

section 1

1) HOW to deal With the "offer~you~can't ~ refuse"?there are

- obviously three options- refuse and face the consequences,
or accept and turn traitor , or accept in the hope of being
able to escape .An important factor is clearly the level of
political consciousness and commitment of the comrade concerned

Let us assume that the second option is not likely

to be taken. Should a comrade then try to save his life in

the hope of being able to escape or should he face the consequences of his commitment ?

The circumstances of each case will obviously play a role,

but it should be borne in mind that the chances of avoiding

compromise are slim and of escape not much better. Comrades

should be prepared for the possibility of the "offer" on capture and be aware that it is unlikely that a tactical acceptance of it will be viable .

ii) HOW to deal With the "turned" comrade Who comes back? Here

the central issue is whether the comrade is genuine or is
still working for the Enemy. Besides the other question of
whether he should be punished or the comrades set up and the

information given to the enemy is inevitable that he will

have done this . It is difficult to be very dogmatic as if one
can save one's life with the prospect of also later saving:

one's honour by escaping , this would be harsh to condemn a
But each case and a comrade will be
different so that treatment
must be on merit would seem the best approach especially if

the comrade has great value to the movement . In this way also

more comrades will be encouraged to escape .

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iii) Protection against "turned" comrades. A response was
to constantly change their security procedures and improve -

them , developing ever more complex questions and answers procedures and methods of making contact . Clearly the more often these procedures are changed the better

Reid Daly tells of several occasions when Selous Scouts ,
infiltrated in guerrilla groups , would leave the group on the

the pretext of going to relieve themselves , while in reality

going off to radio the position of the group . Such tactics are a
harmful

watched and no stranger allowed time on his own a

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Another method used by the Selous Scouts was to make con,

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tact With ZIPRA or ZAHLA (normally ZIPRA) by pretending to be from the other movement.

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j striking distance of the border .
Bases being too compact# . Transit camps , and even training

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bases , should be widely spread out and difficult to pick out
from the air.

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â\200\230- personnel being unarmed . In places liable to be attacked a
high proportion of the occupants should be armed . Thisâ\200\230not
only deters attack but also keeps the ratio high .

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As the question of rear base security is highlighted even more when
one looks at the casualty statistics in the Zimbabwe struggle .

Far more CO3
in the 2010s were killed in Zambia and Zimbabwe than in
Zimbabwe itself . During 1976 for example the Selous Scouts '
alone killed 7976 men in external battles while less than 350 were

killed by all the SFS inside Zimbabwe . a ratio of more than 3:1 .

From 1976 onwards the ratio was very likely even higher as more
and more external raids were launched .

The use of civilians in neighbouring countries by the enemy _
*IS AN IMPORTANTâ\200\231â\200\235 PROBLEM FOR THE SECURITY OF BOTH the civilian and military
personnel and installations . The AWC should in an organized
and thorough manner monitor as much as possible the activities
and movements of South Africans especially whites not connected
to the ASS , in neighbouring countries . The Selous Scouts used
men posing as businessmen or tourists to reconnoitre ZAPU camps
, and the South Africans
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Standard of training of guerrillasâ\200\230 Here , as elsewhere,

and residences in Botswana and Zambia
are undoubtedly very active as well .

one has to evaluate Reid Daly's opinions with the necessary care ,
but without doubt the level of military training of the guerrillas
who fought in Rhodesia , especially those of ZAWLA , was
far inferior to that of the SAS . Obviously in any popular armed struggle
this will be the case , but in the early stages in particular
it is not good policy to suffer serious military defeats
through having poorly trained cadres at the front . It affects
the morale of both the fighters and the people .

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CONCLUSION

The most important issues raised by Reid Daly in Selous Scouts
"Top Secret War " , in as far as they offer lessons to be learned
in conduct of guerrilla warfare have been analysed above .

As the group contacted would not be familiar with the Security procedures of the rival movement, infiltrating! was easy. It is thus important in the case of the AHC in 1970 to know as much as possible about the security and structure for example of the PAC otherwise we can be easily infiltrated by the enemy agency claiming to be PAC and wanting to collaborate with or to join us.

OTHER ISSUES RAISED IN THE BOOK

Reid Daly, although a professional soldier whose job was to carry out orders, talks a considerable amount about his opinion of the people running the war and the way they were doing it, comparing it to the way the British operated.

He was all in favour of the centralized security forces and also a good effort on all levels military, civilian, propaganda, psychological war "hearts and minds" diplomacy etc. This was not done in Rhodesia, much to his disgust.

He was also in favour of external raids very early on in the war, but was not allowed. The South African regime has learned much from Zimbabwe war.

As much of the book is about Selene Scouts' external operations, several important issues are raised about the security of movement personnel in neighbouring countries. Selene Scouts' successes in kidnapping civilian personnel, for example, or attacking their homes, were possible because of the comrades keeping regular hours and not changing movements and travel routes.

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being too close to the border . The lesson is that-
especially large training areas { should not be held within

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1 SELOUS scones - TOP SECRET WAR

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â\200\235TOP SECRET WAR" is a history of the Selene Scout regiment of Rhodesia , by its cem3ander , Ron.Reid Dely. At the same time-

it ie a history of the armed liberation struggle frem.the po~7 inĩ-\201 of view of the Rhodesian Armed Forces , of which the Sel~ cue Scouts were one of the meet important if not', meet important element .

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Up until the end of 1972 , the

Security Forces (SF) of

the Smith regime had encountered little d15fÂfÃ@uety in dealing with the threat i~\201oeed by the armed actions of the liberation movement . This was due to the teetice adapted by the guerrill

Â«as which were semi~conventionel - infiltration across the beÂ» rder from their rear bases in Zembieâ\200\224,â\200\231ermed actions against selected targets and then attempted wiehdrewal back across the border . There was little attempt i~\201e pelificise the messes so

as to be able to melt evey inmo the local populacion to eve5.d SF detection , end as a reeult heavy losses were suffered and

litele advance made 1 In addition the informer 1111111 of the

SFe was not seriously challenged so that avoiding detection w

Â«as extremely difficult o

On the 21st of December 1972 , e settle: homestead an â\200\234A1-tene Farm" in the Centenary district was ettacked by ZAWLA fen rcee . The "fellow'up" operation , code naaeĩ~\202 "Operation HurrÂ» icene".by the SFs , wee deetiheÃ© never to be concluded , becep

use for the first time in the war the attackers hea Ã©ieeppeeru

ed without trace . They had not attempted to get back to hhze~

mbique, but had simply melted into the local population .

â\200\234Operation Hurricehe â\200\235 , in the words of Reid Dely , was to p-rove "Rhodesieâ\200\230e own wind of change " ~ the character ef the war had changed.completely end the Âf119.01 the Smith regime wee already sealed 0

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The ZANLA guerrillas had become "fish.in waterâ\200\234 with the

active support of the population , beeing themselves permaneu ntly within the country , reeupply networks end completely neutralising the SFSâ\200\230 net-

establishing intricate support end_

werh of informers . This letter fecĩ~\201er was the most decisive ,

as simple tracking and patrolling exercises by the SFe were t

~otelly inaequete to contain ZAWLAâ\200\231e tremendously rapid eemÃ©.
ence . Some means 01 localieing the guerr5llee wee neeeeeehy o

Ae General Wells put 1t 10 Reid Dal; when he briefee hlm ,

â\200\234â\200\230mnÂ» .le.vhawrÂ»ru .

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terrorists" were â\200\234real terrorists",wee to have up~to~date infoÂ«7
rmation from captured guerrillas , and also to have real guer~

rillae turn trait or and work in the "pseudo" groups , to preee~

at a genuine front and kill or capture their former comrades .,

while one should evaluate Reid.Daly'e claims in the light';

of whom they come from .11 seems true to say that it 11.1 far
easier to "burn" guerrillas , both ZAHLA end ZIPRA , then it

would be thought possible 0

The normal procedure was as follows :

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f u treat the captured guerrilla well, giving him.the beet medu'

icel treatment available if wounded a no threats ,beetlngee

or torture

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Mrawhwthaeowhwandwerum/Iieĩĩ-\202b11â\200\231 by/Lhang-Q1L: 11111001 â\200\231

the other hand he could not only save his lifeÃ@kbuhhgÂ§01d59

all the hardships in the bush , fight in an elite regiment,

earn a 11111; large eelÃ@ry , have his family looked after

and protected and be forgiven unconditionally all past

actions

3'- as soon as possible the â\200\234turnÃ@dâ\200\235 guerrilla had to set up his

former comrades so as to become , hopefully irrevocably co~

'mpromieed

Reid Dely tells in detail of numerous cases of "terroristsâ\200\234 hen
ing turnedâ\200\234, dwelling especially on the cases of Detachlent and

â\200\234Sectorlal Commanders. Hewever , during the course of en elght

year long wer.he mentions no more than three or four of the la

utter , indicating that the incidence was not that high .In edm
dition . the Selene Scouts were obliged periodically to launch
recruiting campaigns , so one can deduce that not so many gae~.
rrillae were "turned â\200\235 as they would have
one believe . thÂ» â\200\230
ever, the apparent case with which this was achieved is surpri

Reidmy also re ates Cases of "turned" guerrillas who la~

Â«sing and in many cases happened out ln the bush., during an
Operation .WEA 51Â¢ Cd (1/171, Wâ\202- biï-\202ily 712473341! 750 â\200\230WNâ\200\231((0
140; pâ\200\23112:~iâ\200\235
â\200\231â\200\235
ter succeeded in escaping back to ZAELA , For example one SectÂ»
ion Commander escaped back to 'hozembique-end after a brief spell
in detention returned to fight at the_front ; One suspects thet

there.muet have been.10re Cages then those_related in the book.

Returning to the queetiohepoeed 1% the beginning of this

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While the nature of the war in Zimbabwe in 2010 was very different in most respects to the present phase of the struggle in South Africa , in several aspects , it is dealt with in detail in this analysis , the lessons to be learnt are relevant . We should not thenywell when studying and planning the economic development

{of our own struggle .

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of his beck~up - his system of communication , in/exfiltration and resupply.. Not only does a badly run system reduce his military effectiveness , but also lowers his morale and allows the enemy to play on this , encouraging assertion (see below).e

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This issue is central to the book and by extension to the

â\200\235war itself and to all revolutionary struggles . Without intelligence it is necessary to infiltrate the revolutionary movement ; to infiltrate it is necessary to break the movement's protective security, and to do this it is necessary to "turn" cadres to work for the enemy while continuing to pretend to work within the movement .

Here three aspects present themselves :

1)How does a comrade captured by the enemy deal with the "offer

he can't refuse" , to turn traitor and work for the enemy?

ii)How does a movement deal with a comrade who after "turning" ,

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."turns" again back to the movement ?

'_iii)HOW does the movement protect itself against "turned" comrades

and detect them ?

Before dealing with these questions from the point of view

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, of the revolutionary movement , and as a background to them , the

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information presented by Reid will be analysed .

As has already been explained , the Rhodesian SFs faced the problem in the areas infiltrated by ZANLA in particular , of knowing the whereabouts of the guerrillas . They therefore adopted the tactic of infiltrating the rural population, masquerading as guerrillas , to gather intelligence and to make contact with the guerrillas . Initially this was through small groups made up of men drawn from the existing personnel . However , ZANLA quickly realised what was going on and took counter-measures , notably in the form of questions which had to be asked of any unfamiliar comrade to check his real identity and set procedures to be followed when initiating or responding to a contact between one group of guerrillas and another . As these security procedures , as well as the methods of

done with

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operating , tactics , slogans , etc , were constantly changing , the only way to successfully infiltrate the guerrilla groups and the rural population , i.e. convince them that the "pseudo"

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on the need to form the Selous Scouts ~ "... things are not getting Well for us in the operational area ... end, the way the Portuguese are handling things in Wazemhique is likely to make it even Worse for us 0 It is vital we gather effective intelligence on the terrorists Which Will enable us to kill them...

Special Breach are simply not capable of giving us this intelligence on their own . It is no use , at this hot stage of the war , knowing Where the terrorists were yesterday , or Where they might be tomorrow. time is not on our side... We must learn Where they are now... this is very important... we can start hiring them and get the upper hand. We have the means to hire the Security Forces , but not the means to find them:."

Reid Dely was tasked to form a special regiment for pseudo work", meaning pretending to be guerrillas to infiltrate the local population in the guerrilla network

trainees in 1973 , put it as follows : " We have all, I believe experienced the frustrating difficulties in getting information from the local tribesmen, who have been subverted by the terrorists. NOW We have discovered a new method of getting information from the subverted tribespeople ... end you are the men who are going to get that information. You Will

learn not become , as you had believed , the army trackers ... you will pretend to be ZAWLA or ZIPRA terrorists and infiltrate the puppet tribe ... end you will try to edge your way into the actual terrorist groups themselves

Reid Dely on briefing the first group of Selous Scouts

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Thus the Selous Scouts were formed in 1973 With the following

Wing aims :w

to masquerade as guerrillas in order to :

locate the real guerrillas and have them killed by the SFe together intelligence from the population and guerrillas on

guerrilla structures , network , contact people and key cadres

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to create confusion and mistrust Within the guerrilla armies in the field to disrupt their activities.

From 1973 until 1976 the Selous Scouts concentrated on

not exclusively on this internal work but gradually began to turn increasingly to attacks on guerrilla rear bases in

amongst the population and to sensibillize and gain their support.

The armed groups which then followed were based permanently

in the area, continuing the political work, an important

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element of which was the neutralising of the SFE informer network.

According to Reid Dely the surest way of judging the degree of

subversion of the local population by ZARLA, was by noting the extent to which the intelligence sources of the SFE dried up.

Thus ZARLA put into effect:

1. practice the "fish in water" principle

2. principle to excellent effect. On the other hand ZIPRA uses still

unconventional hit-and-run tactics, utilizing much political

work, not having anywhere to hide. On the contrary the SF infiltrates

the areas whereabouts immediately, and it was relatively easy

to mount follow-up operations and lay ambushes.

Thus the important lesson to be learnt is that the revolution

every armed struggle cannot succeed unless it is waged by politically

trained fighters who gain the active political and hence material

support of the people. The support of the people also ensures that informers are detected and

eliminated, pre-empting the security of the freedom fighters.

3. QEE QUEER LEA AS A POLITICAL MOBILIZER

Part and parcel of the concept of the guerrilla is the "fish in

water" is the necessity for him to be politically trained. A

militarist approach to revolutionary armed struggle leads, as it

did for example in the case of ZIPRA (according to Dely) to an over-reliance on controls of the population by fear and threats and not

political persuasion. It also leads to cadres in the field not

fulfilling properly their responsibility to serve as moral and political

examples and committing acts of indiscipline which prejudice the

struggle in the eyes of the masses.

THE IMPORTANCE OF GOOD SYSTEMS OF COMMUNICATION ; INFILTRATION ,
EXPLOITATION OF THE POPULATION ; REINFORCEMENT OF THE

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The problem of communication between guerrilla groups in the field is not one which easily solved. For lack of radio, guerrilla groups in Zimbabwe communicated by letter and otherwise extensive written diaries and files of vital information. The ISR's favourite method of infiltrating guerrilla groups

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oups was to forge introductory letters 0 They also had as a pre
ime objective in any attack the capture of documents , especismâ\200\231

lly relating to security proceĩ-\202ures and names of contactpeople .
Later-on,.ZAHLA.msde use more snd.mere
"mujibss" . Securityutight communications are an important fee~

of messengers , 0r

tor therefore , as intetugroup contacts and coordination are
insespensible .

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â\200\230As important , are good in/exfiltratien routes and syst~

ems . Reid Daly_, despite his ties , does not_deny that he ed~

mirea ZANLA's capacity inâ\200\230this respect and compares ZANLA very .

favourably to ZIPRA 3 ZAHLA built up pismstakingly , in all its
areas of action , a complex chain of contests.stretehing from

the front right back to its rear bases in Hezambique c in this.â\200\230

way ZAKLA high command was assured of a constant sueply of inf~

ormstion from the front while the commanders in the field coula
be sent instrutiens and personnel 'could be withdrawn and new

sly trainee comrades infiltrateĩ-\201 .

A draghsck was the relative inflexibility of such a system ,

wnieh.meant that it tees time for new instructions to filter thÂ»

rough to the front ; e.ge new security measures to thwart_8elo~

us Scouts infiltration Q But , although the Selous Scouts took
of the relative inflexibility , it
â\200\235What advantage they could
is clear throughout the book that ZANLA succeeded in reducing

this inflexibility to s minimum and the Selous Scouts onsmay
occasions founĩ-\201 themselves out out by changes and improvements
in 2mm security and ma their abilities stretched toâ\200\230the lim~
it most of the time.

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.ZIPRA , on the other hand , again according to Reid ĩ-\201ely â\200\231

not only had far less efficient systems of in/exfiltration but

were also much slower in changing and improving them , this be~

ing of course a direct result of their inefficiency'Â¢ Thus ZIBRA
were both easier to infiltrate end else to detect and eliminate
end it was easier to disrupt their systems .

The question of resupply

of arms and ammunition is also

linked to the_ehoveâ\200\231. Dsly talks on several occasions of probl~
eggs suffered by ZIPRA inbeing resupplied and the morale probl-

ems this caused , besides reducing the effectiveness of the ZIÃ©
PEA war effort ,

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It is thus important_te note that the effectiveness of s
guerrilla fighter also depends consiÃ©ersbly on the effestiveness

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