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Speech held by Dr. Volkmar Köhler (M.P. CDU and now State Secretary in the BMZ - Ministry for economic cooperation and development) on the 6. of Sept 1982 at the South African Institut<sup>e</sup> of International Affairs at the institute's international seminar - at which Henry Kissinger and F. Togo (Japan) also spoke on the theme of South Africa.

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The following is also the opinion of my political friends, not just my opinion.

...

The problem of needed change of obsolete structures in societies is not restricted to Africa; we are too confronted with this problem - the total worldwide political system seems to be swaying between the poles of "orderly structure" and "change".

...

One of the factors for this is the fact that only 30 to 40 countries played an important role at the time of the development of the present world order - now about 150 independent countries are part of the Community of Peoples.

...

All these countries which entered the world political scene since the middle of the 50's want a proper place in it. They sometimes very often have an abnormal need for attention, due to the fact of their newly achieved status. ... They are often unstable domestically ... These factors ~~xxxx~~ all taken into account are responsible for the insecurity and disintegration of the world political system which had existed up to now. ... ~~This~~ The problems resulting from this are intensified by the grown self-confidence of the developing countries, which is connected to the year of the first oil-crisis, 1973.

More and more of the developing countries are finding their way to an integration into the world political system. They must be helped therefore by the industrialized countries in this task.

...

Since the developing countries are not a uniform group, we are of the opinion that in the future the need for "interregional dialogs" will grow, as opposed to "global dialogs", which will enable us to react to special/specific situations more adequately.

...



A policy of adaptation to changed opinions and new economic and changed situations in societies is needed to secure progress in the future. We must support the change but at the same time make sure that <sup>it</sup> doesn't freeze in stipulated ordering and structuring systems.

...

The SPD/FDP government has up to now held the construction of reformed global orders to be the prerequisite for the solution of the most important problems.

...

The German government handled the second Lomé Treaty as a question of first of all economic systems to be judged on the basis of systems of political structures. ... The result was that financial aid and support were the over-riding factors in the Treaty. Despite all demands on the part of the European Parliament to more strongly develop the Treaty along lines designed to determine ~~the~~ the economic and general development of the societies and support the change, these factors were not sufficiently considered. ~~That~~ That is also true regarding the Treaty's character as a possible basis for common political behavior governing the relations between the 56 countries of the third world and Europe. When the Treaty is re-negotiated, we shall push more resolutely towards these aims.

The main accents of the German bi-lateral relations were in, for example Morocco, Egypt, Sudan, the Sahel-Zone, Nigeria, Kenya, the Horn of Africa and also in Tanzania. ...

I would have had some additional wishes regarding the geo-strategic interests, for ex. Mauritius and Madagascar. But regarding these two countries there arise some questions directed at the policies of South Africa. Regarding the support of the SADC and the scholarships for students from Zimbabwe, the German government has followed a risky policy, but one which in our opinion was at least partly justified.

...

Special problems exist regarding our relations to the South African Republic and South West Africa/Namibia.

The issue is here as follows: How to retain the existing freedom, ~~and~~ achieve new freedoms, and attain peaceful, secure existence



for the people of different races and with different colours of skin. European companies have contributed substantially to this aim through their model behavior in all of Africa. ...

Africa Policy must not be seen as a function of domestic policy of european and north american countries.

The rejection of violence is a basic principle of our foreign policy. ... Those who come into power through violence and terror will use violence and terror to stay in power. Therefore the necessary changes in southern africa must be brought about peacefully. This is directed foremostly at those countries neighboring the above-mentioned countries. The Federal Republic of Germany must not under any circumstances, either directly or indirectly support violent actions or the threat of violence. We reject breaking off or reducing our relations to any of the countries in southern africa. That would only lead ~~xx~~ to a loss of any possible influence of german policy in the area.

...

The foreign policy of the FRG must ~~theref~~ be directed at creating the prerequisites for a true self-determination of all peoples ~~living there~~ and groups in the society there and at supporting the peaceful existance of all races, peoples and tribes that have been living there for centuries.



... In those speeches there was unfortunately not to find any real wrestle nor any search for answers to highly complex problems. ... The FRG is obliged to stand up for the realization of human rights. The rights and liberties of each individual as laid down in the Declaration of Human Rights and in the treaties of Human Rights of the United Nations as well as in our Constitutional Law are indivisible. All people have the same right to protection from state despotism, to social justice and participation in the processes of political decision-taking. Racial, religious, political or social discrimination because of colour, religion or type of state constitute violations of human rights. And just as emphatically as we wish Apartheid to be abolished in Southern Africa we oppose a policy which demands the realization of human rights in certain countries only while accepting its perpetual violation in others.

South Africa is thus also an issue of our policy. Since the middle of the seventies we find an increased concern for that in our country. From 1976-1980 the policy of the German Gov't towards South Africa was predominantly under the influence of the Carter-Administration. As we all know this gov't was shaped by the ideas of Andrew Young, the UN-ambassador who was unexperienced in matters related to foreign affairs. He was interested in transferring the 'American Model' to South Africa. He was not aware that the system of the USA could not be transferred to a completely different country. Unfortunately the Federal Gov't and Secretary of State Genscher have taken over these ideas of the USA without the required reservations. Genscher and decisive representatives of the US-Gov't (.....), but not David Owen, for example, demanded the principle of 'one man-one vote' for S.A. There were, however, more thoughtful voices, too, such as the interview of Egon Bahr (July 1977) and the electoral platform of the F.D.P. in Oct. 1980. Much to my surprise, however, such differentiated statements never found their way into speeches held at UN-plenary sessions. ...

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I have already made you understand clearly that we in the CDU/CSU regard the abolishment of the "Apartheid" as necessary and face the Homeland-policy critically. Possible criticism on other things in the world does not change anything on that, not even possible self-criticism. But we have the words in our ears that are described to Dr. Kissinger. It is reported that he, after his first meeting with the South-African Prime Minister of that time, B.J. Vorster, expressed that with Vorster he had met a figure of the Old Testament within the 20th century. What does this mean? At least one thing: the one who wants freedom and self-determination for the Blacks in South-Africa must not only take into account the white Africans' resoluteness and military and social power, no matter if they are English-speaking or Afrikaans-speaking. Over and above it he must guarantee to that White-African nation the only thing which they do not have: security for their children and children's children. The freedom of Black South-Africa supposes that a way will be found to guarantee the right of existence to the White-African nation as well as to the Coloured and Indian South-Africans. The one who does not see this point - and we reproach the German Government and the former US-administration with that - does not attain more than to face<sup>S.A.</sup> to an abyss of terrible violence.

With special interest we read Mr Crocker's arguments in the "Foreign Affairs" at the turn of the years 1979 /80. Indeed it is our western task to encourage the South-African conflicting parties to come together at the conference table in order to decide on the political and economic future of their country.

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From the principles, I have already outlined, my friends and I derive the following consequences towards the Republic of South Africa and Southwest-Africa/Namibia in the course of which we take into account the different historical, cultural and political conditions:

We advocate that elected members of all forces willing to peace in the RSA and in SWA/Namibia make common effort to find a constitutional and federative form of living together. It is to guarantee that all citizens will have their rights and all groups of population will be enabled to participate emancipated in the process of political decision and at the same time it is to guarantee this participation on the long run. The principle of "one man-one vote" must not become the basis for the suppression of other races and other groups of population and for totalitarian conditions of power. The point in question is to work towards the realization of peaceful compromises between majorities and minorities. Moderate political forces deserve particular support. This is also to Black people's interest.

The unilateral decree of models of constitution does not help to further the aims of the forces that are willing to peace.

We press the governments of the neighbouring countries of southern Africa to assist in the solution of the current conflicts only by peaceful means. They should also strengthen their influence in order to exclude the abuse of their territories for warlike enterprises.

We press our government to use (together with its allies) the political, diplomatic and economic means, that the Western countries dispose of, constructively in order to support all attempts to attain a peaceful change in Southern Africa and in order to counteract a violent policy of pretended liberation.



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The prior intent of that has to be the stimulation of the social, economic and cultural advancement of the Non-Whites, especially of the Black Africans.

On condition of a satisfactory reform the FRG should use its influence within the European Community to allow substantial trade-facilities to the countries of southern Africa; the more for those countries are an important trade-partner for many other african states, that have already now far-reaching economic relations to them.

We regard the economic co-operation between Europe and the states in southern Africa as dictates of practical reason. Thus a peaceful development is promoted. Enterprises and Trade Unions, industry, trade and business in Europe and in southern Africa can (especially in economically disadvantaged areas) help to create new places of work, to improve infrastructure and to decrease social injustice by partner-like cooperation.

Measures of boycott above all affect the weaker social classes. They prevent progress and aggravate tension and conflicts; therefore they are to reject.

We attach great importance to the peace-making work of the churches in southern Africa and to their sacrificial service to mankind that is often rendered under difficult circumstances.

By the message they preach and practise the churches can and must help to overcome hate and destruction and to strengthen peace, hope and the dignity of man. Unilateral partisanship by which the churches get in touch with violence endangers the mission of the church which is to reconcile all men.



We stand up for an intensification of the human and cultural relations to all the peoples in Africa. Thus we can counteract an economic, cultural or even moral isolation that would only end in people's alienation from those political principles that are indispensable for a peaceful living-together in freedom and social justice.

We support all forces who endeavour by peaceful means to abolish the dangerous discriminations between human beings of a different colour, because they are incompatible with the dignity of man. That means especially to cancel the existing inequalities in the system of education and in work-life. We are fully aware of the fact that members of different races and populations belong to different cultures and that they, with their own way of thinking and acting, do not always live in the same system of values. We also recognize the difficulties that are opposed to our suggestions. Therefore we are willing to help if this is desirable for constructive reforms.

With regard to Southwest-Africa/Namibia there result the following thoughts: In this question the German policy is embedded in the policy of the "Group of the Five". In times of President Carter there was made many a mistake not only by the USA but also by the FRG.

Among those mistakes we include the closure of the German consulate in Windhuk that was ordered by the German government. Obvious to the eyes of the world the German Government submitted to the demands of the militant, communistic-controlled SWAPO and to the pressure of those forces in Africa sympathizing with the SWAPO. By the same step the German Government affected the southwest-african people's effort for years to a peaceful way to independence.



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But the basic idea of the initiative of the Five was right: the possibility of free elections and of the following release of Namibia into independence. We accept the UN-resolution 435, even although it only opens formal ways to the independence of Namibia. But we also understood the South-African doubt against the resolution of the Security-Council concerning Walvis-Bay and in the question of SWAPO bases in Namibia.

The result was like that. In the middle of the year 1979 the SWA/Namibia initiative of the five was practically dead. Therefore we warmly welcome the role of Mr Chester Crocker who has been holding office since January 1980 and who is an old friend of the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation. It is due to his knowledge that the SWA/Namibia initiative was put into new life and perhaps may become successful. In this connexion we support american endeavours to induce the Cubans to withdraw from Angola. Perhaps it is to advise to replace the cuban troops by an OAU-army in order to prevent Angola from lapsing into chaos after the Cubans' withdrawal.

We see the german responsibility towards an independant Namibia. How can incentives be found to make at least the Namibians of german extraction stay in their country. For otherwise not only economy will be damaged soon.

Our consequences are: peace, independance and human rights can even for Namibia only be realized in a democratic and social state with the rule of law. The government of this state must be chosen by free and independant elections and may not be founded on terror and intimidation against the people.

The pre-condition for democratic elections in Namibia are, that.....



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- all political forces will have the same chances and possibilities during the preparation and the performance of the election.
  - no group may demand to have the sole power of representation. The conceding of having sole power of representation to the SWAPO by the UN-majority is incompatible with liberal, democratic and rule-of-law principles,
  - the use and threat of violence before, during and after the poll are renounced in order to correspond to the principles of renunciation of violence and to the guarantee of human rights,
  - the "DTA", which represents the ethnical variety of all Namibian ethnic groups and which aims to a peaceful way to independence will remain included into international negotiations,
  - enough appointed time will be guaranteed for the preparation of the election. The sense of the international participation must be the completely free and independent performance of the poll.
  - the return to their native country must be made possible for all Namibians who were arrested and displaced in african states. Until the independence of Namibia the RSA must concede freedom of action to the representatives of Namibia who were elected in former polls according to their democratic commission.
- In the interest of an economically secure future for the people of Namibia the FRG already now ought to provide effective aid by promoting private investments and other effective measures.



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To the FRG a free Namibia is a welcomed partner for close political, economic and cultural interrelations. We advocate the initiation of political, economic and cultural cooperation with the FRG as well as negotiations about the association of Namibia with the European Community immediately after its independence.

By the foundation of an independent and democratic Namibia an important contribution to peace on the African continent, which is shaken that often by bloody conflicts and civil wars, will be made.

You have noticed that I have demanded again and again the political dialogue in order to shape the field of tension between order and change. That is exactly why I am thankful for the dialogue of this conference and thus thankful to our host who made this meeting possible. You gave me the chance to explain the thoughts of my political friends. But to me it is just the same important to hear and to weigh your arguments and perspectives. I am gratified to detect that the ~~dialogue~~ exchange of thoughts between politicians, social groups and scientists from the FRG and from the RSA takes place in remarkable width and depth. Especially among the scientists of our country there are highly qualified persons like Th. Hanf, H. Weiland, J. Bleck, R. von Lucius, Kl. von der Ropp, who have already for two decades been searching for political solutions and compromise-settlements. During that time they have held close contact to Black, Brown and White South Africans. Abroad their knowledge is more and more asked, as their international publications show. The importance of Th. Hanf needs no comment. His voice is also looked for in South Africa by those who search for a peaceful arrangement.

Just the same South-African scientists are continuously in conversation with all political and social groups in the FRG. They carry the Western-German discussion about compromises back to South-Africa. We will ....



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(We will)...advance this dialogue, and we see with great interest that influential african newspapers (Rapport, Beeld, Die Vaderland, Die Transvaler, Woord en Daad) hold a brief for the dialogue even between the Black-nationalist movement and the Southafrican Government. In this dialogue the german Southafricanists' knowledge can drop in <sup>perhaps</sup> ~~even~~ stimulated by future German Governments.

The vivid contact we have to Gatsa Buthelezi's INKARTHA-Movement is just on the same level. We regard Buthelezi's work with admiration and we are impressed by his political proposals. Our attitude is reflected in the engagement of the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation in Durban and Kwazulu. For us South-Africa is just not a theoretical problem but long ago a concrete challenge. ~~Many~~ Many people in our country see this problem like that; and this is really right, if we only interpret our role honestly and modestly enough. It is good to know that you understand.



radicalization of the ANC! However difficult these questions may be, the door does seem open to experiment, to class struggle—premissed on some greater awareness of the possibilities inherent in a positive simultaneity of popular-democratic and proletarian-cum-socialist assertions.

## The Freedom Charter

Positive simultaneity, creative tensions—certainly very little about the Southern African revolution is locked firmly into place. What, then, of the Freedom Charter—now more than ever the centrepiece of the ANC's presentation of itself—from which a number of recent writers have sought to divine programmatic indicators about the shape of post-apartheid South Africa?<sup>25</sup> The present article will not seek to add to that debate, much of which has been quite useful, but will conclude by suggesting the need to contextualize the Freedom Charter, too, in what has gone before.

The Freedom Charter is, first and foremost, a 'popular-democratic' document. It can be interpreted in an eminently petty-bourgeois and reformist manner (and, indeed, has been, even by Nelson Mandela, albeit many years ago). Yet it also contains the seeds of a more radical possibility—in terms of land reform, in terms of popular ownership of the mines, banks and 'monopoly industry'. But, workers' control? Cooperativization? The nature of planning? The extent of any short-term tactical compromise with capital? On such crucial points the Freedom Charter is, in the main, merely 'not inconsistent with an advance towards socialism', in Slovo's phrase. As Slovo himself has recently stated (August 1986), 'in practice, the question as to which road South Africa will begin to take on the morning after the liberation flag is raised over the Union Buildings will be decided by the actual correlation of class forces which have come to power.'<sup>26</sup> The 'actual correlation of class forces', but also the ways in which those who come to power move to deal with the concrete policy questions which confront them. For 'the morning after' will witness an unleashing of (legitimate) rising expectations on the part of the underclasses who for so long have borne the burden of the exactions of racial capitalism. It may well be, given the complexities of the situation, that Slovo's hunch as to the need for a tempered pace of change in the immediate post-apartheid period, is a good one: 'For some while after apartheid falls there will undoubtedly be a mixed economy, implying a role for levels of non-monopoly private enterprise represented not only by the small racially oppressed black business sector but also by managers and business people of goodwill who have or are prepared to shed racism.'<sup>27</sup> But to keep the long-term goal of socialist transformation alive, while trying both to propitiate capital *and* to outflank it on its own ground, is no easy task.

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<sup>25</sup> See the wide range of contributions over the past year in various issues of such progressive South African publications as *South Africa Labour Bulletin*, *Work in Progress* (Braamfontein) and *Transformation* (Durban).

<sup>26</sup> Joe Slovo, 'Communist Blueprint for South Africa', *Guardian Weekly*, 17 August 1986, p. 9.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.



As the case of neighbouring Zimbabwe makes clear,<sup>28</sup> workers would be unwise to cede exclusive power over such delicate calculations to an unchecked political leadership. It is only too easy to be seduced, over time, into accepting the logic of capital as one's own—particularly in a South Africa whose economy is now so deeply integrated into the circuits of global capitalism.<sup>29</sup> Even with the best intentions, a leadership can prove unduly self-confident about the probity and the primacy of its own tactical calculations during the transition period, moving, in consequence, to choke off critical voices and to permit a collapse into authoritarianism. If nothing else, the experience of 'actually existing socialisms' in this century should have demonstrated how important it is that competing claims be openly reconciled and that there be the widest possible range of forums for ventilating the most embarrassing questions about the precise pace and substance of socialist advance.

Perhaps it is here, in particular, that the weight of the organized working class (but also of organized women and other forces organized for progressive change) can help to draw out the best instincts of the Congress Alliance, diverting it from the twin authoritarian precedents, so ready to hand, of institutionalized petty-bourgeois nationalism elsewhere in Africa and institutionalized 'Marxism-Leninism' elsewhere in the 'socialist bloc'. Hence the possibly broad significance of a resolution passed in July 1986 at the congress of the important COSATU affiliate, the Metal and Allied Workers Union. Noting that 'true socialism' is 'fully democratic', the resolution goes on to state that 'the working class must have open and free debate on all issues, all ideas and all policies . . . . We must build a tradition of democracy and free debate for the future. Sectarianism can suppress free debate and can be a stumbling block in our efforts to build a democratic socialism.'<sup>30</sup>

Given the cruel exigencies of the present moment in South Africa, it is not surprising that sustained thinking about many of the concrete issues—economic, social and political—relevant to the next round in South Africa is not very far advanced, either within the ANC or in other sections of the resistance movement broadly defined. How much energy can actually be spared from the even more immediate and pressing task of 'smashing the apartheid state'? Yet a great deal of work must be done to think through the requirements in all the diverse spheres where specific decisions will be necessary. In the light of capital's own preparations for the next round, the more rapidly this task is advanced the better. As this is done, both now and in the future, all of the elements, ambiguities and tensions that we have identified will re-enter the picture, in ways that are not readily predictable. But the role of the

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<sup>28</sup> For a discussion of the dilemmas posed in Zimbabwe after liberation, some of which have implications for the situation in South Africa, see my 'Zimbabwe: The Next Round', *The Socialist Register* 1980, London 1980.

<sup>29</sup> Papers like those by Rob Davies ('Nationalization, Socialization and the Freedom Charter') and Vishnu Padayachee ('The Politics of International Economic Relations: South Africa and the International Monetary Fund—1975 and Beyond') presented at the University of York Conference on 'The Southern African Economy after Apartheid', September-October 1986, do begin to fill in our picture of the treacherous economic terrain, domestic and international, upon which any post-apartheid socialist project will have to be mounted.

<sup>30</sup> Quoted in 'MAWU's First National Congress', *South African Labour Bulletin*, 11, 7 (August 1986).