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AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS REPORT ON THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF
VIOLENCE IN THE CISCHEI

4th September 1992

1. Introduction

The African National Congress welcomes the opportunity to put forward its views on the nature and causes of violence in the Ciskei. We have made a number of submissions on this matter since the current wave of violence and instability started in Ciskei early in 1991. This wave of violence has reached its peak over the last month, and the following report sets out the nature of the current wave of violence, the background to the key actors involved in the perpetration of the violence, and a set of proposed solutions to the violence which we believe will once again create a climate for free political activity in the Ciskei.

2. The current wave of violence

We wish to once again submit evidence that there is an absence of free political activity in the Ciskei, specifically regarding activities of the ANC and allied organisations. While the restrictions on ANC activities began in early 1991, they reached a high point during and subsequent to the state of emergency declared in October 1991, and again over this period of mass action up the present. During recent months there has been a stronger clampdown on political activity utilising Section 43 of the above Act, despite agreements reached at a national level that this section would be repealed. It must be noted that this section even violates Ciskei's own Bill of Rights. A full bench decision of the Ciskei Supreme Court on 9 December 1991 already found that the restrictions on meetings in the Ciskei National security Act violate the Ciskei Bill of Rights, and in particular freedom of association and assembly.

Details of security force and ADM activities against the ANC during the last month are contained in annexure A to this document. These reports include only a few of the incidents of violence of a more serious nature; the general incidence of violence has reached proportions almost impossible to monitor.

It is evident from these reports that a systematic policy is being pursued by the Ciskei administration and security forces to prevent the ANC from operating legally in Ciskei. The Chief Magistrate in Alice, Mr Mxesibe, has informed us that magistrates throughout Ciskei have been given instructions to refuse permits for any march. This was confirmed by the Middledrift magistrate who said that he had received written documentation to this effect. Marches and rallies which were planned as peaceful demonstrations have been forcefully broken up in such places as Alice (3-8-92 and 5-8-92), Bisho (4-8-92), Mdantsare (3-8-92), Middledrift (21-8-92), Pakamisa (5-7-92), Peddie (13-8-92) and Tentergate (3-8-92). Not only have peaceful rallies, marches and

demonstrations been broken up, even ordinary branch and sub-regional meetings have been targeted for action. Some the places at which disruption of such meetings by Ciskei security force members occurred were Cwaru village (18-7-92), Keiskammahoek (20-7-92 and 27-7-92), Middledrift (18-7-92), Ngqwele (21-6-92), Peddie (13-8-92), and Tyutyu (19-8-92).

There is a concerted campaign of harassment, intimidation and what can only be referred to as state terrorism, waged by the Ciskei security forces, in conjunction with headmen and ADM members, against the ANC and allied organisations. Attacks on ANC members' houses by Ciskei security force and ADM members occurred at Alice (17-8-92), Balfour (2-8-92), Beccles farm (6-8-92), Lower Rexu village (9-8-92), Mdantsane (3-8-92), Rhamnyiba (19-8-92), Tentergate (13-8-92) and Zinyoka location (16-8-92). ANC members have been systematically assaulted by Ciskei security force and ADM members at Alice (24-8-92), Balasi (2-8-92), Beccles Farm (6-8-92), Mdantsane (3-8-92 and 4-8-92), Middledrift (3-8-92), Pakamisa (13-8-92), Peelton (3-8-92), Qongqotha (19-8-92), Seymour, Tentergate (25-7-92 to 10-8-92), and Zwelitsha (15-8-92). At least seven people have died as a result of the above incidents, including a four year old girl at Mdantsane and a two month old baby at Phakamisa. On the 3rd and 4th August at Cecilia Makiwane hospital an estimated 30 people were admitted with injuries as a result of security force actions.

As can be noted from the detailed descriptions in Annexure A, in all these actions the key actors have been the Ciskei security forces, the ADM and the headman. We wish to make submissions on the role each of these components has played in the violence.

3. The security forces

Ciskei security forces, including the Ciskei defence Force under the control of Brigadier Marius Oelschig, the Ciskei police under the control of General J.J. Victor, and military intelligence under the control of Colonel Ockert Swanepoel, have been the central component in fomenting of the above situation of violence, and they have aided other forces such as the ADM and headmen in pursuing acts of violence and intimidation against ANC members. In these actions they themselves have been guided by other forces. The ANC submits to this conference that the activities of the Ciskei security forces are orchestrated by members of the South African Defence Force, who have directed and even controlled the current Ciskei regime from its inception.

Brigadier Oupa Gqozo was put into power by a military coup in March 1990. Immediately following the coup Brigadier Oupa Gqozo, Brigadier Andrew Jamangile and Colonel Zanuszi Zantsi attended a meeting with South African security police, army intelligence and National Intelligence Service members at the home of the South African ambassador to Ciskei, Chris van Aardt. It was at this meeting that Gqozo and his fellow officers were able to persuade the South Africans that their interests would continue to be served by Gqozo. In the words of Colonel Gert Hugo, former

chief of intelligence in the Ciskei Defence Force. "the meeting persuaded (Pik) Botha that Gqozo was our man and could be relied upon to protect our interests".

Within a few months a covert unit, initially known as International Research, and subsequently as Ciskei Intelligence Services (CIS), was set up by South African Military Intelligence officials on Gqozo's farm, and later moved to the capital of Bisho. The head of the unit was former SADF colonel Jan Anton Nieuwoudt and his deputies were former SADF major Ted Brassell and former SADF officer Clive Brink. The group was able to exert a major influence over the activities of the Ciskei administration, with Nieuwoudt serving on the Ciskei Security council. It was at this point during Gqozo's rule that activities against the ANC in the region began.

According to Hugo the unit took over the functions of the Ciskei intelligence unit. The three former SADF officers set up a structure which 'piggy-backed' on an already existing network between the Ciskei, South African and Transkei police, probably set up some years ago. While Gqozo was the ultimate head of the unit, Nieuwoudt appeared to be the controlling force. Former Ciskei Military Intelligence Officer Lieutenant Ntantiso Kleinbooi stated that "the three guys (Nieuwoudt, Brink and Brassell) are the people who are telling Gqozo what to do, and they are doing that in the interest of South Africa through its Foreign Department".

IR/CIS has been linked to a number of operations, including:

- * the 1990 abortive coup attempt in Transkei, in which coup leader Craig Duli and others were killed
- * the January 1991 deaths of Ciskei rebels Colonel Onward Guzana and Charles Sebe. Evidence in the subsequent inquest has revealed that IR/CIS planned and carried out the luring back to Ciskei and extrajudicial execution of Sebe and Guzana under Gqozo's instructions.
- * stockpiling of arms at the units base in the ministerial compound. The discovery of this arms cache by CDF officers led to allegations by Gqozo of a coup attempt and the expulsion of the top CDF officers. Hugo has claimed that this was engineered by IR/CIS.
- * the May 27 armed attack on the Dimbaza home of ANC official Smuts Ngonyama

Kleinbooi stated in February 1991 that "there is a connection between that group and the police in east London and I can even say in King Williams Town" which Nieuwoudt revealed in Security Council meetings.

Hugo referred to the unit as "an undercover operation by the SADF" and that Nieuwoudt had "open and free" liaison with the SADF military intelligence.

As a result of a number of public expose's of IR/CIS and its links to the SADF a high level South African delegation, including Rusty Evans, deputy-director of the Department of Foreign Affairs and General Kat Liebenberg, chief of the SADF, met with the Ciskei Council of State on August 6 1991. Evans subsequently acknowledged that IR/CIS had been mentioned in the "wide-ranging" discussions.

Following the disbanding of IR/CIS an even greater control by the SADF has been established over the Ciskei security forces and Gqozo himself. The entire upper echelons of the CDF are staffed by officers seconded from the SADF, including:

- * Brigadier Marius Oelschig, Chief of Ciskei Defence Force
- * Colonel Dirk van der Bank, Second in Command of CDF (now a contract officer)
- * Colonel Ockert Swanepoel, head of Military Intelligence in Ciskei (now a contract officer)
- * Colonel ray Williams, Chief of Staff, Finance
- * Colonel Martie du Toit, Chief of Staff, Logistics
- * Colonel Chris Meyer, Chief of Saff, Personnel
- * Colonel R Penhall, Officer commanding CDF Air Wing

In addition the Ciskei commissioner of Police General J.J. Victor is the former regional commander of Northern Transvaal security and has been implicated in the CCB activities at Vlakplaas.

At the same time Gqozo has dismissed a total of 23 cabinet ministers during this period, which has left the administration of the government virtually entirely in the hands of seconded and ex- South African government officials.

It is these officials who are providing the managerial and logistical capacity to the Gqozo regime to carry out their actions against the ANC. It is also these officers who are providing the background intelligence reports which underpin the strategy being utilised by the Gqozo regime. In addition it is South Africa which is providing the Gqozo government with the necessary finance to continue operating.

There is recent evidence of the involvement of a private security company, 'Peace Force', in this campaign of violence. Based at the Wesley base of the Ciskei Defence Force, they have been running training courses for ADM members who have then been armed and sent out into the community to attack ANC members. People have been recruited from places throughout Ciskei, including Phakamisa, Dimbaza, Keiskammahoek, Zwelitsha, and even from Grahamstown and Komga in South Africa. The Peace Force has in addition been involved in security force actions in Keiskammahoek and Phakamisa, in the latter incident shooting at pupils in the

local school and injuring seven.

4. The African Democratic Movement (ADM)

On 8 July 1991 Gqozo launched his own party in the context of the changes to local government policies, his loss of popularity, and his fear that homeland leaders would not be represented at negotiations in their personal capacities because of de Klerk's announcement to this effect. The manner in which support was to be facilitated through the headmen system smacked of Sebe's Ciskei National Independence Party. Gqozo at first said that the ADM was only a cultural movement. The ADM was launched after Gqozo had friendly meetings with Buthelezi and praised him.

Basie Oosthuizen, the ADM's acting secretary general and most prominent figure apart from Gqozo, says the organisation was formed by people in Mdantsane who wanted an alternative to ANC and PAC, and not by the Ciskei government. He has in another interview admitted to still being employed as a political advisor to Gqozo, seeing him twice a day, although he works from the ADM offices in Bisho.

Oosthuizen has been linked with South African military intelligence through the MI front company 'Dynamic Teaching', which ran anti-communist education programmes on behalf of the SADF in the Eastern Cape. He established Dynamic Teaching's East London office in Beacon Bay. Oosthuizen has also admitted to being on the payroll of Ciskei Intelligence Services, and that he had no problems with the unit "because they secured the state".

In fact the ADM was initiated following an informal Ciskei Security Council meeting held on Gqozo's farm, Blacklands, in December 1990, called to discuss the formation of the ADM. Details of the meeting were revealed by Colonel Gert Hugo, former chief of intelligence in the Ciskei Defence Force. He stated to the Weekly Mail that "at this meeting Anton Nieuwoudt and Clive Brink - both agents for MI who ran IR - were present even though they were not supposed to sit on the Security Council. It was clear that they had caucused the idea of setting up a political movement like Inkatha and were using the meeting to set this in motion".

"The ADM was created to give Gqozo's anti-ANC regime more credibility by building a civilian movement of support for him and decontaminating the military image that had built up around him", said Hugo.

The ANC contends that the ADM has no real support base within Ciskei, and that its artificial creation and support by the Ciskei administration together with Military Intelligence officials has led to much of the conflict in the region. This has been a deliberate move to undermine democratic organisations in the region and give credibility to an otherwise despotic regime.

5. The headmen

During June 1991 Gqozo announced that the local authorities would be restructured as part of a "democratisation" process, and that the "traditional" leaders would play a more prominent role. In July 1991 a directive was sent to all magistrates instructing them that they should no longer recognise Residents' Associations in their dealings with local communities, and should instead arrange for the re-election of headmen. The election of headmen against the wishes of all communities in Ciskei has been a central issue in the conflict and repression in Ciskei.

The problems in respect of the headmen have been:

- * the undemocratic method of election of headmen, which has often been arranged behind the scenes in the presence of a select few, or with the knowledge of the community, but against their wishes, for example even if there are only two people prepared to cast a vote.
- * The particular candidates who are installed in this manner - they are often the same headmen who exploited their power ruthlessly under the Sebe regime and were even implicated in financial extortion, and/or they are associated with the ADM.
- * All dealings with the government must go through the headmen, including applications for pensions, disability grants and death certificates. Residents who do not support the headmen are unable to obtain their pensions, and business people cannot deal with the government without supporting the local headman.
- * The partisan nature of the headmen system, which is used to foster political nepotism and undermine the ANC.
- * The specific role headmen have played in the current wave of violence. The Ciskei government allocated an amount of R323 000 for the arming of headmen, and they have been implicated in numerous attacks on ANC members.

Again the imposition of the headmen system must be seen as part of an overall strategy to bolster the military dictatorship of Gqozo, and provide a platform from which attacks on ANC members can be launched. Its continued imposition in the face of such widespread opposition demonstrates a profound contempt for the democratic process and the views of the majority of people in this region.

6. The way forward

The key objectives for the current period in Ciskei must be:

- * an end to violence and intimidation by state and political organisations

- * the creation of a climate for free political activity in which all political organisations may mobilise freely without hindrance to each other.

We believe that it is the primary responsibility of the South African government to ensure that the above objectives are fulfilled, as they have been the principal agents involved in the creation and support of the Ciskei regime. In pursuing these objectives, however, and in enacting the proposals highlighted hereunder, the South African government needs to consult closely with all representative bodies within Ciskei.

The ANC wishes to state clearly that we have no interest in 'seizing power' in Ciskei, nor any interest in participating in the administration of what we regard as an apartheid creation, namely the Ciskei administration. Our sole objective during the current period is to create the political space for our organisation to operate freely.

The proposals we submit to this conference are:

1. Brigadier Oupa Gqozo should be removed as 'head of state' in Ciskei, as he has no political legitimacy or mandate to rule over the people of Ciskei, and has demonstrated his disregard for the opinions of the vast majority of people within Ciskei, and further, has waged a campaign of violence against the ANC and other democratic organisations as part of South Africa's strategy to destabilise this region. This should be accompanied by the de jure downgrading of the independence status of Ciskei, as this has already occurred de facto through the controls and secondments South Africa has arranged with Ciskei. Through a proper process of consultation with all representative organisations an interim administration acceptable to all parties should be appointed in the Ciskei, which will have as its primary goal the impartial administration of Ciskei during the transition and the supervision of the process of reintegration of the territory into South Africa.
2. Section 43 of the Ciskei National Security Act, which prohibits the free activity of any political organisation, and which has already been declared in contravention of the Bill of Rights in Ciskei, should be repealed.
3. South African Military Intelligence officials must be removed from Ciskei, as these officials have been the masterminds behind the current violence and instability in the region.
4. The Peace Force security company must be removed from Ciskei, as their actions in training and arming vigilantes and ADM members are fuelling the conflict in the region.
5. The headman system of local government in Ciskei should be abolished, as this has been a central source of conflict in the region, and has been used to foster political nepotism

and corruption, and has been widely rejected by the communities in which it has been applied.

6. The regional peace initiative must be resuscitated and all government structures and relevant parties must give their full support to the initiative.

We believe that these steps are vital to the resolution of the problems outlined above. We call on the South African government to undertake these steps with the utmost urgency, and note that failure to take these steps will allow the current situation to escalate further.

We wish to bring to the attention of this conference that the people of Ciskei will be gathering in Bisho on the 7th September 1992 in support of these demands, and we will wait in Bisho until a representative of the South African government informs us that these demands have been adequately addressed, and can give us satisfactory assurance that there will be an end to violence in the Ciskei, and the creation of a climate for free political activity. We call on all parties at this conference who are committed to a resolution of the violence and instability in this region to join us on this day in support of the call for Peace and Democracy.