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A Plural .

or a Common Society?

. SEVERAL FACTORS UNIQUE to the South African situation suggest that the dream of a relatively democratic society has a better chance of being realized in an integrated S. Africa than elsewhere. The reasons for this realistic optimism are not those of classical liberalism. Rather, it hinges on feasible policy changes that make the crude choice of "dominate or be dominated" obsolete. Taking the comparative lessons into account, it can be demonstrated that in South Africa ethnicity and democracy may prove far more compatible than a primordial perspective can envisage.

. . When Nationalist Afrikanerdom insists on group rights for itself it means right as a racial group. Apart from Whites however, few South Africans desire legislated protection of their racial identity. Politicized Colored and Indian South Africans, irrespective of party affiliation, advocate a common nonracial citizenship in a polity that supports individual merit as the criterion of privilege. Politicized Africans agree: from its inception, the African National Congress has promoted the irrelevance of color and the eradication of ethnic divisiveness among Blacks. The imposed racial classifications lie at the heart of South Africa's illegitimacy.

It is ironic that the white minority, is a group that perpetuates a racial allocation of power; this would be in the direct interest of the racial majority, but they, quite remarkably, adhere to merit-based individualism. The group that would most benefit from its long-term position of advantage nonetheless rejects non-racial meritocracy. Comparative race-relations research has

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frequently discovered that when members of groups encounter one another in new situations, the boundaries between them are likely to be overcome if they compete on an individual basis with one another; conversely, the boundaries will be strengthened if they compete as groups.¹ Since the minority Whites are losing this group contest on demographic and economic grounds, nonracial, individual (i.e., non-group) competition would be their best assurance of future security. Moreover, for cultural, economic, and political reasons South Africa cannot be lumped together with other pluralist societies. As long as the negative lessons of divided societies elsewhere are mechanically and uncritically applied to a forcibly segmented South Africa, its unique potential is overlooked and the analogy remains ahistorical.

Religion and Resistance

Religion, for example, has hardly been a cause of friction in South Africa, because of insufficient power attached to it for it to become politicized. The peaceful coexistence of all major Christian denominations, in addition to small pockets of Hinduism, Islam, and Judaism, demonstrates that religion as such does not poison intergroup relations. It is the privilege and exclusion for which culture has become a marker that has made culture a term of ill repute in South Africa.

It would be wrong to deny the importance of racial perceptions after a long period of enforced racialism: group feelings are an empirical reality and cannot be legislated out of existence or wished away by a narrow, old-fashioned liberalism.² As long as group rights are instituted not at the expense of but in addition to individual rights, a moral claim for such voluntary collective entities can also be upheld. Societies where racial divisions coincide with cultural differences are unlikely to eradicate racial divisions. Differences in religion or language reinforce visibility. Cultural heritage maintenance then becomes at the same time a perpetuation of racial group cognition. In South Africa, however, fortunately, races and cultures overlap greatly. Most people in the

urban sector speak one of the official languages, the major Christian churches have members of more than one racial group, and the educated of all racial groups share a common cultural outlook and aspirations. This allows class divisions that cut across racial boundaries. Where the Shiite Moslem in Lebanon considers American consumer culture an evil empire whose promises and vices 'corrupt the believer and distract from the real purpose of life, many South African Blacks would like to share in capitalist affluence. Like Afrikaner nationalism, which used the state to seize its share of wealth from English imperialism, so Black nationalism, on the whole, aims at capturing capitalism for its own benefit rather than overthrowing it. Moreover, the assumption of shared Christian ideology under which this conflict is fought holds the opponents within certain humanitarian bounds. Even implacable opponents of the government grant its sincere Christianity;³ When popular spokespersons for the oppressed affirm the common Christianity of the oppressors, they cannot be seen as a dehumanized personal enemy to be eliminated with callous ruthlessness-as happens in religious violence from Belfast to Lebanon, India, and Sri Lanka. The racial outsider remains simultaneously a Christian insider who must be enlightened, cajoled, or even threatened but who cannot be destroyed.

Given this widespread religious sentiment among Blacks, the White portrayal of the resistance as "communism" lacks credibility. But equally doubtful is the Marxist insistence that capitalism alone is the motivating force behind White policy. Whatever economic motives are at work, they have to be reconciled with widely practiced religious customs among the Afrikaners.

Nevertheless, comparisons with religiously inspired resistance, be it Iran or Poland, hardly apply. Thus Allister Sparks' assertion emphasizes only one aspect: "Nowhere else, not even in Poland, is religion such a pervasively important factor in the politics of a nation." Unlike in Poland, in South Africa religious practice is fragmented among dozens of competing denominations. The predominant Protestant tradition, be it

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Church Membership according to Race (1980 Census)

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Church Whites Colored: Asians Africans Total

Ned. Geref. 37.4% 26.0% 0.5% 6.5% 13.2%

Geref. 2.8 - - : 1:0

Ned. Herv. 5.4 - -

Anglican 10.1 13.5 (1).; 3.; 2.:

Methodist , 9.1 5.4 0.1 4.1 3.7

Presbyterian . 2.8 3.7 . 1.2 1.5

Congregational - 6.5 0-1 4.1 3.2

Lutheran - 3.7 .6 9.9 7.6

Roman Catholic 8.7 10.1 2. 0.7 1 2

Apostolic Faith Mission 22.8 1.9 2-8 . 0.1

Full Gospel - - . 204

Independent African - 4.5 -7 22.: 8.4

Other churches 12.8 15.6 4. .

SUBTOTAL 91.8 87.0 12.5 74.1 76.6

- - 0.5

Jewish 2.6 - 62 4 _ 26'

Hindu - - . 1 3

Islam - 6.3 18.8 0-6 0.7

Other 0.6 1.2 1.5 . 4.

SUBTOTAL 3.2 7.5 82.6 0.6 f;

Unknown/None 5.0 5.5 4.9 25.3 18.

TOTAL (thousands) 4.528 2,613 821 16.924 24,886

source: 115RC Investigation into Intergroup Relations. Main Committee Report.

7112501701 African Society: Reality and Future Prospects (Pictorial: 115 RC. 1985). p. 3 .

of the Anglican, Calvinist, or Lutheran variety, lacks the pervasive coherence and emotional symbolism that make central

Catholicism such a disciplinary force. In Poland, the church

provides the alternative meaning to an opposmg party doctrine. It is an act of opposition to be active in the church movement. South Africa, on the other hand, prides itself on being a Christian state. Black religious activism, therefore, reaffirms the common bond even when the specific policy is called in question. In the South African context, Black theology implies reform, not revolution. Liberation theology has different implications in different situations. In South Africa it stresses the brotherhood of man, denouncing the policy of apartheid as heresy.

The churches provide a platform and shelter for protest.

But religiously inspired protest pleads for repentance, mercy toward the victims, and a return by the powerholders to the true value of the faith. Praying together to the same God, be it for rain or the dismantling of apartheid, binds the rulers and the ruled, in a situation unique in the annals of contemporary oppression. Thus a front-line state president waits for miracles: "I am not a prophet, but I am a praying man; I believe in God. I can't see him allowing that (apartheid) situation to go on."⁵ The internal leader of a guerrilla movement equally expects divine intervention: "I have no power, but the Almighty God has. South Africa can be as dishonest and clever as they want and try to blind the whole world. The world was made by the Almighty. He will see to it that Namibia will be free."⁵

On the other hand, the same baptism does not necessarily prevent Christian brothers from going to war against each other, as history has amply demonstrated. The South African T(also theologians have perceptively observed: "T here we sit in the same Church while outside Christian policemen and soldiers are beating up and killing Christian children or torturing Christian prisoners to death while yet other Christians stand by and weakly plead for peace" ("The Kairos Document," unauthored and undated). From this moral sensitivity can also flow active resistance and civil disobedience. A minority of South African church people now invoke the doctrine of "Just war" against a "tyrannical" government that is increasingly considered "in principle irreformable."

Other Blacks, however, pray for different goals. The rapid growth of the "Zionist" church movement—grossly neglected in the political literature on South Africa—offers the best example of how the poor give meaning to poverty and invent new mechanisms to cope. More than 30 percent of all Black South Africans now claim membership in one of the many sects of independent African churches that combine Christian rituals with ancestral traditions. Where leadership opportunities are blocked in most spheres, the sects offer religious entrepreneurs a domain of their own. Both the leaders and the followers profit materially from their religion. The strict APLURALORACOMMONSOCIETY? 201

puritanical rules—no drinking, gambling, gossiping, smoking, sexual promiscuity—give Zionists, recognizable by their silver star and dress code, preferential employment chances. Greater than average savings are ensured by discouraging leisure activities, even soccer playing. These savings are shared to a large extent. No member of the small groups feels left alone in a crisis. The rituals of healing place the needy in a circle of touching, caring fellows and make up for the lack of costly Western medicine. Yet it would be wrong to view the mass movement as a mere mutual aid society. Like the spreading cults in Western societies, the disciplined enclaves provide community, a sanctuary from abuse, and a temporary refuge from outside hostility. Menial tasks are sanctified and bestowed with meaning. By viewing the world around them with pity, "God's troops" strengthen their self-esteem. The moral absolutes elevate their followers from a downtrodden existence into a position of superiority, with a monopoly on truth and salvation. This ideological institution seldom tolerates competing loyalties. All the experts agree that the Zionists avoid political commitment. "These gentle, peace-loving people are not engaged in a crusade of social reform. They are not intent on moving the earth by social upheaval. Nor are they the least interested in bringing about political change. At one time the Ethiopian churches aligned themselves with the aims of African nationalism, but Zionists have never espoused any political cause."⁷ Kiernan probably means an oppositional political cause; surprisingly, the massive church endorses the White rulers as legitimate political authority.

In his annual 1985 Easter sermon before one and a half million followers, Bishop Lekganyane of the Zionist Christian Church—a man whom Botha had addressed as "Your Grace"

and assured "of our highest regard"_spoke of lack of Christian love as the source of many ills. He concluded with a plea for love and protection of the visitors: "Lord, we pray that You keep our State President, Mrs. Botha and us all, safe from harm. Amen."⁸ Most Black political activists and intellectuals ignore or underplay mass expressions of "false consciousness." In the writings of Ezekiel Mphahlele, for example, the

hope is expressed that African religion could substitute for the ideological hold that Christianity has acquired over the African mind. Ancestor worship, Mphahlele hoped, could assist Blacks to "snap out of the trance into which we were thrown by Western education."⁹ In fact, however, a fundamentalist religious dynasty has successfully synthesized traditional beliefs and colonial Christianity into a far more enduring brand of status quo support than the unfulfilled promise of mainstream Christian equality has ever been. If the ANC leadership wants to win mass support it may be better advised to work on the Zionist Christian Church hierarchy than to dismiss this enormous group as a relic of political underdevelopment.

Critics of South African liberalism lament that its fatal attitude of nonviolent reconciliation has infected African nationalism.¹⁰ By lighting a rearguard action against the excesses of apartheid, by stressing interracial mediation and the adoption of Black clients, White liberals, say their critics, lubricate the racial order. If the charge were true in its one-sidedness, however, it would apply much better to the churches and, now, to Black Christians.

Significantly, even the anarchistic destruction of property by Soweto's enraged youngsters is sometimes justified by references to God and biblical precedents: "If everything is to be destroyed, then let us destroy and not exempt a single thing. Let us not lose God's support by doing injustice; that is doing harm to some and securing others, whereas they are all on the same elevation of guiltiness. Let us not be like King Saul, who infringed by securing King Hagat whereas ordained to exterminate everything by God. We are Africans and brothers in love, and ought to share the pains and bitterness and the fruits of joy."

The slow pseudo-reform policies of Pretoria, however, increasingly erode that Christian goodwill toward an enemy. Many of the politicized township youngsters are now ready to kill instead of following Tutu's or Lekganyane's advice.¹² The ANC's new policy of being less scrupulous about avoiding soft, civilian targets exemplifies the growing militarization of APLURALORACOMMONSOCIETY? 203

group relations. If the technocrats in power cannot effectively control their security forces, both sides will resort to brutality. State violence inspires civilian violence, not, as intended, civilian intimidation. However, as the events in Northern Ireland and Lebanon demonstrate, societies can adjust almost permanently to a stable level of violence, a "violent equilibrium," albeit at great cost to the quality of life of all.

The distinct possibility does exist that the often predicted bloodbath in South Africa may turn out to be a Black one. Given the ruthlessness of indoctrinated security forces and vigilante commandos who could use their superior firepower without restraint in the future, worse atrocities cannot be excluded. However, such a course would clearly destroy the foundations of an advanced economy that relies on at least a minimal level of labor peace and workers' identification with productive tasks. Increased state repression would destroy an economy that relies on voluntary participation.

Economic Interdependence

The historical advantages of racial privilege have accumulated for Whites such a pool of educational advantage, skills, mobility, and collective attitudes that in any nonracial, industrial setting individuals of this group would inevitably be disproportionately represented in the upper stratum. This results from the long-term shortage of and great demand for higher qualifications. While the unskilled poor Whites of the 1920s and 1930s, migrating to the cities and competing with cheaper African labor, had to rely on racial state protection, their urbanized, graduating Afrikaner counterparts of the 1980s can safely market their knowledge of computers or business administration or their professional expertise without preferential racial treatment. Even a gradual Africanization of the

civil service through attrition or an affirmative action program in the private sector would pose little threat in the foreseeable future to the White monopoly of expertise. Only the dwindling White working class (mostly mine workers), the lower echelons of the apartheid bureaucracy, and a few other mar-
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ginal groups in state employment would be adversely affected by a nonracial policy of equality of opportunity. Much of this loss of racial privilege, in any case, would be only in the realm of status reduction.

Even the often frustrated conservative Afrikaner farmers could adjust. Capital-intensive farming methods have lowered the demand for African labor. The recent history of Zimbabwe demonstrates that under a majority rule a White mechanized farming sector can profitably coexist with increasingly productive traditional agriculture as long as state policy realistically adjusts subsidies and price guarantees to the advantage of both. Use of apartheid for labor control and job reservation has become outdated. With manufacturing capital's growing interest in using a stable, skilled, and productive labor force instead of the traditional migrant labor, it is no longer economic considerations, but political ones, that perpetuate neoapartheid.

The most crucial form of apartheid, the restriction of Black labor mobility, is now collapsing, a process with far-reaching implications for sociopolitical relations in general. In 1979, the Riekert Commission recommended the reconstruction of labor control away from the direct coercion by police raids in the streets to the indirect mechanism of fines for employers of "illegals." However, the ascendant business interests refused to accept self-policing and continued to employ "illegal" workers. As a second form of restriction the Commission envisaged . control of accommodation through construction of urban housing; however, the funds were diverted into the Bantustans and few new houses were built. With the legalization of migration to cities dependent upon unavailable housing, rural workers bypassed the official checkpoints, settling in mushrooming squatter camps outside urban centers. This situation forced the government to abandon the provision of formal housing as a condition of employment. Instead it began to concentrate on site and service supply schemes to at least channel the labor force into regulated settlements under the guise of orderly urbanization. The final breakdown of labor APLURALORACOMMON SOCIETY? 205

control occurred in the Bantustans. Tribal Labour Bureaus, manned by African officials, were supposed to endorse willing migrants on the basis of employers' requisitions and calloin cards. This Africanization of control foundered on a mixture of corruption, incompetence, and administrative mismanagement. Since the plan ignored large sections of the impoverished rural population, these people had little reason to wait when employers in the cities hired first and had the worker's status legalized by the rural authorities later. Thus the rapid growth of a more permanent urban working class under fewer restrictions on selling their labor anywhere. organizing in unions, owning property, living with their families, and (leaving an informal economy has now become an officially recognized fait accompli.

The threat to White security has, then, been redefined. From concerns about being overwhelmed by cheap labor, a consolidated, urbanized Afrikanerdom now considers the instability of an advanced economy to be its greatest threat, for only a collapsed economy would devalue White skills. The likelihood of such a collapse hinges on the unresolved political question. The escalating costs of apartheid make the slide into permanent economic stagnation and instability a real possibility. This potential for structural crisis undermines the technocratic hope of buying off dissent, for successful co-optation largely depends on an expanding economy. Inability to pay the costs of the Verwoerdian ideological blueprints forces the ruling technocrats to consider political concessions in order to contain resistance. But such a reform policy develops its own dynamic that may well escape the control of technocratic planners who have to react to unpredictable responses from below.

The technocratic vision of racial reform is bound for ulti-

mate failure if it continues to underestimate the need for acceptable political incorporation-in other words, for the genuine abolition of apartheid. The rhetorical commitment to the elimination of racial discrimination rings false in a society in which a racial minority maintains ultimate control. Thus the

transfer of political power, not merely multiracial power-sharing or the abolition of material discrimination, becomes the Issue.

The political solution is said to depend on negotiations between representative leaders of opposing racial groups. A reasonable compromise worked out in a national convention would, it is hoped, establish a system of power-sharing that would constitutionally guarantee the rights of minorities. A consociational grand coalition of mutually suspicious and both liberals and nationalists agree, would prevent an escalation of bloodshed. The exiled ANC too, for reasons of its own is sometimes quoted as "willing to discuss and negotiate specific mechanisms to protect White rights."¹³ Envisaged obviously, is a Zimbabwe-style solution, in which guarantees of meaningful representation could ease Whites into a transition to genuine racial compromise.

. This vision, which could be called the consociation or national convention prospect of a future South Africa is not without serious problems. The fundamental flaw lies in its emphasis on race. Since power-sharing between mobilized groups always amounts to a compromise, it will inevitably fall short of Black expectations of full rights and will simultaneously be perceived by the right-wing minority as a sell-out of White rights. This erodes the middle ground of compromising reformists in favor of extremists on both ends of the spectrum. A negotiated racial compromise, if it ever comes about will reinforce racial group boundaries on both sides. Racial claims and racial competition will be constitutionally entrenched. Under such an arrangement racial minority incinerators are likely to lose in the long run, since they depend on the concessions of the majority. i

' In a nonracial society dependent on competition between individuals, on the other hand, achievement replaces ascribed minority status as the criterion for the allocation of scarce resources. Under a system in which Whites would vote for Black candidates and Blacks vote for White candidates because of their ideological outlook or personal attributes minority members would fare better than under a system of racialism. APLURAL OR A COMMON SOCIETY? 207

group rights. To be sure, such an ideal, color-blind system of voting seems out of the question in South Africa today, where racial stereotypes are inculcated from early childhood on both sides, although the predominantly conservative, genuinely nonracial outlook of most Blacks makes it more likely that they would be inclined to support competent White candidates than that the more skeptical and prejudiced White electorate would endorse qualified Blacks as their representatives. Therefore, multiracial political activity in joint political parties has to precede any color-blind voting system. The repeal of the Political Interference Act, which forbade cross-racial politics, is an encouraging sign. Equally hopeful are talks about the eventual de-ethnicization of the ruling National Party, by allowing non-Whites to become members, although at present this remains a pipedream. Nonetheless, an urban, consumerist electorate in an industrial society with no institutionalized racial or ethnic differences holds far better prospects of stability and legitimacy than a fragile coexistence based on racial group rights.

A consociational strategy of negotiated racial group compromises can work in a preindustrial political culture in which the group leaders can command the unquestioned loyalty of their followers, but in a modern economy, mass higher education and divergent interests have politicized the urban population to a high degree. Many will refuse to follow "leaders," however real and genuine, in dubious compromises. Except in some rural areas, the concept of leaders becomes questionable. Black urban representatives in South Africa act merely as articulators of grievances, spokespersons of divergent interests, rather than leaders of monolithic communities. Just as the notion of leadership has to be revised, particularly in the

absence of free and representative elections, so the concept of community needs revision. The current view imposes a preindustrial notion of kinship bonds or, worse, racial similarities on atomized, heterogeneous populations. Incorporation into a common political system can, however, no longer be based on putative innate primordial or racial ties. The only legitimate institutionalization of group rights possible can take

place on the basis of individual, voluntary self-association. Rights and influence of minority political parties, for example, can be guaranteed through proportional representation-or even overrepresentation-as well as veto rights. This seems the only legitimate compromise between a Westminster system of winner-take-all and the consociational model of power-sharing. Relative group autonomy in cultural matters, as long as group membership is determined by the individuals concerned, also represents a legitimate demand in light of fears of permanent majority domination or threats to group existence.

Consociational theory is preoccupied with electoral systems and the problem of forging a working relationship between semi-autonomous ethnic segments in traditional societies. None of the consociational writers; including Lijphart, has yet addressed the different requirements for consociationalism in an interdependent advanced industrial society. How can its major class actors as well as unorganized economic interest groups be brought into a working relationship? This would seem, of necessity, to be different from the political system of power-sharing and to be based on novel organizational principles. Here the model of industrial bargaining with binding arbitration seems more feasible than veto rights or sham coalitions.

The Western democratic tradition offers no legitimate alternative to the universal franchise on all civic matters-at all levels of government, one-person-one-vote, on a common voters' roll of all adult citizens regardless of personal qualifications (save insanity or the forfeiting of civil rights by a conviction by independent courts). This system of democracy, despite its many deficiencies, has proven the most workable mechanism for the representation and reconciliation of conflicting interests. Any system that restricts rights or separates Black political rights from White political rights is bound to fail, as are all the quaint proposals of a qualified or weighted franchise. Even less realistic in an industrial economy is the periodic enthusiasm for partition, even if the partition were "Just." The massive population transfer implied or explicit in APLURALORACOMMON SOCIETY? 209

these blueprints echoes the fascist and Stalinist deportations in the name of totalitarian dreams. Partition is no solution for the country's race relations, because ethnicity in South Africa cannot be territorialized.

Analogies between a gradual, incremental introduction of the universal franchise in Western Europe and North America and a similar process in South Africa ignore a crucial difference. It is impossible to emulate nineteenth-century "solutions" a hundred years later in another part of the world. History does not repeat itself. As part of a global system, South Africa is not immunized against political progress elsewhere; it moves in tandem with world events. Therefore the notion that South Africa cannot be expected to introduce democracy overnight but can well be expected to move from feudalism to an enlightened absolutism overlooks a hundred years of political development.

Only universal franchise can grant South Africa long-term internal stability and international legitimacy. South African business is beginning to heed that message. Economic citizenship through unionization cannot work without genuine political democratization as well. Local and international capital in South Africa can ill afford to let the country slide into racial warfare. It is greatly in the interests of business to use its clout to ensure fundamental deracialization. And a precondition for serious deracialization must be a massive public reeducation effort, primarily of Whites in the civil service. Their ideological confusion, vested interests, and anxiety about the future block fundamental progress.

The colonial solution of a White departure does not apply to South Africa, since it is not a colonial problem. Whites are there to stay in significant numbers, although emigration may

well increase again when the crisis escalates. Racist intransi-
gence can sabotage even majority rule. Worse, it can jeopar-
dize a reasonable transition, to the detriment of all.

If the nature of the post-apartheid society could be convinc-
ingly clarified, apocalyptic fantasies and illusions would give
way to realistic hope. A justified belief in a secure future can
in itself free energies submerged by a stubborn determination

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merely to hold out. Unfortunately, the Freedom Charter is as vague as the liberal designs for a national convention in specifying the vital details of post-apartheid security. However, once a nonracial vision with concrete merits grips the imagination of Whites and Blacks alike, its difficult implementation will have begun. Better than moral indignation, blind belief in coercive power, or illusionary racial deals, a creative political realism will free South Africa from its moral paralysis. Instead of the continued liberal exhortations that South Africans will "suffer the future," a more effective approach could show convincingly that they can enjoy the future, provided nonracial policies are adopted.^H

In summary, it may be argued that, fortunately, little cultural distance separates the urbanized population groups in South Africa. They are, however, separated by a gulf of social distance. The latter is maintained both by legal means and, largely as a result, by customary barriers of employment and educational differentials. Since social distance diminishes with the provision of equal opportunities in an integrated economy, the relatively weak South African cultural cleavages do not form the obstacle to democratic majoritarianism they do in genuinely plural societies. Furthermore, the South African binding economic interdependence does not exist in the typically plural societies of semi-industrialized Lebanon, Cyprus, Nigeria, Sudan, and Sri Lanka; all these states have relatively autonomous segmental economies. Even ethnic competition in industrial settings does not provide sufficient counter-evidence to this interdependence. The ethnic voting in Belgium or Northern Ireland stems from historical identities as well as material advantages tied to ethnicity. The economic unification of Europe or the demise of Quebec nationalism, on the other hand, shows how ethnic sentiment declines when it impedes economic advantages and symbolic needs are fulfilled differently.

The pluralist analogy therefore misleads rather than enlightens in the South African situation. This is not to deny the importance of racial perceptions in certain periods but to emphasize the situational nature of racial boundary maintenance. . . .

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nance. It cannot be assumed to apply inevitably under all circumstances, at least not when it has become dysfunctional. A racial group alone cannot form a moral community, contrary to Samuel Huntington's claim that "racial communities also have moral claims and rights."⁵ Nobody would recognize such claims, for example, for an association of criminals. Racial group rights could only rest on cultural distinctions that happen to coincide with phenotype, or because of restitution programs due to past discrimination. Historically and comparatively viewed, racial groups also persist on their own when certain occupations coincide with physical characteristics, but as this racial division of labor breaks down in a modern economy, the functional basis for racial groupings disappears. In the absence of endogamy rules and other religious barriers, color becomes an artificial and invidious boundary. This is the situation in South Africa. When Blacks and Whites share aspirations, Hollywood soap operas and leisure activities, jokes, tastes, and sacred texts (as is particularly true of White and Brown Afrikaners), a constitution built on false group identities perpetuates offensive racialism under the guise of ethnicity. When no cleavage exists between groups in meaning and belief, their political separation lacks any moral or cultural basis. The intense ideological battles within the Black apartheid opposition also go to prove the weakness of the bond of color or even of common oppression. According to all empirical evidence, if a free election were held in South Africa tomorrow, the Whites would be astonished by the diversity of Black voting. These surveys suggest that a free political contest under universal franchise would still result in one of the more conservative governments in Africa, in which radical so-

cialist demands on the left would compete with Black and White conservative groups on the right, with the government determined by a broad center of social-dcmocratic and liberal voters in shifting coalitions. The White racist projection of ideological solidarity on the basis of color simply overlooks the wide range of outlooks among their putative antagonists. Institutionalizing color in a power-sharing arrangement based on the apartheid designations would induce people to uphold

the color differences only so long as there were rights attached to the distinctions.

Compromise, the virtue of consociationalism, can be institutionalized as long as it is not done in a racial version. Consociationalism is not identical with accommodation in the sense of convergence of policy preferences. On the contrary, divergent sectors accept, in light of the costlier alternatives, common rules that permit them to pursue antagonistic interests peacefully. Consociationalism amounts to an institutionalized truce; it is neither the reconciliation of differences nor the capitulation of one party to another, but a compromise for coexistence. Inasmuch as consociationalism gives formal recognition to racial segments, it perpetuates an invidious (livision. However, there is nothing offensive in the institutionalization of religious or linguistic ethnicity. Their maintenance constitutes a worthy end in itself, but it is the eradication of racial divisions in an interdependent society that should be the primary goal. Thus racially based consociationalism can indeed ensure the perpetuation of, rather than the solution to, strife.

It is necessary, then, to consider not only the degree of pluralism but the kind. The question to be asked is, "Consociationalism for what?" While consociationalism may be both practicable and desirable under conditions of religious ethnicity, it could make matters worse in a racially divided society. Here democratic majoritarianism, not the unstable multiracial compromise, could in the long run generate a nonracial society. The multiracial consociational model, as interpreted by nationalist Afrikanerdom, would freeze racial boundaries in order for one group to retain, at the very least, group power over its own affairs. At present, new bodies administering illusionary "own affairs" spawn as fast as new multiracial institutions regulating "common affairs." From a liberal perspective, racial power-sharing can only be justified as a transitional device to ease in nonracialism and lessen the danger of a right-wing backlash on the way. And from a Marxist viewpoint the entire question of racial power-sharing and ethnic rivalry in South Africa is seen as a giant smokescreen that detracts from APLURALORACOMMON SOCIETY? 213

the real issue: What kind of economic system should South Africa adopt? As long as ethnicity and racial integration are the primary items on the national agenda, they overshadow alternatives to free enterprise policies. While racial sharing is debated, free enterprise continues as the apparently natural order of accumulation. In this sense, anger against racialism serves capitalism well. The immediate debasement by racial discrimination leaves no energy and vision for class exploitation. Even Lijphart admits: "When ethnic or religious segments are the most prominent collective actors in a plural society, class interests will have little chance to be articulated and promoted." 7

It has been said that the dreams of paradise are the seeds of totalitarianism. Milan Kundera has warned about glorifying the alternative utopia: "People like to say: Revolution is beautiful, it is only the terror arising from it which is evil. But this is not true. The evil is already present in the beautiful, hell is already contained in the dream of paradise and if we wish to understand the essence of hell we must examine the essence of the paradise from which it originated. It is extremely easy to condemn gulags, but to reject the totalitarian poesy which leads to the gulag by way of paradise is as difficult as ever?" However, African nationalism can hardly be accused of dreaming about a paradise. Its alternative society is far more modest: it aims at the realization of bourgeois freedoms, not socialism. The Freedom Charter's terms resemble the old-fashioned values of liberal democracies. They lack the ideological zeal of the classless society and the fascist rule of the master race. The Freedom Charter is a pluralist document: "national groups" coexisting in equality, with mutual tolerance. Ironically, even the "radical" Charter, the core blueprint

of the apartheid opposition, flirts with group rights by stating in its second clause: "All national groups shall have equal rights!" Indeed, as the many socialist critics of the Congress alliance have pointed out, its very principle of organization corresponds to the official race classification. The current (leg-
radation is so deep that mere group equality, with eventual abolition of apartheid, is perceived as paradise. This is both

the strength and the weakness of the nonracial forces. Without the ideological certainty of an alternative eschatology, African nationalism is an unlikely victim of a totalitarian temptation. A goal of mere formal equality with the ruling minority lacks the revolutionary inspiration of dreams of true utopias. In the liberal modesty of the nonracial opposition lie its justness and moral promise. It is because the officially differentiated segments in South Africa are so much alike in their aspirations that the ruling minority fears losing control, not because, as the minority asserts, the majority is dichrent.

8

Policy

Implications

Constitutional Alternatives

THERE ARE THREE MAIN ARGUMENTS for the urgency of fundamental sociopolitical change in South Africa. First, exclusion of the Black majority from the central governmental institutions not only violates democratic principles but also increases the costs of racial domination for the ruling minority. When these costs begin to outweigh the benefits, the minority in power can be expected to seek political alternatives, short of full abdication of political control. Second, a reversal of political power through the defeat of the ruling sector cannot be envisaged in South Africa in the foreseeable future. In fact, neither side is likely to defeat the other, short of mutual destruction. Even if a unilateral victory were possible, the price would be so high that the political value of the victory would be, at best, dubious. Therefore, third, in this stalemate power-sharing stands as the only alternative to continued instability. An early anticipation of the costs for both sides of an escalating antagonism provides the most convincing rationale for alternative constitutional proposals. Only if these arguments are accepted is it meaningful to talk about constitutional conflict regulation. Constitutions reflect rather than alter power relationships. Just as bargaining procedures in the industrial sphere are accepted by employers and unions, the institutionalized rules in politics are observed because all competing groups stand to benefit from compliance.

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It follows from the above that neither the unilateral designs of an ethnic technocracy nor preference for an unmodified one-person-one-vote, winner-take-all system without minority protection has a chance of relatively peaceful realization. Genuine power-sharing is a second-best alternative from the view of committed partisans on both extremes, but clearly the only realistic alternative to escalating strife.

While a nonracial system of government remains the ideal, the existing prejudices and vested interests must be taken into account. Therefore pragmatic provisions for obtainable interim improvements should be sought, with the expectation that in this way further changes will be initiated. Political change constitutes an ongoing process and not a one-time solution. At this point, the task seems to be to alter the political status quo in the preferred direction rather than waiting for an opportunity to institute utopia. At the very least, a real political learning process can be initiated and can lay the foundations for future compromises.

A realistic power-sharing system will take cognizance of the diversity in South Africa. The justifiable anxieties of cultural minorities about domination will be taken into account. Therefore, unlike the present policy of assigned racial classification, the politics of multiculturalism should allow all individuals to choose their cultural group affiliation. This free choice of identity constitutes the decisive difference between genuine deracialization and the existing practice.

In South Africa, models of political power-sharing by groups (as opposed to individual representation) cover a wide range: the elite cartel of consociationalism; a federated, regionally based democracy; a corporate federation in which ethnicity is not territorialized; or a confederation, with sovereign cooperating units under an umbrella organization. Almost all these proposals suffer from the structural weakness that they intend to institutionalize a share of political power for the currently constituted four racial groups.' Race is falsely equated with ethnicity. In addition, most proposals aim at making the untenable African rural-urban distinction constitutional or perpetuating the existence of homelands under POLICYIMPLICATIONS 217

the guise of consolidated, larger federal units. While the reality of ethnic homogeneity and the present homeland bureaucracies with all their concomitant vested interests must be taken into account, their political reintegration into the South African state remains an obvious economic imperative. There is no need to test public opinion within Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, and Ciskei (TBVC) regarding the maintenance of their unrecognized independence, since the population was originally lured into losing their South African citizenship by collaborating elites. However, the TBVC administrative structures could well be maintained as a necessary regional bureaucracy, as long as the economic development imperatives of the total region are not subjected to ethnic considerations.

A crucial difference exists between state cohesion in South Africa and resolution of ethnic conflicts in other parts of the world. In Catalonia or Sri Lanka, in Quebec or Nigeria, rebellious nationalists demand secession or greater regional autonomy. In South Africa, the exact opposite is the case: Black nationalism aims at a unitary state. It is the minority in power that advocates secessionist policies. Because of this state strategy of fragmentation and, of course, the prospect of reversal of power by the numerical racial majority, the disfranchised have always demanded a centralist rather than a federal state. Regional, ethnicity-based decision-making has become so discredited in South Africa and is so much associated with status quo conservatism that it is almost considered undemocratic. Genuine democracy, in the eyes of radical South African democrats, requires strong centralist government intervention to bring regional disparities in line with a political formula that guarantees greater equality. Regionalism is so closely tied to

ethnicity that institutionalizing the one is viewed as perpetuating the other. To aid tribalism under the cloak of decentralized decision-making is the last policy Black nationalism in power would like to pursue. ' N
' Yet what forms the core of socialist policies in other parts of the world should not be dismissed out-of-hand as reactionary in South Africa. Even Lenin and Stalin recognized and insti-

tutionalized the different nationalities in the Soviet constitution, albeit in a powerless assembly. More important, modern forms of federalism have been adopted by the most progressive forces in Western democracies, from Australia to Canada and from West Germany to the United States. In South Africa as elsewhere, democratic, nonracial participation in political decision-making by the optimal number of equally enfranchised citizens suggests decentralized government. Anxiety about majority domination can be alleviated by a high degree of minority autonomy. Freedom of movement of all citizens among regions remains a precondition, as does revenue-sharing and the equalization of regional economic disparities. The lack of secessionist tendencies (except among some Afrikaner ideologues) clearly augurs well for a cohesive federal state, not as a compromise between disintegrating segments but as a more democratic form of political organization.

Thus, the power-sharing model that can best reconcile the conflicting interests with an optimal chance of democratic conflict regulation is a federal system. Therefore the constitutional question is better posed as, what kind of federalism should be considered? A regionally based federalism constitutes the most common type, but there is also the possibility of corporate federalism (a term coined by C. Friedrich), in which groups of persons rather than territories are granted rights and powers. Most South African analysts who favor the territorial devolution of power hope to sidestep the overall racial ratios. They advocate that the regions not be strictly proportionally represented in the central parliament as they are in the United States Congress. However, any geographic federation would only gain legitimacy if the regions were represented according to their population size, although new federal units would not have to be approximately equal in population or geographic size. Economic interdependence and historical allegiances seem the most obvious criteria for determining boundaries of eight or ten new provinces instead of the present four. Scattered homelands would then merge into newly delineated compact regions or provinces.

Friedrich's corporate federation, based on freely chosen POLICYIMPLICATIONS 219

group membership, on the other hand, would solve the problem of the interspersed nature of group settlements. It is a design that appeals to Afrikaner Nationalists insofar as it would leave them constitutionally "master in their own house," even if the houses are amidst many more kraals and townships. A corporate racial/ethnic federation, however, has little chance of acceptance by the ANC, although the group may revise its traditional insistence on a central state. There are reports to the effect that "Mbeki indicated to the Commons Committee that while the ANC would not consider a race federation based on units such as 'Bantustans' and racially defined Group Areas, it might be prepared to talk about a geographic federation within the context of a nonracial and democratic unitary South Africa"?

Reaching a compromise between the two positions would be a matter of constitutional engineering in negotiations. For example, in a federal South Africa, the powers of two assemblies could balance each other: a lower house, elected on the basis of universal franchise, and an upper house in which regions or self-defined cultural/ethnic groups would be represented. If the lower house were elected by all adults on a common voters' roll and the upper house elected or appointed by the constituent groups qua groups or regions, such a federation would closely resemble many democratic states (West Germany, the United States) where majorities in the two houses are needed to pass legislation. Indeed, as Forsyth argues: "It is precisely the great merit of the federal state, properly conceived, that it integrates both the group and the individual into one and the same political order."³ Those who do not want to align themselves with any ethnic group could follow the Yugoslav model, which allows people to classify them-

selves simply as Yugoslavs, sitting alongside the ethnic/national groupings.

The obvious question to be asked here is why there should not be solely an individual incorporation into a unitary state according to the Westminster system, with no constitutional regional or group representation? Afrikaner nationalism views Westminster voting in the South African context as ac-

tually being undemocratic. The weight of numbers would not allow meaningful self-determination of minorities. Such fears are justified if one accepts the assumption that all Blacks would want to join a counter African nationalism or even a counter Black racism. It falsely projects the Afrikaner perception of attempted group domination, based on race, onto their opponent and ignores the vast ideological differences among the disfranchised. But given the experience of ethnic mobilization and the concomitant suppression of minorities in many other societies, these anxieties have to be taken seriously. They are legitimate fears that go deeper than the desire to maintain privilege. The often-quoted guarantees of constitutions alone are not sufficient safeguards. As the Economist has expressed the South African predicament of concerned conservatives:

"The issue for South Africa's critics is not abhorrence of Apartheid, but the extent to which genuine reform can be brought about without a lurch into civil war, economic chaos and an authoritarianism of the Black nationalist left instead of the White Afrikaner right."⁴

Liberalism has for the most part failed to recognize the legitimate aspects of mobilized ethnicity, by associating ethnicity solely with unfair advantage or the height of irrationality. But insofar as ethnicity expresses cultural distinctiveness and the quest for individual identity through group membership, it may fulfill desires that liberalism ignores. People do not necessarily want to be all the same. If it is part of human nature to seek differentiation from other members of the species, then cultural ethnicity satisfies a deep-seated need. Cultural ethnicity only becomes problematic if it is transformed into economic and political ethnicity for the advantage of its members at the expense of outsiders. This benign definition of ethnicity is, however, difficult to extol in South Africa, due to its tainted history.

There would be little disagreement about the right to retain a preferred language or practice a specific religion. In practical terms cultural group autonomy means, for example, that the state does not interfere with the educational preferences or language rights of any sizable group. It also means that the

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state should proportionately subsidize private religious or language education while maintaining a public school system of equal standards for all communities.

A cultural federalism could ensure that the Freedom Charter's declared right of all people to "develop their own folk culture and customs" could be meaningfully implemented.

For example, instead of the two European official languages being uniformly imposed everywhere it would be practical to give a regional language equal status in a particular area.

Thus, in Natal, Zulu and English could be the official languages, while Xhosa would have the same status in the Eastern Cape and Sotho in the new federal units in the Transvaal.

There would be no need to have a second official language in regions such as Western Cape and Orange Free State, where the overwhelming majority speak Afrikaans, while in the melting pot of the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vaal (I'WV) area a multilingual policy would apply (insofar as practicable). The confusion of the great variety of home languages is mitigated by the high percentage of bilingualism or multilingualism in South Africa, particularly among urban Blacks. Virtually all adult permanent township residents speak one of the European languages. The 26.9 percent of Africans in the urban areas who cannot speak either English or Afrikaans are mostly migrant workers. On the other hand, only 11 percent of Indians, 8 percent of Whites, and 5 percent of Coloreds can speak an African language.

An important precondition for genuine multiculturalism would be the compulsory teaching of the second language in the area schools, linked to bilingualism or even trilingualism as a prerequisite for civil service careers. Such a policy would reward multilingual Blacks more frequently. At the same time

the learning of an African language by Whites, Coloreds, and Indians would truly "Africanize" the society and foster communication and understanding among the different ethnic segments in future generations. Black writers, both in translation and in the original, could be as much a standard part of school syllabuses in all communities as is von Wyk Louw or Paton.

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Home Language: in the RSA, according to the 1980 Census (5% Sample)

Language Whites Colored: Indians Africans Total

Afrikaans 2,581,080 2,251,860 15,500 77,320 4025 760

Engsh 1,763,220 324,360 698,040 29,120 2,815 640

Dutch 11,740 - - '

German 40,240 - - : 40240

Greek 16,780 - ' - I 0

Italian 16,600 - - : 16.780

Portuguese 57,080 - - 16.600

French 6,340 - - : 562:0

Tam'l '0

Him; - - 24,720 - 24,720

Tales" - - 25.900 _ 25.900

Gujarad - - 4,000 - 4,000

urdu - - 25,120 - 25,120

Cl . - - 131280 - 13 280

nncse - - 2 700 2'7

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Xhosa ' - '

Zulu 8,440 - 2,870,920 2,879,360

swali - 5,323 - 6,058,900 6,064,480

Southern Ndebcle - ,440 : (283,220 650.600

Northern Ndebelc - I 100 - 170120 770220

gloogrcm \$50110 - 2,440, - 2,429,180 2:131:620

TswaLZm 0t 0 - 5,320 - 1,872,520 1,877,840

Tm - 9,300 - 1,346,360 1,355,660

n a -

vc d3 1,180 - 886,960 888,140

n a -

Om _ 40 - 169,700 169,740

cr 35,020 2,660 11,160 73,900 122,740

Total 4,528,100 2,612,780 821,320 16,923,760 24,886,020

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Implication of the Group Areas Act

TfhehGroup Areas Act constitutes the most far-reaching legacy

o t e Verwoerdlan dream. Long after all apartheid laws are

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:11 resettlement in racially homogeneous

Neighborhood schools will mean pre-

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dominantly racial schools. Le

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munities. In light of these unaltera

arises as to how the initial injustice and lingering bitterness

from the Act can be accommmnted. 110w should a democratic

election take the racial structures into account? Should a non-

racial policy reverse the legacy through deliberate ethnic

scrambling, or should it concentrate on a course of equalizing

the infrastructure and services of vastly unequal neigh-

isure activi

y within ethnically similar com-

ble social facts, the question

borhoods?

The Federal Republic ofGermany paid substantial compen-

sation to the surviving victims of Nazism. The Canadian gov-

ernment symbolically acknowledged its guilt over the wartime

expropriation and relocation ofjapanese-Canadians. In this

vein, the South African government could at least accept fi-

nancial responsibility for the losses of victit

Areas Act. While confiscated properties of Coloreds, Asians, and Africans were "compensated" at the discretion of officials, they were in most cases immediately sold to White bidders for a much higher real market value. It is this difference between compensation paid and actual market value, recorded in subsequent sales and available in the deeds of land registers, that could, together with accrued interests, form the basis of an easily administrable monetary settlement. Such a gesture would not even take into account the psychological anguish suffered by the past racist expropriation.

Surprisingly, none of the Indian or Colored political parties have so far made financial restitution for Group Area losses part of their platform. While all these parties advocate the abolition of the Group Areas Act, this demand overlooks that many relocated victims and their children have become accustomed to their new environment and do not want to move again. But they do resent the losses incurred and the past easy enrichment by White municipalities at their expense. Since the White municipal authorities were the main beneficiaries of the Act, a special restitution tax, levied upon those author-

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ities and added to White area property taxes, would be the morally most justifiable way to finance the scheme. If individual compensation is not considered feasible, then the municipal upgrading of services and infrastructure in the generally inferior non-White areas through these special taxes could be made a priority.

. Indeed, the ethnic residential pattern created under the Act is likely to persist for a long time, even with the restoration to individuals of the right to choose where they wish to live. In this case, the class differences between affluent and poor neighborhoods are likely to be accentuated. The Black middle class will gradually move out and the "have-nots" will be left among themselves in their racially homogeneous ghettos compared to the racially mixed better areas. Few Whites Indians, or Coloreds will be moving into the Guguletos, Sowetos or Umlazi, which will even more strongly develop into run-down East Side quarters across the railway track, serving as quarters for impoverished rural newcomers in search of scarce jobs. If the multiracial "haves" want to avoid the seething discontent of the ghettos spilling over into their affluent areas in the form of ubiquitous crime, as in Rio, Detroit, or Lagos, they had better make the townships sufficiently attractive to allow for a civilized life to replace depressed hopelessness.

How? Not following the American model, in which municipal expenditures on a suburb or city area depend on the taxes raised in it, but, perhaps, using the Canadian and European example of metropolitan financing. Here taxes collected at large are spent generally according to need, and the richer areas subsidize the poorer sections of the city. Another model would raise funds through levies upon employers (according to the numbers of Black employees), since the firms benefit most from the Black dormitories. However, this scheme would discourage labor-intensive production and would inevitably lead to further replacements through mechanization and hence, unemployment. i ,

While the financing of the Black areas has to be allocated according to the resources raised at large, political representation is optimally ensured in its opposite—a ward system. In such a system all neighborhoods or designated areas of a metropolitan region (wards) are guaranteed representation on the councils. In theory, a Black person could run for office in a predominantly White ward and vice versa, although in practice most representatives would be respected residents of their ward. Ward candidates could run individually or, more likely, as members of political parties, operating across ward boundaries. More than in an election at large, a ward system would minimize the dependency of the weaker parts on the goodwill of the more powerful sectors, because of guaranteed direct representation. At the same time, a ward system would ensure that minority ethnic groups be represented, since their vote in their residential area could not be "swamped" by majority ethnics in a winner-take-all system.

It would be wise to allow for several rather than one ward representative on the municipal/regional council, to be elected by proportional voting. In this way, several political groupings within a constituency could vie for their share and expect to be represented rather than fall by the wayside as would be the case in the Westminster system. In order to avoid unwieldy councils, it would therefore be wise to delineate relatively large wards represented by several different delegates, rather than small ones each represented by only one person. Similar rules would apply to numerically equal-sized rural constituencies, which will inevitably be more ethnically heterogeneous.

Local councils cannot substitute for central political representation. But democratically elected grass-roots representatives at the local level could initially also act in an indirect election of a regional and central parliament. All ward councillors

Local councils cannot substitute for central political representation. But democratically elected grass-roots representatives at the local level could initially also act in an indirect election of a regional and central parliament. All ward councillors

could elect a regional and central assembly from among themselves, according to proportional representation of whatever groupings emerge. Presumably, the greater rationality of elected ward representatives would also ensure a more competent central assembly, minimizing the chances of electing demagogues as a result of the screening of their peers. Above all, the indirect voting in a proportional system would reflect

the ethnic and/or ideological composition of the country: no minority or area would remain unrepresented. If such a system were to be backed by the consociational prescriptions of veto rights for minorities in existential matters as well as required representation on all administrative bodies, an optimal and widely legitimate democratic system would emerge.

In all likelihood most representatives would be Blacks. But by all accounts these new delegates would also primarily reflect the predominantly moderate social-democratic and religious outlook of their constituency. The majority of these representative spokespersons would have no difficulty forming coalitions with like-minded members of other ethnic groups, and most would already be members of nonracial parties.

It would be a fatal mistake on the part of the present rulers to manipulate representation through fiscal, ethnic, or numerical gerrymandering. Neither the taxes paid -nor the ethnic composition of a district can serve as a legitimate criterion for its voting strength. Head-counts of residents or registration of voters alone guarantees legitimacy. That such equal counting of adult persons for a one-person-one-equal-vote system will necessarily overlap to a large extent with existing residential patterns of ethnic homogeneity is a result of the Group Areas Act. It would be prudent to ensure that the delineation of constituencies is carried out by a multiracial body of representatives or judges who enjoy the highest reputations for impartiality. v t

Constituency representation by a numerically approximately equal number of wards differs in fundamental respects from the government's proposal for regional government. It is not based on discredited urban Black councils or other racially homogeneous bodies, but on a nonracial universal franchise that does not institutionalize enforced racial categories, yet the ethnic composition of an area will be likely to be fairly reflected in the representation. It also eliminates the racial distinction between "own" and "general" affairs, so central to the 1983 constitution. Instead, legitimate area interests come to the fore. These are articulated by whoever the majority of POLICYIMPLICATIONS 227

residents thinks can represent them best, as in all Western democracies.

Security and Group Rights

Constitutional group rights and a Bill of Individual Rights alone do not guarantee justice. At best, they proclaim an intention. What is crucial is whether, and how, stated rights can be enforced against violators. In the last analysis constitutional rights reflect power relations. Security remains a bottom line, and security mostly emanates from control over armed force.

A sovereign state is usually characterized as exercising the monopoly of force in its territory. However, there are many examples of a sovereign state permitting the self-policing of areas under its control. If it were agreed upon that the police forces were to be locally recruited and employed, they would also reflect the dominant ethnic composition of the population in each area. This is already practiced widely, with the exception that the overall control remains in Afrikaner hands. This situation would have to change, making a more autonomous community police. The necessary coordination between the different forces in a metropolitan area under the ultimate control of the elected regional administration would pose few problems.

As far as the military is concerned, however, ethnic units could facilitate a Lebanization of South Africa. The army must owe its allegiance to the state rather than to its communal segments if the state is not to disintegrate in a crisis. Here the Zimbabwean example of a racially integrated army could serve as a model. As long as the military is not the domain of one ethnic group but proportionally represents all population groups, perhaps even deliberately overrepresenting minorities, it can hardly be used to suppress one sector without the risk of disintegration. The inevitable institutional

socialization into an integrated, small, but efficient professional military of high standards-perhaps backed up by auxiliary volunteer commandos in each area under professional

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control-can be expected to override sectional or racial loyalties. This is clearly true for Black soldiers and policemen in the present system, where the army ethic has proven stronger than racial solidarity. In fact, Black policemen are considered far more ruthless than Whites, because of the constant hidden suspicion of disloyalty to their White masters. Their ostracism and renegade status in the townships may in fact reinforce this attitude, rather than leading them to "turn the guns around," as the ANC advises.

More radical proposals, such as to leave military control in White hands as an ultimate safeguard for handing over political power to a majority government, fail to recognize the legitimate claim of a sovereign government that it cannot tolerate a potentially or openly hostile counter-force in its midst. However, should it be agreed upon, the Afrikaners could hardly expect a more generous compromise than such a hard security assurance as ethnically controlled armies in return for abandoning ultimate political control.

Besides such negotiated security provisions, territorially based jurisdictions for Afrikaners ("White Bantustans") amount to anachronistic dreams in an interdependent economy. Gush Enclaves (the fanatic settlers in Israel), be they on the Westbank or in the Orange Free State, cause problems for peaceful coexistence more than they lessen opposition to it. If racist ideologues would like to purchase their own land and work it without using Black labor, there is, however, nothing that should stop such ancient lights of utopia. These enclaves may help to neutralize the potential terror of hard-core racists beyond the control of any government, let alone of reasoned persuasion. If some rural Afrikaners wish to imitate Hutterite colonies or other communes of alternative life-styles, so be it. Private communes of racist escapists from a threatening reality will inevitably fade into insignificance as long as they are not publicly sanctioned by special legal status.

However, a strong case may be made for state recognition of collective cultural rights. Cultural self-determination is not bound to a territorial base. Indeed, the United Nations' Study POLICYIMPLICATIONS 22g

on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious, and Linguistic Minorities lists a wide range of rights that could fall under the rubric "cultural, religious, and language" autonomy. The most crucial would be educational policy, that is, the right to establish denominational schools. The observance of religious or customary holidays and the right to use the minority language in official communications are other examples of desirable public ethnic recognition. One could also ask why should there not be an exclusively Zulu, Afrikaans, Islamic, or Hindu television station and broadcasting facility in place of the state-regulated uniform institution, espousing a correct line of official propaganda, that exists from Pretoria to Cairo at present? As long as such multiculturalism is supported by a large enough constituency and does not infringe on the common, overriding individual citizenship rights of its adherents, the diversity of "meaning-conferring activities" can only enrich the whole society.

Such cultural self-determination in a new nonracial South Africa can emulate various legal forms and precedents. The PFP proposals of corporate "cultural councils," represented in an upper house, is the most widely known. The bodies could also be modeled in part upon the self-governing professional societies in the medical and legal fields. Their self-regulatory existence rests on the assumption of a special competency of its members. So cultural or religious autonomy could be justified on the basis of special interests and knowledge unique to members of a religion or ethnicity. The widely supported self-government of Native people in North America provides another model of legitimate collective self-determination. Natives try to break out of the welfare colonialism by reclaiming their aboriginal land base and first-nation status. Those examples of legitimate cultural self-expression in South Africa,

however, are inextricably tied to two prerequisites: (i) that group boundaries and membership are no longer imposed, but self-chosen; and (2) that no unequal political power and economic privilege are publicly bound up with private ethnicity and heritage maintenance.

Addressing Economic and Status Grievances

Comparative evidence from other divided societies points to the importance of relative economic equality for harmonious intergroup relations. The inequality that exists in South Africa could be redressed at the political level through proportional revenue-sharing and equalization payments for less developed regions or institutional sectors, including affirmative action programs to compensate for past inequities. Unequal development does not present an insurmountable obstacle in a growing economy. In the same way that class conflicts were reduced in progressive West European countries through institutionalized bargaining and compulsory arbitration resulting in ever fewer strikes and lockouts, conflicts about material privileges could be settled without escalating violence. The chances of political violence, however, are much greater when economic and ethnic group cleavages converge. When material inequality crosscuts ethnic cleavages, the common material interests override ethnic loyalties.

Attaining stability requires that the massive Black unemployment and rural poverty be tackled through public works programs and tax incentives for job creation. The recession, if it forces the government to cut its spending on apartheid parallel administrations and Namibia in favor of pressing needs such as housing and Black education, could be a blessing in disguise. In addition, government policy could, for example, pressure the private sector to integrate training, promotion, and job opportunities, by refusing to grant government contracts to firms that do not comply with a stipulated labor code. The present constitution does not require that "general affairs" be administered by a mainly White civil service alone. Attrition of the Afrikaner monopoly could allow qualified Blacks to move into management positions in the vast parastatals and thereby set an example to the private sector.

The gradual Africanization of the higher echelons of the civil service—the pilots of South African Airways, medical staff at hospitals, faculty positions in universities—seems particularly crucial. Role stereotypes would be contradicted in the eyes of a prejudiced public, and the application of criteria of merit demonstrated to Black youth skeptical of career chances.

Other legitimacy implications can best be demonstrated with the example of the judiciary. Hugh Corder, in his analysis of forty years (1910–1950) of interpretations of conflicting rules and judicial precedents by judges of the South African Appellate Court, found a strong commitment to the legislative policy and ideology of the ruling group.⁶ The study shows that the expectation of the judiciary serving as a guardian of justice for the disfranchised is misplaced. While the judges adopted a generally liberal line on matters of personal freedom, they upheld the state whenever the status quo was threatened. The law constrains authority and makes administrative action more predictable; it seldom acts as a trail-blazer.

Yet there is room for judicial discretion. If judges transcend their social background and ideological ties with the established order, as happens occasionally, they can advance the cause of justice even within the narrow confines of the South African system. By reinterpreting the rights of urban Blacks (Rikhotso) or insisting on due process, judges have on occasion made inroads upon an authoritarian administration. Contradictions between the democratic legitimation needs of an executive state and the sense of necessary control among the dominant segments lend themselves to far greater exploitation than a conservative judiciary is willing to perceive. Above all, the racial and ideological disparity in sentences for offenders (mostly as handed down by regional magistrates who are dependent civil servants) proves a strong political bias for the South African legal system. That persons on the political right receive far milder sentences for "terrorist" offenses than

those on the left and that infractions by Whites against Blacks are generally treated more leniently than vice versa constitutes an embarrassing indictment of the system of justice.⁷ John Dugard has emphasized that there has never been a Black judge appointed and that Blacks represent only a tiny percentage of the membership of the four Bar Councils. "It

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would not be too speculative, therefore, to portray the overwhelming majority of our judicial officers as White Protestant males of conservative outlook, who support the present political/racial status quo (and often the National Party Government), and who have little personal contact with members of the other racial groups, except at the master-servant level." Improved training of these judicial officers or their exposure to prison conditions, necessary as these steps may be, can hardly result in changes in an institution that has executed more than 150 Blacks for rape since 1911 but has never sentenced to death, let alone executed, a single White for the rape of a Black woman, though such rapes are far more frequent. Only a partial Africanization of the judiciary can achieve the balance and legitimacy so crucial for the credibility of the legal system. While Black judges would labor under corresponding personality biases due to their social background, at least they could be expected to be familiar with the situation of the majority of offenders and could perhaps restore the balance in the disparity in sentencing. Paradoxically, questioning the very apolitical objectivity and neutrality that judges flaunt as their trademark would be a prerequisite of their true justice. Only when judges become conscious of their political role (as Blacks can be expected to be) do they begin to work for change in the system.

Moreover, because the symbols of dominance—the laws and everyday conduct—are left unchanged, the slow reform from above is perceived by its intended beneficiaries not as liberation but manipulation. One of the fallacies embraced by an ethnic technocracy is the assumption that it can solve the racial problem by budgetary means alone. More township housing, better Black educational facilities, and higher wages, necessary as they may be for stability, do not eliminate discontent. What matters is the meaning given to these initiatives by the recipient, not by the donors. A government cannot manufacture meaning in order to engineer mass loyalty. Reform from above is increasingly held suspect unless it clearly has been instituted under pressure from below. Since such "weakness" is the last thing the establishment wishes to admit, many well-

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intended concessions have failed in their impact even before they are implemented. The work of the Urban Foundation, for example, is constantly suspected of being part of the grand apartheid design of merely pacifying the urban insiders. : The Pretoria government consistently underestimates the status frustrations and symbolic grievances of the highly politicized Black middle class, on whose true incorporation any accommodation is dependent. Pretoria has yet to issue a much-needed statement of intent that will spell out the process of deracialization clearly. In the volatile social climate of South Africa, an untrained bureaucracy and police display attitudes of supremacy as rigidly as ever in daily encounters, whereas all over the world other police forces and social service personnel undergo lengthy professional sensitivity training in intercultural relations.

Addressing Educational Grievances

As is well known, South Africa uses segregated educational institutions at all levels for its four racial groups, regardless of shared languages and cultures. This is in keeping with the forced separation of groups in residential areas and in political rights. The intellectual undercurrents of apartheid in the curriculum, particularly in history textbooks, have been amply documented.⁹ Poverty is assumed to be the natural state for Blacks. Giving little emphasis to precolonial Africa, the texts mainly describe events in Afrikaner history. Blacks are portrayed as posing problems for the Whites. This colonial and Eurocentric bias presents world history in terms of competing nationalisms. The apartheid indoctrination, however, is no longer based on theories of biological racism, but on the more insidious myth that Whites settled in an empty land, that Black underdevelopment is self-inflicted, and that the con-

querors amply deserve their spoils. Added to this is an exaggerated emphasis on cultural differences among Blacks that are said to necessitate separate institutional facilities. The gross inequality in education merely reflects the larger inequality in life chances. 'I'he materially impoverished back-

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grounds of Black students also severely handicap them in the competition with Whites, as do the many legal barriers. The vastly higher school drop-out rates for Blacks further indicate the vast economic gap between Blacks and Whites. At least 30 percent of Black pupils do not go beyond four years of schooling, and 50 percent drop out at the end of primary school. The educational system does little to compensate for the societal inequality but, rather, reinforces it by a differential allocation of resources along racial lines. The per capita expenditure for Black students is one-tenth that for Whites. As a consequence, teacher-student ratios are much higher in the poorly equipped Black schools than in the vastly better facilities for the other groups. In Black schools, the average teacher-pupil ratio is 1:41, compared to 1:19 for White schools. Class sizes of up to 63 for primary school and 43 at secondary level are common in certain areas.¹⁰ However, the racial groups are no longer taught different curricula. At the end of secondary school Black students undergo a written examination similar to that given in White schools. Requirements for matriculation exemption are standardized. Blacks, however, take the tests in their second language. Instruction for the first four years is in one of the Black languages, after which, almost without exception, English is adopted. This is done at the behest of the Blacks themselves, who demand to be judged by universal standards. To them, an education in Afrikaans or in their vernacular constitutes an obstacle to the universal credibility expected of education. However, the lower budgets, unqualified teachers, and second-language instruction combine to ensure a much higher failure rate for Blacks than Whites despite similar syllabi. Of 75,000 Blacks sitting for the matriculation examination in 1984, only 50.1 percent passed and only 11.5 percent passed with matriculation exemption."

At the same time, better education ranks first among Black aspirations, especially among parents. Educational credentials are seen as the only feasible key to a better life and at least minimal status in a society in which most other routes for advancement are blocked. The state has had to respond to the

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Level: of Education by Racial Group (1980)

White: Black:

None 15.7% 48.20%

-Std 6 15.1 37.50

Std 6 9.0 6.20

Std 7 6.1 3.00

Std 8 16.9 5.00

Std 9 5.1 0.90

Std 10 19.5 0.80

Diploma 4-Std 9, 10 8.4 0.35

University degree 4.2 0.05

source: Adapted from Financial Mail (February 1985): 53.

political frustrations expressed by Blacks in educational institutions as well as to the economy's need for a more skilled work force. This second factor now dominates the debate over education. It is no longer possible to restrict Blacks to roles as hewers of wood and drawers of water, as the old "Bantu education" policy had planned. The new demand for a work force trained in vocational and technical skills, which the White sector alone can no longer fill, has altered educational priorities. In addition, the strategy of co-opting the relatively privileged urban sector into the system implies higher education for a future Black middle class, who have been envisaged as a bulwark against the rural poor and as a stabilizer of free enterprise against socialist visions.

Both expectations have thus far failed to materialize. The expected depoliticized defense of the status quo by relatively privileged Black students turned into the most politicized and long-lasting school unrest the society has ever experienced. Grievances about authoritarian learning conditions² were combined with the much deeper resentment against being

second-class citizens and having no future under the new constitution and in the stagnating economy. The prime objects of co-optation, urban educated Blacks with much-sought-after residence and work rights, have turned out to be the most militant rejecters of the imposed racial order and inferior status. Promises of material benefits have so far been unsuccessful in diffusing the feelings of symbolic deprivation.

Projections of Matriculation Passes, 1980 and 2000
1980 2000

Whites 49,239 52.5% 43,700 31.0%

Coloreds 7,226 7.7 11,700 8.3

Asians 4,819 _ 5.1 7,700 5.5

Black: 32,535 34.7 77,900 55.2

soviet: Adapted from Charles Simkins, "Society," p. 114.

This trend toward militancy continues despite increased expenditures on Black education. Unit costs (excluding capital expenditure) in 1984/85, of R 156 per Black student, R 498 per Colored, R 711 per Indian, and R 1,211 per White student, still show vast discrepancies, but the educational budget for the first time surpassed military expenditures. Much of this money, of course, is wasted on duplication of segregated facilities. Salaries of teachers with the same qualifications, however, were equalized-but only 24 percent of the total Black teacher corps of 120,650 in 1982 met the minimum requirements for senior certificates plus professional training. Most Black teachers were severely underqualified or had no professional training at all.

The contradiction in educational policy lies in the economic need for trained people, which undermines the restrictive purposes for which the education has been provided. While the number of White students has remained effectively the same, in line with the declining White population ratio, the number of Black students at the various educational institutions has increased rapidly. This increase has not been confined to primary levels. The number of Black students at secondary-level educational institutions between 1978 and 1983 increased from 467,000 to 678,500, and at tertiary level, from 19,900 to 44,300. The appearance of Black university graduates in such sizable numbers in the job market is a new phenomenon and distinguishes the South African economy from its counterparts elsewhere in Africa. An educated class of this size can no longer accept a lack of political rights even if they are bribed heavily to do so. It is precisely the achievement of material equality that enables people to tackle the issues of

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political and social inequality. The South African educational system has yet to find an answer to this predicament

The establishment has diagnosed a crisis of education in South Africa. Various commission reports, notably that of the de Lange Panel, have addressed the crisis no longer in terms of ideological content or curriculum but mainly in organizational terms. Now dominating the debate is how scarce resources should be allocated among the racial groups and how educational administration should be organized most effectively.

The government tends to ignore the political underpinnings of the conflict in education as well as the conflict at large and instead to treat the antagonisms as a management problem. In contrast to this social engineering approach, most Black spokespersons focus on conflicting interests. They probe how competing claims can be reconciled through institutionalized bargaining and explore how the parties can be empowered to participate meaningfully in the bargaining process according to mutually acceptable procedures that bestow legitimacy on the policy. The government, however, adopts manipulation as its principal technique. It imposes solutions. This management perspective basically denies that there are conflicts of interests. The government assumes that attending to the interests of the dominant party also benefits its adversary. Using this assumption, it concentrates on removing obstacles ("agitators") to an unquestioned goal of maintaining consensus. At the same time this educational policy aims at fragmenting resistance and co-opting useful allies; however, the slightest provocation triggers coercion. While manipulative management of conflict may succeed for a while due to superior resources, it lacks legitimacy and increases costs of domination compared with political incorporation achieved through universal fran-

chise and equal citizenship.

Without equal or integrated schooling, except in private schools, little success can be expected in combating Black educational disadvantages and improving interracial understanding. Currently popular approaches abroad, such as interracial team teaching, peer group teaching, and the buddy

- System in the United States and Canada, presuppose racially mixed classrooms. The same is true for the private and voluntary "brother-sister program" to facilitate the success of foreign students in West German universities. In South Africa the latter would quickly be dismissed as unnatural and token: ISllC, while no institutional structures exist in which the former could take place in any meaningful way. In this respect it should be most worthwhile to observe the effects private schools in South Africa have on human relations. In the meantime, public schools aiming at improved interracial contact may do something by promoting meetings between different racial schools for noncompetitive sports activities or in collaboration on projects of mutual interest, to permit experiences of shared goal achievement. Hiring Black teachers to teach White students may prove more valuable in altering stereotypes than Whites teaching Blacks. Youth leadership camps drawing students from a range of schools may also have, at least limited success in changing attitudes. All these initiatives are hampered by an overall structural context that would quickly dismiss these efforts as technicist reformism; yet even when the structures change, a revamping of traditional attitudes and interpersonal networks will be needed. Finally: those willing to establish private scholarships could adopt a Black student. Larger business enterprises could adopt Black schools in their area and ensure that their facilities are upgraded. Every scholarship that foreign institutions provide, and every foreign teacher who is sent into Black schools, contributes to the equalization of life chances. More than the financial assistance, the direct contact and the expectations and obligations created would make at least a small improvement over the present anonymous hopelessness.

The Style of Accommodation

The consensus that the current South African constitution aims for will always be the result of concessions, not negotiations. Consultation is not identical to bargaining. Since conflict regulation is based on the goodwill of the ruling party, any POLICY IMPLICATIONS 239

concession smacks of paternalism. "It has already been decided to involve Black Local Authorities," declared RW. Botha, announcing at the same time a new forum "set up for them" as proof of a major break from previous policy. Such unilateral decrees lack the legitimacy that would make them work. A more effective procedure would be to ask a representative adversary which mechanism it side prefers, and then bargain about a mutually acceptable compromise or, in the event of a deadlock, a mutually acceptable arbitration. If the talks are not to be hopeless from the start, clarity about the negotiating process seems crucial. Several tested principles and procedures for successful negotiations are available. First, negotiations aimed at results rather than mere posturing would have to begin with informal contacts between the major and most extreme antagonists. Thus, in South Africa the ANC and the government would have to clear contentious issues informally before they were aired formally on a public platform. Van Zyl Slabbert's warning is apt: "Public rejections and postures create additional obstacles for effective behind-the-scenes horse-trading." Once a minimal consensus emerged and a potential compromise was envisaged, all other interest groups that could jeopardize an accord must be brought into the negotiating process. This two-stage approach seems necessary to protect the credibility of the central parties. If, for example, Pretoria were to attempt to negotiate seriously with Inkatha first, in the hope that this would then circumvent the ANC/UDF organizations, Inkatha would be easily outradicalized and lose legitimacy. Buthelezi's reluctance to yield to Pretoria's vague overtures without firm guarantees about the government's intent demonstrates his grasp of this principle. The two-stage approach does not imply lesser importance of center parties or undue recognition of more radical groups; it merely accepts that the middle groups

can be accommodated within the parameters set by the extreme antagonists without complicating the initial bargaining by introducing the inevitable leadership competition for greatest internal legitimacy. It is hard to imagine a more ridiculous statement than the feigned confusion by government

spokesmen: "Among all the competing Black groups, we do not know with whom to negotiate." '5

Obviously, if both parties are interested in reaching a compromise they will set few preconditions for talks. All too often, before the negotiations have even started, the antagonists list nonnegotiable issues that amount to a virtual negation of the possibility of policy compromises. As long as Pretoria demands that the ANC renounce guerrilla warfare and the ANC in turn insists that all apartheid laws be repealed as preconditions for negotiation, no talks will take place. All contentious items must be on the agenda if any real bargaining is to take place. .

It would be helpful if the antagonists were to agree on a mutually trusted third party to chair, mediate the negotiations, and generally act as go-between. However, even if this third party had great legitimacy it would be unlikely to acquire the power of creating binding arbitration. The government in power would erode its claim to sovereignty if it were to agree to such a rational mechanism for conflict regulation. However, once agreement has been fully reached, an outside power can guarantee compliance with the accord through specific incentives and sanctions.

It is of vital importance that the parties to the compromise be able to guarantee the compliance of their constituencies. Only if the government can secure right-wing adherence to the new rules will those rules acquire meaning. Similarly, only if the opposition movements are able to discipline their followers can a new regime achieve stability. Paradoxically, that should give Pretoria a vested interest in having a strong opponent and widely acclaimed Black leadership, rather than a weak and fragmented opposition—the aim of current government policy. The chaos of leaderless and frustrated resistance proves counterproductive to peaceful conflict regulation. All leaders must be permitted political freedom even if they refuse to profess a humiliating allegiance to the constitutional rules in whose making they had no part. Only if all persons who claim a following can participate freely in the democratic

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competition can their representativeness be established and the disruption they threaten be contained by mutually binding rules. 1

The informal contacts of elites in non-governmental institutions facilitate successful accommodation. If elite accommodation is confined to the political realm, without social contact within crucial support groups (universities, professional and business organizations, unions, churches, army, voluntary associations, service clubs, etc.), a deeply politicized distrust is the likely consequence.

The arduous process of reaching an accommodation often proves as important as the ultimate result. This means that racial legislation should be included as part of the agenda for negotiations. Political accommodation is dependent on voluntary social integration. Leaders in a power-sharing arrangement cannot be expected to exercise moderation unless institutional support structures create mutual trust. Although South Africa has made advances in reintegrating segregated institutions, in practice the presence of Blacks is merely token. It is unrealistic to demand that government commit itself beforehand to abolishing apartheid, as the ANC expects. But a public statement of regret about past injustices, an acknowledgment of the need to offer compensation, with an assurance of intent, could ease the situation, as could a temporary ANC truce to test government's intention. In this way both sides could save face and not submit to conditions that amount to prior surrender.

In the wake of criticism of the constitution, Pretoria tentatively began to set up a consultative Black forum or multiracial state council. But it remains an unconventional convention, insofar as the Nationalist administration now tries to solicit Black opinion from outside the established political in-

stitutions. The problem is that the few so-called moderate spokespersons approached fear that being seen talking to government will compromise them in the eyes of their own radicalized constituency. Dialogue outside the public spotlight facilitates frank exchanges without the need of posturing, as has

been argued, and clarifies the contentious issues as well as the controversial areas of potential compromise. However, an on-going secret dialogues alienates those excluded and may well discredit the Black participants. Without an open mandate to negotiate, the Black leaders and their presumed followers alike rely on trust. The brokers must constantly renew this fragile relationship by extremist rhetoric that does not necessarily forward the negotiations. The whole process favors the dominant group, which deals individually with those who speak for Blacks and can exploit cleavages and different strategies. The greatest danger of such secret elites and alliances is that an illusory consensus may emerge whose acceptability has not been tested in open discussion.

In such a situation, few prospects exist for a traditional consociational elite-cartel. Formation of a grand elite coalition of divided segments depends on the grassroots followers' acceptance of controversial alliances and disappointing compromises. In a traditional hierarchy the leader can rely on unquestioned acceptance of decisions. An attitude of apolitical deference to leaders fosters a fatalistic tolerance of disappointments. Politicization changes this picture. Politicized resentment generally favors the group advocates who demand the unobtainable ultimate, rather than compromising moderates. Extreme demands for sacrifices and the promise of further struggle, with their promised psychological rewards of purity and self-esteem, appeal to the disenchanted. The promises of meager spoils by reformers seldom match the excitement of anticipating utopia. Besides, the South African government has repeatedly discredited moderate counter-elites by ignoring their requests.

Consociationalism developed successfully before industrialization in Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Austria, while it failed in Germany because an atomizing and politicizing industrialization had preceded national unification. This wresting of people from their traditional subcultures and thrusting them into the mix of an industrial society changes their experiences and outlooks to such an extent that preindustrial, consociational policy-making is no longer possible. A more democratic means of representation of interests must be found to replace the past reliance on traditional leaders. While any system of mutual group guarantees thus remains a second-best option for the antagonists in a no-win situation, even its chances of success in South Africa recede further the longer a genuine power-sharing compromise is delayed.

The vital question of political prisoners shows how far establishment thinking remains from contemplating real negotiations with a comparatively modest leadership in its jails for acts of sabotage committed twenty-five years ago. Although the liberal opposition and business ritualistically call for the release of all authentic leaders and their inclusion in negotiations, they do not employ whatever clout they have to see that Pretoria complies. This reinforces Pretoria's hard-line stance. Black opinion does not yet figure in these calculations. Instead of using Mandela's release as a gesture of reconciliation and show of goodwill, the government adopts, in the words of a senior official, "a position of high moral ground." The mainstream English sector, worried about marketing and image, pragmatically advocates an even more callous emulation of Russian practices: "He should seize the opportunity of Nelson Mandela's illness-before the man dies in prison and all hell breaks loose and ship him out of the country on a one-way ticket to medical treatment abroad."¹⁶ The government continues to criminalize its major opponent. It equates the ANC with the PLO or with the IRA, with which even the British Labour Party would not speak. However, the false analogy overlooks that the ANC represents the majority sentiment of the population in South Africa. Because it is not an extremist fringe group, it has not yet practiced unrestrained terrorism against White civilians, although a few such inci-

dents have occurred. By rejecting early negotiations as weakness, Pretoria merely incites its opponents to bomb their way to the negotiating table. As many examples in history have proven, those who stubbornly refuse to share power finally end up losing all power.

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Reeducating the White Constituency

Many observers doubt that the delicate process of genuine bargaining will succeed in an authoritarian political culture: "White South Africans are too deeply socialized to accept racial dominance rather than inter-racial balancing, reciprocity and cooperation as the normal mode of social and political transactions. The whole principle of accommodating White interests to Black demands (however limited these might be) is alien to the political culture and basic style in White politics." Any ingrained authoritarian and paternalistic habits in White politics can, however, be unlearned. Evidence indicates that soon after apartheid measures have been repealed, many Whites who had expressed opposition will agree with the change. Law-abiding deference to legitimate authority molds White attitudes. Such a hope no longer counts as idealistic optimism when the benefits of genuine bargaining outweigh those of racial dominance. To be sure, sociologists have identified the phenomenon of "cultural lag"-the slowness of adjustment to conflicting objective demands. But using the modern sophisticated techniques of massmanipulation, a political reorientation could be achieved relatively quickly today. If the neutralization of conflict potential is indeed the primary goal of a technocratic government, then a massive reeducation program for its own constituency should have the highest priority. However, Very little is being done in this area. In party political discourse, government spokesmen frequently reinforce traditional doctrines rather than question cherished formulas of the past. In their desire to ward off right-wing challenges they pander to conservative sentiment and portray themselves as steadfast traditionalists. Since careers are at stake in by-elections, the ruling technocrats frequently adopt a defensive stance toward the ideologues. They, as an opposition, can outdo the government in their extremist rhetoric. While in this predicament a certain amount of double-talk can be expected from the ruling party, the deception does backfire by reinforcing traditional views.

As a result, and despite an official departure from tradi-

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tional apartheid ideology, substantial numbers of Whites still endorse the Verwoerdian setup. If the Human Science Research Council's 1984 survey of White, Colored, and Indian political attitudes adequately reflects the national sentiment, the high degree of support for traditional apartheid testifies to the failure of grass-roots political reorientation. Racist indoctrination persists not only among the two right-wing parties but among the Nationalist constituency as well. A White ideological reorientation cannot be expected unless the all-powerful media undertake deliberate reeducation. However, although the Afrikaans press in many ways explores untrodden paths, it is shackled by its ties to the National Party. To publish a Colored columnist in an Afrikaans paper or use a Black announcer on Afrikaans television is celebrated as a major breakthrough. Above all, Afrikaner audiences receive little exposure to realities of Black experiences and attitudes. Black militancy is caricatured, trivialized, or criminalized, but its causes are not portrayed. For example, instead of giving its readers a taste of Black opposition, during the constitutional debate Rapport refused to accept a paid UDF advertisement. The coalition's statement intended "to clarify the UDF's stand on violence" was; found by editor Wimpie de Klerk to be "unacceptably sharp" and "pure propaganda." This selective reporting reinforces the false picture of harmony interrupted by minor conflicts caused by agitators with whom a strong government adequately copes.

The state-controlled electronic media embody the height of "consensus" politics, South Africa-style. Like Pravda or Moscow television. not once have the supposedly independent commentators ever found it necessary to criticize the government in power. While opposition views are given regular air-

ing in news bulletins as far as necessary to create an aura of impartial fairness, it is television that is clearly the most powerful ideological weapon of the state. In the White referendum in the autumn of 1983, television was massively used to promote a "yes" vote, the size of which surprised even its managers. Television has not, however, been called into service to politically reeducate White South Africans to deracialization.

Afrikamu-S/Icaking Whites' and Englidz-Spmking Whim' (1,024),
Coloreds' (1,242), and Indiam' (1,406) Attitudes
toward Seven Fundamental Apartheid Structures in March 1984

H
Respondents' Attitudes (%)
Apartheid Structure and Uncertain or
Population Group In Favor Neutral Opposed Do Not Know Total'
Mixed Marriages Act

Afrikaans-speaking	78.9	3.8	16.6	0.8	100.1
English-speaking	41.3	15.2	41.3	2.2	100.0
Coloreds	24.6	19.3	45.2	10.8	99.9
Indians	26.9	21.8	47.8	3.6	100.1

M
Immorality Act
Afrikaans-speaking 81.3 4.9 13.4 0.4 100.0
English-speaking 37.8 16.5 41.0 4.7 100.0
Coloreds 23.4 16.8 47.4 12.4 100.0
Indians 23.0 22.9 49.4 4.7 100.0

M
Group Areas Act
Afrikaans-speaking 76.8 6.1 16.1 1.1 100.1
English-speaking 42.4 15.5 38.4 3.7 100.0
Coloreds 22.8 13.6 54.3 9.4 100.1
Indians 24.9 20.6 51.7 2.8 100.0

m
Separate Education
Afrikaans-speaking 90.2 4.2 5.1 0.6 100.1
English-speaking 55.4 13.1 28.3 3.2 100.0
Coloreds 21.1 12.8 56.9 9.2 100.0
Indians 27.8 16.5 52.3 3.5 100.1

m
Separate Amenities
Afrikaans-speaking 84.9 5.3 8.1 1.7 100.0
English-speaking 50.5 16.8 30.1 2.7 100.1
Coloreds 10.9 14.1 66.4 8.6 100.0
Indians 19.1 17.9 58.3 4.5 100.0

W
Black Homelands
Afrikaans-speaking 89.6 2.6 4.2 3.6 100.0
English-speaking 60.3 10.8 19.7 9.1 99.9
Coloreds 27.1 15.3 37.2 20.4 100.0
Indians 30.0 22.4 33.8 13.9 100.1

a
' Separate Voters' Rolls
Afrikaans-speaking 92.1 2.6 2.5 2.8 100.0
English-speaking 64.3 11.1 17.7 6.9 100.0
Coloreds 17.7 12.2 53.2 17.0 100.1
Indians 24.5 18.3 45.9 11.3 100.0

3Totals do not always equal 100%. due to rounding.

sonnet: Human Science Research Council, Institute for Sociological and Demographic
Research. Pretoria. Surveys in subsequent years of heightened unrest showed a substan-
tial increase of White: who believe that the pace of reform is too slow and that politica

l
power-sharing is inevitable.

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Out of fear of disturbing the ethnic sentiments of a prejudiced
audience, the manipulators of consciousness have merely
reinforced the status quo. Generally unimaginative and paro-
chial television programs are carefully screened to omit any
nonracial political alternatives. What filters through as normal
human contact from foreign productions remains of the ster-
ile Hollywood variety, or, at most, reaches the standards of the
popular Bill Cosby comedies. The cultural boycott of South
Africa by foreign academics, producers, and actors paradoxi-
cally aids Pretoria's censorship.

Finally, the reeducation of the ruling constituency cannot
be achieved without a radical revision of the school curricu-
lum. A realistic historical account of conquest and coloniza-
tion should be substituted for the current Afrikaner ethno-
centrism. The image of Blacks as pawns and victims in
imperial power games must be supplemented with insights

into the nature of resistance and the causes for counter-mobilization. Professional, intergroup-oriented teacher training could eliminate the parochial focus on group traditions and "master symbols."

According to Johanna du Preez, a communications lecturer at the University of South Africa, the myths promoted by the biased textbooks include: authority ought not to be questioned; Afrikaners have a special relationship with God; as an isolated and afflicted minority, the Afrikaner is threatened and has to rely on military ingenuity; South Africa as the economic leader on the continent has a God-given development task to fulfill. 'B Leonard Thompson's seminal Political Mythology of Apartheid traced the historical background of those powerful collective fables as the Covenant and laid bare their function in the mobilization of the volk. Although much of the ethnic fervor has waned, it has not been replaced with a critical education, aimed at individual autonomy in making sense of a bewildering reality. Instead rote learning and spoon-feeding remain the norm, resulting all too often in "intellectual parrots" full of information but geared toward conformity.

. Conclusion:

Prospects for an
Evolutionary Transition

DESPITE THE FORMIDABLE OBSTACLES, on various levels, to a fundamental transition, there are reasons to hope for a more peaceful resolution in South Africa than in other divided societies. This realistic hope is founded in four distinct features of the South African conflict. First, economic interdependence in a resource-rich country gives all groups a stake in accommodation. Unlike the Middle Eastern situation, the South African conflict is not fundamentally over values, but over privilege and power. These material and political interests are open to compromise, unlike religious definitions of absolute truth. Race constitutes an invidious distinction that can be discarded when it becomes dysfunctional.

Second, South Africa does not represent a colonial conflict, which can only be solved by the departure or defeat of an alien conqueror; African nationalism recognizes Afrikaner nationalism, and vice versa. The terms of coexistence, not the domination of one over the other, are the points of contention.

Third, despite the militant rhetoric, the ideological differences between Black and White are not as rigid as the color classification suggests. Common Christian values and a common Westernized consumerism engender similar aspirations.

The two main organized Black opposition movements, the ANC and Inkatha, do not espouse socialism.¹

Finally, an ethnic technocracy has begun to perceive the rising costs of apartheid domination and is engaged in modifying its control through reform. Even a Conservative Party in power could only delay but not resist a powerful capitalism

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that now insists on changes in stabilization policies. These reforms develop their own dynamic and have unintended consequences outside planned control.

Liberation in the emotional sense it is not. But technocratic reform accumulates small-scale changes that may in the end make liberation considerably different from the way it is traditionally perceived. Under the pressure of unionized and politicized subjects, the counter-revolution from above may well ameliorate the political alienation by hastening deracialization and political incorporation.

Technocratic liberation aims at eliminating the status inconsistencies of formalized racial classification by replacing it with class stratification. If successful, that action would increase the intra-group conflicts and further minimize the racial distinctions, particularly between Whites, Indians, and Coloreds. A class system would bring South Africa nominally in line with other Western societies. Only ideologists can maintain that such progress is not worthwhile when compared with the system of apartheid. Whether South Africa's social engineering will achieve its end still hangs in the balance. Much depends on the choices of political leadership on both sides. Neither accommodation nor escalating confrontation is inevitable.

A widespread myth has it that the future will essentially be a continuation of the past: just as the Sharpeville emergency and the 1976/77 upheaval were eventually brought under control, so the revolt of the mid 1980s will abate.² This cyclic theory of "uplift," in which violent "tremors" with different "epicenters" shake the country like natural disasters, overlooks at least six distinct differences between the 1980s revolt and the Soweto upheaval nine years earlier. First, many more adults are now involved alongside the township youth. Second, the revolt has penetrated into the countryside, with little-known locations in the Cape and Orange Free State becoming centers of violent protest. Third, the widespread and continuous upheaval has necessitated the use of the military and of emergency legislation to combat the revolt. Fourth, the 1980s revolt has a more political and revolutionary thrust. Endemic general frustration has exacerbated specific grievances. Or-

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ganized internal dissent has fused with externally based efforts, whereas in 1976/77 the ANC was surprised by the militancy of the students, which it tried to harness only afterward. Fifth, the 19803 revolt exposed Black class divisions by making the nascent African middle class the prime target. It occurred during a severe fiscal crisis of the state that eroded the co-optation policy of the urban insideis. As one analyst observed: "A lumpenproletariat, the unemployed and unemployable, seem now to be the driving force behind the unrestf's And, sixth, in contrast to 1976/77, powerful labor organizations now exist that can give the revolt organizational clout and political muscle. Coercive military power cannot secure individual productivity or prevent consumer and industrial action. In sum, there is a new quality to the opposition that technocratic planning could not anticipate. It has exposed the limits of ma'nipulability for important sections of the Black population. For them, the socialization for patience has ended. Fanonesque notions of cleansing through confrontation, of exorcizing colonial degradation through martyrdom, have emerged. The barbarous wrath unleashed against in-group members deflects resentment against the unassailable out-group. The ANC has in consequence experienced a dramatic influx of recruits. Its diplomatic defeat at Nkomati turned into a psychological victory at home. There is no longer any possibility of leaving the movement out of political reform; the success of reform, as well as township stability, now depends on the legalization and incorporation of the ANC. This greatly changed situation demands far-reaching responses both by the state and by the employers. It has undermined past efforts at depoliticization by technocratic reformers. The attempt at gradual African political inclusion via ethnic states and third- or second-tier local administrative institutions will have to be abandoned in favor of central state representation. Incorporation cannot be confined to powerless local-level politics and meaningless "own affairs." These _ questions will be raised at the political center that technocratic reform had hoped to neutralize and depoliticize through ma-

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nipulative consensus politics. In short, the conilict has moved beyond concessions which can no longer assuage. ' New formulae for stability have emerged: a common citizenship with universal franchise, though not necessarily in a winner-take-all Westminster system: proportional representation of parties, based on sclf-association instead of imposed racial origin; an undivided, not necessarily centralist. but federal state. It is likely that the common anti-apartheid stances of a strategically divided opposition will be replaced by an even more divisive debate about the nature of democratic socialism in South Africa.

Many analysts have noted the mutual misjudgments of the opponent's strength in South Africa. If both sides (10 not realize the possibility of an indehnite period of "violence without victory," negotiations are unlikely. As long as one side thinks it can neutralize its antagonist it need not be concerned about compromises. Hermann Giliomee has observed, "The most serious failing is the inability of each side to assess the other's real strength, leading to a frightful inability to embark on constructive thinking and courageous compromise."4 Pretoria believes that it can repress or manipulate the opposition, particularly the ANC. In reality, the very act of repression has imbued the organization with an aura of mystique and purity. Imprisoned or banned, its leaders can do no wrong and are not compromised by daily controversies. Purity is the power of the powerless.

There is a similar underestimation of White intransigence on the part of foreign liberals and the international left. Naive speculations abound regarding the imminent collapse of the regime: "The isolation of the White minority could crack its willingness to resist at some unpredictable but not so distant moment."5 Hope is based on a "general insurrection" that

would sweep the minority out of power as the Shah in Iran fell unexpectedly under the pressure of street forces and a deserting army. But South Africa is not a personal autocracy that suffers from uncertain loyalties of its security apparatus. Neither the isolation of a feudal dynasty nor the religious fa-

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naticism of its opponent characterizes the conflict; rather, an ethnically mobilized group clings to power at all costs. At the core of this determination lie the perceptions that the Afrikaner can only survive as a group, or race; that this survival must be in South Africa, as the only country he can call home; and that greater repression as well as concessions or negotiations, if necessary, but not total abdication 'of power, can best ensure this survival. Any collapse of the will to rule would presuppose a substantial dilution of Afrikaner group feelings into individual interest calculations. While this process of de-ethnicization has been underway ever since Afrikanerdom achieved power, the formidable legacy of 'mobilized ethnicity still blocks any individualistic, nonracial form of government and is likely to continue to sabotage liberal, universalistic political incorporation for a long time to come. '

The intellectual ferment in Afrikanerdom has, however, never been greater. An establishment pillar, the Human Sciences Research Council in Pretoria, in 1985 released a thorough report on Intergroup Relations that flies in the face of government policy.⁶ To implement these recommendations, the government would have to dismantle the Population Registration and Group Areas Act. In Stellenbosch, the academic cradle of the tribe, student representatives seek contact with their African peers in the ANC in defiance of the state. Behind the church facade of unity, intense ideological debates take place. New and thriving political journals such as *Die Suid-Afrikaan* match their best international counterparts in innovative soul-searching and sophisticated analysis. If this ferment succeeds in stopping the escalation of violence, the state would have to change its central political paradigms in three respects: (1) it would have to agree to real power-sharing, not just concessions but negotiations with the implied recognition of African claims; (2) it would have to abandon ascribed group boundaries in favor of individual rights or rights of self-chosen groups; and (3) it would have to make a serious attempt to ameliorate the material inequalities resulting from the political imbalance. This would lead to a lowering of the White standard of living, particularly in a stag-

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nating economy. As has frequently been pointed out, state actors react and rarely make such necessary conceptual leaps."⁷ Yet the resolve of technocratic Afrikaners to come to terms with reality must also not be underestimated. However, despite all the debate, the core of Nationalist supporter—the police and army, as well as the extreme right—will not defect for some time from traditional notions of supremacy and racial group rights. An escalation of violence thus would result in a no-win situation with ever higher costs to both sides and to the South African economy as a whole.

In this "permanent transition" the interests of South African business are most threatened. It is to this class actor that an analysis of the future must turn. In the absence of compromising possibilities between two opposing nationalisms, can business break the deadlock? A prediction about the role of business rests on two assumptions: first, that South African capital does not constitute a monolithic group with identical interests, not even in the same branches; second, that technological and sociopolitical changes have brought about new interest configurations that have fundamentally altered historical relationships between specific economic and political actors. At least three major employer groups must be distinguished: agriculture, mining, and manufacturing.^a White agriculture historically flourished through the political destruction of a viable African competition. an artificially cheap labor supply, generous access to state funds for irrigation and for recouping losses due to weather, and state price guarantees. Until the mechanization of farming in the 1970s, White farmers needed to "tie down" their Black labor through a feudal system of tenancy, since they were competing with more attractive urban employment. With the large-scale dis-

placement of labor by capital-intensive farming and the growth of the tenant population, the landowners' interests shifted to elimination of the feudal legacy. Impoverished Bantustans, however, proved increasingly incapable of absorbing the surplus workers. While influx control slowed the urbanization process. White farmers split in their support for traditional apartheid. Many maize farmers in the Transvaal Stip-

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port the conservative ideologues after being dropped from state protection; others worry about their threatened export markets and back Botha's sham reforms; and the sugar farmers of Natal advocate political power-sharing with Buthelezi in a multiracial administration of the region, in order to stall the governments land consolidation policy.

In mining, divisions have arisen in several ways. Besides the differences in geological productivity of mines, there have been several common developments that have led to divergent responses by the mining companies. Faced with a serious strike threat in the summer of 1985, they again departed from the past unity of the chamber in wage policies. The compound system constitutes a major cause of chronic labor unrest. The high turnover costs of migrant labor, together with the shift to skill-intensive technologies, makes a higher ratio of domestic laborers who reside in family units on the mines more cost-advantageous-though still more expensive than foreign migrants. Higher Rand earnings facilitated wage increases pressed for by an increasingly stronger union. Above all, White workers have continuously lost political influence after the purge of the HNP from the Nationalist Party in the early seventies and the split of the party in 1982. The long-standing job color bar has now all but collapsed, with the last White privilege, that of blasting reservations, being removed. Manufacturing felt the rising cost of apartheid most, but traditionally needed the restrictive color bar least. Skill shortages stilled growth. Overpaying White workers contributed to a high inflation rate. A stagnant domestic consumer market limited economies of scale, while external hostility affected expansion beyond South Africa's borders, disrupted foreign capital flows, and undermined confidence. A costly decentralization policy taxed the urban sector, but mainly benefited new investors. Above all, the political instability eroded labor relations and caused low productivity.

In the predicament of a degenerating economy and in-
flatable security situation, business-assuming it can act
concertedly and with clout-can choose any of three options.
First, it can support the government's repression in the hope
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of restoring law and order through coercion. Capital could even push for a reformist military dictatorship that would equally repress right-wing resistance to nonracial but capitalist incorporation. Such a stance would confirm the Marxist notions about the collusion between capital and state in coping with an organic crisis whose alternative is socialism. Restoring order by all available means is, after all, the first reaction when the security of daily routine is threatened.

However, the success of such a reaction remains doubtful, because it would increase Black alienation and international isolation. It would fall short of its promise. Even without sophisticated weapons, mass rage has the capacity to wreak havoc in an advanced industrial economy. A few youths can paralyze highways at night; they can temporarily cut the vital railway and bus links between the townships and cities; they can invade shopping centers and use arson as a weapon of general destruction. If the employed joined in deliberate industrial sabotage, the economy, though it could not be brought to a standstill, could be crippled seriously without the state or employers having collective coercive countermeasures. Sooner or later the resistance will have access to more and better weapons. Pressure to abandon all current restraints or counter-violence will likely be successful. Leadership aspirants face the choice of either getting ahead of township sentiment or being bypassed by more militant contenders. The ANC old guard, far from harvesting the fruits of unemployed rage, is in danger of following rather than leading the inility.

Much greater intraracial strife between feuding Black factions will occur. This will not be to the overall benefit of minority rule, since its scale and intensity are inevitably spilling over into the plants and unions, where harmony is needed. Once

bombs go off in factories and (liscotheques, planes are hijacked, and public figures are assassinated, a single minor symbolic event can trigger chain reactions on both sides that none of the more responsible leadership can control. Once this threshold has been passed. negotiations for power-sharing come too late. The option then will be surrender or "victory": a light to the death. The capital outflow, emigration,

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and destruction will be on such a scale that the country will have great difficulty recovering, regardless of who eventually comes out on top.

1 For business profits, this represents the worst scenario, although the sentiment of its managers may squarely back the forces of law and order. A modern economy simply cannot be run without a minimal identification of workers with their task, incentives for productivity, and opportunities for upward mobility—all presupposing a basic contentment with living conditions in general.

In short, an equilibrium of violence can exist in the separate service economies of Lebanon but not in an interdependent South Africa, where Blacks and Whites have to work together in the same place. A balance of high-level use of force does not allow for the operation of a technologically vulnerable, cooperative mode of production. A modern economy ceases under these conditions. South Africa would be further cut off from its global connections and commercial lifelines. The quality of life declines dramatically in a true siege economy. To pack up and relocate elsewhere remains the option for some sectors. Major capital sectors in South Africa, however, are bound to the land by resources and structural investments that are not portable. It is these sectors (mining, real estate, local manufacturing, even commercial agriculture) that must consider the second option: to come to terms with the revolution by striking an early deal. Business could actively influence the liberation on the understanding that the basic socioeconomic structure would remain intact. African nationalist aspirations would be met by gradually replacing the Afrikaner bureaucracy, including the parastatals, with nonracial, e.g., African, control. In supporting the exchange of Afrikaner political power with African political hegemony, business would enter into a new alliance but save its major interests. Profit, after all, does not depend on color or ideology but on stability. A capitalist African Azania with international legitimacy would be the industrial powerhouse of the continent, with a large underdeveloped domestic and outside market at its doorstep.

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Since the ANC, by its own definition, does not constitute a socialist movement and to all intents and purposes represents an aspiring but hitherto excluded middle class, such a historic compromise among big capital, small traders, and bureaucrats would not founder on class antagonisms. To be sure, the aspiring Black "bourgeoisie" would not be enticed to capitalism without capital, but, like Afrikaners before them, they could realistically hope to acquire their share of capital through control of the state. After all, the demand of the Freedom Charter for the nationalization of key industries is already half met, considering the large state-controlled sector of the economy that they would take over.

Another factor makes the ANC option attractive to business as a whole: the ANC could be expected to restore order in the townships. Only a widely legitimate mass organization can re-socialize youth who have increasingly been thriving on anarchy. Without such disciplining influence, a capitalist work ethic would be unlikely to prevail. Finally, the ANC in power would hold in check the growing anti-capitalist "ultra-leftist elements" (AZAPO, etc). Since these tasks will probably involve strong-arm tactics rather than gentle democratic persuasion, business is unlikely to be much concerned about civil rights violations under the new regime. In fact, rather than support a right-wing White military it would be inclined to back nationalist Black military power to achieve stability. Yet business is likely only to flirt with this second option. Its major deficiency lies in the fact that it provides neither direction nor prescription for how a stubborn Afrikaner hegemony can be dislodged peacefully. Capitalist cost-benefit calculations fail with power centers such as the bureaucracy and the security forces. Far from losing in a confrontation, the army,

for example, gains status during war. Unlike the Israeli defense force, which functions as an integrating institution, the Al'i'iltaner-led South African army indoctrinates its conscripts to view all Blacks as potential targets. Such entrenched interests and institutional practices are rarely swayed by rational profit calculations. In addition, business itself cannot be sure about the outcome of free political activity. It views the com-

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munist elements with the ANC with unease. Would free Black leaders calm, or incite, the townships? Can assurances about free enterprise be trusted?

Business would have had few problems in concluding such a deal with Buthelezi's pro-enterprise Inkatha. In Natal, the White establishment is engineering a Zulu-dominated, multi-racial administration. Buthelezi has become a powerful regional leader. However, he does not command much loyalty among urban Blacks outside his ethnic group. He could not, therefore, ensure stability at a national level in the face of the growing ANC/UDF hostility toward him. Only in the event of an ANC-Inkatha reconciliation could Buthelezi, as the leader of the strongest ethnic group, gain more broadly based, nationwide acceptance.

Finally, open support for the ANC would harm the working relationship with the Pretoria government, without certainty about the success of the alternative. Hence, business will be reluctant to play the leading role in paving the way for a takeover. Instead, it will defer to government and urge negotiations about power-sharing that are bound to fail under present government auspices. So far Pretoria has not been forced even to contemplate serious negotiations, because it is still far too powerful to have to concede vital terrain of control.

This scenario makes the third option more attractive for long-term business planners: to support the unions as an alternative route to stability. Strange as it may sound, in the unique South African situation, unions and capital have more in common than the adversary principle suggests. The major Black unions have kept aloof from political affiliations and operate with a different agenda from that of the ANC or the protesting UDF middle-class aspirants. The democratically organized unions' main thrust is toward extracting optimal economic benefits and improvement of working conditions from employers for their members. Unions do not wish to make the country ungovernable, lose foreign investments, or expropriate all private enterprise—at least for the time being. At present, unions are ambivalent partners of reform rather than revolution. As Ken Owen has neatly juxtaposed: "Re-

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form requires an economy that can deliver to all communities the promise of a better life in a new kind of state. If revolution requires the breakdown of administration, reform requires effectiveness. If revolution requires schools to be closed and drains to be clogged, reform requires both to be open. If revolution requires destruction of the nascent Black middle class, reform requires the expansion and protection of that middle class."9 Unions currently oscillate occasionally but clearly tilt toward reform. Yet they are not tainted by collaboration. They enjoy high legitimacy. Above all, they are rooted in real, not questionable, organizational strength. All political tendencies defer to workers' rights.

Can business afford a union strategy? Can it overcome its traditional "boss-in-the house" stance? The dismal record on the employers' side leaves much scope for improving management-union relationships. The profits in Rand of the export sector have risen to such heights after the decline of the currency that the companies could easily afford generous wage settlements. Recalcitrant employers could be brought into line through legal action in the Industrial Court. Dealing with unions allows progressive companies to forge ahead rather than business as a whole being hamstrung by its most reactionary parts. Under free-enterprise rules, government would find it difficult to interfere in the autonomous business-union prerogatives. However, to make the relationship work, employers would have to extend their protection of union activists outside the workplace. In short, a capitalist hegemony would compete with an ethnic hegemony; an industrial citizenship would temporarily coexist with the denial of full political citizenship.

Such a situation would be bound to create major contradic-

tions and could not last. A seat in the boardroom would hardly substitute for a place in parliament, assuming South African corporations were to adopt the German co-determination model. Even this limited co-optation of unions was fiercely resisted by German industry and only instituted through the political muscle of labor parties. Nevertheless, the theoretical possibility should not be excluded that utownship socialists will

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change once they administer pension funds," as one enlightened company director explained. The union strategy requires a substantial price. But in the quest for political incorporation the unions, controlled from below, represent a safer and more manageable bet for capital than the more unpredictable political organizations, controlled from above. The militancy of the union is unlikely to fall behind the militancy of the political movements, which will surely attempt to use unions for their own ends. But unions know how to manage this through shop-floor democracy. Business, on the other hand, can deal with union militancy on its own ground and by rules established in genuine bargaining, rather than imposed by government or other outside actors. Whether business will have the foresight to cope wisely with this challenge remains to be seen. The future of South Africa will be decided in the interplay among the three options sketched.

The possibility exists that with the rise of costs, splits within the heterogeneous business camp will make it impossible to act rationally. The ability of capitalism to recognize its long-term interest is frequently overrated. The phrase "disorganized capitalism" aptly summarizes reactions to crisis.¹⁰ South African business for a long time on the margin of political decision-making has not yet developed a political style and corporate culture conducive to concerted planning or lobbying. It was only when political events directly intruded into business operations and the costs of apartheid could no longer be passed on to someone else that business accepted its political role. When the immediate crisis is over South African business would willingly retreat again into its shell. Without the township violence and the outside pressure the reform lobby would not have come into being. The condemnation of political violence therefore must not overlook this trigger effect that makes the irrationality rational. Only a year before the revolt began, South African business interests, with a few exceptions, enthusiastically backed Botha's constitutional reforms, which largely set off the new resistance. Two years earlier in the Carleton and Good Hope conferences of the business elite with government, the new pact between advo-

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cates of technocratic reform and free enterprise was formally endorsed without a single dissenting voice. The free-enterprise doctrine alone will certainly not allow Blacks to become part of an economic system where entrenched elites command the monopoly of capital and resources. It would indeed mainly depend on the clout of unions to insist tenaciously on a social democracy in continuous unspectacular struggles on many sites. Some long-term economic redistribution through profit-sharing schemes, inheritance taxes, and higher corporate rates, as well as an optimal welfare system, would inevitably have to accompany formal political equality. Such redistribution is bound to be resisted fiercely by entrenched power. However, for those who calculate rationally, there is no better option than accommodation.

Since powerful local and international capital interests are dependent on the Black alienated majority, they will, in the long term at least, choose political pacification rather than unfeasible repression. The predisposition for such a historic compromise, if necessary at the expense of an intransigent Afrikaner nationalism, no doubt exists on all sides. The continuous revolt against false reform galvanizes reforms to prevent further revolts.

With the pseudo-constitutional reforms propagated by the National Party, the process of gradual abolition of apartheid has itself become discredited. The government's offer to negotiate under preconditions and only with moderate Black leaders adds fuel to a false expectation among Blacks of seizing power rather than sharing it. How, then, can this political and constitutional stalemate be broken?

Government could pave the way for legitimate power-sharing through legislation enabling a constitutional assembly, just

as free trade-union activity was allowed in the late 1970s. All adult South Africans could elect a constitutional assembly on a one-person-one-vote basis and a common voters' roll in a free political contest. This single act would restore the legitimacy of the political process and the resulting constitution, to be tested in a subsequent referendum. The nonracial voting-on the basis of proportional representation_for candidates

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to the constitutional assembly would guarantee that all interests be fairly represented in this "national convention"; its members would be vested with an unquestionable democratic legitimacy rather than all being drawn 'from the existing leadership of hostile camps; the strength of each competing claim would have been clearly demonstrated; and the likely emergence of working coalitions around constitutional agreements would promise similar outcomes under the new legitimate rules. Invited outside observers with specific mandates could monitor the fairness of the electoral process, including media time and election expenses. i

All sides would save face. The ANC would not have to disarm but would be hard put to reject participating peacefully in the democratic exercise. Pretoria would still be in control until the new constitution had passed its major tests. After all, the government would have set the terms by initiating the process. What at present may appear as voluntary suicide for the powerholders may prove indeed their only rational way of survival in light of worse alternatives.

. Alas, the old question returns: do ruling groups merely react to challenges when it is too late? From Bismarck's innovative social security measures to Disraeli's land reform, conservative elites have at times anticipated the rising costs of traditional policies and initiated progressive reforms. Most often, however, ruling groups had to be forced into defeat or compromise by the demonstrated power of their adversary. Pretoria so far refuses to negotiate seriously, because it is not yet compelled to do so. However, many trends and forces have set the scene for the final demise of apartheid. It may be a far less traumatic transformation than is generally predicted. Among the promising indicators is the mixture between pragmatic rationality, moral bankruptcy, and ideological exhaustion among substantial numbers of the Afrikaner technocracy. The widening split between economic and political powerholders reinforces the confusion about appropriate strategies in light of the force increasingly being exerted by unions, township revolts, and external pressure. Growing numbers of otherwise conservative Whites are becoming reconciled to 3

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South Africa without apartheid. It largely depends on White policy choices whether "things have to get worse before they get better." Legal dcracialization alone, however, is unlikely to substitute for substantial economic transformation in combination with a new nonracial culture that would heal the deep wounds of long-term degradation and injustice. The dismantling of apartheid will have to be followed by the creation of a true social democracy if South African capitalism does not want to drown in the wake of the inevitable post-apartheid aspirations.