

# South African Update

REPORTS AND COMMENTARY ON SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICS

ISSN 1015-5147

THE INKATHA INSTITUTE FOR SOUTH AFRICA

## All sides happy with first round talks - will give-and-take resolve next round?

A year ago, perception of the likelihood of peacefully negotiating a new democratic constitution, if not dismissed out of hand, was seen to face at least **three hurdles**.

**First** was simply getting the various parties to agree to negotiate at all. **Second** was agreement on the negotiating process to be followed. **Third** was agreement on the formulation of the constitution itself.

The 3-5 May talks were a success. The preamble to the talks stated: "The Government and the ANC agree on a **common commitment** towards the resolution of the existing climate of violence and intimidation from **whatever quarter** as well as a commitment to stability and to a **peaceful process of negotiations**." This addressing of the government's and ANC's difficulties led to Mandela's stating afterwards that SA "is the victor".

But despite the euphoria, it is clear that the talks were centred around only the first, and in many ways, the least difficult hurdle. That they were highly significant is not to be doubted, particularly in the light of the agreement reached by both parties to resolve the remaining obstacles.

Assuming that these obstacles are cleared, the next issue to be addressed - and on which there is no agreement - is the negotiating process to be followed. The ANC has formulated its position very clearly in the **Harare Declaration**. However, though the ANC is mobilising strongly around the creation of a **constituent assembly**, this demand is not enshrined within the Harare Declaration itself. This document calls for "the parties" to "negotiate the necessary mechanism for drawing up the new constitution", and their agreement on the "formation of an interim government" to supervise this. At the very least this

implies that the process adopted should be one that finds favour with all parties, and in so far as it is to be negotiated rather than imposed, implies compromise on the means.

So far, there has been little official indication that either side intends backing down on positions already adopted. **Inkatha** has indicated that it sees the ANC's position as being flawed in so far as it puts the government in an impossible position - Inkatha believes it would result in the white right-wing gaining ground at De Klerk's expense (even ousting him as the leader of the whites); that there could be a violent right-wing backlash; and that the government will not be coerced into handing over power to an interim government. (Indeed, the UN implicitly rejected this ANC demand in its December 1989 qualified recognition of the Harare Declaration). Is it possible that Mandela's "win-win" sentiments over the first round talks can be duplicated here? There will undoubtedly be compromise - despite official hardline positions taken, there have been hints from both sides of a willingness to meet halfway.

Ironically, the third hurdle is potentially the most intractable or the most readily resolved of the three. If there is a willingness to compromise on all sides, a solution could be thrashed out surprisingly quickly. The alternative is potentially ghastly, with vastly enhanced levels of violence. **Mandela** stressed after the talks that there could be no compromising majority rule, his sentiments echoed by **Joe Slovo**. However, government chief negotiator **Gerrit Viljoen** has made the first conciliatory move (see page 4) with the suggestion that the protection of minority rights be temporary, serving the purpose of nation-building. Given Mandela's publicly stated view that the ANC is willing to compromise, its response will be interesting. Even if rejected in toto now (as Sisulu did), this does not mean that it will necessarily be thrown out at a later stage.

Though the ANC may proclaim the abandonment of apartheid it is not yet irreversible, South African politics is being transformed - negotiations are gaining a momentum that cannot be halted except at great cost.

Mandela claimed on 29 April that the talks were a victory for the ANC - after their conclusion, he said "we are all victors". Without give and take, or compromise, negotiations fail. Just as compromise epitomised the crossing of the first hurdle, then it is likely that it will do so for the other two. The ANC may dislike being labelled appeasers by the PAC, but in opting to negotiate, it has no option but to give, as well as take. ■

### Contents

#### Politics

Only by compromise can hurdles be crossed	1
Inkatha endorses ANC/Government talks	2
De Klerk woos the West	3
Viljoen on transitional group rights	4
ANC accused of being a socialist party	5
Sayco and the UDF cabal: Part two	6

#### Economics

ANC economic policy	7
---------------------	---

#### Snippets

Sayco vows to destroy bantustans;	
Buthelesi seeks ANC and NP friendship	8



# Inkatha endorses the ANC/Government "talks about talks"

The Inkatha Central Committee fully endorsed the sentiments expressed by the government and the ANC in the talks about talks in Cape Town, in particular "the commitment of both parties to the elimination of the climate of violence and intimidation from whatever quarter as well as the enhancement of stability and the process of peaceful negotiation." It noted furthermore, that the shift towards the middle ground by both parties was to a position which Inkatha had represented for the past 15 years.

And in a press statement of 4 May, Inkatha president **Mangosuthu Buthelezi** found it "heartening" that the two delegations had seen the urgent necessity of addressing the problem of violence flaring up throughout the country, and in Natal. The urgency for Buthelezi, lay in the fact that "there can be no negotiations while the flames of this violence are raging ..."

In a memorandum to the US Young President's Organisation on 8 May, Buthelezi, while reaffirming that "final victory would be inevitable", noted also that he viewed the country today "with a degree of cautious scepticism": "I just ask whether we dare dream of a final transition from apartheid to non-racial harmony and democracy which will be painless." Counterposed with the dream had to seen the dangers of being over-optimistic and of inviting backlashes at every setback.

Buthelezi again commended the ANC and the government on their talks - "If that is what Dr Mandela has come out of jail to do, then I rejoice." But juxtaposed over this scene of the two delegations talking "so nicely", was the ugliness of the situation on the ground in many parts of the country, and of the violence in the Pietermaritzburg area and elsewhere in Natal.

Buthelezi said, however, that these cautionary observations do not represent pessimism. It was a reality that "there is a great unstoppable historic development taking place which is pushing all political leaders and all Parties before it. No one political Party or no one leader or set of leaders is or are directing South Africa's political developments." Both the NP and black politics are being herded in the same direction.

### NP forced to abandon its "holy cows"

Buthelezi noted that there was an "historic demand to eliminate racist distinctions". The **National Party**, historically committed to the preservation of white Afrikaners' interests, has been forced to rely upon non-Afrikaners. Similarly, the distinctions which apartheid has created between black and white, "spell doom to the vested interests of not only the Afrikaner but of Whites generally."

But the NP did not become inclusive of non-Afrikaners by choice, and nor were many of apartheid's "holy cows" abandoned by choice. "The reforms that the National Party has brought about in recent years were necessitated by economic reality dictating that apartheid spells economic doom and dictating that the white man's interest cannot be maintained within apartheid."

Buthelezi placed the NP's leadership dispute between De Klerk and PW Botha within the framework of this historic demand away from apartheid - "Historic forces were solidly behind Mr de Klerk and he was picked up, so to speak, by history and thrust to the fore." This, combined with his own personality, and his perceptions of what can or cannot last, led to the "vast leap forward of white politics" in his 2 February

address to parliament. This shift, this leap forward, was thus not simply an irrational party political move, or one representing the individualism of the party's leader.

### Black politics pushed to the centre

Similar historical forces, said Buthelezi, were guiding **black politics**. "There is a very historically significant national gravitation of political forces down to what really can be called **South Africa's centre-stage politics**," epitomised by the government/ANC meeting.

He warned however, that while "nothing must be said to detract from the importance of the tone of reconciliation that came out of the meetings", there are going to be **backlashes from the right and the left**. It is thus of critical importance, he said, that the success of the meetings be "translated into a broader based political accord between Black and White ..."

The NP will have to "mount a very concerted national effort to win back support from those that have abandoned it as they turned to the right." Similarly, the ANC will have ensure that the Cape Town meetings are not "turned into an exclusive ANC/South African victory." If they are not a victory for moderation for all Blacks, he saw the possibility of Black backlashes being even more dangerous than those of the Whites.

In particular, the **Pan Africanist Congress** was "waiting in the wings ready to swoop on any faltering of the ANC on its journey to the negotiating table." Having been at loggerheads with the ANC since the 1960s, the PAC "has adopted tactics and strategies built on the assumption that the politics of negotiation will fail and that disenchantment for a failed ANC would benefit the PAC."

Added to this was the fact that within the ANC itself, there were hardliners and those on the far left "who could yet prove to be a real problem not only to the ANC but to the whole process of reconciliation in South Africa."

Compounding these problems for Buthelezi, was the question of **violence**. He believed that if Inkatha, the ANC/UDF/Cosatu, and the government wanted peace, it would come about. However, to resolve the Charterist/Inkatha conflict, he noted that it would "take a concerted and visible effort of the total national leadership of the ANC, the UDF and Cosatu, and Inkatha to do so." That this was not taking place was "a matter of grave concern" to Buthelezi, who was quite categorical on Inkatha's position: "I know that Inkatha wants peace in order to get the politics of negotiation off the ground."

For Buthelezi, violence on the ground fatally flaws the peace process. This is so because the politics of negotiations cannot succeed "unless all Black leaders who are going to be involved are free to roam the country in search of support for their positions and in search of **mandates** from the people."

Additionally, negotiations cannot proceed without lifting the **state of emergency**, but this requires the prior elimination of violence. Furthermore, the electorate must be free to choose from a multiplicity of parties - there must be equality of opportunity for all to stake their claims.

Thus Buthelezi believed that although apartheid was doomed, and De Klerk intended burying it, it was necessary to tone this faith with realism: "there will be no leap into Utopia." The Cape Town talks were only talks about talks - **the "real hurdles which lie ahead have still to be tackled."** ■



# De Klerk receives red-carpet treatment abroad. Sanctions soon to be dropped?

However much one agrees or disagrees with the government and its policies, there is no denying the validity of Azapo president Nkosi Molala's February observation that: "The shrewdness of De Klerk is that the man has to a large extent destroyed our international front."

De Klerk's latest foray - his 19 day tour of European capitals - is the direct result of his 2 February speech and steps taken towards the creation of a climate for negotiations. But it is founded equally within a changing international climate reflected in the demise of the cold war, the collapse of communism, and Europe's changing political alignment; and regionally in the context of the Nkomati Accord, the resolution of the Namibian dispute, and SA's removal from Angola.

Despite attempts by the ANC to curtail SA's re-entry into international respectability, the Namibian independence celebrations marked a watershed in SA's diplomatic activity, subsequently reinforced by a range of contacts and cautious encouragement from a growing host of countries (Malagasy Republic, Portugal, Poland, Hungary, etc)

But all this constitutes little more than a curtain-raiser to the current expedition abroad. It constitutes the single most important diplomatic contact between SA and the world since the eulogies of General Smuts as architect of the United Nations.

## De Klerk no pleading supplicant

The purpose of the trip, as expressed by De Klerk, is no more than to explain to these foreign governments how sincere the government is in its commitment to negotiations and to the irrevocable eradication of apartheid. Ostensibly it has nothing to do with pleading an anti-sanctions cause - De Klerk understands fully that supplication would damage his cause. He knows that since sanctions is increasingly becoming a non-issue, there is little point in flogging it.

But, whether stated or not, he knows that if these governments accept his bona fides and accept his integrity, there is a good chance that they will also accept his definition of the SA problem and his belief in how best to resolve it. But even if so optimistic an objective is not reached, De Klerk will hope that this understanding would lead to these governments qualifying what the SA government believes to be their blinkered views.

His first meeting, and possibly the most important given the country's hitherto unqualified rejection of the government, was with France's president Mitterand. All the signs pointed to De Klerk's success - his red-carpet treatment, his meeting lasting double the allocated time, his being escorted to the door by Mitterand, etc. The Greek president said after their meeting that the EEC would be reviewing its sanctions policy. The Dutch government went further, proposing a set of sanctions-lifting measures graded according to further reform/negotiation steps being undertaken. The West has taken to De Klerk, and there is little the ANC can do but dampen its enthusiasm.

When the full National Executive Committee of the ANC met with the UDF and Cosatu in Lusaka on 6 June last year to hurriedly formulate a negotiating initiative, the urgency was in response to their perception that the SA government and its "imperialist allies" were about to state their preparedness to commence negotiations.

The delegates felt it imperative that the ANC formulate a negotiations strategy to fend off this impending initiative, but

in such a way as to ensure that it:

- \* did not create confusion or division in the ranks of the Mass Democratic Movement;
- \* did not result in the demobilisation of the masses;
- \* did not lessen international pressure; and
- \* which resulted in the ANC/MDM maintaining the initiative.

Although the ANC duly formulated the Harare Declaration as its negotiating position, it has been unable to ensure control over all four of these conditions.

## ANC's four concerns

Largely because the negotiating process envisaged by the declaration is seen by its supporters as leading to inevitable victory, the ANC's initiative, while resulting in some confusion and division in its ranks, has been sufficiently militant to constitute in general terms, a unifying force. Thus despite the rhetoric of its more militant left wing, and the frequent signals from parts of its constituency expressing reservations, its constituency has not been too demobilised yet.

But as far as the other two conditions are concerned, the ANC has not been as successful. It is arguable as to whether it is the government or the ANC which is maintaining the initiative. Certainly, in so far as the initiative has switched from one side to the other over the past year, the ANC cannot claim to have successfully maintained it. And the government's success in its international relations is very striking.

The reason for this is quite simply that despite reservations by some states over the government's precise constitutional objectives, the De Klerk administration has succeeded in presenting itself as being genuinely committed to a negotiated settlement. The fact that the ANC deputy president has himself publicly vouchsafed De Klerk's sincerity, attests to the difficulty the ANC is having in getting significant members of the international community to stick to their hitherto unqualified rejection of the SA government's bona fides.

The ANC's Radio Freedom on 11 July said of the 1989 meeting between president Botha and Nelson Mandela that:

It has to be seen as a carefully orchestrated ploy by the regime to defuse the struggle inside our country by holding forth prospects of a just political settlement and a ploy of defusing the mounting campaign for sanctions by sending the bogus signals that Pretoria is ready to enter into serious negotiations with the real leaders of our people.

Whatever De Klerk's bottom line really is, and no matter that he obviously wishes to outmanoeuvre the ANC, it cannot be said now that the whole exercise is a ploy or that he refuses to negotiate with the real leaders.

The ANC realises that it is fighting a losing battle here. De Klerk knows that he has to take only a few more steps (releasing political prisoners, lifting the state of emergency) in order to swing the tide fully in his favour. Eastern Cape UDF leader Mkhuseli Jack said on 10 May that the state of emergency would be lifted when it came up for renewal in June. But far from being entirely delighted at the prospect, he said it would "deliver a confusing blow to the international community". The result? Inevitably, the ANC will soon be almost totally reliant on internal support for political leverage. ■



# NP's bottom line? Viljoen says minority rights need not be permanent

Given the government's unwillingness to put too much on the table up front and risk it being rejected before being given a chance, it is not surprising that government negotiators tend to speak of their proposed constitutional position in very generalised terms. Avoidance of specifics is a defense not only against negotiators representing the disenfranchised, but also against a possible backlash from its own constituency.

However, over the eight months since the September 1989 general election, the government has steadily added a little more flesh to its skeletal election manifesto.

That the government is expected to offer compromises, and expects them in return from the ANC, Inkatha and others, is part of what constitutes normal negotiating (bargaining).

However, in response to Mandela's assertion that the ANC would never compromise on majority rule and group rights, Constitutional Development minister Gerrit Viljoen made what is potentially a breakthrough concession.

Replying to the joint debate on the Constitutional Development Budget vote on 11 May, Viljoen said that the NP believed a **Bill of Rights** should protect group values such as language, culture and religion, and the right of individuals to exercise these in a group context. But Viljoen knows that cultural protection is really a non-issue - all parties have accepted these, though not within the group context.

## minorities to share in decision-making

What the government means by **groups' political rights**, or as it now prefers - minority rights - was spelled out quite clearly by Viljoen. They entailed "an assurance for minority groups that they will have a particular say in the new constitutional system, by way of representation and decision-making, in spite of the fact that they are not part of the majority."

This, of course, is precisely what the ANC is dead against, Joe Slovo paraphrasing the government's intentions as: you can have anything you want as long as we don't want it.

In an attempt to distance the government's plans from the apartheid of old, Viljoen added that minorities "must be defined in terms of a new, acceptable and non-racist set of guidelines. Rights guaranteed to minorities in a new constitution should apply to the whole nation and not constitute special privilege for these minorities."

He spoke also of the necessity of preventing an unsophisticated majority from plunging the country into a one-party state or dictatorship, of ensuring regular elections, of maintaining a free enterprise system, of securing human rights, of maintaining an independent judiciary - all of which, he said, were attainable were minorities granted this participation.

Viljoen took care to add that a form of qualified majoritarianism was the policy of other political groups other than the National Party. He referred to the Democratic Party's federalism and proportional representation, the Labour Party's federalism, Solidarity's support for minority protection, the Conservative Party's national rights, the Natal Indaba, Inkatha's federalism, and the fact that Mandela had stated repeatedly that the ANC believed it would be necessary to reconcile white fears.

But none of this has any great concessionary significance given the NP's insistence that minorities participate in government decision-making as minorities (however defined). With both the government and the ANC vowing not to compromise

on the question of group rights, it is difficult to see why negotiations should continue at all, and it is understandable that the ANC's militants view the whole negotiation initiative with a degree of scepticism bordering more often on blatant cynicism.

## minority rights "temporary"?

However, Viljoen had two days earlier (9 May) made what at face value appears to be a **highly significant constitutional compromise**. He said that rather than being a permanent principle to which the government was wedded, the protection of minorities could be seen as an "essential method, or road - an open-ended road - at this stage in our history towards achieving success in nation-building."

This process, he said, would be endangered by a "dogmatic refusal to acknowledge and accommodate the reality of minorities in a plural population." "It would be wiser", he added, "to acknowledge and accommodate its conflict potential rather than sweeping it under the carpet."

On the reasonable assumption that Viljoen's statement represents not simply his personal views, this clearly marks a clear departure from the common perception that the NP wishes to see minority protection permanently enshrined.

The idea that minority rights should be protected to aid the process of nation-building, is a concept markedly different to the belief that groups have an inalienable right to permanent constitutional protection. It would constitute a **transitional phase** - with a transitional constitution - following which such rights would fall away. At that stage (Viljoen gave no details as to the length of this transitional phase), the country would presumably convert itself to a normal non-racial democracy.

Other than offering a way out of the certainty of an impending constitutional impasse, and mollifying those who might believe the government's inflexible intransigence makes negotiations a waste of time, it begs the question of whether the government is playing things by ear, or whether it is following a carefully scripted game plan. Although it is tempting to view Viljoen's statement as representing a shift in NP policy, this is not necessarily the case. It does represent a new public position, but it is far more likely that this is perhaps a major concession that the government always had in mind. After all, **Barend du Plessis** (who narrowly missed the leadership of the NP on PW Botha's resignation), said in 1988 (emphasis added) that:

Anyone who ignores the significance of the group concept in our constitutional structure, does so at his own peril. Yet the group concept alone is not sufficiently strong to support the entire constitutional structure. ... In my perception, the non-group variable right now is still of lesser importance than the group variable ... but we must accommodate both of these variables in our constitutional equation.

This points to an NP more sophisticated than is often credited and makes more sense of what it expects to be compromised. It may not accord with Mandela's willingness to compromise on fundamentals (**Sisulu** rejected it outright on 13 May), but the government certainly believes that it will find favour with a lot of blacks. If the government can convince the "silent majority" that the alternative is war ("Who wants a destructive power struggle nobody can win?", asked one NP MP on 10 May), it is playing a very shrewd game. ■



# ANC accused of having changed from a broad front to a socialist party

The ANC has always been a liberation movement, not a political party. But now that it is operating legally within SA, its prime task is the mobilisation of the masses into its ranks. At some stage, its liberatory politics will have to be either supplemented or replaced by clear positions on a range of policies, particularly its position on **socialism**, and its relationship with the **South African Communist Party**.

The ANC has always denied that the SACP is anything other than a valued and trusted ally, suggestions of inordinate Party influence dismissed out of hand. Yet because the SACP's membership is secret, and because much of the ANC's leadership are SACP members, this may become problematic if future political debate becomes more issue-centred.

The SACP has decided to remain an underground organisation despite its new-found legality. A statement issued by the party's **Central Committee** (published in January) warns of the dangers of being trapped by the regime's intention of substituting legal activity for "active resistance, defiance and armed challenge", and stresses that the "consolidation and strengthening of the underground and spread of grassroots people's organisation remains the top priority." This is because the party believes it to be "political suicide" to believe that meaningful negotiation could "come about through anything short of intensified struggle and pressure on all fronts."

## claims of SACP dominance of ANC

But a less generous reason for staying underground was given in the 4 May issue of *Africa Confidential* (AC). It states that the SACP has become a victim of its own success - that not being content with dominating the ANC ideologically, it has "gone on to take virtually every position of influence in the organisation." According to AC, the problem for the party is that if it were to come above ground and reveal its membership, this would "unmask the Party's domination of the ANC, which it has turned from a broad front into a socialist party." This would be a "discomforting" confirmation of Pretoria's well-known accusations, a danger, states AC, which certain party members (such as the late **Moses Mabhida**) warned of.

According to AC (which is said to reflect the views of British intelligence), of the 35 members on the ANC's **National Executive Committee** prior to Mandela's release in February this year, only eight were not SACP members: **Oliver Tambo**, **Joe Modise**, **Thomas Nkobi**, **Pallo Jordan**, **Mzwani Piliso**, **Ruth Mompoti**, **Joe Nhlanhla** and **Jackie Molefe**.

The publication proceeds to itemise the Party's dominance over two of the ANC's three offices. "The Party's weakness" in the third, the **Treasurer-General's Office** "is more a reflection of contempt than defeat", since the Treasury is a technical department, "not at the cutting edge of the struggle." AC names the Party members, their position in parenthesis.

**THE PRESIDENT-GENERAL'S OFFICE.** **Administrative secretary**, "one of the most influential positions in the ANC", is **Anthony Mongalo**. The **Political Military Council**, "until recently the most powerful organ in the ANC", is run by **Josiah Jele** (Central Committee). The **army**, although headed by non-Party member **Joe Modise**, has only three non-Party members on its eight-man **Army Headquarters**. The 1987 paralysis in the **Security and Intelligence** department between its non-Party chief, **Mzwani Piliso** and his deputy, **Peter**

**Boroko**, led to the directorate's dissolution, though **Sizakele Sigxashe** (Central Committee) retained his "critical" position as intelligence analyst. The **Political Headquarters**, according to AC, "was a real Party bastion", under **John Nkadimeng** and later, **Josiah Jele**. Secretary was **Mac Maharaj** (Politbureau); underground operations chief, **Jacob Zuma** (now intelligence chief). The Party's control over the **PMC's five regional structures** is also complete, its members running **London** (**Aziz Pahad**), **Gaborone** ('Che' **Ogara**), **Maseru** (**Patrick Mabaso**), **Manzini** (**Klaus Maphepha**), and **Zimbabwe** (**Garth Strachan**). **Department of Information and Publicity** was long headed by **Thabo Mbeki** (Politbureau), but is now run by non-Party member **Pallo Jordan**. (AC suggest that some believe the appointment of **Ahmed Kathrada** as **Internal Publicity Chief** was designed to check **Jordan**, whom the Party would like moved.)

**THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S OFFICE.** This is headed by **Alfred Nzo** (ex Central Committee). His deputy is **Henry Makgothi**, (Central Committee). The **administrative secretary** is **Sindiso Mfenyane** (also head of the Secretariat of the ANC's **NEC**). The **Department of International Affairs** is headed by **Thabo Mbeki**, his deputy being **Stanley Mabizela**. The **Education Department** is run by top intellectual, **Seretse Choabi**, with **Andrew Masekela** (ex Central Committee) under him. The **Women's Section** is headed by **Gertrude Shope**.

AC conclude that "in effect, the Party and the ANC have ceased to be two allied organisations and have become one body with two heads."

The problem with hostile reports such as that of AC is that **verification** is all but impossible. But were it to be factually correct, it might threaten the ANC's prime intention of mobilising a broad united front under its leadership. Although much of the ANC's support is overtly socialist (**Cosatu**, **Sayco**, etc), it is highly unlikely that the ANC would increase its support were it to mobilise under a socialist banner, particularly after the failures of socialism in the **USSR** and **Eastern Europe**.

## can the ANC afford a socialist platform?

There are prominent committed communists within the ANC's ranks locally, but the ANC cannot afford to mobilise around their views either. For instance, in an interview entitled "The Socialist Path is the Only One Open to the Oppressed Everywhere" (*African Communist*, January 1990), **Harry Gwala** states: those "who say they want private enterprise in the socialist countries are not concerned with democracy". He adds that he is unaware that "**Marxism-Leninism**" is undergoing a crisis. This might be quite acceptable to the militants, but will not find favour with all of the ANC's target constituency. One reason is that **Black Consciousness** and **Pan Africanist** movements are also competing at this level ideologically. But more important, there is little to indicate that the bulk of the non-Charterist "masses" are inclined towards a socialist SA.

The SACP believes socialism in SA should not come via a "Great Leap Forward". This confirms their adherence to a mixed economy - but this is temporary, since the immediate post-apartheid era is only a **transitional phase** towards socialism. Since the ANC has not yet distanced itself from this (it used to be its position), and there are good grounds for seeing significant SACP influence in the ANC (even if exaggerated), the necessity for the ANC to clarify its position is urgent. ■



# SAYCO says the UDF was "infected" by a "cancer called the Cabal."

## Towards restructuring the UDF: Part two

Having examined the concept of an alliance and a front in its paper - "Towards restructuring the UDF: The building of a formidable foundation for national unity" - the UDF's largest and most important affiliate, the South African Youth Congress (Sayco) eulogised the initial phase of the UDF's history.

"But unfortunately this situation was not to last. Repression set in and intensified; what began as precautionary, tentative and protective measures, such as the anathema of limited centralisation in the Front, snowballed and became monsters and dinosaurs of over-centralisation, gobbling up most of the hitherto achievements of the UDF in so far as the Front ethos are concerned. Factionalism was the inevitable consequence, backed by a stifling of genuine debates, concentration of resources and decision-making processes in fewer and fewer and sometimes faceless hands and the unequal and undemocratic distribution of such resources. The Front was infected by a serious case of cancer called the Cabal. The cadreship and leadership of the UDF thinned as more and more people were marginalised while some simply called it a day in the face of the frustrating inability to any longer make meaningful contributions in the Front.

Like mushrooms, committees, projects, "resource" centres etc began to crop up in the name of the United Democratic Front but without any accountability to the organisations that constitute the UDF. Some are not even known to certain structures of the UDF.

### people lost the right to elect leaders

In the name of "security", organisations and the masses of our people lost their right to elect or determine the leadership of the United Democratic Front. Co-optation, which method should normally not cause any problems, became a thorn in the flesh of the UDF because it was undemocratic and tended to bury the whole issue of accountability and organised development of leadership.

At the level of ideology, important principles of the National Liberation Revolution such as African leadership and the vanguard role of the working class were openly and brazenly flouted. Nay, even an attempt to refer to them was not viewed positively. In the process, the mass component in the approach to our struggle was sacrificed - it became incidental and no longer normative.

This disregard of principle led to an anomalous situation in which the Front tended to operate like an organisation and not a Front of organisations. This drastically reduced the capability of the UDF to effectively employ the tactic of a United Front. On numerous occasions organisations within the Front have had to come out and fight against decisions said to be of the UDF but which no single organisation is known to have proposed and presented to others for discussion and consideration. It was clear through this tendency that organisations within the UDF no longer had the right to initiate and decide the Front politics. We must say that certain of these faceless decisions have more than once threatened the very existence of the UDF in the way in which they created dissatisfaction and anger in the UDF.

At other times, decisions would be presented to the

NEC, not by any organisation, but by certain individuals who falsely claimed that such decisions originated in the Head Office when the rest of the members of the Head Office knew nothing about such decisions. This tendency clearly pointed to the existence of some group or structure outside the normal structures of the UDF that made decisions for the Front.

### "outside" imposters no fiction

In a situation where the Front does not have any forum for political discussion but still sees papers distributed as "position" papers of the Front, who can deny the existence of such an "outside" decision-making imposter and be honest at the same time? It is an unfortunate analogy but one that is inescapable to point out, that where the apartheid regime wielded its state security council, on our side there existed a cabal or grouping outside the Front that saw itself as either the think-tank or the custodians of all wisdom in the UDF. We must say ours is even worse in the sense that its existence was never officially acknowledged nor its origin traceable within the Front. It is truly faceless. We dispute the assertion that the existence of such a grouping is either fiction or a matter of belief and/or perception. It is not a matter of faith on the part of the masses of our people. To make such claims in the face of genuine massive complaints on the part of our people is to be dishonest and disrespectful of the intelligence of our members and people. It makes all efforts to resolve the problem a sham and only a means to cover up.

The complaints of our people and the demand for an investigation into the matters they complain of are part of their life experience in the Front and not superstition at all.

No-one within the Front who is true to the principles of organisation and Fronts can deny without contradiction that:

- 1) Within the UDF undemocratic practices have developed on a scale and level that is upsetting and disturbing.
- 2) Within and "outside" the UDF, resources are concentrated in fewer hands and are distributed unequally and in accordance with undemocratic and anti-organisation considerations and are used to control rather than to help those who receive them. The basis for employment of functionaries of the Front has been particularly dismayingly. There are so many resource and project centres existing in the name of the the UDF, but who do they in practice serve? Who has decided on their existence within the UDF? Why are these resources concentrated only in certain towns and regions while the rest of the country is suffering? Even worse, why are the people - the sectors and groups in whose name these resources have been created and motivated for - not in control?
- 3) Ascendency into leadership structures of the UDF is now by the route of undemocratic co-optation where organisations play no role at all. We are not against co-optation as a method of replenishing the Front's leadership."

Next issue- towards restructuring the UDF. ■



# Why has the ANC not yet formulated a clear economic policy?

Most political parties and organisations claim that the SA economy needs to be restructured so as to accommodate black aspirations, but to do so, as Inkatha's Mangosuthu Buthelezi has said, without killing the goose that lays the golden egg. The big question is how to mix these two ideals.

Despite a qualified renunciation of the economic failures of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the ANC still sees the **Freedom Charter** as the means of achieving this. Unfortunately though, this document is too vague to serve as a clear economic policy guide. In his statement from the dock at the 1964 Rivonia trial, Mandela said: the "Freedom Charter ... is by no means a blueprint for a socialist state. ... The ANC has never at any period of its history advocated a **revolutionary change** in the economic structure of the country, nor has it, to the best of my recollection, ever **condemned capitalist society**." However, by way of contrast to Mandela (and Azapo, which sees the Freedom Charter as reformist capitalist), a Sayco paper two years ago stated that: "The Freedom Charter makes no demand of democracy other than People's Democracy. It is not a capitalist document and thus it does not seek to impose bourgeois national democracy on us."

### better to get away from precise models

ANC legal and constitutional member Albie Sachs said recently that while it "used to be the Left who were very emotional and dedicated to explicit prescribed programmes, now it is the other way around. It is the free marketeers who insist on prescribing models for the economy and who wish to bind these into the constitution. I think a better approach is to say what are the big problems and then try to define a very broad framework for attending to them, getting away from precise models. Thus the big question in South Africa is not whether to have socialism or capitalism, but how to deal with the enormous inequalities created by apartheid."

Business tycoon Richard Maponya reported after his January prison meeting with Mandela that Mandela was "definitely inclined towards a free enterprise system ... [and was] concerned as to whether black people were getting themselves geared up to take opportunities as they arose. He said he did not believe in nationalisation because it was clear such a policy ran counter to the need to keep the SA economy growing to provide jobs ..."

But although Mandela said on 26 February after his meeting with Anglo American chairman Gavin Relly that under ANC rule the economy would remain intact and continue to be based on private enterprise (though now with nationalisation to give the government resources), there is no mistaking the strident anti-capitalist positions of the **SA Communist Party**, **Cosatu**, and most (if not all) of the **UDF**. Their position is unashamedly socialist - their acceptance of what is commonly termed a mixed economy is generally no more than an acceptance of it as a means towards an end, as an inevitable transitional phase towards a socialism.

Thus SACP leader Joe Slovo has openly acknowledged that Eastern European/Soviet socialism has been distorted, not that it has failed. The future lies in **Democratic Socialism** rather than its Stalinist variant. Cosatu is equally socialist. Though some of its theorists (such as Alec Erwin) preach practicalities, the rhetoric of the organisation's leadership is less

so. And as the largest and certainly the most important of the UDF's affiliates, (and almost certainly the core of the ANC's future Youth wing), Sayco's position is far removed from those of Mandela stated above.

The question that then arises, is why there should be such an apparent **ideological Charterist divide**.

The reason is in part an ideological hangover from the ANC's having adopted in 1969 at its **Morogoro** Consultative Conference, the SACP's theoretical position on the nature of SA society. This defined SA as being characterised by **Colonialism of a Special Type (CST)**, where apartheid colonialism combined national domination and capitalist exploitation. The resolution to this dual domination lay in the theory of a **two-stage revolution** - first the national democratic revolution (to achieve bourgeois democracy), followed by the transition to socialism. The ANC differed ideologically with those in its own ranks denigrating the first phase ("armchair revolutionaries" suffering from "infantile disorders"), arguing that the achievement of a socialist SA had to first proceed through the bourgeois democratic phase.

But it was also acknowledged that while the former was necessary to achieve the latter, socialism would not automatically or necessarily result from the former. Thus the stress on the leadership of the black working class in the struggle.

It is here that the ANC, or rather the Charterist movement as a whole, is showing signs of division. Put in a nutshell, there appears to be a **growing question mark on the validity of the two-stage theory**. On the one hand the SACP and Sayco clearly believe that it is conceptually and practically the route to social justice. On the other hand, there appears little doubt that Mandela heads a group within the ANC which has rejected this in toto. Whenever Mandela makes a public statement which appears to conflict with orthodoxy, there is a qualification to the effect that he remains a "disciplined member of the ANC." But rather than confirm his orthodoxy, this usually serves to do just the opposite, suggesting that but for the discipline of conforming to the ANC's historical positions, he would speak his mind.

### Social Democrat or Democratic Socialist

It would appear that far from being a Democratic Socialist, **Mandela is a Social Democrat** (ie, welfare capitalist). The logical question then, is where the ANC stands on this.

It can hardly be insignificant that following the ANC's high-powered **Harare** meeting of economists and economic advisors in early May, the only decisions taken (that reached the press) were that there should be a mixed economy and that privatisation should be actively resisted. Why, it will be asked, was there nothing more substantive?

The probable answer is that the ANC cannot afford to enter the capitalist/socialist debate, not because of Albie Sachs' suggestion that it is better to stick to practical means of eradicating the horror that apartheid has created, but because the issue is simply too divisive. Although a set of principles must emerge from the ANC at some stage if it is to maintain its credibility, a compromise might be that the ANC commits itself to a redistributive market economy, the transition to socialism coming about only if "the people" want it. But while this will let it off the hook, and help unity, it might smack of expediency, not addressing the question of what the ANC's beliefs really are. ■



## Bantustans to be destroyed, says Sayco

Almost everyone bar the white right-wing accepts that the homelands have no role to play in a future post-apartheid society. If this was not already obvious on ideological grounds, their turbulence, and their current political realignment over the past few months has confirmed it once and for all.

But part of the problem regarding the violence in Natal is that no distinction is made by the Charterists between the Sebe's and Mangope's, and Inkatha's deliberate hi-jacking of the KwaZulu homeland in order to pursue liberation. Inkatha has always rejected the homeland system of apartheid, and has used it to strengthen itself, and to prevent further balkanisation of the country (through refusing "independence"). It has also steadfastly refused to be co-opted into a Rhodesian-styled "internal settlement".

The Draft Policy Document at Sayco's recent congress stated that "the main task of the present phase of our revolution is the total destruction of the internal structures of colonial rule and to replace them and the whole system of apartheid colonialism with organs of mass self-rule in the economic, political and social life experience of the whole of our people."

### destroy bantustans "now and at once"

As far as the homelands were concerned, the document claimed that "our theory and practice" must "now and at once, seek to destroy them and establish in their stead organs of people's self-government, self-management and activation ..."

"As revolutionary youth, we thus deline and identify our enemy as the system of apartheid colonialism and, in this case, the system of the bantustans. ... It is therefore the system of bantustans we must bring to an immediate end, as part and parcel of our route to total liberation."

At the congress, Mandela said of Bophuthatswana's Lucas Mangope: "If any chief decides to be a tyrant and takes decisions for his people, he will come to a tragic end." Diplomatically, Mandela did not mention Buthelezi - indeed, he urged the "young lions" to exercise discipline, to be tolerant of the views of others, and to halt attacks on members of rival anti-apartheid organisations (unnamed, but presumably Inkatha, Azapo, and the PAC).

However, Sayco president Peter Mokaba was quite clear that reconciliation with Buthelezi was impossible: "There is no way we can win Gatsha back. He is a lost cause", he said, to wild applause.

However, although Sayco has committed itself to the immediate destruction of the homelands, the position of other Charterist leaders is a little more qualified. One sign of this was Lekota's mid-March statement that the situation in the homelands cannot be permitted to "deteriorate into anarchy and chaos." Another is the general acceptance that there is little point in destabilising Kangwane, for instance, because it is ruled by a Chief Minister sympathetic to the ANC, or Transkei, because, as Umkhonto we Sizwe Chief of Staff Chris Hani said earlier in the year, "why should we attack a man like Holomisa ... when he is actually articulating good positions?"

Unfortunately, many Charterists believe that far from articulating a good position, Buthelezi and Inkatha are part and parcel of the enemy. Despite Mandela's conciliatory approach to Inkatha, the mood in the lower ranks is markedly more beligerant. Calls made last year by Sactu, that Buthelezi should be physically killed, were moderated by Lekota last month - he should be killed "politically".

### no legitimate opposition to the ANC?

While this is a slight improvement on Sactu's comments, the problem remains that until the Charterists recognise that peaceful co-existence is the route to peace, conflict and violence will continue. UDF Eastern Cape leader Mkhusezi Jack was quite candid on the

SOUTH AFRICAN UPDATE is published by the INKATHA INSTITUTE FOR SOUTH AFRICA. The comment in this publication does not necessarily reflect the views of any particular political organisation.

Postal address:  
P O Box 2415  
DURBAN  
4000

telephone: (031) - 3049305  
fax: (031) - 3062261

Printed by PRONTAPRINT, 475 West Street, DURBAN.

Address:  
32 Masonic Grove  
DURBAN  
4001

Editor: Peter Smith  
Assistant editor: Jane Steel

ANC's position. Addressing a forum at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington on 10 May, he said that the ANC's strategy was quite simply to deny Buthelezi a seat at the negotiating table.

The reason? Buthelezi and his "imperialist backers" were trying to "neutralise the liberation movement" to show there was legitimate black opposition to the ANC. Confirming Inkatha objection to the ANC's claiming to represent the whole anti-apartheid movement, Jack added: "We are broadening our social base - there is a battle going on. ... We are drawing everybody towards us."

It is a fair assumption that Mandela recognises the futility of fighting a war in Natal. He may not like Inkatha's policies, or its having operated from within the system, but he recognises that Inkatha is a populist mass movement enjoying legitimacy among its members. Whether he likes it or not, the Pan Africanist Congress, Azapo and Inkatha are independent mass movements competing with the ANC for support. ANC director of International affairs Thabo Mbeki admitted as much on 3 May - he said the ANC did not see itself as the sole representative of the large majority of the people, and that all parties that had been involved in the struggle should participate in the negotiating process (though he assumed Inkatha would sit beside De Klerk).

Thus despite ANC Southern Natal Convenor Terror Lekota saying on 24 April that the ANC "does not adopt a belligerent position towards Inkatha or any other political party", Jack's denial of there being legitimate opposition to the ANC, a view mirrored by most in the UDF, worries Inkatha. This is not only because it leads to violence in the pre-liberation phase (against Inkatha, Azapo and the Africanists), but could spill over into the post-apartheid era. Inkatha has staked its position very firmly on a multi-party democracy. This pluralist view requires tolerance of others' beliefs (and Inkatha members are not excluded from this), but while some of the senior Charterist leadership (even Joe Slovo) has espoused a similar policy, this is much less marked on the ground.

### keep Inkatha out of the peace process

Allied to this problem is that of the peace process. There is a lot of mutual distrust between Inkatha and the Charterists, but it would appear inevitable that at some stage their leaders will have work together to resolve it. Buthelezi said on 8 May that that the violence could not be stopped unless all parties were involved in a joint effort to end it. Mandela obviously believed this as well, though following the cancellation of the proposed Pietermaritzburg joint rally, Mandela said (in early May) that members of the ANC had "nearly throttled" him over the proposed meeting with Buthelezi. Mkhusezi Jack's view? Buthelezi should be excluded from any peace process in Natal since this would only lend him credibility.

Tragically, peace in Natal looks as elusive as ever. ■

## Buthelezi wants friendship with the ANC and NP

Reaffirming his 8 May statement in which "We continue to offer our hand of friendship to all leaders and all organisations", Inkatha president Mangosuthu Buthelezi said at the annual KwaZulu prayer day on 13 May that he rededicated himself to seeking friendship with the ANC and the NP. He also said that he praised God for the recent talks between the ANC and Government delegations headed by Mandela and De Klerk.

For Buthelezi, the result was that there had never been more promise of change, and a better prospect for achieving a fair and just society. However, he added that while he sought good relations between Inkatha and the ANC, Mandela should lead his colleagues away from confrontation between blacks. In particular, he singled out some ANC figures for having made comments which were counter-productive to good relations. He said Inkatha "lamented terribly" comments made by "Terror" Lekota, Jay Naidoo and Thabo Mbeki.

He asked how there could be peace between the two organisations when he was "unjustly accused" by Cosatu's Jay Naidoo of being a stumbling block to peace. He added that not only had he been calling for talks to end the killing for months, but that Harry Gwala's pressurising Mandela against appearing in public with him had hindered the peace process. Furthermore, he questioned how anybody could still be thinking about the use of violence to solve national problems. ■