

WASHINGTON, D.C. June 26, 1985 OK L N [o]o . AU

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
. JUNE 21, 1985
Security Council resolution
broaches Namibia sanctions

New York

The United States, Britain, and France did not use their veto power to stop a resolution by the UN Security Council for the UN to consider the use of sanctions against South Africa.

The resolution adopted by 13 votes and two abstentions (the US and Britain) reaffirms the UN's legal jurisdiction over Namibia and condemns the 1975-1978 interim government put in place there by South Africa.

It also calls on member states to stop new investment in South Africa, to reexamine their air and maritime links with South Africa, and to consider other moves to persuade South Africa to abide by UN Resolution 435, which calls for the independence of Namibia.

This is the first time the US, Britain, and France, which are opposed to sanctions as a matter of principle, have not resisted such a tough UN stance, UN correspondent Louis Wignitzer reports.

The Washington Times
Africa JUNE 21, 1985

Council condemns Cabinda raid

UNITED NATIONS The U.N. Security Council voted unanimously yesterday to condemn South Africa for a commando raid it staged last month in Angola's oil-producing northern province of Cabinda.

. Angolan Foreign Minister Afonso van Dunen, opening the day-long debate on his country's complaint, charged that South Africa, besides staging the raid, had massed four motorized brigades involving 20,000 men and 80 to 90 aircraft along Angola's southern border with South African-ruled South-West Africa.

The adopted resolution says the 15-member Security Council, which includes the United States:

e â\200\234Strongly condemns South Africa for its recent acts of aggression against the territory of Angola in the province of Cabinda.â\200\235

e â\200\234Strongly condemns South Africa for its utilization of the international territory of Namibia as a springboard forâ\200\235 attacks on Angola.

e Demands that South Africa â\200\234unconditionally withdraw forthwith all its occupation forces from the territory of Angola, cease all acts of aggressionâ\200\235 against that country and scrupulously respect its sovereignty and territorial integrityâ\200\235

THE NEW YORK TIMES

JUNE 27, 1985

7 Killed as Hand Grenade Attacks
Hit Townships Near Johannesburg

JOHANNESBURG, June 26 (AP) â\200\224
Hand grenade attacks in black townships killed seven people today and explosions in Transkei, a so-called tribal homeland, set a huge fuel depot ablaze, knocked out a power station and cut off the capitalâ\200\231s water supply, the police said.

The police said seven people were hurt in the black townships northeast of â\200\230Johannesburg and that most of the casualties were men whose hands were blown off as they started to throw grenades into the homes of black policemen.

The police said another explosion in the area, possibly caused by a limpet mine, killed an eighth man who was apparently planting the explosives, and damaged an electricity substation.

The explosions in Umtata, capital of Transkei, appeared to be in keeping with the type of periodic sabotage attacks staged by guerrillas of the African National Congress.

Fire Rages Six Hours

Mine explosions set off a huge fire at a Government fuel depot at 2:27 A.M., consuming hundreds of thousands of gallons of fuel, the Transkei police said. The fire raged for more than six hours before it was controlled. A second explosion minutes later heavily damaged a power station, knocking out electricity in Umtata and its suburbs.

Several hours later a third blast damaged a water pipeline outside Umtata, cutting off the cityâ\200\231s water supply. Transkei is considered an independent

country by South Africa, but it is not recognized as such by other nations.

The 10 so-called homelands, where South African blacks have citizenship rights, are regarded by opponents of apartheid as a way of denying citizenship to blacks in South Africa itself.

Black unrest in the last 10 months has been widespread. Private groups say more than 400 people have died in the violence.

Reached by telex in Lusaka, Zambia,

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE:MONITOR
UN condemns S. Africa

The UN Security Council strongly condemned South Africa on Friday for what it termed an unprovoked and unwarranted military attack on the capital of neighboring Botswana

the African National Congress office declined to comment on the Transkei blasts and on South African police allegations that the organization had trained and armed "suicide squads" to carry out grenade attacks.

Grenade attacks in South Africa have increased in recent weeks, mainly aimed at black community councilors and policemen regarded as collaborators of the white-minority Government.

Some of the dead and wounded were initially identified as activists opposed to white-minority rule.

A black Anglican bishop, Simeon Nkoane, whose home was firebombed in a separate attack during the night, said many black residents doubted the police version of the grenade attacks. Bishop Nkoane said the victims were mainly local student activists not known to have been involved in such violence in the past.

Pretoria Bars Brazilian Cleric
Special to The New York Times

JOHANNESBURG, June 26 " South Africa has refused to allow Cardinal Paulo Evarista Arns of Sao Paolo to visit Johannesburg to take part in a campaign to end the military draft that starts on Friday. The Cardinal had refused to give a written undertaking that he would not speak at a festival this weekend and would not "involve himself in the affairs of the country."

The campaign calls for young whites to be given the freedom to accept or refuse army service.

Mrs. King Arrested in Protest

WASHINGTON, June 26 (UPI) â\200\224 Co-
retta Scott King, wife of the slain civil
rights leader Martin Luther King Jr.,
and two of her children were arrested
today while protesting against apart-
heid at the South African Embassy.

JUNE 24,1985

for attack on Botswana

June 14. The unanimously approved
resolution demands -full compensa-
tion by South Africa. It represents
the third time in a week that the
council has censured South Africa.

Selected by AF/P for reference use by the Bureau of African Affairs,
U. S. Department of State

TIME, JULY 1, 1985

Fighting Back

Botha answers his critics

A pugnacious State President P.W. Botha, his government under fire for its racial policies and its military adventures into neighboring countries, last week issued a warning to South Africa's critics around the world. "No self-respecting nation," he declared, "can allow any other country, large or small, to dictate to it how it should be governed." Botha's unyielding speech, made at the closing of the new three-chamber Parliament in Cape Town, was a reply to the storm of international protest that has greeted South Africa's actions in recent weeks.

In late May, South African commandos made a foray into Angola. Then, two weeks ago, South African troops attacked what they claimed were strongholds of African National Congress guerrillas in Botswana, killing at least twelve people. Last week another furor erupted over the Botha government's installation of a quasi-independent administration in South-West Africa, or Namibia, the neighboring territory that South Africa has controlled for the past 19 years in

K g
Foreign Minister Pik Botha with State President P.W. Botha
calling for independence for the area.

Botha's remarks seemed specifically aimed at Washington, whose relations with Pretoria are at their lowest ebb since President Reagan entered the White House. Two weeks ago the U.S. recalled Ambassador Herman Nickel for consultations to express its anger over the Angola and Botswana raids. Said Botha: "If there are elements in Washington who think that South Africa is going to be run by the United States, then it must be made quite clear

that those elements are heading for a

confrontation with the South African government and people.â\200\235

Washington stood firm in its opposition to Bothaâ\200\231s policies. Warren Clark, the alternate U.S. representative to the U.N. Security Council, declared that the U.S. â\200\234rejects the establishment of the so-called interim government in Namibia as

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by Pretoria have no standing.â\200\235 The U.S., however, along with Britain, abstained on a Security Council-passed resolution calling on member states to â\200\230â\200\234consider

. taking appropriate voluntary measuresâ\200\235 against South Africa over its action in Namibia.

Botha claimed that the newly installed Namibian government in Windhoek is only temporary and will handle the â\200\234day-to-day administrationâ\200\235 of the territory until the U.N. independence plan can be carried out. But the new administration has limited power: the 62 Assemblymen, all of them se-

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iaâ\200\231s 35 political parties, will have no say on foreign affairs or defense matters, and Botha will have an effective veto over any Assembly decision. Moreover, the Ovambo tribe, which makes up roughly half of Namibiaâ\200\231s popula-

tion, has been given only one of the eight Cabinet seats, while whites, who constitute less than 8%, hold two. Western diplomats in the region suggest that South Africa aims to entrench a friendly government that will eventually force SWAPO, the predominantly Ovambo South-West African People's Organization, to turn from guerrilla warfare to political compromise. SWAPO, which has been at war with South Africa since 1966, refuses to

defiance of United Nations resolutions

null and void. These institutions created

join the new government. []

flos Angeles Siues

June 23, 1985

Threats Only Thicken South Africa's Hide

By PETER HONEY

JOHANNESBURG—U.S.-South African relations haven't been this low in at least five years. Not even in the Carter era, when links with Pretoria were at their chilliest, was the U.S. ambassador recalled, as he was after South Africa's recent commando raid against alleged African National Congress activists in Botswana. Observers throughout the West are incredulous at the timing of the raid on the eve of major South African sanctions debates in the United Nations and the U.S. Senate. News of the attack, which left at least 14 people dead including a 5-year-old child, reached the U.N. Security Council as Western nations were trying to defuse a sanctions-threatening draft resolution tabled by African and Third World countries angered by South African recalcitrance over Namibian independence.

Foreign Office sources in London said that the raid on a country of which the Queen Elizabeth II is titular head could undermine Britain's resistance to selective sanctions proposed by the United Nations and the Commonwealth countries.

At the same time the Reagan Adminis-

tration faces strident domestic and interna-

tional pressures to cut or limit ties with Pretoria and implement economic sanctions against the republic.

Later this year the White House will have to consider divestiture legislation from Congress that calls for bans on bank loans and computer sales to South Africa. It could also end South Africa's \$450-million

Krugerrand trade in the United States, which amounted to nearly a quarter of all U.S. imports from that country last year.

Yet instead of Pretoria eating humble pie, it is the United States that seems to be smarting the most. It has lost face while out on the rather weathered limb of constructive engagement with the Botha regime. The recalling of U.S. ambassador Herman W. Nickel appears to be as much a gesture of wounded pride as it does of arch diplomatic protest.

The Botswana raid was just the latest in a series of external military adventures and bloody domestic interludes undertaken by Pretoria recently that, apart from threatening regional peace, have strained severely Washington's patchy foreign policy toward South Africa. There was the March 21 shooting by police of 20 black funeralgoers near the eastern Cape town of Uitenhage the anniversary of the hor-

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rifically similar Sharpeville shootings exactly 25 years before. A judicial report released last week stunned many observers by exonerating the Uitenhage police commander, in spite of its findings that the unit had used heavy-bore shotgun, shells instead of the usually prescribed non-lethal riot-control equipment.)

A few weeks ago another South African commando group undertook an abortive sabotage raid against an American-owned oil-processing facility in Angola's northern enclave of Cabinda. South Africa claimed that they were aiming at African National Congress cadres in the area; the Angolan government and a captured South African soldier said that the refinery had been the target. This action coincided roughly with the disintegration of a U.S.-sponsored, nonaggression pact between the two countries and the resumption of South African reconnaissance flights over Angola.

This week President Pieter W. Botha was at it again, thumbing his nose at the international community by handing administration of Namibia to a group of local politicians whose credentials are rejected not only by the world at large, but almost certainly by most Namibians as well.

THE NEW YORK TIMES,
JUNE 25, 1985.

Privately
Fighting
Apartheid

By Alan Pifer

" Â«Tonstructive engagementâ\200\235 in
South Africa can mean two very dif-
ferent things. It can mean the Reagan
Administrationâ\200\231s discredited policy
of â\200\230quiet diplomacy â\200\224 so quiet there
are serious doubts it exists at all. Or it
can mean efforts by United States
citizens acting in a private capacity
to give moral and financial support to

-many South Africans â\200\224 white,
Black, colored, Indian â\200\224 working to
bring peaceful change to their coun-

- '] Kave doubts about the effective-
ness of disinvestment â\200\224 disposing of
stock in corporations doing business
in South Africa â\200\224 whatever moral
satisfaction that act affords the sell-
er, and I cannot see what is gained by
driving those companies out of that
country when a longer view suggests
they' will be greatly needed in a
charged South Africa.
Continued on Pg. 15

THE SUN

THE WASHINGTON POST

William Raspberry
â\200\230Mississippi
And South
Africa Are
Differentâ\200\231

â\200\234Rich people sure donâ\200\231t like to tip,â\200\235 the cabbie
complained as he picked me up near the brokerage
house. â\200\234I just brought this guy down here, and . . .â\200\235

â\200\234You brought a fare to this brokerage?â\200\235 I de-
manded.

â\200\234Yeh, and all he . . .â\200\235

â\200\234And do you know what those people do?â\200\235 I said.
â\200\234They sell krugerrands, thatâ\200\231s what. As I recall,
you're the guy who gets all sad-eyed when he talks
about the plight of black South Africans, and here
you are helping them to sell their blasted gold coins.
Well, I hope you enjoy your blood money.â\200\235

â\200\234Blood money?â\200\235 the cabbie said. â\200\234It wasnâ\200\231t but a
one-zone ride, and the dude only tipped me.â\200\235

â\200\234Principle,â\200\235 I said. â\200\234Itâ\200\231s a question of principle.

American investments in South Africa help to keep that racist regime afloat. I thought everybody understood that now, what with all the college campuses

JUNE 26, 1985

and civil rights leaders and decent people generally calling for disinvestment. And what do you do? Why, you drive some guy down here who, for all you know, wants to purchase a boatload of krugerrands.

"I'm sorry, man," the cabbie said. "I guess I just didn't think it through. I suppose you've disinvested all your South African holdings?"

I acknowledged that I didn't, at the moment, happen to be in the stock market, but that I was making sure my alma mater purged its portfolio of tainted stock.

"In other words," the cabbie said, "disinvestment is not costing you anything personally?" &

"Disinvestment is bigger than the economic concerns of any one individual," I told him, blunting the thrust of his impertinence. "It's a moral question, and each of us has to do what he can to undermine the economics of that country in order to defeat apartheid. You'd understand that if you knew how black people suffer under that regime." J

"And undermining the South African economy eases the black man's suffering?" he said. "Looks to me like we might just be putting a lot of black people out of work."

I had heard that mealv-mouthed argument before, and I was ready for it. I told him that black people in South Africa were used to suffering, that it was the white regime that would be brought to its knees either at the bargaining table or on the battlefield. "I don't tell you that black people won't be hurt to some extent," I said, "but every revolution requires sacrifice."

"I see that," the cabbie said, "but it looks to me like you're trying to force the black South Africans to do some sacrificing they'd rather not do, other-

Continued on Pg. 15

JUNE 21, 1985

South Africa's Bitter Fruit

South Africa's repeated provocations make a mockery of the Reagan administration's constructive engagement policy. In recent weeks, the apartheid regime has (1) launched a commando raid against the Cabinda Gulf Oil Company installation in Angola, (2) staged a cross-border raid against Botswana at a cost of 16 lives, (3) unilaterally set up a transitional government in Namibia in defiance of the United Nations and (4) smothered Soweto blacks with tear gas.

Each of these actions represents a direct challenge to stated U.S. objectives. Collectively they mark an affront to an administration that has gone to great lengths to improve relations with Pretoria. Last week, after the raid on Botswana, the State Department called home Ambassador Herrhan Nickel for consultations, citing serious questions about [South Africa's] recent conduct

and policy. To hammer home its disapproval, the |

administration should change envoys

Constructive engagement was based on the

assumption: that better understanding between Washington and Pretoria could lead to a regional peace settlement, the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and a retreat from apartheid. There

Were 'some early successes: accords between,

South Africa and both Angola and Mozambique, plus the removal of some of apartheid's ginpricks:

But theory put to practice has resulted in long-term deterioration. Racial violence has led to 400 (mostly black) deaths in South Africa since last September. The raids in Angola and Botswana have contravened understandings between Washington and Pretoria. The Namibia ploy undercuts U.S. efforts to deliver independence to that nation. . What has the Reagan administration gained for its efforts? Almost nothing but negatives. Black South Africans have developed a dangerous animosity toward the United States. Black Americans have turned to public protests that have broad support in the white community. In Angola there are 50 percent more Cuban troops than when President Reagan took office. Mozambique, despite its supposed turn toward non-alignment, is getting more Soviet bloc military aid.' And U.S. credibility among black African states is disappearing, Despite this erosion, President Reagan still vaguely of continuing present policies. South African President P. W. Botha, noting moves in Congress to penalize his government, harbors no such illusions. In true laager tradition, he defies international meddling; and says any elements in Washington who think they can run South Africa are heading for a 'confrontation.

they're bitter indeed. 3

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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

JEINE 24,1985,

A historic session in S. Africa

Cape Town

South Africaâ\200\231s 308 members of Parlia-
ment are back home with their constitu-
ents following the countryâ\200\231s first attempt
at multiracial government.

For some legislators, such as the mem-
bers of the right-wing Conservative Party,

the session was a bitter ex-

perience of what they call

white abdication of power.

Under the new system,

Asians and Coloreds (peo-

ple of mixed race) now

have a direct say in how

the country is run.

Other parliamentar-

ians, on the left wing, re-

gard the new system as a

pitifully inadequate at-

tempt to address South
Africaâ\200\231s problems because the nationâ\200\231s
black majority is still excluded from
Parliament.

Political observers who watched the
first full session of the three-chamber Par-
liament believe that South Africa can not
ever be the same again politically as it
was before.

The new Parliament scrapped several

By Humphrey Tyler

laws previously regarded as tundamental
to apartheid, the policy of strict racial seg-
regation. Kirst to go were laws tnau
banned racially mixed marriages and inti-
mate relations between whites and blacks.

Also repealed was a law that banned
any multiracial political movements. Its
repeal revived fears going back to the
start of this century that white English-
speakers might one day align themselves
with blacks for a confrontation against
Afrikaners.

The major opposition party in the white House of Assembly, the Progressive Federal Party (PFP), has played on the fears by announcing a major campaign to recruit black members. The party is trying to become the country's largest and most racially representative party.

— Because of its outspoken stand on civil liberties and racial justice, the PFP is the white party with the greatest credibility among blacks. But it will meet strong opposition from the established black political movements if it starts trying to lure away their

members.

The ruling National Party has declared it will not admit black members.

But it is still aware of changed political circumstances. It is already deeply involved with the major Colored and Indian parties in Parliament. Members of both parties are

full members of the Cabinet.

In his closing speech to Parliament, President Pieter Botha made it clear the government is ready to consider virtually any political option except one man one vote, which he said would be a disaster under present conditions.

He indicated that a series of summits with top black African leaders is feasible.

The Parliament recess comes as racial violence continues throughout the country with blacks attacking other blacks and government police.

Many observers here regard the violent opposition to the political system as endemic, indicating that time is limited in the search for peace and stability.

THE ECONOMIST JUNE 22, 1985

The South African government has sent armed men on unprovoked raids into two neighbouring countries in the past month, and has set up a puppet regime in a third. This is despite four years of constructive engagement from the United States followed, contrariwise, by six months of threats of economic retribution from the same source. Neither appears to have had much effect on South Africa's policy-makers.

The raids into Angola and Botswana were acts of war, in only one case semi-excused as action against terrorist targets (the other target was an American Gulf Oil plant). The installation of a multiracial government in Namibia is intended to reduce the cost to South

Africa of running that territory, and to localise the battle against the South West Africa People's Organisation. South Africa retains a veto over local legislation. This is a direct snub to America's efforts to implement the United Nations demand for formal independence for Namibia.

The first response to these events is to say that South Africa is now beyond the pale of tolerable behaviour. The ruthless killing of anti-apartheid activists in self-imposed exile in Botswana puts South Africa in the same camp as Libya and Iran. It gives the coup de grace to President Reagan's four-year-old attempt to deal with South Africa by carrot as much as by stick.

Stalking off, holding nose

It is unfortunate, however, that it should also have reinforced those members of the American congress who have gone in the opposite direction and are now demanding disinvestment and other sanctions against South Africa. These measures would be justifiable only

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Pariah in a manger

if their advocates could show that they contribute to the end of apartheid and of South Africa's belligerent attitude to its neighbours. The attack on Botswana does nothing to alter that uncomfortable equation. The talk of sanctions does not achieve those ends. It may impress South Africa's liberal diplomats and businessmen, but these people count for little in this matter. The sanctions threat delights Pretoria's right-wing politicians, bureaucrats and soldiers because it pulls in more votes behind Afrikaner intransigence. The only other benefit is the warm glow in liberal American bosoms.

Constructive engagement was, in retrospect, a clever but frail policy. It overstated American leverage, and misread Afrikaner politics. But in its quieter moments it did tilt South Africa's President Botha towards a tentative liberalisation of apartheid. Its end may see him let up on reforms, and concentrate instead on strengthening the neo-apartheid fortress. Such is usually the concomitant of national ostracism.

There is no case for Europe to follow America's present path towards economic and political disengagement from South Africa. If congress indeed enacts disinvestment, then Europeans should reinforce their contact with the people and institutions in South Africa that can help the country's movement towards change. European companies are more deeply involved in the region than American ones. Through the enforcement of anti-apartheid protocols which raise the living standards of black workers, they can use their presence to erode apartheid and improve intra-regional trade and investment. Presence is better than absence. There is change in the air in South Africa. The rest of the world should not join America in walking away.

THE ECONOMIST JUNE 22, 1985 NEWSWEEK/JUNE 24, 1985

The Cross Fire at Gaborone

Namibia T

Puppet on a longer string

On June 17th a new, mainly black council of ministers took over the government of Namibia in theory. South Africa's latest attempt to create an alternative to the guerrilla-backed South West Africa People's Organisation (Swapo) may look slightly more convincing than previous efforts, but that is not saying very much. The trouble is that any regime installed by the South Africans is almost bound to be seen by local blacks as a puppet.

The new Namibian administration, formed by a coalition of six parties known as the Multi-Party Conference, is neither elected nor representative. South Africa's President Botha has simply given each of the six an equal number of representatives in the national assembly, except for Mr Dirk Mudge's Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, whose 11 tribal groups were arbitrarily counted as three parties.

The result is lopsided even by South Africa's yardstick. The Herero tribe, which makes up 6% of the total population, has two ministers and two deputy ministers; the whites, who make up 7%, have the same number. But the Ovambos who add up to more than half of all Namibians and provide the backbone of Swapo get only one.

All the same, the new multiracial government has higher hopes than the previous one run by Mr Mudge from 1979 until 1983, because it has much wider powers. In theory it can scrap all apartheid laws, make the schools multiracial, and narrow the gap between rich whites and poor blacks. In practice it will probably be able to do little of this, because the coalition contains such an array of opposites that it will most likely be doomed to immobility.

At one end of the spectrum is Mr Moses Katjiuongua, leader of a faction of the South West African National Union, an authentic nationalist movement that predates Swapo. Mr Katjiuongua spent years in exile, many of them in Peking. At the inauguration ceremony on June 17th he wore a Mao suit. Close to him is Mr

Andreas Shipanga, a founder of Swapo who fell out with its leader, Mr Sam Nujoma, and formed his own party. At the other extreme is Mr Eban van Zijl, a member of the Afrikaners' National party, whose Namibian branch is to the right of the South African government. In between is a trio of DTA ministers Mr

Mudge and two Namibians of mixed race.

The new set-up is unlikely to impress the Ovambos in the north, or the many

blacks in the south who sympathise with Swapo. Namibia today sometimes seems like two different countries: the southern two thirds, containing a third of the population, is peaceful, although the mainly white troops of the South African army and the mainly black ones of Namibia's home-grown forces are much in evidence.

In the northern third, Swapo and the

It was 1:15 a.m. Suddenly the chatter of

machine-gun fire broke the sleepy silence of Gaborone, the capital of Botswana. Jolted awake, Police Commissioner Simon Hirschfeld traced for his phone. It was ringing when he reached it. "We are being attacked," said a frightened officer at the other end. A unit of South African soldiers had crossed the border, ostensibly to attack sanctuaries of the African National Congress (ANC). As sound trucks warned residents to stay indoors, South African commandos zeroed in on 10 buildings, blasting them with mortars and grenades, then gunning down their inhabitants. At least 12 people died, including a six-year-old child who was caught in the cross fire.

At a press conference, the head of South Africa's armed forces, Gen. Constand Viljoen, said that the raid had been organized because the ANC was planning to escalate attacks on moderate black and Coloured South African political leaders during the last two weeks of June. "There could be further operations in Botswana or anywhere else if necessary," he declared. "We still know about more targets in the same area, but they are more difficult to hit without hurting innocent people." Foreign Minister Roelof (Pik) Botha argued that since August 1984, ANC terrorists in Botswana had been responsible for 36 acts of violence

South African army have been fighting a vicious war for 19 years. Official statistics say that more than 9,000 Swapo guerrillas and 1,341 civilians have died in it. Trapped between the demands of the guerrillas, whom they generally support and often fear, and the army, which they fear, most people are too frightened to talk to visitors. According to missionaries, who wield great influence in the area, the war can be stopped only by the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 435, providing for UN-supervised elections, which Swapo would almost certainly win.

The touchstone of the new order is money. Nearly 99% of personal tax revenue, used for education, health, agriculture and social welfare, comes from the country's 71,000 whites and goes to a separate white administration headed by Mr Van Zijl's party. That spells a huge imbalance in the money available to the different, racially segregated services.

If the new government is to win support from the blacks it will have to insist on getting more money for the blacks. The whites' National party might then walk out of the coalition. Mr Botha would be very reluctant to let that happen, because he would then be accused of abandoning Namibia's whites to the mercy of left-wing blacks. But if he prevents the black ministers getting their way, and allows the whites to veto any change of substance, the bulk of the Namibian people will be all the more convinced that the new government is a worthless puppet.

in South Africa. He said that his government had repeatedly asked Botswana to stop the attacks. When it failed to do so, he contended, South Africa had no choice but to act on its own.

~ Sanctions: The incident did nothing to improve South Africa's image in the United States or to buttress Ronald Reagan's policy of constructive engagement. Relations between the two countries had already been strained by an abortive South African raid on Angola's mission that was apparently designed to destroy a facility that is 49 percent owned by Gulf Oil Corp. Meanwhile, Reagan has been under strong pressure from Congress to adopt a get-tough policy toward Pretoria. Both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the full House have recently approved legislation calling for economic sanctions against South Africa to protest apartheid.

The State Department responded to the guns of Gaborone with what an official described as a moderately serious procedural signal temporarily recalling U.S. Ambassador Herman Nickel home for consultations. Dismayed administration officials acknowledged privately that the raid showed how little influence the U.S. government has over Pretoria; but they insisted that there were no plans to reassess overall policies toward South Africa. Nonetheless, the attack could only sharpen congressional demands for economic sanctions and challenge the Reagan notion that Pretoria needs only a nudge from Washington to mend its ways.

U.S. Aide Says Tons of Food Are Sitting in Sudanese Port

WASHINGTON, June 24 (Reuters) â\200\224
A United States official said today that
tons of food had not reached famine
victims in the western Sudan because a
key railroad has been carrying reli-
gious festive goods instead of relief
supplies.

â\200\234Frankly, the railroad system has
not delivered for the people of western
Sudan,â\200\231â\200\235â\200\231 Peter M. McPherson, Admin-
istrator of the Agency for International
Development, said. â\200\230â\200\234We can deliver
the food but we cannot deliver the
will.â\200\235â\200\235

He said that 1,300 tons of food a day,
requiring 60 rail cars, were needed to
feed two million people in the western
Sudan.

Mr. McPherson told reporters that
300,000 tons of food had piled up at Port
-Sudan. The United States is supplying
950,000 tons of food aid to the Sudan in
the current fiscal year, worth \$242 mil-
lion.

But instead of transporting needed
food to the western Sudan from the
town of Kosti, the railroad had been
delivering commercial goods and
sugar and sweets for use in the Moslem
feast marking the end of Ramadan, he
said.

The Washington Times

CORD MEYER

JUNE 21, 1985

Savimbi seeks a policy shift

fter four years of hyperac-

tive diplomacy and innu-

merable meetings of U.S.

officials with African lead-
ers and European allies, President
Reagan's negotiating strategy to get
South African troops out of Namibia
and Cuban troops out of Angola has
stalled well short of its goal, with no
early U.N. settlement in sight.

To make matters worse, a reckless
South African government, after
promising a total pullout of forces
from Angola, last week launched an
abortive raid against Angolan oil
installations.

Cord Meyer is a nationally syndi-
cated columnist.

President Reagan's
strategy to get South
African troops out of
Namibia has stalled
well short of its goal.

Complaining that the people of
Namibia cannot wait indefinitely
for a breakthrough on the with-

drawal of the Cubans from Angola,

South African President P.W. Botha
also this week handed over limited
authority to a new, multiracial
administration in Namibia that may

be designed to pre-empt U.N.-
sponsored elections.

Nor has the Reagan administra-
tion been any more successful in
restraining the aggressive interven-
tion of both Cubans and Soviets in
Angolan affairs. In stark contrast to
its professed willingness to discuss
with the United States the phased

withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, the Marxist MPLA regime in Luanda has been moving in exactly the opposite direction.

Since the middle of 1984 there has been a massive buildup in the amount and quality of Soviet armaments being delivered to Angola, including helicopter gunships, MiG

Continued on Pg. 14

THE NEW YORK TIMES

JUNE 22, 1985

The Sham of Namibia

South Africa has produced yet another surrogate regime for South-West Africa, or Namibia, the former German colony whose independence it has long and illegally blocked. The excuse for the last five years has been the presence of Cuban troops in Angola, Namibia's other neighbor. The reality is that South Africa has all the while been stirring up civil war in Angola to make sure the leftist Angolan regime will have to keep its Cuban protectors.

Even in a cynical world, this ploy stands out as extraordinary. Only the Reagan' Administration ever treated the Cuban issue as a genuine obstacle. And even the Administration recognized its gullibility when a South African raiding party was recently caught trying to sabotage an American-owned oil facility in Angola - far from the Namibian border over which South Africa allegedly frets.

Five years ago the combined pressure of the United States, Britain, France, West Germany and Canada seemed on the verge of liberating Namibia. South Africa was making a big show of concern about wanting to leave the territory's one million residents under a truly democratic order instead of at the mercies of Angolan-based guerrillas belonging to the South-West Africa People's Organization (Swapo). To preserve the rights of other political parties, it feigned interest in a plan calling for a cease-fire and supervised elections as it withdrew.

Its real concern, however, has always been domestic: It fears that an independent Namibia and

successful Swapo will encourage black revolutionaries in South Africa. Playing upon Washington's collateral fear of leftists, it threw up the Cuban issue and then kept stirring Angola's tribal strife to make certain the Cubans would have to stay.

A Namibia deal was to have been the Reagan Administration's great prize for - constructively engaging - instead of pressuring South Africa. Washington even obtained Angola's help in planning gradual Cuban withdrawals, provided that the South Africans ceased their meddling inside Angola.

Last month, South Africa firmly promised to stop its cross-border raids. Days later its agents

were caught red-handed far to the north, ready to blow up American property and blame Communists.

When this was followed last week by a South African commando raid into another neighboring country, Botswana, even the Administration's apologists were shamed into protesting and recalling America's Ambassador from Pretoria. But South Africa carried on with an obviously prepared plan. It unveiled a new government to administer Namibia indefinitely. Only the threat of American and British vetoes prevented the U.N. Security Council from calling for mandatory sanctions.

President Reagan needs to recognize that Pretoria's credit has run dry. His policy of constructive engagement has been betrayed. South Africa is an international outlaw, courting the isolation that its warmest friends worked so hard to prevent.

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

JUNE 27, 1985

Mozambique: a decade after independence

While socialist rhetoric continues, poverty, a rebel war and the failure of past policies force some liberalization of the economy

By Sam Levy

Special to The Christian Science Monitor

Maputo, Mozambique

Mozambique celebrated 10 years of independence

management: "I'm sure that if they [the employees] were working for a boss, he would never tolerate this." Machel's assertion may soon be put to the test by the venture toward economic liberalization. It could also represent his last chance to revive the economy and hold

from Portugal this week by initiating a program of economic reform. President Samora Machel has declared that his government is on a political and organizational on to political power.

According to the original plans rural life was to be offensive.

Although still deeply mistrustful of free enterprise, widespread hunger and political disaffection are forcing Mozambique to begin a series of economic reforms that include the sale of state businesses to private entrepreneurs.

It's a bitter ideological choice for a nation which came into being with plans for an overhaul of the economy in accord with the doctrines of Marxism-Leninism and a program calling for radical nationalization.

The political rhetoric, however, continues. In remarks at

transformed by collectivization and mechanization.

the independence celebration Tuesday President Machel said: "Our country will be the grave of capitalism and exploitation. There is no force capable of bringing down the People's Republic of Mozambique, from whatever corner :

The ruling FRELIMO Party (Mozambique Liberation Front) took power in 1975 after a left-wing Portuguese Army coup ousted the colonial government in Lisbon.

The target of Machel's offensive is sloth and theft in state enterprises: Each-morning's newspaper carries a photo of Machel pointing an accusing finger at things like a pile of unsold, molding shoes. or harrgls of chemicals. left out in the rain. He is depicted tongue-lashing the

are now rare in rural areas. :

The attempt to impose socialism in the industrial sector where productivity also fell has been beset by problems. Following nationalization, 230,000 Portuguese, who made up the skilled and most of the semiskilled labor force, left the country. They were replaced with politically loyal but inexperienced administrators who were required to attend countless meetings, and had little time to oversee operations. ; Drought and war have played their part,

too. The Mozambique National Resistance, an anti-government guerrilla movement, operates freely in much of the country. Commercial traffic, often attacked by hungry troops of both sides, has ground almost to a halt.

The first signs of liberalization came in 1980

and 1981 when the government closed the People's Shops and began selling off some state commercial interests. This year it has put state furniture factories on the block. Quiet negotiations are going on between the government and the Portuguese business community in South Africa for the return to them of properties nationalized after independence.

Agricultural reforms are being introduced. cooperatives, the traditional family-run sector, which produces more than 85 percent of the nation's food, was largely ignored. Prices fixed below production costs in

Heavy machinery and East-bloc advisers were brought in to work the nationalized farms. But lack of expertise and spare parts made the sophisticated equipment impossible to maintain.

There were mid-course corrections of the plan. In Niassa

Province, where an ambitious project was planned, Romanian technical advisers have left new tractors and combines sitting in the sun. Instead, progress toward mechanization will start with oxen for plowing.

While resources were - vested in state farms and

order to subsidize urban consumers resulted, analysts say, in production drops.

One feature of nationalization was rural People's

Shops.â\200\235â\200\235 Designed to serve the same funct

:s the pri-

vately-owned general stores they replaced, they proved to be a management nightmare. Goods purchased â\200\224 or pilfered â\200\224 from their shelves were never replaced. â\200\234We've all got money,â\200\235" a farmer complained recently, â\200\234but thereâ\200\231s.nathing to. buy.â\200\235 .Seap, salt, and-cloth. Discrimination against family and private commercial agricultural interests has ended. Last month, free-market prices were decreed for selected farm products and fixed prices on others were more than doubled. The â\200\230â\200\234â\200\230nationalist entrepreneurâ\200\235 is now celebrated in the state press. As Luis Ferreira, a Niassa farmer, showed a visitor his farm recently, he recounted a tour by the provincial

governor last fall.

â\200\234Learn from this man,â\200\235 the governor reportedly commanded his entourage. â\200\230â\200\234This is

how to rÂ» a farm.â\200\235

Shortly thereafter,

Ferreira w.. awarded a parcel of uncultivated land belonging to a neighboring state farm.

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

JUNE: 26,1985

to resume diplomatic ties

Khaftoum, Sudan

Sudan and neighboring Ethiopia agreed Tuesday to resume full diplomatic relations and exchange ambas-

.sadors, a senior Sudanese - official

said.

A member ot the ruling Transitional Military Council indicated on Sunday that Ethiopia had agreed to stop aiding a rebellion in southern

Khartoum.

Sudan againstâ\200\231

JUNE 24, 1985 THE SUN JUNE 22, 1985

Zimbabwe can't be
generous with
surplus grain

THE NEW YORK TIMES,

12,000 Rally for Mugabe
in Zimbabwe

By SHEILA RULE
Special to The New York Times

HARARE, Zimbabwe, June 23 â\200\224
About 12,000 chanting supporters of
Prime Minister Robert Mugabe came
out today to demonstrate support for
their candidate as Zimbabwe prepares
for its first elections since 1980.

Not far away, Joshua Nkomo, the
leader of the main opposition party,
held court before a few supporters in
the yard of his modest home. He had
been denied permission to hold a large
rally near the stadium where the Mu-
gabe loyalists were meeting.

Mr. Nkomoâ\200\231s party, the ZimbabwtÂ¢
African Peopleâ\200\231s Union, one of five par:
ties opposing Mr. Mugabe, is fielding 8(
candidates. '

Mr. Mugabeâ\200\231s party, the Zimbabwe
African National Union-Patriotic
Front, is certain to win the majority of
the 80 seats reserved for blacks in the
100-member Parliament, according to
political analysts and local journalists.
But the question is how big that ma-
jority will be.

3 Million Blacks Registered

Of Zimbabweâ\200\231s eight million people,
about three million blacks are regis-
tered to vote on July 1 and 2; 32,000
white voters, out of a population of
about 100,000 whites, have registered to
vote this Thursday to elect candidates
for the 20 seats guaranteed to them.

For tne whites the choice is basically
between the Conservative AllianÂ¢e of
Zimbabwe of Ian D. Smith, who was
Prime Minister when the country was
called Rhodesia, and the Zimbabwe
Group, which includes people who de-
fected from Mr. Smithâ\200\231s camp.

Some people here question whetner
Mr. Smith will even be able to win his
own seat, while others are betting on
the strong personal appeal that he still
retains among older whites to keep him
in Parliament.

In recent months, political analysts

here say, Mr. Mugabe has altered his

tactics. The governing partyâ\200\231s congress last August resolved to turn this former British colony into a one-party state, giving Mr. Mugabe unprecedented powers to move toward dismantling the British-drafted Constitution that accompanied independence â\200\230and enshrined multiparty rule. Governing' Partyâ\200\231s Goal

Earlier this year, the party was saying that a sizable victory at the polls could be seen as a mandate to proceed with one-party rule in what the partyâ\200\231s constitution calls â\200\234â\200\230a socialist state in Zimbabwe based on Marxist-Leninist principles, but firmly based in our historical, cultural and - social experience.â\200\235â\200\235 The goal then, some said, was to increase by at least 6 the partyâ\200\231s 57 seats in Parliament.

But while party officials are still committed to a single party â\200\234in the fullness of time,â\200\235 they have' backed away from it as a major issue, deciding to campaign instead on a less divisive

platform of national unity and peace. In doing so, they have taken some of the steam out of the campaigns of opposition parties, which have been calling for a continued multiparty system.

Under the nationâ\200\231s British-sponsored Constitution, agreed to in 1979 after a seven-year guerrilla war, no major changes in the system of Government may take place before 1987 without unanimous parliamentary approval. The multiparty system is supposed to be retained until 1990.

â\200\230Strategy Wasnâ\200\231t Workingâ\200\231

â\200\234â\200\234Up through February or so, I was feeling gloomy about the elections,â\200\235 one Western analyst said. â\200\234Zanu was thundering on about sweeping the elections and that this would be a mandate for a one-party state. Senior Zanu officials were revving up the youth brigades to beat people up and trash the

opposition. Today, things are looking

better.â\200\235â\200\231

In March, the analyst said, â\200\230â\200\230they realized their election strategy wasnâ\200\231t working, maybe even backfiring. People like their kids to be disciplined and were tired of hearing about socialism and one party. They have cooled the rhetoric and reined in the youth. There seems to be a conservative effort to have the elections look good to the peo-

ple of this country.â\200\235â\200\231

Mr. Nkomo,. however, who led a separate Soviet-backed guerrilla army in the war, thinks differently. At an interview in his home in the black township of Highfield, he spoke of continuing intimidation directed against his supporters by the governing party. He said that those who had been angered by the harassment would vote for his party, which won 20 seats in the 1980 election, but that those who had been frightened might feel compelled to vote for Mr. Mugabeâ\200\231s party.

There were several incidents of political violence late last year and early this year between Mr. Mugabeâ\200\231s mostly Shona-speaking party and Mr. Nkomoâ\200\231s largely Ndebele-speaking group, including one in which about 20 people were killed and 200 homes of Nkomo supporters were burned down.

Mr. Mugabe has been taking an increasingly hard line against Mr. Nkomoâ\200\231s party, announcing last week that its members would hold no Cabinet positions after next monthâ\200\231s general elections. Speaking in Shona at his rally today, Mr. Mugabe said that â\200\230â\200\234a. lot of peopleâ\200\231â\200\231 were crossing over to his party in Matabeleland. A gain of several seats by the governing party in the area would be seen as an important victory for Mr. Mugabe. Yet, the Prime Ministerâ\200\231s candidates are not expected to pick up more than 1 or 2 of the 15 seats in the area, which covers the southern-and western parts of Zimbabwe along the border with Botswana.

8

By Sam Fulwood III
Sun Staff Correspondent

CHEGUTU, Zimbabwe â\200\224 Sixteen new grain silos rising from the flat and fertile terrain in this farming region are monuments to a developing nationâ\200\231s success at feeding its people.

Abundant rainfall earlier this year, along with government aid to encourage farmers, will fill to overflowing the Chegutu grain silos, making Zimbabwe an overfed country on a starving continent.

But the satisfaction of having more food than is needed may be short-lived, given the fact that Zimbabweâ\200\231s population of 7 million is expanding annually by about 4 percent. ;

As for filling the stomachs of mil-

lions of starving Africans with the surplus grain, Zimbabwe is learning the hard facts of global economics: As a developing nation that is surrounded by developing nations, Zimbabwe can hardly afford to give away a potential revenue source, and its neighbors in Africa are too poor to purchase Zimbabwe's grain.

The 16 silos, built in part with \$5.4 million in U.S. aid, opened for business in April, early enough for this season's harvest. Twelve silos have storage capacity of 5,000 tons each and four others have storage capacity of 2,000 tons each, boosting the nation's total grain storage capacity to a total 438,000 tons.

Yet Zimbabwe still has too little room to shelter the grain its farmers produce. Of this year's estimated corn harvest of 3 million tons, about 1 million tons will have to be stored.

Peter Murphy, chief economist in the Ministry of Agriculture, said government agricultural planners failed to predict the plentiful rain and so didn't look for export markets to absorb the surplus production.

"We didn't know we were going to be in this situation," he said. "I don't believe we'll be able to shift exports and move more than 300,000 tons this year. We would like to export about 1 million tons."

He said the surplus situation is a problem for us because it put additional financial hardships on the government.

"That grain will be a burden on us until next year," Mr. Murphy said. "We'll just have to keep on trying to get rid of it."

Under Zimbabwe's social capitalism, the government-operated Grain Marketing Board buys all of the nation's farm output at set prices. The government is then stuck with hav-

Continued on page 1L

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

. JUNE 26, 1985 THE WASHINGTON Post

Whites warm to life in

Zimbabwe, but cool to
election By Jan Raath

Whites in Zimbabwe seem largely indifferent to their
parliamentary elections scheduled for Thursday.

But beyond the elections, whites seem more enthusiastic about developments in general and their futures in Zimbabwe. The white emigration that followed Zimbabwe's (formerly Rhodesia) independence in 1980 has slowed and there are signs that some who left are returning.

Sarah Bishop, a computer operator who returned from England this year, said "We missed the sun, the easy life style, the people, the unspoilt countryside. You can't beat it anywhere."

Zimbabwe's independence constitution guaranteed 20 seats for whites in Parliament, seats that will be contested this week. The country's black majority votes July 1 and 2 to elect representatives for the remaining 80 seats in Parliament.

Terence Oatt, vice-president of the Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe (CAZ), led by Ian Smith, former prime minister of Rhodesia, estimated that whites eligible to vote number twice those registered.

Still, rivalry among the three white parties and the seven independents is fierce and often bitter. Thousands of dollars have been spent on advertising campaigns for the 20 seats reserved for whites.

Perceived antiwhite sentiment in the first two years after independence stimulated the departure of some 150,000 whites up to the beginning of 1985. But such sentiments are rarely evident now. Strong signs of economic recovery, and widespread acknowledgment that Prime Minister Robert Mugabe's promise to transform the economy along Marxist-Leninist lines has so far been more rhetorical than actual, have apparently accounted for a decline in the emigration rate.

But the government has indicated it plans to reduce

white representation in Parliament. Those plans are expected to have the support of black legislators elected when the country's black population votes.

The unanimous consent of all 100 members is now required for changes in the Constitution. But that provision expires in 1987, when the required number drops to 70. Government officials expect it will not be difficult to muster those votes. If the Constitution is changed to eliminate the provision for a guaranteed

number of seats for whites, the next white election, now scheduled for 1987, will not

take place.

The constitutional clause was originally designed to assure whites â\200\224 about 1 percent of the population â\200\224 that their interests would be represented as Zimbabwe made the transition to independence.

Emigration of whites, who are a major force in the countryâ\200\231s economy, does continue, but one powerful restraint is the governmentâ\200\231s ruling that only a small amount of money can be taken out of the country by those choosing to leave.

There are signs of whites returning. Trevor Bailey, said his moving company brought back the belongings of 49 former Zimbabwean families from South Africa in

JUNE 22, 1985

â\200\234Spirit of Cooperation

While I recognize that an attempt to set the record straight once The Post has exercised its editorial wisdom is unlikely to succeed, nevertheless I am obligated'to try.

The Office of Foreign Missions does not consider the concerns of the citizens of Woodley Park for the beauty and character of their neighborhood to be â\200\234absurd,â\200\235 nor do we think either D.C. zoning laws or the process of review either â\200\234absurdâ\200\235 or even unreasonable [â\200\234The Tower: Round One,â\200\235 editorial, June 13]. While the Office of Foreign Missions was disappointed that the Benin Embassyâ\200\231s needs were not met in the recent case, we will continue to work closely and in the same spirit of cooperation with D.C. officials and with neighborhood associations as we have in the past to reconcile possible conflicts.

Throughout the Benin case representatives of the Office of Foreign Missions met frequently with Woodley Park citizens and with the embassy to â\200\230seek a solution. We examined from a technical review whether a less obtrusive antenna was possible. We sought the agreement of the embassy to undertake landscaping to minimize the impact:of the antenna. The Embassy of Benin fully cooperated by hiring local representation and presenting its case to the Board of Zoning Adjustment, demonstrating clearly its respect for the local government process.

My office has the clear responsibility to bring to the attention of local government the international obligations of the United States, to facilitate the provision of adequate and secure facilities for foreign missions in the nationâ\200\231s capital; we did so by our presentation to the board with the clear recognition of the boardâ\200\231s legitimate concerns.

It is interesting to note that the alleged quotations attri-

buted to the State Department in the editorial do not appear in The Postâ\200\231s own news account of the boardâ\200\231s decision, even though that news story extensively quotes a representative of the Office of Foreign Missions. Further, although I was interviewed by the same reporter who wrote the original news story on another matter between the time of the news article and the editorialâ\200\231s appearance, no effort was made to obtain my views on the Benin case or to determine whether the alleged quotations were either accurate or reflected the views of the Office of Foreign Missions.

Let me state it so clearly that it cannot be misunderstood.
Who do I think these people are? I think they are responsible

. __Continued on page 14

March and April this year, compared with none in the same period last year. The indications are that the number will increase, he said.

White indifference toward the election was evident in the small numbers that showed up at meetings held by the Independent Zimbabwe Group (IZG), made up chiefly of former members of Parliament who broke away from Mr. Smith's party in 1982. What for? Let them [the government] get on with it, says John Bird, a structural engineer, when asked if he was going to vote.

The differences between the two main white protagonists, the CAZ and the IZG, are blurred. The IZG accuses the CAZ of damaging white interests by steering a confrontational course with the government. But the CAZ say it has supported the government on 95 percent of the bills introduced in the last five years.

Interest will focus on Smith, whose party, suffers a drawback: Many dislike being associated with the man responsible for resisting black rule.

Smith, running from a rural constituency is thought by some officials, privately, to be at risk. Appearing in a television interview he justified his stance on Rhodesia during the period he was its prime minister (1964-79), declaring he would never regret a minute of it. Smith is considered a favorite against Irish-born Paddy Shields, the IZG candidate.

JUNE 24, 1985

By Jonathan C. Randal

Washington Post Foreign Service

KHARTOUM, Sudan—An ambitious U.S. logistics operation to feed famine victims deep in Sudan has turned into a disaster, with relief officials afraid that 500,000 to 1 million Sudanese may die of starvation. i

The "sheer size" of Africa's largest country "defeats us all," the British director of an international relief organization said, warning of a "major tragedy" that could dwarf the Ethiopian famine.

Conceived 18 months ago with foresight and imagination and skillfully guided through the Washington bureaucracy, the project to deliver massive shipments of sorghum to Northern and Southern Darfur, Sudan's westernmost *provinces, now lies in ruins, a textbook example of how not to run a relief operation.

Together with a similar operation in Northern and Southern Kordofan provinces, just to the east, where trucks are delivering sorghum again after a six-week interruption this spring, the U.S. relief program already has cost more than \$400 million, including \$100 million for transportation in Sudan.

At the heart of the Darfur failure lies what many observers criticize as overreliance on Sudan Railways. That notoriously inefficient, government-owned corporation, long impervious to outside pressure, was

to have transported 1,300 tons of sorghum daily along the final 590-

mile route from the White Nile city of Kosti west to Nyala in Darfur.

After successful initial deliveries in December and January, Sudan Railways abruptly ceased honoring its contract despite the doubling of normal freight rates for the grain shipments. Â¢

In retrospect, that doomed U.S. hopes of stockpiling sorghum in regional centers before the July and August rainy season made road distribution to villages all but impos-

sible in the provinces, an area the size of France.

But U.S. Agency for International Development officials continued to hope that Sudan Railways would resume functioning normally and delayed turning to road transport as a major alternative. K

In recent weeks starving villagers have been reduced to breaking open anthills in search of grain, tearing leaves off trees and eating

fore it is edible.

.Hundreds of thousands of others have abandoned homes and fields to

the encroaching desert, defeating

the program's goal of keeping them | on the land to prevent further ecol-

ogical damage and potentially dan-

Sudan Relief Stymied

sonous bush that must be soaked for three days and then boiled be-

have a buffer stock of 60,000 tons in place by June 1.

And after six months, you'd think we'd done no work at all. You go out to Darfur and you'd think we'd only started. And the rains are coming.

Critics of the U.S. operation focus on the lack of management con-

ROE migrants to urban centers. trol and especially the absence of a We didn't think it was possible backup delivery system by truck.

for Sudan Railways to fail entirely,

an AID official said. We thought'

they could manage at 30 percent efficiency.

In fact, Sudan Railways has managed to operate other services such as passenger and general freight trains, especially for enormous shipments of sugar for pastries and candy prized by the urban population during Ramadan, the just-ended Moslem month of daytime fasting and nighttime feasting.

U.S. officials said they remained at a loss to pinpoint reasons for the railway's refusal to deliver grain, despite repeated, well-publicized

entreaties by Gen. Abdel Rahman Sawar-Dhahab, leader of the transitional military council that overthrew president Jaafar Nimeri in early April. But indifferent and incompetent management, possible union opposition to the weak military government, the decrepit condition of rolling stock and roadbeds, widespread corruption and a higher priority for traffic destined for urban centers than for remote villages

are often cited. S

â\200\234In the old days, we would have sent in the marines to run the railroads,â\200\235 a U.S. official said, â\200\234but we | cannot do that anymore.â\200\235

â\200\234] guess someone could make the point that weâ\200\231ve made a complete flop of it,â\200\235 another U.S. official said glumly. â\200\234Weâ\200\231ll have to take our lumps. We are going to come out as bad guys no matter what.â\200\235

â\200\234We knew everything had to work out perfectly,â\200\235 the - official added, â\200\234because no one had ever tried a relief effort as big as this one.â\200\235 it

Summing up his frustration, An-Birew Timpson, director in Sudan of Save the Children, which AID hired to distribute the grain to Darfur villages, said, â\200\234Weâ\200\231ve got the food in the country, first at Port Sudan on the Red Sea, then trucked to Kosti. We have the fuel to move it, and the relief workers were on the ground in Darfur before the food arrived. For the first time we felt weâ\200\230_could prevent famine. We were going to

10

They pointed to the six-week break in March and April in truck

deliveries of sorghum to Kordofan '

as evidence of AIDâ\200\231s failings. The hiatus in deliveries was

caused when Sudanese truckers subcontracted by the U.S.-Sudanese firm Arkel Talab demanded higher rates for delivering grain to Kordofan after expiration of the contract covering the first shipments from Texas.

â\200\234They had the Americans by the throat,â\200\235 a foreign trucker from Port Sudan said. â\200\234They should have given part of the contract to outside firms to keep Arkel Talab and the

Sudanese subcontractors from ratcheting up their prices for the subsequent contracts.â\200\235

Even: now, according to 'Emil Steinkrauss of CARE, the American organization under AID contract to distribute sorghum in Kordofan, lack of fuel has halved deliveries of grain rations for 1.3 million famine victims there.

â\200\234Weâ\200\231re playing catch-up ball,â\200\235 Steinkrauss said, complaining that Arkel Talab had failed to deliver the fuel.

Had an extensive trucking network existed for the Darfur oper-

| ation from the very beginning, crit-

ics argue, Sudan Railways would not have been able to choke off deliveries secure in the knowledge that no alternative transportation existed.

In any case, the critics said, some supplies would have reached the drought victims by truck in addition to the trickle of daily rail deliveries, which declined from 224 tons in the month before March 26 to 176 tons for the 75 days thereafter.

U.S. officials originally argued that bringing in big, desert-equipped trucks would collapse the Sudanese trucking industry.

During the past month AID belatedly has set up a trucking link from Khartoum across desert trails to El Fasher, more than 500 miles to the west in Southern . Darfur

Province. But so far, less than!

2,500 tons of sorghum has been moved, and truckers have tripled

THE WASHINGTON Posr

their rates to the west in the past month.

U.S. officials are adamant that Sudan Railways not only can deliver the contracted amounts of grain, but, in fact, that it remains the only means of transporting the sorghum in meaningful quantities.

In the meantime, as more grain ships dock in Port Sudan, the sorghum is being funneled into warehouses, and U.S. officials worry that the stockpiles there may soon â\200\234get

out of hand.â\200\235

But despite some signs that the military government finally had prevailed on the Kosti railway workers to speed up grain shipments, deliveries in Nyala remain irregular and far below target.

In any event, truckers originally interested in moving the grain to 12 district centers have wandered off in search of steadier work.

And time is running out. On the basis of weather records, the Kosti-to-Nyala road can be expected to wash out four to six times during the two-month rainy season, each time requiring a week to repair.

Chris Eldridge, the Save the Children director in Nyala, said waiting for the grain trains to arrive had made him â\200\234numb with frustration and the thought of impending disaster

Timpson, his superior in Khartoum, predicted an â\200\234explosion â\200\235 of deaths next month and said that the area north of Geneina was likely to be the hardest hit.

Save the Children has chartered a 50-truck convoy to carry 500 tons of food to Nyala, but Timpson acknowledged that such an isolated effort could not solve the problem.

â\200\234Itâ\200\231s symbolic,â\200\235 he said. â\200\234We just have to do something, no matter how desperate the situation is.â\200\235

Since the -end of May, the European Community, which originally had contributed almost nothing to the western Sudan relief operation, started an airlift with Belgian and West German air force transport planes. -

Additional aircraft may be forthcoming from Britain, Denmark, France, Italy and the United States.

But the transport planes tend to tear up the rudimentary airfields in Darfur and, in any case, cannot move bulk grain effectively and are many times more expensive to operate than trains or trucks.

â\200\234With planes weâ\200\231re salving our conscience,â\200\235 one diplomat said, â\200\234not

continued on pg. 14

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

JUNE 24, 1985

In Sudan, aid workers keep on truckinâ\200\231 food to famine victims

By Edward Girardet
Special to The Christian Science Monitor

Port Sudan

It is known simply as Kilo Eight.

A sprawling desert â\200\234mawgifâ\200\235â\200\231 or truck park, Kilo Eight lies at the base of the Red Sea Hills and about five miles from Port Sudan.

At any one time as many as 1,000 vehicles can be found encamped here, along Sudanâ\200\231s only all-weather road from the coast to its vast interior.

Amid the roar of engines, drifting exhaust smoke, and cooking fires, long lines of trucks and trailers file slowly past the fuel pumps, drinking in the precious commodity for their arduous hauls inland. Others, loaded and ready to leave, wait in lines outside the police checkpoints, the

last phase of a long bureaucratic process required before vehicles hit the road.

â\200\234Kilo Eight is the main staging area for Sudan where everything is finally loaded, fueled, and dispatched,â\200\235 says CAREâ\200\231s John Britton, a bearded young relief coordinator from New Jersey.

For Sudan, Africaâ\200\231s largest country, an estimated 85 percent of its total intake â\200\224 imports as well as famine relief â\200\224 must come through Port Sudan, the nationâ\200\231s sole functioning harbor.

More than half :this intake, mainly food commodities, is destined for refugee and famine relief programs in Eritrea and Tigre in neighboring Ethiopia, as well as in affected parts of Sudan.

A cursory glance at a map illustrates how logistically precarious this situation is. Although some supplies are brought in from Kenya to the south, Egypt to the north, or by rail from Port Sudan, the paved highway from the Red Sea represents Khartoumâ\200\231s main communications link with the outside world. But even this has begun to deteriorate because of the wear and tear of traffic.

â\200\234In effect, this road serves as [Sudanâ\200\231s] lifeline. Without it, it would collapse,â\200\235 Mr. Britton observes.

Since late January, CARE has acted as operational

partner to the Khartoum government and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

CARE is responsible for organizing and monitoring food shipments, and more recently non-food items, directly from the port to more than 500,000 Ethiopian refugees in the camps of Sudan's semiarid Eastern region. At the same time, CARE is coordinating relief assistance for United States aid to Sudanese famine victims in Kordofan and Kassala provinces.

Although certain voluntary agencies are running their own supplementary food programs, Britton and his assistant, Sylvano Guerrero from Belize, are faced with the overwhelming task of ensuring that the right amount of food is distributed to the right area at the right time.

In a sense, channeling food to refugee camps in the

east is somewhat less daunting than getting it to the more distant relief areas in western Sudan. Fortunately, the main highway from Port Sudan

It goes through Kassala, Showak, and Gedaraf, where most of the camps are situated, or are at least not too far away. This means that most of our trucks can make the journey there and back in two days," Britton explains.

Nevertheless, it is hard to imagine the massive logistical organization behind such an operation. "For some reason," Britton adds, "people don't like to see their money used for trucks and fuel, although both are essential to keeping refugees alive."

During the initial stages of the refugee emergency, which began to escalate last November, severe food shortages arose. According to some sources within

UNHCR, they were largely due to the lack of proper contingency planning on the part of UNHCR. Substantial amounts of supplies had to be airlifted directly to Kassala from Europe until the first shipments began to reach Port Sudan in January.

Since then, food distribution has improved steadily. It is now at roughly 9,000 tons a month. "When we first started," recalls Britton, "it was an absolute nightmare. We were totally dependent on the Sudanese government for fuel, which sometimes meant delays of up to three weeks. Last April, CARE and UNHCR signed an agreement with Shell Oil Company for 3,000 metric tons of fuel.

"We were feeling pretty relieved, but then I woke up one morning and realized that meant putting in a gas station," he laughs. CARE now operates four pumps for refugee supply trucks only, a move that promises to keep the food shipments rolling.

But critical obstacles remain. For one, the hiring of

trucks is a matter of tough competition. â\200\230â\200\234There is a limited supply and we are competing against other aid programs . . . or the cross-border feeding operations, as well as local commercial industries,â\200\235 Britton explains. â\200\234â\200\234All this has caused transport prices to more than double and has just made things a lot more difficult. On any given day we are all out there in the souk [market] looking for trucks to hire.â\200\235

Through the Shell agreement, however, CARE has obtained a certain degree of leverage.

â\200\234Now that we have our own fuel supplies, we can offer the added incentive of loading and fueling on the same day,â\200\235 says Mr. Guerrero, who runs CAREâ\200\231s small downtown transport office.frem which he dispatches between 50 to 90 trucks daily.

By late morning, when loading of the trucks has been completed, a bevy of noisy drivers can be found besieging Guerreroâ\200\231s office for their travel documents.

CARE is furnishing the camps with 10-day â\200\234packagesâ\200\231â\200\231 (cereals, pulse, ail, sugar, etc.) to ensure the daily minimum of 200 metric tons. â\200\230â\200\230On good ddys, we can load between 400 and 1,000 tons a day,â\200\235 says Britton as he charges around the port in a four-wheel-drive vehicle to inspect loading operations. Efforts are being made to

Continued on page 13

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

JUNE 25, 1985

Bridge to Chadisa food aid success story

By David K. Willis
Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

Nâ\200\231Djamena, Chad

The trucks, grinding toward us across semiarid desert in gray, eÃearly-morning light, loomed up like refugees from a junkyard: filthy, overloaded, held together with wire and hope.-

One by one they slithered and slid, their 14 wheels slamming into holes in the sandy track, loads swaying dangerously, drivers weary. â\200\231

They might not look itsutthesedmchs patiide e success stories of the African drought â\200\224 an impromptu Bu roic land bridge from Cameroon keeping almost half of Chadâ\200\231s population of 5 million people alive.

â\200\234They have averted mass starvation,â\200\235 says Jamie Wickens, head of the United Nations World Food Program in Nâ\200\231Djamena. Yet elsewhere across the Sahel â\200\224 the â\200\234edgeâ\200\235 of the Sahara, where 35 million people live in eight countries â\200\224 drought and famine still bite deep.

â\200\234For the Sahel the worst has yet to come,â\200\235 says a senior Western aid official in the hot, dusty city of Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso, to the west of here.

â\200\234The rain is supposed to start falling by the end of June. Planting begins but the harvest doesnâ\200\231t come until October. Between now and then there is no food except what the West provides in aid. It has to come from the nearest port, which can be two days away. So the Sahel crisis is not only still with us. It's worse.â\200\235â\200\231

Many experts believe that the 1968-73 drought in the Sahel never really ended. There were only a few years of decent rainfall in the mid 1970s.

In the best of times, only 11 percent of the entire Sahel can be farmed at all because of poor soils and low rainfall. Today only about one-fifth of this 11 percent is actually farmed. The rest is desert or the run of wandering herds. The Sahara is steadily spreading south as populations-of humans and livestock overuse

land which then reverts to dust and sand. B

The heart of the Sahel includes the countries of Mauritania, Senegal, Mali, Niger, Chad, and Burkina Faso (formerly Upper Volta). Also a part of the Sahel are the Cape Verde Islands and tiny Gambia.

In Burkina Faso crops failed so badly last year that some northerners began selling their precious bicycles for 30,000 Central African francs (about \$70) to buy food, then moved south. :

In Chad, which is twice the size of France, the crucial Logone River is close to drying up alt.,oggether. in Nâ\200\231Djamena. Recently the current of the C}}ar_l River simply stopped. Once 600 yards wide at N Djamena, the

Chari is now less than 100 yards wide. Eighty percent of
the once-huge Lake Chad has dried to hard, cracked
earth. : :

Enormous percentages of the populations spread out
over vast distances now have virtually no food other
than what arrives as aid:]

Getting food into landlocked countries such as Chad
and Burkina Faso is a logistical nightmare. It means rail
and road journeys of up to 1,000 miles in countries that
lack paved roads and where getting a spare wheel or car-

buretor can take six months.

In all of Chad there are only 48 miles of paved road.
The entire northern part of Burkina Faso depends on

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sand roads which turn to impassable mire when (and if) it
rains.

Lack of clear goals, political will, and. trained man-
power hamper aid efforts at every turn. o

In 1973, the eight Sahelian countries formed a joint
committee based in Ouagadougou. It is known by its
French initials CILSS.

According to officials interviewed in Ouagadougou,
recent studies have shown that 70 percent of the money
spent between 1978 and 1982 went toward famine relief
and salaries. Only 1.5 percent went to plant trees to stop
the encroachment of the desert. Only 4.5 percent was
spent on new ways to grow food.

However, in Chad and Cameroon the truck à\200\230land
bridgeà\200\235à\200\235 shows what can be done, officials say.

Such examples, they add, have so far been all too rare
in Africa.

The most logical, shortest, and most efficient route for
food aid to Chad is via the Nigerian ports of Apapa and
Lagos. But late last year the Nigerian government of
Maj.- Gen. Muhammad Buhari closed its borders to
Chad, thus cutting off the flow of aid.

It refused a direct personal appeal from President
Reagan to reopen its borders in October. At various
times it has cited port overcrowding, lack of money for
fuel and trucks, and priority for food aid for Niger, but
Western donors are still puzzled.

A quick new plan had to be devised as food aid for
Chad piled up. in ships, and starvation drew closer in
Chad itself, the most landlocked country in Africa.

â\200\234We turned to the Cameroon,â\200\235â\200\235 said Jamie Wickens in
Nâ\200\231Djamena â\200\234â\200\230and it has worked.â\200\235

â\200\234Yes, it's surprisingly effective,â\200\235 says another senior
aid official in Nâ\200\231Djamena. â\200\234All credit goes to the
Cameroon.â\200\235

For historical, political, and economic reasons there
had never been a bridge from the Cameroon . city of
Kousourri to N'Djamena across the Logone River. At the
urging of the UNâ\200\231s World Food Program (WFF) and the
United States, there are now two. The WFF, which
funded the building' of the bridges, functions largely
through voluntary contributions. ;

From the Chadian side, the first bridge looks like a

bank of earth as wide as a single truck, thrown across the
extremely low Logone waters. The whole thing moves
precariously up and down as each truck lumbers across
it. Soldiers with automatic rifles watch.

In April and May alone some 30,000 tons of tood
inched across this unlikely bridge. The grain comes into
the Cameroon port of Douala 1,000 miles to the south. It
travels at the rate of 1,200 tons per day by special trains
to the end of the line at Nâ\200\231GaoundÃ©rÃ© to be loaded into
trucks.

The World Food Program now has expediters, one
Swiss and one Portuguese, in Douala and Nâ\200\231GaoundÃ©rÃ©.
By the end of the year about 100,000 tons of grain should
have crossed the river in this way.

If rains come and the Logone rises and covers the
earthern bank, trucks will move to a much more perma-
nent and higher metal causeway now almost ready about
half a milÃ© a way.

. JUNE 26, 1985

Qaddafi pursues dual strategy in effort to expand Libya's influence in Chad

By David K. Willis

Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

A . Nâ\200\231Djamena, Chad

Here in a highly strategic country twice the area of France, Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi pursues a double strategy in his apparent effort to expand his government's influence.

Moving to try to contain him are France, the United States, the Chad government of President Hissein Habré, and such African states as Niger and Zaire.

Chad may be the world's poorest nation (according to the World Bank), thinly populated (less than 5 million people), more than half desert, and devastated by drought. But it is also Libya's southern neighbor and borders on traditionally pro-Western Sudan and Cameroon. Fierce civil war and French-Libyan confrontation have racked the country for two decades.

The first element of Colonel Qaddafi's dual strategy is unfolding in northern Chad, where, according to knowledgeable sources here, Libya is now hard-surfacing a long 10,000-foot runway at a new airfield.

This causes the Chadians anguish, says an inside source; because it confirms that Libya has engineered the de facto parti-

tion of Chad. Libya has been able to reach the south of Chad with long-range Soviet aircraft but the new airstrip gives shorter range planes the ability to fly farther south than ever before.â\200\235

The second element of the strategy is apparent in reports from

these same sources stating that Libya is dropping arms in southern Chad to commando units to encourage them in their rebellion against President Habré. French intelligence has confirmed two such arms drops recently; sources report.

There is some surprise here that Qaddafi has not launched a military offensive south of the two main northern cities he still holds (Faya-Largeau and Fada) since making and then breaking a troop withdrawal agreement with French President François Mitterrand in Cyprus last September. The French withdrew. The Libyans did not. :

Western sources agree, however, that Qaddafi retains the ability to launch an offensive when he chooses. â\200\234He has the initiative and he is impossible to predict,â\200\235â\200\235 one source says. 3

It may be partly wishful thinking, but there is some lingering hope here that Qaddafi may face opposition from his own armed forces to another campaign â\200\230of the 'kind that brought French

troops into Chad in 1983 in an operation codenamed â\200\234Manta.â\200\235 In August 1983 Libyan troops entered northern Chad in support of insurgents, prompting the Chadian government to ask for French support.

French policy, as summed up by one source close to French thinking here, is to keep troops and aircraft nearby but not in Chad itself. About 1,200 French troops are believed to be stationed at Bangui in the Central African Republic, south of here, and more in Libreville, Gabon.

President Mitterrand, facing French legislative elections next May which many analysts expect him to lose, is thought to want to avoid the embarrassment in Chad suffered last year when the Libyans failed to leave.

Yet if the Libyans do come south in a big way, the French will have to come in again for their own credibility in Africa as a whole, says an informed source.

But they won't come in without clear reasons, first because they don't want to be seen to be acting in a colonial way, and second because France views itself as a Medi-

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terranean power as well as an African one and does a lot of business with Libya, including arms sales.

The word here is that the French prefer to act not as gendarmes (who step in to prevent trouble) but as pompiers (firemen who respond to a blaze).

Meanwhile the French have just announced that \$500.000 has been given to Habré to pay allowances to commandos who support the government. The only

way the government can keep these very poor codos [commandos] is to pay them, says one source.

The French are also raising their budget support to Habré this year. ;

Habré himself has been touring those parts of Chad he controls. He is said to be planning a diplomatic offensive against Libya at the Organization of African Unity meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. He is seeking the support of Zaire and Niger, both of which have criticized Libya for alleged subversive activities in their own countries recently.

The Reagan administration supports the Habré government against Libya as a way of containing Libyan influence in general.

As of Oct. 1, 1984, Washington had provided \$52 million in economic aid. US military aid runs at about \$5 million a year. In 1983, as the Libyans sent troops into northern Chad, President Reagan authorized up to \$25 million to purchase military supplies.

The US makes it clear that France has the primary role in this part of Africa. If Libya does move south, US pressure on France to react as strongly as needed will be intense. The US itself is not about to send troops.

Habré seems to be gaining some ground now, says one Western source. The French seem more committed to him.

But, remarks another source here, don't forget that Habré's home town is Faya-Largeau in the north. The Libyans hold it. Don't forget that the core of Habré's

fighting Support is northern soldiers. For both reasons he feels he has to go back north . . . eventually.â\200\235

IN SUDAN: AID WORKERS
KEEP TRUCKIN' (Continued)

build up adequate stocks for the rainy season, which has already begun in many areas.

Many of CAREâ\200\231s activities in Port Sudan have been facilitated by the port authorities themselves. Customs officials are prepared to rush through relief imports simply based on UNHCR letters of guarantee.

Yet, with such a high proportion of aid supplies coming in, the port is losing substantial revenue by not levying import charges.

Ultimately, even if CARE succeeds in establishing the smoothly-run operation it is aiming for (something it has already achieved in the Somalia refugee program), Port Sudan is only one aspect of the problem. Ultimate success will depend on continued outside assistance and better logistics in the interior. :

SPIRIT OF COOPERATION (Continued)

citizens who have every right to be concerned about their

SUDAN RELIEF STYMIED (CONTINUED)

neighborhood and to raise those concerns both to their Board

of Zoning Adjustment and to their Department of State. I do not think local zoning laws are absurd, but rather believe

they are important.

Unfortunately, federal and local interests cannot always be resolved to everyone's satisfaction, but they can be approached and worked on cooperatively and with good faith. The Office of Foreign Missions has enjoyed the spirit of cooperation with which D.C. officials have approached all issues to date and will do all we can to maintain and strengthen that cooperative approach to these difficult issues. The Post's editorial, which suggests we don't care about local concerns, is wrong.

James E. Nolan Jr.

The writer is director of the State Department's Office of Foreign Missions.

THREATS ONLY THICKEN SOUTH AFRICA'S HIDE

Why do the South Africans plunge so blithely into contention when they are beset as never before by escalating insurrection, economic recession and mounting threats of international counter-action? As a senior State Department spokesman noted: "They seem to have decided they are going to get punished anyway, so they might as well get in as many acts as possible while they can."

Perhaps, but governments usually do not deliberately engage in lemming-like behavior. The Botswana action, according to Gen. Constand Viljoen, chief of the South African armed forces, had been carefully weighed against the expected international reaction. Foreign Minister Roelof F. (Pik) Botha, said later that South Africa had no alternative but to act against "terrorists" in

25s, armored cars, and artillery. Similarly, the State Department has had to raise its estimate of Cuban troops in organized units in Angola to 30,000, with 5,000 additional Cuban military technicians in reserve.. -

In the face of this deterioration in a situation that looked quite hopeful a few months ago, the able and indefatigable architect of the Reagan administration's African strategy, Assistant Secretary of State Chester-Crocker, is trying to pick up the pieces and put them back together again. A hurried trip to Europe to

assure the "contact group" of Britain, France, West Germany, and Canada was reasonably successful, but confidential conversations with Jonas Savimbi, the leader of the UNITA guerrillas in Angola, went less well.

« Based on a serious misunderstanding of a previous exchange of views, Mr. Savimbi was under the impression that the U.S. government was ready to agree to a withdrawal schedule with the MPLA regime that would have removed 24,000 Cuban troops in two years and left a permanent residual force of 6,000 to defend Luanda. After Mr. Savimbi had been reassured that the United States would press for a much tighter

module, the UN refugee agency asked a basic question: whether:

solving the problem.

Or, as a veteran disaster specialist remarked, "when you see C130s or any other transport plane flying supplies you know someone has goofed badly."

It's going to be hard to explain why flying food is needed, an American relief worker said, "but it's going to be even harder explaining why people are going to die when food is piling up in Port Sudan

and Kost. "

neighboring countries.

For Pretoria it is a matter of priorities, and right now international pressure is secondary to the government's belief that it must show strength in the face of adversity. Besides, limited sanctions already exist: an arms embargo, for example. This actually stimulated South Africa's own armaments industry to the extent that it now exports to other countries.

As South Africa's pro-Botha newspaper, Beeld, commented last week, "Well, now they know, as if they needed proof: South Africa will not allow itself to be intimidated not by the Security Council, nor by the world's outrage over the Cabinda incident, nor by threatened sanctions from the

ANGOLA (CONTINUED)

the American negotiating strategy had not been overtaken by events.:
_ As Jeremias Chitunda, Mr. Savimbi's foreign policy adviser, is now explaining to legislators and Reagan officials in Washington, the UNITA

leadership believes the American negotiating objectives can no longer be achieved in the sequence originally proposed. y
Back in 1981, when UNITA controlled only a small corner of southeast Angola, it was possible to expect that the MPLA forces could request the departure of Cuban troops. since MPLA forces could ON(ro) Mese ofgne country without themr

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NEW YORK TIMES, JUNE 27, 1985

Somalia Reports Cholera Is Spreading in Camps

MOGADISHU, Somalia, June 24
(AP) A Health Ministry official has reported a new outbreak of cholera among famine refugees in northwestern Somalia and said it was spreading to refugee camps in the central and southwestern districts.

The official, Ahmed Sharif Abbas, the ministry's director general for preventive medicine, said Tuesday that the new outbreak was reported at Ganed in the northwest region, but was under control. The severe intestinal disease spread from there to the nearby towns of Hargeisa and Borama, he said.

(Continued)

US.A. y

It might not seem a sensible reaction in Western eyes, but it is certainly not new to Southern Africa observers. Botha and his colleagues have been ostracized by the world for so long, do they really care if the going gets a little rougher?

Some economic experts predict that there are enough commercial interests waiting in the wings to fill the vacuum left by American divestiture.

What's more, agreeing to sanctions is one thing, making them stick is another matter.

Peter Honey is a reporter for the Star newspapers in Johannesburg.

ZIMBABWE CAN'T BE GENEROUS WITH SURPLUS GRAIN

llg to store and market the grain.

Even when 14 more sil
completed later this year in mgsne%.rex';

by town of Norton, adding 58,000
tons of capacity, the government will
still have to stack up to 3,600 tons in
200-pound burlap bags, outdoors,
under weather-resistant tarpaulins.

The most recent harvest was the
best in three years.

The challenge of managing a
developing nation's economy that de-
pends heavily on agricultural exports
poses both opportunity and danger
for Prime Minister Robert G. Mugabe.

'MISSISSIPPI AND SOUTH AFRICA

ARE DIFFERENT (CONTINUED)

wise they wouldn't be working for those racists in
the first place.

I tried again to explain it, but he still didn't quite
understand. "

Here's where I get hung up, he said at last. I had
this uncle in Mississippi who was in such bad shape
that he finally decided to become a sharecropper on
this white man's plantation. Conditions were terrible.
The roof leaked; he had to haul his water from a well;
the children had to work for the man when they should
have been in school, and he cheated my uncle every
chance he got. I told my uncle that he should leave that
place, but he told me that at least his kids were eating

keep thinking what my uncle would have said i

folks like you had organized a big cotton boycott. It
probably would have bankrupted the white man wh
ran that plantation, and I'm here to tell you that he
would have deserved it. It would've done my heart
good to see that old rascal lose his farm and have to
go on welfare.

But my question is, what good would that have *
done for my uncle?

Don't get me wrong. I wouldn't have investea a
dime to keep that crook in business. But it looks to
me like the thing to do would be to find some way to,
help my uncle: maybe find him a job or help him buy_
a little piece of land for himself. What I want to know
is, how would hurting that white man have helped
my uncle? A

For your information, I said, Mississippi and
South Africa are different.

I tipped him a dime and got out of his cab.

(Continued)

The opportunity: Zimbabwe can hasten its economic development if it can transform its successful agricultural sector into a foreign-capital generator, say agricultural officials.

Minister of Agriculture Denis Norman told a meeting of World Bank delegates last month that 52 percent of his nation's annual foreign currency earnings come from agricultural exports, usually with aid groups, such as the World Bank, serving as food brokers for the impoverished Third World.

The danger: Zimbabwe's government risks alienating some of its socialist supporters if Mr. Mugabe continues to pursue this obviously capitalistic route, say some political observers. Already, he is perceived as not going fast enough toward transforming the nation into a more socialized economy.

Other observers discount such a threat to the ruling party. Mr. Mugabe enjoys wide popularity among both blacks and whites, and he is expected to win reelection easily in July. A major reason for his popularity has been his ability to stimulate Zimbabwe's healthy farming sector.

This country is a success story in terms of agriculture, said E. Gibson Lanpher, deputy chief of the U.S. Embassy.

When Mr. Mugabe came to power in 1980, he set out to aid the black peasant farmers whose votes had helped to put him in office. He promised to make farmland available and to provide government education and loans so that the formerly landless might become self-sufficient.

White farmers were frightened. They felt their way of life would be menaced by Mr. Mugabe's policy. Many of them fled the country.

Although the government purchased some of their farms, Mr. Mugabe has proceeded very slowly

too slowly, his more radical critics say at providing land to all of the waiting black farmers.

Yet black farmers, who now are making an independent living off their new property, are happy and productive beyond previous expectations.

For the 1985 harvest season,

black farmers in resettled white areas or on traditional communal farms are expected to account for more than half of about 1.7 million tons of the corn harvest.

The farming is much better here, said K. Chimbawanda, who was resettled three years ago from an unfertile tribal trust land to a white farmer's abandoned tobacco farm.

He said he expected to harvest a record crop of corn and earn enough to repay the 81,500 he borrowed from the government two planting seasons ago to purchase an ox cart, fertilizer, seeds and a mechanical pesticide sprayer.

Despite the growing prosperity of black farmers, Zimbabwe's agricultural engine continues to be driven by the large-scale, commercial farmers. They are the ones who generate the greater portion of the exportable cash crops, such as tobacco and coffee.

Commercial farmers are the most favored group in this nation, black or white, Mr. Lanpher said.

Zimbabwe's commercial farmers are still the white, wealthy landowners. Contrary to the commercial farmers' nightmares as they awaited transition, Mr. Mugabe didn't kill, imprison or drive away the white farmers who once paid slave wages to their black workers.

As a result, many of the old Rhodesians who didn't flee their farms now praise Mr. Mugabe for his ability to heal the wrongs of the past without crippling the nation's future.

PRIVATELY FIGHTING APARTHEID (Continued)

During the 30 years I have regularly-visited South Africa, I have become familiar with or been personally involved in efforts by American organizations and foundations, church

X ; corporations, voluntary and to bring change to the country and to improve the lot of those victimized by systematic oppression. The efforts include educational assistance, legal aid, medical care, development of black leadership skills and public exposure of the appalling human consequences of apartheid.

Private constructive engagement generally takes place inside South Africa; but there are things that be

done in the United States as well. For example, organizations have been set up in this country to raise money to support black students at several universities in South Africa. One such organization is the University of Cape Town Fund, in New York City.

The 'University of Cape Town is cial activities. Many are housed in will not bring down South Africaâ\200\231s

South Africaâ\200\231s cldest and one of its most prestigious universities. A high-quality, autonomous institution with a world famous medical school, it has always been vpen to students of all races. In fact, the university fought a hard battle, over three decades, against enormous Government opposition, to retain its status as an open university.

Today, about 15 percent of the universityâ\200\231s tctal enrollment of 12,000 students are members of the three groups classified as â\200\230â\200\234non-whiteâ\200\235 in South Africa. This figure puts to shame most four-year colleges and universities in the United States â\200\224al-though blacks in South Africa, to be sure, constitute a much larger proportion of the population there than do blacks here. These students enjoy precisely tlie same rights and privileges at the university as white students, including full participation in =ll its academic, recreational and so-

campus dormitories, though this is contrary to provisions of the Group Areas Act.

By United States standards, the cost of attending a South African university is modest â\200\224 about \$3,000 for tuition, room and board. The problem is that many black students come from such severely impoverished â\200\230backgrounds they cannot even think of attending a university without generous financial aid. Nor is the university by itself able to meet the demands piaced upon it by the rapidly growing enrollment of black students.

I have little time for those who say |that we should ostracize South Africa and all its works. That strikes me as ot only sanctimoniots but downright irresponsible when I know from personal experience that many brave tsxwthâ\200\231 Africans wart and need our

elp.

Private constructive engagement

apartheid Government â\200\224 any more than will disinvestment. That will depend on people.inside the country. Helping individual blacks develop their talents and acquire leadership skills is, however, something positive and useful we Americans can actually do

If, in the. future, when apartheid has been eradicated, there ig tobe a decent standard of living for every South African and a stable government that can insure equal rights for all, well-educated blacks will be desperately needed. A student we help today may one day be the nationâ\200\231s president. To have enabled that student to obtain a high quality university education now would be a real a(:'higrvement. o v

Alan_Pifer is president emeritus and sesfler consultant of Carnegie Corporation of New York, a philanthropic - foundation.

JUNE 22, 1985

Putting America on its mettle

South Africa, Zaire and Russia produce large amounts of four of the world's most important metals—chromium, cobalt, manganese and platinum (see chart). That such troubled or unfriendly nations should do so worries the United States. Since 1939, the federal government has hoarded enough of these metals to keep American industry running for three years. But its stockpile is supposed to be a last resort in the event of war. What if the challenge to America was economic rather than military?

True, America weathered Russia's embargo of chromium and manganese in 1949 and a temporary cut-off of Rhodesian chromium after 1966 as a result of the anti-Ian Smith trade sanctions (chromium was later exempted from the sanctions by congress). A cobalt shortage in 1978-79 was short-lived: Zaire and Zambia increased their output by 43% within a year, and users quickly adopted recycling techniques.

None the less, the United States is worried. It mines virtually no chromium, cobalt, manganese or any of the platinum group metals (which include palladium and rhodium). In 1982, it imported 227,000 tons of chromium, about half of it from South Africa. In the same year Zaire produced 45% of the world's cobalt, Russia mined 41% of total manganese production and South Africa and Russia 94% of the platinum.

All four are indispensable. Chromium and manganese make steel harder and stronger. Without them, factories would be hard put to make bearings, tools, car engines or turbine blades for aircraft. Cobalt is a vital ingredient of many

World mine production, 1981
Cobalt

superalloys and (like platinum metals) of the catalysts used to refine petrol and manufacture chemicals. Platinum metals are also put to work in the catalytic converters of car engines and as contacts in telephone switching systems.

Congress occasionally ponders a sec-

ond stockpile of essential metals for economic emergencies. But hoarding could cause the shortages it is supposed to insure against. Congress's Office of

Technology Assessment (OTA) prefers a different approach[®]. First, diversify supply by mining new deposits. Second, cut demand for essential metals by using them more efficiently and recycling scrap and waste. Third, invent man-made materials to take their place. A simple-sounding plan, but how realistic?

@ Diversifying supply is easier said than done. Untapped sources of some metals do not exist. Where they do, there is often little incentive to mine them.

Chromium falls in the first category. America's small deposits in Montana, California and Oregon are of poor quality; better ones will not emerge unless geologists become cleverer or luckier. Even if such small producers as Albania, Turkey and the Philippines (together accounting for 16% of total production) boosted their output, the impact on world supplies would be small. And technologically neat alternatives^{eg}, squeezing chromium ore out of beach sands^I look horribly uneconomic.

America has big cobalt deposits in Idaho, Missouri, Minnesota and California. The catch is that cobalt is usually mined as a by-product of nickel or cop-

Chromium

Manganese

per. The OTA reckons that price increases of about 50% for nickel and copper and 100% for cobalt would be needed to tempt companies to mine America's own deposits. America has virtually no manganese but could produce small amounts of platinum.

@ Recycling techniques are improving fast. Scrap provides a quarter of the chromium used to make stainless and heat-resisting steel in America. In principle, chromium and platinum-group metals could be plundered from the catalytic converters of dumped cars, and cobalt from the scrap left over from the machining of jet-engine components. In practice, the cost is high and the prices commanded by some salvaged metals is low. Better to use the metals more efficiently in the first place^{eg}, by using more techniques such as the argon-oxygen-decarburization process, which greatly reduces the chromium content of stainless steel.

@ New materials can replace those at risk for some applications. Plastic is replacing decorative chrome in motor cars. But in many industries the cost of raw materials is not important enough to alter production habits. Raw materials account for about 1% of the cost of a jet

engine. Even platinum group metals,
which can cost \$400 an ounce, make up
less than 5% of the cost of the products
for which they are used as catalysts.

* â\200\234Strategic Materials: Technologies to
Reduce US Import Vulnerability.â\200\235 Office
of Technology Assessment, US Congress.

Platinum group metals

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Source: Office of Technology Assessment, US Congress

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