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Convention for a Democratic South Africa

TOWARDS A UNITED, DEMOCRATIC, NON-RACIAL AND NON-SEXIST SOUTH AFRICA

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In December 1991, the first phase of substantial political negotiations between the South African liberation movements, the government/National Party and other political parties was successfully concluded with the agreement reached at CODESA, the Convention for a Democratic South Africa.

The final declaration was not signed by the Inkatha Freedom Party and by the government of the 'independent homeland' of Bophutatswana. The organisations who refused to participate in the CODESA include, on the one hand, the liberation movements PAC and AZAPO and, at the other end of the spectrum, the Conservative Party.

In the next phase, which is expected to last until March 1992, the agreement reached will be worked out in 5 working groups on the following subjects:

1. a climate for free political participation and the role of the international community
2. constitutional principles
3. a transitional arrangement/interim government/transitional authority
4. the future of the 'independent homelands'
5. timing and implementation of CODESA agreements.

or See back page for the full text of the final declaration)

Parliament Denmark


EC '86 sanctions can be lifted

In the light of the positive outcome of the CODESA meeting, the majority of the Danish parliament has agreed to implement the first phase of its schedule of gradual lifting of sanctions against South Africa. Thereby the ban on new Danish investments and the services paragraph of the trade ban have been lifted, as well as the Danish veto on lifting the EC ban on the import of iron, steel and gold coins.

Other Danish sanctions remain in place, such as the trade ban (including coal imports) and the bans on non-investment loans and trade credits, oil transport, computer deliveries, air links, nuclear relations and the arms embargo.

The comprehensive economic sanctions packages of SWEDEN and NORWAY remain in place for the time being.

With the EC's 1986 sanctions lifted, those implemented in by the EC IN 1985 REMAIN FULLY IN PLACE, such as the oil boycott, the bans on computer deliveries and nuclear relations, as well as the arms embargo.



The opening session of the conference 'CHANGING SOUTH AFRICA, CHALLENGE FOR EUROPE', was addressed by (right to left): Dr. J. Pronk, Minister of development cooperation of the Netherlands, Dr. G.K.T. Chiepe, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Botswana, representing SADCC, AWEPA President Mr. J.N. Scholten (chair) and Dr. G. Livi, representing the European Commission. The conference was organised in Rotterdam by the Standing Committee of European NGOs, on January 22-23, 1992.

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Appeal for international support for election process

ANGOLA IN TRANSITION, FIRST MULTI-PARTY CONFERENCE

The May 1991 Peace Accord on Angola has triggered developments in political, economic and military fields. Confinement of troops to assembly areas and demobilisation is underway all over the country, strong devaluation of the Kwanza has taken place, and about two dozen political parties have been formed. Mid-January this year the Government convened a multi-party conference, where unprecedentedly frank exchanges took place between Government and opposition, partly broadcast on Angolan TV. Unita did not attend as it prefers to follow the letter of the Bicesse Peace Accord, which does not mention a multi-party conference.

The UN plays a central role in providing and coordinating foreign aid to Angola. Recently a number of appeals have been made in this regard:

- (a) the Special Relief Programme for Angola-II, SRPA-II, totalling \$ 167 m.
- (b) support to the electoral process
- (c) assistance for demobilising soldiers and their dependents, to the tune of \$27.3 m.

These three fields of UN involvement in Angola come in addition to the UNAVEM-II teams that are monitoring the implementation of the Peace Accord. The information below has been extracted from UN project documents.

SPECIAL RELIEF PROGRAMME FOR ANGOLA: Phase Two (SRPA-II)

The main focus of the second phase of the Special Relief Programme for Angola (SRPA) is to prevent further suffering and deaths and to begin the process of normalising the lives of vulnerable sectors of the Angolan population and give them the opportunity to return to productivity. Urgent assistance is required for the following targeted population. The total costs amount to \$ 167 million.

1. Refugees and Returnees

The organised repatriation of some 300,000 refugees presently in neighbouring countries (Zaire and Zambia) is expected to commence in May 1992 and end by September 1992 in time for the planting season and before the heavy rains.

2. Demobilising Soldiers

A special emergency programme for the currently estimated 250,000 demobilising soldiers and their dependents gathered in the assembly areas is underway and will run for six months, October 15 to March 15, 1992, after which time it is assumed that all troops will be demobilised and thus, as civilians, be assisted under SRPA, while some will be absorbed into the national army.

3. Internally Displaced Persons

Assistance is also needed for the reintegration of an estimated 827,000 internally displaced persons.

4. Abandoned Children

Assistance is being requested for over 50,000 children who have become separated from their families because they have been lost, kidnapped, abandoned and orphaned.

5. Disabled Persons

Rehabilitation programmes are needed for some

40,000 - 50,000 people who have been left maimed as a result of conflict or mine injuries.

In planning for the groups identified as requiring special assistance, the needs of the rural areas as a whole have been taken into account. Most are in need of assistance and many are equally as poor as returning population. Because of war and under-spending on social services, only 30 per cent of the rural population have access to health services and potable water supplies; only 28 per cent of the rural population are literate and estimates of primary school attendance range as low as 50 per cent.

In order to carry out interventions in this appeal, assurances have been received from the Government and Unita that the key agreements upon which SRPA was based will be upheld. The cornerstone of these agreements is free passage for the movement of humanitarian assistance and relief personnel to enable relief supplies to reach all those in need, wherever they are located.

SPECIAL APPEAL FOR DEMOBILISING SOLDIERS AND THEIR FAMILIES

The most immediate concern of the UN is to secure food stocks that can be supplied to the assembly areas. At present, in-country stocks are at alarmingly low levels. It is the considered opinion of the UN that unless food is made available immediately, the entire peace process is likely to be threatened, as demobilising soldiers move away from their assembly areas in search of food. The UN Senior Field Co-ordinators based in several provinces have reported that this is already starting to occur.

Implementation

Logistical problems have plagued the programme, most notably the unavailability of trucks to transport the food to the assembly areas. The logistical problems include the poor state of the roads system and bridges throughout the country, much of which are still mined. Some assembly areas are located in very remote and almost inaccessible areas, and the UN has had to use costly airlifts.

Donor response

Donors initially had been slow to respond to the programme, which has caused major problems for its prompt implementation.

Donors who have responded to the appeal thus far include USA (US\$ 4,500,000), Sweden (US\$ 3,000,000), Netherlands (US\$ 2,000,000), Norway

AWEPA Mission to South Africa

BEYOND LEGAL APARTHEID: THE LEGACY REMAINS

From November 3 to 9, 1991 AWEPA organised its first official fact finding mission to South Africa, hosted by Dr. Frank Chikane, General Secretary of the SACC (South African Council of Churches). The delegation was impressed to visit South Africa at a period of historical importance and was glad to acknowledge that impressive positive changes have taken place compared to seven years ago, when AWEPA was founded, although they have not occurred as rapidly and profoundly as one would have wished. It is the delegation's impression that South Africa stands poised for a more democratic and more just future, if all parties act in a spirit consistent with the realities and needs of a new South Africa.

The delegation has met leading representatives of the full political spectrum including:

- the government, the National Party, the Inkatha Freedom Party and the Conservative Party
- ANC, PAC, the Democratic Party, the People's Progressive Party of Bophutatswana and AZAPO
- the churches: SACC and SACBC (Catholic Bishops' Conference)
- the EC Liaison office
- development organisations, trade unions and the business world
- human rights and community organisations

The delegation visited the Johannesburg, Pretoria and Cape Town areas, including urban townships (Alexandra, Soweto, Winterveld and Crossroads) and rural communities (Goedevonden and Mogopa).

The Constitutional Process

The AWEPA delegation was hosted in Cape Town by Dr. Alan Boesak and participated in the conference organised by IDASA, entitled: Key Questions for Constitution-Making.

Prof. Dennis Davis of Wits University stated that the true reason for the National Party's enthusiasm for reform is not some miraculous conversion on the

road to Damascus, but a combination of external pressure and internal ungovernability. The government commitment is one to **reform without democratisation**, as seen in current attempts to maintain the status quo during the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy; e.g. land, VAT, privatisation. Furthermore, violence hangs as a shadow over the whole process, and the constitutional talks depend on the success of the Peace Accord.

Dr. Frene Ginwala of the ANC expressed the view that an **interim government** is of vital importance during the constitutional negotiations. Otherwise a number of issues will remain unresolved: the role of

Continued from page 6

2000', which was meant to promote the interest of white groups in Namibia. The Bill ensures that Government money used fraudulently for private and racist purposes was repaid.

- Minister of Finance, Otto Herrigel, had several Bills debated. Workers who have been laid off or have been exempted from paying income tax on their severance pay; the State Finance Act had to be amended to end fraud and abuse of State property; the Sales Tax Consolidation Bill extended taxation on certain goods and services, although maize meal and millet were still exempted. The National Assembly also ratified Namibia's accession to the Common Monetary Area with South Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland.
- The Land Bank Act of 1944 was amended to regulate the consolidation of debts owed to the bank and according to the Minister of Agriculture, Gert Hanekom, the new-style bank would in future be the main body concerned with agricultural finance in Namibia, *inter alia* assisting farmers in the communal areas to buy farmland in the commercial areas.
- The Recognition of Certain Marriages Bill was introduced to recognize marriages concluded by Namibians in exile as being valid inside the country.
- The Minister of Justice, Ngarituke Tjiriange introduced a Bill to establish a Law Reform and Development Commission.

The most heated exchanges of the session occurred

during the debate on a motion introduced by the Prime Minister, Hage Geingob, condemning the secret and illegal 'slush funds' of R100 million given by the South African Government to parties opposing SWAPO during the 1989 elections. The acting-president of the main opposition party DTA (which had been the major recipient of the funds), Mishake Muyongo, said his alliance would not hesitate to accept money again and that the money received from South Africa had been used to fight a peaceful election. It was pointed out that this money violated the 'impartiality clause' in UN Security Council Res. 435, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Theo-Ben Guirirab commented that when a leader stood up and boasted about having received 'blood money' it was tantamount to having said, 'I have no principles; I have no morals.'

The next session of the National Assembly will open in February 1992, when a major item will be legislation establishing the new University of Namibia.

Another demonstration of the democratisation of Namibia was the congress of the ruling SWAPO party, which was held in December 1991. Over 1000 delegates discussed freely the wide-ranging set of problems facing Namibia, and at times the leadership and/or failing policies were openly criticized. A nine-hour debate on education drew the most participation, with further attention given to unemployment and crime. SWAPO President Sam Nujoma was re-elected, but on the enlarged Central Committee of 70 people, 33 have not previously held senior positions in the party.

the police and security forces; the state-controlled broadcasting service; the financial resources available to one party; and other government support at the disposal of one delegation in the talks.

Jayendra Naidoo, working for COSATU on the **peace negotiations**, gave a closer look at the South African Police and the challenge faced in transition. Police loyalty was built up in the 'total war' strategy, with a mentality of self-protection and a culture of secrecy around covert operations. This same police force will be the police in a 'new' South Africa, and it needs support in the transformation process: it must be removed as a political instrument in anyone's hands; it must be empowered to make it effective and representative; clandestine operations must be limited; it must be non-partisan and use minimal force; and monitoring and disciplinary mechanisms are needed to deal with misconduct claims.

As Mary Burton of Black Sash pointed out, individuals also have a responsibility to lodge complaints with superiors when violations of the Peace Accord, such as police without name tags, are noticed.

Summarizing the key issues and priorities brought up in the conference, IDASA's Executive Director, Dr. Alex Boraine, stated that it was clear a constitution could not be drawn up in a vacuum. Factors of direct relevance in South Africa include: the violence which continues despite the Peace Accord; the historic disparities in social spending and opportunity; the need for mechanisms to manage the transition and break the government's monopoly on power; the need for devolution of power and democratisation of the debate. At all levels, people need to be educated on the content of the issues and the importance of their participation in the process.

In its meetings, the delegation noticed different but not absolutely irreconcilable approaches with regard to the installation of an **Interim Government or Transitional Mechanism**.

The convening of a **Constitutional Assembly** through general elections which is to draft the final text of a new constitution, appears non-negotiable for the liberation movements, possibly on the basis of an earlier agreement on general constitutional principles. For the government such elections are 'not ruled out at a certain stage' though both the government and Inkatha are strongly in favour of working out a full and final compromise behind closed doors by the main political leaders.

With regard to the future of the 'independent' and the 'self-governing' **homelands**, all (except the Conservative Party) agreed that they should be fully incorporated into South Africa on the basis of negotiations. The government/NP stressed that the homeland policy has proven to be unworkable, but as such was the first step towards black political participation, power sharing and decentralisation. There was considerable disagreement still on the content of the future constitution, especially with regard to the **political structure**. The position of the NP/government (summarised in AWEPA Bulletin, Vol. V, no. 5, Sept./Oct. 1991, ed.) and Inkatha strongly favoured a decentralised system with large powers for regional and local government, as well as the enforced formation of broad coalitions with veto power to political minorities.

The liberation movements and related organisations stressed the need for effective central government, certainly on security matters (army, police) and on socio-economic policy. For them it is unacceptable if at the end the minority can enforce its will on the democratically elected majority.

The notion of regions and subregions enables bantustans or specific urban or rural neighbourhoods to assert their 'own community right', very much along colour lines. Another consequence will be that poor areas remain poor, as a weak central government will have insufficient funds, entrenched in the constitution, to redress economic imbalances. Metropolitan areas should have a single tax basis, townships must be reincorporated to assure redistribution of state income to where it is most needed.

For the Conservative Party, it was absolutely unacceptable that the 'white people' be co-governed by other peoples, regardless of the policy content of the that government. 'We defend our rights as a people in all aspects of life under the motto: **'Freedom, People and Fatherland'**. Their model is partition and self-determination in people's states, where all peoples of South Africa will enjoy self-determination, even Asians and Coloured people. They claimed to have the support of the majority of all whites, not only of Afrikaans speakers and warned that whatever de Klerk negotiates with the ANC will not succeed if the majority of whites disagree with it.

To the AWEPA delegation, as democratically elected members of Parliament, the National Party appears to have collected a selection of delaying devices and blocking mechanisms from every constitution in the world and placed them together to prevent a government, which enjoys the confidence of the majority of the people, from being able to govern. Such a **layer after layer of safeguards for political minorities** produces the opposite of the founding principle of any democracy: that the will of the majority prevails, subject of course to guarantees of basic civil and human rights.

Violence, reconciliation, human rights

The continuing problem of the appalling level of **violence** is no longer an obstacle for the beginning of substantial political negotiations, but its solution remains as urgent as ever. Without stopping the violence, the political process will be seriously endangered, especially at the grassroot level. It is caused by an interplay of various political, social and economic factors, apparently including elements within the **security and police forces**. Released prisoners are used to foment unrest in mines and that notorious units, previously used in Angola and Namibia, were now used inside South Africa. While it is often difficult to establish final proof who started a particular incident and most victims are ordinary citizens, independent research has established, according to anti-apartheid organisations, that their followers are the main victims of the violence. Those findings were challenged by Inkatha without independent counter-evidence being supplied to the delegation. It was also pointed out to us that there seems to be a **cycle** in the violence, which is increased and reduced

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according to specific circumstances. When President de Klerk travels abroad, for instance, the violence seems to subside, while there were upsurges just before the meeting of the Patriotic Front or when local ANC branches were establishing themselves.

In the **Cape Town** area the problem of violence is different: here the most pressing and immediate new social problem is the **taxi war** in the townships. Since January 1991 and the arrival of a new taxi company, Lagunya, more than 100 deaths have occurred among drivers, passengers and bystanders, in what has been termed a combination of political, collective and criminal violence. Third Force and in any case police involvement in the taxi war is common knowledge, indications are that police officers own a number of taxis of Webta, the company with a previous monopoly position in taxi services. Mediation by Archbishop Tutu, Mayor Van der Velde and the ANC had not born fruit.

Meanwhile, the township residents, who require transport to reach industrial areas and the center of Cape Town, must travel in fear of the next murderous attack.

In any case, the **South African Government** appears not to have acted with sufficient effectiveness in line with its primary responsibility. Only a few cases have been thoroughly investigated are prosecuted and as long as this situation does not improve, violence remains an effective means to settle any political difference or other conflict of interest.

Meanwhile we are encouraged by the recent Peace Accord and hope that all bodies involved will soon succeed in translating this accord into social reality, especially in local communities. This will in turn help clearing the way for further succesful political negotiation and social reconciliation.

A particular sign of hope, from AWEPA's particular concern for **human rights**, is the reasonable convergence between the recent proposals by the Law Commission for a Bill of Rights, which the government has welcomed, and the proposals of the ANC on the same subject. Anti-apartheid organisations propose that socio-economic ('second generation') human rights should also be included in a Bill of Rights, while reserving the ultimate policy determination for the political decision makers.

Socio-economic policy

Whether and how such rights will be formally codified, it is obvious that any new government will be confronted with the social **legacy of apartheid** which is still completely present.

It was generally stated that there are legitimate and deeply felt **expectations of socio-economic improvements** among the majority of South Africans, which must be met by the next South African government, of whichever political composition:

- employment / ability to earn an income
- education, professional training and human resources development
- health
- housing

Across the political spectrum it was stated that substantial **economic growth** has to be achieved and that the South African economy must shift its emphasis **from export of raw materials to**

strengthening and expanding the manufacturing sector. There also appears to be a growing consensus that a **mixed economy** is the most viable economic system for South Africa, which traditionally has a strong para-statal sector.

Whereas the business community and the NP, the CP and Inkatha prefer as little state interference as possible, trade unions and liberation movements stress the need for active government interference to ensure an effective policy to redress economic imbalances. They oppose current policies to privatise parastatal public utilities, which are of general social importance, such as electricity and health facilities. Representatives of the **business sector** pointed out that South Africa is not a rich country, in spite of appearances from white living standards. Income distribution is very uneven, more than anywhere else in the world. Due to apartheid policies, the distribution of social services is also very uneven, but it is impossible to redress this fully at short notice. State expenditures (now rand 80 billion p.a.) would have to be doubled for a number of years.

The economy is very open and foreign trade accounts for 55 - 60 % of the Gross National Product. Real deep mining exists only in South Africa, but is increasingly costly, with diminishing returns (especially gold).

They stressed the necessity of an internationally **competitive export sector**, which makes use of the relative advantages of the SA economy in comparison with the rest of the world. South Africa can become a gateway into Africa for foreign companies and European, US and Japanese products can be adapted to African preferences and circumstances, which foreign companies know less than South Africans. (Cars for instance must be stronger and last longer).

There are also good opportunities in the clothing industry. When export manufacturing can be stimulated, that will create jobs which are lost when mining comes to an end. As South African wages in this industry are not among the lowest in the world, wage increases will only be possible if **productivity** rises. That again requires better **qualification** of workers and students should be stimulated to take technical, not art courses. Business representatives objected to direct income redistribution by the government (which stimulates inflation), but agreed that more should be spent to improve the education and professional expertise of the black population, so that they will be able to participate at a higher level of the economy.

Trade unions and liberation movements gave priority to developing the South African **home market**, which has great growth potential with relatively low investments and great benefit to the people. For instance, basic housing schemes increase the quality of life, require relatively little investment and create good job opportunities. Electrification will stimulate the sale and production of electrical appliances. The textile industry will benefit disproportionally from individual increases of incomes.

One potentially profitable source of financing labour intensive investments are workers' **pension funds** which amount to 150 billion Rand, on the investment of which the trade unions currently have hardly any influence.

They stressed the need for **tripartite structures** (of government, unions, business) for consultations and negotiations on economic policy. Nobody's agenda should dominate, collective negotiations must result in the necessary stable environment. A new growth path must be developed and existing monopolisation which defines the interest of the country, can not be maintained. Their central concern must be how to deal with the economic crisis, to remove mass poverty and to democratise the economy. Both macro-economic growth and meeting the needs of the people must be achieved.

In that light the national strike on the introduction of Value Added Tax (VAT) was held for various reasons. The unions accept that VAT is a more effective taxation system, but object to the specific content of the measures, making life more expensive, especially for the poorest.

More generally the strike was a signal of no-confidence in the economic policy of the government and a demand for **involvement in national economic policy making**.

THE LAND QUESTION IN SOUTH AFRICA

Land registration based on race is gone in South Africa, but that doesn't begin to solve the problems of land allocation left over from decades of apartheid legislation. Land restoration is needed to allow people forcibly removed from their land to reclaim it. Positive discrimination and an affirmative action programme are needed for redistribution and to assist the millions of landless South Africans. State intervention for land development is also called for.

These are some of the conclusions which emerged from the Land Seminar in Johannesburg, 6 November 1991, organised by the African-European Institute and AWEPA in cooperation with the South African Council of Churches (SACC) and participation by the ANC Land Committee, the PAC, the National Land Committee and the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), among others.

In the past 30 years, 3,5 million people have become victims of **forced removals** moved to homelands, without compensation, no or insufficient facilities at new place. Moreover, many black rural communities have not been removed physically but administratively by 'forced incorporation': redrawing of boundaries and adding such 'black spots' to homelands, causing great deterioration in their situation economically, socially and with regard to political and human rights.

The delegation visited Goedgevonden, where the forcibly-removed community 'illegally' returned to their land after 12 years, and Mogopa, where after 6 years a relocated community obtained permission to return, after the Supreme Court refused to allow the state to remove the community for a second time and ordered negotiations out of court. Both are located near Ventersdorp, 150 kms West of Johannesburg in rural Transvaal and the main seat of the extreme right wing Afrikaner Resistance Movement AWB. At present 20 similar communities are trying or have succeeded to get their land back and an association of communities, victims of forced removals has been founded.

Mr. Derek Hanekom of the ANC's Land Commission outlined the current situation: the legacy of apartheid in South Africa, the **decades of devastation**, have left 80% of the land in white hands. It is essential that action be taken to address the historic injustices of apartheid.

The criticism of the government's White Paper on land, apart from the fact that there was no consultation with the majority, was that it attempted to start with a clean sheet, to ignore this past history, by stating that addressing the past would be too

complex. There needs to be a Land Claims Court with set criteria and standards, to handle claims from those dispossessed of their land.

According to Hanekom, there needs to be **redistribution** of land. Blacks have been excluded from owning land, they have had no access to land or to the facilities needed to work the land, and there have been the forced removals. Black agriculture has been destroyed by the Land Acts. White agriculture is also in a crisis, and the need for a viable and sustainable agricultural system is acute.

The ANC Land Commission is working on new policy lines for the future government. It plans to establish a policy research centre to examine such issues as farm size and economic viability, the impact of reincorporation of homelands on agriculture, and the desired role of existing institutions, such as the DBSA.

Joanne Yawitch of the National Land Committee applauded the repeal of the Land Acts of 1913 and 1936, but objected strenuously to the new land policy of the government. 'We see the effort to put a long-term policy in place now, on the eve of negotiations, as preemptive of a democratic process of land reform. The government is attempting to set up institutions to make it extremely difficult for blacks to acquire land.' South Africa's black community has suffered from past disadvantages in resource allocation, which will not be redressed in simply a free market approach to the land question. In Goedgevonden the Land Committee is supporting the community in their negotiations with the government and the Advisory Commission on Land Restoration. The government's position is seen to be too limited in scope and even allows the State President to overturn Advisory Commission decisions in favour of land restoration. A land reform programme for the future cannot ignore the injustices of past land policies.

Charles Ndabene of the SACC Justice and Social Ministries Department sees land as a question of justice in South Africa. The main effort of the churches is to **empower communities** by informing them of their rights to occupation and ownership of

land. The churches also own vast tracts of land, against some of which legitimate land claims can be made. The SACC is working on this aspect, and can in future act as a facilitator for claims of communities on land presently owned by churches. There was agreement that although agriculture formed a small sector of the national economy, it was essential that **the rural population be able to feed itself**. Legal structures and skills training need to be put in place to realise this. Rev. Moathse of the SACC called on Western countries to finance the purchase of land for those forcibly removed, to provide training and skills for land use, and to fund the resettlement of people back onto their own land.

International pressure and support

It was acknowledged by a wide spectrum of South African political opinion, including the government, that **pressure by the international community** has positively stimulated the internal political process. As long as basic issues have not yet been solved by negotiations AWEPA therefore concludes that outside pressure still has a positive role to play. Thus the Commonwealth formula of linking the elimination of specific sanctions to progress on specific aspects of political developments in South Africa constitutes a realistic and effective method.

The delegation paid an informative visit to the Office of the **European Communities** in Pretoria, which is the liaison office for implementation of EC Special program to support the victims of apartheid. It does not have diplomatic status and does not deal with the SA government on development or other issues. The European Commission will decide on raising the level to diplomatic status, possibly in 1992 or 1993, depending on political developments in South Africa (see AWEPA appeal on page 3 of this Bulletin, ed.) Of the total EC support (currently 80 million ECU) the largest part is allocated for **education and training**, bursaries, basic adult education, distant education etc. inside South Africa, through specialised service organisations. The remainder is spread in various fields such as civic organisations, rural development projects, water and sanitation programs and advice centres, trade union programs, etc.

The extra-parliamentary community organisations in South Africa are historically dependent on outside funding, much of it from EC. The focus of the support is now shifting from direct financial support to the relief of apartheid victims to more **development oriented projects**, in line with similar policy shifts of the recipient organisations. Other new and urgent issues are the repatriation of South

African exiles and the refugees from Mozambique who are in a desperate state. Support projects for the latter are set up by various groups, among them the churches, to which the EC Office contributes. Formerly, the EC channeled most of its funds through coordinating bodies in South Africa, mostly the Kagiso Trust, the churches and the trade unions. Increasingly, the ultimate beneficiary agencies can liaise directly with the EC office.

The **Kagiso Trust**, one of the main recipients of funds provided by the European Communities for development purposes, pointed out that an annual economic growth of 7 - 8 % for the next 10 years would be needed to obtain the same living standards for blacks that whites now enjoy.

No next government will be able to meet all needs, maybe even less because expectations will be so much higher. There is the risk that the new government inherits a weak economy, too weak to attain political stability. But even in the most favourable of circumstances this figure highlights the need for foreign support to development projects, especially to **reach the most marginalised** sections of society: women, youth, rural people, informal squatters, 60 % of the population.

The Trust, founded in 1985 to channel the EC funds to support the victims of apartheid, has become more development oriented, especially focusing on (adult) education, management training and human resources development. There is already now a shortage of skilled workers at the top end of the labour market, but huge unemployment at the same time. More skills are needed on every level and in every field, people who can run cities, mines, railways, factories etc.

A crucial criterium for its projects is that they must be sufficiently **community based**. The Trust acts rather as a facilitator and consultant than as a implementator. In the emerging political situation, developmental NGOs must be de-linked from political parties and projects should be equally **depoliticised** in party-political terms, both at the national level and locally. Development processes should be in the hands of communities, not of political organisations.

Complaints were voiced that the EC has stopped its financial support to **alternative media** as from 1992. Apparently the world wrongly thinks that the issue of complete and balanced communication is solved with the legal removal of apartheid and alternative media can be commercially viable. For many years to come, the mainstream media will remain relatively strong, with the practical effect of favouring the current political and social establishment.

At a press conference, the delegation stated the following:

The world has to look beyond the formal establishment of a democratic and non-racial political structure, supported by the vast majority of all South Africans, which we hope to see in place soon. It is clear that South Africa faces an enormous problem with regard to human resources development and looks to the international community for assistance. We are impressed and encouraged by the commitment of various organisations, in particular the churches, in their efforts to provide relief for the needs of the most deprived sectors of the population.

The international community should continue playing a constructive role in building up a new South Africa. Already now, plans and commitments should be made and programmes implemented for social and economic support to help ensure that, ultimately, all South Africans will have proper job opportunities and basic social needs fulfilled, which most whites have taken for granted for so long.

CODESA: DECLARATION OF INTENT

We, the duly authorised representatives of political parties, political organisations, administrations and the South African Government, coming together at this first meeting of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa, mindful of the awesome responsibility that rests on us at this moment in the history of our country,

declare our solumn commitment:

1. to bring about an undivided South Africa with one nation sharing a common citizenship, patriotism and loyalty pursuing amidst our diversity, freedom, equality and security for all irrespective of race, colour, sex or creed; a country free from apartheid or any other form of discrimination or domination;
2. to work to heal the divisions of the past, to secure the advancement of all, and to establish a free and open society based on democratic values where the dignity, worth and rights of every South African are protected by law;
3. to strive to improve the quality of life of our people through policies that will promote economic growth and human development and ensure equal opportunities and social justice for all South Africans;
4. to create a climate conducive to peaceful constitutional change by eliminating violence, intimidation and destabilisation and by promoting free political participation, discussion and debate;
5. to set in motion the process of drawing up and establishing a constitution that will ensure, inter alia:
 - a. that South Africa will be a united, democratic, non-racial and non-sexist state in which sovereign authority is exercised over the whole of its territory;
 - b. that the Constitution will be the supreme law and that it will be guarded over by an independent, non-racial and impartial judiciary;
 - c. that there will be a multi-party democracy with the right to form and join political parties and with regular elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage on a common voters roll; in general the basic electoral system shall be that of proportional representation;
 - d. that there shall be a separation of powers between the legislature, executive and judiciary with appropriate checks and balances;
 - e. that the diversity of languages, cultures and religions of the people of South Africa shall be acknowledged;
 - f. that all shall enjoy universally accepted human rights, freedoms and civil liberties including freedom of religion, speech and assembly protected by an entrenched and justiciable Bill of Rights and a legal system that guarantees equality of all before the law.

We agree:

1. that the present and future participants shall be entitled to put forward freely to the Convention any proposal consistent with democracy.
2. that CODESA will establish a mechanism whose task it will be, in co-operation with administrations and the South African Government, to draft the texts of all legislation required to give effect to the agreements reached in CODESA.

We, the representatives of political parties, political organisations and administrations, further solemnly commit ourselves to be bound by the agreements of CODESA and in good faith to take all such steps as are within our power and authority to realise their implementation

SIGNATURE(S)

REPRESENTING

Mlandela	African National Congress
P. S.	Bophuthatswana Government
K. M. Kopele	Ciskei Government
S. M. Kopele	Democratic Party
S. M. Kopele	Dikwankwetla Party
S. M. Kopele	Inkatha Freedom Party
S. M. Kopele	Inyandza National Movement
S. M. Kopele	Intando Yesizwe Party
S. M. Kopele	Labour Party of South Africa
S. M. Kopele	Natal/Transvaal Indian Congress
S. M. Kopele	National Party
S. M. Kopele	National People's Party
S. M. Kopele	Solidarity
S. M. Kopele	South African Communist Party
S. M. Kopele	Transkei Government
S. M. Kopele	United People's Front
S. M. Kopele	Venda Government
S. M. Kopele	Ximoko Progressive Party

We, the South African Government, declare ourselves to be bound by agreements we reach together with other participants in CODESA in accordance with the standing rules and hereby commit ourselves to the implementation thereof within our capacity, powers and authority.

SIGNATURE

South African Government

*Nkosi sikelel' iAfrika. Ons vir jou Suid Afrika.
Morena boloka sechaba sa heso. May the Lord bless our country.
Mudrimu Fhatutshedza Afrika. Hosi katekisa Afrika.*

5 Working groups will work out the above agreement on the following subjects:

1. the creation of a **climate for free political participation**, with no less than 17 issues such as: political prisoners, the return of exiles, remaining repressive and discriminatory legislation, violence, implementation of the Peace Accord and the role of the security forces, neutrality of state media, access to (public) meeting venues, improvement of socio-economic conditions, promotion of political tolerance and fair access to all potential voters; this group also deals with the **role of the international community**;
2. general **constitutional principles**, including the process (timing, referenda, transfer of authority) and the composition, legal status, elections for an constitution making body;
3. transitional arrangement/**interim government**/transitional authority;
4. the future of the TBVC states, the '**independent homelands**' Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei, with no less than 23 sub-issues, mostly on re-incorporation, and on full and free information, business confidence, land transfers and citizenship;
5. **timing and implementation** of CODESA agreements.