed nationalist Nelson Mandela and legalize the outlawed African Na-. tional Congress in exchange for a suspension of hostilities. By weekâ\200\231s end, the dignitaries, led by the former leaders of Australia and Nigeria, had not met with Mr.,

Botha or Mr. Mandela. The signals seemed as mixed as ever

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THE NEW YORK TIMES

MAY 21, 1986

Pretoria Strikes Out

No one doubts the armed might of South Africa or its ability to pummel defenseless neighbors like Zambia, Botswana and Zimbabwe. Mondayâ\200\231s commando raids against â\200\230â\200\230terroristsâ\200\231â\200\231 housed in those countries said nothing new about Pretoriaâ\200\231s military prowess. What the assaults betray again is the political weakness of a beleaguered white minority regime. Instead of moving toward open negotiation with the various leaders of South Africaâ\200\231s blacks, it strikes at already disenfranchised and exiled rebels to placate white diehards. The world will unite to condemn this policy, portending disaster for all South Africans.

The ostensible target of the raids, which claimed at least three lives, were $\hat{a}200\230\hat{a}200\230$ terrorist transit facilities $\hat{a}200\235\hat{a}200\235$ of the African National Congress. Zambia asserts that Pretoria $\hat{a}200\231$ commandos struck a United Nations refugee camp near Lusaka. In any case, the Congress is forced to operate abroad because it is outlawed in South Africa. Though driven to violence and incorporating radicals, the Congress has a better claim to speak for many of South Africa $\hat{a}200\231$ 24 million blacks than the white regime elected by 5 million whites.

Some of the outlawed exiles were visited last week by a British Commonwealth negotiating team that was said to be sufficiently impressed to propose legalization of the congress and an unconditional amnesty for its jailed leader, Nelson Mandela. Instead, Pretoria pursues his colleagues across frontiers. Even assuming South Africa had cause for complaint, it had ample economic leverage for pressuring its neighbors \hat{a} 200\224 Commonwealth countries vulnerably bound to it by trade.

ws - South Africa At

South Africa sent several messages with its aerial and commando raids on presumed guerrilla sites in the capitals of Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe. None was to those host governments. They already expect raids in retaliation for terrorism launched from their soil, and generally restrict the activities of African National Congress exiles to whom they give sanctuary to avoid giving offense to South Africa.

The real messages are going elsewhere. They are not to the ANC apparatus outside South Africa, either. South Africa has conducted sporadic raids on alleged ANC targets in African countries for the past five years, without telling effect. The ANC does exist. It is deeply entrenched underground in South Africa where it enjoys broad support, and it sustains a constant if modest level of terrorism. This combines with the spontaneous protest and violence in the black townships to create what is probably the early stage of revolt. South Africa is at its wit's end trying to turn it off.

The real messages of these raids were to South

Africaâ\200\231s blacks, its intransigent whites and the population generally. The raids seem designed to convince the blacks in the townships that South Africa can hit their ANC anywhere; to convince the rightwing Afrikaner whites that the regime is not soft on opponents; and let all know that the military forces play a decisive role in affairs.

The raids cut the ground from Prime Minister Thatcher of Britain, who a year ago urged a last-try negotiating effort to head off Commonwealth sanctions. Also bloodied again are the Reagan Administrationâ\200\231s apologists for the Government of President P.W. Botha, who asked the world to interpret some recent reforms as the long-awaited sign. of apartheidâ\200\231s demise.

By striking out against African neighbors for transient political effect, Mr. Botha has wounded his few Western friends and deepened Pretoriaâ\200\231s isolation. He has also made a compelling case for the United States and other concerned nations to take steps that will diplomatically legitimize the African National Congress and other black opposition groups.

After the last such cross-border violence, the United States temporarily withdrew its Ambassador from Pretoria. At the least, as he is again withdrawn, let him demonstrate sympathy for the invaded nations and hold publicized meetings with the leaders of the exiled congress. And let his return be conditioned on the release of Mr. Mandela and other political prisoners.

What drives the normally cautious Mr. Botha to such desperate acts? Even his paternalistic gestures toward blacks seem to have stirred a revolton his right in the ruling National Party. Seeking to prove toughness, he has implied panic and division in his ranks. Instead of reconciling anxious whites to inescapable change, his Government persists in pretending that South Africaâ\200\231s problems at home and already painful economic losses abroad can be chased with a nightstick.

lacks

â\200\230T'he raids were timed to wreck the most promising mediation effort to date, the â\200\234Eminent Persons Groupâ\200\235 of the British-led Commonwealth of Nations, which has been seeing both the ANC and the government of President P. W. Botha. There has long been anticipation of the regime freeing the elderly Nels6n Mandela, titular ANC leader, from imprisonment. If it had the sense to do so, it would probably combine the soft action with a hard one, such as these military raids.

President Botha's comparison of the raids to the U.S. bombing of targets in Libya after terrorist incidents promoted by Libya against Americans was fatuous. The U.S. responded to a government that had aggressed against American citizens and had spurned persuasion to desist. The South African raids were tactically futile gestures. against South Africans who had been deprived of minimal rights and who had turned to exile and violence after being denied political expression.

Unless South Africa comes in very quickly with soft gestures equal to the raids, the effect is to drive the Botha regime and its supporters deeper into their laager, in greater isolation from neighboring states and the West, repudiating those in the British and American governments who still seek to broker accommodations. And in South Africaâ\200\231s perverse way, that is what sÃ@ems to have been intended.

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR MAY27.'1886

S. Africa whites

ad iust Rising numbers grudgingly accept change

oy Ned Temko Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor Johannesburg

The numbers tell the story $a\200\224$ of a society in anguish.

More and more South African whites seem to be coming to terms with the idea of sharing public facilities, schools, neighborhoods, and even power with the countryâ\200\231s black majority.

But most donâ\200\231t seem to like it one bit. And the angry, sometimes violent, minority of whites intent on resisting change is growing.

This is the picture emerging from a series of opinion polls published here. It may also help explain the governmentâ\200\231s oscillation between pledges of â\200\234reformâ\200\235 and the much tougher approach that has predominated in the past few days. [South African raids on neighbors deal blow to Commonwealth peace initiative. Story, Page 7.]

The pollsters agree that a growing number of the countryâ\200\231s roughly 4.5 million whites are lining up behind President Pieter W. Bothaâ\200\231s moves to chip away at the apartheid system begun by his National Party some 35 years ago. There are signs, too, that more whites are ready for further steps on that road.

The most recent sample $\hat{a}200\224$ a comparison of white opinion in 1981 and 1986, commissioned by the pro-government Rapport newspaper $\hat{a}200\224$ showed a leap in acceptance of at least some form of further racial integration.

One litmus test used was the Group Areas Act, a 1950 law that classified residential areas by race. The act has led to forced removal of at least 126,176 families from previously mixed areas.

The Rapport poll, which appeared Sunday, showed that slightly more than half of the white respondents were ready to let at least individual neighborhoods decide to integrate. In 1981, only 36.6 percent favored this. About 25 percent favored desegregating schools $\hat{a}\200\224$ up from 11 percent in 1981.

Another sampling, by an independent research council that presented the results at a seminar last week, asked whites whether they wanted schools kept segregated. Sixty-three percent said yes, down from 74 percent a year ago.

There was a weightier move toward acceptance of blacks in Parliament, from which theyâ\200\231ve been excluded. A year ago only 25 percent of respondents favored a change. Now, the total is 42 percent.:

The poll showed about 70 percent of whites still identified white-minority rule as the $a\200\234ideala\200\235$ form of South African government, but felt this was unworkable

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

MAY 19, 1986

Apartheid Thwarts Effort to Train Blacks

By StevE MUFSON Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

JOHANNESBURG, South Africaâ\200\224 Anglo American Corp., South Africaâ\200\231s richest industrial and mining company, plucked 12 of the countryâ\200\231s best and brightest black 1979 high school graduates to train for careers of corporate leadership.

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ The greatest thing was the dream, $\hat{a}\200\235$ remembers Cecil Ngwane, $\hat{a}\200\234\hat{a}\200\230$ the dream that you could pull yourself up and then when you were up you could change things. We talked about how change must come. We said it every day like a lit-any. $\hat{a}\200\235$

But the dream has turned to disappointment. Not even Angloâ\200\231s gilded patronage was able to bridge apartheidâ\200\231's gap between black and white.

After nearly seven years, only two of the youths have finished the program and joined Angloâ\200\231s professional ranks. The rest have scattered: one is an anti-apartheid activist, one lives in the U.S., two are still struggling to complete their university education, one has a routine job at a bank, one works for International Business Machines Corp., one worked until recently as a clerk at a gold mine and lived in a crowded workersâ\200\231 hostel, one is working and studying to retake exams he failed, one attends an all-black homeland university, and another has simply vanished.

Anglo selected the trainees as potential leaders. $a\200\230\234$ We talked about creating a pool* of talent to create a just society, $a\200\235$ says Donald Ncube, Anglo $a\200\231$ s top black professional, who works in the industrial-relations department.

The company paid their housing and tuition at the nrestigious University of Wit-

watersrand, gave them tutors and computers and paid them a salary. During va-

cations, the students worked at the diamond and gold mines, assured of post-university employment.

But for some ot the trainees, not even the fairy-tale Anglo treatment could overcome apartheidâ\200\231s formidable barriers. Other of the youths simply lacked the motivation to finish courses, while some were poorly prepared by their black high schools. Perhaps most important, Angloâ\200\224 which has spent millions of dollars on numerous programs to aid black educationâ\200\224 had failed to foresee that this program put most of the black trainees in an untenable position vis-a-vis both blacks and whites.

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ We didn $\hat{a}\200\231$ t appreciate the pressure on black kids who succeed in the capitalist world, $\hat{a}\200\235$ says Zach de Beer, an Anglo director. David Adler, one of the training program $\hat{a}\200\231$ s coordinators, says, $\hat{a}\200\230\hat{a}\200\230$ Identification is the central problem for these guys. Whose side are they on in a strike? They aren $\hat{a}\200\231$ t trusted by either side. $\hat{a}\200\235$

What went throught the minds of the young blacks while they were still in training, and what happened to them afterward? Here. are profiles of three of the trainees that may provide some answers:

The Dreamer

On Good Friday, working men of the rural village of Nqutu travel five hours from Johannesburg to display the fruits of their big-city labor. Each struts through the center of a crowd gathered on a barren hill. One shows off 4 dark-blue suit; another does a leaden pirouette in a sky-blue outfit A third dazzles with his bright orange

Continued on Pg. 14

and thus favored $a\200\234a\200\230$ power sharing. $a\200\235$

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ We can deduce, $\hat{a}\200\235$ said the researcher who presented the findings, $\hat{a}\200\234$ that if the government continues dismiantling . . . apartheid structures in terms of human rights, there won't be the [right-wing] backlash we fear. $\hat{a}\200\235$

But the government, and at least some other researchers, don $a \times 200 \times 231t$ seem so sure of this.

A local newspaper poll in the Hillbrow area of Johan-

nesburg $\hat{a}200\224$ where officials have turned a blind eye to the $\hat{a}200\234$ illegal $\hat{a}200\235$ arrival of many nonwhites $\hat{a}200\224$ showed strong support for a formal end to Group Areas curbs there. But within minutes of publication, the editors were swamped with calls from residents opposing such a change.

The national sample published in Rapport hinted at similar backlash. It showed that even the growing $a\200\234$ pro reform $a\200\235$ sentiment left a majority opposed to wholesale dismantling of apartheid.

Such a shift, however, has become the minimum

demand of most black South African leaders.

The Rapport poll also detected increased support for the major antireform party \hat{a} 200\224 the Conservative Party.

Although many respondents favored the principle of

 \hat{a} 200\230mixed neighborhoods, less than one-third said they per-

sonally wanted to live next door to one of the country $\ 200\ 231s$ 22 million blacks.

THE NEW YORK TIMES THE WASHINGTON Post

The South African Bully

MAY 21, 1986

Africa Raids: What Goal?

Pretoriaâ\200\231s Move Seen As Show of Strength

By ALAN COWELL Special to The New York Times

JOHANNESBURG, May 20 â\200\224 Some South African commentators suggested today that with the raids Monday against three black-governed nations to the north, South African authorities seemed ready to forfeit any hope of international sympathy and support in pursuit of limited domestic goals drawn from the politics of the white minority.

 $\hat{a}\200\230\hat{a}\200\234\hat{a}\200\234$ Was this meant as a further sop to the restive right wing of Afrikanerdom? $\hat{a}\200\231\hat{a}\200\231$ Johannesburg $\hat{a}\200\231$ s afternoon newspaper, The Star, asked in an editorial today. $\hat{a}\200\234$ If that is so, the reasoning is shortsighted and the action irresponsible. $\hat{a}\200\231\hat{a}\200\231$

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ If the price of these raids is to weaken the economy, to delay the long-awaited revival of business, to undermine confidence and to aggravate employment, $\hat{a}\200\235\hat{a}\200\235$ said Business Day, a morning paper here, $\hat{a}\200\230\hat{a}\200\230$ then the result will be greater insecurity within the country. $\hat{a}\200\235$

The raids on the capitals of Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe were the most spectacular and closely coordinated South Africa has launched in its 25-year campaign against guerrillas of the outlawed and exiled African National Congress, the most prominent of the movements seeking the overthrow of white rule.

Yet, by the standards South Africaâ\200\231s sets for its frequent military forays against its black-ruled neighbors, the results were uncertain. Only three people were reported killed in the attacks, while the death toll in the nationâ\200\231s townships at around the same period was much higher.

Instead, South Africa alienated its two leading friends in the West, the United States and Britain. The three countries attacked were all members of the Commonwealth, like Britain, and the raids put Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher under pressure from her ad-

versaries to support sanctions, a step she continues to oppose. Washington reacted with incredulity and hostility. And South African commentators speculated increasingly on the probability that a hostile world will enforce punitive economic measures against Africaâ\200\231s wealthiest nation.

So the question recurs: why did the South Africans risk so much to apparently gain so little? Many of those who look for answers in the psyche of the Afrikaners, the dominant white group here, seemed to come up with the blunt reply that Afrikaner strength and survival was seen as a more pressing priority than a solution \(\frac{a}{200} \) 230to the, nation \(\frac{a}{200} \) 231s strife that would dilute their power.

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News Analysis

ducting its outrageous raids in three neighboring countries, naturally was quick to cite *he American raid in Libya as political cover. The te House was ready to make essential distincons:- \hat{a} \200\234The Libyans and Col. Qaddafi have been the No. 1 exporter of terrorism on a worldwide basis, \hat{a} 200\235 spokesman Larry Speakes said, \hat{a} 200\234and we've produced proof of that. a\200\235 The Pretoria regime did not even attempt to establish proof that its targets in Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe, which deny allowing African National Conress military operations, had any connection to terrorism at home. All attacks conducted in the name of fighting terrorism are not equal; some are justified and some are not. +.A calculus of defiance and intimidation is evident in South Africaâ\200\231s blows at neighbors with which it had supposedly been trying to come to ceful terms on issues of cross-border violence. t will confirm the views of those who believe armed struggle and pressure are the only way to dismantle -apartheid. At the same time, Prime

THECHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

THE SOUTH AFRICAN government, con-

May 21, 1986

Minister P. W. Bothaâ\200\231s whole strategy is to combine partial and crabbed reform with constant muscle flexing meant to reassure worried whites and neutralize critics to his right. Mondayâ\200\231s raids came as an â\200\230â\200\234â\200\230eminent persons groupâ\200\235 representing the British Commonwealth was trying to fit into place a plan for a broad negotiation between the Botha government and a freed Nelson Mandela of, yes, the ANC. Both an intent to block such an opening and an intent to make political room for it can be read into the raids.

In Washington, Democrats are about to introduce legislation to tighten economic sanctions against South Africa. The latest attacks, with their potent

aura of bullying, will feed into this debate. The administration fought off legislated sanctions last year only by promulgating (milder) sanctions of its own. It opposes new legislation, but it will be under the gun to prove that it is not being excessively cozy with the Pretoria regime for strategic reasons. Pretoriaâ\200\231s raids now require that it take clear and unambiguous action to show its displeasure, to distance itself from what happened on Monday.

MAY 21, 1986

Pretoriaâ\200\231s unjust attacks

OUTH Africaâ\200\231s military attacks on

targets in three neighboring coun-

tries â\200\224 Botswana, Zambia, and Zimbabwe â\200\224 cannot be justified under rules of international law. The condemnation that has been expressed by much of the world community, including the United States and Britain, is warranted. The three governments involved have been conscientiously seeking a diplomatic solution to South African tensions.

The lightning strikes $\hat{a}\200\224$ which, according to South Africa, were directed against terrorist camps of the African National Congress (ANC), the main guerrilla group fighting the white-led South African government $\hat{a}\200\224$ cannot be excused on the grounds of $\hat{a}\200\234$ fighting terrorism, $\hat{a}\200\235$ or justified, as Pretoria is attempting, by comparison with the US air strikes against Libya.

As we have noted in these columns, the US air strikes raised disturbing questions in themselves. But suffice it to say at this point that in the case of the South African raids, this was no instance of Pretoriaâ\200\231s engaging in â\200\234hot pursuitâ\200\235 of fleeing guerrilla or terrorist forces returning to their home base after the guerrilla forces had just committed terrorist acts. Nor is the ANC necessarily the direct â\200\234agentâ\200\235 of the three neighboring governments involved. Indeed, there have been no major crossborder raids recently by ANC forces.

One unfortunate casualty of the South African assaults could well be a sevennation Commonwealth peace effort aimed

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at bringing Pretoria and the ANC to the conference table.

The South African attacks raise troubling new implications about the increasing willingness of nations to justify their own intemperate actions by claiming that they are merely dealing with the misdeeds of others.

It would be tragic if the world community were to enter a period where vigilante action became a norm. Sovereign nations should not have to find themselves subject to invasion by other countries that might harbor some particular grievance. After all, if your neighbor is giving you difficulty, you surely donâ\200\231t have a right to enter his house and rip the furniture apart.

In the case of South Africa, terrorism, from the African National Congress or other militant groups, is not the issue. The basic problem is South Africaâ\200\231s policy of apartheid. The raids apparently represent an attempt by Pretoria to appease critics from its own right wing who are concerned that the government of President Pieter W. Botha is moving too quickly toward some type of racial accommodation â\200\224 a â\200\234hasteâ\200\235 that is hardly discernible to its critics.

South Africaâ\200\231s boast that its attacks were carried out with $a\200\234$ surgicalâ\200\235 precision cannot be comforting to those civilians caught in the cross fire.

Washington and the global community must be firm in letting Pretoria know that such raids are not to be tolerated.

LETTER

Wiz 20, L9986

US policy on South Africa

In the article about grass-roots organizations in South Africa, Dan $\hat{a}\200\230$ Connell serfously misrepresented US policy toward that troubled country $[\hat{a}\200\234$ Protecting South Africa $\hat{a}\200\231$ s fledgling grass-roots democracy, $\hat{a}\200\235$ April 9].

The implication that the United States does not support substantive change in Sauth Africa suggests Connell does not understand US policy, which is designed to use our influence to encourage meaningful referm. OQur objective is to end apartheid and assist South Africa to move toward a more just society and a system of government based on the consent of all South Africans. To the extent that grass-roots organizations in South Africa can peacefully contribute to that goal, they have an important role to play and deserve our support.

It is incorrect to describe our assistance ~program as a\200\234traditional charitya\200\235 or to suggest that it is a\200\234inappropriatea\200\235 in the South African context. In the first place, our assistance program in South Africa is considerably different from programs elsewhere in the world. It does not work through any South African government institution, but rather through private

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

community organizations of various kinds. Moreover, one of the key objectives of -that program is to promote political, economic, and sorial rights of those disadvantaged by apartheid.

I disagree with Connellâ $\200\231$ sâ $\200\235$ endorsement of punitive economic sanctions as the way to foster $\hat{a}\200\234$ substantial and lasting change. $\hat{a}\200\235$ In the administration $\hat{a}\200\231s$ view, such actions would be counterproductive. They would instead undermine those in South Africa most active in promoting the repeal of apartheid and would also aggravate the misery of those the sanctions are interided to help. Moreover, black opinion in South African is divided on the issue. Many black South Africans are strongly opposed to disinvestment or punitive sanctions, because they believe such measures would threaten their jobs and reduce opportunities for advancement. Disinvestment would also punish US

companies which have been in the forefront of the struggle to end racial discrimination in the workplace, improve living conditions in black communities, and work for reform.

Finally, the US has consistently condemned violence in South Africa re-

Countries showing success with market-oriented agriculture

The Washinaton Times

MAY 23, 1986

Out of Ethiopia

A former commissioner of relief for the Communist government of Ethiopia has just revealed that he sought political asylum when he came to the United States last October, and he has an interesting story about the famine in his country.

Dawit Wolde Giorgis told The New York
Times: â\200\234We called it a drought problem, but
it was more of a policy problem. Drought
only complicated the situation. If there is no
change in our policies, there will always be
millions of hungry people in Ethiopiaâ\200\235â\200\231

Mr. Dawit is not merely playing to hosts presumed to be conservative. He disputes Western relief agency estimates of 100,000 deaths from the resettlement of Ethiopian

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gardless of its source. We believe that the solution to South Africaâ\200\231s fundamental problems is negotiations between the South African government and credible leaders of all communities, not violence and repression. To suggest or to imply that US policy condones or supports violence in South Africa is simply wrong.

J. Douglas Holladay Director, South Africa Working Group

MAY 23, 1986

US Dept. of State Washington

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

By KENNETH H. BACON

WASHINGTONâ\200\224 After years of famine, economic stagnation and declining per-capita income, conditions are beginning to improve in sub-Saharan Africa.

Rains have brought good harvests in many countries. Higher coffee prices are boosting export receipts, while declines in oil prices and the dollar have reduced the cost of imports. Lower interest rates are slowing the rise in Africaâ\200\231s debt-service burden, though it remains onerous.

These developments have created a $\hat{a}\200\234$ breathing space for much of Africa, $\hat{a}\200\235$ says World Bank President A.W. Clausen. But he stresses that $\hat{a}\200\231s \hat{a}\200\234\hat{a}\200\230a$ breathing space in which efforts to adjust economies and to establish solid growth foundations must be accelerated. $\hat{a}\200\235$

A growing number of African nations may, in fact, be willing to take tough measures to improve their economies. After years of blaming their problems on their colonial heritage and international economic forces, Africans are showing increased recognition that they have hurt themselves with policies that suppressed market forces, discouraged agricultural production with inadequate incentives and failed to attract investment.

â\200\230â\200\234Although considerable disagreement persists on the pace, extent, effectiveness and sustainability of particular reform programs, a major corner appears to have been turned by Africans in thinking about their own economic problems and how to deal with them,â\200\235 says Carol Lancaster, director of the African studies program at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service.

It remains to be seen whether the change was spurred by disenchantment with burdensome state planning, a conviction that market forces are more efficient or a keener eye for what pleases Western

Sub-Saharan Africa Begins to Accept Need to Promote Free-Market Policies

lenders. But a test of Africaâ\200\231s commitment to more incentive-oriented policiesâ\200\224and of the Westâ\200\231s willingness to finance themâ\200\224 will come late this month at a United Nations special session on Africaâ\200\231s economic and social crisis. There are signs that the U.N. session could be more than just another international gabfest about Africa and its problems.

In a position paper prepared for the conference, the Organization of African

Unity calls for $a\200\234\200\230$ radical change in development priorities $a\200\231\200\235\200\235$ with more attention to agricultural production, incentives and productivity.

Because of this focus, the conference offers $\hat{a}\200\234$ the first opportunity in a long while for Africans, the World Bank and West-

erners to agree on a policy prescription $200\231$ for the future, says Princeton Lyman, a deputy assistant secretary of state for African affairs. The changing view in Africa could also pave the way for improved relations with the U.S. $200\234\200\234$ 0ne thing this administration has said is that without good, sound economic policies, we can't carry our friends, $200\235$ a State Department official says.

A number of countries already have started difficult adjustment programs to make their economies more market-oriented and, they hope, more efficient. Some have devalued their currencies, a move that boosts exports and makes imports more costly. Ghana, Zambia, Zaire and Mauritania have decontrolled crop prices or raised them substantially to give farmers more incentive to produce, the World Bank reports. Some countries are beginning to sell state enterprises and reduce public employment.

The U.S. and the World Bank are tailoring their aid programs to encourage such

changes. The U.S. has established a \$500 million, five-year fund to aid countries that are working to make their economies more efficient. Under the program last year, the U.S. distributed \$75 million to five countries. This was part of \$1.9 billion in economic and food aid, including \$782 million of special famine relief, that the U.S. sent to sub-Saharan Africa last year. But the Gramm-Rudman deficit-reduction law is likely to limit future funding.

The challenge African nations face is how to push economic changes that, in the early stages at least, frequently cause pain by raising prices and eliminating jobs. The challenge the U.S., its allies and multilateral lenders such as the World Bank face is how to provide enough funding to help Africa help itself.

Sub-Saharan Africa already is bending under \$76 billion of debt, and its debt-service burden is rising. â\200\230â\200\230In 1980-1985, only 15 of the 44 sub-Saharan African countries, holding some 15% of the groupâ\200\231s 1985 debt, were able to service their debt promptly without obtaining relief or incurring payments arrears,â\200\235 says a new report, African Debt and Financing, from the Institute for International Economics.

In addition, the Organization of African Unity has drafted a five-year economic recovery program with a \$115 billion price tag, far more than Africa and its creditors can provide.

This is clearly an unrealistic request, yet, despite budget limitations, the U.S. and its allies have a stake in helping Africa move toward the economic reforms the West espouses. The changes are worth promoting with aid because they offer the hope of economic health and because both the U.S. and Africa will suffer if market-oriented reforms fail.

MAY 19, 1986

THE NEW YORK TIMES,

MAY 22, 1986

U.S. Group Accuses Zimbabwe of Repression

By EDWARD A. GARGAN
Special to The New York Times

HARARE, Zimbabwe, May 21 â\200\224 A report issued today by an American committee of lawyers asserts that over the last three years, Zimbabweâ\200\231s Government has committed a wide range of human rights violations against its political opponents and other people in the south of the country.

The report, issued by the New York-based Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, charges that Prime Minister Robert Mugabeâ\200\231s Government has engaged in a systematic campaign of terror and repression against the minority Ndebele-speaking people of southern

Zimbabwe. Many of the reportâ\200\231s assertions, which include torture, murder, arbitrary arrest and indefinite detention, have been made in the past by Amnesty International.

A spokesman for the Zimbabwe Government, Justin Nyoka, declined to re-

spond to repeated telephone requests were being killed by the security forces Jargely

for comment on the charges. In the past, the Government has denounced

similar contentions by Amnesty International. Mr. Mugabe has described more thar/100 leaders of Mr. Nkomoâ\200\231s the rights group as $a\200\234a\200\230$ Amnesty Lies In. Party wete abducted and many have ternational. $a\200\235$ not been heard from since.

Since independence in 1980, the Nde- The reportâ $\200\231s$ authors, Michael Posbele have consistently supported ner, the executive director of the law-

. Joshua Nkomoâ\200\231s Zimbabwe African Yers committee; Elliot Schrage, a for-

mer Kennedy Fellow at the Harvard

Law School, and William Berkeley, an American journalist, all spent time in Zimbabwe last year and this year investigating charges of human rights abuses. Last month, the lawyersâ\200\231 committee issued a report describing widespread brutality by the South African police and army against black childrer in that country.

After independence, the Ndebeles

Peopleâ\200\231s Union in electoral: contests against Mr. Mugabeâ\200\231s ruling party, the Zimbabwe African National Union. Since 1982, armed bands have swept through southern Zimbabwe robbing and Kkilling. Mr. Mugabe has charged that these bands, dubbed â\200\230â\200\230dissidents, â\200\235â\200\235 have been supported by Mr. Nkomo. In 1983, the report charges, at least 1,500 Ndebele-speaking geoplehvev(jere killed by security forces dispatched to A : quell â\200\230â\200\234dissidentâ\200\235 activity. The report ;Vr}:)%uf:;d o(:?lxlldli;(: et:zleg.â\200\230ned S:_::Ã@hâ\200\234â\200\230fv%sÃ@ also charged that thousands more Nde-2: beles were beaten, that hundreds were Supported Mr. Nkomoâ\200\231s rebels durfpg detained without charges and thatthe guerrilla war against the white many women were raped by soldiers. Rnodesian @;:r?(lmeâ\200\234;â\200\231 cï¬\202"mï¬\201ke d to By 1984, the report said, fewer people \hat{a} 202 \neg Xpress their backing for Mr. Nkomg and their distrust of Mr. Mugabeâ\200\231s northern Shona-speaking but detentigns and beatings continued party. After independence many of Mr. unabated. | /In 1985, the report said, Nkomoâ\200\231s former guerrillas found

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themselves unemployed. Most of the armed $a\200\230a\200\230dissidentsa\200\235$ in Matebeleland are thought to come from the ranks of these former guerrillas.

The Governmentâ\200\231s response to the activities of these armed men has, according to the lawyers committee, resulted in a campaign of terror in the south of Zimbabwe.

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ It is the conclusion of this report that the Government $\hat{a}\200\231$ s campaign to suppress armed dissidents in Matabeleland has resulted in grave and persistent abuses of human rights, $\hat{a}\200\235\hat{a}\200\231$ the re-

portâ\200\231s authors wrote, adding that â\200\234the Ndebeles have been subjected to a: campaign of harassment and repression that has been scarcely distinguishable from the counterinsurgency campaign waged by the old white regime.â\200\235â\200\235

The Government has charged that the dissidents are supported by the South African Government and that the. police and army are simply responding to threats to the nationâ\200\231s security.

continued on pg.1115

THE NEW YORK TIMES,

â\200\230By CLIFFORD D. MAY

A defector who formerly headed Ethiopiaâ\200\231s food relief effort says that his Governmentâ\200\231s policies, as much as drought, were responsible for the catastrophic Ethiopian famine of 1984 and 1985. And, the former official asserted, these policies threatento cause continuing starvation in the future.

â\200\234We called it a drought problemn but it was more of a policy problem,â\200\231â\200\231 said the former official, Dawit Wolde Giorgis, who spoke in a recent interview, +his first since leaving Africa on Oct. 25. â\200\234Drought only complicated the situation. K there is no change in our policies, there will always be millions of hungry people in Ethiopia.â\200\235

Mr. Dawit, until recently Ethiopiaâ\200\231s Commissioner for Relief and Rehabilitation, is the most senior Ethiopian-official to defect. He said he had asked the United States for political asylum.

Served on Central Committee

A former Governor of Eritrea and deputy foreign minister, Mr. Dawit was also an original member of the Central Committee of the ruling Workers Party of Ethiopia.

During more than five hours of conversations on Long Island on Friday, and later in telephone conversations,.

Mr. Dawit, a powerful-looking man of military "bearing, provided rare glimpses into the workings and climate of the Moscowâ\200\231s closest ally in Africa.

Mr. Dawit, who is 43 years old, said that the most damaging of the Government $200\231$ s policies have been economic measures that have discouraged initiative, productivity and self-sufficiency.

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ For the peasant, the question of land is what the revolution was all about, $\hat{a}\200\231\hat{a}\200\235\hat{a}\200\231$ he said. $\hat{a}\200\230\hat{a}\200\234$ He wanted it taken from the landlords and_given to him. But instead of giving them land of their own, we collectivized, $\hat{a}\200\235\hat{a}\200\235$ he said, referring to the program of Soviet-style socialization of agriculture.

The bulk of the Governmentâ\200\231s invest-

THE NEW YORK TIMES,

In Kenya, Increasing Signs

By SHEILA RULE Special to The New York Times NAIROBI, Kenya, May 12 $\hat{a}200\224$ The recent arrests and convictions here of | several people on sedition charges $\hat{a}200\224$ 'the first major political crackdown since a failed coup in 1982 $\hat{a}200\224$ has cast new light on the political intrigues and indecurities bubbling beneath this East A'fl: (bgn country.

,Ateast nine people, including a university lecturer and two senior civil servants, have been given jail terms rapging from 15 months to five years for their reported involvement in a clandestine socialist organization called Mwakenya. In addition, at least a gcore of people have been detained, among them a prominent Kenyan autentary and a reporter for the state-owned news agency.

The authorities said some of the det\(\tilde{A}\) entions were in connection with the clandestine circulation of seditious pamiphlets that undermined \(\frac{a}{200}\) 230\(\frac{234}{4}\) the root

ETRIOPIAN POLIGIES BLAMED IN FAMINE

ment in agriculture continues to be directed to collective and state farms that, Mr. Dawit said, $a\200\230a\200\234a\200\234$ have proved to be a failure. $a\200\235a\200\235$ He noted that hunger and malnutrition*were becoming increasingly widespread in rural areas years before Ethiopia was affected by serious

 \hat{a} \200\230lackiof rainfall.

{Corruption Called Minimal

M|. Dawit asserted that very little of the fimine aid donated by the West was actnlly lost through corruption or divertd to the military. $\hat{a}\200\234$ We can be proul of that, $\hat{a}\200\235$ he said. $\hat{a}\200\231$

Fod was routinely redirected, howevel for use in the Governmentâ\200\231s resdtlement effort, a continuing prograp to move. millions of peasants froy northern parts of the country affliced by hunger and civil war to more fertle and stable regions in the south, he fid. He added that American aid wag conscientiously exempted from usefin resettlement areas, in compliang with conditons set by Washington.

- M. Dawit described as exaggerated estinates by some Western relief officiab that up to 100,000 Ethiopians had diel as a direct result of the resettlemeit effort. But he said it complicated relâ¢f logistics by absorbing such scace resources as trucks and money.

this and other aspects of the relief effirt, he said, $\hat{a}\200\230\hat{a}\200\$ was a clear contrdliction between political priorities

anl human needs. \hat{a} \200\235 \hat{a} \200\231

Ir. Dawit said that when he left Etiopia on'a fund-raising tour at the erf of October, he fully intended to retlg]. However, he said that in his abseice he learned that he was being condin\201nned by \alpha\200\230hard-line\alpha\200\235\alpha\200\231 members of th leadership as being too sympathtic to Western interests.

Mr. Dawit said friends subsequently injormed him that his residence in the Efiopian capital, Addis Ababa, had bã@en ransacked by the security police axd that it would be dangerous for him tareturn to Ethiopia.

As a result, he said, he quietly re-

of mational stability and peace. $\hat{a}\200\235$ Mivakenya was accused of seeking to take $\hat{a}\200\230$ over the Government by unlawful means. 2

Presideritial Censorship

 $\hat{a}\200\230$ Pyesident Daniel afap $\hat{a}\200\231$ Moi has ordetred a halt to discussi \hat{A} ©ns about the socialist group, which-had been the subject of banner headfihes and detailed stories in recent weeks in the nation $\hat{a}\200\231$ s thiee English-language daily newspa-

pers.

the coup attempt in 1982. (;ou;f'{",evi-'

dence has indicated that the group $a\200\231s.ac-$

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MAY 21,1986

signed from the Government in December. But until now he has reatedly refused requests for interws and refrained from criticizing tle Marxist Government in public.

Letters to Mengistu

Ipstead, Mr. Dawit said he wrote a

ries of letters to the Ethiopian lead-

, Lieut. Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam,

colleague since the overthrow of Em.

ror Haile Selassie in 1974.

He added 'that, â\200\234Like mary Ethio-

ans, I was not bold enough to sacrice myself by speaking out while still th}a country. $\hat{a}\200\235$ Had he done so, Mr. awit said, $\hat{a}\200\234$ I would, of course, have peen executed. The system does not tolprate such political differences. $\hat{a}\200\235$

. He said there was no reaction to his etttâ $200\230$ ersâ $200\230$ until earlier this month when 'thlopla issued a statement accusing im of betraying the revolution and

stealing relief money.

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ ".I $\hat{a}\200\230$ h $\hat{a}\200\230$ is was their response, $\hat{a}\200\235$ a $\200\235$ he said. $\hat{a}\200\234$ It is intended to damage my credibil—ity inside the country and out. $\hat{a}\200\235$ a $\200\235$ Asked about the charges, Mr. Dawit said they contained $\hat{a}\200\230$ a $\200\230$ no truth at all. $\hat{a}\200\235$

A recent statement from the State Department said that American monitoring of relief aid to Ethiopia showed $\frac{3}{200}\frac{230\hat{2}00}{230no}$ indication that any U.S. assistance has been diverted. $\frac{3}{200}\frac{235}{235}$

No Western relief organizations have accused Mr. Dawit of diverting funds.

Key members of the Ethiopian leadersh!p, Mr. Dawit said, had opposed revealing to the world the dimensions and details of the famine because they considered it $a\200\230a\200\234a\200\235a\200\231$

Some members of the Ethiopian Government, he added, actually $\hat{a}200\234\hat{a}200\234\hat{a}200\230did$ not know and did not want to know $\hat{a}200\231\hat{a}200\231$ how serious the situation had become in the countryside. $\hat{a}200\230\hat{a}200\234$ The leadership lives in a fz;ntasy world created by our own policies and imaginations, $\hat{a}200\231\hat{a}200\231$ he said. $\hat{a}200\234$ We don $\hat{a}200\231$ t realize how much our people are suffering. $\hat{a}200\235\hat{a}200\235$

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of Unrest

tivities date back as tar as 1981.

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ We will deal with thém, $\hat{a}\200\235\hat{a}\200\231$ the President said, $\hat{a}\200\234\hat{a}\200\230$ and I am askitg police and the special branch to arrest all loose talkers and make them reveal the sources of their rumors. $\hat{a}\200\235$

A Sign of Vulnerability

Kenyans and foreigners who follow

politics here say the recent events are a new sign of the Governmentâ\200\231s vulnerability, which was exposed nearly four years ago when the attempted coup splintered Kenyaâ\200\231s longstanding reputation for stability.

The coup attempt followed a sustained period of Government action against opponents, including the creation of a one-party state. But the political weakening of the Kenyan Government can be traced farther back, to Mr. Moiâ\200\231s taking office in 1978.

His predecessor, Jomo Kenyatta, led the nation to independence in 1963 and,

as a member of the dominant Kikuyu
! tribe, ruled with absolute authority

continued on pg. 15

THE NEW YORK TIMES,

By EDWARD A. GARGAN

KINSHASA, Zaire $\hat{a}200\224$ Fifteen years ago, President Mobutu Sese Seko decided to catapult Zaire into a distinctively African future, sharply breaking with the colonial past. He attempted to impose a way of thinking $\hat{a}200\224$ a way of life, really $\hat{a}200\224$ called $\hat{a}200\234$ authenticit $\hat{a}200\235\hat{a}200\231$ by the French-speaking elite, through which he hoped to develop the country by relying heavily on indigenous culture.

The President decreed that citizens could be called only by African names. Instead of $a^200^230a^200^234mon$ sieur,â\200\235 â\200\230â\200\234â\200\234madameâ\200\231â\200\235 or â\200\230â\200\234ma damoiselle, \hat{a} \200\235 they were to be addressed as $a^200^230a^200^230citoyena^200^235$ or $a^200^234citoyena^200^235$ enne, \hat{a} \200\235 French for \hat{a} \200\234citizen. \hat{a} \200\235 \hat{a} \200\235 Coats and ties were banned, replaced by a modified Chinese Mao suit, called an abakos, touched up with a silk ascot and pocket hankerchief. Places were renamed: Leopoldville, named for Belgian kings, became Kinshasa; the Congo river became the Zaire. Citizens had a community duty, called Solongo, to clean roads and attend to parks on Saturday afternoons. Opposition political parties were banned, while Mr. Mobutu, exercising supreme power in presumed traditional fashion, took to wearing a leopard-skin cap and carrying a carved wooden staff.

His intentions, said a Western diplomat, $\hat{a}\200\234$ were basically to wipe out the traumatic memories of the colonial period. $\hat{a}\200\235$ Authenticity, he added, is not a philosophy but perhaps a kind of political methodology.

Ideologically at least, the Africanization in Zaire has been more thorough than in many countries that have attempted to recapture a real or imagined heritage. In some, it has largely stopped at changing the names of a few cities, as in Chad, where Fort-Lamy became Ndjamena. In Tanzania, however, former President Julius Nyerere wrenched rural society apart, creating socialist communities called ujamaa villages.

Mr. Mobutu nationalized foreign companies, contending that Zairians could run them better than Belgians and other Europeans. But mismanagement, combined with collapsing commodity prices and major governmental mistakes, brought the economy to its knees. By 1983,

MAY 18, 1986

Zaire Tries to Be True to Its Traditions

agriculture and industry were moribund. Mr. Mobutu turned to the International Monetary

Fund for help $\hat{a}200\224$ a tacit admission that the adthenticity approach was not invigorating Zaire $\hat{a}200\231s$ vast, diverse society.

Today there is widespread grumbling among

young intellectuals. In March, students at the Ifstitut Makanda Kabobi, where future officials of the one legal party are trained, sent the President a stinging critique accusing him of encolraging a cult of personality, abusing power and failing to consult the people on economic decisions. It urged the creation of a second political

party.
Sending Money Abroad

Calls for authenticity, meanwhile, have largely vanished from economic discourse. â\200\234In -fhe beginning,â\200\235â\200\235 said a University of Kinshasa student, â\200\234it meant the President demanding 6f the Zairian people: â\200\230Even when we are dealing with foreigners, we must do our best not to forget our origins and not to forget our heritage.â\200\231 The decision about authenticity, was taken when the economy was very good. Thatâ\200\231s why people accepted it. The economic situation has gone very, yery wrong. I donâ\200\231t think if that decision were taken today, it would be effective. Authenticity cafnot solve the problem of the economy.â\200\235

A Western businessman and longtime resident agreed. $a\200\230\230\234$ Now the feeling is, it $a\200\231$ s not so bad to hire Westerners to advise the Government, $a\200\235\200\231\200\235$ he said. And far from demonstrating nationalist pride, many business and Government officials seem to have little confidence in the country. $a\200\234\200\230$ As -Zai-rians make money, $a\200\235$ he added $a\200\234$ they put it_into Belgian and Swiss bank accounts and American property. $a\200\235$

From the sprawling Cité, where the bulk. of Kinshasaâ\200\231s three million people live, to affluent riverfront neighborhoods, men have largely shed their abakos for sports shirts. In music clubs, women are increasingly appearing in slacks. Even at the partyâ\200\231s central bookstore, the latest tract on authenticity was dated 1979. $a\200\230a\200\234a\200\234$ There are, $a\200\235$ the university student said, $a\200\234$ more important things to worry about, $a\200\231$

THE NEW YORK TIMES,

Ethiopian Leader Urges U.S.

By SHEILA RULE Special to The New York Times

ADDIS ABABA, Ethiopia, May 21 â\200\224
The leader of the Marxist Government
here says that Ethiopia wants to improve its strained relations with the
United States, but that the Reagan Administration must first curb its â\200\234â\200\230antiEthiopia stance.â\200\235

The Ethiopian leader, Lieut. Col.

Mengistu Haile Mariam, speaking in
an unusual news conference for foreign
journalists l}ere, shart;:ly critÃ@::liz_etc;

Washington for what he termed i
â\200\234â\200\230sheer arroganceâ\200\231â\200\235 and â\200\230â\200\234blind hatredâ\200
\235â\200\231
against his Governmentâ\200\231s Marxist policies. But he said relations were not â\200\234â\200\230ir-

reparably ruptured.â\200\235

The * 90-minute session Monday touched on various subjects, including Ethiopiaâ\200\231s relations with Somalia and the Sudan and its program of relocating hundreds of thousands of people threatened by famine.

Colonel Mengistu called on $a\200\234$ well intentioned $a\200\231 a\200\235$ members of the Reagan Administration to look i{1}::) what was actu-

happening in Ethiopia. allâ\200\230yUnff))s')te'unalely, the United States Government, out of its dislike of the social economic system we have opted for ourselves to free ourselves from underdevelopment and also out of $a\200\230$ sheer arrogance, has taken this unfriendly

stance against us, $\hat{a}200231\hat{a}00231$ he said, speaking in Ambharic through an interpreter.

James R. Cheek, the chargé dâ\200\231af-faires at the American Embassy â\200\224 Washington has not sent an ambassador here in years â\200\224 said later Monday that the United States would welcome an easing of relations with Ethiopia, but that it would have to begin with discussions on basic relations. Mr. Cheek expressed concern over Ethiopiaâ\200\231s ties with the Soviet Union, accusing Moscow of exploiting its position in the region and â\200\230â\200\230generally destabilizing the area and retarding its growth.â\200\235

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MAY 22, 1986

to Soften Its Enmity

The chargé also cited what he said were Ethiopiaâ\200\231s moves to threaten the

stability of Somalia and the Sudan.

This nation has been in a virtual state of war with Somalia for nearly a dec-ade in a border dispute over the Ogaden region. This month it began p $\tilde{\text{A}}$ ©ace talks aimed at ending the conflict.

The Sudan, meanwhile, has long accused Ethiopia of backing a guerrilla army fighting in its southern region. Ethiopia, in turn, has charged that the Sudan has aided rebels fighting in its northern provinces, according to some Western sources.

Colonel Mengistu, dressed in the official royal blue suit of his Workersâ\200\231 Party, said. that his Government had always wanted peace in the region and that he had no territorial claims on his neighbors.

He said progress would be made in the peace process with Somalia, but he added that the $a\200\230a\200\234a\200\230$ one single source $200\231a\200\231$ of

CONTINUED ON PG. 15

MAY 16, 1986

Ivory Coast: boom amid W. African bust

By Peter Blackburn

: Abidjan, Ivory Coast

West Africaâ $200\231s$ answer to the Crystal Palace sprang up in the Ivory Coastâ $200\231s$ posh capital last autumn. On the banks of Abidjanâ $200\231s$ lagoon, some 450 companies built a village of wooden pavilions. An empty lot became a bustling fairground, crowned by a Ferris wheel.

Expo 85, the Ivory Coastâ\200\231s largest industrial trade fair ever $a\200\224$ and the first for 15 years $a\200\224$ attracted huge crowds and raised hopes of economic recovery after several years of recession.

Expo 86 showed the wide variety of goods â\200\224 from air

conditioners to army uniforms $\hat{a} \ge 00 \ge 224$ now made here. It also showed how much this country has developed industrially since it won its independence from France nearly 26 years ago.

For 20 years up to 1980 the country averaged a growth rate of 8 percent a year, after inflation. At independence,

there was only a handful of companies; today there are some 700; employing 90,000 people. The kinds of goods displayed at the fair all had to be imported two decades ago. One-third of all goods made here are now exported.

Industry Minister Bernard Ehui, speaking during a conference at the time of the fair, said that $a\200\234$ substantial recovery $a\200\235$ had been made in 1985, with real gross domestic product (GDP) growing by 5 percent after falling almost 10 percent during the previous three years. The ministry forecast further growth for this year.

The capital of Abidjan, meanwhile, has grown from 30,000 people at independence to nearly 2 million today.

Economic development contrasts sharply with the decline of most other West African countries. Several factors have made growth possible:

® Political stability. President Félix Houphoust-Boigny has ruled the Ivory Coast firmly for the past 25 years. This has given the country a favorable environment for economic development. Last October, he was unanimously elected for a sixth five-year term.

 \hat{A} ® Mr. Houphou \tilde{A} ©t-Boigny \hat{a} \200\231s cooperation with Franc and the West. This has combined with economic poh'cie: that encourage private enterprise and foreign capital. As a result, the number of French expatriates more than

tripled by the end of the 1970s, AmWhen Esso disco \;ei'ed offshore oil here in 1974,

erican companies felt encouraged to penetrate what had hltperto been a French pre; egrve. Ethough an :il boom dn.inâ\200\231t materialize, some 60 American â\200\230companies are now installed in the Ivory Coast, including more than

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a dozen in the oil sector. Several American banks and companies use Abidjan as a regional base.

Abidjan is arguably black Africaâ\200\231s most luxurious metropolis. Unlike Nigeria's chaotic capital, Lagos, this city is clean and orderly. It has elegant shops, good accommodations, and some of the best restaurants in black Africa. Electricity, supplied by the countryâ\200\231s hydroelectric dams, is plentiful, and one can buy practically anything one wants â\200\224 at a price.

The city is massed on a central plateau and girdled by the lagoon; a six-lane highway runs dround the plateau. American visitors say the capital $200\231$ s modern skyscrapers resemble Manhattan rather than an African city.

. $\hat{a}\200\234\Compared$ with the rest of West Africa it's paradise $h\tilde{A}\Compared$ an' American manager said.

Abidjan also-has excellent roads, water supplies, a well-equipped port, air and telecommunication links, and a pool of relatively well-educated labor. Ivorians occupy most of the administrative and managerial posts, while African immigrants do the manual work.

This is one of the few African countries that have been able to build up agriculture. It has become the worldâ\200\231s main cocoa producer and exporter of robusta coffee. It is also one of Africaâ\200\231s main producers of palm oil, cotton, rudber, pineapple, and timber.

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ What makes the Ivory Coast even more remarkable is that prosperity is based on agriculture, rather than oil or mineral resources, $\hat{a}\200\235$ one economist pointed out. $\hat{a}\200\234$ At independence it was a backwater, while Ghana, Guinea, and Senegal were far more developed. $\hat{a}\200\235$.

In an-effort tom

beans into cogoa liguor; greater utilization of the : roast coffee, but onty: one:sells.instant GO1 their combined capacity. amounts:to last yearâ\200\231s crop of 300,000 toms. . " * ings in-its timber industry by processing

The government has:pinned its-hog industrial reforms, $\hat{a}\geq 00\geq 24$ part-of & World adjustment: meant. tq make Ivorian: petitive and export-oriented. Effectivg $\hat{a}\geq 00\geq 24$ which:in the past has rup as-higha has been reduced to 40 percent; and g tions have been introduced to allow \hat{A} \$

An - export-incentive program.is; Most of the Ivory Coastâ\200\231s exports:g tries. But industry, in view. of:the.s must expand experts not:only to Frany o 5 but also to Nigeria and countries within: thesl@-regmpber Economic Community of West Africa. THE ECONOMIST

CONCLUSION NIGERIA SURVEY

The capitalist flaw

Farming and farm trade are what the vast majority of Nigerians do. Given reasonable access to markets, and some help with better seeds and farming techniques, there is evidence that they can do it very Well. But practically all farming is on a tiny scale: all large farm projects are in the public sector and operate under political risks. Large private-sector farming does not and cannot exist in Nigeria, because there is no such thing as private ownership of farmland.

For a generation Lagos, and its immediate surrounding territory, was administered as a British crown colony, under British law. That law has been preserved there. Land is owned (and frantically traded in) just as in any West European or North American economy. All that land now is urban. Throughout the rest of Nigeria the colonial power decreed, and the principle has with small exceptions been maintained, that customary law should prevail in questions of land tenure. That means different things in different parts of the country.

Broadly speaking, traditional rulers or village councils decide which land is used for what purpose. The ownership of land, however, is vested in the governors of the 18 states outside Lagos. The governor may grant a $\frac{3}{200}\frac{234}{235}$, against a payment of N10 per hectare per year. So consider the case of a private individual or concern seeking exclusive use of some landâ\200\224say a brewery wishing to grow high-quality millet to replace imported barley for beer; or a cattle-man hoping to rear Texan Brahman stock whose meat will be more eatable than that of the stringy native Fulani beasts; or a forester hoping to supply the urban demand for firewood. For all these purposes land must be enclosed, and traditional rights of use, access and grazing extinguished.

First, the would-be farmer has to find some suitable unoccupied land. This is harder than it sounds, since much poor land is left fallow for years, while other apparently unused tracts may be reserved by ancient right to nomadic cattle-herders. Then he starts negotiations with the community having rights over the land. If they agree in principle to transfer the right of use, they will bargain hard on

 $a\200\234a\200\230compensation a <math display="inline">200\235a\200\224for$ each tree, for firewood rights, for the grazing of women' a $200\231s$

goats, for grandfatherâ\200\231s grave. Sums of up to N5,000 have been paid in compensation for marginal land. Once agreement has been secured from the locals, the farmer must approach the governor for a certificate of occupancy. A progressive governor will expect a share of the actionâ\200\224if he is honest, through state representation in management, if dishonest for himself. A political involvement is inev-

itable. Even so ownership is not absolute: a 99-year certificate of occupancy may at any time be revoked by the governor, and governors and their policies change.

Certificates of occupancy may not be sold. Commercial banks will therefore not accept them as collateral for loans, the normal way of financing farm investments. But the federal agricultural-credit bank has been instructed to lend against the certificates: at this stage again a political involvement can hardly be avoided. In this most unsocialist of countries, genuine private-sector farming is impossible. You do it in partnership with, or by bribery of, federal and state government agencies, or you do not do it at all.

Similar restrictions on private farming apply throughout black Africa, whereever traditional law has survived colonialism. That means practically everywhere, with two exceptions. Kenya and Zimbabwe were both subjected to farming by white men, under European laws of ownership and inheritance. They therefore took on, afier independence, laws encouraging the private ownership of land. It may be coincidence, but in those two countries farming based on land ownership by black people (and still a few whites), and the creation of a true African peasantry, has shown the best results in the continent.

Nigeria, given its history and its peopleâ\200\231s reliance upon their traditions, can almost certainly not move into a stage of private land ownership for many years, if ever. Private-enterprise farming, except on a tiny scale within the rules of traditional communities, cannot therefore exist. It would help if the countryâ\200\231s own farm experts, and many of the foreign well-wishers who would like to help them, stopped preaching the virtues of a private sector which does not exist.

Nigeria has been attempting, rather unsuccessfully, to develop along private-enterprise lines. But the country \hat{a} 200\231s largest body of assets, and its largest single economic sector, are excluded from the

rules of ownership that have made \hat{A} « 1pi-talism work elsewhere. Without the ownership of assets, it is impossible to build

up anything recognisable as private enterprise. The whole notion that Nigeriaâ\200\224or indeed any black African country where traditional Bantu land-use customs surviveâ\200\224can use private ownership as the basis of its economic relationships must be false.

Foreigners are usually too polite to menuon the principal reason why large organisations are so badly run in Nigeria. Nigeria is an English-speaking nation: government, business, army and police are all meant to be run in the language of the former conquerors. Yet Nigerian English is often very difficult to understand, even for other Nigerians.

Broadly speaking, three African languages dominate Nigeria. (About 300 others exist, but none of them is much spoken outside peopleâ\200\231s homes.) All across the north the lingua franca is Hausa, spoken by around 40m people: it

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is widely spoken outside Nigeria too. In the south-west the Yoruba people (some 20m of them) speak their own ancient tongue: it is a tonal language and Yoruba-speakers tend to have trouble pronouncing other peopleâ\200\231s consonants. In the south-east, Ibo is widely used by more than the 10m-odd native Ibo-speakers. In Lagos most street talk is in pidgin-English, which contains more Yoruba and Portuguese words than mainstream Eng-

lish. In other cities other varieties of pidgin are spoken.

Only a tiny elite, mostly foreign-educated, of lawyers, civil servants, academics and business people use English for everyday purposes in their homes. By far the best everyday English is spoken in the south-east, for two reasonsâ\200\224that more missionary teachers were allowed to work there than elsewhere and that Ibo is not so preponderant over other languages as to make its everyday use irresistible.

But throughout Nigeria, after the first few weeks in school, English is the sole language of education. Textbooks are in English, and often absurdly old-fash-ioned: quite small children are supposed to be able to describe the â\200\234â\200\230present perfect continuous caseâ\200\235, and have been doing so for years. Yet many teachers can barely manage a conversation in English and certainly cannot write a letter in it.

For decades the best jobs have been in the army, the police, the civil service or the cumbersome parastatal organisations that are now being dismantled. Young people with good examination results have aimed for these jobs: the teachers are the educational second-raters. Recruits to the state-run teacher training colleges have almost all failed the West African School Certificate. Almost anybody who can write a passable sentence in English can get through that test. Teachers have in effect been selected for their inability to write the language they are meant to teach in.

Numbers have overwhelmed the system. In 1970 there were said to be 3.7mchildren in Nigerian primary schools. Today there are supposed to be 15m: about 1.2m new entrants join the labour force each year. It simply has not been possible to quadruple the number of properly qualified teachers. There are, it is true, enough more-or-less qualified people in the southern states, where Christian missions have been established for generations. But the northern states want Muslims and reject Yorubas or Ibos for their schools. European teachers are too expensive. The highest standards are found among the many Ghanaian expatriate teachers; but they are often resented, and from time to time the federal government expels them (but they come back: their own country is bankrupt). Some northern states have hired Filipinos on contract, but they often speak English as badly as, and certainly not in the same way as, the girls whom they try to teach.

Even India has to go on n^*ng up with continued on pg. 19

CONCLUSION NIGERIA SURVEY

English for most nationwide uses, since Hindi or any other language would be politically unacceptable. Nigeria could not possibly go over to vernacular education, without also accepting that the civil service, the police and the other nationwide services be split up on regional lines. But English has failed in the schools, and the burden on the universities is therefore intolerable.

There are at the moment about 20 universities in Nigeria. (It may be more or less: some state â\200\230â\200\230universitiesâ\200\235 are unrecognised, the status of others is undetermined.) In a four-year course, the first two years need to be spent in remedying the linguistic failures of the schools, a task for which the universities are not equipped. A visiting examiner at one of the more reputable Nigerian universities sadly told this correspondent that, when marking finals papers, â\200\234I often have to give credit not for what the student says, but for what I think he would have said if he knew how.â\200\235

It may or may not be significant $\hat{a} \geq 00 \leq 224$ there are, as usual, no figures $a \leq 200 \leq 24$ but the fastest growth in circulation in Nigeriaâ\200\231s lively and fragmented press seems to be among the newspapers printed in Hausa in Arabic characters. The Koranic schools of the north teach by rote, with hordes of pupils sitting in rows and faithfully repeating their teacher \hat{a} 200\231s holy words as he points to them on a blackboard. Devout parents pay for such teaching and often keep their children out of the official schools to preserve their religious orthodoxy. The result, at least, is a modest literacy. But the growth of the Koranic schools contributes more than anything else to the growing divisions among the many cultures of Nigeria, which English is supposed to unite.

To keep Nigeriaone

Nigeria was patched together in 1900 for the convenience of its foreign administrators, not of its own people, and was governed for 60 years on the principle of %indirect ruleâ\200\235, which did not do much for national unity. Only seven years after independence the Biafra war showed that a substantial part of the then eastern region was prepared to fight for separation from the rest. The rebels were coaxed gently back into the mainstream of the nation by the generosity of General Gowonâ\200\231s military junta, which had oil money to spare. For as long as the federal government had cash to hand out, nobody saw an advantage in separation from it. Things could be moving in another

direction now.

The talk is not so much of separatism, as of confederation or some other fancy name for weakening the authority of the central government. Most of that talk comes from the south of the country, where there is genuine apprehension about the rising fervour of Islam in the

north. A rather trivial recent incident made the talk much louder.

Late last year it leaked out, through broadcasts from overseas, that the federal government had applied for full membership of an international body called the Islamic Conference Organisation. The government first denied it, then confirmed it, then set up a study group of academics, lawyers and eminent persons to say whether it was a good thing or not. It seems that various ministers did not tell each other what they were doing: the oil ministry wanted to look more Islamic, because it was breaking OPEC $\hat{a}\200\231s$ rules and nevertheless needed Arab friends, while the foreign ministry seems to have known nothing about it. But the reaction to the $muddle \hat{a} \ 200 \ 224 if you believe the Lagos news$ papersâ\200\224was something like hysteria among southern professors, priests and assorted intellectuals. The spectre of an Islamic takeover was raised, with ample references to the cutting off cf hands and $\frac{200}{224}$ perhaps worse $\frac{200}{224}$ the banning of money-lending at interest.

Nigerian Islam has hitherto been very much its own affair. Mainline Muslims tend to regard the Nigerians as heterodox, and they have been rich enough to build their own mosques without the

Saudi subsidies that have poured into other African countries. The Libyans have been careful not to upset the authorities in the one African nation that could seriously block their presumed ambitions south of the Sahara: there is influence from the north in some of the flourishing Koranic schools, but that has always been the case since Islam was introduced by migrants from the desert. Diversity is Nigeriaâ\200\231s fascination. Its differences of geography and culture are reinforced by religion. In the far north practically everyone is Muslim and speaks Hausa. In a belt across the middle of the country every sizeable town has its mosque, but every village has pigs in the gutters: there are scores of languages behind the Hausa facade. In the southeast, where Ibo is the language of the markets, the churches are mostly Catholic (with fond memories of their Irish founding Fathers, who taught their flocks to distrust Lagos as they themselves had been taught to mistrust London). In the

south-western Yoruba country there are rival churches and chapels of every denomination, and luxurious mosques, and followers of the old gods of iron and war; Alhadji enjoys his beer, and the pillar of

the church is henpecked by three wives. The one benefit of the civil war of 1967-70 was that it immunised the country against separatism. The fight was agonising: never again, they said. The most passionate resistance to the idea of Biafra came from within the area claimed by that would-be mini-state. Its leaders, and most south-easterners, were Ibos. The Calabaris, Efik, Ijaw, Ibibio and other non-Ibos of the region had, no doubt, their grumbles about rule from far-off Lagos by Yorubas and Hausas. But they were even less happy with the idea of rule

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by Ibos from the nearby and mainly non-Ibo city of Port Harcourt.

For all its domination by three great language-groups, a very large minority of Nigerians are neither Hausas nor Yorubas nor Ibos. The 19 states are subdivided into 201 local government areas; some are

the lands of traditional chiefs, some are linguistic or ethnic enclaves, and all are passionately jealous of their borders, on which fights quite frequently break out over land rights or the enforcement of traditional law. Dividing up Nigeria again, on whatever basis, would be a bitter and bloody business. Foreigners may airily wonder why, if Nigerians dislike each other so much, they do not just split. The answer is that splitting would be far worse than staying together.

In particular the armed forces stand for unity. They and the federal police are truly Nigerian rather than regional. The army is largely officered by Muslim northerners: the navy and air force, since they demand education and technological competence, have many Ibo officers; many senior policemen are Tiv from the eastern uplands. But all units are mixed: soldiers or policemen who want to keep their units united cannot be sectarian or regionally minded. Since more than half of all Nigerians are Muslims, democracy meant Muslim rule. That was one reason why it passed without much regret $a \geq 00 \leq 24$ that and corruption.

Democracy, therefore, failed the test of keeping the nation together, as well as the test of simple probity. Capitalism fai}ed the probity test, and anyway (as Fhls survey has argued) the conditions for it to function properly will not exist until private ownership becomes possible in

the countryâ\200\231s largest single economic activity, which is farming. Like it or not, military rule and some sort of guided economy are what Nigeria is going to have for the foreseeable future. President Babangida has promised, and no doubt at present intends, to restore democracy in 1990, on some formula yet to be worked out. For that we must wait and see.

Meanwhile, the armyâ\200\231s responsibility is awesome. It must play the most subtle form of politicsâ\200\224the politics of national unity in a state that does not feel unitedâ\200\224 without the help of elections, which are the only accurate test of what people want. One formula for political acceptability is widely agreed. The soldier in charge needs to be a Muslim, so as not to offend the northern majority. But so as not to offend the south he must be tolerantly Islamicâ\200\224probably from a community where the faiths are mixed, prefera-

bly with a single wife from another area, or from abroad. He must be senior enoughnot to upset the military hierarchy.

In other words, what Nigeria needs at the top is a moderate middle-belt major-general. The supply is running short. Major-General Mohamed Buhari has done his stint as head of state and is now in detention. Major-General Tunde Idiagbon was his chief of staff, and was

continued on pg. 15

PRETORIA'S FORCES RAID 3 NEIGHBORS (Continued)

He said $\hat{a}200\230\hat{a}200\234\hat{a}200\230$ small elements of the army $\hat{a}200\231\hat{a}200\231$ conducted the raids. $\hat{a}200\234$ The operations were successfully completed, $\hat{a}200\235$ he said, making no reference to South African casualties.

Accounts of the attack from Lusaka quoted Zambian officials as saying the targets were occupied by South African refugees, not guerrillas. Two people, neither of them South African, were said to have died in the attack on Lusaka, which Zambiaâ\200\231s President, Kenneth Kaunda, termed a â\200\230â\200\230dastardly, cowardly action.â\200\235

One Death in Botswana

One man, believed to have been a Botswana Government worker, was reported to have been killed in the $3\hat{A}$ minute strike on Gaborone.

Some diplomats said the raids showed that hard-liners in the Government predominated over those favoring a negotiated settlement to the nationâ\200\231s conflicts. At the same time, these analysts suggested, the American raid

on Libya Jast month may have emboldened the South Africans, since Pretoria depicts its campaign against the Congress as part of an international effort against terrorism.:

According to official South African accounts, the attacks began early to-day when South African warplanes, flying 350 miles through Zambian airspace, bombed what Pretoria termed $\frac{3}{200}$ Congress $\frac{200}{231}$ $\frac{230}{230}$ Congress $\frac{200}{231}$ a $\frac{200}{2300}$ Congressive center and department of information and publicity $\frac{200}{235}$ 10 miles south of Lusaka.

The South African authorities aid not say what type of aircraft were used in the raids. Since a 1977 arms embargo,, South Africa has so far been unable to develop its own combat aircraft and thus relies on older airplanes including British Canberra and Buccaneer bombers and other planes built under license before the embargo was im-

. These include Italian-designed planes called Impalas in South Africa, and French Mirages. Earlier this year, however, South Africa unveiled its own combat helicopter.

In Gaborone, witnesses said, helicop-, ter-borne South African commandos' were said to have leapt f%m the air-craft at 6 A.M. with guns blazing, attacking a village called Mogaditsane, five miles west of the capital and near a

Botswana Defense Force barracks. The South Africans were Said to have dropped leaflets urging Botswana

troops not to interfere and saying their targets were the African National Congress, not Botswana nationals.

Last June, 12 people died when the South Africans raided Botswana. Since then, the authorities in Gaborone have seemed to crack down on the Congress, expelling some of its officials.

For several years now, South Africa has shown little hesitation in attacking black-ruled neighbors it accuses of harboring its foes and has struck at Mozambique, Lesotho and Angola in addition to the nations attacked today.

U.S. Voices â\200\2300utrageâ\200\231

By BERNARD WEINRAUB
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 20 $a\200\224$ The Reagan Administration expressed $a\200\234a\200\230$ out-rage $a\200\231a\200\231$ today over the South African military attacks.

After an official protest was filed, a spokesman said that $a\200\234$ further steps $a\200\235$ were under consideration by the United States against Pretoria. d

Despite the Administrationâ\200\231s criticism, however, the White House said it was not considering major economic sanctions against South Africa. â\200\234We donâ\200\231t think sanctions are the solution,â\200\235 said Larry Speakes, the White House spokesman. â\200\230It punishes the very people we are trying to help.â\200\235

Last September, under Congressional and public pressure, President Reagan ordered a series of limited economic sanctions.

In what were described as the Administration $200\231$ s strongest comments against South Africa, Mr. Speakes said the South African military raids $200\230\200\234\200\230\could$ very well be a major setback $200\235$ for peace prospects in the region.

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ We vigorously condemn these attacks by South Africa $\hat{a}\200\235$ on the three neighboring countries, said Mr. Speakes, adding: $\hat{a}\200\230\hat{a}\200\234$ The United States stands with the Governments and peoples of those countries in expressing our sense of outrage at these events. $\hat{a}\200\235$

White House officials said the harshly worded comments were prompted by Secretary of State George P. Shultz. =

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ Shultz felt very strongly, $\hat{a}\200\235$ said a key White House official. $\hat{a}\200\234\hat{a}\200\234$ It $\hat{a}\200\231s$ about as strong a statement as we've issued.

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL WIAY 23, 1986

Right-wing extremists seized control of a meeting hall in Pietersburg and prevented South Africaâ\200\231s foreign minister from addressing members of the ruling National Party. Police used tear gas to disperse the extremists, who believe that the government is betraying white interests by easing certain apartheid laws.

Thereâ\200\231s some feeling that the South Africans may have torpedoed their own peace talks. It makes us doubt their sincerity, their commitment to peace.â\200\235â\200\231

The State Department spokesman, Bernard Kalb, told reporters that the Snuth African charge dâ\200\231affaires, Andre Killian, had been summoned to the State Department this morning to receive an official protest from the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester A. Crocker.

White House and State Department officials said further steps were under consideration by the United States, and indicated that one possible move was the recall of the American Ambassador Herman W. Nickel. Mr. Nickel was recalled last June for three months after South Africa conducted a raid into neighboring Botswana.

What especially upset Administration officials about the attacks was that they were made while a Common-wealth peace mission was in South Africa.

Although President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia said the South African attacks were inspired by the American raid on Libya last month, Administration officials said such a comparison was wrong and far-fetched.

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ It is quite a different situation, $\hat{a}\200\235$ said Mr. Speakes. $\hat{a}\200\230\hat{a}\200\234\hat{a}\200\234$ Libya and Colonel Qaddafi have been the number one exporters of terrorism on a worldwide basis and we produced proof of that. $\hat{a}\200\235\hat{a}\200\235$

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ In this case the South Africans and their neighbors were engaged in what appeared to be a constructive solution to the problems they $\hat{a}\200\231$ re experiencing with some dissident groups. $\hat{a}\200\235\hat{a}\200\231$ -

At the State Department, Mr. Kal

said, $a\200\230a\200\234$ They simply are not parallel. Libya is the worlda $200\231s$ principal proppnent of state-sponsored terrorism. The governments of Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe have made seriots efforts to limit cross-border violence directed at South Africa. $a\200\235$

AFRICA RAIDS: WHAT GOAL? (Continued)

3 counter that impression and partly to Not long before the raids, parts of the jemonstrate to black-ruled nations and South African Government regarded as (10 African National Congress that relatively liberal had sought to gener- pretoriaâ\200\231s will to rule had not been ate a mood of optimism around the ef- weakened by 20 months of violent proforts of the Commonwealth mediators test and that, if there are to be negotiaknown as the Eminent Persons Group. tions of some kind, then Pretoria The group had visited the Congressâ\200\231s wishes to talk from a position of overt headquarters in Zambia shorlty before military strength. the raida and wasback in Cape Town The other domestic factor, as dis-

WL GRS SRS cerned by South African political com-

The deal they were reportedly offer- mentators, was that the governing Naing was that, if Pretoria legalized the tjonal Party has seen its supported African National Congress, outlawed eroded by extreme rightists who seek a since 1960, and released its imprisoned. return to apartheid in its old-style, unleaders, notably Nelson Mandela, the compromised form. A show of strength Congress would use its influence to halt, against those perceived as Communist-the violence raging across the country. | jed black radicals thus might reassure

To some in the Government, that White supporters that the authoritiesâ\200\231

m eemed pe inati in i trol of
like appeasement, deterrmnauon to remain in con
"So?tvhh:\lgc:n comi ntatgr's said, and the nationâ\200\231s evolution had not faltered.
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the raids were mounted, partly to $\hat{a}\200\234$ We also know that military violence township unrest.

Although the outside world might see township protesters, and the African $\hat{a}\200\230$ National Congress, as pursuing some kind of legitimate role, South Africa $\hat{a}\200\231$ s message, as articulated in Afrikaans-language editorials and official commentaries, seemed to be that, as ever, the security of the white fortress against what is depicted as terrorism was paramount. $\hat{a}\200\234$ We believe that the Defense Force also sees the matter in this light, $\hat{a}\200\235$ Beeld said, $\hat{a}\200\230\hat{a}\200\234\hat{a}\200\230$ that action against terrorists will always be inevitable. $\hat{a}\200\235$

Moreover, the newspaper said, if President Reagan could order the bombing of Libya and if Western nations at the Tokyo summit decide that $\frac{3}{200}\frac{34\hat{a}}{200}$ must be eradicated once and for all, then they should not threaten South Africa with sanctions

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ en she protects her own interests. $\hat{a}\200\235\hat{a}\200\235$

will not solve anything, $\hat{a}\200\231\hat{a}\200\231$ the Afrikaanslanguage daily Beeld, which some-

times articulates Government thinking, said in an editorial. $\hat{a}\200\234\hat{a}\200\230$ Once the dust has settled, the diplomatic process will proceed. $\hat{a}\200\235$

Yet, those caiculations seem to ignore the mood of many of the nationâ\200\231s black townships. While it is generally acknowledged that the African' National Congress does not steer day-to-day protest in the townships, it is none-theless viewed by many blacks as the torch-bearer of a still indistinct future.

By attacking the Congress, thus, South Africaâ\200\231s white rulers seemed ready to risk another escalation of the nationâ\200\231s violence. That, in itself, will prompt a tough response from authorities who seem long ago to have acknowledged their reluctance or failure to secure a political settlement of the

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TrEe WASHINGTON POST Moy 201986 Bishop, Aid Figure Die in Sudan Plane Crash; Rebel Fire Cited

NAIROBI, Kenyaâ\200\224Anglican Bishop John Malow of Wau, in southern Sudan, and Mark Fletcher, a South African-born aid coordinator for the Band Aid charity program, were among eight persons killed when rebels shot down an aircraft over southern Sudan on Sunday, a World Vision relief organization spokesman said yesterday.

The official Sudan News Agency said rebels near Rumbek, 580 miles south of Khartoum, downed a military plane with an SA7 missile. It identified one of the victims as Makour Deshgai, governor of southern Sudanâ\200\231s Lake District. But the rebel radio said insurgents shot down a helicopter flying into Rumbek, The Associated Press reported.

Jacob Akol, a spokesman for World Vision International here, said Fletcher lived in Belgium before going to Sudan and worked for the rock music charity Band Aid, coordinating relief operations in southern Sudan with World Vision International.

OUT OF ETHIOPIA (Continued) peasants, and he insists, contrary to some allegations, that little of the money raised by Live-Aid was diverted to military purposes.

Nor does Mr. Dawit show signs of abandoning his attachment to land reform. 0} g the peasant, $\hat{a} \geq 00 \geq 35$ he maintains, $\hat{a} \geq 00 \geq 34$ the question of land is what the revolution was all about. He wanted it taken from the landlords and given to him. But instead of giving them [peasants] land, we collectivized. $\hat{a} \geq 00 \geq 35$

Mr. Dawit affirms that emergency food shipments were used routinely to lure peasants into the resettlement program, which in turn had the political goal of depopulating the rebellious northern part of the country. As a former governor of Eritrea, he is more than casually familiar with that rebellion.

Before going public with his criticisms, Mr. Dawit wrote a series of letters to Ethiopiaâ\200\231s Communist strongman Mengistu Haile Mariam. Col. Mengistu responded by accusing Mr. Dawit of stealing relief money.

.« was not bold enough to sacrifice myself by speaking out while still in the country, \hat{a} \200\231 says Mr. Dawit. \hat{a} \200\234I would, of course, have been executed. The system does not tolerate such political differences. \hat{a} \200\235 A

Welcome to the United States, Mr. Dawit. You will have time enough to discover that what happened to Ethiopiaâ\200\231s revolution is ominously similar to the fate of every other revolution the Communists have launched. SEOUNENARRIEESSRPROMIES ESEEOME WITH FINE PPINT (Continued) While Mr. Botha renewed his promises of racial im-

provements last week. he also made clear that the crack-down on township violence could toughen. Some American analysts assert that such duality is inevitable at a time of expectations raised by the stirrings of change. Yet earlier, while Government ministers repeated the refrain that apartheid is dead, authorities reconfirmed plans to grant nominal independence to the so-called tribal homeland of KwaNdebele in December, thus seeming to reassert the notions of ethnic compartmentalization that are seen as the guarantors of white survival.

APARTHEID THWARTS EFFORT T@ TRAIN

suit, & red shirt with white ruffles, and a white umtrella.

Cecil Ngwane hasnâ $200\231$ t any tinery Dressed in khaki pants and shirt, he watches the show with distaste.

His childhood in Nqutu inculcated simpler tastes and different values. Both of Mr. Ngwaneâ\200\231s parents were nurses who lived on the grounds of the local hospital. Mr. Ngwane played with the black and white children of doctors and nurses. â\200\234â\200\234To say it was a multiracial setup suggests that one was conscious of different colors. In fact, we werenâ\200\231t. It was uniracial,â\200\235â\200\235 he says.

He impressed Anglo talent scouts by quoting George Bernard Shaw, John Stuart Mill and D.H. Lawrence. $\hat{a}200230\hat{a}200234\hat{a}2002300$ f course I needed the money, but I thought we are all living to make life better, and you can $\hat{a}200231$ t do that unless you're up high, $\hat{a}200235\hat{a}200235$ Mr. Ngwane says of his dreams at Anglo.

Once in Johannesburg, however, Mr. Ngwane found the university work difficult and the surroundings alien. $\hat{a}200234\hat{a}200230I$ didn $\hat{a}200231t$ belong to that place. It belonged to the white guys, $\hat{a}200235$ he says.

The same alienation prompted two other Anglo trainees to shun the student cafeteria in favor of eating with black university workers. Anglo, sensing that black students weren $200\231$ t talking to whites, asked each of its proteges to interview and write about a white person on campus. Mr. Ngwane made one up.

When he flunked accounting a second time, Mr. Ngwane was dropped from the training program and took a job as a clerk at Angloâ\200\231s gold mine in Welkom. It was a less dignified life. At the physical examination, Mr. Ngwane and hundreds of other blacks were paraded naked in front of company examiners. He was housed in a compound surrounded by 12-foot walls with barbed wire on top.

With the relatively high status of clerk, Mr. Ngwane shared a small room with three other men. $\hat{a}\200\234$ It was like boarding school, but old people were there living

like school children, $\hat{a} \geq 00 \geq 35$ he says. One morning at 7 a.m., a white foreman woke him up and ordered him to clean his room.

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ You come to regard the white man as superior and accept it. I almost said $\hat{a}\200\230$ baas $\hat{a}\200\231$ (the obsequious Afrikaans word for boss) to him. $\hat{a}\200\235$

Mr. Ngwane lasted one year and 24 days at Welkom. In order for Mr. Ngwane to retake his accounting exam and get his degree, Anglo arranged a job for him as a clerk in its Johannesburg headquarters.

Anglo says it wants the trainees to think of themselves as managers, not as blacks. Mr. Ngwane says he identifies with neither black workers nor management. Moreover Mr. Ngwane no longer sees how he can improve society by improving himself.

The Success

Anglo has spent well over \$100,000 to groom Jacob Maroga. One of the two to finish the Anglo training program, he is only the second black engineer ever to work at a South African mine. In the status-conscious world of the mines, Mr. Maroga has been a stunning success. As Western Deep Levels Mineâ\200\231s only engineer to complete a university degree instead of an apprenticeship. he commands grudging

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(Continued)

respect even frÃ@m conservative whites.

 $\hat{a}\200\234T$ have to make the guys look at me as an engineer, not as a black, $\hat{a}\200\235$ he says.

And Mr. Maroga expects to be treated with -appropriate deference. He was enraged when thrown in for a physical exam with hundreds of black laborerg, and he demanded to be treated like the white engineers. The mine manager quickly rectified the mistake.

Mr. Maroga started in January and already earns about \$850 a month. $\hat{a}\200\230\hat{a}\200\234$ There $\hat{a}\200\231$ s going to be a need for engineers. I must set an example for the guys who come after me, $\hat{a}\200\235$ he says.

The Activist

In six years, Mafa Goci, 27, has come full circle: from the streets of the black township of Duncan Village to the corridors of Anglo and the classrooms of Witwatersrand, then to the all-black University of Fort Hare, where he was arrested for stoning President P.W. Bothaâ\200\231s limousine, and finally back to the streets of Duncan Village.

Here he joined the local residents $200\231$ association and became a teacher with Masazane, a community-education program whose name means $200\230\$ Last month he was elected regional publicity secretary of the United Democratic Front, an important anti-apartheid position.

That makes him a carefully watched young man, and, as he drives a friendâ\200\231s beat-up car through Duncan Village, he points out a series of unmarked police cars to a visitor. Mr. Goci says this, not Anglo, is the proper place for him. â\200\230â\200\234â\200\230My capabilities are an asset for the community. I can pinpoint issues and explain them in laymenâ\200\231s terms.â\200\235

At the moment the government wants to demolish Duncan Village and pave it over with a major highway. $\hat{a}200\2340$ ne can explain that it isn $\hat{a}200\231$ t inevitable that people must make way for a road, that there are ways and means to make a road without disrupting community life, $\hat{a}200\235$ says- Mr. Goci.

Mr. Goci also has negotiated community demands for new schools and housing. Donald Carr, a white East London town councillor, says Mr. Goci can sway his entire negotiating team with a nod. $a\geq 00\geq 30a\geq 00\geq 34$ worries me a little bit. Heâ $\geq 00\geq 31$ very, very deep. $a\geq 00\leq 35$

Mr. Gociâ\200\231s brief stint with Anglo wasnâ\200\231t distinguished. especially when he had to speak in front of the video cameras e program often used. $a\200\234$ Purportedly I was making faces at the camera, $a\200\235$ he says mischieviously. I was feeling like a monkey, so I was doing my best to show I hadnâ\200\231t learned anything. $a\200\235$

Mr. Goci also was disturbed by what he saw in brief tours of the mines that built the fortunes of white South Africa and Anglo. Mr. Goci says he felt tremendous guilt when the workers asked what he did-to earn his Anglo allowance and all he could say was $200\230\200\230$

When a magazine reporter asked Mr. Goci whether he was grateful to Anglo, he said no. $\hat{a}\200\234I$ said that the money being used .on us was money that rightfully belonged to our fathers who were working in the mines and who weren $\hat{a}\200\231t$ paid money due to them. $\hat{a}\200\235$

CONCLUSION NIGERIA SURVEY CONTINUED

arrested along with him on his return from Mecca after last Augustâ\200\231s coup. Major-General Mamman Vatsa was shot on March 5th. Major-General Domkat Bali is defence minister and army chief of staff, combining the two most powerful jobs in the state. Major-General Ibrahim Babangida, the president, lives closeguarded in Dodan Barracks, Lagos.

If the major-generals cannot keep the people happy, they will have to meet discontent with repression. If they do not keep the armed forces happy, there is a real danger from disgruntled majors. In the happy days of middle-belt (Christian) Major-General Yakubu Gowon, the military government bought peace by placatory hand-outs of oil money. For the moment there is no such money. Running military politics without spare cash is going to demand extraordinary skill: and if the generalsâ\200\231 skill fails, the result could

be bloody and continued chaos.

U.S. GROUP...(CONTINUED)

The 201-page report quoted from 1n-

terviews with many people who said they had been tortured by members of the security forces.

* The report notes that the countryâ\200\231s former minority rulers, the whites, have not in general been harassed but rather have been welcomed.

ETHIOPIA LEADER URGES +++ (CONTINUED)

the conflict was Somaliaâ\200\231s failure to recognize international boundaries.

The colonel said that his Government $a \ge 00 \ge 31$ concern was to see peace in the Sudan and that there was $a \ge 00 \ge 30$ absolutely no linkage in character or origin $a \ge 00 \ge 31$ between the Sudan $a \ge 00 \ge 31$ and Ethiopia $a \ge 00 \ge 31$ rebel activities.

He characterized as $a\200\230a\200\2301$ amentable $a\200\231a\200\235a\200\231$ the defection to the West last year of Ethiopia $a\200\231$ s top refugee official, Dawit Wolde Giorgis, who has been accused by the authorities here of embezzling hundreds of thousands of dollars.

Mr. Dawit, interviewed in New York over the weekend, said he believed his Governmentâ\200\231s collectivization policies were as responsible as the drought for the catastrophic Ethiopian famine of 1984 and 1985. Mr. Dawit, who said he was seeking asylum in the United

States, said he was convinced these

policies could lead to further starvation in the future.

Colonel Mengistu defended his nationâ\200\231s policy of resettlement, which involves moving people from distant villages to selected sites for what the Government calls improved social services and a better quality of life. The program has been criticized as involving gross violations of human rights.

The colonel said the program, which has been temporarily suspended to consolidate it, as the authorities put it, would continue on a large scale. â\200\234We believe this project has to be pressed ahead and carried on on a large scale until such time as people are reliably able to feed themselves,â\200\235 he said.

IN KENYA INCREASING

join the continuing drift to the urban slums. Some officials put the number of unemployed at more than 6.5 million, although others say the figure is higher, and suggest that the number could triple.

Some analysts suggest that the jobless men lining the streets of his cosmopolitan capital city are members of a

growing malcontented class that could some day direct their anger at the wealthy landed elite of Cabinet members, political party leaders and senior , civil servants.) until his death in 1978. But Mr. Moi, a member of the minority Kalenjin tribe, required the backing of key Kikuyu figures, including Mr. Moiâ\200\231s Vice President, Mwai Kibaki. t Political sources here say Mr. Moi has tried to reduce Kikuyu dominance of Kenyan politics and that his relationship with the Kikuyu elite is tense. But At the same time, they say, Mr. Moi has been unable to forge politically solid links with other major tribes. An Economic Balm

Some Kenyans and others say that the latest unease has been ten'}pered, at least for now, by a much-improved economy. Kenyaâ\200\231s long-stagnant earnings from coffee exports have risen dramatically, while tourism hgs benefitted from the success of the film â\200\234Out of Africa.â\200\235â\200\235 Declines in world oil prices

... (CONTINUED)

and interest rates have meant Jarge savings for Kenya.

 $\hat{a}\200\234\hat{a}\200\234I$ think the economy has saved us for a couple of years, $\hat{a}\200\235$ said a political scientist here, who asked that he not be named. $\hat{a}\200\234But$ if the economy gets into trouble and there are more and more people unemployed, more and more blatant political corruption and more people with empty and howling bellies, then' we can expect to see some very difficult times. $\hat{a}\200\235$

With the worldâ\200\231s highest population growth rate at more than 4 percent annually, the Government can expect continuing tensions as Kenyans struggle to find room to live and food to eat.

Goals Cannot Be Met

Vice President Kibaki, who oversees the nationâ\200\231s family planning program, said in a recent speech that the population would grow from the current 20 million to 35 million by the end of the century and that, for Kenyans to enjoy a modest improvement in their standard of living, a minimum 5.6 percent yearly economic growth would have to be achieved over the next 14 years. But with the current population growth rate, he warned, such a target could not be achieved.

Of particular concern to Government officials is unemployment, as students leave school with no job prospects and

NEW HILL EFFORT OPENS TO PRESSURE

to apply $\hat{a}\200\234$ punitive sanctions $\hat{a}\200\235$ on

South Africa in an effort to force an

end to apartheid.

Kennedy and other members of Congress at the news conference cited the worsening racial violence inside South Africa, marked by the rise in the average monthly death toll among blacks from 70 last year to 130 now, and the South African raids Monday on black nationalist sites in three neighboring states.

Gray said these developments showed there had been $a\200\234$ no meaningful reform $a\200\235$ in the apartheid system over the past year and that it is not only an int $a\200\234$ threat to regional peace. $a\200\235$

Thesanctions bill is being introduced in the House by 20 Democrats and 10 Republicans, including a conservative, Rep. Vin Weber (R-Minn.), and in the Senate by 13 Democrats and one Republican, Weicker.

The proposed sanctions would go far beyond the meastures Reagan imposed Sept. 9. They ended U.S. bank loans to the South African government, stopped computer sales to -apartheid-enforcing agencies and banned the sale of South African krugerrands in the United. States.

The proposed legislation is also stronger than a 1985 House-ap-

proved bill, which does not include a ban on landing rights for South African aircraft, a prohibition on imports of coal, uranium and steel or any provision for the disinvestment of U.S. computer firms.

The proposed ban on aircraft would end the five flights a week by South African Airways between Johannesburg and New York.

Ending imports of the three materials would strike at a main source of foreign exchange for

(Continued)

The prospects for Congress passing such new sanctions legislation before adjourning for the fall campaigns remain uncertain, according to House and Senate sources.

Rep. Howard -E. Wolpe (D-Mich.), chairman of the House Africa subcommittee, said he plans to mark up the bill the first week of June and to bring it to a floor vote by the end of that month. The Senate, however, is unlikely to move as fast, sources said.

South Africa, though U.S. importsCHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR of them are relatively small. Annual MAY 22, 1986

South African uranium exports to o . 9

the United States are valued at Commonwealthâ\200\231s effort

about \$192 million, coal at \$27 mil- alive, South African says

lion and steel at \$117 million, ac- Foreign Minister R. F. Botha said cording to a House Africa subcom- yesterday an effort by Commonmittee. wealth countries to set up talks be—
Unlike the House-approved bill, tween the government and black the proposal also calls for \$25 mil- guerrillas was still alive, despite lion in U.S. aid for education assist- South Africaâ\200\231s raids Monday on alance to black South African refu- %;gegl glifn'mau?fgem in neighborgees and for community develop- aCcK countries.

ment programs selected in consul- _ The Capeheadquarters of tation with black leaders but with- li0essaid yester-the outlawed Afout the involvement of the South day that therican National African government South AfricanCongress (AN-C)
o e: raids on reported had no convincing

Provision for such aid was includ mjjitary rationale and were meant ed in the compromise legislation to mollify the right wing of the rul-worked out between the House and ing National Party. Senate last year but not enacted warrred that Monday's actions were after Reagan announced his sanc-just-the $\hat{a}200\234$ first installment $\hat{a}200\235$ in the tions. campaign to crush the ANC.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, W&Iâ\200\230 Ald fOlâ\200\230 MOZam quue.. \mid B

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Special to The New York T:mes

INYANGA, Zimbabwe â\200\224 Capt. Steve Norris of the British Army made a close insgection of the 48 Mozambican Army officers standing at attention before him, briskly trimming stray threads from their camouflage uniforms with a razor blade.

Through a Portuguese interpreter, he congratulated the Mozambicans for having successfully completed a rigorous 12-week training course run by the British Military Advisory and Training Team in Zimbabweâ\200\231s eastern Inyanga Mountains bordering Mozambique.

The Mozambicans marched off smartly to graduation ceremonies and returned to their war-torn country that night.

Captain Norrisâ\200\231s attention to details of dress was in striking contrast to the condition of the ragged soldiers the Mozambican officers would return to in the eight-year-old battle against the South African-backed rebels of the Mozambique National Resistance.

The South Africans have been supplying the rebels in violation of a 1984 accord with Mozambique in which the two sides pledged not to give material help to oppositon movements in each otherâ\200\231s country. A British officer who visited Mozambique recently estimated that only 40 percent of the Mozambican battalion he saw had boots. Many of the soldiers who did, he said, lacked laces.

 \hat{a} 200\230Valuable New Skills \hat{A} ®

The British assert that their spit-and-polish attitude raises morale and goes hand in hand with teaching crucial skills such as map reading and logistical planning and with maintaining discipline. .

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ These men are fine soldiers and they are going back to Mozambique with valuable new skills which should improve their performance, $\hat{a}\200\235$ Captain Norris said.

It has been suggested that the 48 Mo-zambican officers remain together in one brigade to emphasize the effectiveness of their new training.

The graduation .ceremony highlighted the unusual cooperation between Mozambique, neighboring Zimbabwe and Britain in the war against the Mozambican rebels, which has shattered Mozambiqueâ\200\231s economy and left its army demoralized and largely ineffective.

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MA-Y 18, 1986

tish Spit and Polish

The British will train some 200 Mo-Zzambican officers this year. The training, coupled with a shipment of British radios, represents a symbolic effort by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcherâ\200\231s Conservative Government to aid President Samora Machelâ\200\231s Marxist Government against the rebels.

 $\hat{a}\200\2340ur$ aim is to help in whatever small way we can, $\hat{a}\200\235$ a British military attaché said at the graduation ceremo- $\hat{a}\200\230ny$. $\hat{a}\200\234\hat{a}\200\230We$ have no illusions that we can tip the balance in favor of the Mozambicans in 1986. $\hat{a}\200\235$

Terror Rife in Cities

Much greater aid by Zimbabwe, which sent some 12,000 troops to Mozambiquelast year, was insufficient to counter the rebels $\hat{a}\200\231$ activity.

Mozambiqueâ\200\231s major cities â\200\224 Maputo, Beira, Quelimane and Tete â\200\224 are frequent targets of terrorist attacks, such as the land-mine explosions on Maputoâ\200\231s public beach in April in which three people lost limbs. The rebels have also concentrated their attacks on factories in those cities, reducing Mozambiqueâ\200\231s already small manufacturing capacity.

Mozambiqueâ $\200\231s$ rural areas have been plunged into near anarchy, with even subsistence agriculture disrupted by the rebelsâ $\200\231$ maurauding, according to foreign medical workers in the country.

Zambezia Province, which generally exports rice and other food from the fertile Zambezi River delta, has been

80 badly affected by the rebel war that the Mozambican Government recently announced that a million people there face acute food shortages.

Not surprisingly, the situation has taken its toll on the performance of the

Mozambican Army. Poorly equipped, badly fed and often not paid, the army has proved a feeble ally to the Zimbabwean forces sent to guard the 180-mile transport corridor linking landlocked Zimbabwe to the port of Beira in Mozambique.

Rebel Camp Captured

The Zimbabwean forces headed efforts to rid central Mozambique of the rebels, notably by capturing their Casa Banana headquarters in the Gorongosa area last august. The plan was to turn the area over to the Mozambicans. But the Mozambican Army lost Casa Banana to a smaller rebel force in Janu-

ary, forcing the Zimbabweans to recapture the camp recently.

The Zimbabweans are holding the Casa Banana camp themselves this time, according to the British military men. The camp could not be left in rebel control because it is only 37 miles from the Zimbabwe-to-Beira transport corridor, which includes vital rail, road and oil pipeline connections.

The Zimbabwean Army has now scaled back its forces in Mozambique from 12,000 to about 6,500, according to British military liaison officers, and has taken on the more realistic task of safeguarding the transport route from rebel interference.

It is in Zimbabweâ\200\231s interests to maintain the transport links to Beira, but officials stress that the Government of Prime Minister Robert Mugabe is also morally indebted to the Machel Government for its support in the battle to end white Rhodesian rule in the $1970\ a^2$

Rebels Get South African Herp

A British instructor noted that $-\hat{a}\geq00\geq30$ Mozambique really took several bad beatings from the Rhodesians $\hat{a}\geq00\geq35$ for its support of Mr. Mugabe $\hat{a}\geq00\geq31$ s now-disbanded guerrilla army. $\hat{a}\geq00\geq34$ Now Mozambique is still - suffering from these rebels, $\hat{a}\geq00\geq35$ he said.

Western gdiplomats in Zimbabwe and Mozambique agree that South Africa has continued to the Mozambique National Resistance with supplies and training in violation of its

March 1984 nonaggression pact with Mozambique. nhlde acogix'd v;vatsur;ug-o posed to signal Mozambiqueâ\200\231s

the West and to the destabilization efforts by South Africa.

Western diplomats in Maputo say they are pleased with the warmer relations with Mozambique, but add that they are not able to help control the rebel war. The failure of the South Africa-Mozambique accord has left Brit-

ain, and the West in general, offering Mozambique merely symbolic help, such as the officersâ\200\231 training course in Zimbabwe.

 $\hat{a}\200\230\hat{a}\200\230As$ long as South Africa continues to insist on spreading its troubles $\hat{a}\200\230$ throughout the region, it seems Mozambique will continue to suffer, $\hat{a}\200\231$ the British officer said. $\hat{a}\200\234$ We want to help but we $\hat{a}\200\231$ re just spitting into the wind. $\hat{a}\200\235$

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