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The Place of Politics in People's Education:
The Case of the Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College
by John Pampallis

The concept of People's Education emerged in South Africa from the struggle for people's power, one of its central aspects. Student activists at the time considered that people's education and political education were the same thing. While the idea that People's Education can be merely a subject in the curriculum is far too narrow, it does indicate the centrality of politics in the popular conception.

One of the resolutions of the December 1985 National Conference on the Crisis in Education gives a more comprehensive definition of People's Education, but includes political education. The resolution declares that:

People's education is education that:

1. enables the oppressed to understand the evils of the apartheid system and prepares them for participation in a non-racial democratic system.
2. eliminates illiteracy, ignorance and the exploitation of one person by another,
3. and encourages collective input and active participation by all, as well as stimulating critical thinking and analysis,
4. trains our people to participate actively and creatively in the struggle to establish a non-racial democratic South Africa,
5. allows students, parents, teachers and workers to be mobilised into appropriate organisational structures, participate actively in the initiation and management of people's education in all its forms, and
6. resist exploitation and oppression at their workplace/

While many of the above aims of People's Education are clearly political, they obviously cannot all be achieved in the same manner or with the same methods. For understanding the evils of the apartheid system cannot be achieved by the same methods as those used to resist exploitation and oppression. It is, therefore, necessary to examine the concept of political education more closely. The remainder of this paper will first identify some areas of political education and comment briefly on each, and then give an outline of the political education provided at SOMAFSCO and some of the problems encountered. '

The Scope of Political Education

Three main areas of political education are instruction, personality and democracy.

i. Political Instruction:

The learning of political theory, knowledge and analysis. This includes the study of:

- 0 the history of our country and its changing forms of national and Class oppression;
- 0 the resistance to oppression and how it has developed over the years;
- 0 the theoretical development of the liberation movement;
- 0 current political events and their significance;
- 0 the international dimensions of our struggle;
- 0 the principles of political economy; and
- 0 the revolutionary struggles of other peoples and the building of new societies in liberated countries.

Political instruction can take place in either a formal classroom situation or in study groups. Where people's power already exists this is probably the easiest of the three areas of political education to implement. One simply organises it as an integral part of the school curriculum and the extra-curricular activities. The problems lie mainly in getting skilled teachers who are committed to the people's cause, and developing a programme of instruction which is logical, systematic and appropriate to the age and intellectual development of the students.

ii. The Development of Revolutionary Qualities:

They include dedication to the liberation struggle, loyalty to one's comrades and ideals, perseverance, diligence, a preparedness to make sacrifices, a sense of responsibility, respect for the working people, kindness, intolerance of

racism or oppression of any kind, and an internationalist outlook, and so on.

The development of such qualities may be aided by political knowledge. For example, an understanding of the injustice and suffering caused by apartheid, combined with the knowledge of how other revolutionary movements have succeeded against powerful enemies, may help to sustain commitment to the struggle. However, political knowledge does not translate automatically into desirable revolutionary attitudes and attributes. It is possible for someone to have quite a deep knowledge of the history of our struggle, of the working of the apartheid system and the policies of our movement, but at the same time to be cynical and ambitious and to use this knowledge mainly to impress people and to promote his/her own personal interests.

Personal revolutionary qualities are not developed mainly in the school, although the school can play an important role in promoting or retarding their development. This development can be effected by a large number of factors such as: the example of those whom one admires; the exhortation/preaching of parents, teachers and political leaders; the constructive criticism of one's comrades; critical self-reflection; the influence of a revolutionary and humanistic art; living in a community where such revolutionary qualities are highly valued and where the need for struggle is more or less obvious. The main task of educators is to ensure that conditions promoting the development of revolutionary qualities are created for their students.

iii. The Ability To Organise and Function Effectively in Democratic Structures:

This is not something that can be learned properly in a classroom. Although a certain amount of theoretical knowledge may be useful, the necessary skills can ultimately only be acquired in practice. The practical experience can

come as a result of organising and functioning in democratic structures set up by students with or without the aid and approval of school authorities, or even in those structures which have nothing directly to do with the school (for example, community organisations).

Political Education at the Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College

The Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College was established at Morogoro, Tanzania, in 1978 by the ANC in the wake of the Soweto uprising. Many of the young people who fled the police terror came to the ANC's external mission with a desire to continue their schooling. At first, scholarships were found for them at schools in various countries in Africa and abroad. However, it was felt undesirable to have our school students scattered around the world, and that it would be better to have them together in one school where they could more easily maintain their South African identity and stay in touch with our people's struggle for freedom. Another advantage of such a school would also be to give the ANC the opportunity to create an alternative to the Bantu Education system where we could aim for high academic standards together with a democratic political orientation. The school would serve both the students as individuals and the liberation movement as a whole. Although SOMAFCO was first envisaged only as a secondary school, it has since grown to include nursery, primary, secondary and adult education divisions. (This paper deals only with the nursery, primary and secondary divisions, as adult education is the subject of another paper).

The aims and principles set down in the Education Policy of the ANC (adopted in October 1978 at Morogoro) have striking similarities to those currently being put forward for People's Education. For example, under the subheading, 'General Aims of the ANC Education Policy' it is stated that: 'The entire educational programme... will be geared towards the following objectives:

1. To prepare cadres to serve the national liberation struggle of the people of South Africa in the phase of struggle for seizure of political power and the post-liberation phase.
2. To produce such cadres as will be able to serve the society in all spheres, i.e. political, economic, socio-cultural, educational and scientific. Priorities will be dictated by the needs of the liberatory struggle in the pre- and post-liberation period.

The sub-section on the 'Principles of the ANC Education Policy' states, inter alia, that:

'The Education Policy of the ANC shall be geared towards producing a new type of South African dedicated to serve the interests and needs of the South African people as a whole.'

'The ANC educational programme, as an on-going process, shall cater for both young and old irrespective of race, colour, sex or creed.'

'While observing the priority to impart basic knowledge at each level in each field, the ANC educational programme shall promote to the full the creative and democratic participation of students, teachers and the community in all educational activities.'

In pursuit of these aims and principles, SOMAFCO's nursery, primary and secondary schools have established political education programmes of various types which cover the three areas discussed above. At the nursery school, political education is elementary and falls into the first two areas. Children are taught to know the ANC flag, to sing the national anthem and other revolutionary songs, to know the main leaders of the ANC and the entire liberation movement, to share things among themselves and help one another, to know and appreciate the ANC policy of non-racialism (this is aided by the non-racial composition of the pupils and staff), to know some of the problems of South Africa and why they are in exile.

At the primary school too, political education also falls mainly into the first two areas. Political instruction is carried out in class via various subjects, particularly History of Struggle. The school attempts to promote the development of personal revolutionary qualities through teachers, school administrators and ANC leaders talking to the children, by the personal example of the staff, through 5th dent participation in sports and cultural activities (many of which are infused with revolutionary content). An important role is played by videos depicting the struggle in South Africa and performances of progressive South African cultural workers.

At the secondary school, all three areas of political education are dealt with. In the junior secondary school (Forms 1-3) political instruction is given through History of the Struggle and History (World and South African History to about 1860), and to some extent Geography and English. All these subjects are compulsory. In the senior secondary school (Forms 4-5) political instruction is given to all students through Development of Societies (this subject deals with the elements of philosophy and political economy and with aspects of the history and theory of the South African revolution) and the once-weekly Political Discussions (on mainly contemporary issues), History (modern world and South African history) is an optional subject.

Both Development of Societies and History are examined at O-Level by the ANC Examination Board. Geography and Literature, both optional subjects, were until the end of 1987 also examined at O-Level by the ANC Examination Board and thus were vehicles for our political instruction programme. However, a decision has recently been taken to follow the University of London Examination Board syllabi and to write the exams of that Board (as has always been done for the natural sciences, Mathematics, and English Language).

A more informal type of political instruction takes place in the evening news sessions. A student news committee monitors various radio stations around the world and presents the days news to the student body each evening. After the news is read, a discussion follows when students may ask questions or offer comments. From time to time, the news committee also presents news analyses.

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The growth of personal qualities desirable in revolutionaries is promoted, as in the primary school, through exhortation. example, participation in labour. sports and a variety of cultural activities. These things, combined with some of the political instruction. encourage students to identify themselves with the struggle of our people and to develop the attitudes and abilities necessary to participate fully in it. The secondary school provides wide opportunities for students to learn to function in democratic structures and to administer their own affairs. The highest body among the student structures is the Students' Council which is headed by a six-member Executive Committee, five of whose members are elected directly by the whole student body and one of whom (the political commissar) is appointed by the school authorities. The remainder of the Student Council consists of the Chairpersons of the other student committees. There are 16 such committees. including the Cultural, Sports, Entertainment. Emulations (Awards). News. Bulletin Board, Labour, Hostels (Male and Female), Catering, Disciplinary, Pioneers and Young Women's Section committees. There is also an Editorial Board (to produce a student magazine), a Commissariat and a Form Commanders' Council. Some of the committees are elected directly by the students while others are appointed by the Executive. All the student committees are responsible to the College Commissar (a member of staff) and, through him, to the principal.

The above description of the political education at SOMAFCO has not focused on any of the problems (both objective and subjective) faced. and so runs the risk of painting too rosy a picture of the situation at the college. The problems. however. exist in no small measure. Many are associated with our location in exile and so are not likely to be fully overcome in the near future.

Young people who have left their country as children, and even more those who have been born in exile, have difficulty even imagining what South Africa is like. So a large proportion of SOMAFCO students (most in the primary school and about a quarter in the secondary school) know their country mainly from videos and the words of others. It should not be hard to imagine that it is difficult for these young people fully to understand and identify with the struggle; unless teachers are careful, cynicism and anti-political attitudes can develop.

Other serious problems with which the college is faced include: a high staff turnover which causes instability in both the political and non-political education programmes; insufficient boarding staff, especially at the primary school where there are many children without parents, or youngsters who have had to leave their homes, often under rather traumatic circumstances (eg after detention and torture); an insufficient level of organisation in the educational and some other sections of the ANC which makes planning difficult.

Despite these problems though, considerable progress has been made in both the sphere of political education and other spheres. This is largely due to SOMAFCO's one big advantage: it is a school of the liberation movement where our people are free to pursue their lofty educational aims without hindrance from anyone. When this condition exists in South Africa itself, the people's education will make progress like never before. Until that time our people both at home and in exile will continue to use education as an important tool in our struggle for freedom.

Adult Education as Political Action
by Pethu Serote

This paper is based mainly on the experiences of the Adult Education Division of the Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College in Mazimbu, Morogoro.

Efforts by the ANC and its allies. the SACP and SACTU. to provide education for its adult membership have not been fully successful. There are some very interesting stories told by comrades who have been activists since the early days

iii The 1930s. 40s and 50s. Some of the stories are about painstaking efforts conducted with candle- or paraffin light under constant police threat. Others are of similar efforts in the prisons and yet others are of efforts among Umgwenya in Kongwa and in subsequent training camps. It is important for us to put this information together because it constitutes part of our history of Adult Education and forms a basis on which we can build for the future.

In Mazimbu. Dakawa and Dar es Salaam. Adult Education in its organised form is a relatively young area of the

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ANC educational provision for its cadres. For this reason it is still in a situation of flux. On the other hand, because of this very factor. it is one of the most exciting and challenging areas to work in;

The Basic Adult Education section is divided into three groups. namely. the Functional Literacy group, the Intermediate group and a more advanced group which we call the 1.5. This section started operating in 1983. At the moment we are in the process of discussing the production of our own primers for these groups.

After J.S.. the learners join the South African Extension Unit, which is a branch of the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Co-operation, to continue their studies through correspondence. We also have a group of learners who are doing their tOl- and tAi-Level studies through the SAEU. We will present our first 18 candidates in this section in June 1988. The SAEU provides written material and other forms

of support for these groups, and the ANC Adult Education Division, representing the ANC Education Department, acts in an advisory capacity to the SAEU.

The curriculum is still developing in the subjects English, Maths, Agriculture and Integrated Science and Political Education. We are taking into consideration that most of the participants in the Basic Courses are learning in order to be able to cope with the demand of their jobs. We however encourage them to take advantage of opportunities offered by our National Scholarship Committee for them to go and study elsewhere. We hope that when our Vocational Training Centre opens, it will find some of its apprentices from these learners.

We are running a six-month secretarial course whose first candidates will sit for the Pitman's International Examination in July 1988. We hope that some graduates from this course will go on to the Intermediate Course, and some will go on to the Advanced Course. If we continue to receive the support we are presently getting from the administrative structures of Mazimbu, Dakawa and Dar es Salaam, we will soon say goodbye to the days of incompetent secretaries. We also have a political education/discussion course for the community. This is run under the Adult Education Division by a Political Education Committee made up of members of the community. The meetings are held once a week and are in the form of a paper on a given topic and then a discussion based on the paper. These discussions are of political and educational value to the community as a whole.

We are in the initial stages of encouraging workers to receive some education related to their work at their places of work in the small industries created to support the educational institution of SOMAFCO. We hope that once this is started, it will act as a support for the work being done in the Basic Adult Education section.

We hope also that those comrades who are not involved in adult education, would, on encountering many problems, come and join. This will take us some way into transforming the Mazimbu community into a learning community.

We are also in discussions with a group who would like to start a handicrafts group to do embroidery, knitting and crochet work. As we now have our own classrooms, we are in a position to offer such groups a place to work in. Because of our improved staffing position, we are in a position to offer our services for the first time to special groups. We have allocated one teacher to the Kate Molale Centre for Young Mothers. She is assisting a group of young teachers from the Women's Section who have started offering Maths, Geography and History to the young mothers. She is an English teacher.

Although we have made these advances, which in themselves are small ones, we still have many problems. One of the major problems is that Mazimbu, Dakawa and Dar es Salaam are not equally developed as far as Adult Education is concerned. The achievements mentioned above are those of Mazimbu. We need to bring all three areas to the same level. Most of the problems, though, are related to the building of something new. If enumerated here they would fill up pages and pages and yet remain unsolved.

To say something about our learners, especially those who are in the basic literacy group, the inability to acquire formal education when they were young has made a dent in their personalities. Somehow they feel inadequate, lack confidence and undervalue themselves and their life experiences. Added to that, is the fact that their bitter experiences and immense sufferings at the hands of the police and the army and the system in general, have affected them. So they come to Adult Education with a brutalised personality, so to say. For adult education to be successful, it must rebuild their confidence and enable them to find a place in life that they can occupy with full confidence and great pride. This places heavy responsibility on us, the adult educators, to act with

love, dedication and a committed tenacity because the restoration of confidence is very delicate work.

In order to create the right conditions for the execution of this task, it is important for us to transform our communities into learning communities. Mazimbu, for example, has all the potential for us to achieve this goal. Here we have, for example, members of the organisation who have worked for a long time in the underground structures of the movement; we also have members of the Luthuli Detachment who have a wealth of experience in the armed struggle: there is also a group of older comrades who responded to the ANC's call to build Mazimbu and look after the children. All these comrades live together with the young ones who have gained their fighting experience in the streets of the townships in June 1976 and after. The combination of the groups gives us a possibility of creativity. Added to the combination is the fact that they all live in the educational atmosphere of SOMAFCO which they helped to build. We must find a way of organising and systematising their collective and individual experiences in the struggle so as to transform them into learning experiences. In this way we shall rescue our history from getting washed away by time and neglect, arm ourselves for the future and give meaning to collective and individual experiences.

Adult education is a political action. Action is important to the formulation. Adult education is something we do and must do. It is not enough to merely theorise about it. It is a practical political action that opens up avenues which have been hitherto closed to the adults. It empowers them to act more effectively and function fully as responsible citizens through the acquisition of knowledge and make the best use of the world around them, as well as their experiences in life. For this acquisition to be empowering, it necessarily must take place within a situation that is guided by a progressive and humanistic approach to life, a situation that is well grounded in a sound ideological base.

That adult education is important to our revolution is obvious to all of us. It is important because in our country the majority of adults have been deprived of the opportunity to acquire the knowledge and skills necessary for the task of development. We feel the need to have their maximum contribution to our struggle now, but when we have taken

over our country and we are going through the process of reconstruction. we will feel the need even more acutely. Also in a practical way. during this initial period of transition and the transformation of our fighting structures into organs of People's Power, we need people with the knowledge and skills that can be creatively used for this purpose. Our Movement in the external mission is crying out for people with knowledge and skills. and one of the ways to deal with this problem is through adult education.

A close look at the history of our education will also indicate to us how important adult education is for our struggle. Firstly. the fact that ignorance was used as a means of continued oppression and subjugation of our people. lays a big responsibility on us to give adult education the urgent attention it deserves. Secondly. the totality of our grievances against the racist regime found expression in the explosion of the Students' Uprisings of 1976. Students and young people have sacrificed formal education to participate in the struggle being waged in all fronts inside our country. We shall not have played our part fully if we fail to give education to them now and in the future.

We must single out the women because they constitute the majority of adult learners everywhere. Secondly. since the rapid rise into prominence of the feminist movement. the fast-changing position of women has spread to different areas of our lives. This is a revolution in itself. We should not. like Rip van Winkle, sleep through it. Thirdly, (and most importantly), because of the conditions in our country and the structure of our society, more men than women have left the country to come into exile, more men than women are in prison and more men than women die every day. If this trend continues, and all indications are that it will, women will be a crucial force of development during the period of the reconstruction of our country. So in order to ensure that today's sacrifices are not in vain, we should tap the rich potential found in this force. The provision of adult education for women is crucial for our future.

As a way of concluding this discussion paper, we would like to say that the imbalance in the provision of education for the different races in our country from the early days of colonisation, the backwardness and poor quality of provision through Bantu Education, Coloured Education and Indian Education since the takeover of power by the Nationalist Party, and the absence of formal education for the majority of young people because of school boycotts since 1976, have serious implications for our nation for the future. There is no way we can right these wrongs if we exclude adult education from our solution. We must therefore recognise that adult education has a major role to play for now and for the future. We must also accept that adult educators cannot perform this duty except from within a sound ideological position.

Politics and People's Education

by Khulu Mbatha

Introduction

Xkosi Ntshini. a young man of 20 years from the Pietermaritzburg town-torn zone. had this to say when speaking to 21 Weekly Mail reporter in January this year: Firstly. I am 20 and too old to return to standard eight. Also. I do not think I can stomach to sit in front of a teacher for her to tell me that history began in 1652 with the arrival of Jan van Riebeeck. Besides. what is the use of an education when I cannot get the job I want and cannot live where I want to. I will not enjoy the fruits of it anywayf'

Comrade Jaak Simons. when describing education under Apartheid. said: 'Firstly. it is wholly undemocratic. imposed on Afrikaners. Coloureds and Indian communities without their participation or consent Secondly. the system is alien to the people's aspirations and fundamental needs. Thirdly. it is part of a network of institutions designed to perpetuate a social order based on white supremacy and the monopoly of power in all spheres of social activity.Q

The central issue in both statements is the subordinate position of the oppressed in South African society and the general

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problem of ill-education. Barred from political participation in the government, the oppressed majority were forced to take the type of education that will always make them remain drawers of water and hewers of wood. And this is so because the education system in schools and institutions of higher learning, like the universities and academies, preserves the interests and reflects the outlook of the dominant white minority: it expresses the dominant values of the ruling Classes. Education as the embodiment of the traditions, customs and culture of the people, lays the basis for the totality of ideas that influence the thinking (political or otherwise) of the individual in any society; Bantu education was planned and designed (especially in the Verwoerdian style and method) with the aim not only of robbing the majority of our people of professional skills, but also of the cultural wealth of our own society and of all the peoples of the world. Civilisation and rational thinking was reserved for the Whites. By so doing, the system has to strive to monopolise not only the rationality itself, but also the interpretation of what constitutes rationality. This is so that the system can engineer a universal social perception that only it is rational.

To achieve that goal, the system has sought to influence and control social thinking through schools, universities, radio, television, newspapers, the army and its apparent aura of invincibility, the security system, the civil service, hospitals, the airline, mental asylums, public holidays and an array of other institutions, organisations and spectacular public activities, all of which can be persuasive symbols of good government, being under the total control of the system and through which the system monopolises influence, debate and analysis. That is why the system will clamp down on any attempt to challenge the monopoly. The oppressed, in other words, must be consigned to a world of perpetual irrationality, in which there is a total absence of constructive thinking.

Every claim that we, the oppressed, have made to our rights and every struggle waged by us as students, youth, workers or women have been blamed on the influence of outsiders, or communists, or anything except our intellectual capacity of political understanding.

Our Resistance

The oppressed masses have fought back. Their thirst for knowledge has become part and parcel of the oppressed culture of resistance. We have such examples as:

1. The experiment of Elias Wellington Buthelezi in setting up alternative schools in the Eastern Cape in the 1920s.

2. The Cultural Clubs of the ANC which were established in the 1950s to provide an alternative schooling to Bantu Education.

3. The awareness programmes of the Committee of 81 during the school boycotts of 1980.

The significant feature of the present stage of our struggle is that the enemy is being confronted on all fronts. The political army of students, youth, women, workers, the rural masses and other sections of our people has remained firmly in the trenches of struggle. Indeed, the level of commitment to the task of liberation has never been higher than it is today. It is in this context that the rejection of apartheid education has gone well beyond the condemnation of the grossly unequal provision by the racist regime of educational resources for the different population groups.

Today increasing attention is being focused on the question of Alternative Education. What others prefer to call People's Education or People's Alternative Education. Whatever conceptual understanding one gets from the above, the main call is directed towards the move to a democratic educational system that rejects the concepts of White education, Bantu education, Coloured education and Indian education and at the same time intends to assess and establish the role of intellectuals, students, workers and youth in the liberation struggle with the aim of introducing a system that fundamentally liberates and guarantees a democratic future.

The ANC Policy on Education

The ANC along with the rest of the democratic movement, has correctly stated that the crisis in education is directly linked to the broad struggle for the liberation of South Africa.

It emphasised that education cannot be divorced from the denial of political rights to the majority of our country and other apartheid practices.

The Education Policy of the ANC is therefore an answer to the call for an Alternative Education. This policy is based on the Freedom Charter and has as its objective the achievement of a free, equal, non-racial and compulsory system of education.

What is the aim of such an education system?

0 It should undo the negative effects of colonialism.

0 It should embrace a process of 're-humanisation' of all the people of South Africa.

0 It should eliminate the gross inequalities of apartheid and provide adequate and equal facilities for all national groups.

0 It should provide adequate human and material resources.

0 It should provide a syllabus on the history of the strug-

gle and the origin and aims of our revolution.

0 It should embody the value systems and institutions of a liberated South Africa.

0 It should emphasise the teaching of social and natural sciences on equal bases as complementary elements of a broad integrated curriculum.

0 The curricula and syllabi should include efforts to rediscover our authentic cultural heritage and make it accessible to all.

It is in this light that one can appreciate the efforts of the ANC to build Somatbo. The college has provided an opportunity to demonstrate the importance of educating and developing the youth with an understanding of the history of struggle and the principles on which our revolution is being fought.

Education and Politics

In order to understand the relationship between education and politics it will be necessary to discuss some of the principles that have just been mentioned. Educational activity is inseparable from changes in the conditions of peoples existence. As we can observe, the problems arising in connection with the endeavours to set up an alternative education system largely go beyond the framework of the system itself. That is why our people have correctly put forward the slogan: Peoples Education for Peoples Power.

1. Education as the means to prepare qualified cadres for the future organisational and administrative work at different levels, in all spheres of the economy, state apparatus, public bodies, and so on. Peoples Education should also provide access and training in the technical, administrative and professional skills to enable workers to occupy a commanding place in the economy of a future South Africa.

But the most vital aspect of this education should be a combination of professional and political skills. One must acknowledge the fact that a free South Africa will inherit from the racists a value system, even among the oppressed people, which views certain categories of work as inferior. These values will not change immediately or spontaneously

when the political structures change. The demands of the people will partly be shaped by their previous experiences. What it means is that there will also be a tremendous amount of work that needs to be done in the political sphere. The ideological instruments will have to be sharpened now in order to tackle such problems.

Professor H Vilikazi remarked: We are so accustomed in this country to thinking that the problem of education concerns only black education. that it needs to be stressed again and again. by all means possible. that the crisis of education in this country is a general one. embracing both black education and white education. The psychology of oppression. which is so neglected in its full dimension. applies as well in this case. Oppression damages not only the oppressed, but also deals the most serious injury to the spirit and mind of the oppressor. Black education and white education are twins. almost identical.

At the Second Conference of the NECC in 1986, Zwelakhe Sisulu said: We are no longer demanding the same education as whites. since this is education for domination. People's education means education at the service of the people as a whole. education that liberates education that puts the people in command of their lives. Depending on the outcome of the struggle. the dialectics of the education and working conditions of people in post apartheid South Africa will be such that. on the one hand. the changing social conditions will create a basis for proper education as a process of influencing the individual. And on the other. the individuals changing socio-psychological and moral attitudes will be a powerful stimulus for a more vigorous labour activity, including the activity of school and vocational students. The mastering of new equipment. the creative reconstruction of our country. should be regarded as an important Character-moulding factor and means of satisfying the personnel requirements of our future national economy.

2. The policy of the ANC. in a future Peoples Republic of South Africa. is the democratisation of the running of education. This then means that people should fully participate in the decision-making process and have a say in the control of their learning. the affairs of state. the economy and all sectors of life. The decisive controlling factor in the sphere of education shall be the party in power. the state. its movement. youth organisations. trade unions. teachers' collectives. the family and all the progressive forces of society.

But we shall never lose sight of the fact that the process of democratisation should go hand in hand with the campaign to stamp out illiteracy. Otherwise it will be difficult for the people to make use of their right to have a say in political economic and cultural issues. Special programmes will have to be worked out to meet these demands. These will play an important role in giving broad sections of the population access to political life. and accelerate the transformation of relations between parents teachers. students. educational authorities and society in general.

3. The Freedom Charter states that the doors of learning shall be opened to all. This is an essential objective. It must be practical and realistic at the same time. People's Education will have to identify the alternative system, specifying the defects, shortcomings and inadequacies against which the national democratic revolution is directed. In other words, it must have adequate knowledge of education under apartheid and the enormous imbalance that exists today amongst all national groups in the field of education.

The most serious deficiency results from discrimination in the allocation of educational resources, including state expenditure. The reasons for the poor performance of African students include the absence of a sound educational foundation. insufficient pre-primary school facilities and the poverty of the households from which the students come. The disparities in the level of social development (and

specially in the education field) between the different national groups is real. It is a result of hundreds of years of inequality. To remove it by just giving equal chances to everybody is impossible, unless we want to perpetuate the real inequality. Peoples education should give priority to freedom fighters who devoted their lives to the struggle and could not educate themselves. The same should be done to those sections of the population which are most under-developed. The practical policies of Peoples Education shall have to take into account specific features of provinces and regions, of town and countryside. As you can see, these are not matters to be settled only by educational authorities. This is an issue affecting the national question in a very broad sense.

4. Alternative education is in the process of evolving. There are other proposals which attempt to practise alternative education. They are a direct result of the struggle of the people. The Americans and the British are spending a lot of money recruiting black students to study in the USA and Britain. The racist regime and allied institutions in South Africa have come up with other alternatives. For example, they allow white private schools and universities to enrol black students. Training colleges have been built in Soweto and many blacks from Soweto can now attend school in central Johannesburg. There is a lot cooking in the pot.

We have observed that white South Africa, by expanding the possibilities of education, hopes to create an educated black elite for use against the national liberation movement. This problem needs to be addressed. Looking at the positive and negative sides:

Firstly, from the side of the government, the aim is to depoliticise education, which I think will not be easy. The new measures affecting the administration of universities, announced in October last year by the Minister of Education and Culture, are a case in point.

Secondly, the regime aims at increasing the black middle class, not only because of the education crisis, but also because of the economic crisis South Africa is going through. The capitalist mode of production demands these steps be taken. The government needs an effective black education system to provide the trained manpower which an economy.

increasingly dependent on black skills, needsf"

Thirdly, in the global strategy of imperialism, South Africa should remain in the Western camp. The money that is being poured by Western countries into 'improvement of black education' will have to serve the objectives of this conspiracy.

This means that a post-apartheid South Africa will inherit thousands of professionals in the engineering and technical fields, who were trained in the West, who will be involved in the production industry and the education field. The economy will need these qualified people. Our problem is going to be that of re-educating them. It shall therefore be necessary to take political education to the places of work. in the factories, in schools and universities. For example, we might have to give an hour or so a week for political instructions at the place of work. The teachers, who were produced by apartheid, will need political education as well. This is a process of re-educating the educators themselves. Since the ANC is not yet in power, the only conclusion one can make for discussion, is that the education policy is subject to the demands of the struggle as a whole. There is need to constantly hold discussions on this subject in the broader democratic movement, with the women, youth. students, parents and the NECC, so as to arrive together at a policy accepted by all on alternative education.

FOOTNOTES:

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 2. Jack Simons, Alternative Education
 3. Dr Njabulo Ndebele: International Challenge for the struggle in CEAPA Journal, Volume 1. No.2. October, November, December 1987, p.5-6
 4. Ibid. p.6
 5. Father Smangalis Mkatshwa: Keynote Address in Report on National Consultative Conference on the Crisis in Education, organised by the Soweto Parents Crisis Committee at the University of Witwatersrand. Johannesburg 28-29 December. 1985 p. 12
 6. Mikhail Rutkevich: Education Reform. Societys Needs and Young People in Social Sciences, USSR Academy of Sciences, Volume XVII, No 1. 1986. p.60
 7. Professor Herbert Vilakazi. Address given at CEAPA launch, in CEAPA Journal, Volume 1. No.2 p.2
 8. Zwelakhe Sisulu: Keynote Address, Peoples Education for Peoples Power, Second National Consultative Conference. 29 March 1986.
 9. Jack Simons, Alternative Education
 10. Irina Filatova's contribution to the Social Scientists Seminar. Moscow, 17-22 March 1987. p.64 (unpublished)
 11. Weekly Mail January 22-28. 1988. p. 12
- Education Policy:
1. ANC Education Policy. adopted by the National Executive Committee of the ANC in 1978
 2. Conference Report: Education Under Apartheid. 15 November. 1986. London
 3. 0 The Second Council Meeting of the ANC Department of Education and Culture. Morogoro. Tanzania. 14-18 April 1979
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 - 0 Report of the National Education Council 1983 (5th meeting). Morogoro. Tanzania. 17-21 August 1983
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Achieving Commitment and Dedication in Political Education

by MN Njobe

Life in a society needs to be regulated so that the collective interests of all members are protected and served in the best possible way. Political education teaches how the collective interests can be best served. Therefore political education should be an important component of any educational system. In a liberation movement, political education should teach why there is a need for a struggle for liberation, how it should be conducted, what objectives it must seek and so on. One usual aim of political education in a liberation movement is to achieve attitudes and values that promote the struggle, such as commitment, dedication, honesty in carrying out tasks given, and preparedness to sacrifice for the cause.

This paper suggests, from a curriculum perspective, some considerations to be kept in mind in trying to achieve success with political education. The concept of commitment to a political cause, often expected to show in practical acts of dedication and sacrifice, is analysed from the perspective of psychology. In the analysis, a curriculum for liberation is defined as the total life experience which a liberation school provides to the learners.

Two major components of this curriculum are then identified as:

a) the openly declared and written curriculum recorded in the form of syllabuses.

b) the unwritten, undeclared (hidden) curriculum
CURRICULUM FOR POLITICAL EDUCATION

The paper highlights the concept of the hidden curriculum component and the influence this component might have on the expected outcome of political education. The paper concludes that the more decisive factor in political education is the way the hidden component of the curriculum is handled.

Curriculum for Political Education
A common narrow view is to see learning in a school as being only the outcome of what learners read, or hear from their teachers. However, we now know that the way a school is managed, the way teachers behave, the way the community relates to the school, influence outcomes. Other, more important, factors which determine the success of political education include the total experience of the learner in the life situation of the school, and the surrounding community
7 the hidden curriculum.

In effect, this hidden curriculum content can silently teach, in a most successful way, just the exact opposite of what the school intended to teach. This fact is well illustrated by the outcome of Bantu Education. In the case of Bantu Education, all the lessons intended to influence learners to accept apartheid education have, in effect, resulted in the opposite outcome of its total rejection. The total experience of living in Bantu Education schools and living in apartheid South Africa reverses the intended outcome of making the learners accept apartheid.

The concept of hidden curriculum in political education will now be further elaborated. The content of learning might be categorised as consisting of:

a) Information and facts (cognitive domain) which teachers, books and other written materials convey to learners.

b) Feelings as expressed in attitudes, norms, values and interests (affective domain) and;

c) Physical skills (psychomotor domain) as taught at vocational training centres. Skills include writing, carpentry and other learning with a manual, physical element.

Many people appear to think that the cognitive element is enough for political education; that when all aspects of struggle have been explained and perhaps repeated so that comrades know all about its importance, then they will immediately become committed, dedicated and ready to sacrifice for the cause. However, we know that people who know what is good do not always do what is good. There is something more that is necessary to translate the knowledge

of goodness into genuine actions of doing good. In political education attitude, values, interests and so on also need to be acquired in addition to information and facts concerning the struggle. Only after the acquisition of the affective domain content are we likely to produce cadres showing genuine commitment, dedication, sacrifice and so on. Complicating the issue is the fact that even when the acts of commitment, dedication and sacrifice appear to be there, one can never be certain that such acts are, in reality, genuine. Many supposedly trusted comrades have betrayed. Evaluation of political commitment can never be absolutely sure. Comrades in a struggle always have to trust each other on faith. Thus in judging each other for purposes of decision-making, we must always be very cautious, for judgments of this kind have a very high subjective factor. One's political commitment is a personal matter about which others can never be absolutely certain. We therefore must never take irreversible decisions on the fate of people on the basis of our subjective evaluation of each other's political commitment. When we do so, our political education programme may cause difficulty for those people living as subordinates of the makers of such decisions. Political commitment cannot be measured with much degree of certainty.

Hidden Curriculum

Political commitment, dedication, sacrifice, willingness and so on, in the context of a liberation struggle, are dimensions of attitude towards the struggle. Being committed includes being positive in attitude towards tasks aimed at achieving the objectives of the struggle. A committed cadre tries to play his/her own part in advancing the course of struggle. The foregoing attitude, along with the value systems including sacrifice, are developed to a large extent by the hidden curriculum in the school. The appearance of the schools physical structures, including buildings, furniture and how

it is arranged in the classroom, the school grounds and how and who maintains them, and so on, all silently teach certain attitudes and values to the learners. The elegance of the physical structures of the white schools in South Africa and the dilapidated appearance of black schools, by contrast, are intended to teach apartheid values and attitudes such as whites being superior and blacks being inferior. Capitalist values in the society are also partly taught this silent way. Thus the new elegant private schools, with imposing buildings, though not openly declaring their content do teach socio-economic stratification attitudes and value systems.

Aspects of the school and community environment which influence the development of attitudes include those pertaining to social relations. The way the school community and its social institutions are organised, structured and function influence attitudes. Social relations among the school staff, between staff and students, staff and community will influence the outcome of political education in the school. Distribution of power in the school, who holds it, how the one holding it came to hold it, how much of it is decentralised and so on are important factors which silently affect the success of political education. How those who have come to power use that power are also important determinants of attitudes and values in a school and community situation. The factors merit serious consideration when imparting values and attitudes to cadres.

The way power is shared in South Africa's socioeconomic structures and in black schools as between the school authorities and the students SRCs, parents, etc, reversed the intended outcome of apartheid education into the opposite outcome of producing some committed and dedicated militants of our struggle. The political educators in a liberation struggle will achieve success if the school and community structures, power distribution and its exercise are seen by the learners to reflect genuine attempts to advance, in concrete reality, towards a model of the kind of society the struggle is aimed at. Repetition of political cognitive content by teachers and commissars without evidence of support from the hidden component of the school and/or community experience of living, is unlikely to help the achievement of genuine commitment, dedication and a sense of sacrifice for the struggle among the learners or community.

The way rewards are distributed in a school teaching political education will influence the learners' political attitudes and values. Rewards include test marks, praise, prizes, appointments, promotions, privileges and so on. A showering of praise and prizes on the top scorers in a test cultivates certain attitudes and values. Appointments of subordinates on an exaggerated subjective basis of supposed political commitment, where more democratic methods could have worked, has a devastating effect on the success of political education in a real sense. The same equally applies to the granting of privileges such as tasks of compiling and reporting news, being convenor, secretary or leader of a discussion or representing one's political group elsewhere.

Other Factors

In a political education class, all members of the class must, at one time or the other, be given responsibilities which involve them in activities of the foregoing kind to stimulate their political commitment. Tasks so allotted need to have close bearing on the work of the struggle. Learners need to see tasks given as furthering the course of the struggle. When one is involved in this way, one feels recognised and accepted as a contributing fighter in the struggle. Involvement of this kind deepens feelings of commitment and stimulates dedication, thereby cultivating a preparedness to sacrifice for the cause of the struggle. Political educators, therefore, need to make every effort to involve each and every one they are trying to educate in activity of the above kind as equally as possible, without showing favouritism.

Equally important to realise is that one does not get com-

mitted to a cause which ignores or operates adversely to one's main interests. For example, one's interest in furthering one's education cannot just be brushed aside in the interest of the struggle, without consent. The interests of the individual need to be integrated with the interests of the struggle by mutual agreement. To ignore one's dominantly declared interests or expected interests is to cultivate deceptive attitudes. These are attitudes of people who pretend to be committed, only to await a chance when they can defect. Some, in resentment, might even betray to punish the organisation, in their poor thinking.

In the actual practice of educating, in the context of transmitting information and facts (cognitive content) on the why, what and how of struggle, the discussion method can prove very effective. All opinions behind closed classroom doors need to be freely voiced and discussed. In a liberation struggle such as the one of South Africa there can never be a problem of justifying the struggle. The political educators themselves must make balanced statements in their presentations and accept and allow discussion on them. Otherwise, learners might silently decide not to believe whatever a political educator says if the learners experience in living with him has silently taught them that they cannot question what he says. However, for fear of consequences they might never show these feelings, until the opportunity to retaliate comes when they might desert the organisation.

The use of reasons to justify political positions taken can be very effective. At the end of each lesson or political address, the audience must never feel they were being compelled to accept misinformation. If they ever do feel so, then even a mild form of the backlash experienced by the racists over Bantu education can be expected. Under camp conditions, falsehoods might be silently swallowed for a while for fear of reprisals, but desertions and betrayals might be experienced when the opportunity presents itself.

Conclusion

The foregoing discussion centred on political education in a school intended to develop commitment and values of dedication and sacrifice. The same principles apply to the political education of a community. Members of a movement

do not become committed. dedicated and sacrificing just because the need to do so is understood. The necessary attitude and value system need also to be developed. The latter partly develops from the information and facts given, but the greater part is acquired silently through the experience of living in the situation in which the educating process takes place.

In a political organisation. the individual members silently watch and assess their experiences. including how the community is organised. how its structures function, how power is shared and used. and how rewards are given. In considering these kinds of factors (hidden curriculum) the greater part of their attitudes to the struggle and value systems, including dedication and sacrifice. is acquired. These factors need always to be controlled so that their effects favour the political orientation desired. That is. in the ease of a liberation struggle. the factors must favour the development of commitment, dedication and sacrifice as part of the programme of political education.

The information and facts about the struggle without a supporting result of evaluation of experience in living in the situation is not enough to achieve the desired outcome of political education. Political educators need to spare no effort in attempting to secure genuine commitment, dedication and a sacrificing spirit in the cadres they educate. Towards this end, information and facts are necessary, but not enough. Appropriate attitudes, values and interests which complement commitment and dedication also need to be developed. Active involvement and balanced discussions of political issues are also important attitude builders. However, the learners daily experience of actual living in the physical, socio-economic and psychological environment of the school and the community are probably the most decisive factors for the success or failure of a political education programme.

The Role of the Media in Political Education

by Victor Moche

The specific discussion of the role of the media in political education must come naturally to us. considering the role we ascribe to the media as a collective educator, agitator and organiser.

This role that we ascribe to the media arises from its character and function in society _ as instruments of ideological influence and communication and in capitalist society additionally as an instrument of profit. In this regard it must be noted that the media are expressions of historically developed social relations and not mere reflections of or on events in society _ as some would have us believe.

The role and output of media will therefore always be an expression of given social relations and the forces shaping those relations.

The recent ban on certain major media organs in South Africa. culminating in the present total clampdown. is but a reflection of the interaction of the forces occupying the main historical arena in our country, while reports that there were church services in Soweto to commemorate those who died in the riots...I(BBC 16.06.78 21.00gmt) contrasted with a call for solidarity on this anniversary Of the Soweto massacresI(Dar-es-Salaam Radio 15.06.75) as the practical expression of the same interaction of these historical forces.

PW Botha had occasion to say: "I appeal to newspaper editors to draw up a policy for their newspapers which will prevent radical and revolutionary elements from getting the headlines. If the editors do not do this. then the govern"

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ment will see that it is done? Conversely, in writing about the community paper Grassroots it has been stated that the paper itself has also contributed to the building of democracy. The starting point for asserting democratic control is a critical understanding of our oppression and the development of an alternative world view. Grassroots has played a crucial role in contesting apartheid and contesting the dominant (sic)

ideology of South Africa V

Thus the role of the media in our society is characterised by the contest for self-assertion by the two major contending forces. The role of the media of the democratic forces must, perforce, be one of a collective educator, agitator and organiser.

In the specific function of political education the media of the democratic forces must of necessity arise from within the democratic movement, specifically answering the social need of these forces to create communication, for learning. Political education is, as we understand it, the more or less permanent change of behaviour that occurs as a result of activity or experience.

The democratic movement engages in activity to resist and oppose the oppressive system of apartheid. In opposing that system it evolves and formulates an alternative system and elaborates an alternative democratic ideology out of which it determines, through active struggle, the norms and parameters of that alternative system. The primary vehicle for imparting these norms - political, social, cultural etc _

.is the network of communication which includes, as a major element the organs of mass communication - the printing press, the electronic media and other instruments and ,organs of publicity. The other elements for imparting this iknowledge and experience of struggle such as the educational system, cultural work, etc are discussed elsewhere but must .be held at the back of our minds as we consider the specific role of the mass media of communication. All these elements are closely related and interdependent.

If a primary vehicle for activising this learning process is communication then a primary vehicle of communication is, in turn, language.

Before we proceed to examine the important part played by language in any system of political education it may be necessary to underline the importance of the principle of activity in any such system.

Human activity predetermines all human interaction, whether between individuals, individual and group or group and group and underlies that process of production which sustains society. It is in activity, which includes production that language is born. If we are to create, shape and develop consciousness of a specific kind then it is important to study the psyche of the individual and its interaction with society and how this interaction influences and is influenced by society. This involves analysis of the being of society, its characteristic mode of production and the system of social relations in a given mode of production. The propagandist - and this term is used deliberately - cannot look into the individuals head and determine how thoughts, feelings and will are born, develop and function. Only through an understanding of the mode of production and the system of social relations are we able to understand the concept of class consciousness. Class consciousness and class struggle are not pre-existent and antecedent to revolutionary consciousness and struggle. They are born out of direct human activity in this sphere. The only prerequisite is the objective condition of class exploitation. Revolutionary consciousness and struggle can only develop where there is struggle. This relationship is important especially in the development of the forms of struggle that we engage in and propagate. It is important that we underscore at a given stage of our struggle, the interests that we propound in order to motivate it and the language that we shape to inspire these motives.

It is beyond the framework of this paper and possibly this workshop to pursue this area of discussion and we aim here only to show the broad interrelationship of human activity, production, social relations and social consciousness and recommend strongly that the study of such phenomena and social structures must precede the systematic study of ways and means and the methodology of socialisation, conscientisation and propaganda work.

Another brief discourse before our consideration of language in the system of political education must be on information. Information which is the basis of communication is the product of human activity and the production process. Social information - that information that influences that development of consciousness - is the purpose-oriented communication of ideas, thoughts feelings or findings W in an attempt to bring about or influence specific responses in a second party. Social information requires the posses" sion of communicable ideas and facts by an individual or group.

Human beings, in the process of cognition of the reality around them, select ideas and facts through their perceptirm. We cannot receive the totality of the reality surrounding HST so that eventually information and communication are cssetv tially subjective. We do not only communicate bare facts but also ideas arising out of our system of perception. The imr portance of the foregoing cannot be overstated in relation to the need to foster communication and establish the means of communication - especially mass media if our society

is to prosecute its revolutionary struggle in a planned systematic fashion.

We have ascribed, elsewhere in this paper, to the media, the character of organiser. A very important element in this function of the media as organiser is language. Language itself has an organising function. Organisation affords us control. Furthermore language creates community. Language makes it possible to co-ordinate human activity in an intelligent way and to describe and transmit experience. It also makes it possible to single out particular objects by attaching significance to them through words and their associations. Words have the effect of marking objects - in naming for instance - which results in categorisation and systematising, the result of which is that what is marked is then dealt with within the system or through particular attitudes. Words have a property of power through which they attain the function of control' (Ernst Fisher, The Necessity of Art p.31). Naming a thing makes it comprehensible, brings it within grasp of the human being and therefore opens the possibility of control by that person. Control makes possible modification and development. In development and struggle, therefore, words can be equated with tools. They certainly are in propaganda work, journalism and publicity. To digress somewhat, in an attempt to illustrate the foregoing and to highlight the importance of language and its usage in propaganda work, we can say without fear of contradiction that the religious community, especially the Christian community, inspired by various factors, including economic and political factors, seems to have been the most apt and consistent agency in recognising the power of language. Missionaries ensured the translation of the Bible into ethnic languages very early on in the process of evangelisation. This act was certainly no accident of history but the conscious and systematic creation of community cohesion and control. For the propagandist it is crucial to remember that language is a form of identity and creates identity. It is a preservative - of its own self, its culture and history; and therefore highly potent for propaganda. In illustrating this we easily find that a second or foreign language cannot create or bear for the user the same images as the native one, as seen by examples of the American Indian in his ritual of worship or even nearer to us where the Angoni in Zambia resort to their traditional culture in observing certain religious and ceremonial rites.

The question has been asked whether foreign-language speakers become like albinos in a community and the brutal but honest teasing by Children of a mate who does not or only poorly speaks their language may be an indicator of the psychological response that Iforeign-languageespeakersI evoke in non-COsmopolitan communities. In some of our vernaculars Iuku-kumtshai or Igo-tshomal is a reflex sound that is a caricatured imitation of English speaking. The caricature is a derogatory label denoting at times alienation. at other times misdirection. the being withoutl as compared to being one of us'. It adds to differentiation and evokes more often than not. attitudes, variously. of antagonism, envy and distance.

The foregoing must be of particular note for our activists and organisers in the field especially in relation to our non-urban and non-eosmopolitan communities.

Nobody. and least of all political activists, can claim that a language is impossible to learn. because even species that have vocal organs different from hutnans can learn to vocalise human language The voeal organs of birds are far removed from those of humans yet parrots can learn to vocalise a hutnan language. Reluctance to learn other peoples languages is always expressed by the excuse about the difficulty - in a physical sense # of speaking that language as much as of understanding it. How often do we hearztlt is all Greek to me or it all sounds Chinese to me, implying unintelligibility and therefore inferiority. That. for a political worker. organiser and propagandist is rank arrogance and even chauvinistn

Still on this aspect, it has been noted in scientific study that certain types of spider have so perfected the construction of their webs that their dependence and reliance on such webs is in turn making them blind as a species. due to disuse of their eyes. For our purposes the disuse of a language would eventually kill off that language and by extension kill off the culture of a people. that is borne by that language. The danger of the loss of the narratives the songs. the poetry, the mythology and indeed whole portions of the history of such a people must make us acutely aware of language usage in our propaganda work.

All said and done - the human brain is essentially an organising instrument. It receives. perceives. assesses and processes all stimuli. sensations and messages from our organs. Language is a crucial element in this function of the brain. If we are to organise workers. peasants and intellectuals who will be capable of fully mastering their own destinies then we must be eognisant of the potentialities of the element of language. We dwell on language at such length because it is the primary tool of agitation and propaganda. both in its oral and visual forms. Political education through the mass metlia demands a mastery of the use of this tool. Even simple communication demands a minimum proficiency in language.

It is out of order in writing in a newspaper to say tthere were not enough inputs to rehabilitate the inttastrueturef as a Nigerian paper once did. when what they wanted to say was that there was no tar to mentl the roads. Still as

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misleading and offensive even though perhaps more excusable is to say, as one headline did: tMan steals tyres to feed family as if the family ate tyres.

Clear and careful formulation of the propagandist's message is the key to successful communication. Successful communication leads to stimulation of the perceptive and cognitive processes that arouse attention. Attention denotes interest. Interest motivates. Motivation inspires. Inspiration activates. Activity calls for eo-ordination. Co-ordination calls for organisation and organisation is strength. Strength of course is a long way down the road to victory.

Mastery of language also helps us as organisers and political educationists in differentiating the content of our

newspapers, broadcasts and the profiles of our organs. A single news item can be followed up as an editorial, a comment, a guest column a feature or a letter. In other words we are afforded a wider use of the various genres of mass communication, treating the same issue in new different forms, thereby ensuring that we set the agenda and stimulate a true process of communication, a communication that evokes responses and influences attitudes and opinions. Attitudes lead to convictions and opinions lead to deeper and broader discussion. Convictions and deeper understanding lead to commitment and the correct assessment of courses of action.

In differentiating our approach to political education through the media we are thus better able to unmask and interpret the language and ideas of the enemy for our people, This is one of the most fundamental roles of the media in political education. In thus communicating with our people we steadily impart to them the knowledge and skill not only to participate meaningfully in present struggles but also to communicate amongst themselves, to multiply our organs, to popularise the struggles and generalise their experience. The slogan each one teach one is the most apt for the agit-prop workers. Only if we assiduously study and understand the dynamics of our society and the larger world community and evolve potent weapons to reach the psyche of our people coupling these with the practical skills of propaganda work and making the necessary effort to acquire the wherewithal for such work can we be assured of harnessing the revolutionary potential of all Our people for victory over oppression.

The regime has recently launched its most decisive offensive against the democratic media of our country. This is no accident.

Communication is the missile of tomorrow, says Jean-Luc Lagardere. President of Matra, the French armament (missiles) and media conglomerate (Newsweek. US edition, Dec 22 1980 p.49). He should know and so must we.

The Erosion of White Political Cohesion in South Africa by Rob Davies

In September 1985, a number of prominent personalities of monopoly capital travelled to Zambia to meet members of the leadership of the ANC. In July 1987, a group of largely Afrikaans-speaking intellectuals and professionals, some with previous associations with Afrikaner nationalism, met a delegation from our movement in Dakar. There have also been a number of similar ANC meetings with representatives of other constituencies of the white community. These events are among the most visible and positive indications that the political and ideological cohesion of the white power bloc in South Africa is eroding. At the same time, however, the same process of fragmentation has led the far right to increase its support among other strata of the white population. In the May 1987 whites-only elections, for example, the Konserwatiewe Party increased its representation in parliament from 18 to 22 seats and displaced the Progressive Federal Party as the official opposition in the white House of Assembly.

The aim of the present paper is to analyse some of the major contradictions and divisions which have emerged within the white community in the contemporary period. A fundamental point of departure has to be a recognition that racist minority rule is in chronic and irreversible decline. This situation has, of course, been brought about by the advances of our people's struggle in the period since the early 1970s. These fundamentally altered the strategic balance of forces between oppressor and oppressed and created a profound organic crisis for the apartheid system and state. Not only is it now almost universally recognised that the Botha regime's reformed apartheid programme has failed: it is also becoming increasingly evident that there is no new guise racist minority rule can assume which is capable of guaranteeing it a stable future.

It is more than two years since our movement concluded that the Botha regime had lost the strategic initiative.¹ With its reformed apartheid programme in tatters, the regime has been forced to fall back on the only means available to it to prolong its rule — a reign of state terror. However, notwithstanding certain tactical gains which it has without doubt made since the declaration of the nationwide State of Emergency in June 1986, it has not succeeded in regaining the strategic initiative. As this year's January 8 message from the NEC put it, in the strategic sense the enemy has been defeated in its intentions. Whatever the reverses we have suffered (through the enemy's campaign of repression) we have, in the main, successfully defended our organisational formations. In certain instances (notably trade unions and youth) we have actually expanded the organised formations of the mass democratic movement.² The regime thus remains as far away as ever from the quest of producing a viable political solution to the continuing, and indeed deepening, crisis of the apartheid system and state.

The present paper is divided into two main sections. The first presents an overview of the impact of the evolving people's struggle over the past 15 years and of the Botha regime's strategy in the face of the challenge posed by it. The second section examines some of the major contradictions between different class forces in the white community, which have been revealed, heightened or have emerged in this context. It focuses on the growth of far-right reaction and on some of the major tendencies moving towards acceptance of solutions which reach beyond the parameters of racist minority rule.

With respect to the latter, the paper argues that the distinction made by our movement between forces for change and democratic forces is a useful and valid one, but suggests that it is also increasingly necessary to discriminate carefully between different forms for change. Some of the latter (notably monopoly capital) have some disagreements with

the regime, but also have sharp and deeply-rooted differences with the democratic movement. Their movement towards searching for solutions reaching beyond racist minority rule has been extremely cautious and vacillating and they retain strong ties with the regime in a number of areas. At the same time, however, the paper argues that there are other forces - various strata of intellectuals, professionals and strata of white labour - which can be mobilised and eventually, possibly, even be drawn into the ranks of the democratic movement.

Finally, the paper argues that some account has to be taken of contradictions which have emerged within the regime itself - differences over strategic objectives, differences over instruments of strategy and differences over specific tactics,

I. THE CONTEXT

1. The Changing Balance of Forces and the Reformed Apartheid

The deep-seated multiple crisis in which the apartheid system and state have been enmeshed in the past 15 years followed a ten-year period of boom and apparent stability, which ran from about 1963 to 1973. This decade of stability and 'prosperity' was, of course, made possible only by the brutal application of repression against the nationally oppressed and exploited people. This golden age of apartheid followed the defeats inflicted on the democratic movement in the early 1960s. In the ten years which followed, the strategic initiative rested with the oppressors and exploiters, who used their class power and control over the state to stifle any form of popular struggle. The real wages of black workers stagnated or declined and the national oppression of all classes of the oppressed majority was intensified by the more ruthless and effective application of a growing range of apartheid laws. At the same time, and of course dependent on the increased exploitation and oppression of the black majority, the decade was one of growing prosperity for all classes in the oppressor white community. Monopoly capital

consolidated itself as the economically dominant force in all sectors of the economy and through extensive state intervention and support. Such Afrikaner corporations as Sanlam, Rembrandt and Volkskas emerged as monopoly conglomerates. With profit rates among the highest in the world, foreign capital continued to pour into the country. With state coffers full, the military apparatus was rapidly expanded and modernised. The overwhelming majority of white wage earners continued to be rapidly promoted from the ranks of the manual working class posts to clerical administrative and technical positions and the gap between white and black wage rates widened.

The white minority never has been, and did not become during the 1963-73 period, an undifferentiated monolith. Important contradictions continued to exist between different social times. The government Nationalist Party was not the direct political representative of non-Afrikaner monopoly capital, the economically dominant class force. The growth of Afrikaner monopolies led to widening differences with other class forces within the Afrikaner nationalist alliance. There were important rivalries between branches of security apparatuses, the military and the Bureau of State Security (BOSS) in particular. Nevertheless, under the overall domination of the struggle of the period, these remained largely latent and what may be described as the white power bloc was characterised by its relatively high level of overall cohesion. This was reflected at the party political level by the fact that the governing Nationalist Party continued to consolidate its position at the expense of the official United Party opposition. Liberal and right opposition was largely confined to the hinges.

There is no need to describe in detail the process of the struggle which began in the early 1970s and fundamentally altered the strategic balance of forces between oppressor and oppressed. It is sufficient to state our present purpose merely to note that in the wave of struggle, which began with the Durban strikes of 1972/3, passed through the 1976 Soweto Uprising, and has seen the resurgence of armed struggle as well as the growing unity of mass action around the basic programme and perspectives of our movement, the oppressed have gradually assumed the offensive and forced the oppressor on to the defensive. This change in the strategic balance of forces has produced a political crisis of the apartheid system and state, which has been characterised as "organic" in the sense that it has revealed deep-seated fundamental contradictions and a chronic inability of the system to maintain itself in the old way. It should, moreover, be noted that at the same time as the apartheid system was coming under pressure from the growing challenge inside the country, the defeat of Portuguese colonialism in the mid-1970s has changed the balance of forces within the Southern African region. The apartheid state found itself no longer surrounded by a ring of allied states, but by independent states committed to achieving liberation in the subcontinent.

The Botha regime, which came to power in September 1978, represented a new alignment of forces within the minority

dominant classes - an alliance between Afrikaner monopoly capital (which dominated the Cape Nationalist Party and was behind the emergence of the right-wing tendency within Afrikaner nationalism) and the top military commanders. The new regime also received a degree of support from non-Afrikaner monopoly capital, unprecedented for a Nationalist Party administration. The point of unity between these forces which coalesced in varying degrees behind the Botha regime was a recognition that the crisis had deepened to the point where it was impossible to maintain racist minority rule through established classical Verwoerdian apartheid. In Botha's famous slogan, apartheid had to adapt or die. The details of the Botha regime's total strategy, launch-

ed in a bid to adapt racist minority rule to the new conditions of struggle. need not concern us here. In essence the total strategy sought to combine repression with various measures designed to restructure the apartheid system in a number of specific respects. Presented ideologically as a programme of reforms, changes were initially introduced in the economic and social spheres. These sought to relax certain restrictions on the horizontal and vertical mobility of the more skilled strata of the black labour force. At the same time measures were introduced to provide more openings for a black middle class in the hope of widening the regimes minuscule support base among certain strata of the nationally oppressed majority.

The overall strategic objective was to create a more secure base for racist minority rule. Black allies were to be drawn into power sharing structures. but in such a way that ultimate political power remained in the hands of the present racist minority regime. The regimes reformed apartheid programme aimed, in short, not at initiating a process of gradually abolishing racist minority rule, but on the contrary at creating a new, more secure base for the existing power holders to maintain their monopoly of political and economic power under the new conditions of struggle.

As an integral part of the attempt to implement its total strategy, the Botha regime also sought to reorganise the entire decision-making structure of the apartheid state. This has resulted in the emergence of a two extra-parliamentary, military-dominated, parallel government system existing alongside, but effectively controlling, the institutions of civilian administration.

At the head of the National Security Management System (NSMS), as it is known, stands the State Security Council (SSC). This has become the most important decision-making body in the apartheid state. The SSC is chaired by the State President himself, and includes six ministers # defence, foreign affairs, law and order, constitutional development and planning, justice and finance # plus the following senior state officials: the Chief of the SADF, Chief of Army, Air Force, Navy and Chief of the South African Medical Services, the Chief of Staff Intelligence, Director-General of the National Intelligence Service (NIS), the Director-General of Foreign Affairs, the Director-General of Law and Order, the Director-General at the State President's Department, the Director of Security Legislation, the Commissioner of

Police, and the Head of Security Police.

Apart from these statutory or primary members, other ministers and officials may be co-opted at the State President's discretion. The SSC has its own Secretariat. This is currently headed by Lt.Gen. Charles M Lloyd, a former General Officer Commanding both the South West African Territory Force and the Northern Transvaal Command of the SADF. The SSC Secretariat is responsible directly to the State President and its staff is drawn from various government departments, but with a very high military component. The SSC's statutory responsibility is to advise the government on the formulation and implementation of national policy and strategy in relation to the security of the Republic. This is wide enough to embrace virtually every area of the government's internal and external activity. In practice, the SSC concerns itself with and manages the total range of policy strategies of the state. Under the Total Strategy, everything deemed to be connected with the security of the state falls under its purview. It is the SSC which co-ordinates and plans the utilisation of all the means available to the state to achieve specific objectives as spelled out in the formulation of the Total Strategy. While the SSC, in formal terms, only makes recommendations to the Cabinet, these carry the stamp of approval of the State President and in practice are merely endorsed by the full cabinet. The SSC meets weekly throughout the year, and is thought to prepare the agenda for the cabinet. It is also known to have met before the 1986 Federal Congress of the Nationalist Party, evidently to prepare the strategy to be adopted there.

In addition to the SSC, the NSMS now also embraces a series of other military-dominated structures which reach down to local government level. Once again in formal terms these Joint Management Committees (JMCs) as they are known, are merely advisory to parallel structures of civil administration, but in practice they control the actions of their civilian counterparts in a similar way to that in which the SSC effectively controls the cabinet.

2. The Crisis of the Total Strategy

In practice the Botha regime's reformed apartheid programme rapidly proved to be almost as unacceptable to the majority of the people of the country as Verwoerdian bantustans. The programme's unacceptability to a mass movement increasingly uniting around the Freedom Charter's call for a democratic, non-racial South Africa, was evident from the moment it began to be implemented and was underlined in the campaign against the elections for the tri-cameral parliament, organised by the United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1983/4. However, the advances in the popular struggle, which took place between the time of the Vaal Triangle uprising of August 1984 and the declaration of the country-wide State of Emergency in June 1986, added an important new dimension. Not only did they confirm the continued unacceptability of the reformed apartheid; they also demonstrated its unworkability as a viable solution to the deepening crisis. As is well known, through a combination of mass action (including strikes and school, rent and consumer boycotts) and armed struggle, the period August 1984 to mid-1986 saw the balance of forces further shifted in favour of the oppressed at the expense of the oppressor. The mass action of the period succeeded above all in destroying the regimes' Black Local Authority (BLA) system - a linchpin of its proposed constitutional reform programme. By the end of 1985, not only were the BLAs largely inoperative, but embryonic structures of popular power had begun to be created in black urban residential areas and in the rural areas of some of the bantustans.

These developments were to have profound political consequences not only for the people and progressive forces but also for relations between different class forces within the white minority as well as between the apartheid state and the major imperialist powers, upon whose tacit goodwill, ill

not openly declared support, the apartheid system depended for its survival and prosperity. By the end of 1985 at the latest, it was becoming clear that it was not only the democratic movement which had concluded that apartheid was becoming unworkable and the country ungovernable. By the time of PW Botha's Tlokweng speech³ of August 1985, racist minority rule itself was being widely seen on all sides of the political spectrum in all corners of the world as no longer viable. The regime had been placed in a position where it was being seen as having no credible political solution to the crisis in South Africa. It had lost the strategic initiative. This is one element, which is of critical importance in analysing current divisions within the white minority. But it is also necessary, to complete the picture, to take note of some of the elements of the regime's response to this situation, and in particular of the strategy it appears to have been following in the period since the declaration of the State of Emergency in June 1986.

3. The Regime's Post-1986 Strategy

Faced with the failure of its own reformist apartheid programme to contain the advancing liberation struggle, the Botha regime was forced to make a strategic choice between two broad alternatives. First, it could respond to the growing mass challenge and international pressure by beginning to move on to the terrain of what may be described as serious negotiation politics. This would imply struggling over the terms, conditions and timing - but accepting the inevitability - of an eventual transfer of power. The alternative was to attempt to hold on to power by launching a reign of state terror at home and a wave of military aggression in the region.

The regime's chosen path was never really in doubt. It rejected pressure, including the threat of sanctions, to move towards a negotiated transfer of power. It was not, however, able to totally ignore all domestic and international demands for negotiation. Rather than openly rejecting such calls, it attempted to redefine the terms and scope of negotiation -- to accept that negotiation should take place but try to shape and contain the process within parameters which would not imply a transfer of power.

Late 1985 and early 1986 saw the regime making a major

effort to secure the support and endorsement of the western powers for its conception of a negotiated settlement. This was clearly the motivation behind the decision to receive and enter into discussions with the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group (EPG). Given the EPG's origins in a compromise resolution at the October 1985 Bahamas Commonwealth Conference designed to avert a split over the question of sanctions, the regime evidently calculated that it might succeed in selling its version of negotiations to the Group. It accordingly went through the motions of discussing its proposals with the Group. This saga is well covered in the EPG's own report. When the Group presented its own proposals which would have implied moving, beyond racist minority rule the regime broke off discussions. The break with the EPG was symbolised by the SADF raids against Gaborone, Harare and Lusaka on May 19 1986. It was followed within a month by the declaration of a country-wide State of Emergency. This has served as a cover for a reign of state terror involving detentions, bannings, restrictions and the unleashing of vigilantes against democratic organisations. However, although the main means through which the regime has attempted to cling on to power has been repression, it is evident that its entire strategy is not reducible to force alone. Rather the regime has sought to use repression as a means of rolling back the advances made by the mass struggle in the hope that this will create more favourable conditions for the re-launching, in a slightly modified form, of its stalled "reformed apartheid" programme. Two main strands can be identified. These are to some extent associated with different tactical positions within the NP and theretofore the subject of some intra-regime rivalry. But a degree of complementarity is also evident.

The first, associated with what is called the reformist faction of the NP, focuses on attempts to draw representative groups of "black" people into negotiations. As part of this strategy some of the regime's spokesmen have begun speaking the language of "power-sharing". Such pronouncements are evidently intended to be all things to all men. Above all they are intended to blur the distinction between the regime's own reformed apartheid programme and the multi-racial power sharing proposals being advanced in certain circles of domestic monopoly capital and imperialism. The former can broadly be defined as the creation of "power-sharing" structures in a system in which final direct political control rests with the existing racist minority regime.

The latter would imply some transfer of power within the "power sharing" system which would constrain the capacity of a new government to transform the basic structures of apartheid capitalism. Reformist rhetoric of this type has particularly become associated with Stoffel van der Merwe, the Deputy Minister in the State Information Department responsible for both Information and Constitutional Development and Planning. Stoffel van der Merwe, who was appointed to the second of the above posts in June 1987, has been described as the regime's frontline negotiator with voteless blacks and is generally regarded as one of the foremost "reformists" within the regime. Van der Merwe has deliberately set out

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to create an image of flexibility and reasonableness. He is on record in a recent interview as saying "if we say we want to create a system in which no one group dominates any other group or groups, it also means that white domination of such a system cannot be perpetuated?"

A closer examination of proposals emanating even from reformist elements within the regime indicates, however, that they remain firmly located within the problematic of reformed apartheid. They set out from an acceptance of the basic long standing objective of the Botha regime's "reform" strategy - to draw certain black allies into "power-sharing" structures at local council, regional and national level in such a way that ultimate control remains in the hands of the pre-

sent power holders. tReformistsi may now use the language of tpower-sharingl, but they continue steadfastly to reject any transfer of power. In the interview quoted above, Van der Merwe stressed that majority rule - or black majority dominationl as he called it _ was non-negotiable; as was the maintenance of the free enterprise system. In a Nationalist Party pamphlet written in July 1986 he put the point even more bluntly, saying: t... the National Party still resolutely rejects any form of power-sharing which amounts to a surrender of powerbf

The other element of current state strategy, favoured by the lmilitarists' who are regarded by observers as being in the majority in the cabinet as well as controlling the SSC is what has been described as the Brazilian option. This is an approach which is seen to have been successfully applied by the military regime which took power in Brazil in 1964. It places emphasis on promoting good governmentl at local level: attempting to ensure that local level administrative structures function efficiently and introducing programmes which bring concrete visible material benefits to influential strata of local residents. It is a version of a paternalistic. theaits and minds' strategy premised on the assumption that democratic aspirations are not deeply rooted among the majority of the people, who can consequently be thought off with a few material concessions. The basic thinking underlying this is summed up in the following quotation from Magnus Malan:

tWhen you talk about democracy, what democracy are you talking about. African. Russian or what? The big question is also how many of the black people are only interested in the satisfaction of their material requirements - housing, education. employment clothing, bread and butter etc. There are at the moment only a small portion that are really interested in political participation. I think that for the masses in South Africa democracy is not a relevant factor. For them, it concerns the satisfaction of their own requirements. These requirements change from time to time and are presently being exploited by the revolutionarieshl

While the differences between the two tendencies are real enough. they occur within definite limits and aim at the same objective _. creating a new support base for racist minority rule. Moreover. the two approaches are not incompatible and have to a considerable extent been complementary within an

overall strategy aiming to impose new power-sharing, structures at local, regional and national level.

It is at local government level that the Brazilian option has been most evident. Using the cover of the Emergency, the military have entered townships, like Alexandra which has in many ways become a model, in force. They have established military-dominated mini-JMCs as local level structures of NSMS. Apart from providing a direct security back up, these mini-JMCs have also served to supervise and control new Black Local Authorities, which have now been set up in a number of areas. The apparent hope here, is that hearts and minds can be won by providing good government and reducing some of the grossest excesses of corruption, which are seen to have contributed significantly to the discrediting of the BLA system in the first place.

At provincial level, new Joint Executive Authorities embracing white provincial authorities and Bantustan administrations have been established. The first such body was set up in Natal in November 1987 and joins the Natal provincial administration and the KwaZulu bantustan authorities, the latter dominated by Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi. It will administer a limited range of services hitherto under the separate control of the two structures - principally roads, health services and education. The body is appointed, thus underlying the regimes rejection of the proposals for an elected regional government put forward by the Kwa-Natal Indaba.

At national level, the regimes plans continue to envisage establishing a National Council. This is intended to serve as a forum to negotiate a new power sharing constitution and in the meantime give blacks a say in national questions. The latest version represents a modification of the original proposal first put forward in January 1986. in that it introduces an elective element. Under the National Council Bill published in September 1987, nine seats on the Council which would originally have been filled by representatives of urban blacks chosen by the regime will now be directly elected. However, the Council will still be a purely advisory body subordinate to the existing legislature. It will also still have a built-in majority bloc of imoderates, known allies and members of the regime. Commentators have compared the proposed Council to the indirectly elected Natives Representative Council (NRC) which existed between 1936 and 1950. The NRC was supposed to advise the government on racial policy but was in practice ignored and earned the nickname toy telephone. The UDF has described the proposed National Council as another toy telephone.

It will be apparent from the above, that the regimes current proposals, whether in their reformist or militarist form, do not envisage more than a re-launching, in a slightly modified form of the original stalled reformed apartheid programme. In concrete terms. the Botha regimens current political strategy appears principally to rest on the hope or expectation that the repression of popular organisation and struggle will encourage moderate potential black allies, who have hitherto remained aloof, to come forward and accept the deal already on offer and rejected by the masses. A minority of reformists within the regime are said to believe that there is a chance of bringing elements of the ANC into this, but the majority of militarists are reportedly of the view that the war against the ANC can be won and that the movement can therefore be excluded.

In addition to the intended impact on the domestic front. the regimes strategists evidently hope that such an approach will benefit them internationally. The short term aim appears to be to use the language of negotiation, as well as the defiant response to sanctions, to reinforce the argument that sanctions do not work and are in any case unnecessary since some real change is under way. The hope evidently is that this will strike a resonance with the positions being argued by Reagan, Thatcher, Kohl et al. In the longer term the

regime appears to be calculating that. if it cannot obtain endorsement from the West in advance, a successful re-launching of its reformed apartheid strategy will create a new defacto reality on which to base a bid to improve relations with the major Western powers. Its strategists appear to recognise to some extent that it was the perception that apartheid was weak that led to increased international pressure in the 1984-6 period. They appear, therefore. to be hoping that a successful strong arm approach will present the world with a fait accompli which will restore the credibility of reformed apartheid and lead to some new accommodation with the Western powers on terms more favourable to the regime.

There can be no doubt that the reign of terror launched by the regime under the Emergency has. as the NEC put it. meant that: we have not advanced on all fronts in our general offensive with the same speed and success. In this sense the enemy has made certain tactical gains in the past IX months. But. as argued at the beginning of the paper. it has not regained the strategic initiative. In examining contradictions within the white power bloc at the present moment all these complexities have to be taken into account. The system remains in crisis. The regime has not regained the strategic initiative. It is still unable to produce a political solution. and racist minority rule itself appears doomed. On the other hand, the Challenge from the oppressed masses is perhaps felt less intensely than it was before the Emergency. The regime itself, or at least some of its members are using a discourse of power sharing and 'negotiation' similar in form if not substance to that of imperialism and monopoly capital.

11. Contradictions Within The White Minority

In general terms all of the various elements described in the previous section - the deepening crisis. the "reforms. militarisation. and the increasing perception that racist minority rule is doomed - have revealed. produced or heightened contradictions between different forces within the white power bloc. Some of these contradictions were already evident in the 1963-73 boom period but were held in check by the general conditions of prosperity and the veneer of stability. Others have only emerged with the onset of crisis. In broad terms, the regimes attempt to implement its reformed apartheid strategy and its failure to produce a

Viable solution to the deepening crisis has led to a fracturing in two different directions. First there has been the revolt of the far right reaction generated by the reforms. Second the failure of the reforms has led certain forces to move towards acceptance of solutions reaching beyond the parameters of racist minority rule. The limits of this process should be stressed at the outset. We are discussing minority tendencies within 'white politics'. Over half the white electorate (52.1%) supported the Nationalist Party in the May 1987 elections — more than in 1948. However, both the breakaway tendencies have been generated by the current crisis. It is unlikely that either has yet peaked. Both, therefore, need careful analysis. In addition, contradictions have also emerged within the regime, the governing Nationalist Party and associated institutions, such as the Afrikaner Broederbond. Some brief consideration of these is given in the last part of this section.

ii) Far Right Reaction

The first, and still, in numerical terms at least, the most important effect of the eroding cohesion of the power bloc has been the growth of far right reaction. In class terms the far right draws its support from certain categories of small capitalist agriculture, white labour and white urban and rural petty bourgeoisie. These are class forces originally mobilised and united under the banner of Afrikaner nationalism in the late 1940s, whose current perception is that any reforms or mutiliations to apartheid are a sell out made at their expense. They generally hanker after the golden days of apartheid and fear that even minor adjustments to the system will result in the undermining of their privileged position in it. Still closer to these, the far right now also draws support from certain categories of the English-speaking petty bourgeoisie, including prominently, former Rhodesians and other recent immigrants.

The emergence of a far right faction within Afrikaner nationalism, of course, already been evident under Vorster. The growing influence of the right within the Nationalist Party, and the modification by the regime of certain minor apartheid regulations by the Vorster regime provoked a reaction from the right. The high point of this during the time of Vorster's premiership came with the breakaway of the Irresistible National Party (HNP) in 1969. Under Vorster, however, the revolt of the far right was largely kept in check. The HNP itself was confined to the fringes of white politics, standing in numerous elections but winning only a derisory share of the vote. With the coming to power of the Botha regime and the implementation of the reformed apartheid programme, however, far right influence grew. In the 1981 elections, the combined far right vote (cast for the HNP and Connie Mulder's National Conservative Party) reached 15.5% — compared to the 3.3% in the 1977 elections. However, far right reaction did not in the end find its only, or even its most important, expression in the HNP. A variety of political groupings, cultural, religious and other organisations began to be formed in the early 1980s, while far right opposition to Botha's reforms also built up within

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the Nationalist Party. This finally culminated in the breakaway of 18 MPs and the formation of the Konserwatiewe Party (KP) in 1982.

The KP has now established itself as the major party political organisation of the far right. The HNP, although still drawing some support, is in decline, its bid for hegemony having been defeated by the KP. The HNP lost its only seat in parliament in the May 1987 whites only elections and is now facing defections to the KP, the most prominent being that of its former Secretary General and sole elected MP, Louis Stofberg. The KP, significantly, has recognised the potential support which it has among certain social categories in the English-speaking community. Unlike the HNP, it does not push an Afrikaner exclusivity and is, for example, com-

mitted to maintaining the existing official language policy. However, while the KP is currently the most important far right organisation in the parliamentary arena, the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) led by Eugene TerreBlanche has emerged as a major extra-parliamentary force. The AWB has shown that it is able to mobilise large numbers of supporters at rallies, demonstrations and the like and has won several tests of strength when the NP has attempted to hold meetings in its strongholds. TerreBlanche has an evident strong charismatic appeal within the far right and, at joint meetings, has frequently upstaged both the KP and the HNP leaders. After the formation of the KP in 1982, the AWB allowed its own political party - the Blanke Volksstaat Party (BVP), registered in 1980 - to become virtually moribund and concentrated instead on what appears to be a strategy of entryism into the KP. Considerable numbers of AWB members joined the KP (which unlike the HNP permits dual membership) and AWB influence with the KP is considerable. Press reports have spoken of even Conservative Party Members of Parliament distributing AWB literature. According to one estimate the AWB has 100 000 or more members.¹⁰

In addition to its general ideological/political influence, the AWB also has some military or paramilitary power. The organisation has its own para-military wing - Called the Stormvalke - whose declared objective is to take up arms and resist any sell-out of the Afrikaner'. In 1983, TerreBlanche received a suspended prison sentence on an illegal arms charge. Two other AWB members imprisoned on the same charges were released at the same time as Comrade Govan Mbeki. In September 1986 there were reports that the AWB was organising farmers in the Eastern Transvaal into a bandwagon to defend themselves against landmine attacks. The latter was considered a sufficiently serious development for Magnus Malan to warn the AWB not to compete with the SADF.¹¹

As well as having its own para-military organisations, there is considerable evidence of significant far right support within the SADF and SAP. By November 1982, far right influence within the SADF was considered to be sufficient to prompt the then Chief of the SADF to issue a warning through the pages of the official SADF periodical Paratus against SADF personnel becoming involved in secret military factions.¹¹

A specific regulation exists preventing members of the police joining the AWB. Despite this, however, TerrelBlanche has openly boasted of AWB support within the SAP and offered free legal assistance to any SAP member victimised for association with the AWB.¹³ After the AWB broke up an NP meeting at Pietersburg due to have been addressed by R.F. Botha in May 1986, the Minister of Manpower, Pietie du Plessis, publicly accused the police of taking sides with the far right. He said TerrelBlanche had actually entered the building escorted by police and that the police did nothing to stop Botha's meeting being disrupted.¹⁴ A number of prominent personalities who held high rank within the security forces were nominated as KP candidates in the May 1987 white general election. They included Gen HJ van den Berg, the former head of BOSS and Brig. Theuns Roux, Rust Swanepoel, the former chief interrogator of the Security Police. Swanepoel, who stood against the Foreign Minister RF Botha, described his goal as being to root out the communists in the government.¹⁵

The far right has proved over the years that it has a definite relatively secure constituency among those strata of the white electorate identified above. In the May 1987 election, the KP increased the number of its parliamentary seats from 18 to 22 and displaced the PFP as official opposition in the white House of Assembly. The percentage of the total vote cast going to the far right nearly doubled from 15.5% in 1981 to 29.5% in 1987.

Moreover, the influence of the far right has probably not yet peaked. There were a number of specific factors at the time of the 1987 election which probably reduced the total far right vote to a lower level than it might otherwise have been. The two main far right parties - KP and HNP - entered the election not only having failed to negotiate an electoral pact but also against the background of well known public feuding. At the same time, the NP went into the election with a strongly rightist programme clearly intended to appeal to potential far right voters. "1 One commentator estimated before the election that had there been a united front, the far right could have won up to 38 seats.¹⁷ In numerical terms, the far right is estimated to have the potential support of up to 400 000 members of the white community.xx

It is unlikely that the far right will ever take over state power. Its only solution to the crisis would be to intensify repression. but in a context where repression alone is increasingly seen as incapable of guaranteeing stability. There is no important force in the capitalist class which shows signs of being willing to ally with it - a fundamental condition for coming to power. It seems to be generally recognised within the capitalist Class that a far right regime could only take South Africa more rapidly down the low road to Clem Sunter's wasteland.

This does not mean, however, that the far right can be dismissed or ignored. The real question is not whether the far right will come to power, but whether it will stage some insurrectionary activity aimed at blocking a move towards a transfer of power (or even power sharing). The fact that the far right has support within both the SADF and the SAP as well as its own para-military organisations. means that it has some capacity to become the basis of an OAS-style terroristic resistance movement'. The menace posed by the far right is likely to become more pronounced the closer we move towards a transfer of power and indeed, any serious move towards democracy would seem to be dependent on the physical neutralisation or defeat of the far right forces. This raises the spectre of some future civil war among the whites - between far right bittereinders' and more far seeing forces prepared to contemplate a transfer of power. The bittereinders, would undoubtedly try, in such an event. to transform this into a black-white racial war by various provocations.

2. Forces looking beyond racist minority rule

While the growth of the far right reaction has been one important effect of the fracturing of the power bloc there has also been a growth of forces within the white community looking towards solutions which reach beyond the parameters of racist minority rule. These now reach much broader strata of the white community. than the tiny minority of progressive whites who have always been involved in the democratic movement or broader anti-apartheid struggles. This growth has been fuelled by the failure of the Botha regime's reformed apartheid strategy and in some cases by a dashing of illusions about how far Botha really intended to go. A number of different currents, with varying class bases and different degrees of distance from the regime have emerged. These need to be carefully analysed and distinguished.

i. Monopoly Capital

First, there has been a certain change in the stance of monopoly capital in the past few years. This has above all been the result of a lack of confidence in the Botha regime generated by the failure of its total strategy. As indicated earlier, the Botha regime came to power with a degree of support from monopoly capital unprecedented for an NP administration. This was in part based on tactical considerations and a calculation that the NP was there to stay. This was well expressed in an interview given to Business International by Harry Oppenheimer in 1980:

Since we were not going to get the Nationalists out of power so quickly _ much as I'd like to see the Progressive-Federal party come in - one has got to find a means of doing social justice in a way that the reasonable people in the Nationalist W 7

Party might go for .

But there were also strong expectations or illusions that the regime's reformed apartheid programme would in fact succeed in making South Africa safe for capitalism as well as in opening up the Southern African region to South African capital.

Until the latter part of 1984, relations between monopoly capital and the regime remained generally warm. This was reflected in various business-government meetings and in the fact that most of the leading business personalities supported

the campaign for a Yes Vote in the November 1983 referendum on the tri-cameral constitution. There was also widespread support for the Nkomati Accord signed with Mo/ambique in March 1984.

This began to change during the 1984-86 surge forward of the people's struggle, as the perception grew that reformed apartheid was failing. The first real sign of a strain in relations between monopoly capital and the regime came in November 1984 when the arrest of trade unionists involved in the stayaway organised at that time led six leading capitalist organisations to submit a memorandum complaining that the regime's heavy-handed action was threatening to undermine industrial relations procedures. Significantly this memorandum was also signed by the Afrikaner Handelsinstituut whose president said that technical considerations no longer had the same weight among his membership as in the past. The same month also saw the first signs of disquiet at the regime's non-observance of the Nkomati accord signed with Mo/ambique. With the breakdown in November 1984 of attempts to promote a ceasefire between the MNR bandits and the FRELIMO government in Mozambique, and amidst growing evidence of continuing support by the Pretoria regime for the MNR bandits, serious concern began to be expressed that a continuation of bandit activity at its existing levels at least, was placing in jeopardy the Nkomati Accord and all it represented in terms of Pretoria's credibility in the region and at the wider international level. By the beginning of 1985, serious criticism was also being voiced of the regime's handling of the deepening fiscal crisis of the apartheid state. In January 1985, the Star summed up the views of leading businessmen on this as follows:

'For the first time in the country's long history the feeling is increasingly growing that things have got out of hand and that the government in the visible form of (Finance Minister) Mr du Plessis simply has no answers. Talk of the end of the 'split' of Carlton and Good Hope began to be common.

By mid-1985 it had become apparent that many of the leading spokespersons for monopoly capital had come to the conclusion that the Botha regime is determined apartheid programme was incapable of resolving the multiple crisis of the apartheid state. Various alternative plans and proposals and scenarios for the future began to be mapped out. While these varied in detail, they suggested that monopoly capital had come to see itself as obliged by the advances in the popular struggle to move beyond the parameters acceptable to the 'reasonable people' in the Nationalist Party in their desperate search for a solution which would make South Africa safe for capitalism. Botha's interview of August 15th 1985 in which he basically reaffirmed his unwillingness to move beyond the existing reform package, led to a major rupture between the regime and the opposition. The financial press was unanimous in calling for Botha's resignation. The Sunday Star wrote:

Business leaders who normally support President Botha were 'shattered by his speech. His speech, watched by millions

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globally, ended any remaining closeness between business and the government, built up after the Carlton and Good Hope conferences'.³²

This was followed by the meeting in September of the same year between the ANC and a group of leading personalities associated with monopoly capital. This meeting took place despite strictures from Botha about disloyalty.

It was, in short, the pressures created by the 1984-6 advance of our people's struggle that forced monopoly capital to review its positions and to conclude that racist minority rule — even on the basis of a programme of social and economic reform — was no longer capable of creating stable conditions for capital accumulation. In the current Emergency-phase, monopoly capital appears generally still

to be of the View that it will eventually be necessary to move beyond Nationalist Party rule to some system in which the structures of government are multi-racialised.

At the same time, however, this class force is evidently concerned to constrain the capacity of any new post-NP government to act in ways which would seriously threaten the position of monopoly capital. Although precise proposals have not yet emerged, it is clear that ideally monopoly capital would like to initiate a process of negotiation from which some kind of federalist or consociational system would emerge. This would entrench minority vetoes and legally enforceable rights'. Not only would these entrenched rights protect existing capitalist ownership patterns, they would also severely limit a new government's capacity to transform the system of exploitation and oppression or even to act to rectify the most glaring inequalities generated by apartheid. In other words, the guarantees being sought would tend to place severe restrictions on any programme aimed at achieving the democratic demands put forward in the Freedom Charter.

As a fall back, monopoly capital would probably be prepared eventually to settle for a deal which offered major guarantees to big capital but did not exclude nationalisation altogether. In this respect it is notable that Gavin Relly is on record as accepting a measure of state planning and intervention to compensate for the errors of omission and commission of the apartheid era'."

There is as yet no complete clarity on whom and which organisation monopoly capital sees as leading and participating in such a post-NP government. Our movement is undisputed position as the vanguard of the struggling oppressed people, demonstrated once again during the 1984-6 surge forward, has led some of the more far sighted elements of monopoly capital to the view that the ANC is an indispensable element in any settlement.

However, considerable hopes still seem to be being placed on Buthelezi and Inkatha. In May 1986, Gavin Relly responded to a question on his attitude towards Buthelezi saying:

You can't expect us to run away from the single black leader who says exactly what we think. I like Buthelezi and what he says. Business has talked to him for a long time. None of us believe in the simple blackism that the ANC puts

forward. Lifets not like that. live been told that Buthelezi plays a rough game in Natal. But South Africa is not for the faint-heartedl ."

More substance was given to the intended role for Buthelezi (who has, despite considerable efforts, failed to secure a country-wide base among the oppressed population) during the KwaNatal Indaba. This received substantial backing from both Natal-based capital and monopoly capital in general. In a nutshell the indaba proposals would amount to handing over administrative control throughout Natal to Buthelezi and Inkatha, who would then be placed in a better position to terrorise communities throughout the province. Buthelezi would also thereby secure his place in future national negotiations on the basis of his regional base _ as a force or factor which could not be ignored. These plans, however, received a setback when the indaba proposals were rejected by the regime - on the grounds that they were based on the prime ciple of tmajoritarianism rather than tpower-sharingl. The severe limitations of the degree of monopoly capital s tbreaki with the Botha regime need to be stressed. If it has differences with the regime, monopoly capital also has serious reservations about the democratic movement. The programmes and proposals for a post-NP South Africa emanating from monopoly capital envisage something very different from the non-racial democratic society called for in the Freedom Charter. It is not any inherent inability to coexist with racist minority rule that has forced monopoly capital to look for alternatives, but rather a perception forced on it by the developing struggle that racist minority rule can no longer guarantee the stable conditions for capital accumulation that the monopolies are seeking.

In the concrete conditions of struggle which have emerged in South Africa, monopoly capital has shown a degree of vacillation normally attributed only to the petty bourgeoisie. It is at moments in the struggle when the challenge from the democratic movement is felt most intensely that the greatest distancing from the regime occurs. At moments, such as the present Emergency phase, when the regime appears to be more in control, the distance is much less. For example: A number of leading business personalities who initially condemned the Emergency, have now endorsed itzs; Some credence is being given to the regimes pronouncement on power sharing; and evidence has emerged even of businessmen being drawn in to assist NSMS structures in the implementation of the current hearts and minds strategy (26). Moreover, there can be no doubt that the regime is making some effort to heal the rift with monopoly capital. The Thatcherite economic treform' measures - including privatisation of state corporations, changes in the tax system, and a freeze on state expenditure # which will dominate the legislative programme in the current session of parliament are evidently intended to appeal to business. Beyond this there are, of course, a number of more permanent links with the regime, and the military in particular, which influence the positions taken by monopoly capital. A number of major monopolies have strong ties to Armscor, whose policy is, wherever possible, to award contracts to the private sector,. Over 900 private contractors employing 70 000 people have lucrative contracts with Armscor, including the subsidiaries of major monopolies.27 As comrade Mac Maharaj has put it: For such Firms, increasing defence expenditure, the development of new weapons systems. and their use in war contributes to accumulation?2x Domestic repression, as well as regional destabilisation is, in short good for business.

The limitations of monOpoly capitalis current position can perhaps be summed up as follows. While this class force has shown some indication that it is prepared to contemplate a post-NP negotiated settlement (something which cannot be ignored and indeed needs to be encouraged), it has not shown any sign that it is itself willing to do much to bring about

a move towards any such situation. The monopolies have, as yet, given no indication of being prepared to put their considerable class power behind any attempt to dislodge the regime or force it to create a climate for negotiation. On the other hand, the monopolies have made it abundantly clear that if and when a process of transition does occur, they will put up a stiff fight to ensure that a post-NP negotiated settlement does not seriously affect their interests. Indeed, the monopolies appear to be more actively involved in preparing a strategy for struggle on the terrain of the post-NP society (where the principal adversary will be the democratic movement), than in acting to create the conditions for a move on to such a terrain.

Among other things, this suggests the following:

0 First, the democratic movement needs increasingly to assume the offensive even now in the debate/struggle over the character of a post-apartheid society. We need to set the pace in defining the issues under debate. We should not allow ourselves to be submerged in reacting to proposals from others, and should not allow concerns of the monopolies _ about how their interests would be affected _ to dominate the debate. Rather we should force them to address the concerns of the people _ to say how the people will share in the country's wealth, have work and security, houses and comfort. Moreover, we should seek to widen the debate beyond the ranks of the hired academics of big business, where much of it is now located. As well as obviously implying a need to democratise the debate and bring it to the people's organisations, this could also involve challenging a variety of organisations active in specific fields to say how they will contribute towards bringing about change and eliminating inequalities. These could include various professional bodies (medical, educational, legal etc.) with largely white membership as well as church, cultural and other organisations.

0 Second, there are areas of vulnerability which could be developed in an attempt to encourage/cajole the monopolies to withdraw support from the regime. Success here would both weaken the regime and possibly also encourage the monopolies to become somewhat more robust in pressing the regime. In particular, the monopolies could be confronted with their collaboration with the military. 21 point of

vulnerability for them at the political/ideological level. This would suggest the possibility of considering directing some pressure towards challenging, delegitimising and raising the costs of their ties with the military and their involvement in the arms industry.

ii. Other Forces

Another immediately more encouraging effect of the fracturing of the white power bloc has been a significant increase in the number of white intellectuals, professionals, church people, youth, students etc - both English and Afrikaans-speaking - breaking with the white establishment. This trend can, in the first instance, be seen as a symptom of the deepening ideological crisis of the apartheid system and state. The past fifteen years have seen the classic Verwoerdian formulations of apartheid being ditched in favour of a discourse of transition. This was initially ambiguous, broadly cast and pitched at generating high expectations. In practice, it has increasingly been forced by the developing struggle to reveal its limitations and contradictions, and has failed dismally in its quest to mobilise significant support among the oppressed. At the same time, the liberal ideology of monopoly capital with its attempt to present apartheid and capitalism as entirely distinct phenomena has run up against a popular consciousness increasingly clear about the relationship between capitalist exploitation and apartheid oppression. All of this has led to important desertions from the ranks of the organic intellectuals of the ruling class, including a number from Afrikaner nationalism.

There have also been a number of other specific factors which have contributed to this process. Militarisation and the drift towards war, has meant that apartheid no longer offers white youth only the prospect of a privileged comfortable life. Enjoyment of the good life now has to be interspersed with periods of active service in the SADF fighting apartheid's regional wars or doing battle in the townships. This has prompted a growing rebellion against conscription by increasing numbers of white youth. The undermining of the white parliamentary democracy through the emergence of the NSRF, although accepted by most whites, has also had some effect. Most importantly, it brought to a head a simmering conflict within the Progressive Federal Party (PFP) between a centrist majority unable or unwilling to look beyond the white parliamentary arena and a minority seeking some relationship to the extra-parliamentary democratic movement. This led to the resignation in 1986 of the then PFP leader Frederick van Zyl Slabbert and the formation of the Institute for Democratic Alternatives in South Africa (IDASA). The dashing of the current PFP leader, Colin Eglin's hopes of forging a new centrist alternative to the NP in the May 1987 elections have meant that conflicts over role definition have continued within the PFP. Finally, the states move away from the policy of protecting the privileges of white wage earners through job reservation and the like, while leading some strata of white labour to support the far right has led other white workers to turn towards the democratic trade unions.

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Left to themselves, such currents would have had little potential to become much more than pockets of dissidence, symptoms of decay of the apartheid system and augurs of its future downfall. It is to the credit of the democratic movement that it has sought to weld these disparate currents into more than an expression of vacillating, rootless alienation - although there remain many expressions of just that. The activities of organisations like the End Conscription Campaign (ECC), IDASA, Johannesburg Democratic Action Committee (Jodac), the Five Freedoms forum, the National Union of South African Students (Nusas), the Black Sash and others, as well as the various meetings with our movement have been important aspects of the process of encourag-

ing such elements first to move on to the terrain of forces for change and eventually, in some cases, to become part of the broad democratic movement.

It is among such social categories that the greatest prospects for effective political work/education within the white community will continue to lie. We should be realistic. The growth in their ranks will not be dramatic. We will not reach the majority in the white community. The influence within the white community of those we do reach will be limited. Nevertheless, the impact of advances in this area can reach beyond the numbers directly influenced as the Dakar meeting showed. Gains in this area can be an important part of the process of delegitimising the racist minority and establishing the ANC's position as the legitimate representative of an alternative democratic and non-racial South Africa.

It seems to the present writer that some attention should be given to finding ways to follow up major events like Dakar. Consideration could perhaps be given to finding ways of further publicising and developing our positions on the cultural and language rights of minorities. not in a defensive way but because these are real issues which will have to be faced in a liberated South Africa. We can also win the argument about the legitimacy and necessity of the armed struggle. We could perhaps think about publishing some of our material in the Afrikaans language and encourage Afrikaners to think of themselves as Africans (which is, after all, the correct English translation of Afrikaners).

3. Contradictions Within the Regime

While the above have been the most visible effects of the erosion of the cohesion of the white power bloc, contradictions have also reached right into the regime, the state apparatus, the Nationalist Party and associated institutions such as the Broederbond. The well known divisions between verligtes and verkramptes which appeared in the 1960s, have as the crisis deepened, multiplied and a number of different factions and groupings now exist. The major differences in the current Emergency phase are said to be between a reformist minority and the militarist majority. The basic positions of each were discussed earlier. In addition to this a New Nati faction supposedly willing to move beyond racist minority rule emerged during the 1984-6 surge forward. Some of these left the NP before the May 1987 election and constituted themselves in the Malan/Lategan/Worrall

independent movement (which has now split). Others are said still to be in the NP, however. Differences between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the military have also been reported over aspects of regional destabilisation policies. Justice Minister, Kobie Coetzee, is said to have lobbied for the release of political prisoners. The increasing dominance by the military over the security apparatuses of the state has reportedly led to resentments by the security police, and so on.

The significance of such contradictions has often been greatly exaggerated. At one stage, for example, it was alleged that there were up to 33 New Nat, MPs. Unlike old style verligtes, personified by Chris Heunis, whose bottom line was that although blacks will be in parliament, white Nats will keep ultimate control, the New Nats were said to be willing to contemplate a transfer of power.²⁹ In the end some of those so named – such as Wynand Breytenbach, the Deputy Defence Minister – proved to be closer to the verkrampste than verligte wings of the party. Several others, such as Stoffel van der Merwe, were no longer verligte reformists seeking negotiation within the parameters of racist minority rule. Moreover, many of those who genuinely did hold something approaching positions attributed to the New Nats have now resigned from the party. A small number, the best known being Albert Nothnagel, have remained in the NP, but under strong pressure from Botha and lacking any support from high profile NP leaders are reported to have retreated into the laagerij. Most other divisions within the NP can be characterised as tactical – they are about the means to achieve the common objective of retaining racist minority rule.

There is no important tendency within the regime or NP that the democratic movement can positively welcome or seriously contemplate entering into even a tactical alliance with. This does not mean, however, that the contradictions which have emerged within the regime are irrelevant. They reflect differences over how to respond to the challenge posed by our struggle. The differing positions represent differing levels of resistance/reaction to our demands and struggle. Moreover, the struggle between them appears to be crystallising in and around the contest to succeed PW Botha. Although Botha has indicated that he has no plans for an early retirement, a succession struggle is clearly underway. The generally recognised contenders in this are: FW de Klerk; Gerrit Viljoen; Chris Heunis; Barend du Plessis; RF tPikl Botha and Magnus Malan.³¹

Although none of these candidates offers anything other than a programme aiming at the maintenance of racist minority rule, it cannot be a matter of indifference to us which of them takes over from Botha. Most importantly, if Magnus Malan, who is now reported to have a retired Brigadier. Kobus Bosman, actively lobbying for him in the NP caucus, were to become NP leader it would mark a further step towards a complete military take-over. In this respect it is worth recalling that although they do not currently appear to be favouring Malan, important sectors of imperialism and monopoly capital have often turned to military dictatorships in times of crisis. At one stage there was talk of an enlightened military under Malan implementing reform. It is not impossible that this kind of talk is revived. Our movement can take some initiatives in this situation. Most directly, we can show how it is only ANC policies which can guarantee democracy in South Africa. While apartheid in its various guises inevitably leads to militarisation and dictatorship. Less directly, although the democratic movement itself cannot initiate a campaign in the arena of white politics, we could perhaps consider supporting a broad-based campaign by sympathetic forces around some theme like, 1Stop Magnus Malan and the Military Take-Over of our Country. As with other campaigns. this could of course be used to raise a range of further issues.

111. CONCLUSIONS

The present paper has attempted to analyse and describe some of the major effects and implications of the erosion of the coherence of the white power bloc which has emerged in the last decade or so. The paper has argued that there has been no independent, internal dynamic underlying this fructuring. The divisions which have appeared within the dominant classes have been provoked by the advances in popular struggle which have brought about a major change in the balance of forces between oppressor and oppressed. The paper has argued that racist minority rule is in irreversible decline, and that this will in general tend further to heighten contradictions within the white minority. Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that there is still a direct relationship between the level of pressure of mass struggle and the degree of contradiction within the white minority. It is at moments in the struggle when the pressures from below are felt most strongly, that contradictions within the dominant classes are at their sharpest. Conversely, at moments in the struggle when the challenge of the oppressed is felt less intensely, contradictions within the power bloc recede. This would suggest that even on tactical grounds there is little to recommend an approach of unilaterally offering concessions _ such as suspending the armed struggle. There is no dynamic within white politics that suggests that any such move would substantially increase support from within the white community for a move beyond racist minority rule. On the contrary, it would be lessening the pressure, probably slowing, at least temporarily, the process of disintegration which has drawn some strata of the white community away from positions supportive of racist minority rule.

This is not to suggest that the only response called for is to intensify general pressure. The paper has suggested that there are a number of specific points of intervention which can widen specific contradictions within the white community to our advantage. At the same time, the paper has attempted to draw attention to the fact that the very same process of decay and disintegration of the cohesion of white power, which makes it feasible for us to widen the ranks of forces for change also allows the far right to expand its influence among other strata. The potential menace posed by this also needs to be taken into account.

While pressure from mass struggle and international action is fundamental. this does not diminish the importance of presenting the ANC case at all levels. It is precisely when our forces are regrouping on the ground that we must take political and ideological initiatives aimed at maintaining and widening divisions in the enemy camp. It is not a question of choosing between mass revolutionary struggle on the one hand and political action aimed at forcing change on the other. On the contrary, the political, military and diplomatic struggles are, as always, inextricably linked. In the past we have perhaps tended to see political struggle as aimed at the masses at home, and diplomatic action as directed at peoples and governments abroad. Perhaps we need to think of a kind of politico-diplomatic offensive at home - reaching into sectors from which we have been excluded in the past. We do not become direct participants in white politics', but we do need to take every opportunity to present our positions and prepare our white compatriots for the future.

FOOTNOTES:

1. Message of the National Executive Committee of the ANC on 8 January 1986 delivered by President Tambo. Lusaka. 1986.
- Statement of the National Executive Committee of the African National Congress on the Occasion of the 76th Anniversary of the ANC. Presented by President Oliver Tambo. 8 January 1988. Lusaka. 1988. page two.
3. For a development of these points see R. Davies. D. O'Meara and S. Dlamini. The Struggle for South Africa: A Reference Guide to Movements, Organisations and Institutions, London. Zed Books. 1984. Vol.1. pages 20-32.
4. On this see Mark Swilling. The Politics of Negotiation. Work in Progress 50/51. October/November 1987.
5. Lmdcrslzip. 6.4.1987
6. Federal Information Service of the National Party NP Position Paper No. 1: Power Sharing and Related Concepts (17m compiled by Dr Stoffel van der Merwe. MP. Cape Town. July 1986 (emphasis in original).
7. Die Suid-Afrikaanse (aan. Winter 1986. pages 12-13. quoted in P. Vale. 'The Inevitability of the Generals: The Anatomy of White Power in South Africa' paper presented to Seminar in Memory of Aquino de Braganca and Ruth First. organised by Centro de Estudos Africanos. Univet'sidade Eduardo Mondlane. Maputo. 21-22 January. 1988.
8. See Southern Africa Report 5.42.23.10.1987.
9. Statement 1988i. op.cit. page 2.
10. Div Burgers. 1986 quoting Able du Plessis of Potchefstroom University's Institute for Political and African Studies.
11. See The Star 1.9.1986.
12. Pumtus. 33.11. November 1982.
13. The Star 6.3.1986.
14. See The Times (London) 24.5.1986.
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- 25
15. See Sunday Tribune 15.2.1987, Sunday Times 15.2.1987.
16. See Centro de Estudos Africanos, 'The Coming South African General Election and the Far-Right Factor,' Southern Africa Dossier reprinted in Transformation, 3, 1987.
17. Financial Mail 20.3.1987 calculation by Prof Dirk Laurie.
18. Estimate by Prof Willem Kleynhans quoted in The Citizen 1.4.1987.
19. Business International Apartheid and Business: An Analysis of the Rapidly Evolving Challenge Facing Companies with Investments in South Africa, Multinational

Study, Johannesburg, October 1980, page 230.

20. The Guardian (London) 19.11.1984; The Star 26.11.1984; Financial Mail 18.1.1985.

21. See Financial Mail 30.11.1984; R. Davies, South African Strategy Towards Mozambique since Nkomatii, Transformation 3. 1987 pages 18-20.

22. 18.8.1985.

23. Sunday Times 1.6.1986.

24. Extract from interview with Anthony Sampson reproduced in Business Day 12.5.1986.

25. On this see. for example. the 1987 annual statement by Anglo American Chairman. Gavin Relly, part of which reads: In the circumstances the imposition of the State of Emergency last year and its recent renewal, though regrettable. were necessary to contain the widening cycle of senseless Violence (abridged version reprinted in the Financial Mail 17.7.87). A year earlier. in his Chairman's Report for 1986. Relly had written: While the process by no means has been easy experience has shown that disparate groups can come together and reach agreements acceptable to all parties Naturally. all this cannot proceed in an environment clouded by the restrictions imposed by a State of Emergency. and measures which have resulted in the incarceration of people who would have to be included in future negotiations. It is impossible in these circumstances to maintain, let alone develop. the sound industrial relations essential to a free enterprise. democratic state (abridged version reproduced in Leadership, 5.4.1986).

26. See Southscan 2.17.13/1/1988.

27. See Southern Africa Report, 6.2.15.1.1988.

28. Mac Maharaj. Internal Determinants of Pretoria's Present Foreign Policy. paper presented to Seminar in Memory of Aquino de Braganca and Ruth First. organised by Centro de Estudos Africanos. Universidade Eduardo Mondlane. Maputo. 21-22 January 1988.

29. See Dries van Heerden. "The New Natsi. Frontline 6,2 March 1986.

30. Willem de Klerk. Behind Closed Doors, Leadership 6.6.1987.

31. Ibid.

32. See Southern Africa Report, 5.45. 13.11.1987.

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International Relations and Political Education

by Dan Cindi

Introduction

Broadly-speaking, international relations may be viewed as the sum total of socio-economic and political relations existing among nations based on the production and distribution of wealth and influenced by historical and cultural specificities of each nation or group of nations.

In view of the broad nature of this subject, however, it is not the intention of this paper to deal with the entire gamut of international relations, but rather to examine their impact on the struggle for National Liberation.

More specifically, the paper seeks to focus on the importance of the complexities of international relations in the struggle for liberation in South Africa, using the region of Southern Africa as a point of departure.

In so doing, let us hasten to add that addressing this issue in no way implies that a mastery of this subject would in itself lead to liberation. On the contrary, we submit that the struggle itself will be won on the ground. There is however, no doubt that such knowledge would go a long way in helping us to better understand the tactics of the enemy and thus enable us to formulate our counter-offensive.

The International Context of our Struggle

There can be no denying that since the triumph of the Great October Revolution in Tsarist Russia in 1917, the Character of international relations has been unalterably transformed. In the epochs preceding this monumental event, international relations were in the main determined by the contradictions and rivalries of the exploiting classes in the various countries of the world. In the ensuing conflicts, the exploited classes were only relevant to the extent that they could provide the muscle for the forcible realisation of interests of the ruling Class.

Even the ideological concepts of those epochs were built on the edifice of rivalries between dominant classes. The norms of international relations, translated in treaties and diplomacy, reflected the selfish interests of the exploiting classes.

The Great October Revolution succeeded in setting international relations on a new course. It ushered in the socialist state which provided a new and real challenge to imperialism. It gave a new impetus to the National Liberation Movement in the numerous colonies of the world. This process was further intensified with the triumph of the Peoples Democracies after the Second World War and the subsequent disintegration of the colonial system.

In international relations this phenomenon reflected itself in the shifting of the balance of forces in the United Nations in favour of the newly independent nations and in the emergence of regional groupings such as the Non-Aligned Movement and the OAU who called for concerted action against imperialist plundering. Accompanying this was a new language on the world stage such as calls for 'New International Economic Order' and 'New World Information Order'. Therefore, to the extent that these groupings of the third world countries objectively stand opposed to imperialist domination, they constitute the natural allies of the socialist countries, whose raison d'être is the elimination of exploitative relations. Moreover the practical support given by the socialist countries to the newly independent countries as well as to the liberation movement further underscores this point. Thus the struggle for National Liberation is being waged in a world climate where imperialism seeks to recoup its losses and roll back what it considers as the spread of communism.

The Struggle in South Africa

The struggles in South Africa and Namibia cannot be viewed outside the context of international relations. In other words these struggles cannot be waged in an international vacuum. In Southern Africa, as elsewhere, the exacerbation

of international tensions and strife results in the intensification of imperialist aggression. The relaxation of such tensions has a restraining effect on the imperialist onslaughts against the National Liberation Movement.

The US aggression against Grenada, the attack on Libya, the intensification of the destabilisation against Nicaragua and the build-up of tension in the Middle East all coincided with Reagan's offensive against the Soviet Union, the so-called evil empire. Clearly, therefore, it is in the objective interests of the National Liberation Movement to fight for and support the struggle for peace and disarmament.

In the Southern African arena the apartheid regime, seeking to perpetuate its continued oppression of the majority of the people of South Africa and its continued illegal occupation of Namibia has been playing an anti-communist card.

Its successive regional policies over the years, whilst reflecting certain variations, have exhibited one constant, namely with imperialist support, to undermine the cohesive force of support for ANC and SWAPO by Africa in general and Southern Africa in particular. At the same time Pretoria seeks to impose its hegemony on the region and the continent. Accordingly, Verwoerd's policy of the Commonwealth of Southern African Nations; Vorster's policy of Dialogue and Detente with Africa; Botha's policy of the Constellation of Southern African States were all based on the assumption of the dominance of Pretoria. The attempt to accomplish these objectives has been accompanied by the use of violence against the countries in the region. Pretoria's internal policies can be summed up as containment of the liberatory forces, coercion, co-optation and control of the population. Externally, the racist regime has been utilising variants of this strategy with respect to countries in the region.

The Challenge Facing the Region

Apart from a greater political input into the OAU, NAM and

the UN. the countries of the region have had to devise strategies designed to counter Pretorials and imperialist strategies. These measures found expression in the emergence of a political grouping known as the Frontline States and the formation of the Southern African Development Co-ordinating Conference (SADCC). Because of the successes scored by these groupings as well as the new vistas opened by their development the Pretoria regime has now intensified its offensive against the region. Since the survival of the region from Pretoria's onslaught has a direct bearing on the course of our struggle, our responsibility lies not only in intensifying our efforts towards the destruction of apartheid, but also in countering Pretoria's aggressive regional policies of state terrorism.

An effective counter-strategy requires a clear perception of the regime's efforts not only at the leadership level but also the level of the general membership. Our cadres not only exhibit a fundamental determination to give all their energies towards the destruction of apartheid and the creation of a United Democratic South Africa, but also develop a thorough grasp of the inter-play and balance of forces. This therefore suggests that our programme of political education must be broadened and geared to serve worldwide and local objectives:

A. On a Global Scale

Without exaggerating the role and importance of international mobilisation against the apartheid regime, or down-playing the significance of the internal struggle, efforts should be made to ensure that our cadres fully appreciate the international dimensions of our struggle and the need for specialisation.

In the various fronts of our struggle, our movement should discourage the perception of these fronts by our cadres as watertight compartments. In other words an appreciation of the complexities of international relations should not be the monopoly of the leadership or a specific category of cadres.

Therefore topical issues such as the worldwide campaign for sanctions against the apartheid regime as well as disinvestment should not be perceived through the prism of the western media but should be seen in the context of the ongoing struggle on the international plane.

B. At a Regional Level.

Our programme of political education needs to highlight that, though the struggle against apartheid has a strong emotional pull, overall and concrete support for our struggle should not be taken for granted. The utterances by political leaders may not necessarily reflect the reality on the ground. To enhance and consolidate support strenuous efforts should be exerted by our movement to defeat the machinations of imperialism in the region.

To this end, our programme could seek to cover the following areas:

1. A study of the socio-economic developments in our region. A knowledge of the weaknesses and strengths of the

various countries at any given stage can reveal their capacity to withstand pressures from the apartheid regime. The signing of the Nkomati Accord is a case in point. Whether or not this act caught the leadership of our movement by surprise is not the point. But what is incontestable is that the general membership was caught completely unawares. This may explain the great sense of resentment that permeated our general membership.

2. Our education should seek to foster an appreciation of the varied cultures of the peoples in this region. This would clear the way for a deeper understanding of their psychologies, thus helping us to avoid treading on their sensitivities and therefore alienating them. Too often it has been difficult to resist the temptation by some of our comrades to hold the ordinary peoples of the region in low esteem

precisely because of the historically conditioned uneven socio-economic development.

3. Part of our drive should be to seek to galvanise support for our struggle at the grassroot level. To do this effectively we must in our interaction with the local communities be able not only to place the deprivations and tensions in the region within the context of the imperialist strategy but also demonstrate our capacity, with their support, to defeat imperialist intrigues. In other words, we need to inculcate into the peoples in the region a conviction of the victorious outcome of our struggle. This is all the more important in view of the fact that as the struggle inside South Africa and Namibia intensifies we are certainly going to witness a drastic escalation of Pretoria's destabilisation of the neighbouring states. An appreciation of the inevitability of the final demise of apartheid will help to fortify the peoples of the region enabling them to remain steadfast in their support of our cause. These and other initiatives can greatly assist in evolving a political programme that will facilitate the production of an all-round cadre who will understand the inter-penetration of the different fronts of our struggle. The grasp of the international dimensions of our struggle is not only important for purposes of enhancing international support but is relevant for greater mobilisation inside the country.

A clearer understanding by political activists inside SA, of the contemporary anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggles waged elsewhere in the world helps to generate a greater awareness of the very issues that confront our people. Therefore a concrete expression of solidarity with the struggles waged by the people of Namibia under SWAPO, Palestine under the leadership of the PLO and all others lighting elsewhere will greatly strengthen the bonds of friendship between our peoples and the struggling people of the world.

Having attempted to make a case for more attention to be given in our political syllabus to international issues, let us address a question that is legitimately coming up very often in our movement. The question is: Is the movement placing an undue emphasis on international mobilisation at the expense of the actual struggle that needs to be waged inside the country?

In answer to that we can only say that we fully appreciate this concern and are all for the intensification of the struggle inside South Africa. To make the above-mentioned proposals is not to seek to divert our energies and resources. On the contrary it precisely reinforces that effort. It is up to the responsible authority within our structures to obviate the problem of a bias in favour of international Work at the expense of internal mobilisation.

Our submission is that in the contemporary world no struggle can be fought outside the context of existing international relations.

The US Religious Right in South Africa

Over the past few years, particularly after the Reagan Administration took office in January 1981, the world, has seen a sudden sprouting of pseudo-religious groups and sects. These are known as The Religious Right or born-again Christians. They claim to be only concerned with the need to spread the word of God.

However, a close look at their timing, source of funding and activities on the ground in various countries of Latin America/Caribbean, Asia and Africa and links with reactionary regimes and groups world-wide strongly suggests that many of these sects have allowed themselves to be used in support of the foreign policy interests of the major Western countries, in particular the United States, and therefore cannot be said to be non-political.

This has caused serious concern, if not alarm, among both political and church leaders in many parts of the world. Dr Beyers Naude, the former General Secretary of the South African Council of Churches (SACC) and now Director of the Institute for Contextual Theology at Braamfontein, Johannesburg, pointed to the effects in a report to a meeting held in Lusaka in May 1987 on The Churches' Search for Justice and Peace in Southern Africa. He remarked that:

the role of the charismatic churches and evangelical groups, especially those which have active links with similar groups in countries like the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany is being actively promoted through the governments propaganda, especially as they are being presented as "non-political" and actively opposed to "violence". The continued wooing of the largest single African independent Church in South Africa, the Zion Christian Church (ZCC), by the government as well as its support from the membership of the Pentecostal, Baptist and other evangelical churches, is a very successful tactic to divide the Christian witness against apartheid.

Last September, President Kenneth Kaunda expressed the same feeling when he addressed the fifth general assembly of the Association of Evangelicals of Africa and Madagascar (AEAM) and pointed out that these pseudo-religious groups were averse to joining the broad ecumenical movement. Instead, they preferred to follow the tactic of recruiting new members from among the poor and deprived sectors of the society, including the peasants, youth, students and women and believing Christians, sowing seeds of doubt and ambiguity in their minds. President Kaunda then sadly added that this situation "... causes a great deal of pain to those of us who see that inter-faith unity on the spiritual level is not supported by the fundamentalist Christian groups' sole concern with spiritual salvation and rugged individualism". The above concern and fear was also expressed in 1987 by a number of Zimbabwean government officials and Rev. Kuchera, General Secretary of the Zimbabwe Christian Council of Churches.

Writing in an article which appeared in the June 1987 issue of the Institute of Contextual Theology News, Almut Kock, a respected theologian from the FRG, also pointed out that it is high time in South Africa for Christians to find out more about these groups, their interests, their theology, their connections and their funding (because) this will help us to understand their mission more clearly and determine our role in this regard as servants of the Lord. Finally, the ANC Arusha In-

ternational Conference last December also took up the issue and made a call to expose the essentially right-wing political nature of some fundamentalist Christian groups operating in South Africa but based in the USA.

Our preliminary investigations have shown that although some of these groups have been in existence for twenty to thirty years with roots going as far back as the nineteenth century, most were formed and reactivated since 1980, especially after the Reagan Administration took office in 1981 . The emergence of new and old fundamentalist evangelical groups followed a recommendation made by Reagan's transition team in the Santa Fe Document in 1980. It urged the United States to seize the ideological initiative ... in the war for the minds of mankind. US foreign policy must begin to counter liberation theology in Latin America. The role of the church in Latin America is vital to the concept of political freedom private property and productive capitalism

In fact, one can go further and say that the Religious Right groups, in particular Rev. Jerry Falwell's so called Moral Majority, the Christian Voice and Tim LaHaye's American Coalition for Traditional Values (ACTV) contributed much to Ronald Reagan's triumph during the 1980 US elections by organising the many fundamentalist, Pentecostal and

charismatic churches into solid voting blocs. Without the support of pulpit politics, Reagan, himself a born-again Christian, would probably not have been able to win the elections. Many other factors assured Reagan a victory in the elections. Nevertheless, Reagan had to show appreciation for the large support given by the fundamentalist church groups. He appointed evangelical activists to some posts in his administration, offering a symbolic championing of their cause.

Carolyn Sundseth, a member of the Board of Directors of Christian Response International (CRI), the US branch of Christian Solidarity International, was appointed to the office of Public Policy as liaison officer between the Reagan Administration and the Religious Right. The CRI is involved in fanning religious intolerance and hostility among Christians in socialist countries towards the authorities.

Its International Advisory Committee includes Otto von Habsburg, head of the 700 year-old House of Habsburg and a right-wing and rabid anti-communist member of the European Parliament, who, in 1984, said that:

One third of Europe is today under foreign colonial rule. For us decolonisation should not stop in Africa and Asia. Referring to socialist countries in Eastern Europe, he said: Europe, too, has the right to be decolonised.

Like many fundamentalist religious sects, the Worldwide Church of God is an apologist of capitalism and equates it with democracy, even if its form of democracy is that of the apartheid system. At the same time, it dismisses socialism and popular democracy as ungodly. It believes that on his return Christ will place over nations and cities those he has already trained to rule under him.

The Seventh Day Adventist Church was established in 1843 and benefited from the social and political frustrations faced by many Americans in the aftermath of the US Civil War of 1861. The Seventh Day Adventists commonly called Jehovah's Witnesses believe in a Second Coming of Christ, when born-again Christians will be quickly swept up into the air to welcome Jesus. William Miller predicted that the Second Coming of Christ would occur in 1844. Some followers, like Jerry Falwell, consider World War III to be inevitable. Hence their support for Reagan's Star War programme and opposition to any movement which fights for peace, social justice and against all war preparations.

The Jehovah's Witnesses are a fundamentalist evangelical religious sect founded by Charles Taze Russell towards the end of the last century. Their current president is Frederick W. Franz. With a claimed membership of 2.5 million people throughout the world, the Jehovah's Witnesses are evidently the most widespread of all the fundamentalist religious sects and for that matter, one of the most pernicious. They are distinguished by their apocalyptic interpretation of the world, refusal to allow their patients to receive blood transfusions or donate blood because for them the latter constitutes the soul itself, and non-recognition of national symbols like the flag and anthem.

The plausible denial method forms an essential part of US covert operations, the US security and intelligence services. In 1954, when the US National Security Council (NSC) adopted a plan of subversion and sabotage against unfriendly states, it agreed that: "Covert foreign activities for the US Government should be supplemented by covert operations. If uncovered the United States can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them. Specifically, such operations shall include propaganda, political action, economic warfare, preventative direct action, including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition subversion against hostile states or groups, deception plans and operations."

At this stage it becomes clear that the fundamentalist evangelical groups, whatever their field of work, have indeed played an important part in the covert side of US foreign policy.

Closing Speech of the DPE Seminar

Political Education for People's Power

by ANC Treasurer-General TT Nkobi

Over the last four days all of you here have been seriously debating and discussing the question of political education. I believe you have been pin-pointing problems and trying to find ways and means of improving the political education among our community here in exile and also amongst our people at home.

These deliberations hopefully will give guidance to the DPE which faces the enormous Challenge of developing political awareness within the ranks of the ANC and the masses inside our country. Facing this Challenge is not only the task of the DPE but of the movement as a whole, from the highest echelons of the leadership to the youngest pioneer. Each and every one

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of us has a responsibility to ensure that our struggle achieves its goals and the principles of the Freedom Charter. Political education with a resultant politically conscious people is the cornerstone of a revolution. The politically enlightened masses are the very foundation upon which to build a new society. As history the world over has shown, without this base liberation and the hoped-for social revolution will only sink into the quagmire of what came before it. Without this firm political foundation, from colonialism will rise neo-colonialism. from fascism will rise neo-fascism. It is our task to build this foundation and there is no other way than through political education.

Political education is the cutting edge of the struggle that carves the path to liberation - it hones the strategies and tactics for us to achieve our goal of a united, democratic, non-racial South Africa.

With this in mind the debate during this seminar focused on the Trade Union Movement, Education and Training, the International arena, the Home Front, the Armed Struggle and the Revolutionary Army, the Working Class and Nation Building and Culture.

Culture is the fabric of society. It is through culture and its artistic expression - the Arts - that we reach the broadest section of the people. To build a politically conscious people we have to change the attitudes, beliefs and behaviour of the individual - that is, in effect, their culture. That does not mean breaking down what was but rather building upon the national cultures by taking the best from each and developing it within a political framework. To quote from Joe Slovo's paper:

The historic process of spreading a national (as opposed to ethnic or tribal) consciousness and the national consolidation of existing state entities is, in the modern African era, generally a weapon of liberation and social advance. . . .South Africa is a nation in the making. . . .The concept of one united nation, embracing all our ethnic communities remains the virtually undisputed liberation objective?

The ANC has initiated, in general terms, its principles of the ANC Education Policy, that:

It shall be geared towards producing a new type of South African, dedicated to serve the interests and needs of the South African people as a whole

In the same spirit we need political education for our people. Obviously to take the reins and to develop an economically and technologically sophisticated nation we need to educate and train our people in the areas of science, technology, production skills and administration. But in order for us to serve the interests and needs of the people they need to be politically educated. Political education opens the horizons of our understanding about our history and the history of the ANC and its leaders, since its inception in 1912. We need - and I understand that this has begun both internally and in exile - to re-write the history of South Africa which was written by the early white settlers, the Afrikaner nationalists and bourgeois academics. We need to research and collect the speeches and words of our historical leaders, such as Gumede, Luthuli, Rev Calata, SM Molema etc. The political history of our people is the context of our political education. The Trade Union Movement has always had at its very core the existence of the political education of its members. COSATU, with its paid-up members of 1 million has made enormous strides to politicise our people. This political education of its members is the key to its strength and continued survival. But much still needs to be done and the challenge is to reach out and politicise the non-unionised workers, the unemployed sector and the rural areas.

Political education goes hand in hand with discipline - the ever important discipline that each and every freedom fighter must have, whether from the leadership, or a representative overseas, or an MK cadre, or an ordinary member of the ANC or Trade Union or mass democratic movement. It is imperative that we conduct ourselves with the utmost vigilance and discipline, particularly in the face of pressures, threats and temptations from the regime and its allies. Of particular sensitivity is how our military trained comrades behave in the Frontline States. We need to understand our host country and its people, the majority of whom are staunch supporters of our cause. We can only live in harmony with them when we are aware of our political obligations and this can only be achieved through political education.

In order to get our message across and to grow inside the country and internationally, the media and our external missions play a vital role. How we use and disseminate information is critical to the success of the struggle. Without a political

framework the media can be a dangerous tool as we have learnt from our foes inside the country and from the Western-dominated news agencies of the world. We laud the statement issued by South African media workers who gathered at a colloquium in Holland in December 1987, which goes as follows: in the international arena the ANC and the mass democratic movements from home are growing in recognition and stature. But due to the economic and strategic importance of South Africa it is easy to fall prey to the ulterior motives of the developed world and its capital. We have to be well informed and politically astute to avoid such manipulations and pitfalls, whilst at the same time encourage and develop the enormous potential for support and solidarity amongst the people of the world?

As I said at the beginning, political education, being the cutting edge of the struggle that carves the path of liberation, hones our strategies and tactics. The present crisis facing us now places upon us an even greater responsibility. I refer, of course, to the illegalisation of 17 of the leading anti-apartheid organisations in the country and the banning of a further 15 individuals. (We, in fact, have 18 on our list). The organisations are as follows:

Azapo, Azanyu, Cayco, Cosatu, Cradock, Descom, DPSC, NECC, Neusa, Pebco, RMC, SCA, Soyco, Sayco, Sansco, UDF, Vaal Civic Association and the Western Cape Civic Association.

How does this affect the mass democratic movements and the underground movement? What action should we take? The ANC issued a statement (which has been circulated) but we must go beyond this into action. In part it reads:

The illegalisation of the democratic movement is an open challenge to all patriots either to submit to the juggernaut of the police state or devise new and better methods of continuing the struggle in conditions of total illegality. We are convinced that just as the resilient response of our people over the past two years has defeated the enemy's strategies, it is this same spirit of 'no surrender' that will thwart Botha's attempts to crush the national democratic movement.

Let us rally in great numbers and say, the Botha-Malan regime is, itself, illegal and has no right over us.

Internationally we have to consider how we conduct ourselves in the light of this latest campaign of repression. Even Thatcher and Reagan, who support the apartheid system, have

both issued statements condemning the action of the South African government, saying how appalled they are at such repressive steps.

But we must urge them and the international community to act and not merely make rhetorical statements. We must continue the challenge made to Thatcher by Neil Kinnock that she seriously discuss at the UN Special Committee the imposition of sanctions - which she rejected. And we must continue the challenge made to Reagan by a journalist at his last press conference. who asked why he was not supporting the ANC and the liberation movement as a whole. when he proudly assists so called freedom fighters in many other parts of the world. And we must take Reagan to task on his answer that it is the tribal question that makes it difficult to give support. In order to act in a concerted and politically mature manner whether in response to the latest repression of the South African regime or not. we have to be informed and politically educated.

The ANC and in particular the DPE has a great responsibility to make available information to us all and of necessity to organise structures and systems whereby South Africans in the struggle are included in political education programmes. The information you have accumulated during this seminar is enormous and the contributions submitted by those who have presented papers have enriched the DPE and the movement.

What now remains is to draw up the syllabus for Political Education of Cadres and carry on with the job.

I would like to thank, in the name of the South African revolution, those who have made this seminar a success.

Thank you.

Amandla!

Addendum - Press Statement

Amsterdam, Netherlands, 11 December 1987

We, the 8111 11h African journalists gathered at this colloquium consider that the picture of South Africa presented to the world

by 1'11 111W Mliezm and international media is not the true picture.

11 1:1 :1 ;ilCILer distorted intentionally by the South African state and sometimes unintentionally by the media itself.

1 h1 st 111 x interest in distorting the picture is obvious. We believe the international media distort the picture of South Africa

by 11h 11111 UlltLLC weight to the interpretations and perspectives of the state - the very people responsible for perpetuating

1111111111'1 racist rule. The opinions of the Pretoria government are not entitled to the weight conventionally and correctly given

to the opinions and attitudes of the democratic governments - opinions and attitudes which have the weight

of 1111111111; support behind them.

South Africa is a complex society. but not an unique one and we ask that journalists covering the South African story,

should follow the values and norms they would expect in journalism in their home countries. South Africa and

its, 1111111111, Are entitled to be judged and interpreted by journalists in terms of accepted democratic principles.

The South African story is not a set of sensational events concerning what Pretoria calls 'black-on-black violence and

'111111111'. Nor is it a series of body counts. It is a story of a repugnant society and attempts to transform that society. It

is :11: 111going story requiring consistent coverage and analysis.

This is not :1 call for journalists throughout the world to practise biased, skewed or advocacy journalism. It is precisely the

opposite 11 is an appeal for unbiased and undistorted coverage guided by those democratic principles adhered to in their

11-2,;1 countries.

flux 1111110113le include:

9 the right freely to inform and to be informed

3-7 the right to live peacefully in a non-racial democratic society based on universal franchise.

As journalists we believe we are entitled to live and work in a society based on those principles. And we believe that only

in a society based on those principles is a truly free South African press possible.

We would also like to take this opportunity to thank those responsible for organising this

s colloquium enabling us to meet
:iltti discuss these issues freely. Our discussions were limited by the absence of some of
our colleagues prevented by Pretoria,
ll! various ways. from attending.

