

MEMORANDUM FOR DISCUSSION WITH THE POLISH AMBASSADOR  
TO SOUTH AFRICA, HIS EXCELLENCY MR S CIENIUCH

BY MANGOSUTHU BUTHELEZI, PRESIDENT OF INKATHA FREEDOM PARTY  
AND CHIEF MINISTER OF KWAZULU

ULUNDI : 29th JUNE 1992

Mr Ambassador, I am very grateful to be able to receive you here in Ulundi. There must be a great demand on your time by numerous people in this crucial period of South Africa's constitutional development. I therefore appreciate the fact that you took time to travel to Ulundi, all the more.

Since February 2nd, 1990, there was hope that we were moving out of apartheid towards a new democratic South Africa. The establishment of the Polish Embassy and others is in itself evidence of the fact that the whole international community appreciated this fact. I am saddened by the impasse that occurred at CODESA II merely because the ANC/SACP alliance and their allies could not get their way and were therefore defeated on the floors of CODESA. Thus the thumping of the tables by the President and a walk-out of CODESA by them and their allies.

Mr Ambassador, I want to state very clearly that I believe Dr Mandela and the ANC and its allies are being grossly irresponsible at a time in which every political party should be making every effort to make progress in negotiations.

Tensions are running high in the country because of escalating violence. To withdraw from CODESA at this time is bad enough. To go further and actually take delicate negotiation issues to street corner politics is unforgivable.

I would like briefly to state why we think the ANC is erring in withdrawing from CODESA, and then I want to go on to say why at this time, of all times, they should not be subjecting South Africa to the tensions of violence which flow from mass action politics.

The ANC's Withdrawal from CODESA

We find the ANC's withdrawal from CODESA deeply offensive. It is an insult to all the other parties in CODESA for the ANC to maintain that it withdrew from CODESA because of the problems it was experiencing with the South African Government.

That is political subterfuge. It can not tell the world the real reasons why it withdrew from CODESA. It withdrew from CODESA because it suffered a democratic defeat, and the image it painted of itself as THE vanguard liberation movement commanding support of the oppressed in South Africa, is clearly incompatible with the kind of defeat it suffered.

Each Working Group in CODESA is composed of two delegates, plus two back up persons from each of the eighteen participating parties, and organisations, and from Government. Half of these delegates in Working Group II rejected the ANC's thinking about interim constitutional arrangements.

Mr Ambassador, I make a point that even had the South African Government sided with the ANC there would have been insufficient consensus in Working Group II for the ANC's proposals. We rejected the ANC's proposals on two separate grounds. \

The first is that we would not lay South Africa open to the dangers of an early election which would not be free and fair because the high levels of violence would permit too much intimidation. The ANC commands more intimidatory powers than any other party. And because of their commitment to mass action politics, we can be quite sure that they would have gained most from holding elections now in the face of violence.

It would do irreparable damage to hold elections which are not fair and free, and land up with election results which would be a gross distortion of political sentiment in South Africa. The ANC was pressing for elections now, which we said no. We rejected their bids to establish a Constituent Assembly through early elections, which would become the Constitution making body of the country.

For us the very essence of democracy is the curbs it places on a ruling party and the extent to which it protects citizens from arbitrary political action against them. No political party should ever be intrusted with writing the constitution under which it would govern in the future.

The ANC left CODESA, in part because it could not get its way in this matter. It also left for another reason. This is that political parties have been gravitating into two very distinct camps in CODESA I and CODESA II. The fundamental divide emerging

is the divide between those who are seeking a unitary state solution and those who are seeking a federal solution.

The ANC is deeply committed to establish a unitary state in which they can become the government under a constitution which gives them a very powerful system of centralised political control.

We say no to that. We say no for two reasons. Firstly we say no to it because we never again want to see any political party so powerful and so entrenched that it can amass the kind of monolithic powers around itself that the successive South African Governments amassed around themselves. For us the government must be small, lean and efficient, and close enough to the people for them to appoint governments and remove governments at will.

The second reason we reject unitarian power in government, is the need that there is in South Africa to deal with this country's heterogeneity. It is world wide experience that democracy has moved away from centrist Westminster type political models towards consensus models in one or another form of federal arrangement. This is particularly so among plural societies.

Unless we offer a federal future we will not be able to develop the national unity democracy will need in this country. If we do not develop a national will to put a democracy in place, and maintain it, we will never be able to go on' to make the national sacrifices needed to get our economy productive enough to produce the wealth that any government will need to make democracy meaningful to the poverty stricken masses. If we can not succeed in this, poverty here, like poverty everywhere in the third world, will prove to be the mortal enemy of democracy.

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The ANC suffered political defeat in CODESA because delegates motivated by this kind of thinking said no to the ANC.

It cannot admit that it left CODESA because of the above stated reasons, and instead is presenting a false picture to the world. It blames the Government for not being prepared to negotiate away its monopoly of power.

Mr Ambassador, the ANC leaving CODESA is bad enough, and the distortion of the negotiation process as one in which it is the Government and the ANC which is disposing of the fate of South Africa, is bad enough.

What is worse is the ANC resorting to mass action at this time. Mass action can not succeed unless it is backed by intimidation containing the threat of violence, and the actual use of violence. Having failed at CODESA the ANC dare not fail at street corner politics. If it takes intimidation to make mass action succeed, the ANC will use intimidation and blame others for it.

This is precisely what is happening in Boipatong. No IFP leadership structure at the national level, at the regional level, or at the local level made any decision to attack Boipatong. No

IFP structure at any level has ever made any decision to use violence.

Yet the ANC is billing this violence as IFP violence. Boipatong was manna from heaven for the ANC. It is making a huge political meal out of the tragic deaths of 39 people. Only recently, in April, 23 IFP people died in a similar horrific attack. Where was the national outcry then? Then there was also an attack on Zonkizizwe, a squatter camp near Crossroads, where the IFP is a strong force and which can legitimately be added to the Crossroads total. Zonkizizwe was attacked three days after the assault on Crossroads. This made a total of nearly 30 people killed.

The tragedy was covered over because it was IFP people that died. There was not a murmur about it. In this connection I wish to attach a copy of a clipping with an article by Patrick Laurence a senior journalist from The Star.

The ANC is politicising the Boipatong violence cynically in order to lambast the IFP and the Government. In spreading violence one

must understand that retaliatory violence and preemptive violence are people's options more often than not. I do not condone what happened in Boipatong. Nothing whatsoever can condone that kind of horror violence. If it is not IFP violence, and it is most certainly not IFP violence, then it needs to be explained.

As always there is a multiplicity of explanations for a Boipatong type event. One of the contributing factors could have been the fact that on the previous Sunday, three IFP people were butchered when they were returning from an IFP rally in Soweto. Another contributing factor is that the hostel from which the attack is alleged to have taken place, is a hostel which has ended up as

being a refuge for IFP victims of ANC violence in the Vaal Triangle.

The Boipatong tragedy has its roots in the kind of violence which

the National Peace Accord has been designed to avoid. Instead of the ANC immediately beginning to work with the IFP to bring Peace Accord mechanisms into play, it went out on a political

extravaganza, blaming the IFP because it needed the imagery of Government and IFP duplicity in violence to justify the accusations it is making against the Government and the IFP.

Mr Ambassador, we have conveyed our position to the Secretary General of the United Nations, and to both the outgoing and incoming Chairmen of the Organisation of African Unity. I am

making a copy of our submission available to you for your information.

We need international understanding for three crises we are going

through, and I sincerely hope you will be able to convey the IFP's position to your Government, Sir.

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Patrick Laurence contrasts and compares the Boipatong and Crossroads massacres

The anatomy of two atrocities

HE cry of outrage in South  
Africa and abroad at the  
massacre of civilians at  
Boipatong contrasts with

the muted protest at the slaughter-

of men, women and children at  
the Crossroads squatter camp on  
the East Rand.

Similarities between these two  
grim episodes on South Africa's  
killing fields makes the contrast  
even more startling. They are  
both products of the undeclared  
war for supremacy in black town-  
ships between the ANC and IFP.

Just over two months separates  
them chronologically: the Boipa-  
tong atrocity occurred on the  
night of June 17; the Crossroads  
outrage took place on the night of  
April

At least 33 people, including a

grandmother and a nine-month  
baby.

Two old children, were stabbed,

and shot to death by unidentified  
attackers in a squatter settlement  
on the edge of Boipatong; at least  
23 people, including women and  
children, were brutally murdered  
when the Crossroads squatter  
camp was attacked by unknown

author.

The attackers are alleged to  
have been, or to have included, in-  
mates of nearby migrant worker  
hostels in both cases, Kwaifadala  
in the Boipatong bloodbath and  
the Katalo hostel in the Cross-  
roads carnage. In both cases the  
shocked survivors accused the po-  
lice of being slow to respond.

. charging that their -delay had

given the marauders an opportunity to murder, pillage and escape.

Another common theme links the episodes: accusations that attackers were aided by, or were

of, a 'third force' which allegedly instigates intra-black violence in the interests of white supremacy.

But there is one fundamental

thing at Boipatong were '224 to put it no higher '224 not hostile to the ANC most of the victims at

Crossroads were IFP members of sympathisers.

The marauders at Boipatong are said to have been Zulu-speaking; the assassins at Crossroads, are said to have been Xhosa-

speaking. . ;

The difference in public response to these tragedies is astounding. Boipatong, labelled by the ANC as a national tragedy, has become a national crisis. Crossroads, reported almost perfunctorily in the press, quickly disappeared from public consciousness,

The victims of 2 murderous attacks on Zonke'zizwe, a squatter camp near Crossroads where the IFP is a strong force, can legitimately be added to the Crossroads. Zonke'zizwe was attacked three days after the assault on Crossroads. The attackers were again said to be 'Xhosa-speaking men'.

. A total of nearly 30 people '224

three quarters of the death toll at Boipatong '224 lost their lives at Crossroads and Zonke'zizwe early in April.

The cries of anguish, however, were more or less confined to bereaved families and friends of the victims and to the IFP. There was no national, let alone international, solidarity.

Mr Mandela described the attackers at Boipatong as 'animaless'. No similar epithet was ap-

pliet to the killers at Crossroads,  
some of whose victims were barat  
alive.

Archbishop Desmond Tutu visit-:

ed Boipatoog to express solidarity  
with the victims. Crossroads ap-  
parently did oot merit a sirular  
wvisit. The South African Council of  
Churches was moved by the plight  
of Boipatong bul its concern was  
less audible over the killings at

On the face of it, the reason for  
the different responses â\200\224 aogry  
outrage verssss oear indifference  
â\200\224 is that the IFP has beeegq castas  
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political drama.

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of protest was lower after Cross- crjously to investigate them.  
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He attributes the relative public  
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iduced by the eademic violence.

The outburst of protest which  
ame after the Boipatong mas-  
scre was due to the high-proiile  
pblicity surroundiog the ANC's  
lass action campaigo which pre-  
eded it, Dt Jordan reasons.

| He cites the disarming of [FP

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Joe 14, the return to them of  
\eir weapons aa Juae 15, and the  
Joomw-ladenâ\200\235 predictions by Law

ad Order Minister Herpus Kriel  
fat mass action would lead to  
violence on June 16. 0

are able to command the atten-

tion of the media more effectively

than their IFP counterparts.  
Themba Kheza, of the IFP, puts

publicists move into action they f

patong Lie reverse applied, he  
adds,

No one has been arrested yet  
for the Crossroads massacre, ac-  
cording to the IFP. There have,  
however, been a0 publicly voiced

indications of collusion between  
the police and the attackers, de-  
spite an IFP complaint at the  
time that police had searched  
and disarmed Crossroads resi-  
dents the day before the attack.

Soon after the Crossroads at-  
tack the finger of suspicion was  
pointed at the ANC by the IFP,  
which declared that the attackers  
were "Xh : inmates of  
Rotalo Hostel in Germiston and  
that they had been reinforced by  
men from the Phota Park and