FIFTH SESSION OF THE FIFTH KWAZULU LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY DEPARTMENT OF POLICE

BUDGET SPEECH BY THE HONOURABLE MANGOSUTHU BUTHELEZI, MINISTER OF POLICE

MAY 1993

INTRODUCTION:

Mr Chairman, Honourable Members, notwithstanding the encouraging signs of political resolution in South Africa, the year under review has once again been characterised by continued unrest, political violence and escalating crime.

As has become the norm in recent years, the police have yet again been singled out for attack and criticism, ranging from allegations of operating 'hit squads' to accusations of political bias. Not based on fact, such criticism often originates from organisations and individuals - usually 'faceless' people - who make vague, unsubstantiated and generalised allegations via commissions and the media, and, in so doing, are able to create the false perception that it is the police who are in fact behind the violence.

While it is readily accepted that the media have a crucial role to play in improving police accountability, along with that goes an obligation to provide accurate and balanced reporting. To create and pursue an unsubstantiated perception is no mean feat. Yet to redress the damage created is a time consuming and arduous process. The relationship between the police and the media should be one of partnership pursuant to the democratic ideal of sound police-community relations, and not one of mutual alienation as it often appears to be.

The increase in crime over the past year has been particularly disturbing. However, additional steps to curtail this development are being evaluated and implemented on an ongoing basis. Among the steps which are being taken include not only the more efficient employment of available manpower and equipment, but also the expansion and development of our technical capabilities - fingerprint, photography, dog unit, etc. Although the overall picture is cause for concern, encouragingly the KwaZulu Police report that in their area of jurisdiction, there was a marked decline in the cases of arson, rape, stock and car theft over the past 12 months.

Political violence and violence against the individual on the other hand, remained consistently high and, in fact, showed an increase. In the twelve month period from January 1 1992 to December 31 1992, the Force has lost twenty (20) members - victims of either shooting or stabbing. A further 21 members have died as a result of other causes.

Until such time as a political solution acceptable to all sections of the community can be reached, it can be expected that violence and crime will escalate both in absolute terms as well as in intensity. It is clear that without political stability and a strong and growing economy, a successful and peaceful transition to democracy will remain extremely difficult - if not impossible - to achieve, thus compounding the problems of an already heavily burdened police force.

Mr Chairman, I want to state very clearly that the initiatives being mounted by the ANC/SACP Alliance aimed at bringing all the country's security forces under one central command structure, must be rejected out of hand - rejected for two sets of reasons.

The first is that this country must end up with a federal system of government. That is the demand from the men and women at grassroot level. That is also the demand by big business as expressed at the last National Conference of the South African Chamber of Business. It is the demand of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly and the IFP. It is also the demand of many parties now involved in the negotiating process.

Federalism is also in keeping with international trends over the last thirty or more years. It is most certainly endorsed as the best possible form of government for plural societies such as ours. Federal republics or unions across the world have shown the utility of regional security forces. This is the trend - not the centralisation, the ANC/SACP Alliance and their fellow travellers are seeking.

I could respond at great length on the reasons why smaller, leaner, more efficient police forces working close to the people and within their communities are more preferable to a huge bureaucratically structured police force at the national level. Universal federal endorsement of this fact is, however, sufficient.

The second reason why the centralisation of control over the security forces must be rejected is just as compelling. Police forces should be quite beyond political control and professionally independent police forces should add strength to an independent judiciary.

The call for the centralisation of control of the security force by the ANC/SACP Alliance is politically inspired. Umkhonto weSizwe is a private army with Dr Mandela being Commander-on-Chief. The ANC/SACP Alliance wants centralised control over the security forces to enable it to incorporate MK into the SAP and armed forces, and to gain political control over the security forces.

Mr Chairman, Honourable Members, I must pause to read into the records of this House, the Memorandum that Dr Mdlalose presented to the Negotiating Council.

I want to put on record that this House condemns the political use to which the ANC is putting MK violence. We will not stand by while the ANC centralises control over the security forces to, inter alia, make it possible to infiltrate Umkhonto officers (who have not earned their stripes) into units serving people on the ground in KwaZulu.

Right from the first day of its establishment, I have called on the KwaZulu Police Force to be professional, impartial and to earn the status of being the friend of the downtrodden and the oppressed. I have always said that if there are any reliable allegations of KwaZulu Police brutality and political biases in favour of the IFP, I personally would have seen to it that offenders were charged and brought to court and sentenced if found guilty.

The people of KwaZulu, whom the members of this House represent, are proud of the KwaZulu Police and loathe Umkhonto weSizwe as an instrument of death being directed against us by our political enemies.

We will oppose the establishment of a Transitional Executive Council being established to take control of all the security forces in the country - and we will do so vigorously from within a non-negotiable stand.

Mr Chairman, I now read into the record the Memorandum which Dr Mdlalose presented to the Negotiating Council.

OPENING STATEMENT BY DR FT MDLALOSE NATIONAL CHAIRPERSON OF THE INKATHA FREEDOM PARTY

TO THE NEGOTIATING COUNCIL

ON MONDAY 26TH APRIL, 1993 AT THE WORLD TRADE CENTRE IN JOHANNESBURG

When we met barely three weeks ago we did so deeply aware of the need to achieve something constructive after a wasted ten month hiatus in negotiations. From May 1992 to date, nothing of substantive value has been achieved in bringing democracy to our land other than the formation of this body to replace Codesa.

Yet we gather today under the menacing shadow of everincreasing violence. Our party has lost yet more leaders in the
last month. Mr Siphiwe Gumede, a member of the KwaZulu
Legislative Assembly, was assassinated by unknown assailants.
Mr Leonard Ngubo, Ntuzuma vice-chairperson and our
representative in the imminent formation of an Ntuzuma LDRC,
was likewise assassinated. Mr Ephraim Ndebele, Umlazi unit 17
councillor and IFP leader and prominent in the region's peace
process, was murdered. Mr Robert Sikobi, Mr John Thembani and
Mr Roy Mpisane, all IFP leaders in Umlazi, were all killed
during the past month. A prominent member of our Central
Committee, Professor Maphalala, has been subjected to police
harassment and his property damaged.

We would point out that the murders of yet more IFP leaders have followed inflammatory statements by ANC leaders. Addressing mourners at the vigil for Mr Chris Hani, the ANC's Southern Natal chairman, Mr Jeff Hadebe, called on ANC followers to "rid" South Africa of Dr M G Buthelezi. After our President, Dr M G Buthelezi, had expressed his horror at the murder of Mr Chris Hani and offered his condolences to the family, ANC and SACP leader, Mr Blade Nzimande, publicly rejected these at a rally in Pietermaritzburg on April 12, saying the ANC said "no thanks to the tears of Mangosuthu Buthelezi."

It is this sort of denigration that fans the flames of violence. Mr Nzimande's utterances are not words spoken in the heat of the moment. They form part of a campaign of killing talk by senior ANC leaders that has gone on for years. Many senior leaders of the ANC, including the late Mr Chris Hani, have in the past publicly called for the murder of Dr Buthelezi and members of the IFP's Central Committee.

This is what State President, Mr F W de Klerk, said in Parliament on April 20 about the role of the ANC in violence: "Its major role in creating a climate for violence and politically motivated murders is undisputed. The many graves of members of the leadership of the IFP who have been systematically decimated by the ANC and its structures, bear testimony to this. (Hansard, disc 481)

None of us can forget the fact that over 270 officials of the IFP have been slaughtered with modern weapons. Our entire organisation and the bereaved families demand to know who is behind in the systematic and serial killing of IFP officials. All the sophisticated institutions and organisations of our country are unable to provide an answer to this fundamental question.

There is great hope that this multi-party forum will succeed where Codesa failed, that the foundations have been laid for genuine and inclusive negotiations that will produce the settlement we have waited so long for. The IFP is pleased with progress to date - particularly with the recognition given to the need to review Codesa's agreements and to prioritise debate on the form of our future state. This bodes well for moving forward. We would also like to believe that the negative bilateralism of the recent past and the attempted marginalisation of parties participating in negotiations, is now over.

However, since we are less than confident of a fundamental change of heart among those involved, only unfolding developments will reveal whether this is the case or not. Certainly we are not impressed with the manner in which SACP leader Chris Hani's murder is being cynically used as a gambit to take make unilateral demands over the timetable of change.

Boipatong was likewise seized upon as an excuse first to walk out of Codesa and then to present a series of totally unreasonable demands backed up with mass action that culminated in the tragedy of Bisho.

Mass action is again being seized upon as an instrument to force the pace of change and to secure the ANC's grip on the reigns of power, though this time we suspect the ANC's haste is partly motivated by a desire to crack down upon the very grassroots militants it exhorted to render the country ungovernable. This, together with apartheid, was responsible for nurturing the culture of violence that has reduced the country to the state it is now in.

Hani's assassination and the latest proposal for six weeks of mass action remind us that irrespective of what we negotiate as leaders in this forum, and irrespective of whatever World Trade Centre bonhomie the nation perceives in us through the media, it must be recognised that we are not negotiating in a vacuum. Talks that broke down have been resumed, but what is being done about the political violence?

The Inkatha Freedom Party believes it is time to get serious if this body is going to have any meaningful role to play in charting the way forward. We believe it is time this multiparty forum came to grips with the realities of what is happening in this country, instead of pushing unpleasant matters under the carpet as though their disappearance from the agenda of this body will make the problem go away.

Frankly, we hold out little hope for a successful transition to democracy unless the question of political violence is addressed, and addressed properly. Constitutional negotiations cannot succeed on their own, in taking the nation forward.

Negotiations, if they are the success we pray they will be, can merely reflect the consensus reached by us on the rules of the game of the future political system within which normalised politics should be played out. This is transparent politics which respects multi-partyism, respects political opponents, and respects the broad values that underpin true liberalism.

However, the political violence tearing our society apart renders this completely meaningless. What good is a decent constitution superimposed upon a lawless people, with no respect for themselves or their political opponents? What good is a transition to democracy founded upon savagery? Where are the values going to come from to ensure that the document we negotiate lasts longer than the first crisis that befalls the first government? Violence threatens all of us and our future. Violence is no foundation upon which to make the transition to democracy.

Far from decreasing since February 1990, political violence has in fact increased steadily. Last year we recorded at least 759 attacks on our party, and 590 supporters were killed, 388 of them in Natal/KwaZulu. Violence appears to have a life of its own, consuming more and more of our fathers, mothers and, tragically even children, in its evil flames. A further casualty is the hopes and dreams we have of peace. Cynicism, withdrawal, anguish, fear and hatred become the dominant emotions. Constant threats of mass action are designed to cow people into accepting the supposed inevitable take over of power by those for whom the ground rules of politics are intimidation and the denial of freedom of choice. Our politics has degenerated to that of territorial hegemony and rule through the barrel of the gun - yet certain parties blithely talk of setting an election date as if we are lying in a bed of roses.

We are convinced that much of the violence is not accidental and that it is no mere inevitable by-product of the transition. There is an agenda behind it whose goal is to subvert the democratisation process and to deny the people of South Africa their freedom of choice in the forthcoming elections.

In addition to its thousands of ordinary members who have been hacked, stabbed, burnt and shot to death over the past few years, the Inkatha Freedom Party has seen over 270 of its office bearers assassinated. Office bearers - branch chairpersons, secretaries, organisers and the like - are the life blood of a political organisation. We believe our opponents are working on the axiom that if you remove the head, the body dies. The agenda we believe, is simple - marginalise the IFP through any means fair or foul, to prevent it maximising its opportunities in the election to come.

We know with a certainty born of direct experience, that the IFP has been deliberately targeted by certain organisations. We have traced the events of the past decade in detail. We have

the words of senior and mid-ranking leaders indelibly etched in our memories. We have their strategy documents. We have their agendas. We have their hit lists. It is appalling of course, but not surprising for that is the way of revolutionaries.

But even more disturbing is the fact that there is collusion at the most senior levels of government to downplay this. We believe that the Government has failed in its responsibility to put an end to this nefarious agenda.

- * We find it totally incomprehensible that the SA Police have seemingly failed to establish who is behind these serial murders of our leaders over a period of several years.
- * We find it totally incomprehensible that the Government has known for a very long time that trained MK killers are deployed from Transkei to assassinate our leaders, but that the first steps it took to deal with Transkei were occasioned by APLA's killings of whites at the end of last year still no mention is made of MK, however.
- * We find it totally incomprehensible that despite the provisions of the Groote Schuur and Pretoria Accords, let alone the National Peace Accord, the Government was party to an agreement permitting the continued training of the selfsame cadres now being deployed against us in South Africa.
- * We find it totally incomprehensible that the Government was party to another agreement that chose to put all the blame for political violence on the IFP, whose hostel supporters were to be fenced in like animals, while totally exonerating those attacking them.
- * We find it totally incomprehensible that the Government acceded to a demand that traditional accourrements be banned while such instruments were responsible for at the very most, less than 5% of deaths in political violence. Yet it legitimised others' military training.
- * We find it totally incomprehensible that the Government gives the leaders of those found to be involved in gun running every opportunity to distance themselves from the incidents and that it takes steps to prevent the release to the media, of incidents of profound significance relating to the planned assassination of IFP leaders.
- * We find it totally incomprehensible that the Government is committed to double standards vis a vis its relationship with organisations responsible for deliberately perpetrating acts of political violence as instruments of political strategy. That it threatened to break off negotiations with the PAC over as-yet unproven APLA killings but continues to negotiate with the ANC when its military wing has been proven to be involved in violence is reprehensible.
- * We find it totally incomprehensible that intelligence agencies of the Government are actually involved in a smear campaign against the IFP and are involved in providing support to those seeking our demise.

The mere fact of this political violence is in itself, a national crisis. However, the Government's unwillingness to deal with it, and indeed its covert connivance in permitting its continuance, lead the IFP to assert with total conviction that the implications for both the transition to democracy and the fledgling democracy yet to be born are so profound, that it is absolutely vital that we deal with it, and that we do so now - in tandem with negotiations, not afterwards.

The fact of the matter is that the IFP cannot see its way through to negotiating a constitutional settlement if this forum continues to pretend that the violence only need be sorted out later. When is later? What happens in between? Are we to lose another five or fifteen or twenty five leaders? Is there to be a repeat of the 9 massacres in Natal/KwaZulu that took place in the last few months of last year, mostly committed by trained hit squads in uniform? Will there be the standard refrain decrying the hideous violence in which women and children are mown down like animals but an unwillingness to point fingers at and take steps against, those guilty of perpetrating the dastardly acts? It seems to us that the prevailing attitude is that it doesn't really matter if the victims are IFP people because the IFP doesn't matter.

This attitude, I am afraid to say, seems to the IFP to be that which certain parties have purposively adopted precisely in order to minimise public perceptions of the severity of the slaughter and the culpability of those involved. Violence is decried, but one of the most fundamental causes is ignored. Yes, apartheid is to blame, but we are sitting here transforming that. Socio-economic deprivation is another factor, and that too, is being addressed, albeit in a very limited fashion.

The State's covert agencies have an ugly past, but we are assured, though why we should believe it I do not know, that such activities have been stopped.

But why is absolutely nothing being done about the proliferation and the activities of private armies in South Africa?

Every effort must be made to deal with the threat of violence emanating from the right wing both within and without the security establishment. Conservative militants refusing to participate in negotiations and vowing to subvert the democratisation of South Africa have to be emasculated if we are to avert the potential of the counterdemocratic forces.

We observe that it is suggested on all sides that the strongest action be taken against APLA and that pressure be exerted on the PAC leadership.

But when attention is focused upon Mkhonto we Sizwe, suddenly we are in a new ball park. Suddenly, the rules of the game change. The IFP is extremely disturbed by this. We know that the Government and the ANC have a cosy agreement on MK being permitted to train its cadres and we know they are being trained overseas and in Africa, as well as in Transkei whose independence is not recognised by the ANC and which is defined by them as an integral part of South Africa.

There may be no formal agreement between the Government and ANC to this effect, but we also know these cadres are being deployed in Natal/KwaZulu and that they are coming into the region with hit lists of IFP leaders; that they are importing large quantities of arms and ammunition; and crucially, that the Government is fully aware of this. The Government knows what MK is up to, but it does nothing. Not only this, it actually assists the ANC and covers up incidents which might prove highly embarrassing.

For instance, when MK arms smugglers were recently arrested near the Swaziland border, the Government gave the ANC intelligence department access to the prisoners and later set up a press conference for them in its Durban security headquarters to enable the ANC leadership to state that it was ignorant of the gun running. Again, when MK cadres were apprehended entering Natal with maps of Durban townships, a list of IFP leaders and their addresses, together with silenced weapons, there was a prohibition on the release of this incident to the media.

The IFP wants to know why. We want to know why the people of South Africa are denied information in the Government's possession pertaining to persistent attacks upon the IFP by another party's armed wing. We have requested the Goldstone Commission to sub poena the Government to release all the information in its possession, but to date, we have heard nothing. We want to know why the South African taxpayer is funding MK training. The fiscus cannot cope with our people's horrendous socio-economic plight, yet it pays for MK training. We want the Government to explain to us and to our people why it is so silent on this and what purpose is being served. We want a public explanation of a possibly clandestine agenda determining one approach towards APLA and another towards MK?

There is an election coming up in the near future. We don't know yet exactly when it will be, but in terms of our proposals being put before this body, we envisage the entire negotiations, transitional and electoral processes being finalised by the end of next year at which stage the first democratic governments ever in South Africa can take office. We sincerely believe this is possible, and we are determined to avoid lengthy delays in the finalisation of the new constitution and democratisation of our land.

But we must also be quite frank in admitting that there are major problems with our timetable if the violence directed against us is permitted to continue unchecked. If there is to be a general election in South Africa, it must be clearly

understood by this forum that it is to be a fair and free election. It is not to be an election premised upon the politics of victory at all costs backed up by private armies devastating communities and sowing fear and mayhem.

What kind of election are we talking about when our party, and others for that matter, are prevented with violence from mobilising actual, let alone potential supporters? -

- * When, following attacks upon the IFP in Sebokeng that sparked 1990's "Reef War", the President of an opposing party explicitly endorses what he calls "the community's resolution to ban Inkatha members from the Vaal Triangle", and when aligned organisations presently repeat the call that none but the so-called "democratic forces" may mobilise on the Reef?
- * When, for fear of the assassin's guns, our party officials live every day as though it were their last of 32 IFP branch chairmen in the Natal Midlands in 1987, only two were still alive in 1991? It was a planned attack on our branch chairman in Table Mountain that resulted in the murder of six children earlier this year.
- * When masked hit squads run amok in communities such as in Gengeshe, Hlanzeni, Zimeleni, Folweni, Felekisi, Umgababa, Bhomela and Mkhobeni in the second half of last year slaughtering 93 people and in the process rendering the communities paralysed with fear?

This is what is happening now. This is the reality before us. It is simply not good enough that this multi-party forum concentrates its energies exclusively upon constitutional matters. It is our responsibility to take the lead in directly the country towards peace, failing which our constitutional deliberations will come to naught.

Some steps are fairly obvious. We would have thought it obvious that we require as a top priority, some public form of political reconciliation between the ANC and the IFP. We are committed to this and to our jointly spreading the peace message to violence-torn communities, but we fear our counterparts have little commitment to pursuing this, in large part because they have given in to pressure from their militants to avoid conciliation at all costs.

Notwithstanding this, the IFP believes there are other steps that can be taken. First, the National Peace Accord must be strengthened; there must be penalties for infringements of its provisions; and much more financial support must be given to boost the peace process, particularly at the local level.

Second, more effective policing is needed, both in preventing violence and in arresting the perpetrators. Third, a review of the judicial system must be undertaken in parallel with this, to prevent the release on bail of suspected killers, to provide a witness protection programme, and to speed up the processing of cases.

But these will remain essentially palliative unless private armies are stopped in their tracks once and for all. Nearly three years have gone by since the ANC ostensibly committed itself first to peace and then to a suspension of the armed struggle.

It may sound cynical to declare that at one level the ANC has in fact fulfilled its side of the bargain - there is to all intents and purposes a cease fire between itself and the Government. Perhaps this is in part why the Government is content to accept the status quo. Its Members of Parliament, its branch chairmen, its leaders are not being assassinated, so what's the problem?

And the ANC is happy that the CCB is disbanded since ANC members were in the main the target of the State's covert security organs. It is likewise more than satisfied with the Government's preparedness not to force the organisation to hand over its weapons of war. What has happened to the Operation Vula arms caches established in Natal? We have no assurance whatsoever that they are not in fact being used by MK now against us, yet the caches remain in the ANC's possession and the individuals responsible for the smuggling of these weapons figure prominently in these multi-party talks and did so in Codesa without a care in the world.

But where does this leave the IFP? We, who were as much a target of the ANC as was the Government during the ungovernability years, remain a target. In the 1980s the KwaZulu Government was to be destroyed though attacks on councillors, schools and the like. In 1990, it was to be disbanded, and despite PAC and Azapo warnings to the ANC of impending doom, this was precisely the result. And in 1992 it was to be overthrown through mass action. In the 1980's, there were frequent calls for our leaders to be assassinated, as indeed they were - but in a brief few months last year, 17 IFP and traditional leaders were assassinated in Natal/KwaZulu alone.

As already mentioned, the week before Mr Chris Hani was slain, a member of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, Mr Siphiwe Gumede, was assassinated - hardly a word appeared in the media and no one other than us gives a damn. After all, he was an IFP man.

I am not attempting to be melodramatic. This is indeed the perception of our constituency. Our supporters believe that the war declared on Inkatha many years ago has never come to an end, and that it is now continuing - in fact getting worse - precisely because the deployment of armed cadres and hit squads has been legitimised by a Government unwilling to do anything to upset the bilateral apple cart it is so busy trying to balance.

This will not do. The negotiating process is not being authored by the Government and the ANC. This is a multiparty forum, not a bilateral forum, which means we either make progress together or we do not do so at all.

What do the participants in this forum expect of the IFP? Are we to concur that it is right to take a hard line on APLA because its activities clearly lead to loss of innocent life, exacerbate racial tensions, nurture hatred and generally render the political climate extremely tense, but are to accept that this does not apply to MK whose activities are of a far greater magnitude? Where is the integrity in condemning in the most strenuous terms APLA's killing of whites, but in remaining silent on an assault on a fellow participant that has taken the form of a low-intensity civil war?

The IFP will not accept these double standards. We believe all private armies must be disbanded forthwith. APLA, MK, AWB or Wit Wolve members wishing to join the future defence force can do so, providing they satisfy whatever minimum criteria are in place.

We have no problems with this. So why are these private armies needed? Apartheid cannot be resurrected, so there is no need for liberation armies to renew their assault upon the apartheid state. So why are they needed? The fact of the matter is simple. Private armies not only serve absolutely no useful purpose whatsoever, but, as instruments of violence, are the most serious threat to the potential success of these multi-party talks. Our hopes for a future democratic South Africa are underpinned by nothing less than the efforts we collectively put into resolving the problems facing us of which violence is a key.

Constitutional negotiations have to go hand in hand with the peace process since neither can succeed without the other. We have had enough of failed negotiations and we have had enough of failed peace. Now is the time for us to put the past behind us and to do everything in our power to bring both peace and democracy to our land.

We demand that this forum immediately set up a Commission supported by military and technical experts to organise and supervise the disbandment of private armies, the identification and control of arms caches, measures to prevent any further recruitment and military training of citizens abroad, and the rehabilitation of former members of private armies.

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Budgetary constraints have once again restricted meaningful expansion and development in the Police Force. Nevertheless, the training of new recruits and the introduction of additional advanced efficiency training courses for members in the ranks of Lieutenant and Captain will continue to be conducted on a continuous basis.

A substantial number of our officers will also be attending management courses in the near future. Furthermore, all courses are also being evaluated and upgraded to meet the demands of our changing society.

These steps can be expected to contribute tremendously to our efficiency and professionalism. This will help us in our main objective to re-establish our pivotal role as the protector and friend of the community we serve, in the full realisation that we cannot function in isolation and can never realise our full potential without the community's acceptance, respect and cooperation.

We accept also that in these times of transition, reform of the Police is also essential and this aspect is receiving priority attention. Implicit in this belief is the expectation that given organisational support, improved police acceptability will result in the community becoming more fully involved in policing issues - this is, of course, the ultimate democratic ideal.

Although the past year was marked by numerous crises, the KwaZulu Police can be proud of its achievements in the various fields of its operations. At times members had to work night and day to realise these achievements, which were often accompanied by great hardships and sacrifices.

We salute these men and women for their loyal and dedicated service to the KwaZulu region and its people, in spite of the extremely difficult circumstances under which they have had to work during the previous year as well as the year under review. Permit me, Mr Speaker, Sir, to outline in detail the extent of these difficult circumstances, and how the Department of Police are responding.

ESTABLISHMENT AND TRAINING

During the year under review the KwaZulu Police Force did not expand and, in fact, manpower strength remained almost static with the recruit intake barely covering casualties through death and normal turnover.

Police Stations and establishments remain the same number as reported last year; that being, 24 Police Stations and 8 Administrative Headquarters. However, new "emergency" police stations are under construction and it is intended that they will become operational during 1993. These police stations are: Folweni, Mangeni, Ntuzuma, Ezibayeni and KwaCeza.

It must be mentioned that before any further Police Stations are taken over the following facts, which to a degree preclude such a step being taken, should be seriously considered. At present we have a critical manpower shortage in the KwaZulu Police which is further exacerbated by serious financial constraints. The following figures speak for themselves:

Actual Numerical Strength				Approved 1992 Establishment		
(i)	Officers	, - %	134	296	(Deficit	162)
(ii)	Other ranks	- 3	443	5 606	(Deficit	2 163)

The percentage manpower deficit is 64.99% This manpower deficit is expected to increase further with the advent of the 1993 financial year when the approved establishment increases to 353 officers and 6 836 other ranks.

Regular members of the Force continue to be supported by Special Constables and members of the public still come forward to serve in the Police Reserve to fill any gaps in the regular ranks.

While close and continuous scrutiny is maintained on manpower levels and every effort is made to capitalise on existing strengths by placing personnel where they are most needed, and to place the right person in the right position, these ideals are somewhat compromised by the large discrepancy between the total number of personnel that should be serving in the Force (establishment) and the actual number of persons in the Force (actual strength).

Training of members remains an ongoing exercise. Although the number of new recruits trained at the Police College in 1992 was well down on the previous year, the Advanced Training Establishment at Amatigulu was busy with a wide range of courses and even managed to find time to assist other Government Departments with training.

STRENGTH AND ESTABLISHMENT

The strength and establishment figures with reference to personnel for the year under review and taken as at 1992-12-31, are as follows:

In addition to the actual strength there are 5 temporary officers of various ranks. The establishment and strength of the Force in relation to the senior and sub-ordinate ranks is as follows:

Commissioned officers - 123; Warrant Officers - 139; Sergeants - 480 and Constables - 2 857. The above figures include detectives and female staff.

Casualties

The following is a breakdown of turnover and casualties during the year under review:

Retirement - 1; Resignation - 8; Discharged (medically) - 7;
Dismissed through misconduct - 25; Death - 41; Suspension - 19.

RECRUITING

Only 36% (152 members) of the total number of persons needed (420) were inducted into the Force in 1992 because of stringent financial constraints. However, it must be said that there is no lack of applicants for the Force. Indeed, the intake in the lower echelons is greatly over-subscribed.

At the other end of the scale, the Force was fortunate to obtain the services of a Bandmaster and seconded officer to head the Force's legal section.

As the Force is under-manned, both in regular and seconded personnel, recruiting remains an ongoing exercise and it is hoped that increased funding will enable the Force to bring its numbers up to establishment or to at least an acceptable level.

KWAZULU POLICE TRAINING COLLEGE

The Training College for student constables, as with other areas of policing, was hampered by lack of finance. It was therefore only possible to have one intake during 1992. This intake consisted of 115 males and 37 females, all of whom successfully completed the six month basic training course.

In addition to the end-of-course, pass-out and display, the trainees also gave demonstrations of drill and physical training at

the Pietermaritzburg Royal Agricultural Show, the Zululand Agricultural and Industrial Show at Eshowe and the Zululand Trade Fair in Richards Bay.

It is pleasing to report that members of the various communities where these displays and demonstrations took place, attended in large numbers and displayed great interest in proceedings.

ADVANCED TRAINING ESTABLISHMENT : AMATIGULU

It was yet another busy year for the Advanced Training Establishment situated at Amatigulu in terms of Advanced and Refresher training for members of the Force.

During the year under review a total of 2 101 members attended various courses, e.g. Promotion courses, In-Service Training, Vehicle Driving courses, Refresher Courses, Pension Escort courses, Musketry courses, etc.

PROMOTIONS

During the year under review the following promotions took place within the KwaZulu Police:

Brigadier to Major General - 1; Colonel to Brigadier - 2; Lieutenant Colonel to Colonel - 4; Major to Lieutenant Colonel - 6; Captain to Major - 6; Lieutenant to Captain - 18; Sergeant to Warrant Officer - 37; and, Constable to Sergeant - 36.

It should be noted that, as from the latter part of 1991, there were no further promotions due to posts being frozen towards the end of 1992.

DETECTIVE BRANCH

The KwaZulu Criminal Investigation Department is staffed by 43 commissioned and 428 non-commissioned officers. Although the ratio of C.I.D. staff to population and extensive area is very small, this branch is steadily improving its performance. Demand for the services of this branch will increase, given the overall trend of increasing crime in the country and the ongoing acquisition by the KwaZulu police of new areas of policing authority. A study of tables of serious crime printed in this year's Annual Report gives the exact statistics of the situation.

MURDER AND ROBBERY/SPECIAL INVESTIGATION UNITS

Special Investigation Units were established in the Umlazi and Esikhawini Districts. The units operate together with the Murder and Robbery Units.

Recent success was achieved when the Umlazi Unit, together with the South African Police Unit, arrested nine suspects in connection with the murder of twenty six persons in the Folweni district. The nine accused have appeared in Court and a further three suspects are being sought.

Interestingly, three months prior to the arrest of the gang, there were fifty six murders and thirty nine attempted murders in the Folweni area. Since these arrests only seven murders and eight attempted murders have been reported in the area. In the majority of these incidents, AK-47 rifles were used.

LOCAL CRIMINAL RECORD CENTRES

This centre has now established two new field stations. The Head Office is at Ulundi with field stations in Umlazi, KwaMashu, KwaNdengezi, Nqutu, Madadeni and KwaMsane. The centre has a total of twenty five members.

Three members have recently returned after undergoing their final course in Pretoria. One of the members, Sergeant SE SHANGASE, distinguished himself by achieving first position in the Photographic Section of the final course, this after competing against police force members from all over South Africa.

A new centre will be opened at Mondlo during 1993.

VEHICLE THEFT UNIT

This unit has its Head Office at Umlazi with a sub-unit at Nqutu.

A total of ten members are stationed at Umlazi and four at Nqutu.

Projected expansion for the year under review had to be postponed due to financial constraints.

As with most Police Forces in South Africa, the theft of motor vehicles remains a major problem for the Force, despite the fact that 180 more vehicles were recovered than for 1991. In spite of a greater recovery rate, less people were brought to trial due to the fact that most of the recovered vehicles were discovered abandoned rather than recovered by operational action, as was the case in 1991.

The total number of vehicles recovered were 762; the estimated value of these vehicles was R11 845 000,00; the number of persons arrested 47; and, the number of cases prosecuted 42.

KWANAB (KWAZULU NARCOTICS BUREAU)

This Unit is tasked with the Prevention and Detection of Drug and Liquor offences. However, during 1992 as in 1991, the Unit was unable to expand due to financial restraints, or to carry out many of its main functions, due to other commitments. However, the Unit still managed to record some successes. The following figures are relevant to the year under review:

Liquor seized - 466 litres; total number arrested - 603; Dagga seized - 579 kg and total number arrested - 20.

THE FIREARM UNIT

The Firearm Unit is based at Ulundi and again performed well during the year under review, despite the fact that its members were often used on other duties. Apart from weapons recovered by other units of the KwaZulu Police, the Firearm Unit made the following weapon recoveries:

AK 47 Rifles - 21; .22 Rifles - 4; .303 Rifles - 1; Air-Rifles of all types - 3; Revolvers of all calibers - 25; Pistols of all calibers - 17; Sub-machine guns - 1; Shotguns of all types - 12; and homemade weapons, various - 6.

Although the total recoveries were down on last year, more AK 47's were recovered which is significant, as these weapons are particularly lethal in the hands of a criminal.

COMMERCIAL BRANCH

During the year under review the Commercial Branch investigated a total of eighty five (85) fraud cases, amounting to a value of R5 105 909,33.

A further case of interest was received during the latter part of 1992 where five cheques amount to 5,6 million rand were punched on the Computer and forwarded to fictitious companies who were meant to supply KwaZulu Government with certain goods. A number of accused persons have been arrested which includes prominent business men from the Pietermaritzburg and Durban areas.

CHILD PROTECTION UNIT

The unit was established on December 1 1991 and is based at Umlazi. It is composed of two female Sergeants and three female Constables. Although the unit has only one vehicle at its disposal, it was able to investigate one hundred and fifty eight (158) cases of which seventy four (74) cases were solved, with those found guilty receiving sentences ranging from five (5) to eight (8) years imprisonment for rape.

Investigation of the cases was done on the basis of seven days of a week to arrive at the creditable figure of solving 47% of the cases investigated. Cases investigated for the year under review are as follows:

Rape - 104; Indecent Assault - 6; Child stealing - 8; Child abandonment - 5; Incest - 2; Abduction - 2; Assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm - 6; Sodomy - 2; Attempted rape - 4; Attempted murder - 2; Abortion - 2; Kidnapping - 2. It is envisaged that another unit will be opened at Madadeni during 1993.

RADIO TECHNICAL UNIT

During 1992, a Lieutenant from the South African Police was seconded to the KwaZulu Police to establish the Unit. The major

problems were identified but due to the lack of technical equipment and qualified personnel to assist the officer, the radio communication problems remain unsolved. Since the establishment of the Unit, unnecessary expenditure on radio purchases and repairs has been considerably reduced, resulting in a large saving of funds.

During 1993 the Radio Technical Unit is looking forward to making meaningful improvements to the radio communication system of the KwaZulu Police.

PUBLIC RELATIONS OFFICE

The Public Relations Office is located at Unit "A", Ulundi, and is staffed by a Public Relations Officer, a senior Police Officer and four other members. This office is involved in liaising with all sections of the media, the issuing of Press Statements -whether on request or otherwise - and the setting up of interviews with the media to cover matters relating to the Force.

The year under review has seen an overall increase in work and probably the most important event handled by this unit was the press releases on the infamous Folweni massacre.

THE OPERATIONS ROOM

The Operations Room is part of the portfolio of the Public Relations Office and is situated in close proximity to that office. The task of the Operations Room, which is staffed by ten members on rotating shifts, is to supply a 24 hour service to the public and to be a receiving centre for reports on all serious crime which is then, in turn passed on to the Commissioner by the Duty Officer,

the Commanding Officer, Criminal Investigation Officer and the Public Relations Officer.

Communications are by radio and telephone. As well as receiving messages, the Operation Room is also utilized for the dissemination of press releases and internal police messages.

The year under review saw an increase in the number of communications handled, although there was greater concentration on matters relating to crime.

THE KWAZULU POLICE BAND

On 1992-01-31 the long awaited appointed of a Bandmaster took place. Since that date, Lieutenant Colonel GC JEFFERSON (L.A.R.M.), whose expertise on band matters dates back to 1941, has taken the band from strength to strength. Training has been increased and continues to be an on-going priority to improve drill and bearing, whilst basic programmes of technical study and practice have brought about a marked improvement in both individual and collective standards of performance. As a consequence of improving performance, invitations to the band to play at functions - both military and civic - over and above their normal commitments, have increased during the year under review.

The new training schedules and increased performances have meant long hours and, often, long distances to be covered; However, band morale is high and there is cheerful enthusiasm for their chosen profession.

CHAPLAIN'S DEPARTMENT

The Chaplain's department has experienced another busy year, and as a consequence, the Chaplain and his staff have been kept fully occupied. The Chaplain made 127 visits to members' homes and to police establishments; 71 visits to members' families in hospital and conducted 47 funeral services. This amounts to a 48% increase in work load when compared with 1991.

The Social Workers, who also form part of the Chaplain's department, made 132 visits to stations and members' homes and dealt with 61 specific social problems.

KWAZULU POLICE LEGAL SERVICE SECTION

In the 1991 Annual Report this section was headed "CIVIL CLAIMS". However, June 1992 saw the advent of a Legal Services Section with the arrival of a Senior Legal official, on secondment from the SA Police.

This new section, acting in close liaison with the KwaZulu Department of Justice, took over all legal matters pertaining to the Force and the administration of Civil Litigation against the Minister of Police, Commissioner of Police and individual members of the Force. This section has already made an impact.

Already, in a short space of time, several civil cases have been disposed of to the Government's advantage. In one case a claim for over two million rand was dismissed with costs, and several old cases - which had lain dormant for a number of reasons, have been finalised. Close co-operation has developed with the State Attorney's office in Natal.

It is encouraging to note that despite the unrest, the escalating violence and allegations against the KwaZulu Police by hostile factions, the number of civil claims instituted against the KwaZulu Police has declined for the second year running.

In addition to his normal duties, the Senior Legal Officer will also be responsible for the training of his staff of KwaZulu Officers and other ranks and for conducting a series of lectures on an on-going basis, the theme being the elimination of causes which create a platform for unnecessary civil claims.

The statistics relevant to the year under review are as follows:

Number of claims instituted - 117, which is a 17.6% decrease compared to 1991. Number of claims finalised - 93, which is a 388% increase compared with 1991. Number of claims paid out - 20, which is a 5.3% increase. Amount paid out R203 713,00 which is a 351% decrease compared to 1991. Number of outstanding claims brought forward from 1991 - none. Outstanding claims carried forward to 1993 - none; number of claims successfully defended and dismissed - 59.

LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY PROTECTION UNIT

This Unit is responsible for security within the Government complex at Ulundi. The strength of the unit was increased from 166 to 252, and consists of all ranks. The men and women of this Unit are all employed on security duties on a shift system which ensures 24 hour coverage. The Unit is also responsible for the parking of vehicles within the L.A. complex and to this end the Unit is assisted by 25 Special Constables.

KWAZULU POLICE DOG UNIT

The headquarters of this Unit is at Ulundi where the bulk of the handlers and dogs are stationed. The Unit has two sub-units, each with seven handlers and dogs, at Nqutu and Esikhawini. Further sub-units are planned at KwaMashu and Umlazi, finance permitting. Despite stringent financial restrictions, the number of trained dogs has increased from 123 at the end of 1991 to 126 at the end of 1992, with 7 dogs awaiting training.

It is pleasing to report that the Unit has a member with a two year Animal Health Diploma, who is therefore able to care for the health of the Police Dogs in KwaZulu and to liaise with veterinarians when necessary. Statistics for the year under review are as follows:

Arrests for petty offences - 893; arrests for first schedule offences - 8; Dagga recovered - 127,10 kg; Firearms recovered - 22; Mandrax (tablets) recovered - 4,100; motor vehicles - 1.

THE TRAFFIC DIVISION

The Unit's manpower strength remained almost as it was at the end of 1991, and was unable to expand due to lack of finance. The following statistics are relevant for the year under review:

Total number of persons prosecuted - 3 864; total value of prosecution documents issued - R261 620,00 as compared to R353 365,00 for 1991.

It will be seen that the value of prosecution documents issued showed a reduction of nearly 50% when compared to 1991. Although the standard of driving still leaves much to be desired, the units report that far fewer drivers violated the Road Traffic laws during

the year under review. It is pleasing also to report that the R.S.A. Road Traffic Act 29/1989 was adopted in terms of the KwaZulu Road Traffic Act 18/1992. This will enable the Unit to cooperate far more fully with their counterparts in R.S.A., not only in regard to law enforcement but also in terms of committed work and training.

POLICE RESERVE

The KwaZulu Police Reservists continue to support the regular members. Their input remains vital to the running of the Force. It is to their credit that the members of the reserve continue to serve in the Force, despite the very real danger posed, particularly in the urban areas, to themselves and their families.

Strengths for the year under review are as follows: Esikhawini - 255 males and 18 females; Nqutu - 39 males; Nongoma - 275 males and 19 females; Umlazi - 193 males; KwaMashu - 215 males and 1 female; Magisterial Districts - 104 males.

SPECIAL CONSTABLES

The Special Constables are a valuable support arm and back-up for their regular compatriots. Although their activities are limited to guard duties with regard to their terms of reference, they still fulfill a valuable role in that they relieve regular policemen to carry out police work. Thus they are trained in the guarding of buildings, premises and persons and as such are trained in the use and handling of firearms. As of 1992-12-31 their overall strength stood at 531 men.

THE POLICE CHOIR

It is now seven years since the inception of the Police Choir in 1985 and its membership now stands, as of 1992-12-31, at 36 members drawn from both male and female members of the Force. The choir again performed at Police and Government functions, public functions, police weddings and funerals. The choir continues to broaden its repertoire and vocal range and has, to its credit, recorded three record albums - SIYAMUZWA UMSINDISI, MLINDI KUYEZA UKUSA AND BABA WETHU.

THE OFFICER'S CLUB

The KwaZulu Police Officers' Club continues to perform a very necessary function in the Force, in the sense that it gives Officers a place where they can meet socially and discuss subjects of mutual interest in pleasant surroundings.

POLICE OFFICER'S LADIES CLUB

This Club continues to provide a very useful forum where Officer's wives can meet and discuss matters of mutual interest.

ACCOMMODATION AND HOUSING

It is still the intention of my Department to take over Police Stations at Ubombo, Ingwavuma, Mbazwane, Emanguzi and Ndumo in Northern Zululand, plus Izingolweni, Mpendle, Nseleni, Gamalakhe and Magabheni. Work study personnel are at present carrying out the necessary investigation and their report is awaited. The

Police Station at KwaCeza will be completed during the first half of 1993.

CONCLUSION

Notwithstanding an overall dismal picture, there is extreme hope for the future. Negative perceptions are changing with the international community and major political and economic players looking upon us more favourably. Most important though, is a discernible change in domestic political thinking in the RSA which could bring about peace and stability in our region in the foreseeable future. The Police Department is aware of the crucial role it has to play and will certainly be intimately involved and endeavour to encourage and promote prosperity, democracy, justice and tolerance to the benefit and well being of all South Africans.

BUDGET AFFAIRS

The estimates of expenditure for the 1993/1994 financial year as reflected in the printed estimates, show an allocation of R166 904 000,00 to the Department of Police. This represents an increase of approximately 23% on the previous year's final allocation of R128 206 000,00.

Personnel expenditure - R125 449 600

Of this amount R82 897 400 or nearly 50% of the total budget has been earmarked for members' salaries. Accounting for this figure are salary increases as well as the financial costs involved in the proposed enrolment of 500 students for the next intake at the College. The difference is for personnel expenditure which, inter

alia, includes allowances, leave gratuity and medical expenditure.

Medical expenditure will amount to nearly R15 million.

ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE - R10 282 000

This vote was increased by 30% from R3 172 900 to R10 828 000. Of this amount nearly 60% or R6 000 000 is allocated to motor transport, R1 980 000 on postage and telephones and R1 500 000 on subsistance allowance. The increase can mainly be attributed to the rise in postal and telephone tariffs as well as to the petrol price rise and the acquisition of extra vehicles.

PROFESSIONAL OR SPECIAL SERVICES - R6 713 000

This vote was increased from R5 787 500 to R6 713 000. The main consumer of funds of this vote are the contractor services which amounts to 76% of the vote or R5 105 000.

MISCELLANEOUS - R865 000

These funds are mainly spent on claims against the State; namely civil claims, workmen's compensation and informer claims, etc.

STORES AND LIVESTOCK - R13 997 400

This vote was increased from R6 844 600 to R13 997 400 which reflects an increase of approximately 48% on the previous year. This greatly increased allocation became necessary due to an oversight in the previous year where the provisions and catering vote was miscalculated in certain fields. This necessitated an

increase of close on five (5) million rand. We were also forced to take into consideration the proposed increase in manpower and the accompanying cost for uniforms, etc.

EQUIPMENT - R9 597 000

This vote was increased from R7 474 000 to R9 597 000. This increase became necessary due to the proposed increase in manpower, the upgrading of obsolete equipment, i.e. radios, typewriters, firearms, etc., as well as the commissioning of the five (5) new satellite Police Stations in KwaZulu. The total amount of funds requested for the Department of Police is R166 904 000.

Mr Chairman, Honourable Members, I now move the adoption of the 1993-1994 Vote of the Department of Police.

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